■■rs.
THE HARVARD ORIENTAL SERIES
VOLUME SEVENTEEN
HARVARD ORIENTAL SERIES
EDITED WITH THE COOPERATION OF VARIOUS SCHOLARS
BY
CHARLES ROCKWELL LANMAN
PROFESSOR IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY, HONORARY MEMBER OF THE ASIATIC
SOCIETY OF BENGAL, THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY (LONDON), AND THE
DEUTSCHE MORGENLANDISCHE GESELLSCHAFT, ETC., CORRESPONDING
MEMBER OF THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND
OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE (ACADEMIE DES INSCRIPTIONS
ET BELLES-LETTRES)
IDolume Seventeen
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
Gbe 1barv>ar£> TUntverstts press
1914
THE
YOGA-SYSTEM OF PATANJALI
©r tbe ancient Ibinbu Doctrine of Concentration of flDtnfc
EMBRACING
THE MNEMONIC RULES, CALLED YOGA-SUTRAS, OF PATANJALI
AND
THE COMMENT, CALLED YOGA-BHASHYA, ATTRIBUTED TO VEDA-VYASA
AND
THE EXPLANATION, CALLED TATTVA-VAigARADI, OF VACHASPATI-MigRA
TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL SANSKRIT
BY
JAMES HAUGHTON WOODS
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY
V
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
Gbe 1barvar£> ^University press
1914
The volumes of this Series may be had, in America, by addressing Messrs. Ginn and Company, at New York or Chicago or San Francisco, or at the home-office, 29 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. ; in England, by addressing Messrs. Ginn & Co., 9 St. Martin's Street, Leicester Square, London, W.C. ; and in Continental Europe, by addressing Mr. Otto Harrassowitz, Leipzig. — For the titles and descriptions and prices, see the List at the end of this volume.
17. i- 57
PRINTED FROM TYPE AT THE
UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD, ENGLAND
BY HOKACE HART, M.A.
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
First Edition, 750 Copies, October, 1914
HVNC- LIBRVM
IN • MVLTIS • ET • LONGINQVIS ■ TERRIS
ELABORATVM • ATQVE ■ NVNC ■ DENIQVE • CONFECTVM
SOCIIS- FIDELIBVS
QVORVM ■ MEMORIA ■ LABOR ■ ILLE ■ FELICITER ■ COMPENSATVR
ALUS • MAGISTRIS ■ OMNIBVS ■ SEMPER ■ AMICIS
D.
Xlll XV
xvii
XX
xxi
CONTENTS
Preface page
1. Keasons for taking up the work ix
2. Difficulties of comprehending the work ix
3. Difficulties of style ix
4. Translation of technical terms x
5. Punctuation x
6. Texts and manuscripts xi
7. Acknowledgements xi
' Introduction
1. Authorship of the Yoga-sutras : The two Patanjalis .... xiii
2. Tradition of their identity not earlier than tenth century .
3. Comparison of philosophical concepts does not confirm the tradition
4. Date of the Sutras (between a. d. 300 and 500) ....
5. Date of the Bhasya (between a. d. 650 and 850) ....
6. Date of Vacaspatimicra's Tattva-vaicaradi (about a. d. 800 to 850)
Analytical Summary of the Yoga-sutras
1. Book 1, Concentration (samadhi) xxiv
2. Book 2, Means of attainment (sadhana) ...... xxv
3. Book 3, Supernormal powers (vibhati) xxvii
4. Book 4, Isolation (kaivalya) xxviii
The Yoga-sutras translated without the Comment or the Explanation Being the Sutras translated in groups, with group-headings by translator xxx
Translation of Patanjali's Yoga-sutras or Mnemonic Eules Together with the Comment or Yoga-bhasya, attributed to Veda-vyasa And Vacaspatimicra's Explanation or Tattva-vaicaradi
1. Book 1, Concentration (samadhi) 1
2. Book 2, Means of attainment (sadhana) 101
3. Book 3, Supernormal powers (vibhuti) 201
4. Book 4, Isolation (kaivalya) 297
Appendixes
1. Bibliography of works referred to in this volume .... 351
2. Index of quotations in the Comment, in the order of citation . . 359
3. Index of the same grouped according to their sources .... 361
4. Index of quotations in the Tattva-vaicaradi, in the order of citation . 362
5. Index of the same grouped according to their sources .... 364
6. Quotations not yet traced to their sources ...... 365
7. Index of words in the Yoga-sutras 366
PREFACE
1. Reasons for taking np the work. — It is not without misgiving that one ventures to render into English the texts of an intricate system which have never, with the exception of the sutras, been translated in Europe or America. But the historical importance of those texts, as forming a bridge between the philosophy of ancient India and the fully developed Indian Buddhism and the religious thought of to-day in Eastern Asia, emboldens one to the attempt. For this system, together with the Nyaya and Vaicesika systems, when grafted upon the simple practical exhortations of primitive Buddhism, serves as an introduction to the logical and meta- physical masterpieces of the Mahayana.
2. Difficulties of comprehending the work. — Even after a dozen readings the import of some paragraphs is not quite clear, such for example as the first half of the Bhasya on iii. 14. Still more intractable are the single technical terms, even if the general significance of the word, superficially analysed, is clear. This irreducible residuum is unavoidable so long as one cannot feel at home in that type of emotional thinking which culmi- nates in a supersensuous object of aesthetic contemplation.
3. Difficulties of style. — The Bhasya and, still more, the Tattva-vaicaradi are masterpieces of the philosophical style. They are far from being a loosely collected body of glosses. Their excessively abbreviated and disconnected order of words is intentional. The Mimansa discussed first the meaning of words (paddrtha) ; then in a distinct section the meaning of the sentences (vdkydrtha) ; and finally and most fully the implication (bhdvartha) of the sentences as a whole. Wherever the sentence -form is lacking, I have intro- duced in brackets the words needed to make a declarative clause. Much more obscurity remains in the bhdvartha section of the Bhasya. For here many extraneous technical terms are surreptitiously introduced under the guise of exegesis. Thus polemic with an opponent whose name is suppressed
D [h.o.s. 17]
Preface [x
creeps into the argument. The allusions are suggestive, but obviously elusive. The passage at iii. 14 might be quite simple if we had before us the text which it criticizes.
4. Translation of technical terms. — A system whose subtleties are not those of Western philosophers suffers disastrously when its characteristic concepts are compelled to masquerade under assumed names, fit enough for our linguistic habits, but threadbare even for us by reason of frequent transpositions. Each time that Purusa is rendered by the word " soul ", every psychologist and metaphysician is betrayed. No equivalent is found in our vocabulary. The rendering " Self " is less likely to cause misunder- standing. Similarly, and in accordance with the painstaking distinctions made at the end of ii. 5, it is most important to remember that the term a-vidya, although negative in form, stands for an idea which is not nega- tive, but positive. Bearing in mind the express instructions of the text, I have adopted " undifferentiated-consciousness " as the translation of avidya. Another word, which Professor Garbe discussed more than twenty years ago (in his translation of the Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya, S. 70, Anm. 1), is guna. I prefer to translate this term by " aspect " rather than by " con- stituent ", because, in addition to the meanings " quality " and " substance ", it often seems to have the semantic value of " subordinate " as correlated to pradhdna. Three other words sattva and rajas and tamos seem untrans- latable, unless one is content with half -meaningless etymological parallels. In another case I have weakly consented to use " Elevation " as equivalent to prasamkhyana ; the original word denotes the culmination of a series of concentrations; the result is the merging of the Self in the object of contemplation.
5. Punctuation. — 1. Quotations from the Sutras are enclosed in single angular quotation-marks (< >). 2, Quotations from the Bhasya are enclosed in double angular quotation-marks (<K »). 3. Quotations from authorita- tive texts are enclosed in ordinary double quotation-marks (" "). 4. Objec- tions and questions by opponents, and quotations from unauthoritative texts, are enclosed in ordinary single quotation-marks (' '). Hyphens have been used to indicate the resolution of compound words. A half -parenthesis on its side is used to show that two vowels are printed in violation of the rules of euphonic combination (Lanman's Sanskrit Reader, p. 289).
xi] Preface
6. Texts and Manuscripts. — The text of the sutras of the Yoga system, like that of the sutras of all the other five systems, except perhaps the Vaicesika, is well preserved; and there is an abundance of excellent printed editions. The most accessible and the most carefully elaborated of these books is the one published in the Anandacrama Series and edited by Kaclnatha Shastri Agace. Variants from twelve manuscripts, mostly southern, are printed at the foot of each page ; and Bhojadeva's Vrtti is appended ; also the text of the sutras by itself and an index thereto. Another
y — edition, in the Bombay Sanskrit Series, by Rajaram Shastri Bodas, is also an excellent piece of work. I have, however, made use of the edition by Svami Balarama (Calcutta, Samvat 1947, a.d. 1890; reprinted1 in Benares a.d. 1908) because it is based on northern manuscripts and because of the valuable notes in the editor's tippana. Of manuscripts, I have collated, with the kind permission of the Maharaja, during a charming week's visit at Jammu just below the glistening snows above the Pir Panjal, two of the oldest manu- scripts in the library of the Baghunath Temple. In Stein's Catalogue these are numbered 4375 and 4388 and the former is dated Samvat 1666. Two other manuscripts were lent me, one by the courtesy of the most learned Gafigadhara Shastri, the other the very carefully written Bikaner manuscript, sent to me by the generosity of the Bikaner government, which proved to be extremely valuable for disputed readings in the Tattva-vaicaradl. This latter manuscript seemed to be about a hundred and fifty years old and is described in Rajendralala Mitra's Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Library of His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner (Calcutta, 1880) under the number 569. An old Sharada manuscript, which, by the kind mediation of Mukundaram Shastri of Shrinagar, was put into my hands, proved, upon critical examination, to have been so badly corrupted as, on the whole, not to be worth recording.
7. Acknowledgements. — At the end of one's task comes the compensation of looking back to old scenes, and to the friends and helpers who have watched the progress of the book. First of all I remember the delightful
1 In the reprint, the pagination is unchanged, but the lines vary a little. Hence there are some small apparent inaccuracies in the references. The reprint may be had from Harrassowitz in Leipzig ; it is catalogued there as Patanjala-darqanasya yoga-tattva.
\J
l^Y^\t-
Preface [xii
visit on the island of Fohr, where, besides the long friendly walks upon the sands, I enjoyed the inestimable opportunity of reciting and reading the Yoga-sutras with Professor Deussen. The next winter, at Benares, Mr. Arthur Venis opened the doors of the Sanskrit College to me and with the utmost generosity smoothed my way through my first winter in India and initiated me into the methods of many controversial sutras. Since my return he has always been ready to assist, and I thank him for illuminating for me the perplexing debate on the sphota in iii. 17. Besides all this I am most grateful to him for an introduction to the lamented Shriman Mukunda Shastri Adkar, a scholar who has put the wealth of the ancient tradition and his own ripe scholarship at my disposal for many years. To many other scholars in Benares and in Kashmir and in Poona I wish to express my thanks, especially to Dr. Shripad Krishna Belvalkar and to Mr. V. V. Sovani. To Professor Arthur W. Ryder, of the University of California, I am also much indebted. Furthermore, my thanks are due to Colonel George A. Jacob of the Bombay Staff Corps for his courtesy in searching after quotations, and to Dr. Frederick W. Thomas of the India Office Library for similar favours too many to enumerate or to repay. My deepest insight into this system and into what little I know of the philosophy of India I owe to Professor Hermann Jacobi of Bonn. Each visit to the little city on the Rhine adds to my debt of gratitude to him and reveals to me the beauty of the scholar's life.
On my return from each visit to India I laid the work in its several stages before Professor Lanman, my teacher in my student days and now my colleague. To him I owe the revision of the manuscript for the press and a comparison of most of the translation, either in manuscript or in proof, with the original. His rigorous criticism has detected many over- sights which strike a fresh pair of eyes more quickly than those of the author. For his ready and ungrudging help through many years of intimate friendship my hearty thanks.
James Haughton Woods.
Harvard University, July, 1914.
INTRODUCTION
1. Authorship of the Yoga-sutras. — Identity of Pataiijali, author of the sutras, and of Pataiijali, author of the Mahabhasya, not yet proved.
The opinion in India and in the West that the author of the Yoga-sutras is also the author of the great grammatical comment upon Panini has not been traced definitely any farther back than to the tenth century. The Yoga-bhasya (about a.d. 650 to 850) makes no statement as to the authorship of the Yoga-sutras, unless the benedictory verse at the be- ginning be regarded as valid proof that Patanjali wrote the sutras. Still less is there any statement in the Yoga-sutras about the author of the Mahabhasya. And conversely there is no reference in the Mahabhasya to the author of the Yoga-sutras. On the other hand, there is ground for believing that the author of the Comment on Yoga-sutra iii. 44 may have had the author of the Mahabhasya in mind when he quotes a certain formula and ascribes it to Patanjali. This is the only mention of Patanjali in the whole Comment. The formula is Ayutasiddha^avayava-bkeda^,anu- gatah samuho dravyam; and although it is ascribed to Patanjali (iti Patanjalih), it has not been found in the Mahabhasya. Nevertheless the Yoga-bhasya does here seem to contain an allusion, more or less direct, to the theory of the unity of the parts of concrete substances as set forth in the Mahabhasya. But the allusion is not direct enough to serve by itself as basis for the assertion that the Yoga-bhasya assumes the identity of the two PataSjalis. In other words, it does not justify us in assigning to the tradition of their identity a date as ancient as that of the Yoga- bhasya (eighth century). The allusion is, however, significant enough not to be lost out of mind, pending the search for other items of cumulative evidence looking in the same direction.
2. Tradition of identity of two Patanjalis not earlier than tenth century. — So far as I know, the oldest text implying that the Patanjali who wrote the sutras is the same as the Patanjali who wrote the Maha- bhasya, is stanza 5 of the introduction to Bhojadeva's comment on the Yoga-sutras, his Rajamartanda. This I would render as follows :
Victory be to the luminous words of that illustrious sovereign, [Bhoja] Rana-rangamalla, who by creating his Grammar, by writing his comment on the Patanjalan [treatise, the Yoga-sutras], and by producing [a work] on medicine called Rajamrganka, has— like Patanjali — removed defilement from our speech and minds and bodies.
Introduction [xiv
Bhoja's Grammar, his comment called Rajamartanda, and his medical treatise are all extant. The stanza must mean that Patanjali and Bhoja both maintained a standard of correct speech, Patanjali by his Mahabhasya and Bhoja by his Grammar ; and that both made our minds clear of error, Patanjali by his Yoga-sutras and Bhoja by his comment upon them; and that both made our bodies clear of impurities, Patanjali by his medical treatise and Bhoja by his Rajamrganka.
This certainly implies that the writer of this stanza identified Patanjali of the Yoga-sutras with Patanjali of the Mahabhasya. If the writer of the stanza of the introduction is the same as the Bhojadeva who wrote the Rajamartanda, we may note that he is called Ranarangamalla here, Maharajadhiraja in the colophon in Mitra's edition, and Lord of Dhara or Dharecvara in the colophon in the edition of Aga9e. There were a number of Bhojadevas; but whichever of them the author of the Raja- martanda may be, no one of them is earlier than the tenth century of our era.
The tradition of the triple activity of Patanjali as a writer on Yoga and grammar and medicine is reinforced as follows :
Yogena dttasya, padena vdcdm
malam, carirasya tu vdidyakena
yo 'pdkarot, tarn pravararh munindm
Patanjalirh prdnjalir dnato 'smi.
This is cited in Qivarama's commentary on the Vasavadatta (ed. Bibl. Ind.,
p. 239), which Auf recht assigns to the eighteenth century. The stanza
occurs also in some MSS. just before the opening words of the Mahabhasya
(Kielhorn's ed., vol. I, p. 503) — that is, not under circumstances giving
any clue to its date. We may add that an eighteenth-century work,
the Patanjalicarita (v. 25, ed. of Kavyamala, vol. 51), vouches for Patanjali's
authorship in the fields of Yoga and medicine in the following giti
stanza :
Sutrdni yogacdstre
vdidyakacdstre ca vdrttikdni tatah
krtvd Patanjalimunih
pracdraydm dsa jagad idam trdtum.
As to the precise medical work of which Patanjali was the author or
with which he had to do, all three stanzas leave us uninformed. Not
so the following stanza from the introduction to the commentary on
Caraka, composed by Cakrapani, who (according to Jolly's book on
Medicine in Biihler's Grundriss, p. 25) wrote about 1060 :
Pdtanjala-Mahdbhdsya-Carakapratisamskrtdih
mano-vdk-kdyadosdndm hantre 'hipataye namah.
xv] Introduction
This agrees in sense with the other stanzas, and in addition informs us that Patanjali's medical work consisted in a revision (pratisamskrta) of the great compendium of Caraka.
Accordingly, the Bhoja-stanza appears to be the oldest external evidence thus far at hand for the tradition as to the identity of the two Patanjalis, and this tradition is not older than the tenth century, a thousand years and more after Patanjali the author of the Mahabhasya. 3. The identification of the two Patanjalis not confirmed by a comparison of philosophical concepts. — Inconsistent use of terminology and con- flicting definitions of concepts in the case of a single writer of two books are frequently explained by the fact that quite distinct subjects are dis- cussed in the different works. In other cases the subject under discussion is the same and such an explanation of the inconsistency does not hold. An instance of the latter is the discussion of the nature of substance [dravya) in the Yoga-system and in the Mahabhasya. In the commentary on Yoga-sutra iii. 44 we have the following definition, " A substance is a collection of which the different component parts do not exist separately (ayutasiddha^avayava-bheda^anugatah samuho dravyam iti Patan- jalih)" and the definition is attributed to Patanjali as being consistent with his sutras. This quotation is of the most technical kind and is in the same style as the Nyaya-sutras. A similar use of language, for instance, is found in Nyaya-sutra ii. 1. 32 (Vizianagaram edition, p. 798). On the other hand this phrase is not to be found in the Mahabhasya, which however does repeatedly analyse the concept of substance. And, what is more important, nothing so precise as the formula attributed (iii. 44) to Patanjali is found in the Yoga-sutras themselves. Yet substance is partially defined in Yoga-sutra iii. 14, " A substance (dharmiri) conforms itself to quiescent and uprisen and indeterminable external-aspects (dharma)." In this terminology dharmin and dharma of the Yoga-sutra are substitutions for dravya and guna of the Mahabhasya. In neither case is the description of substance discriminating. Yet such as it is, the difference is very slight. In the Mahabhasya it is substance, we are told, which makes the difference in weight between iron and cotton of the same bulk and dimension (Mahabhasya, Kielhorn's edition, vol. II, p. 36619) ; and it is that which causes the difference between penetrability and impenetrability. Or again it is that which does not cease to be, even when a succession of properties appears within it (vol. II, p. 36623). Of what kind then is this form of being (tattva) ? The answer is that when the various reds and other properties of a myrobalan fruit, for instance, successively appear within it, we have the right to call it a substance. In short a substance is a concretion of properties (guna-samdravo dravyam
Introduction [xvi
iti, Kielhorn, vol. II, p. 36626) ; or, as it is put elsewhere, it is a collection of properties (guna-samuddya) such that the various states (bhdva) depend upon it (II. 20014). This collection is loosely paraphrased as being a group (samgha) or mass (samuha, II. 35 66).
In order, however, to make the comparison of the dharmin of the Yoga- sutras with the dravya of the Mahabhasya, we must assume that the interpretation of the Yoga-sutras, as given in the Comment, correctly represents the concept in the mind of the author of the sutras. There might well have been a series of redactions of the works of Patanjali, as of those of Caraka. The later interpretation, such as the formula in the Comment on iii. 44, might give us the original thought in more tech- nical form. If this be so, we find a great similarity in the discussion of the relation of whole and parts in the two works. In the Comment on the Yoga-sutra iii. 44 a collection (samuha) is of two kinds: 1. that in which the parts have lost their distinctness, for example, 'a tree', 'a herd', ' a grove ' ; 2. that in which the parts are distinctly described, for example, ' gods and human beings.' The second class has two subdivisions : 2a. one in which the distinctness of parts is emphasized, for example, ' a grove of mangoes ' ; 2b. one in which the distinctness is not emphasized, for example, ' a mango-grove.' From another point of view a group is two- fold: 1. a group whereof the parts can exist separately, for example} ' a grove ', wherein the trees exist separately from the aggregate whole ; 2. a group whereof the parts cannot exist separately, for example, ' a tree ' or ' an atom '. The question now arises, To which of these kinds of groups does a substance belong? A substance (dravya) is an aggregate of generic and particular qualities (sdmanya-vicesa-samuddya). This is the definition of substance from the point of view of its relation to its qualities. Furthermore, the substance is a group of the second subdivision of the second kind ; it is ' a collection of which the different parts do not exist separately '. This then is the resultant definition of substance according to the traditional interpretation of the Sutras.
What now is the relation of whole and parts in the Mahabhasya, with especial reference to the substance and its qualities ? A collection (samu- ddya) is loosely paraphrased as being a group (samgha) or mass (samuha, Kielhorn, vol. II, p. 35 66). It is, etymologically at least, a concretion of properties (guna-samdrdva II. 3662G). It is a collection of parts; the characteristics of the parts determine the characteristics of the whole (III. 314; avayavdir arthavadbhih samuddyd apy arthavanto bhavanti 1. 21716 ; I. 3026-27 ; avayave krtam lingam samuddyasya vicesakam bhavati I. 2892f ; and I. 377u). All these cases would belong to the first subdivi- sion of the second kind of group, whereof the parts can exist separately.
xvii] Introduction
Yet a collection (samuddya) is not merely an assemblage of parts, but is a unity performing functions which the parts by themselves cannot perform, for example, the blanket, the rope, the chariot, as compared with the threads, the fibres, the chariot-parts, I. 22016-23. All these cases would belong to the second subdivision of the second kind of group, wherein the parts cannot exist separately (ayutasiddhdvayava). Such then are the different groups (samuddya).
With regard to the substance (dravya), its relation to its qualities (guna) is analogous to the relation of the parts to the group, I. 220, vart. 11. Just as a collection (samuddya) is characterized by its parts (avayavdt- maka) III. 314, so the substance (dravya) is characterized by its qualities (gundtmaka) or is a collection of qualities (gunasamuddya) II. 20013. This last formula is given tentatively as a not quite final conclusion ; yet the definition is not rejected. And elsewhere, I. 41113, II. 35617, II. 41 513, and especially II. 36614-26, it is accepted as a working definition. Some qualities like sound, touch, colour, and taste belong to all substances ; they at least are present I. 246ff, II. 1985ff. Nothing, however, is said about a generic-form being required to constitute a substance (dravya). At the most it is true that when one asserts the reality of a species (dkrti) one does not deny the reality of the substance (dravya); and conversely. For each person who makes the assertion, the reality of both is asserted. Either the species or the substance may be dominant in anything, and the other subordinate. It is only a matter of the relative emphasis in the use of words. But the word substance is used for mass of particular qualities ; it is not a concretion of species and qualities, but is contrasted with species. Accordingly even if we admit that the formula ascribed to Patanjali in the Comment on iii. 13 is the correct rendering of the thought in the mind of Patanjali, the author of the Yoga-sutra, it is not true that Patanjali, the author of the Mahabhasya, when speaking of a substance (dravya) means what is contained in this formula. And there is nothing here to indicate that the tradition which identifies the two Patanjalis must be correct.
4. Date of the Yoga-sutras between A.D. 300 and A.D. 500. — If Patanjali, the author of the Mahabhasya, is not the author of the Yoga-sutras, when were they written? The polemic in the Yoga-sutras themselves against the nirdlambana school of Buddhists gives the answer. Very probably in the two Yoga-sutras iii. 14 and 15 and certainly in iv. 14 to 21 this school is attacked. The idealism of the Vijndna-vdda is attacked in iv. 15, 16, and 17. We cannot, it is true, maintain that the Vijndna-vdda here attacked by the Sutra must be the idealism of Vasubandhu. But the
C [h.o.s. 17]
Introduction [xviii
probability that the idealism is Vasubandhu's is great. And the earlier limit would then be the fourth century. There surely were idealists before him, just as there were pre-Patanjalan philosophers of yoga. Yet we have the great authority of Vacaspatimiera to support the obvious probability that the school of Vijndnavddins is here combated by Patanjali. He accepts the interpretation of the Comment which intro- duces a Vijndnavddinam Vdindcikam (p. 29217, Calc. ed.) as being intended by the author of the Sutra. It is true that the Sutra itself obviously does not make explicit references to this or any other school. Still the fact remains that the Sutra is attacking some idealist ; that the Comment explicitly states the idealist's position ; and that Vacaspatimiera identifies the idealist as being a Vijndnavddin. Elsewhere Vacaspatimiera contrasts this school with other Buddhist schools. And the possibility that he is referring to some Vijndna-vdda other than Vasubandhu's is remote. If this be so, it becomes clearer why Nagarjuna (a little before A.D. 200), the great expounder of the Qunya-vdda, does not, so far as we have discovered in the portion of the Mulamadhyamika-karikas thus far published (fasc. I-V), mention Patanjali. Yet from the Chinese transla- tions of Nagarjuna it is clear that he was familiar with the philosophical yoga. For example in the Chinese translation,1 made in A. D. 472, of Nagarjuna's Upayakau^alyahrdaya-castra (Nanjio, No. 1257), eight schools of philo- sophers and logicians are enumerated: 1. Fire-worshippers, 2. Mlmansakas, 3. Vaicesikas, 4. Sarhkhya, 5. Yoga, 6. Nirgranthas, 7. Monists, 8. Pluralists. There was then a philosophical school of Yoga about a.d. 200.2 Patanjali was not unknown to Buddhist writers. But there is nothing to indicate that Nagarjuna is referring to Patanjali, the philosopher, who would then have preceded both nirdlambana schools. More probably, we may suppose, he refers to some one of the authorities on Yoga, such as Jaigisavya or Panca^kha who are quoted in the Yoga-bhasya.
With regard to the later limit, a reference, if historically sound, would make it certain that Patanjali lived before a.d. 400. In the Mahavansa, chap. 37, vs. 167 (Tumour, p. 250 ; compare Dines Andersen, Pali Reader, I, p. 113, st. 3), we have the words
Vihdram ekam dgamma rattith Pdtanjall-matam parivatteti.
The verse refers to Buddhaghosa, who lived in the first half of the fifth
1 I am indebted to the Rev. Kentoku Hori upon logical inferences and not upon
of Tokyo for this reference. intuitive processes, as early as 300 B.C.
2 Professor Jacobi has proved the existence (SB der konigl. preuss. Ak. derWiss.,
of a philosophical Yoga system, resting 13. Juli 191 1).
xix] Introduction
century. But unfortunately the Mahavansa proper, the work of Maha- nama, ends, according to the judgement of Professor Geiger, at chapter 37, verse 50, at which point also the tika stops. The quotation therefore belongs to the Culavansa. And if, as Professor Geiger concludes, the work of Mahanama is to be placed in the first quarter of the sixth century, the verse in question comes later, and probably later to such a degree that its value as evidence is almost nothing. If this be so, one can easily explain how it is that Buddhaghosa in the whole Visuddhimagga and in the Atthasalini makes no allusion to Patafijali.
Much more conclusive is the fact that Umasvati in his Tattvarthadhigama- sutra ii. 52 refers to Yoga-sutra iii. 22. There can be little doubt of the reference since Umasvati's Bhasya repeats (Bib. Ind. ed. p. 5313 and 653) two of the illustrations given in the Yoga-bhasya, of the fire set in the dry grass and of the cloth rolled up into a ball. Other references (Tattvartha- dhigama-sutra xii. 5 and 6 and ix. 44-46) are quite as likely allusions to ancient Jain formulae as to Patafijali. By how much Umasvati's date precedes that of his commentator, Siddhasena, cannot be said until the complete text of Siddhasena is published. The date for Siddhasena is set by Professor Jacobi (ZDMG. 60. 289, Leipzig, 1906, reprint p. 3, Eine Jaina- Dogmatik) at the middle or end of the sixth century. Umasvati precedes him ; and Patafijali the philosopher would not be later than a. d. 500 and might be much earlier.
On the other hand I should guess that he is not much earlier. Because, for one reason, as Professor Stcherbatskoi reports, Dignaga (about A.D. 550 or earlier) seems to know nothing of him. And secondly because it is improbable that the Yoga-bhasya was composed very much later. Other confirmatory evidence, somewhat later but more certain, would be the reference to Yoga-sutra i. 33 in Magha's Qicupalavadha iv. 55. Professor Hultzsch has kindly pointed out another reference at xiv. 62 of Magha's poem. In respect of the date of Magha, Professor Jacobi concluded (WZKM. vol. Ill, p. 121 ff.) that Magha lived about the middle of the sixth century. But Mr. Gaurishankar Ojha's discovery of the Vasantgadh inscrip- tion dated Vikrama 682 adds new and most convincing evidence. Professor Kielhorn (Gottinger Nachrichten, philol.-histor. Klasse, 1906, Heft 2, p. 146) is of the opinion that Magha, the grandson of a minister of the King Varma- lata, must be placed at about the second half of the seventh century. Still later, Gaudapada (about A.D. 700), in his comment on the Samkhya- Karika 23, quotes Yoga-sutra ii. 30 and 32 and names Patafijali as the author.
The conclusion would be then that Patanjali's sutras were written at some time in the fourth or fifth century of our era.
Introduction [xx
5. Date of the Yoga-bhasya between A.D. 650 and A.D. 850. — Of this the limits are easier to fix. Three pieces of evidence help us to determine the earliest limit.
A. The Comment could not in any case be much earlier than a.d. 350. For (at the end of iii. 53 or 52) it quotes Varsaganya in the words
murti-vyavadhi-jdti-bheddbhdvdn ndsti mulaprthaktvam iti Vdrsaganyah.
And again (iv. 13) the Comment quotes from a cdstrdnucdsanam as follows :
Gundndm paramam rupam na drstipatham rcchati yat tu drstipatham praptam tan mdyeva sutucchakam.
Fortunately Vacaspatimicra offers us the information that this is an exposi- tion of the teaching of the Shasti-tantra. And furthermore, in the Bhamati on Vedanta-sutra ii. 1. 2. 3 (Nirnayasagara edition, 1904, p. 352, line 7 of the Bhamati), we are told that it is Varsaganya, the founder of the Yoga system, who said these words (ata eva yoga-cdstram vyutpddayitd aha sma Bhagavdn Vdrsaganyah " gundndm paramam . . .").
Thus the Comment contains two quotations from Varsaganya. There is little reason to doubt that Varsaganya was an older contemporary of Vasubandhu. Professor Takakusu1 by a combination of dates centering about the Chinese translation of Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu estimated that Vasubandhu lived from about A.D. 420 till 500. Professor Sylvain LeVi (Asaiiga, vol. II, pp. 1 and 2) accepted the result of these discussions. But Professor Wogihara2 had conjectured that the date of Vasubandhu must be set back. An elaborate confirmation of his suggestion is now offered by Monsieur Noel Peri,3 who places the death of Vasubandhu at A.D. 350; and by Mr. B. Shiiwo,4 who estimates that Vasubandhu's life was from A.D. 270 to 350. This is a return to the fourth century, the date for Vasubandhu which Biihler 5 favoured. Accordingly the Bhasya must in any case be later than A.D. 350.
B. Another kind of evidence which helps us to determine yet more closely the earliest limit is the fact that the decimal system is used by way of
1 Bulletin de PEcole Francaise d'Extreme- 4 "Doctor Takakusu and Monsieur Peri
Orient, 1904, tome IV, pp. 48 and 56 ; on the date of Vasubandhu " in the
and JRAS. Jan. 1905, pp. 16-18 of the Tetsugaku Zasshi, vol. 27, Nov.-Dec,
reprint. 1912. I am indebted to Mr. K. Yabuki
2 Asanga's Bodhisattvabhumi, Leipzig, for this.
1908, p. 14. B "Die indischen Inschriften und das
3 " A propos de la date de Vasubandhu " Alter der indischen Kunst-Poesie," in
(Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Ex- Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserl. Akad.
treme-Orient, tome XI, 1911, p. 339). der Wiss., Wien, 1890, p. 79 f.
xxi] Introduction
illustration in the Comment on iii. 13. The oldest epigraphic x instance of the use of the decimal system is in the Gurjara inscription of a.d. 595. With one obscure and doubtful exception, there is no literary evidence of the use of the decimal system before Varahamihira, who lived in the sixth century. If we consider this kind of evidence alone, it is improbable that the Comment precedes the year A. D. 500 ; it is probably later.
C. There is evidence which determines that the earliest limit of the Comment is still later, as late as the seventh century. In the stanza iv. 55 of the Qicupalavadha by Magha (circa a.d. 650), not only Yoga- sutra i. 33 is referred to, but also the words of the avatdrana in the Comment. In the Comment the parikarma of the citta is enjoined. This is an uncommon term. Even if citta-parikamma might be found in Buddhist books, the fact that it here immediately precedes the quotation from sutra i. 33, makes it almost certain that such a mixture of termino- logy is impossible. In fact the stanza is full of specific yoga- terms in each line to such an extent that reference to any other system, much less to some heretical book, is quite excluded. The point is then that the words citta-parikarma together with the first word of the sutra have been wrought into the metre of the poem as one word. The poet, as we saw, probably lived in the second half of the seventh century. If this is trustworthy evidence, the Comment cannot be earlier than A.D. 650.
D. The later limit is set by the date of Vacaspatimic,ra's Nyaya Index, A.D. 841 — see below, page xxiii.
Accordingly the date of the Bhasya would be somewhere between about A.D. 650 and about a.d. 850.
6. Date of Vacaspatimicjra's Tattva-vaigaradl about A.D. 850. — In the
verse at the close of his Bhamati-nibandha, Vacaspatimicra gives the names of his works, seven in number :
Yan Nydyakanikd-Tattvasamiksd-Tattvabindubhih I Yan Nyaya- Sdmkhya-Yogdndm, Veddntdndm nibandhandih ll Samacaisam mahat punyam, tat phalam puskalam maya I Samarpitam; athditena prlyatam Paramecvarah ll. The Nydya-vdrttilca-tdtparya-tlkd is on the Nyaya system ; the Tattva-
1 See p. 78, of Biihler's Palaeographie, in " place-value " is utilized. Most of
his Grundriss. In his Notes on Indian these he thinks are worthless as evi-
Mathematics (Journal of the Asiatic dence for the introduction of the Society of Bengal, July 1907, vol. Ill, . decimal system. The same conclusion
number 7, p. 482, note 5), Mr. G. R. is reached in a later article (JRAS.
Kaye gives a list of epigraphical in- July 1910, p. 749). stances of the notation in which
Introduction [xxii
kdumudi is on the Samkhya system ; the Tattva-vaiqaradl is on the Yoga ; the NycLya-kanika, a gloss on the Vidhi-viveka, is on the Mimansa; the Tattva-bindu is on Bhatta's exposition of the Mimansa ; the Tattva-samiJcsd and the Bhamatl are both on the Vedanta.
In the same verse at the end of the Bhamatl he speaks of himself as living under King Nrga :
ta8min maMpe raahanlyaklrtavu Qriman-Nrge 'kdri maya nibandhah. Unfortunately there is (as Professor Liiders informs me) no epigraphical record of this king and we cannot say when or where he lived. Vacas- patimifjra was a native of Mithila,1 the northern part of Tirhut, and the latter part of his name would indicate, as Fitz- Edward Hall has pointed out, that he was a native of Gangetic Hindustan.
In the introduction to his edition of the Kusumanjali (Calcutta, 1864, p. x), Professor Cowell thinks that Vacaspatimicra lived in the tenth century. Barth (Bull, des Rel. de l'Inde, 1893, p. 271) would set him at the end of the eleventh or beginning of the twelfth century. Professor Macdonell (Hist, of Sansk. Lit., p. 393) places him soon after a.d. 1100. These judgements rest, more or less, upon the opinion that the Raja-varttika, quoted by Vacaspatimicra in his Samkhya-tattva-kaumudI on Karika 72, was composed by, or for, Bhoja Raja, called Ranaraiiga Malla, King of Dhara (1018-1060). This opinion accords with the assertion of Pandit Kacmatha Qastrl Astaputra of Benares College, who assured Dr. Fitz-Edward Hall that a manuscript of the Raja-varttika had been in his possession several years (Hall's edition of the Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya, 1856, p. 33). But the visible basis for this assertion that the Raja in question is Bhoja is not now at hand.
Similarly, Professor Pathak in his article on Dharmaklrti and Shankara- carya (see Journal of the Bombay Branch RAS., vol. XXVIII, no. 48, 1891, p. 89, and also the table in the same Journal, p. 235, no. 49, note 74) is content to rest his conclusions as to the date of Vacaspatimicra upon the fact that QrlbharatI, the pupil of Bodharanya, in his edition of the Samkhya- tattva-kaumudI (Benares, Jainaprabhakara Press, 1889, p. 182), prints, in a note at the end, the word Bhoja before the word Raja-varttika. Thus it would appear that this varttika is by Bhojaraja and that Vacaspatimicra, who quotes it, must be later than Bhojaraja, that is, later than the tenth century. But we are not at all sure from other manuscript evidence that the word Bhoja should be read before the word Raja-varttika, and the date of this Raja-varttika is therefore undetermined.
1 See the beginning of the Nyayasutro- prasad (^astri, Notices of Sanskrit MSS.,
ddharah by Vacaspatimicra Qrlvaca- Second Series, vol. II, p. 98).
spatimi^rena Mithile$vara$urind (Hara-
xxiii] Introduction
By way of contrast we now have the direct statement of Vacaspatimicra that he finished his Nyayasuclnibandha in the year 898. For on the first page of this appendix to the Nyaya-varttika, as given in the edition of the Nyaya-varttika in the Bibliotheca Indica, 1907, he says that he is about to compose an index for the Nyaya-sutras
Qrivdcaspatimicrena mayd sucl vidhdsyate. And in the colophon he says that he made the work for the delight of the intelligent in the year 898.
Nydyasuclnibandho 'sdv akdri sudhiydm mude Qrivdcaspat imicrena vasv-an ka-vasu-vatsare.
It remains to determine whether this year belongs to the era of Vikrama- ditya or of Qalivahana. In the introduction to his edition of Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts (Bibl. Ind., 1910), Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasad Shastri gives the date as belonging to the second era, to Qaka 898. He says (p. iii) that the author of the Apohasiddhi " takes a good deal of pains in elaborately refuting the theory of Vacaspatimicra", and that he does " not quote or refute Udayana, whose date is Qaka 905 = A.D. 983". In his Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts, second series, vol. II, p. xix, this distinguished scholar had come to the same conclusion with regard to the era to which this date of Vacaspatimigra should be assigned. This conclusion seemed doubtful to Mr. Nilmani Chakravarti, M.A., in his valuable Chronology of Indian Authors, a supplement to Miss Duff's Chronology of India (Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. 3, 1907, p. 205). And one cannot refrain from thinking that the other era is presumably more likely for a Northern writer ; and that more especially a great difficulty is created if only seven years are supposed to separate Vacaspatimicra and Udayana. The difference between the two philosophers is of such a kind that one must assume a much longer interval between their writings. And furthermore, would it not be an extraordinary coincidence that the author of the Apohasiddhi should be so minutely familiar with the work of Vacaspatimi^a, and yet not have the dimmest sense of the existence of Udayana, the light of a new dawn in the world of Nyaya1? Accordingly, the date of Vacaspati's Nyaya-index would appear to be Samvat 898 = A.D. 841 ; and the dates of his six other works, including the Tattva-vaic^radl, may be presumed to be not many years earlier or later. We are therefore safe in making the statement that the date of the Tattva-vaicaradI is not far from the middle of the ninth century, or approximately a. d. 850.
ANALYTICAL SUMMAEY OF THE YOGA-SUTRAS
BOOK FIRST— CONCENTRATION
1. Reasons for beginning the book .....
2. Characteristic mark of yoga is the restriction of fluctuations
3. Intelligence in the state of restriction
4. Intelligence in the state of emergence
5. There are five fluctuations
6. List of the five fluctuations
7. The first fluctuation is the source of valid ideas
8. The second fluctuation is misconception .
9. The third fluctuation is predicate relation
10. The fourth fluctuation is sleep .
11. The fifth fluctuation is memory
12. Two methods of restriction of the fluctuations 18. The first method is practice
14. The confirmation of practice
15. The second method is passionlessness
16. Characteristic mark of the highest passionlessness
17. Result of these methods is conscious concentration of four kinds
18. Characteristic mark of unconscious concentration
19. A first way of approach to unconscious concentration
20. A second way of approach to the same as used by yogins
21. Gradations of methods and intensities
22. Yet another way of approach ....
23. Devotion to the Icvara is this way of approach
24. Characteristic mark of the devotion to the Icvara
25. The Icvara is unexcelled in his power of knowing
26. The Icvara has no limit in time
27. The symbolic expression of the Icvara
28. Description of the devotion
29. Two results of this concentration
30. List of nine obstacles removed .
31. Five accompaniments of the obstacles
32. Prevention of these by calming the mind-stuff
PAGE
3
8 13 14 17 19 20 24 26 29 31 34 34 35 36 37 40 41 43 45 47 48 48 49 55 59 60 61 62 63 65 66
xxv]
Analytical Summary of the Yoga-siitras
PAGE
33. Four ways of calming the mind-stuff 71
34. Breathings calm the mind-stuff . ....... 72
35. Fixed attention steadies the mind ....... 72
36. Fixed attention to processes of thought steadies the mind ... 74
37. Attention to the mind-stuff of great yogins ..... 76
38. Fixed attention to objects seen in sleep ...... 76
39. Contemplations of the most desired object ..... 77
40. Mastery of the mind-stuff the result of attentions .... 77
41. Balanced state of the steady mind ....... 77
42. Balanced state with regard to a coarse object ..... 80
43. Balanced state with regard to a super-coarse object .... 82
44. Balanced states with regard to subtile and super-subtile objects . 88
45. Extent of the existence of subtile objects . . . . . . 91
46. These balanced states are seeded concentrations .... 92
47. Kesult of the super-subtile balanced state ...... 93
48. Truth- bearing insight ......... 94
49. Object of the truth-bearing insight ....... 94
50. Latent impressions from this insight inhibit others .... 96
51. Seedless concentration is the restriction of even these impressions . 98
BOOK SECOND— MEANS OF ATTAINMENT
1. Yoga of action
2. Besult of yoga of action
3. The five hindrances .........
4. The root of the other hindrances is undifferentiated -consciousness
5. Undifferentiated-consciousness is the first hindrance .
6. Feeling-of-personality is the second hindrance
7. Passion is the third hindrance .
8. Hatred is the fourth hindrance
9. Will-to-live is the fifth hindrance
10. Bemedy for hindrances when subtile
11. Remedy for fluctuations which result from hindrances
12. Latent-deposit of karma the cause of hindrances
13. Three kinds of fruition of karma ......
14. Results of fruition
15. Pleasure to be rejected, inasmuch as it is intermingled with pain
16. A. Future pain avoidable . .......
Q [h.o.s. 17]
103 105 106 106 110 115 116 117 117 119 120 121 122 131 132 139
Analytical Summary of the Yoga-sutras
[xxvi
17. B. Cause of future pain. Correlation of seer and seen
18. Nature of an object for sight
19. Subdivision of objects for sight
20. Nature of seer ....
21. Object for sight subordinate to seer
22. Plurality of objects for sight .
23. Nature of the correlation .
24. Undifferentiated-consciousness the cause of the correlation
25. C. The escape from pain is the isolation of the seer
26. D. The method of escape is discriminative insight
27. Seven forms of discriminative insight
28. Means of attaining discrimination
29. The eight aids to yoga
30. i. The five abstentions
31. Qualified abstentions
32. ii. The five observances .
33. Inhibition of obstacles to abstentions and observances
34. Nature of perverse-considerations
35. Consequences of abstention from injury .
36. Consequences of abstention from lying
37. Consequences of abstention from stealing .
38. Consequences of abstention from incontinence
39. Consequences of abstention from property
40. Consequences of observance of cleanliness .
41. Further consequences of cleanliness .
42. Consequences of observance of contentment
43. Consequences of observance of self-castigation
44. Consequences of observance of study
45. Consequences of observance of devotion to the Icvara
46. iii. Nature of postures
47. Ways to success in postures
48. Consequences of postures .
49. iv. Nature of restraint of the breath .
50. Three kinds of restraint of the breath
51. A fourth kind of restraint of the breath
52. Consequences of restraint of the breath
53. A further consequence is fixed attention
54. v. Nature of fixed attention
55. Consequences of fixed attention
PAGE
140
144
148
154
157
159
160
166
168
169
170
172
177
178
180
181
183
183
186
186
186
187
187
188
188
189
189
190
190
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xxvii] Analytical Summary of the Yoga-sutras
BOOK THIRD— SUPERNORMAL POWERS
1. vi. Characteristic mark of fixed -attention .
2. vii. Characteristic mark of contemplation .
3. viii. Characteristic mark of concentration .
4. The three last together are called constraint
5. Consequences of mastery of constraint
6. Three stages of constraint
7. Last three aids more direct than first five .
8. Even last three less direct than seedless concentration
9. Characteristic mark of restricted mutations
10. Peaceful flow of mind-stuff due to subliminal impressions
11. Nature of mutations in concentration
12. Characteristic mark of focused mutations .
13. Mutations of external-aspect and time-form and intensity
14. Characteristic mark of a substance ....
15. Reason for the order of mutations ....
16. Consequences of constraint upon the mutations
17. Consequences of discriminating things from words and ideas
18. Consequences of direct perception of subliminal impressions
19. Consequences of direct perception of presented-ideas of another
20. Object of such a presented-idea not perceived .
21. Consequences of constraint upon the form of the body
22. Consequences of constraint upon karma .
23. Consequences of constraint upon acts of sympathy .
24. Consequences of constraint upon powers .
25. Consequences of constraint upon luminous processes .
26. Consequences of constraint upon the sun .
27. Consequences of constraint upon the moon
28. Consequences of constraint upon the zenith
29. Consequences of constraint upon the navel
30. Consequences of constraint upon the throat
31. Consequences of constraint upon the tortoise-tube
32. Consequences of constraint upon the radiance in the head
33. Consequences of constraint upon the vividness .
34. Consequences of constraint upon the heart
35. Consequences of constraint upon knowledge of the Self
36. Consequences of direct perception of the Self .
37. Supernormal powers obstructive to concentration
38. Mind -stuff penetrates into the body of another .
39. Consequences of constraint upon Udana .
PAGE
203 204 204 205 206 206 207 208 208 210 211 211 212 224 229 232 233 247 249 249 250 251 252 253 253 254 260 260 260 260 261 261 261 262 262 265 265 266 267
Analytical Summary of the Yoga-sutras [xxviii
40. Consequences of constraint upon Samaria .....
41. Consequences of constraint upon relation between the ear and air
42. Consequences of constraint upon relation between body and air
43. Dwindling of the obscuration of light
44. Atomization and other supernormal powers
45. Perfection of body ....
46. Method of mastering the organs
47. Consequences of mastering the organs
48. Mastery over all matter
49. Means of attaining Isolation
50. Means of reducing opposition to Isolation
51. Consequences of constraint upon moments and their sequence
52. Object of discriminative perception .
53. Characteristic mark of discriminative perception
54. Consequences of the discrimination .
55. Isolation is purity of the sattva and of the Self .
PAGE
268 268 271
272 273 278 280 280 282 283 284 285 287 290 294 295
BOOK FOURTH— ISOLATION
1. Different causes of supernormal powers
2. Reasons for mutations into another birth ,
3. No impulse given by karma ....
4. Created mind-stuffs ......
5. Mind-stuff which gives the impulse .
6. No latent-impressions in created mind-stuffs
7. Varieties of karma ......
8. Latent impressions conform to karma
9. Continuity of impressions
10. Latent impressions from time without beginning
11. Termination of impressions ....
12. External-aspects in all three time-forms .
13. External-aspects phenomenalized or subtile
14. Activity of a thing due to a single mutation
15. Things and mind-stuff on different levels .
16. Things not dependent upon a single mind-stuff.
17. Rejection of idealism .....
18. The Self undergoes no mutations
19. Mind-stuff does not illumine itself .
20. Fallacy in confusing thinking-substance and thing
21. One mind-stuff not illumined by another .
299 300 301 303 303 304 305 306 307 309 314 315 317 318 323 325 327 328 328 330 331
xxix] Analytical Summary of the Yoga-sutras
22. Intelligence aware of its own mind-stuff .
23. Mind-stuff, when affected, capable of perceiving all objects
24. Intelligence distinct from mind-stuff
25. Change in the habits of the mind-stuff
26. Change in the nature of the mind-stuff
27. Disturbances in the discriminating mind
28. Escape even from subliminal-impressions
29. Means of attaining the Eain-cloud
30. Consequences of the Eain-cloud
31. Condition of mind-stuff in the Kain-cloud
32. End of the sequences of mutations .
33. Characteristic of a sequence
34. Nature of Isolation ....
PAGE
332 334 336 337 339 339 340 340 341 342 343 343 347
/
TRANSLATION OF THE YOGA-SUTBAS WITHOUT THE COMMENT OR THE EXPLANATION
Being the Sutras translated in groups, together with group-headings added by the translator
BOOK FIRST— CONCENTRATION
Goal of Concentration
i. 1-4. Yoga is the concentration which restricts the fluctuations. Freed
from them, the Self attains to self-expression.
i. 1 Now the exposition of yoga [is to be made], i. 2 Yoga is the restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff, i. 3 Then the Seer [that is, the Self] abides in himself, i. 4 At other times it [the Self] takes the same form as the fluctuations [of mind-stuff].
Forms of the mind-stuff
i. 5-11. The fluctuations are all exposed to attack from the hindrances and are five in number: 1. sources-of - valid-ideas ; 2. misconceptions; 3. predicate-relations; 4. sleep; 5. memory.
i. 5 The fluctuations are of five kinds and are hindered or unhindered, i. 6 Sources-of-valid-ideas and misconceptions and predicate-relations and sleep and memory, i. 7 Sources-of-valid-ideas are perception and inference and verbal-communication, i. 8 Misconception is an erroneous idea not based on that form [in respect of which the misconception is entertained], i. 9 The predicate-relation (vikalpa) is without any [corre- sponding perceptible] object and follows as a result of perception or of words, i. 10 Sleep is a fluctuation of [mind-stuff] supported by the cause of the [transient] negation [of the waking and the dreaming fluctuations], i. 11 Memory is not-adding-surreptitiously to a once experienced object.
Methods of restricting fluctuations
i. 12-16. An orientation of the whole life with reference to one idea; an emotional transformation corresponding to this focused state.
i. 12 The restriction of them is by [means] of practice and passionless- ness. i. 13 Practice is [repeated] exertion to the end that [the mind-
xxxi] Translation of the Yoga-sutras
stuff] shall have permanence in this [restricted state], i. 14 But this [practice] becomes confirmed when it has been cultivated for a long time and uninterruptedly and with earnest attention, i. 15 Passionlessness is the consciousness of being master on the part of one who has rid himself of thirst for either seen or revealed objects, i. 16 This [passion- lessness] is highest when discernment of the Self results in thirstlessness for qualities [and not merely for objects].
Kinds of concentration
i. 17-18. Four kinds of conscious concentration, and the concentration of subliminal-impressions alone.
i. 17 [Concentration becomes] conscious [of its object] by assuming forms either of deliberation [upon coarse objects] or of reflection upon subtile objects or of joy or of the feeling-of-personality. i. 18 The other [concentration which is not conscious of objects] consists of subliminal- impressions only [after objects have merged], and follows upon that practice which effects the cessation [of fluctuations].
Degrees of approach to concentration
i. 19-23. The worldly approach; the spiritual approach; the combina- tions of methods and intensities ; and the devotion to the highest Self.
i. 19 [Concentration not conscious of objects] caused by worldly [means] is the one to which the discarnate attain and to which those [whose bodies] are resolved into primary-matter attain, i. 20 [Concentration not conscious of objects,] which follows upon belief [and] energy [and] mindfulness [and] concentration [and] insight, is that to which the others [the yogins] attain, i. 21 For the keenly intense, [concentration] is near. i. 22 Because [this keenness] is gentle or moderate or keen, there is a [concentration] superior even to this [near kind], i. 23 Or [concentration] is attained by devotion to the Icvara.
Analysis of the highest Self
i. 24-28. Unique quality of the highest Self; proof of His existence; His
temporal priority ; His symbolical realization.
i. 24 Untouched by hindrances or karmas or fruition or by latent-deposits, the Icvara is a special kind of Self. i. 25 In this [Icvara] the germ of the omniscient is at its utmost excellence, i. 26 Teacher of the Primal [Sages] also, forasmuch as [with Him] there is no limitation by time. i. 27 The word-expressing Him is the Mystic-syllable, i. 28 Kepetition of it and reflection upon its meaning [should be made].
Translation of the Yoga-sutras [xxxii
Obstacles to the calming of the mind-stuff
i. 29-34. The inner sense is exposed to distractions which may be over- come by focusing the mind ; by the cultivation of sentiments ; one may also practise breathings.
i. 29 Thereafter comes the right-knowledge of him who thinks in an inverse way, and the removal of obstacles, i. 30 Sickness and languor and doubt and heedlessness and worldliness and erroneous perception and failure to attain any stage [of concentration] and instability in the state [when attained] — these distractions of the mind-stuff are the obstacles. i. 31 Pain and despondency and unsteadiness of the body and inspiration and expiration are the accompaniments of the distractions, i. 32 To check them [let there be] practice upon a single entity, i. 33 By the cultivation of friendliness towards happiness, and compassion towards pain, and joy towards merit, and indifference towards demerit, i. 34 Or [the yogin attains the undisturbed calm of the mind-stuff] by expulsion and retention of breath.
Attainment of Stability i. 35-39. Suitable objects for fixed-attention and contemplation.
i. 35 Or [he gains stability when] a sense-activity arises connected with an object [and] bringing the central-organ into a relation of stability. i. 36 Or an undistressed [and] luminous [sense-activity when arisen brings the central-organ into a relation of stability], i. 37 Or the mind- stuff [reaches the stable state] by having as its object [a mind-stuff] freed from passion, i. 38 Or [the mind-stuff reaches the stable state] by having as the supporting-object a perception in dream or in sleep, i. 39 Or [the mind-stuff reaches the stable state] by contemplation upon any such an object as is desired.
Mastery and concentration
i. 40-47. Classification of concentration with reference to different single objects or absence of objects, or to the mental act, or to a fusion of object and knower.
i. 40 His mastery extends from the smallest atom to the greatest magnitude, i. 41 [The mind-stuff] from which, as from a precious gem, fluctuations have dwindled away, reaches the balanced-state, which, in the case of the knower or of the process-of-knowing or of the object- to-be-known, is in the state of resting upon [one] of these [three] and in the state of being tinged by [one] of these [three], i. 42 Of [these balanced-states] the state-balanced with deliberation is confused by reason of predicate-relations between words and intended-objects and
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ideas, i. 43 When the memory is quite purified, [that balanced- state] — which is, as it were, empty of itself and which brightens [into conscious knowledge] as the intended-object and nothing more — is super-delibera- tive, i. 44 By this same [balanced-state] the reflective and the super- reflective [balanced-states] are also explained, i. 45 The subtile object also terminates in unresoluble-primary-matter (alinga). i. 46 These same [balanced-states] are the seeded concentration, i. 47 When there is the clearness of the super-reflective [balanced-state, the yogin gains] internal undisturbed calm.
Normative insight
I. 48-51. After-effects of concentrated insight efface after-effects of con- centration upon objects.
i. 48 In this [concentrated mind-stuff] the insight is truth-bearing, i. 49 Has another object than the insight resulting from things heard or from inferences, inasmuch as its intended-object is a particular, i. 50 The subliminal-impression produced by this [super-reflective balanced-state] is hostile to other subliminal -impressions, i. 51 When this [subliminal-impression] also is restricted, since all is restricted, [the yogin gains] seedless concentration.
BOOK SECOND— MEANS OF ATTAINMENT Devices for weakening hindrances
ii. 1-11. Aids serviceable to the beginner who is on the path to con- centration.
ii. 1 Self-castigation and study and devotion to the Icvara are the Yoga of action, ii. 2 For the cultivation of concentration and for the attenuation of the hindrances, ii. 3 Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) and the feeling-of-personality and passion and aversion and the will-to-live are the five hindrances, ii. 4 Undifferentiated-consciousness is the field for the others whether they be dormant or attenuated or intercepted or sustained, ii. 5 The recognition of the permanent, of the pure, of pleasure, and of a self in what is impermanent, impure, pain, and not-self is undifferentiated-consciousness {avidya). ii. 6 When the power of seeing and the power by which one sees have the appearance of being a single self, [this is] the feeling-of-personality. ii. 7 Passion is that which dwells upon pleasure, ii. 8 Aversion is that which dwells upon pain. ii. 9 The will-to-live sweeping on [by the force of] its own nature exists in this form even in the wise. ii. 10 e [h.o.s. 17]
Translation of the Yoga-sutras [xxxiv
These [hindrances when they have become subtile] are to be escaped by the inverse-propagation, ii. 11 The fluctuations of these should be escaped by means of contemplation.
Karma
ii. 12-14. Origin of karma in hindrances; result of karma in state-of-
existence, length of life, and pleasure or pain.
ii. 12 The latent-deposit of karma has its root in the hindrances and may be felt in a birth seen or in a birth unseen, ii. 13 So long as the root exists, there will be fruition from it [that is] birth [and] length-of-life [and] kind-of-experience. ii. 14 These [fruitions] have joy or extreme anguish as results in accordance with the quality of their causes whether merit or demerit.
All is pain
ii. 15. Present and future and past correlations with objects result un- avoidably in pain.
ii. 15 As being the pains which are mutations and anxieties and subliminal-impressions, and by reason of the opposition of the fluctuations of the aspects (guna), — to the discriminating all is nothing but pain.
There is an escape
ii. 16. Only yogins are sensitive to future pain. This may be avoided in that it has not expressed itself in actual suffering.
ii. 16 That which is to be escaped is pain yet to come.
Cause of pain
ii. 17-24. The Seer-sight relation implies 1. complexes of potential stresses between aspects (guna) and between sense-organs and elements, 2. the power of the Seer who is undefiled by aspects, 3. the actual correla- tion until the purpose of the Seer, which is to differentiate consciousness, is completed.
ii. 17 The correlation of the Seer and the object-of-sight is the cause of that which is to be escaped, ii. 18 With a disposition to brightness and to activity and to inertia, and with the elements and the organs as its essence, and with its purpose the experience and the liberation [of the Self], — this is the object-of-sight. ii. 19 The particularized and the unparticularized [forms] and the resoluble only [into primary matter] and irresoluble-primary-matter — are the divisions of the aspects (guna). ii. 20 The Seer who is nothing but [the power of seeing], although undefiled (piddha), looks upon the presented idea. ii. 21 The object- of-sight is only for the sake of it [the Self]. ii. 22 Though it has
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ceased [to be seen] in the case of one whose purpose is accomplished, it has not ceased to be, since it is common to others [besides himself], ii. 23 The reason for the apperception of what the power of the property and of what the power of the proprietor are, is correlation, ii. 24 The reason for this [correlation] is undifferentiated-consciousness {avidya).
The escape ii. 25. Positive state of Isolation follows the ending of the correlation.
ii. 25 Since this [non-sight] does not exist, there is no correlation. This is the escape, the Isolation of the Seer.
Means of escape ii. 26-27. The act of discrimination leading up to the act of insight.
ii. 26 The means of attaining escape is unwavering discriminative discernment, ii. 27 For him [there is] insight sevenfold and advancing in stages to the highest.
Eight aids to yoga
ii. 28-29. To purify the aspects and to intensify intuitive thinking there
are five indirect aids and three direct aids.
ii. 28 After the aids to yoga have been followed up, when the impurity has dwindled, there is an enlightenment of perception reaching up to the discriminative discernment, ii. 29 Abstentions and observances and postures and regulations-of-the-breath and withdrawal-of-the-senses and fixed-attention and contemplation and concentration.
First indirect aid : i. Five abstentions
ii. 30-31. The elements and degrees of morality in the form of prohibi- tions.
ii. 30 Abstinence from injury and from falsehood and from theft and from incontinence and from acceptance of gifts are the abstentions, ii. 31 When they are unqualified by species or place or time or exigency and when [covering] all [these] classes — there is the Great Course-of-conduct.
Second indirect aid : ii. Five observances ii. 32. Advances in morality in the form of voluntary action.
ii. 32 Cleanliness and contentment and self-castigation and study and devotion to the l9vara are the observances.
Results of the abstentions and observances ii. 33-45. Persistent inhibitions of certain kinds reorganize an increase of activity of the opposite kind.
ii. 33 If there be inhibition by perverse-considerations, there should be
Translation of the Yoga-sutras [xxxvi
cultivation of the opposites. ii. 34 Since perverse-considerations such, as injuries, whether done or caused to be done or approved, whether ensuing upon greed or anger or infatuation, whether mild or moderate or vehement, find their unending consequences in pain and lack of thinking, there should be the cultivation of their opposites. ii. 35 As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from injury, his presence begets a suspension of enmity, ii. 36 As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from falsehood, actions and consequences depend upon him. ii. 37 As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from theft, all jewels approach him. ii. 38 As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from incontinence, he acquires energy, ii. 39 As soon as he is established in abstinence from acceptance of gifts, a thorough illumination upon the conditions of birth, ii. 40 As a result of cleanliness there is disgust at one's own body and no intercourse with others, ii. 41 Purity of sattva and gentleness and singleness-of-intent and subjugation of the senses and fitness for the sight of the self. ii. 42 As a result of contentment there is an acquisition of superlative pleasure, ii. 43 Perfection in the body and in the organs after impurity has dwindled as a result of self-castigation. ii. 44 As a result of study there is communion with the chosen deity, ii. 45 Perfection of concentration as a result of devotion to the Icvara.
Third indirect aid: iii. Postures ii. 46-48. Bodily conditions favourable to concentration.
ii. 46 Stable-and-easy posture, ii. 47 By relaxation of effort or by a [mental] state-of-balance with reference to Ananta. ii. 48 Thereafter he is unassailed by extremes.
Fourth indirect aid: iv. Restraint of the breath ii. 49-52. Calming of affective states is favourable to concentration.
ii. 49 When there is [stability of posture], the restraint of breath, a cutting off of the flow of inspiration and expiration, follows, ii. 50 [This is] external or internal or suppressed in fluctuation and is regulated by place and time and number and is protracted and subtile, ii. 51 The fourth [restraint of the breath] transcends the external and the internal object, ii. 52 As a result of this the covering of the light dwindles away.
Fifth indirect aid : v. Withdrawal of the sense-organs ii. 53-55. The span of attention is confined to an inner object.
ii. 53 For fixed-attentions also the central organ becomes fit. ii. 54 The withdrawal of the senses is as it were the imitation of the mind-stuff as it is in itself on the part of the organs by disjoining themselves from their object, ii. 55 As a result of this [withdrawal] there is a complete- mastery of the organs.
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BOOK THIRD-SUPERNORMAL POWERS First direct aid: vi. Fixed-attention iii. 1. The knower focuses the process of knowing upon the object to be known.
iii. 1 Binding the mind-stuff to a place is fixed-attention.
Second direct aid : vii. Contemplation iii. 2. A two-term relation between the process of knowing and the object to be known.
iii. 2 Focusedness of the presented idea upon that [place] is con- templation.
Third direct aid : viii. Concentration
iii. 3. A fusion of the knower and the process of knowing with the object
to be known.
iii. 3 This same [contemplation], shining forth [in consciousness] as the intended object and nothing more, and, as it were, emptied of itself, is concentration.
Transition to seedless concentration iii. 4-10. The direct aids in combination result in insight and restricted subliminal-impressions and the calm flow of the mind-stuff.
iii. 4 The three in one are constraint, iii. 5 As a result of mastering this constraint, there follows the shining forth of insight, iii. 6 Its application is by stages, iii. 7 The three are direct aids in comparison with the previous [five], iii. 8 Even these [three] are indirect aids to seedless [concentration], iii. 9 When there is a becoming invisible of the subliminal-impression of emergence and a becoming visible of the subliminal-impression of restriction, the mutation of restriction is inseparably connected with mind-stuff in its period of restriction, iii. 10 This [mind-stuff] flows peacefully by reason of the subliminal- impression.
Mutations of substances
iii. 11-15. In the focused state the concentration holds two time-forms within the span of attention. Mutations are in fixed orders of subliminal- impressions in the restricted state.
iii. 11 The mutation of concentration is the dwindling of dispersiveness and the uprisal of singleness-of-intent belonging to the mind-stuff, iii. 12 Then again when the quiescent and the uprisen presented-ideas are similar [in respect of having a single object], the mind-stuff has a mutation single-in-intent, iii. 13 Thus with regard to elements and to organs, mutations of external-aspect and of time-variation and of intensity have been enumerated, iii. 14 A substance conforms itself to quiescent and uprisen and indeterminable external-aspects, iii. 15 The order of the sequence is the reason for the order of the mutations.
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Application of constraints to different orders of mutations
iii. 16-52. Given a single mutation of external-aspect or time-form or in- tensity, the whole sequence comes under control of the concentrated insight. iii. 16 As a result of constraint upon the three mutations [there follows] the knowledge of the past and the future, iii. 17 Word and intended- ohject and presented -idea are confused because they are erroneously identified with each other. By constraint upon the distinctions between them [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of the cries of all living beings, iii. 18 As a result of direct perception of subliminal-impressions there is [intuitive] knowledge of previous births, iii. 19 [As a result of constraint] upon a presented-idea [there arises intuitive] knowledge of the mind-stuff of another, iii. 20 But [the intuitive knowledge of the mind-stuff of another] does not have that [idea] together with that upon which it depends [as its object], since that [upon which it depends] is not-in-the-field [of consciousness], iii. 21 As a result of constraint upon the [outer] form of the body, when its power to be known is stopped, then as a consequence of the disjunction of the light and of the eye there follows indiscernibility [of the yogin's body], iii. 22 Advancing and not-advancing is karma ; as a result of constraint upon this [two- fold karma] or from the signs of death [there arises an intuitive] knowledge of the latter end. iii. 23 [As a result of constraint] upon friendliness and other [sentiments there arise] powers [of friendliness], iii. 24 [As a result of constraint] upon powers [there arise] powers like those of an elephant, iii. 25 As a result of casting the light of a sense-activity [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of the subtile and the concealed and the obscure, iii. 26 As a result of constraint upon the sun [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of the cosmic-spaces, iii. 27 [As a result of constraint] upon the moon [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of the arrangement of the stars, iii. 28 [As a result of constraint] upon the pole-star [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of their movements, iii. 29 [As a result of constraint] upon the wheel of the navel [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of the arrangement of the body. iii. 30 [As a result of constraint] upon the well of the throat [there follows] the cessation of hunger and thirst, iii. 31 [As a result of constraint] upon the tortoise-tube [there follows] motionless- ness of the mind-stuff, iii. 32 [As a result of constraint] upon the radiance in the head [there follows] the sight of the Siddhas. iii. 33 Or as a result of vividness the yogin discerns all. iii. 34 [As a result of constraint] upon the heart [there arises] a consciousness of the mind-stuff, iii. 35 Experience is a presented-idea which fails to distinguish the sattva and the Self, which are absolutely uncommingled [in the presented-idea]. Since the sattva exists as object for another, the [intuitive] knowledge of the Self arises as the result of constraint upon that which exists for
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its own sake. iii. 36 As a result of this [constraint upon that which exists for its own sake], there arise vividness and the organ-of-[supernal]- hearing and the organ-of-[supernal]-touch and the organ-of-[supernal]- sight and the organ- of-[supernal] -taste and the organ-of-[supernalJ-smell. iii. 37 In concentration these [supernal activities] are obstacles ; in the emergent state they are perfections (siddhi). iii. 38 As a result of slacken- ing the causes of bondage and as a result of the knowledge of the procedure [of the mind-stuff], the mind-stuff penetrates into the body of another, iii. 39 As a result of mastering the Udana there is no adhesion to water or mud or thorns or similar objects, and [at death] the upward flight. iii. 40 As a result of mastering the Samana [there arises] a radiance, iii. 41 As a result of constraint upon the relation between the organ-of- hearing and the air, [there arises] the supernal-organ-of-hearing. iii. 42 Either as a result of constraint upon the relation between the body and the air, or as a result of the balanced -state of lightness, such as that of cotton-fibre, there follows the passing through air. iii. 43 An outwardly unadjusted fluctuation is the Great Discarnate ; as a result of this the dwindling of the covering to the brightness, iii. 44 As a result of con- straint upon the coarse and the essential -attribute and the subtile and the inherence and purposiveness, there is a mastery of the elements, iii. 45 As a result of this, atomization and the other [perfections] come about, [there is] perfection of body ; and there is no obstruction by the properties of these [elements], iii. 46 Beauty and grace and power and compactness of the thunderbolt, — [this is] perfection of body. iii. 47 As a result of constraint upon the process-of-knowing and the essential- attribute and the feeling-of-personality and the inherence and the purposiveness, [there follows] the subjugation of the organs, iii. 48 As a result of this [there follows] speed [great as that] of the central- organ, action of the instruments [of knowledge] disjunct [from the body], and the subjugation of the primary-cause, iii. 49 He who has only the full discernment into the difference between the sattva and the Self is one who has authority over all states-of-existence and is one who knows all. iii. 50 As a result of passionlessness even with regard to these [perfections] there follows, after the dwindling of the seeds of the defects, Isolation, iii. 51 In case of invitations from those-in-high- places, these should arouse no attachment or pride, for undesired consequences recur, iii. 52 As a result of constraint upon moments and their sequence [there arises the intuitive] knowledge proceeding from discrimination.
Culmination of concentration
iii. 53-55. The particular which is indiscernible in respect of class or term or point-in-space is intuitively discerned ; the widest span of objec- tivity is also discerned. This is the attainment of Isolation.
Translation of the Yoga-sutras [xl
iii. 53 As a result of this there arises the deeper-knowledge of two equivalent things which cannot be distinctly qualified in species or characteristic-mark or point-of-space. iii. 54 The [intuitive] knowledge proceeding from discrimination is a deliverer, has all things as its object, and has all times for its object, and is an [inclusive whole] without sequence, iii. 55 When the purity of the sattva and of the Self are equal there is Isolation.
BOOK FOURTH— ISOLATION Substances and subconsciousness
iv. 1-13. Correspondence between imperceptible forms of substance and
latent-impressions of concentrated states.
iv. 1 Perfections proceed from birth or from drugs or from spells or from self-castigation or from concentration, iv. 2 The mutation into another birth is the result of the filling in of the evolving-cause. iv. 3 The efficient cause gives no impulse to the evolving-causes but [the mutation] follows when the barrier [to the evolving-cause] is cut, as happens with the peasant, iv. 4 Created mind-stuffs may result from the sense-of-personality and from this alone, iv. 5 While there is a variety of actions, the mind-stuff which impels the many is one. iv. 6 Of these [five perfections] that which proceeds from contemplation leaves no latent-deposit, iv. 7 The yogin's karma is neither-white-nor-black ; [the karma] of others is of three kinds, iv. 8 As a result of this there follows the manifestation of those subconscious-impressions only which correspond to the fruition of their [karma], iv. 9 There is an uninterrupted-causal-relation [of subconscious-impressions], although remote in species and point-of-space and moment-of-time, by reason of the correspondence between memory and subliminal-impressions, iv. 10 Furthermore the [subconscious-impressions] have no beginning [that we can set in time], since desire is permanent, iv. 11 Since [sub- conscious-impressions] are associated with cause and motive and mental- substrate and stimulus, if these cease to be, then those [subconscious- impressions] cease to be. iv. 12 Past and future as such exist ; [therefore subconscious-impressions do not cease to be]. For the different time- forms belong to the external-aspects, iv. 13 These [external-aspects with the three time-forms] are phenomenalized [individuals] or subtile [generic-forms] and their essence is the aspects (guna).
Polemic against Idealism iv. 14-23. Knowledge of the stream of consciousness is impossible unless it be a permanent order as contrasted with a succession of transient appearances.
iv. 14 The that-ness of a thing is due to a singleness of mutation.
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iv. 15. Because, while the [physical] thing remains the same, the mind- stuffs are different, [therefore the two are upon] distinct levels-of-existence. iv. 16 And a thing is not dependent upon a single mind-stuff, [for then in certain cases] it could not be proved [by that mind-stuff], [and] then what would it be? iv. 17 A thing is known or not known by virtue of its affecting [or not affecting] the mind-stuff, iv. 18 Uninter- mittently the Master of that [mind-stuff] knows the fluctuations of mind-stuff [and thus] the Self undergoes-no-mutations. iv. 19 It does not illumine itself, since it is an object-for-sight. iv. 20 And there cannot be a cognition of both [thinking-substance and thing] at the same time. iv. 21 If [one mind-stuff] were the object-for-sight for another, there would be an infinite regress from one thinking-substance to another thinking-substance as well as confusion of memory, iv. 22 The Intellect (citi) which unites not [with objects] is conscious of its own thinking-substance when [the mind-stuff] takes the form of that [thinking- substance by reflecting it], iv. 23 Mind-stuff affected by the Seer and by the object-for-sight [leads to the perception of] all intended-objects.
Complete Self-realization of the Self
iv. 24-34. All hindrances subside; all acts of the Self are spontaneous and free ; absence of limitations which thwart one who wishes to attain the ultimate ideal of his own nature.
iv. 24 This [mind-stuff], although diversified by countless subconscious- impressions, exists for the sake of another, because its nature is to produce [things as] combinations, iv. 25 For him who sees the distinction, pondering upon his own states-of-being ceases, iv. 26 Then the mind- stuff is borne down to discrimination, onward towards Isolation, iv. 27 In the intervals of this [mind-stuff] there are other presented-ideas [coming] from subliminal-impressions, iv. 28 The escape from these [subliminal- impressions] is described as being like [the escape from] the hindrances, iv. 29 For one who is not usurious even in respect of Elevation, there follows in every case as a result of discriminative discernment the concentration [called] Eain-cloud of [knowable] things, iv. 30 Then follows the cessation of the hindrances and of karma, iv. 31 Then, because of the endlessness of knowledge from which all obscuring defilements have passed away, what is yet to be known amounts to little, iv. 32 When as a result of this the aspects {gum) have fulfilled their purpose, they attain to the limit of the sequence of mutations, iv. 33 The positive correlate to the moment, recognized as such at the final limit of the mutation, is a sequence, iv. 34 Isolation is the inverse generation of the aspects, no longer provided with a purpose by the Self, or it is the Energy of Intellect grounded in itself.
I [h.o.s. 17]
BOOK FIRST CONCENTRATION
1 [h.o.s. 17|
NOTICE TO THE READER
Patanjali's Mnemonic Rules or Yoga-sutras are divided into four books as follows :
Book 1. Concentration or Samadhi, with 51 rules or sutras, — pages 1 to 100
Book 2. Means of attainment or Sadhana, with 55 sutras, — pages 101 to 200
Book 3. Supernormal powers or Vibhuti, with 55 sutras, — pages 201 to 296
Book 4. Isolation or Kaivalya, with 34 sutras, — pages 297 to 348.
In all, there are 195 rules. Their extreme brevity is apparent when they are printed continuously, as at the end of the Ananda^crama edition, where the entire text of the rules occupies only between four and five pages.
The Comment or Bhasya, usually after a brief introductory paragraph or phrase (called avatdrana), takes up the rules, one by one, and gives first the text and then the meaning thereof.
Vacaspatimicra's Explanation is of course in the first instance an explanation of the Comment ; but since the Comment comprehends also the Rules, it is in fact an explanation of both Rules and Comment. In the body of this volume, the Explana- tion is not put all together by itself, but is made to keep pace with the Comment, rule by rule.
Meaning of the Differences of Type
The translation of the Rules is set in pica type of full-faced Clarendon style ;
The translation of the Comment is set in pica type of Roman style ;
The translation of the Explanation is set in long primer type of Roman style.
Single angles (like these < >) indicate that the words which they enclose are taken from
the particular Rule or Yoga-sutra under discussion. Double angles (like these <£ /») indicate that the words which they enclose are taken
from the Comment or Yoga-bhasya. Double quotation marks (" ") indicate that the words which they enclose are taken from
some authoritative text. Single quotation marks (' ') indicate that the words which they enclose are the objections
or questions of an opponent, or are a quotation from some unauthoritative text. A half-parenthesis on its side («) is used between two vowels to show that they are
printed in violation of the rules of euphonic combination.
BOOK FIEST CONCENTRATION
May he, who, having abandoned his primal form, exercises his power to show kindness to the world in many ways — he with the beautiful hood and many mouths, possessed of deadly poison and yet abolishing the mass of hindrances — he the source of all know- ledge, and whose girdle of attendant snakes produces continual pleasure, — may he, the divine Lord x of Serpents, protect you, with his white stainless body — he, the giver of concentration (yoga), and himself concentrated in concentration. 1. Now the exposition of yoga [is to be made]. The expression <now> indicates that a distinct topic2 commences here. The authoritative book which expounds yoga is to be understood as commenced. [To give a provisional definition :] yoga is concentration ; but this is a quality of the mind-stuff (citta) which belongs to all the stages. The stages of the mind-stutf are these : the restless (ksipi&), the infatuated (mudha), the distracted (viksijpta) , the single-in-intent (ehdgra), and the restricted (niruddha). Of these [stages the first two have nothing to do with yoga and even] in the distracted state of the mind [its] concentration is [at times] overpowered by [opposite] distractions and [consequently] it cannot properly be called yoga. But that [state] which, when the mind is single-in-intent, fully illumines a distinct and real object and causes the hindrances (Jdega) to dwindle, slackens the bonds of karma, and sets before it U&T& goal the restriction [of all
1 See Linga Purana, I., Ixiii. 22-37. application (atidega). The word atha
2 There are six kinds of sutras according to may introduce a topic (adhikaravartha),
the Mlmahsa : the definition (samjnd), or give the purport (prastdva^artha), or
the key to interpretation (paribhdsd), state the subject-matter of the dis-
the statement of a general rule (vidhi), cussion {drambha^artha). This is dis-
the restrictive rule (niyama), an original cussed in Qloka-varttika i. 1. 22-24. statement (adhikdra), an analogical
i. l — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [4
fluctuations], is called the yoga in which there is consciousness of an object (samvrqjndta) . This [conscious yoga], however, is accompanied byj deliberation [upon coarse objects], b^Preflection [upon subtile objects], by joy, by^the feeling-of -personality (asmita^^ This we shall set forth later. But when there is restriction of all the fluctuations (vrtjfy^of the mind-stuff], there is the con- centration in which there is no consciousness [of an object].
I prostrate myself before him who is the cause of the world's origination, before Vrsaketu, who — although for him fruition and other results of karma proceeding from the hindrances have ceased — is yet kindly [to the world he has made]. Prostrating myself before Patarijali the sage, I proceed to set forth a brief, clear, and significant explanation of the Comment by Vedavyasa. For here the Exalted Patarijali — wishing to announce in brief the import of the book which he is about to begin that he may thus assist the procedure of men of understanding and that he may, more especially, make the hearer easily comprehend — composed this sutra : 1. Now the exposition of yoga [is to be made]. Of this [sutra] the first portion, the word <now>, he [the author of the Comment] discusses in the phrase «CThe expression <now> indicates that a distinct topic commences here.^ [The word <now> is used] as in [the sutra] " Now ' this is the Jyotis ". It does not imply that it is to be preceded [by condi- tions as in the first Brahma-sutra]. Now by the word <exposition> he means the authoritative book in the sense that it is that whereby a thing is expounded. Moreover the book may enter upon its activity when preceded not only by calm 2 and the other [five conditions required by the Brahma-sutra] ; but it must be preceded also by [Patanjali's] desire to announce [his] truth. [Calm], on the contrary, would follow when once there had been a desire to know and when the knowledge [had entered into action]. As it is written [BAU. iv. 4. 23 or 28], " After that, calm and subdued and retired and resigned and concen- trated let him behold himself in the Self only." Although it would be possible [for the book to enter into action] immediately after advantage had been taken of such things as students' questions or performances of austerities or elixirs of life, [still these are] not mentioned. The reason for this is that these things would be of no use either to the student's knowledge or to [his] feeling inclined (pravrtti) [for it]. [What then would be advantageous? The book's authori- tativeness.] If the book be authoritative, then, even if there are no [questions or austerities or elixirs], the exposition of yoga is to be accepted ; but if not authoritative, then, even if [there be questions and all the other conditions, still]
1 These words are from the Tandya-Mahabr. soma. See Caland and Henry : L'Agni-
xix. 11.1 (Biblioth. Ind.). The jyotis stoma, I, p. 166. And compare Qastra
is a chant by the udgatar in the Agni- Dipika (Benares edition), p. 23020.
stoma directly after the filtering of the 2 See Vedanta Sara 4 and 14 and 17.
5] Conditions required for a beginning [ — i. 1
the book is to be rejected. Thus it is [by insisting upon the authorita- tiveness of the book] that [Patahjali] refuses to say that [the book may begin] immediately after his understanding the truth and his desire to announce. But if it be agreed that [the word <now> indicates] that a distinct topic commences, then when once yoga has been mentioned as the topic of the book the student easily understands the announcement of the import of the book as a whole and is started into action. — Now every one knows from Qruti and Smrti and the Epics and the Puranas that concentration is the cause of final-bliss [and that yoga is authoritative]. Some one might ask, ' If the word <now> indicates that a distinct topic commences in all those works to which it is attached, then, if this is so, would not such an announcement1 as, "Now therefore the inquiry into Brahma [is to be made] " also be included ? ' To prevent this mistake [the commentator] uses the word «here.» [Again], some one cites the Yogiyajha- valkyasmrti, " Hiranyagarbha and no other of ancient days is he who gave utterance (valctd) to yoga" and asks how it can be said that Patahjali gives utterance to the authoritative book on yoga. In reply the author of the sutra says <the exposition): exposition in the sense of expounding something previously expounded. When then the word <now> signifies that here a dis- tinct topic commences, then the point of the statement is quite consistent. — Accordingly he says, «The authoritative work which expounds yoga ... as com- menced». Here an objector interrupts, ' The topic which is commenced here is not the authoritative work, but yoga in so far as it is taught.' In reply to which, he says ^Cis to be understood. » True, we are beginning yoga in so far as it is taught. But the instrument which is to teach this [yoga] is the authori- tative work which deals with the same. Moreover the teacher's activity has to do more immediately with the instrument than with the thing he works upon. Accordingly, with emphasis upon the activity of the author (Jcartr), we are to understand that the authoritative work which deals with yoga is commenced. But the topic commenced is that yoga only which is limited in its activity by an authoritative work. This is the real point. — And one must suppose that the hearing of the word <now>, which means that a distinct topic has com- menced, suggests — like the sight of a water-jar 2 carried [on a girl's shoulder at early morning] — another meaning, [namely,] it serves as an auspicious beginning. — Doubt as to the actual thing [yoga] is occasioned by doubt as to the meaning of the word [yoga]. This [doubt] he removes by stating that [«yoga» in the phrase] <Kyoga is concentration^ is etymologically derived from the stem yuj-a [Dhatupatha iv. 68] in the sense of concentration and not from the stem yuj-i [vii. 7] in the sense of conjunction.
Another objection is raised, ' The yoga which is to be described is a whole, and concentration is a part of it ; and a mere part is not the whole.' The reply is
1 Brahma-sutra i. 1. 1. which one makes a circumambulation
2 This is in the list of auspicious objects to (pradaksina), Visnu-snirti lxiii. 29.
i. 1 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [6
in the words «But this.» The word ca has the sense of «but» and distin- guishes the whole from the part. — «Which belongs to all the stages^ refers to the stages or states which are to be described : Madhumati [iii. 54], Madhu- pratlka [iii. 48], Vicoka [i. 36], Samskaracesa [iii. 9]. These belong to the mind-stuff. In all these [stages] is found that yoga the [more] special mark of which is the restriction of the mind-stuff. But concentration is a part [of this] and has not this as its special mark. And the words «yoga is concen- tration» are a statement for etymological purposes only, in so far as one is not dwelling upon the difference between the whole and the part. But [when he is referring to] the practical purpose of what he calls «yoga,)» [he says] it is the restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff: this is the stricter sense of the term. To those [Vaicesikas] who hold the view that fluctuations are sensations inherent in the soul and that therefore the restriction of them would also involve the soul (atmari) in which they inhere, — to these in rebuttal he says, «a quality of the mind-stuff .2> — The term <mind-stuff> (citta) he uses as a partial expression for the inner-organ ' (antakkarana), the thinking-substance (buddhi). The point is that the Absolutely-eternal Energy of Intellect (citi-gakti), [since it is] immutable, cannot have sensations as its properties ; but the thinking-substance may have them. — An objector says, ■ This may be so. But if yoga belongs to all its stages, — why then ! Sir, [since you concede that] the restless and the infatuated and the distracted states also are stages of mind-stuff, and [since] there would be among these states, reciprocally at least, also a restriction of fluctuations, — then <yoga> would have to include these states also (tatrapi).' In replying to this difficulty he makes clear which stages are to be included and which not included [in yoga] by the words beginning with <the restless.) i. The restless incessantly thrown by force of rajas upon this or that object is excessively unstable ; ii. the infatuated because of a preponderance of tamas is filled with the fluctuation of sleep ; iii. the distracted differs from the restless in that, although prevailingly unstable, it is occasionally stable, this prevailing instability being either natural or generated by diseases and languor and other obstacles later [i. 30] to be described ; iv. the single-in-intent is the focused ; v. the restricted mind-stuff is that in which all the fluctuations are restricted and in which nothing remains but subliminal-impressions {saihskara). In spite of the fact that certain fluctuations of the restless and the infatuated, [the first two] of these [five stages], are restricted each by the others, still, since these two are not even indirectly causes of final bliss and since they contend against it, they are so far removed from [the possibility of] being called yoga that he has not expressly denied that these two are yoga. But in the case of the distracted [state], since occasionally it has stability when directed towards a real object, he denies that it can be yoga in the words <KOf these stages.^ When the mind is distracted, the concentration which is the occasional stability of the mind-stuff
1 Compare Camkara Bhasya on ii. 4. 6 (Nirnayasagara edition, p. 71 111).
7] States of mind- stuff jit for Yoga [ — i. 1
when directed to a real object, cannot properly be called yoga. Why [cannot this be called yoga]? Because it has come under the adverse influence of distraction, which is the opposite of this [yoga]. When fallen into the hands (antargata) of a troop of opponents, it is hard for a thing to be even what it is and it is still harder for it to produce effects. Just as any one can see that a seed which has fallen into the fire and stayed there three or four moments has not power, even if sown, of sprouting : this is the real meaning. If then concentration which has come under the adverse influence of distraction be not yoga, what then is yoga ? To this he makes answer, «But that [state] which, when the mind is single-in-intent.» By the word <Sreal» (bhuta) he excludes [any] imaginary [object]. Since sleep, a fluctuation of mind-stuff, is also single- in-intent with regard to tamas, — a real (bhuta) object, the peculiar (sva) [aspect of a substance x] upon which it [sleep] depends (alambana), — so he says <Kdistinct» (sad) ; which means is clear (gobhana), in which the sattva [aspect] becomes evident in a very high degree. But that thing is not clear in which the tamas is in preponderance, inasmuch as it, [the tamas,] is the cause of hindrances. Now the perception of a thing either by verbal communication [dgama] or by inference may, we grant, be luminous (dyotanam bhavad api) ; still, in so far as it is mediately known, it does not destroy undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) which we directly experience. For in such [illusions as the sight of] two moons or a defective sense of orientation, [verbal communications or inferences] do not destroy undifferentiated-consciousness. Accordingly he uses the word <Kfully» (pra), because it means luminous to the full extent (pra-karsam) and because it alludes to immediate perception [in the case of yoga]. The feeling- of-personality (asmita) and the other hindrances have their root in undifferen- tiated-consciousness (avidya). Furthermore, since knowledge (vidya) destroys undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) ; and since, when knowledge emerges, the hindrances [arising] from undifferentiated-consciousness and so on are destroyed, inasmuch as they are contrary the one to the other, and inasmuch as [then] the cause [of the hindrances] would be destroyed ; therefore he says «and causes [the hindrances] to dwindle. 2> This, then, is the reason why [yoga] slackens the bonds which consist of karma. — And in this passage by a figurative use of the cause for the effect he employs the word <£karma», whereas subtile-influences (apurva) are intended. — The word <Kslackens)» means brings [them] down from their operation. For later [ii. 13] he says, " So long as the root exists, [there will be] fruition from it." And finally it «Csets before it as a goal the restriction [of all fluctuations].^— Moreover since this [yoga] conscious of objects is four-fold, he employs the words [beginning] «This [conscious yoga].» He describes [the yoga] not conscious of objects with the words «all the fluctuations.^ [In other words,] we know (Mia) that sources-of- valid-ideas and other fluctuations (pramanadivrtti) made of rajas and tamas are
1 'Aspect of a substance' is dharma (see iii. 13) or parinuma.
i. 1 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [S
restricted in [yoga] conscious [of objects] while fluctuations of sattva are retained ; but that in [yoga] not conscious [of an object] all fluctuations whatsoever are restricted. Therefore [the final result] is established (siddham) that ^belonging to all stages^ means occurring in all these [four] stages, MadhumatT and so on, which [four] are [all] included in these two stages [of the conscious and the unconscious yoga].
The intent of the following sutra is to state the distinguishing characteristic of this [yoga].
2. Yoga is the restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff. By the non-use of the word ' all ' [before <the fluctuations)], [the yoga which is] conscious [of objects] is also included under the denomination of yoga. Now mind-stuff has three aspects (guna), as appears from the fact that it has a disposition to vividness (prakhyd), to activity (pravrtti), and to inertia (sthiti). For the mind-stuff's [aspect] sattva, which is vividness, when commingled with rajas and tamas, acquires a fondness for supremacy and for objects-of-sense ; while the very same [constituent-aspect, sattva,] when pervaded with tamas, tends towards demerit and non- perception and passionateness and towards a failure of [its own rightful] supremacy ; [and] the very same \_sattva\ — when the covering of error has dwindled away, — illumined now in its totality (sarvatas), but faintly pervaded by rajas, tends towards merit and knowledge and passionlessness and [its own rightful] supremacy ; [and] the very same [sattva'], — the stains of the last vestige of rajas once removed, — grounded in itself and being nothing but the discernment (khydti) of the difference between the sattva and the Self (purusa), tends towards the Contemplation of the Rain-cloud of [knowable] Things. The designation given by contemplators (dhydyin) to this [kind of mind-stuff] is the highest Elevation (prasamkhydna). For the Energy of Intellect (citi-cakti) is immutable and does not unite [with objects] ; it has objects shown to it and is undefiled [by constituent-aspects] and is unending. Whereas this discriminate discernment (viveka-khydti), whose essence is sattva, is [therefore] contrary to this [Energy of Intellect
9] Provisional definition of Yoga [ — i. 2
and is therefore to be rejected]. Hence the mind-stuff being disgusted with this [discriminative discernment] restricts even this Insight. When it has reached this state, [the mind-stuff], [after the restriction of the fluctuations,] passes over to subliminal impressions (samskdra). This is the [so-called] seedless concentra- tion. In this state nothing becomes an object of consciousness : such is concentration not conscious [of objects]. Accordingly the yoga [which we have defined as] the restriction of the fluctuations of the mind-stuff is two-fold.
He introduces the second sutra with the words <Sthe distinguishing charac- teristic of this.» The words <Kof this» refer to the two kinds of yoga mentioned in the previous sutra. 2. Yoga is the restriction of the fluctuations of mind- stuff. Yoga is that particular state of mind-stuff in which sources-of -valid- ideas and the other fluctuations are restricted. The objection is made that this cannot be the distinguishing characteristic [of yoga] since yoga conscious [of objects] would be excluded. For in this [conscious yoga], [those] fluctua- tions of mind-stuff which have the sattva-nspect are not restricted. The reply is <£by the non-use of the word ' all '.X> If yoga had been said to be the restric- tion of all the fluctuations of mind-stuff, [yoga] conscious [of objects] would not have been included. But [if the objection be made that this includes too much since there is restriction of sattva in the first three states, the reply is,] the restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff which are hostile to the latent- deposit (agaya-paripanthin) of karma from the hindrances [i. e. the restriction, as thus qualified] includes this [yoga] also. [And this is so] because there is a restriction of those mind-stuffs fluctuations which have the rajas and tamas aspect in this [conscious yoga] also, and because this (tad) [hostility to the hindrances] is (bhavat) a part of that (tasya) [restriction]. But why is this mind-stuff, which is a single thing, in connexion with [its own] restless and other stages 1 And since some one might be in doubt why the fluctuations of mind-stuff which is in such [a three-fold] state should be restricted, he now makes clear first of all the reason for [the mind-stuff's] connexion with [these] states. «Now mind-stuff» [is in this threefold state] since the aspect sattva has a disposition to vividness [and] since the aspect rajas has a disposition to activity [and] since the aspect tamas has a disposition to inertia. The use of the word «£vividness» is the use of a part for the whole (upalaJcsana). It alludes also to other kinds of sattva, to serenity and lightness and joy (priti) ; and «Cactivity» alludes to [the other] kinds of rajas, to pain and grief. Inertia is a property of the tamas-fluetuation and is opposed to activity. The use of the word «inertia» is a partial expression for heaviness and covering and dejection and similar states. What he means to say is this : the mind-stuff, although a single 2 [h o.s. 17]
i. 2 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [10
thing, has, inasmuch as it is made up of three aspects and inasmuch as the aspects are not in equilibrium, a multitude of mutations (parinama) arising from a multitude of reciprocal antagonisms ; and thus may consistently have many states. He shows that the restless and other stages of the mind-stuff have according to circumstances a variety of subordinate states. «For . . . which is vividness.^ Mind-stuffs sattva is sattva in its form as a mutation of mind- stuff; [and] this [mind-stuffs sattva] in its form as vividness is thus shown to be a preponderance of sattva in the mind-stuff. In this mind-stuff when rajas and tamas are somewhat less than the sattva, and when they two are equal each to the other, then (tadd) [that mind-stuff] is that thing thus described [in the Comment] which acquires a fondness for supremacy and for objects- of-sense, sound and so on. Although the mind-stuff under the predominance of sattva desires to meditate upon reality (tattva), still, when the reality is concealed by tamas, it thinks that such supremacies as atomization (animan) are the reality and desires to meditate upon them (tad). It meditates a moment, and then, caught by rajas, although obtaining no permanence [in its meditation] on them, it gains nothing except a fondness for these things. But its natural inclination towards sound and so on [the objects of sense] is quite well known. Accord- ingly in this way the mind-stuff is said to be distracted. — While describing the restless mind-stuff, he alludes also to the infatuated : <Sthe very same . . . with tamas. s> Now when tamas suppresses rajas and extends itself, then, since rajas has become incapable of removing the tamas which covers the mind-stuff's sattva, the mind-stuff covered with tamas tends towards demerit and other [forms of ignorance]. «Non-perception)» is declared to be misconceived perception [i. 8], and also to be sleep-perception [i. 10] which is supported (dlambana) by a cause (pratyaya) of a [transient] negation. And from this [word] comes the sug- gestion (sucitd) of the infatuated state also. A ^failure of its [own rightful] supremacy^ is an obstruction to one's will in every direction. Thus it is that mind-stuff becomes pervaded with demerit and the other [forms of ignorance]. But when this same substance (sattva) of the mind-stuff comes to have its sa#ra[-quality] manifest [and] its cover of tamas removed [and] is accompanied by rajas, then it tends, as he says, towards merit and perception and passionless and [rightful] supremacy, as he says in the phrase ^dwindled away.^ That [substance of the mind-stuff] is referred to, the covering, that is, the tamas [-quality], that is, the infatuation of which has almost entirely (prakarsena) dwindled. For the same reason «it is illumined in its totality2>: in substances- as-effects (viqesa) and substances-as-causes (avigesa) and in the linga and the lingin [see ii. 19] and the Self. Still it has not the capacity for merit and [rightful] supremacy since it lacks activity. With regard to this he says «pervaded by rajas only.» In other words when rajas is the active agent, merit and the rest do persist. Accordingly for the two middle classes of yogins,1 the
J See below, iii. 51, and cf. Kern's ' Lotus \ SBE. xxi. 387.
1 1] Functions of the mind-stuff [ — i. 2
Madhubhtimika and the Prajnajyotis who have attained to concentration con- scious [of an object], the substance (sattva) of the mind-stuff is included. — He now describes the state of the mind-stuff of the fourth class of contemplators, the Atikrantabhavaniya, with the words «the same.» Since the stain of the last vestige of rajas is removed, the mind-stuff is grounded in itself. Now the gold of the substance (sattva) of the thinking-substance (buddhi), — when once the stain of the rajas and tamas is purified by the joining [of the upper and lower parts] of the crucible (puta-palca), which are practice and passionlessness, and when it has withdrawn [see ii. 54] the organs which are concerned with objects- of-sense, and is grounded in itself, — has still a further function to perform (para Mrya), namely, the discriminative discernment [referring to the sattva and the Self], which performs its function in so far as its task (adhiJcara) is un- finished. With this in mind he says «the mind-stuff.» The mind-stuff which is nothing else than the discriminative discernment referring to the sattva and the Self tends towards the Contemplation [called] the Rain-cloud of [knowable] Things. The Eain-cloud of [knowable] Things will also be described [iv. 29]. He tells what is perfectly clear to yogins with regard to this [state] in the words, «this ... is the highest.^ The mind-stuff which is nothing else than the discernment of the difference between the sattva and the Self and which lasts until the Rain-cloud of [knowable] Things, is designated by contemplators as the highest Elevation. And if one does not wish to make the distinction between the substance and its property, [this Elevation] may be regarded as having the same office as the mind-stuff [:the mind-stuff itself is the Eleva- tion.]— In order to introduce the Concentration of Restriction as the ground for rejecting the discernment of the difference and as the ground for accepting the Energy of Intellect, he shows the excellence of the Energy of Intellect and the inferior value of the discriminative insight by the phrase «the Energy of Intellects and the following words. — Impurity has as its essence pleasure and pain and infatuation. For even pleasure and infatuation give pain to the man of discrimination [ii. 15] ; therefore, like pain, they too are to be escaped. Moreover exceptional beauty also comes to an end and so gives pain. Accord- ingly, that too the man of discrimination can only reject. Since this same impurity and this coming to an end do not occur in the Energy of Intellect [which is] the Self, it is said to be «undefiled and unending.» An objection is made, ' How can this (iyam) [Energy of Intellect] be free from defilement, if, in being aware of things which have as their essence pleasure and pain and infatua- tion, it assumes their form ? and how can it be unending if it accepts and rejects their forms ?' In reply it is said «it has objects shown to it.S It [the Energy of Intellect] is that to which the various objects are shown. That [objection] would be sound, if, like the thinking-substance (buddhi), the Energy of Intellect assumed the form of objects ; but it is the thinking-substance only which, because it undergoes mutations (parinata sail) in the form of the objects, shows the object to the Energy of Intellect, which [latter however] does not take their
i. 2 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [12
form. And when this happens, the Self is then said to become aware [of the objects]. The objector asks, 'How can the Energy of Intellect unless it strike upon the thinking-substance which has taken the form of some object, know [that] object ? or, if it do strike upon [that] object, how is it that it does not undergo a change into the form of that [object] ? ' To this he replies <Kdoes not unite [with objects].^ Union is contagion ; not any of this is in Intellect : this is his meaning. If any one asks why there is no [union] of this [Intellect with objects], the reply is, it «Cis immutable.^ Mutation, which has the three- fold character [see iii. 13] of external aspect (dharma) and time-variation (laJcsana) and intensity (avastM), does not appertain to the [Energy of] Intellect also (api) [as it does to the mind-stuff] in any such way that {yena), by passing into a mutation in the form of an action, the Energy of Intellect should mutate in correspondence with the thinking-substance. That it, [this Energy,] even if it does not unite [with objects], can [nevertheless] be conscious of objects, he will now show to be possible. This [much] is established, that the Energy of Thought is unsullied by [the aspects (guna)]. But it has been said that the discriminative discernment, since it has as its essence the substance of the thinking-substance is not unsullied. It is <K[therefore] contrary to this» Energy of Intellect. And since even the discriminative discernment is to be rejected, then how can you make mention of the other fluctuations which abound in defects : this is the real meaning. Thence, [that is,] for this reason, the introduction of the Concentration of Eestriction is fitting. And so he says, «CHence . . . with this.^ The meaning is that he restricts even the discrimina- tive discernment by the higher passionlessness which, surely, is nothing more than the complete calming of the perceptions. — Now, what kind of a mind- stuff would that be that has all its fluctuations restricted ? In reply he says «[When it has reached] this state.^ He speaks of that [mind-stuff] the state of which has restriction. — He tells what restriction itself is : «This is the [so-called] seedless. » The latent-deposit (aqaya) of karma, which corresponds with the hindrances — birth and length-of-life and kind-of-enjoyment [ii. 13], — is the seed. That which is exempt from this is ^Cseedless.^ For this same [seedless concentration], he indicates the proper technical term which is current among yogins when he says «In this state nothing.^ He sums up with the words «the yoga [which we have defined as] the restriction of the fluctuations of the mind- stuff is two-fold. »
The mind being in this [unconscious] state, what will then be the condition of the Self? For it is the essence (dtman) [of the Self to receive] knowledge (bodha) [reflected upon it] by the thinking-substance (buddhi), [as this in its turn receives the impression of external objects, and in this case] there is a [total] absence of objects [in the thinking-substance].
13] Consummation of Yoga [ — i. 3
3. Then the Seer [that is, the Self,] abides in himself.
At that time the Energy of Intellect is grounded in its own self, as [it is] when in the state of Isolation. But when the mind-stuff is in its emergent state, [the Energy of Intellect], although really the same, [does] not [seem] so.
To introduce now the next sutra, he raises the question beginning «The mind being in this [unconscious] state . . .?» The question has the force of an objection: 'Now this Self, whose essence is [that it receives] the knowledge (bodha) [reflected upon it] by the thinking-substance which is mutated into the form of one [object] after another, is always undergoing an experience, [but there is] no [experience] when [the Self] is deprived of the knowledge from the thinking-substance. For the very nature of this Self is the know- ledge (bodha) thrown upon the thinking-substance precisely as shining is [the nature] of the sun. Moreover this [knowledge of the thinking-substance] does not occur in that kind of mind which consists of subliminal-impressions (samskara) only. And further a thing cannot exist without its own nature. If this is so, then why does not the Self know that thinking-substance also which consists of subliminal-impressions only?' To this he replies <£there is a [total] absence of objects.^ The thinking-substance as such (buddhi-matra) is not the object of the Self, but (apt tu) only in so far as it fulfils the purposes of the Self [iv. 32]. Now the two purposes of the Self are discriminative insight and the enjoyment of objects ; and these do not exist in the restricted state [of the mind-stuff]. Thus the [total] absence of objects is established. The rebuttal is [also] given in the sutra: 3. Then the Seer [that is, the Self] abides in himself. The words <in himself> mean that the peaceful and the cruel and the infatuated nature falsely attributed [to the Self] has ceased. For the Self's Intelligence (caitanya) is himself (svarupa), [and is] not conditioned ; while the knowledge of the thinking-substance has the various forms peaceful and other. And so it is subject to conditions just as the crystal which is in its own nature absolutely transparently white [is subject to conditions] : the redness of the [crystal] is its condition of being near the China-rose. And when a condition ceases, there is no cessation of the thing conditioned ; since this would prove too much. This is the real point. And although [the Seer] in himself (svarupatah) cannot [actually] be divided,1 still when-he [the author of the Comment] -supposes-a-predicate-relation (vikalpya) [between the drastr and his svarupa], the words <in himself) (svarupe) are put in the locative case. This same meaning is made clear by the author of the Comment when he says «grounded in its own self.» «At that time» means in the state of restriction [and] not in the state of emergence. [The objection is made,] ' This may be true. But if while in the state of emergence the Energy of Intellect is not
* Literally, although the essential-attribute (svarupa) cannot be divided [from the Self].
i. 3 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [14
grounded in itself and while in the state of restriction is grounded [in itself], then it would enter into mutation ; or else if in [the state of] emergence it [remains] grounded in itself, [then there would be] no difference between emergence and restriction.' In reply to this he says <KBut when the mind-stuff is in its emergent state.2> Never does the Energy of Intellect, [in that it is] absolutely eternal, deviate from itself. Accordingly, as [it is] in restriction, just so [is it] in emergence also. Assuredly, mother-of-pearl as such (svarupa) does not suffer increase or decrease of being, no matter whether the perception (jndna) which refers to it (gocara) be the source of a valid idea (pramana) or [the source of] a misconception. The observer however, although the thing is really the same, is under the illusion that it is not so (atathatvena). Compared with the concentration of restriction, even [the concentration that is] conscious [of an object] is nothing more than emergence.
How in that case [is it that the Energy of Intellect does not seem the same in the emergent state] ? [The answer is,] Since objects1 are shown to it.
4. At other times it [the Self] takes the same form as the fluctuations [of mind-stuff].
In the emergent state [of the subliminal-impressions], the Self has fluctuations which are not distinguished from fluctuations of the mind-stuff; and so we have a sutra [of Pancacikha2], " There is only one appearance [for both], — that appearance is knowledge." The mind-stuff is like a magnet ; and, as an object suitable to be seen [by the Self as Witness], it gives its aid [to the Self] by the mere fact of being near it, and thus the relation between it and the Self is that between property (svam) and proprietor (svamin). Hence the reason why the Self experiences (bodha) the fluctuations of the mind-stuff is its beginning-less correlation [with the thinking-sub- stance].
To introduce the next sutra, he inquires «How in that case ?2> If [the Energy of Intellect], though really the same, [does] not [seem to be] so, in what kind of a way in that case does it assume an appearance ? such is the meaning. He supplies the words «Since objects are shown to it» which give the reason, and [then] rehearses the sutra. 4. At other times it takes the same form as the fluctuations [of mind-stuff]. <At other times> means «in the emergent
1 Compare Visnu Pur. i. 14. 35. mente in Festgruss an Roth, Stuttgart,
2 See Garbe : Pancacikha und seine Frag- 1893, p. 75.
15] The Self correlated ivith its thinking-substance [ — i. 4
state ;» <the fluctuations [of mind-stuff ]> are the tranquil and the cruel and the infatuated ; <Knot distinguished» means not different. These [three] are those [fluctuations] which the Self has. — <The same form:> in these words the word ' same ' is synonymous with ' one '. What he means to- say is this: when, by reason of nearness to each other, the difference between [the colour] of the China-rose and of the crystal [vase], or analogously, between the thinking-substance and the Self, does not come to consciousness (a-bheda- grahe), then the individual by wrongly attributing the fluctuations of the thinking-substance to the Self, recognizes [wrongly] that he is tranquil or pained or infatuated. Likewise, wrongly supposing that his face when reflected upon the dirty surface of a mirror is itself dirty, [the individual] bemoans himself at the thought that he is dirty. Although1 the fluctuation of the thinking-substance, like the perception of sounds or other [perceptible] things, is also wrongly attributed to the Self, and although in so far as it is primary- substance it should be experienced as being unintelligent, nevertheless by transferring the quality of the Self to the thinking-substance, [the fluctuation of the thinking-substance] appears as if it were a fluctuation of the Self, as if it were an experience [of the Self]. And so although the Soul (atman) has no misconceptions, it seems to have misconceptions ; although not an ex- perience^ it seems to be an experiencer ; although it lacks the discriminative discernment, it seems to be provided with it, [and] it shines forth by the discriminative discernment.2 And this will be set forth in detail in this [sutra] [iv. 22], "The intellect (citi) which unites not [with objects] is conscious of its own thinking-substance when [the mind-stuff] takes its form [by reflecting it] ; " and in this [iii. 35], " Experience is undistinguished from a presented- idea on the part of the sa^va-aspect and of the Self, each absolutely uncom- mingled [in the presented idea]." And this has been established in another system also [the Sarhkhya]. Accordingly with the words «and so2> he intro- duces (aha) the sutra of Panca^kha the acarya, " There is only one appearance [for both], — that appearance is knowledge." The question is raised, ' How is there one appearance ? considering that you say that the fluctuation of the thinking-substance — occupied on the one hand with the different kinds of things, and occupied on the other hand with insight, and perceptible as being unintelligent in so far as it is primary-substance — is appearance ; and [considering that you at the same time say that] the Self's intelligence (caitanya), which is different from this and which is the perception, is [also] appearance.'
1 Literally : Although yet another Self- native discernment [that is, so long as
wrong-attribution possesses a fluctua- there is no discriminative discernment :
tion of the thinking-substance like the reading iva a vivekakhyfitydh]. Or: it
perception of sounds and so on, and seems to be provided with it during
although . . . the time of non-discriminative discern-
2 Reading iva vivekakhydtyd. Or : it seems ment [reading iva a-vivekakhydtydm].
to be provided with it up to discrimi-
i. 4 — ] Booh I. Concentration or Samddhi [16
To this he replies [in the words of Paflcacikha] <Kthat appearance is know- ledge.^ When he says <£only one2>, he says it with reference to ordinary (laukika) knowledge, [which is] a fluctuation subject to origination and dissolu- tion.1 But knowledge (khyati) is not intelligence (caitanya), [which latter is] the very nature of the Self. On the contrary that [i.e. intelligence] is concerned not with an ordinary perception (lokapratyaksa), but rather with verbal-com- munication and inference. Consequently after [the author of the Comment] has shown that undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) is the original cause [of making wrong attributions] in the emergent state, he suggests that this [consciousness] is the cause of the contact [of the Self with the thinking- substance], and also that the relation between property and proprietor is the cause of experience. He makes this [series of assertions] consistent by saying «Cthe mind-stuff.» Mind-stuff is the property of its proprietor, the Self: this is the connexion [of the statements]. The objection is made that that-by- which-one-is-intelligent (cetana), [namely,] the agent that is Master of the mind-stuff, accepts aid (upaMra) afforded by the mind-stuff, whereas it is impossible that he [the Master of the mind-stuff should accept] aid afforded by this [mind-stuff]. The reason for this is that there is no correlation [of the Self] with this [mind-stuff], since [the Self] cannot be aided [by it]. But on the other hand (ca) if it be the case (4ve) that there is a connexion with this [mind-stuff] or that aid is accepted from it, one would have to admit that [the Self] enters into mutation. In reply to this objection he says «like a magnet ; and, as an object suitable to be seen [by the Self as Witness], it gives its aid [to the Self] by the mere fact of being near it.» The mind-stuff is not in connexion with the Self, but is near it. [This] nearness, moreover, does not result from a correlation either spatially or temporally of the Self with it [the mind-stuff]. But the distinguishing characteristic [of this nearness] is [that the Self stands to the mind-stuff in a relation of] pre- established harmony (yogyata). Moreover the Self has the capacity for being the experiencer [while] the mind-stuff has the capacity for being experienced. Accordingly [mind-stuff] is described «as an object suitable to be seen.» In other words it is described as an object-for-experience when it enters into mutations which have the forms of various kinds of things (cabdadi). Although experience is a fluctuation in the form of sounds and of other [perceptible] things and is an external aspect (dharma : see iii. 13) of the mind -stuff, still it [experience] belongs to the Self, because the Self <takes the same form as the fluctuations :> [that is, because they result from the false supposition of an identity between mind-stuff and intelligence (caitanya) : this is what is
1 The original, udaya-vyaya-dharmini, may Digha-nikaya, ii. 157, ed. PTS. But
be a reminiscence of one of the most Vacaspati seems to understand it more
famous of all Buddhist gathas, pregnantly here as ' subject to rising
aniccct vata sankhara into and passing out of conscious-
uppada-vaya-dhammino, nesa '.
1 7] Five hinds of fluctuations [ — i. 5
meant. Therefore although there is no correlation with the mind-stuff, still it is established that the Self accepts aid afforded by it, and that it does not enter into mutation. A question is raised, ' The relation of property and proprietor is [we grant] the reason for experience and is subject to the condi- tions of undifferentiated-consciousness. But subject to what conditions is undifferentiated-consciousness? Not subject to conditions (as everybody admits) no effect is produced. As they say, "Is there any commencement of un- differentiated-consciousness for him [that is, man] as in the case of sleep and so on?"' While apparently summing up, he [in fact] removes this doubt with the words ^Hence the reason why . . . experiences the fluctuations of the mind-stuff.» The reason for the [Selfs] awareness of the mind-stuffs fluctuations in the form of tranquil and cruel and infatuated forms is the [above-mentioned] correlation, which is without beginning since it is under the conditions of undifferentiated-consciousness which is without beginning. And the serial-order (santana) of undifferentiated-consciousness and of the subconscious-impressions (vasana) is, like the serial-order of seed and sprout, without beginning.
Moreover these — for there are many such found in the mind-stuff — must be restricted.
5. The fluctuations are of five kinds and are hindered or unhindered.
The hindered (klistct) are those which are caused by the hindrances {kief a) [undifferentiated-consciousness, &c. : see ii. 3] and are the field for growth of the accumulation of the latent-deposits of karma ; the unhindered have discriminative discernment as their object and thus obstruct the task (adhikdra) of the aspects {guna). These are still unhindered even when they occur in the stream of the hindered. For even in the midst of the hindered [fluctuations] they are un- hindered ; while in the midst of the unhindered [they are] hindered. Corresponding subliminal-impressions are produced by nought else than [these] fluctuations, and fluctuations [are made] by subliminal- impressions. In this wise, the wheel of fluctuations and subliminal- impressions ceaselessly rolls1 on [until the highest concentration is attained]. Operating in this wise, this mind-stuff, having finished its task, abides in its own likeness, or [rather] becomes resolved [into primary substance]. — These, either hindered or unhindered, are the five-fold fluctuations.
1 Compare iv. 11, p. 2882 (Calc. ed.). 3 [h.o.s. 17]
i. 5 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [18
Let this be granted. Still a man is qualified for that in which he has capacity. Furthermore the restriction of fluctuations is impossible unless one has an idea of the fluctuations. And yet no one even in a thousand years could count them. Numberless as they are, how [then] can they be restricted ? In reply to this difficulty he introduces the sutra whose purpose is to teach us their number and their nature with the words ^Moreover these — for there are many such found in the mind-stuff — must be restricted :)» 5. The fluctuations are of five kinds and are hindered or unhindered. The fluctuations form a single whole. Of this [whole] there are five parts, and of them the first is the source- of-a- valid- idea. Accordingly, there is a fluctuation which has the parts of this [whole], [namely] five-fold, [that is] of five parts. And since these fluctuations are many, inasmuch as there are different mind-stuffs belonging to Chaitra and to Maitra and to other people, the use of the plural is consistent. What he wishes to say is this : Whether Chaitra or Maitra or any one else — of all these without exception, the fluctuations are of exactly five kinds [and there are] no more [fluctuations]. And the word <Kmind-stuff,» which has a collective sense (jatyabhipraya), is a singular, but is to be taken as [a plural,] mind-stuffs. He shows that there are differences of a subordinate kind which are serviceable in the pursuit [of yoga] in the words <hindered or unhindered.) By the help of the unhindered [fluctuations], the hindered should be restricted ; and the former, [should be restricted] by the higher passionlessness. He gives the explanation of this in the words <£caused by the hindrances ;2> in other words the fluctuations have the feeling-of-personality and the other hindrances as their cause of action. Another interpretation would be that, for a person whose chief end is to fulfil the purposes of the Self, those fluctuations which consist of rajas and tamas act as hindrances in so far they cause hindrance. «Hindrance» is in the sense [Pan. v. 2. 127] of having something hindered [as its effect]. This [hindrance] belongs to those [fluctuations] and therefore they are called hindered. — Since the action of those [hindered] fluctuations tends towards an increase of hindrance, it is they which are the field for growth of the accumulation of the latent- deposits of karma. For this observer [namely, the thinking-substance whose chief end is to fulfil the purposes of the Self] decides definitely (ava-saya) by sources-of-valid-ideas and in other ways what the [intended] object is and becomes attached to it or averse to it and [then] accumulates latent-deposits of karma. Thus, hindered fluctuations become the soil for the propagation of the accumu- lated merit and demerit. He explains the unhindered [fluctuations] by saying that they <Khave discriminative discernment as their object.^ When the sattva of the thinking-substance is cleansed of rajas and tamas and flows calmly onwards, the clearing of the insight {prajha) is the [discriminative] discernment. By [thus speaking of] that which has [discernment as its] object he partially describes that discrimination (viveJca), between sattva and the Self, which is the object of this [insight]. Accordingly, since [the unhindered] have as their object the discrimination of [the difference between] the sattva and the Self, for
19] Mingling of fluctuations [ — i. 6
this very reason they obstruct the task of the aspects (guna). Now the aspects have the task to develop products. Since moreover this [development] lasts until the end of discriminative discernment, and since when the. aspects have accomplished their task (adhikara) [these unhindered fluctuations] restrict their authority (adhiJcdra), for this reason sources-of-valid-ideas and the other fluctua- tions are these unhindered ones. [The objection is made :] ' This may be true. But all living creatures have hindered fluctuations only, since there is nothing born that is free from desire. Furthermore, unhindered fluctuations cannot exist in the stream of hindered fluctuations. And even if those [unhindered fluctuations] could exist, they could not produce effects since they have fallen into the midst of obstructors. Tor this reason restriction of the hindered by the unhindered and of these latter by the higher passion lessn ess is nothing more than a wish.' In reply to that objection he says <Kin the stream of the hindered. » Practice and passionlessness are produced by devoting oneself steadily to verbal communications and to inferences and to the instruction of teachers. <Kln the midst of the hindered» [means] among [them]. That they occur there means that they are in themselves quite unhindered although they occur in the stream of the hindered. Surely a Brahman, although he reside at Calagrama which is crowded with hundreds of Kiratas, is not [on that account] a Kirata. This is an example of what is meant by [occurring] in the midst of the unhindered. And in so far as they are found among the hindered, the unhindered, without being suppressed by the hindered, do after all, as gradually their own subliminal- impressions come to fruition, suppress the hindered. ^Corresponding^ means that unhindered subliminal-impressions [are produced] by unhindered fluctua- tions. This is that wheel of fluctuations and subliminal-impressions which ceaselessly rolls on until the concentration of restriction [is attained]. Operating in this wise, the mind-stuff reaches the state of restriction and, coming [then] to consist of nothing but subliminal-impressions, abides in its own likeness (atmaJcalpena) : this is the superficial view. Or else — and this is the stricter view — it becomes resolved into primary substance. — He joins together the meaning of sutras [5 and 6] by the word «These.» — The word «five-fold3> [literally, five times] is an expression of the sense merely ; but it is not a literal rendering of the force (vrtti) of the termination {gdbda), because it is not taught [by Panini, at v. 2. 42] that the termination taya (tayap) has the meaning of 'kinds'.
6. Sources-of-valid-ideas and misconceptions and predicate- relations and sleep and memory.
These [five] he announces by their technical names. 6. Sources-of-valid-ideas and misconceptions and predicate-relations and sleep and memory, [The compound] is analysed according to the order of words in the enumeration [of the sutra]. The compound is a copulative (cdrthe dvamdvak, Panini ii. 2. 29) in
i. 6 — ] Booh I. Concentration or Samddhi [20
the sense of mutual conjunction. — Just as once more in the statement [ii. 5], " The recognition of the permanent, of the pure, of pleasure, and of a self in what is impermanent, impure, pain, and non-self, — is undifferentiated-conscious- ness," such illusions as the loss of the sense of orientation or as the fire-brand [whirled about so as to be seen as a] circle, are not expressly excluded, — so here also, even in the mentioning of the sources-of-valid-ideas and the rest, since doubt as to the real existence of other fluctuations would not [otherwise] be excluded, in order to exclude them [these others], the words ' of five kinds ' should be added. Thus it becomes clear that fluctuations are just so many and no more.
7. Sources-of-valid-ideas are perception and inference and verbal-communication, i. Perception is that source-of- valid- ideas [which arises as a modification of the inner-organ] when the mind-stuff has been affected by some external thing through the channel of the sense-organs. This fluctuation is directly related to that [object], but, whereas the intended-object (artha) consists of a genus * and of a particular, it [the fluctuation] is chiefly concerned with the ascertainment of the particular [the genus being subordi- nate in perception to the particular]. The result [of perception] is an illumination by the Self (pduruseya) of a fluctuation which belongs to the mind-stuff, [an illumination which is] undistinguished (a-vipsta), [that is, one in which the Self does not distinguish itself from the thinking-substance], [as] we shall explain in detail hereafter [ii. 17] in the passage 2 beginning " Self is conscious-by- reflection of the thinking-substance." ii. Inference is [that] fluctuation [of the mind-stuff] which refers (-visayd) to that (tat-) relation (sambandha) which is present in things belonging to the same class as the subject- of-the-illation (anumeya) and absent from things belonging to classes different [from that of the subject-of-the-illation] ; and it is chiefly concerned with the ascertainment of the genus. Thus, for instance, the moon and stars possess motion, because, like [any man, for instance,] Chaitra, they get from one place to another ; and because [negatively] the Vindhya [mountain-range] does not get [from one place to another, it] does not possess motion, iii. A thing which has been seen or inferred by a trustworthy person is men-
1 Compare ii. 14, p. 2143 ; iii. 44, p. 2572 (Calc ed.). 2 Compare also i. 29 ; ii. 20 ; iv. 19.
21] Sources of valid ideas [ — i. 7
tioned by word in order that his knowledge [thereof] may pass over to some other person. The fluctuation [in the mind-stuff] of the hearer which arises from that word and which relates to the object- intended by that [word] (tad-artha-visayd) is a verbal-communica- tion. That verbal-communication is said to waver, the utterer of which declares an incredible thing, not a thing which he himself has seen or inferred ; but if the original utterer has himself seen or inferred the thing, [then the verbal-communication] would be un- wavering.
Among these [five], [of one, that is,] the fluctuation which is the source-of- valid- ideas, he gives (aha) [what may pass as the naturally expected] general dis- tinguishing characteristic (laJcsana), by analysing [that one into three and saying] : 7. The sourees-of-valid-ideas are perception and inference and verbal-communication. A valid-idea (prarnd) is an illumination of a thing 1 not already presented and is caused by the operation of the Self. The instrument for this is the source-of-the-valid-idea (pramdna). And the mention [of the sources-of- valid-ideas] analytically [is] for the purpose of definitely excluding either a less or a greater number.
i. Of these [three] he gives first the distinguishing-characteristic of percep- tion, since it is the root of all the [other] sources-of- valid-ideas, in the words beginning ^Cof the sense-organs.^ By using the words «intended-object2> he rejects [the doctrine of maya according to which the object is] a false attribution. With the words <Kdirectly related to that,^ in so far as [the fluctuation] has an external field-of-action, he renounces [the Buddhist doctrine which conceives] the field-of-action as having the form of mental-objects [literally, form of knowledge]. With the words ^affected by some external things he shows what the relation is between something to be externally known and [the object] in the form of a sensation which is found in the mind- stuff. With the words <Kthrough the channel of the sense-organs» he tells the reason for the affect of this [external thing] upon the [mind-stuff which is] separated 2 [from it by the sense-organ in question]. — The object is the genus and nothing more : thus some maintain. Particulars only : thus others. Members of yet other schools [say that the object is something that has] the genus and the particular as its properties. To reject these [points of view] he says that [the object] ^consists of a genus and of a particular. » The object does not have these two as its properties ; but it consists of these two [by a relation of identity]. This will again be the topic of discussion in that passage [iii. 13] where it is said "since we do not maintain an absolute unity." With the words
1 Literally, Of a that-ness not yet presented recognized as existent but of unknown
to consciousness. That is, something quality.
2 Vyavahita : compare Samkhya Karika 7.
i. 7 — ] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [22
^Cchiefly concerned with the ascertainment of the particular^ he distinguishes that which relates to perception from that which relates to inference and to verbal-communication. In other words, although the genus itself does shine forth [into consciousness] in perception, still it is subordinated to the particular. This would also be a partial characterization of direct experience (saksatTtara). And so even the discriminative-discernment receives its characteristic mark. — With the words «The result [of perception] is an illumination by the Self of a fluctuation which belongs to the mind-stuff >» he denies that there is any contradiction in the result. An objector asks how an illumination which is found in the Self can be the result of a fluctuation situated in the mind-stuff ? For surely when an axe ' is busy with a khadira-tree, it is not chopping on a palaca-tree. In reply [Vyasa] says ^undistinguished. S For the illumination whose seat is in the Self is not produced, but is the result when the intelligence (caitanya) is reflected in the mirror of the thinking-substance and assumes the form of that [thinking- substance] in so far as the fluctuation of the thinking-substance has the form of the object. And this [intelligence] in this [assumed] condition is undistinguished from the thinking-substance and has its being in the thinking-substance. More- over since the fluctuation has its being in the thinking-substance there is ground for the relation of the source-of-the-valid-idea to the result in the fact that [both] have the same locus [namely, in the thinking-substance]. And this he says «we shall explain^ in the passage " Self is conscious-by-reflection." ii. After perception [and before verbal-communication], because [in the first place] verbal-communication depends upon inference, in so far as it obtains its validity 2 from a knowledge of the connective-power-of- words (sambandha) result- ing from an inference with regard to a cognition (buddhi) on the part of the hearer which [inference] is based on actions and so on, and [in the second place] because [in this sutra] the inferred is folio wed-in-enumeration by verbal-commu- nication,— [therefore] he gives the characteristic marks of inference, before [he gives those of] verbal-communication, in the words «subject-of-the-illation.» A subject-of-illation is a subject (dharmin) distinguished by attributes (dharma) which we wish to know. Things belonging to the same class with it [the subject-of-illation], [are] objects similar to the genus which is an attribute of the major-term (sadhya), [that is, objects that are] similar instances {sapaksa). «£Which is presents in these [things belonging to the same class], — with these words he excludes [both] contrariety s and lack of community as between an attribute of the middle-term (sddhana-dharma) [and the attributes of the major].' Things belonging to different classes are dissimilar instances, and they are other than the similar instances, [that is,] contrary to them and containing the nega- tion of them. ^Absents from these [things belonging to a different class].
1 See G. A. Jacob : A Handful of Popular 2 Samutihatayd : samarthyam grhndti, Bala- Maxims, part 1, 2nd edition, 1907, rama.
p. 32. s See Athalye and Bod as, Tarka-samgraha,
§ 54, p. 306, and § 53, p. 302.
23] Perception and inference and verbal-commwiication [ — i. 7
Accordingly (tad) by this he rules out over-inclusive (sadharana) non-coextensive- ness (anaikantikatva). Things-are-brought-into-relation — such is the use of the word <Krelation2>, a syllogistic-mark (linga). Thus describing the minor premiss (paJcsa-dharmatd) he avoids the fallacious-reasoning (asiddhata) [of the svarupa type1]. — <KRefers to that2> [means] having [necessary] con-nection with that, because of the etymology2 of the word <Krefers» (vi-saya) based on this [statement of Dhatu-patha, v. 2, that] "the root si means -nect." — With the words «the ascertainment of the genus» he distinguishes [the object of an inference] from the object of a perception. Inference arises on condition that there be an aware- ness of a relation [between two terms]. In so far as, in the case of particulars, one does not apprehend relations, it is only the genus which, as affording an easy apprehension of relations, comes into the discussion. For this he gives an example in the passage beginning «Thus, for instance.» The word ca [after the word Vindhya] carries with it a reason. — Because the Vindhya [range] has no motion, therefore it does not get [from one place to another]. Hence, as there is an absence of motion 3 (gati-nivrttdu), there is an absence of getting [from one place to another]. [And conversely,] because they do get from one place to another, the moon and stars, like Chaitra, do have motion. Thus [the point] is established. iii. Of the fluctuation which is a verbal-communication he gives the distinguish- ing characteristic in the words <Ka trustworthy persons [and so on]. Insight and compassionateness and dexterity-of-the-sense-organs combine into trust- worthiness. A man whose ways are governed by that is a trustworthy one. He is the one by whom the object is seen or inferred. Unless there be a heard word, there is no receiving [of the seen or inferred object on the part of another person], because, in so far as this [word] is rooted in something seen or inferred, it is only by these two that its meaning becomes complete. «CHis knowledge [thereof] passing overX> [to some other person] means that in the mind-stuff of the hearer there arises [into consciousness] knowledge similar to knowledge found in the mind-stuff of the trustworthy person. To effect this [passing], «a thing is mentioned» [that is,] is made known, as a means to obtain what is good for the hearer and to avoid what is bad [for him]. The rest is easy. The verbal-communication <£the utterer of which declares an incredible things — for example, 'These identical ten pomegranates are going to be six cakes4,' — <Knot a thing which he himself has seen or inferred^ — for example, ' A shrine let him worship who desireth heaven,' — that verbal-communication «wavers.» An objector says, ' If that be so, then the verbal-communication even of such persons as Manu would waver, [and thus they would not be supreme authorities,] for even they [declared] things which they themselves had not seen or inferred.'
1 See Athalye, p. 310. ' to stand still means not to move '.
2 According to this, visaya ought to mean 4 This is an allusion to Patanjali's Maha-
' dis-nection '. In fact it means ' sphere bhasya on i. 2. 45 (Kielhorn i. 21713).
of action ' from root vis ' act \ Cakes (apupa) are made with ghee : see
3 See Dhatu-patha, i. 975, sthd gati-nivrttdu, Sayana on R V. x. 45. 9.
i. 7 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [24
In reply he says <Kbut if the original utterer.» For in case of such persons (tatra), the original utterer was the Icvara, who had himself seen or inferred the things. For instance, it is said [at Manu ii. 7], " Whatever law has been ordained for any person by Manu, every such [law had been already] laid down in the Veda. That, surely, contains within itself all knowledge." This is the meaning.
8. Misconception is an erroneous idea (jndna) not based on that form [in respect of which the misconception is enter- tained].
Why is it not a source-of-a- valid-idea ? Because it is inhibited by the source-of-a-valid-idea, for the reason that the source-of-a-valid- idea has as its object a positive fact. In such cases there is evidently an inhibition of the source-of-the-in valid-idea by the source-of-the- valid-idea, as for instance the [erroneous] visual-perception of two moons is inhibited by the actual (sad-visaya) visual-perception of one moon. This [fluctuation, namely, misconception] proves to be that [well-known] five-jointed undifferentiated-consciousness [the joints of which are enumerated at ii. 3 in the words] : " UndifFeren- tiated-consciousness and the feeling-of-personality and passion and hatred and the will-to-live are the hindrances." These same [are known] by peculiar technical x designations : Obscurity and Infatua- tion and Extreme Infatuation and Darkness and Blind-Darkness. These will be discussed in connexion with the subject of the defile- ments of the mind-stuff.
8. Misconception is an erroneous idea not based on that form [in respect of which the misconception is entertained]. The word <Misconception> indicates the thing to be characterized ; the words <erroneous idea> and so on [give] the distinguishing characteristic. A form which appears [in conscious- ness] as an idea (jndna) is un-based on that form, [or, to put it as does the sutra,] <not based on that form>. As, [to give another example in which the negation applies to the action2 and not to the object,] • One who eats not the funeral-feast.' Accordingly doubt also would be included [in the definition of misconception]. But there is a distinction to this extent : in this case [the case of doubt] the failure to be based [on the true form] is overridden by a [clear] perception (jndna) ; but [in the other case], such as [the vision] of two moons, [the misconception is over-
1 Compare Visnu Pur. i. 5. 5. rupa. Compare Patanjali : Maha-
2 A case of prasajya-pratisedha. The nega- bhasya, Kielhorn's edition, i, p. 215,
tion applies to pratisfha and not to last line; 221u ; 31912; 34P.
25] Nature of misconception [ — i. 8
ridden] by the perception of the inhibition [of the one idea by the other idea]. An objector says, ' If this be granted, the predicate-relation (vikalpa), in that it is not based on the true form, would also upon consideration prove to be a mis- conception.' In reply to this he says 4Can erroneous perception.^ For these words describe an inhibition familiar in common experience to everybody.1 Now this [inhibition] occurs in misconception ; but not in the predicate-relation, for- asmuch as the business-of-life [is done] by this [predicate-relation], and because, on the other hand, only the learned kind of persons when they might be engaged in reflection would have in this matter any idea of an inhibition. — [The author of the Comment] puts forward the objection «Why is it not a source-of-a-valid- idea ? » The point is that a previous [perception] should not be inhibited by a later [perception] which has incurred contradiction ; on the contrary the later [perception should be inhibited] by just that previous [perception] which occurred first and has not incurred contradiction. He gives the rebuttal in the words <KBecause ... by the source-of-a-valid-idea.^ For this rule [of the Mimansa] applies (evam) when a later [perception] arises in dependence upon a previous. But in this present case two perceptions, each from its particular cause, in entire inde- pendence of each other, spring up. Accordingly the later [perception] does not attain to a rise [into consciousness] unless it has destroyed the earlier [perception] ; and in fact its rise [into consciousness] has its being in the removal of that [previous perception] by inhibition. But it is not true that the rise [into con- sciousness] of a previous [perception] has its being in an inhibition of the later, for the reason that, at that time [the time of the earlier perception], this [later per- ception] does not yet exist. Hence the fact that [one perception] has not incurred contradiction is the reason why [another perception] is to be inhibited ; and [hence also] the fact that [a perception] has incurred contradiction [is the reason] why it should act as inhibitor. Consequently it is established that the source-of -a- valid- idea, because its object is a positive fact, can inhibit the source-of-an-invalid-idea.
An example is given in the words 4Cln such cases by the source-of-the-
valid-idea.» In order that it may be rejected, he shows the worthlessness of this [source-of-invalid-ideas, i.e., of undifferentiated-consciousness] in the words «This . . . that . . five.» So, undifferentiated-consciousness as a genus [exists] in five special-forms [literally, in five joints], namely, undifferentiated-conscious- ness, sense-of-personality, and so on. The mental-process (buddhi) which [recog- nizes : compare ii. 5] the self in eight forms which are not the self, that is, in the undeveloped [primary substance] and in the Great [thinking-substance] and in the substance of personality and in the five subtile-elements (tanmdtra), — is undifferentiated-consciousness, the [so-called] Obscurity. Similarly the mental- process which [recognizes] welfare {(^reyas) in forms where no welfare is, in atomization (animan : technical, see iii. 45) and the rest of the eight supremacies of yogins, is eight-fold, the [so-called] Infatuation. [This is] worse than the pre-
1 On the form sarvajanlna see Pan. iv. 4. 99, Siddhanta Kaumudi, § 1651, or Whitney's Grammar, 1223 d.
i. 8 — ] Booh I. Concentration or Samddhi [26
ceding. And this is called the sense-of-personality (asmitd). In this way, after one has obtained eight-fold supremacy by yoga and after becoming perfected (siddha), the resolution (atmika pratipattik) to enjoy the ten objects which are seen [in the world] (drsta-) and taught [in the qastra] (anuqravika : see i. 15) is [called] Extreme Infatuation ; this is desire. In case atomization and the other supre- macies do not come-into-play (an-utpattdu), because while working on in this way with this same intention he is impeded by something or other, [then, ] while he is bound down by this [impediment,] there arises, from the failure to enjoy the objects seen [in the world] and taught [in the $astra], anger towards the im- pediment. This is the so-called Darkness ; this is hatred. In like manner, if he have success with the [supernatural] qualities, atomization and so on, and if he dwell in thought close to the objects seen [in the world] and taught [in the qastra], [then] the fear that all this will perish at the end of the mundane period is the will-to-live, the [so-called] Blind-Darkness. It hath been said [Samkhya- karika1 xlviii] "There are eight different kinds of Obscurity and of Infatua- tion. Extreme Infatuation is of ten kinds. Darkness is eighteen-fold ; likewise Blind-Darkness."
9. The predicate-relation (vikalpa) is without any [corre- sponding perceptible] object and follows as a result of perceptions or of words.
This [predicate-relation] does not amount to a source-of-valid-ideas, nor does it amount to a misconception. In spite of the fact that there is no [corresponding perceptible] object, [nevertheless,] because there is dependence upon the authority of perceptions or of words, something is evidently said [literally, there appears something- said (vyavahdra) which possesses a dependence]. Thus for instance, when it is said [by some philosophers] that ■ The true nature of the Self is intelligence (cditanya) ', then in this case [of absence of per- ceptible object] we may well ask — since the Self is itself nothing but intelligence — what thing is in the attributive relation to what [other] thing? For (ca)2 the expressive-force (vrtti) [of language] lies in the attributive-relation, as for instance ' Chaitra's cow '. [The eow is distinguished as being Chaitra's, who is something different from her.] Likewise [there is expressive-force when the subject and the predicate are identical, when for instance] the Self is said to be the unchanging [Absolute and thus is characterized] by the negation of some quality which is found in some [percep- 1 Compare (the unedited) Civa-sutras ii. 13. J For ca meaning ' for', see p. 23ls, above.
27] Nature of predicate-relation [ — i. 9
tible] thing.1 [Or when there is a connexion between a positive and a negative, when for instance] it is said, The arrow comes to a standstill [or] will come to a standstill [or] has come to a stand- still. The bare meaning of the verbal-root [sthd, ' stand still ' : com- pare page 23] is understood to be ' not to move '. [In this case also there is expressive-force in the attributive relation even in the absence of any factor or kdraka.'] So too [there is expressive- force] in the sentence ' The Self is something which has the property that it does not come into existence.' All that is meant is that there is an absence of the property of coming into existence ; not [any negative] property inherent in the Self. Therefore this property [which is a negation so far as perceptible objects are concerned] is predicated and as such it is something-that-is-thought (vyavahdra).
9. The predicate -relation (viJcalpa) is without any [corresponding per- ceptible] object and follows as a result of perceptions or of words. The objection is made that, if the predicate-relation follows as a result of percep- tions or of words, then one would have to admit that it is included under [that] source-of- valid-ideas [which is termed] verbal-communication, or [on the other hand], if the predicate-relation has no [corresponding perceptible] object, it ought to be a misconception. In reply to this he says <SThis [predicate-relation] does not.)5> This is not included among sources-of-valid-ideas nor among misconcep- tions. "Why not ? Because he says <£object.» With the words «In spite of the fact that there is no [corresponding perceptible] object,S> he denies that [the predicate-relation] is included among sources-of-valid-ideas. And with the words <Kbecause there is dependence upon the authority of perceptions or of words, » [he denies] that it is included among misconceptions. "What he means to say is that a man in some cases falsely attributes diversity to things that are identical, and again in other cases identity to things that are diverse. There- fore since identity and diversity are non-existent as perceptible objects, the portrayal (dbhasa) of these two is a predicate-relation [and] not the source-of- a-valid-idea. Nor yet would it be a misconception, because it is not in contradic- tion with the fact that something is said. He gives an illustration which is well established in the systems (gastra) in the words «Thus for instance.^ "What subject (vigesya) is in the attributive-relation (vyapadigyate), that is, is defined (vigesyate) by what [other] thing ? For when there is identity, there is no rela- tion of subject and predicate. Because [for instance] a cow cannot be defined as a cow ; but by something different [from herself J, by Chaitra. To this he replies by the phrase «For the expressive-force [of language] lies in the attributive-relation. )» The relation between that to which the attribute is 1 Literally ' possessing negated perceptible-objcct-qualitics '.
i. 9 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [28
to be applied and that which furnishes the attribute is the attributive- relation, that is to say, the relation-of-predicate-and-subject. In this [lies] the expressive-force (vrtti) of the sentence «as for instance Chaitra's cow.S He adds another example found nowhere but in the books of the systems (cdstrlya), ^Likewise [there is expressive-force]. S [A negated quality found in some per- ceptible thing would be, for instance,] motion, a quality belonging to some such [perceptible] thing as earth [and this quality as belonging to the Self] is negated. Who would that one [thus characterized] be ? «The Self is said to be the unchanging [Absolute].^ Surely it cannot be urged in a Samkhya system that there is a certain quality in perceptible-objects called non-existence and that the Self could be defined by this. — Sometimes there is found a reading ' Qualities of a perceptible thing are negated '. The meaning of this would be that negated [qualities] are those concomitant with negation ; qualities of [perceptible] objects cannot be concomitant with this [negation], because [in them] there cannot be a connexion between an existent and a non-existent. While on the other hand in this way [by the predicate-relation] there is distinct-knowledge. — In the words <£The arrow is coming to a standstills he gives an example from everyday life. Now just as when we say ' he cooks ' or ' he chops ', we mean that the accumu- lated moments of an action in serial order and characterized by a unity in the result are distinctly known, so it is also quite as truly a serial order to which he refers when he says «comes to a standstill.^ When he says <Kwili come to a standstill, has come to a standstill,^ — then some objector may say, 'If we grant [that the action of coming to a standstill is] like that of cooking, then the arrow could have as its attribute an action, namely, stopping still,1 which is in a serial order and is over-and-above {bhinna) the arrow itself.' To this he replies, [that stopping still is not a series of actions, but that] «The bare meaning2 of the verbal-root is understood to be 'not to move'.S To begin with (tavat), not-to-move is a mental-structure (kalpita) ; then too (api) the exis- tence-in-positive-form (bMvarupatva) of this [non-moving (reading tasya api)] [is a mental-structure] ; [and] then too a serial order in this [existence-in-positive- form] [is again a mental-structure] — if that's what you mean (iti), whew! what a string of mental-structures ! — such is the intention [of the Comment.] — [On the other hand,] a non-existent is conceived {gamyate) as in relation with all the Selves, [although not with perceptible-objects,] not only (ca) as if it were an existent, but also (ca) as if it were inherent (anugata) — [provided it be] a mental- structure.3 But a [non-existent is] not any kind of a property [existentially] distinct from the Self. By way of another illustration, he says, «So too ....
1 The words sthasyati, sthita and so forth of assertion, but no less also in terms
explain the succession implied in the of negation, and both may be equally
word tisihati. inherent in the concept of the Self, as
9 Compare Patanjali : Mahabhasya on Pa- when we say ' Not coming into exie-
nini i. 3. 2, vart. 11 (Kielhorn i. 25818f)- tence is a property of the Self, or
1 The Self (purum) can be defined in terms ' The Self is un-changing '.
29] Nature of sleep [ — i. 10
the property that it does not come into existence.^ — Many thinkers [of the Mimansa and Nyaya schools] have advanced the assertion that there is no fluctuation [called] predicate-relation other than the source-of-valid-ideas or the misconception. To enlighten them, is, as we may suppose, the purpose of this abundance of illustration.
10. Sleep is a fluctuation [of mind-stuff] supported by the cause (pratyaya, that is tamas) of the [transient] negation [of the waking and the dreaming fluctuations].1
And this [fluctuation] by [the operation of] connecting-memory becomes, upon awakening, a special kind of presented-idea (pratyaya). How is it that one can reflect : ' I have slept well, my mind is calm, it makes my understanding clear ; I have slept poorly, my mind is dull, it wanders unsteadfast ; I have slept in deep stupor, my limbs are heavy, my mind remains unrefreshed (kldnta) and languid and as it were stolen [from my grasp] ? ' [The answer is : ] the man [just after] awakening would of course not have this connecting-memory, had there not been [during sleep, some] experi- ence of [this form] of a cause (pratyaya, that is tamas) ; nor would he have the memories based upon it and corresponding with it [at the time of waking]. Therefore sleep is a particular kind of pre- sented-idea (pratyaya) ; and in concentration it also, like any other presented-idea, must be restricted.
10. Sleep is a fluctuation [of mind-stuff] supported by the cause of the [transient] negation [of the waking and the dreaming fluctuations].1 For, the word ' fluctuation ' given-in-the-topical [sutra i. 5] is made-the-subject-of- an-assertion [here]. Because, with regard to sources-of-valid -ideas and misconcep- tions and predicate-relations and memories being fluctuations, there is no disagree- ment among investigators, — therefore this word is-made-the-subject-of-an-assertion (anudyate) [namely, that one of the fluctuations is sleep,] in order that this particular [fluctuation] may be mentioned. But as to whether sleep is a fluctua- tion or not, there is disagreement among investigators. Accordingly it must be expressly said that it is a fluctuation. And the fact that the matter-in-hand [namely, that one of the fluctuations is sleep] is made-the-subject2-of-an-assertion cannot serve as an express statement [to the effect that sleep is a fluctuation].
1 The point here is that sleep is a positive fore of sufficient importance to require
experience and not, as some Vedantins, an explicit assertion.
Udayana, for instance, would teach, the 2 Compare Jacobi : Anandavardhana's absence of a fluctuation. It is there- Dhvanyaloka, p. 23, note 1.
i. 10 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [30
Consequently the word fluctuation is used [here] again. That fluctuation is called sleep the object or support of which is a cause (pratyaya), that is, a cause (karana), — the tamas which covers over the substance (sattva) of the thinking- substance, — of the [transient] negation of the fluctuations of waking or of dreams. For the substance of the thinking-substance has three aspects ; and when tamas, the coverer of all the organs, preponderates over sattva and rajas and becomes manifest (avis), then, because there is no mutation of the thinking- substance into the form of an object, the Self, aware of a thinking-substance which consists of intensified tamas, is in deep sleep and inwardly conscious. Thus it is explained.
[An objection :] why not consider sleep to be merely an absence of fluctuations, as in the case of restricted isolation (kdivalya)? He answers «This.» And this [fluctuation] by [the operation of] connecting-memory, that is, a remem- brance which can be made the basis of an argument (sopapattiJca), is a special kind of presented-idea. How [is the argument ? He replies] : When tamas is manifest in company with sattva, then the connecting-memory of a man just arisen from sleep is of such a kind that he reflects <Kl have slept well, my mind is calm, it makes my understanding clear ;S> clarifies it, in other words. But when tamas is manifest in company with rajas, then the connecting- memory is of such a kind that he reflects (aha) <Kl have slept poorly,» in other words, my mind is dull and unfit for work. "Why? Since it wanders unstead- fast. [The author of the Comment] describes the connecting-memory, of a man [just] awakened, with reference to a sleep in which tamas, preponderating altogether over rajas and sattva, comes-quite-to-the-fore (samullase), in the words <£l have slept in deep stupor, my limbs are heavy, my mind remains unrefreshed and languid and as it were stolen [from my grasp]. ^ — In the words «... of course not have this . . .,» he gives a negative instance of the middle-term (hetu), [that is, experience,] in order to show that the major-term (sadhya) [that is, memories] does not exist. «Awakening» means just after awakening. «[Had there not been during sleep, some] experience of [this form] of a caused means [had there not been] an experience of the cause of the [transient] negation of the fluctuation. «Based upon it2> is said with reference to the time of waking. An objection is made that sources-of-valid-ideas and other fluctuations have their locus in the emergent mind-stuff and must be restricted because they are enemies to concentration ; but that sleep, since it amounts to a fluctuation single-in- intent, is in no wise a foe to concentration. To this he replies with the words «And in concentration.^ Sleep, to be sure, does amount to [a fluctuation] single- in-intent; but, because of its quality of tamas, it is a foe to concentration-with- seed and to seedless-[concentration], [that is, concentration without subliminal- impressions]. And therefore it also must be restricted : this is the meaning.
31]
Nature of Memo ry
[-i.il
11. Memory (smrti) is not-adding-surreptitiously (asampra- mosa) to a once experienced object.
Does the mind-stuff remember the presented-idea or does it [remember] the object ? The presented-idea, if affected by the object-known (grdhya), shines-forth-in-consciousness (nirbhdsa) in a form x of both kinds, both of the object-known and of the process- of-knowing (grahana), and gives a start to the corresponding subliminal-impression. This subliminal-impression [of these two kinds changes into] its phenomenal [form 2] by the operation of the conditions-which-phenomenalize {vyanjaka) it (sva) [that is to say, the subliminal-impression], and brings forth [in its turn] a memory which [also] consists of the object known and of the process-of-knowing. With regard to these two (tatra), — in the case of the idea (buddhi), the form of the process-of-knowing is predomi- nant ; and in the case of memory, the form of the object-known is predominant. The latter [that is, memory] is of two kinds, in that the-things-to-be-remembered are imagined (bhdvita) or not imagined. In a dream the-things-to-be-remembered are imagined, whereas in waking the-things-to-be-remembered are not imagined. All memories arise out of an experience either of sources-of-valid-
1 The object as such is not directly per-
ceived, but only its form (akara) as reproduced in the thinking-substance (buddhi-sattva), which in its turn reflects the image cast upon it by the Self.
2 Literally, " possessing a manifestation of
the manifester of itself." (1) The word sva denotes some mutation or time- form or intensity [iii. 13] yet to be phenomenalized. Anger or fear would serve as an example. (2) The word vyanjaka denotes the conditions which transform the unphenomenalized-form into a phenomenon. The approach of the tiger would be a concrete example. (3) The word anjana, that is prakagana or dvirbhdvaka, is the presented-idea of the tiger. The discussion is not with regard to things in themselves, but to their phenomenal forms. A phenome- nalized-form (yyakti) is in Vacaspati-
micra's terminology equivalent to a fluctuation (vrtti). And this pheno- menalized-form is further conceived to be any change in a substance (dharmin) which realizes some purpose (arthakriydkdritva). When we so regard a substance that we see it doing any- thing which interests us, we call it a thing, in other words, a mutation (parinama) or a phenomenalized-form (vyakli). Consequently things do not arise and pass out of existence, as Buddhists would contend ; but our conscious experience temporarily iso- lates successive phenomenal aspects of permanent substances. In fine, all phenomena are latent or implicit in the substance and become fluctuating or explicit under certain determined conditions.
i. 11 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [32
ideas or of misconceptions or of predicate-relations or of sleep or of memory. And all these fluctuations have as their being pleasure and pain and infatuation ; and pleasure and pain and infatuation are to be explained among the hindrances [ii. 3-9] : " Desire is that which dwells upon pleasure " [ii. 7] ; " Aversion is that which dwells upon pain " [ii. 8] ; while undifferentiated-consciousness is the same as infatuation. All these fluctuations must be restricted. Because it is [only] upon their restriction that there ensues concentration whether conscious or not conscious [of objects].1
11. Memory (smrti) is not-adding-surreptitiously (asampramosa) to a once experienced object.
This not-adding-surreptitiously-to, which is the same as not stealing for, an object once experienced by means of sources-of-valid-ideas and other fluctuations is memory. For in the case of knowledge produced by nothing but a subliminal- impression, the object which appeared in that experience which was the cause of the subliminal-impression, is the own peculiar [object of that knowledge]. But the appropriation of any object in addition to that [own peculiar object] is a surreptitious addition, that is, a stealing [from other experiences]. Why [is there any stealing at all] ? Because there is similarity [between the subliminal- impression and other experiences]. — Since this word <Ksurreptitious adding» (sam- pra-mosa) is etymologically derived 2 from the root mus ' to steal '. What he means to say is this : all sources-of-valid-ideas and other fluctuations give access (adhi-gam), either by the generic or the special form, to a hitherto inaccessible object. But memory does not go beyond the limits of a previous experience. It corresponds with that [previous experience] or corresponds with less than that, but it does not correspond to [any experience] in addition to that. This fact distinguishes memory from other fluctuations. — He puts forth for discussion the problem CDoes [the mind-stuff remember] the presented-idea?» Because experience (anubhava) directs itself towards the object-known, [therefore] the subliminal-impression resulting from it {taj-ja), [that is, from experience,] since it has no [present] experience of its own, makes us remember only the object- known : this is one view of the case. [Another view is that the subliminal- impression makes us remember] only the experience [of knowing], for the reason that [subliminal-impressions] are derived solely from experience. After putting forth this problem, [the author of the Comment,] byway of bringing the two views into consistency, decides that remembrance must be of both kinds. In so far as it directs itself towards the object-known, [the subliminal-impression] is affected by the object-known. But, strictly speaking, it makes-to-shine- forth-in-consciousness, [that is,] it illumines, not only the object-known but also
1 Compare the definition of memory as a tion ', at Philebus 34 A a-arrjpia alrrdfj-
' keeping or maintenance of a sensa- a-tas. 8 Dhatu patha i. 707.
33] Contrast between perception and memory [ — i. n
the process-of-knowing, that is, the form of both kinds, the nature of the two. This [subliminal-impression] is thus described as one which has the manifesta- tion (anjana) or form (dJcdra) of the manifester (vyahjaha) or cause (kdrana) of itself, in other words, which has the form of the cause of itself. [The subliminal- impression produces a memory corresponding to the cause of that impression, that is, to the experience (anubhava). ] Another interpretation would be that [this subliminal-impression is one] which has the manifestation (anjana) or the bringing-to-the-point-of-fruition (phaldbhimukhlkaratia) of the manifester (vyanjaka) or suggestive-stimulus (udbodhaJca). An objection is made : ' If, in so far as both refer to the cause [that is, to experience], there is a similarity between the idea (buddhi) and the remembi'ance, then what difference is there between them ? ' In reply to this he says <KWith regard to these two . . . the process-of-knowing. 2> i. [Perception :] the process-of-knowing (grahana) is an apprehending (upaddna). And there cannot be an apprehending of that which is [already] known. Accordingly an idea (buddhi) is said to be an illumination (bodhana) of that which has not been already got at (adhigata) by this [process-of-knowing]. This [idea] is that in which the configuration (dJcara) or form (rupa) of the process-of-knowing is the predominant or principal [element]. Though the relation between the idea and the process-of-knowing is one of identity, [still] l by predicating [the one of the other] the relation may be treated here as if it were that of principal and subordinate, ii. [Memory :] that whose predominant or primary [element] is the configuration of the object-known. This same predominance of the object-known in the configuration of the object-known lies in the fact that the object-intended (artha) has already been made the object of one of the other [four] fluctuations. Accordingly memory is declared to be concerned with objects which have already been made the object of one of the other fluctuations : this is precisely what is meant by not adding surreptitiously [to the once experienced object]. It might be urged that there is even in memory a surreptitious addition. For in a dream one's parents and others deceased who have been experienced in one time and place are brought [by memory] into relation with another time and place not previously experienced. The reply is «The latter [that is, memoiy] is of two kinds :» that [memory] by which imagined or mentally-constructed things are to be remembered ; [that memory by which] not imagined, that is, not mentally-constructed [or] real things [are to be remembered]. This [memory of imagined things] is not [really] memory, but is misconception ; because it agrees with the characteristic-mark [i. 8] of this [misconception]. But it is called memory in so far as it resembles memory, just as that which resembles a source-of-valid-ideas is called a source-of-valid-ideas. This is his point. — But why is memory placed at the end [of i. 6] ? To this he replies «A11 memories.» Experience (anubhava) means getting to [an object]. Memory is a fluctuation preceded by a getting to [an object]. [Not until] after this [getting to an object]
1 Literally, ' a relation of principal and subordinate is here (ayam) predicated.' 5 [h.o.s. it]
i. ll — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [34
do memories associate themselves [with the subliminal-impression and with the experience]. The objection is made that a reasonable person should restrict those objects only which hinder 1 a man. Moreover the hindrances [affect him] thus ; but fluctuations do not. Why then should these [fluctuations] be restricted ? In reply he says «And all these. » [The rest is] easy.
Now what means are there for the restriction of these [fluctuations] ? 12. The restriction of them is by [means of] practice and passionlessness.
The so-called river of mind-stuff, whose flow is in both directions, flows towards good and flows towards evil. Now when it is borne onward to Isolation [kdivalya], downward towards discrimination, then it is flowing unto good ; when it is borne onward to the whirl pool-of-existence, downward towards non-discrimination, then it is flowing unto evil. In these cases the stream towards objects is dammed by passionlessness, and the stream towards discrimina- tion has its flood-gate opened by practice in discriminatory know- ledge. Thus it appears that the restriction of the mind-stuff is dependent [for its accomplishment upon means] of both kinds, [practice and passionlessness].
With the word ^Cnow^ he asks what is the means for restriction. He gives the answer in the [following] sQtra : 12. The restriction of them is by [means of] practice and passionlessness. If the restriction is to be effected, then both [these] distinct activities, practice and passionlessness, must operate together, but not either one or the other separately.2 Accordingly he says «The river of mind-stuff.^ The words ^borne onward to>» [connote] a continuous connexion ; ^downward towards^ [suggest] depth or bottomlessness.
13. Practice (abhydsa) is [repeated] exertion to the end that
[the mind-stuff] shall have permanence in this [restricted
state].
Permanence is the condition of the unfluctuating mind-stuff when
it flows on in undisturbed calm. Practice is an effort (prayatna)
with this end in view, — a [consequent] energy, a persevering
1 Read kli^nanti. with the distinction that there be [two]
2 Literally, There is [ = must be] a piling-up- subordinate activities, but not an alter-
together (samuccaya) [= simultaneous native [action],
action] of practice and passionlessness,
35] Restriction of fluctuations by practice [ — i. 14
struggle, — the pursuit (anusthdna) of the course-of-action-requisite thereto with a desire of effectuating this [permanence].
Of these [two], he characterizes practice by telling what it is (svarupa) and what its purpose is, [and does so in the words] 13. Practice is [repeated] exertion to the end that [the mind-stuff] shall have permanence in this [re- stricted state]. This he discusses in the words «of the . . mind-stuff. » The word ^unfluctuating^ means without fluctuations of rajas and tamas. Its flowing on in undisturbed calm is stainlessness, is the flowing on of the fluctuations of sattva ; it is singleness-of-intent ; it is permanence. It is with this end in view [that there is practice]. In the words <shall have permanence) there is [a pregnant use of] the locative case expressive of the reason [for the action] as in the phrase "He kills the leopard for the sake of the skin." He makes the word «effort» clear by a pair of synonyms «a [consequent] energy, a persevering struggle.^ That this [effort] starts from a specific volition (iccM) he declares in the words «with a desire of effectuating this.» The word «this» refers to permanence. In the words «the course-of-action-requisite thereto^ he describes the goal of the effort. The [eight] means-of-attaining [this] permanence are the [three] inner means (anga) and the [five] outer means, of which [eight] the first [two] are the abstentions and the observances [ii. 30 and 32]. The sense is that the functional- activity of the agent is occupied with the means [of the action], and not with the result.
14. But this [practice] becomes confirmed when it has been cultivated for a long time and uninterruptedly and with earnest attention.
[Practice,] when it has been cultivated for a long time, cultivated without interruption, and carried out with self-cast igation and with continence and with knowledge and with faith, — in a word, with earnest attention, — becomes confirmed. In other words it is not likely to have its object suddenly overpowered by an emergent subliminal-impression.
An objection is made that practice is obstructed by emergent subliminal- impressions, which are the foes of practice [from time] without beginning. How does [practice] conduce to permanence? In reply he says, 14. But this [practice] becomes confirmed when it has been cultivated for a long time and uninterruptedly and with earnest attention. This same practice becomes a confirmed state only when (san) provided with [these] three qualifica- tions. And its goal, namely permanence, is not suddenly overrun by emergent subliminal-impressions. But if, even after having done practice of this kind, a man should fail to persevere, then in the course of time he might be overrun [reading abhibhuyeta]. Therefore one must not fail to persevere.
i. 15 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [36
15. Passionlessness is the consciousness of being master on the part of one who has rid himself of thirst for either seen or revealed objects.
The mind-stuff (citta), — if it be rid of thirst for objects that are seen, such as women, or food and drink, or power, — if it be rid of thirst for the objects revealed [in the Vedas], such as the attain- ment of heaven or of the discarnate state or of resolution into primary matter, — if, even when in contact with objects either super- normal or not, it be, by virtue of Elevation (prasamkhydna), aware of the inadequateness of objects, — [then the mind-stuff] will have a consciousness of being master, [a consciousness] which is essen- tially the absence of immediate-experience1 (abhoga) [and] has nothing to be rejected or received, [and that consciousness is] passionlessness.
He describes passionlessness. 15. Passionlessness is the consciousness of being master on the part of one who has rid himself of thirst for either seen or revealed objects. He describes this riddance from thirst for seen objects whether animate or inanimate in the words beginning with «women.» «Power)» is sovereignty. Eevelation is Veda ; <Krevealed» is that which is known from this [revelation], heaven for instance. Thirstlessness even for these things is specified in the words beginning <Kheaven.» <KDiscarnate» means without carnate body. «The discarnate stated is the state of those who are resolved into their organs. But there are others deeming themselves to be nothing but primary-matter, persons who worship primary-matter, who are resolved into primary-matter, which of course has its task [still unfulfilled in so far as primary-matter is for them an object of desire] : the state of these is ^resolution into primary-matter. » A man rids himself of a thirst which is directed to the attainment of this. Now one who is rid of thirst for a revealed object is said to be rid of a thirst which is directed to the attainment of heaven or the like. It might be objected : ' If passionlessness is riddance from thirst and nothing more, — why ! then this [riddance from thirst] exists even if you don't get to your objects. And for that reason (iti) [that riddance from thirst] would [also] be passionlessness.' The reply to this is in the words ^super- normal or not.» Passionlessness is not merely riddance from thirst. But it is [the consciousness of being master] on the part of the mind-stuff, and is
1 This word anabhoga occurs in Asariga's in classical Sanskrit. The fact that it
Mahayana-Sutralamkara (1907), p. 319. occurs here is another indication of the
In his translation (1911) on page 8, intimate relation between Patanjali and
note 7, Sylvain Levi discusses this word the Mahayana. Haribhadra Suri uses
and states that it apparently is lacking it at Yoga-bindu, vs. 91 and elsewhere.
37] Restriction of fluctuations by passionlessness [ — i. 16
essentially the absence of immediate-experience of objects whether supernal or not, even when in contact with them. This same [consciousness] he makes more clear by saying «[has nothing] to be rejected. » The words <Khas nothing to be rejected or received^ mean free from flaw of attachment. This 'idea, [a state of] indifference, is the ^consciousness of being master. » But whence comes this idea? In reply he says <Kby virtue of Elevation.^ Objects are encompassed by the three kinds of pain. That is their inadequateness. By meditation upon that, [results] a direct perception of it, [and that is] Elevation. By virtue of that. 1. The Consciousness of Endeavour (yatamana-samjna) ; 2. The Consciousness of Discrimination ; 3. The Consciousness of a Single Sense ; 4. The Consciousness of Being Master : these are the four consciousnesses, according to those who know the tradition. 1. Such things as desires are of course taints found in the mind-stuff. By these the senses (indriya) are turned each toward its particular object. So, in order that the senses may not turn toward this or that particular object, there is a beginning, an effort [made] to bring these taints to maturity [and thus to cast them off] : this is the Con- sciousness of Endeavour. 2. When this beginning is made, some taints have matured and others are maturing or are about to mature. In this [situation,] the ascertainment of the matured by [a process of] discriminating [them] from those about to mature is the Consciousness of Discrimination. 3. Inasmuch as the senses are [now] incapable of turning [toward objects], the matured [taints] per- sist in the central-organ 1 as a faint [barren] desire : the Consciousness of a Single Sense. 4. The faint [barren] desire also is destroyed and there is indifference to objects, whether supernal or not, even when they are close at hand : this idea (buddhi), higher than the other three [forms of consciousness], is the Conscious- ness of Being Master. And inasmuch as the [three] preceding ones have their purpose fulfilled by this same [fourth form of consciousness], therefore these are not separately mentioned. Thus all is quite cleared up.
16. This [passionlessness] is highest when discernment of the Self results in thirstlessness for qualities [and not merely for objects].
[One yogin becomes] passionless on knowing the inadequateness of [all] objects, seen or revealed. Through practice in the vision of the Self, [another yogin,] because his thinking-substance is satiated with a perfect discrimination, resulting from the purity of this [vision], [between the qualities (guna) and the Self], [becomes]
1 The central-organ (ntanas) is counted as the eleventh sense-organ and is the Single Sense here referred to.
i. 16 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [38
passionless with regard to [all] qualities whether perceptible or not- perceptible. Thus passionlessness is of two kinds. Of these [two], the latter is nothing but an undisturbed calm of perception [untouched by any objects whatsoever]. And at the rising of this [state, the yogin] on whom this insight has dawned, thus reflects within himself, ' That which was to be attained (prdpanlya) has been attained ; the hindrances which should have dwindled have dwindled ; the close-interlocked succession of existences-in-the- world, which — so long as it is not cut asunder — involves death after life and life after death, has been cut.' It is just this utter- most limit of knowledge that is passionlessness. For it is with this that Isolation, as they term it, is inseparably connected.
After describing the lower passionlessness he tells of the higher: 16. This [passionlessness] is highest when discernment of the Self results in thirst- lessness for qualities [and not merely for objects]. Lower passionlessness serves as a cause of higher passionlessness. He points out the means to this [higher passionlessness] in the words ^passionless on seeing the inadequateness of [all] objects, whether seen or revealed. » By this [statement] the lower passionlessness has been set forth. ^Practice in the vision of the Self » is the practice in that vision of the Self who has become accessible through verbal- communications and inference and the instruction of teachers. [This practice] is a constantly reiterated performance — through this. Purity of this vision is a focusedness upon sattva in so far as rajas and tamas have been rejected. Kesulting from this [purity] is that perfect discrimination between the qualities and the Self — to the effect that the Self is pure and exists from time-without- beginning, whereas the qualities [in respect of which it is not contaminated] are the opposite of this — by which [discrimination] the thinking-substance of the yogin is satiated (d-pyayita). It is to such a yogin that reference is made. Now these same words (anena) describe the concentration called the Eain-cloud of [knowable] Things [iv. 29]. A yogin of such a kind as this is altogether passion- less with regard to qualities (guna), whether their properties be developed or undeveloped, — that is to say, even to the extent that he is passionless with regard to the discernment of the difference between sattva and the Self, [for to this discernment] qualities are essential. — «Thus» that is, therefore, passionlessness is of two kinds. The first is when the substance (sattva) of the mind-stuff has [all] its tamas washed away by the excess of its sattva, and when the mind-stuff's sattva1 is in contagion with a tiny stain of rajas. This [passionlessness,]
1 This use of sattva is an intentional am- sattva (as a guna), which in the higher
biguity. Sattva is not only the ' sub- stages of attainment preponderates in
stance ' (of the mind-stuff), but is also the citta (Samkhya-sara, iii, near beg.).
39] Undisturbed calm of the Self [ — i. 16
moreover, is common to those also whose wishes have been fulfilled (taustika).1 For they also have by virtue of the same [discrimination] been merged in primary matter. In this same sense it has been said [Sariikhya-karika 45] "From discrimination results resolution into primary-matter." Among these, that is, of these two [kinds of passionlessness] the latter is nothing but an undisturbed calm of perception. The use of the words ^nothing but» indi- cates that this [passionlessness] is without any object. For it is the mind- stuffs substance (sattva) of precisely such a kind as this that is untouched by the stain of even a particle of rajas. This is the substrate for that [kind of passionlessness]. For this very reason it is called the undisturbed calm of perception. Because the substance (sattva) of the mind-stuff, although by nature undisturbed, [sometimes] experiences defilement from contact with rajas and tamas. But when all defilement by rajas and tamas is washed away by a stream of the undefiled water of passionlessness and practice, it [the substance of the mind-stuff] becomes absolutely undisturbedly calm and becomes so that nothing more is left of it than an undisturbed calm of perception. He shows its qualities so that we may be inclined to receive it. He says «Cat the rising of this.^ The meaning is : When this [state] arises, then the yogin — on whom this insight has dawned ; in other words, when there is this particular insight [that is, the undisturbed calm,] — has present insight [that is, the Kain-cloud of knowable Things]. «That which was to be founds that is, Isolation, has been found. In this sense he will say [iv. 30] " Even while living the wise man becomes liberated." The reason would be that what is nothing but subliminal- impression has its root [in undifferentiate d-consciousness] cut : this is the point. How is it that [Isolation] has been found ? Since all the hindrances which should have dwindled, — undifferentiated-consciousness and the [four] others together with subconscious-impressions (vasana), — have dwindled. It is urged as an objection that there is a mass of merit and of demerit ; there is the succession of existences-in-the-world, the unbroken sequence of birth and death for [all] living creatures. How then can there be Isolation ? In reply to this he says «has been cut.» — That [succession] the joints of which show no connexion is close- interlocked. These sections of the whole (samuhin) multitude (samuha) of merits and demerits, which are the parts, are close-interlocked. For nothing alive is ever free from connexion with bondage to birth and death. This is that same suc- cession of existences-in-the-world. When hindrances dwindle, it is cut. To this same effect he will say [ii. 12] "The latent-deposit of karma has its root in the hindrances," [and ii. 13] " So long as the root exists there will be fruition from it." Some one might ask ' Without the full maturity of the Elevation (prasamkhyana) and the restriction of the Rain-cloud of [knowable Things], what is this undisturbed calm of perception ? ' To this he replies ^uttermost limit of knowledge.^ Higher passionlessness is only one kind of the Rain-cloud of
1 Cp. Samkhya-karika 50.
i. 16 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [40
[knowable] Things ; nothing but that. To this same effect he will say [iv. 29] " For one who takes no interest even in Elevation there always follows, as a result of discriminative discernment, the concentration [called] the Eain-cloud of [knowable] Things," and [iv. 31] " Then, because of the endlessness of per- ception from which all defilements and coverings have passed away, the know- able amounts to little." For this reason Isolation is inseparably connected with it [and] is an essential characteristic (avinabhavin) of it.
Now when the fluctuations of mind-stuff have been restricted by these two means, how are we to describe the [ensuing] concentra- tion conscious [of an object] ?
17. [Concentration becomes] conscious [of its object] by assuming forms either of deliberation [upon coarse objects] or of reflection [upon subtile objects] or of joy or of the sense-of-personality.
Deliberation (vitarka) is the mind-stuff's coarse direct-experience (abhoga) when directed to its supporting [object]. Reflection (vicdra) is the subtile [direct-experience]. Joy is happiness. The sense-of-personality is a feeling (samvid) which pertains to one self [wherein the Self and the personality are one]. Of these [four] the first, [that is, deliberation] which has [all] the four associated together is concentration deliberating [upon coarse objects]. The second, [that is, reflection,] which has deliberation subtracted [from it] is [concentration] reflecting [upon subtile objects]. The third, [that is, joy,] which has reflection subtracted from it, is [concentra- tion] with [the feeling] of joy. The fourth, [that is, the sense-of- personality,] which has this [joy] subtracted from it, is [concentra- tion] which is the sense-of-personality and nothing more. All these kinds of concentrations have an object upon which they rest. After having mentioned the means (updya), in order that he may state what- may-be-obtained-by-these-means {upeya) in all its variations, he asks «Now . . . by these two means ?» 17. [Concentration becomes] conscious [of its object] by assuming forms either of deliberation [upon coarse objects] or of reflection [upon subtile objects] or of joy or of the sense-of-personality. Since [concentration] not conscious [of an object] is preceded by [concentration] conscious [of an object], he describes first concentration [conscious] of an object. The generic-nature of [concentration] conscious [of an object] is to be learned from its association with the forms of delil eration and of reflection and of
41] Concentration conscious of an object [ — i. is
joy and of the sense-of-personality as they are in themselves. He explains deliberation by the words <Sthe mind-stuff s.» The direct-experience (dbhoga) [of an object] is an insight (prajna) with a direct-perception (saksdtJcdra) of the thing itself. And this is coarse because the object is coarse. Tor just as an archer, when he is a beginner, pierces first only a coarse, and afterwards a subtile target, so the yogin, when a beginner, has direct experience merely of some coarse object of contemplation made of the five [material] elements, [for example] four-armed [Vishnu], and afterwards a subtile [object]. Likewise the subtile direct-experience, when directed to its supporting [object], is a reflection upon an object which is either the unresoluble-primary-matter (alinga) or the resoluble-matter (linga) or the five tanmdtra which are the subtile elements, the causes of the coarse [elements]. — Having thus described the object to be known, he describes the object which is the process-of-knowing with the word <5Cjoy.» Happiness is the mind-stuffs direct-experience when directed towards a sense-organ as a coarse 1 supporting object. Sense-organs, as every one knows, arise from the personality-substance (ahamJcdra), in so far as they have a dispo- sition to illumine because of the predominance of the sattva [quality]. And because the sattva [gives] pleasure, these sense-organs also [give] pleasure. Thus direct-experience when directed to them is happiness. — With the words «a feeling which pertains to one self » he tells of the concentration which has the knower as its object (grahitrvisaya). Organs-of-sense are produced out of the sense-of-personality. Consequently the sense-of-personality is their subtile form. Moreover this [sense-of-personality] together with the [Self as] known becomes the idea (buddM), that is, the feeling which pertains to one self. And because the knower becomes included in this [feeling], one may say that there is a [concentration] conscious of the knower as its object. — He gives another subor- dinate difference between [these] four in the words <Kof these [four] the first. » The effect adjusts itself to the cause, not the cause to the effect. Hence this coarse direct-experience becomes associated [by inherence] with coarse [objects] and with subtile [objects], with sense-organs and with the feeling-of-personality, which are four kinds of causes. Furthermore, the other [first three direct- experiences, inasmuch] as they have three or two or one cause, assume a triple or double or single form. The words <KA11 these» distinguish [concentration conscious of an object] from [concentration] not conscious [of an object].
Now by what means is that concentration produced which is not conscious of any object 1 or what is its nature ? 18. The other [concentration which is not conscious of objects] consists of subliminal - impressions only [after
1 The word sthula is used here in the sense of product as contrasted with suksma in the sense of cause : cp. iii. 44. G [h.o.s. it]
i. 18 — ] Booh I. Concentration or Samddhi [42
objects have merged], and follows upon that practice which effects the cessation [of fluctuations].
The concentration which is not conscious [of objects] is that restriction of the mind-stuff in which only subliminal-impressions are left and in which all fluctuations have come to rest. The higher passionlessness is a means for effecting this. For practice when directed towards any supporting-object is not capable of serving as an instrument to this [concentration not conscious of an object]. So the supporting-object [for this concentration] is [the Bain-cloud of knowable things] x which effects this cessation [of fluctuations] and has no [perceptible] object. For (ca) [in this concentration] there is no object-intended. Mind-stuff, when engaged in the practice of this [imperceptible object], seems as if it were itself non-existent and without any supporting-object. Thus [arises] that concentration [called] seedless, [without sensa- tional stimulus], which is not conscious of objects. To introduce [the topic of] [concentration] not conscious [of objects] which comes next in order, he asks <KNow ?» 18. The other [concentration which is not conscious of objects] consists of subliminal-impressions only [after objects have merged], and follows upon that practice which effects the cessation [of fluctuations]. The first2 clause [<follows upon> to <fluctuations>] relates to the means ; and the last two 2 words [from <the other> to <merged>] relate to the thing itself. The middle words [from <consists> to <only>] are dis- cussed in the words «all fluctuations. )» He discusses the first2 clause in the phrase «The higher .... this.» The cessation is the non-existence of fluctua- tions. That which effects this [passionlessness] is the cause [of it]. The practice of it is the repeated pursuit of this [cause], [The concentration] is that which follows upon this same pursuit. If it should be asked why lower passionlessness is not the cause of restriction, the reply is in the words <Swhen directed towards any supporting-object.^ A cause ought to be homogeneous with its effect, not heterogeneous. And, because it is directed towards a sup- porting-object, lower passionlessness is heterogeneous from its effect, which is concentration [not conscious of objects], [and] not directed towards a support- ing-object. This is the ground for the statement that it [restriction] arises from the undisturbed calm of perception which is not directed towards a sup- porting-object. For when all the defilements of rajas and tamas have fallen away from the sattva, it is the concentration of the Rain-cloud of [knowable]
1 Literally, [the Rain-cloud] is-made-tbe- 2 The words first and two apply to the supporting-object. original, not to the translation.
43] Concentration not conscious of an object [ — i. 19
things which is produced ; its activity continues quite transcendent to any object ; it has no end ; it beholds the taints in objects ; and because it alto- gether rejects all objects, it remains grounded in itself and so is not directed to any supporting-object ; [and thus] it may consistently be the cause of the concentration wherein subliminal-impressions only are left and which is not directed to any supporting-object because of the homogeneity [between the restriction and the concentration not conscious of objects] : this is his meaning. Coming to be directed to a supporting-object (alambana) is coming into depen- dence upon [an object] (agrayana). It <Kseems as if it were itself non-existent3> because it does not perform its functions as a fluctuation. It is «Cseedless,;» that is, not directed to any supporting-object. Another interpretation might be [that <KseedlessS>] is that from which the seed, namely, the latent-deposit of the karma from the hindrances, has passed away.
This same concentration is, as every one knows, of two kinds. It is produced either by [spiritual] means [i. 20] or by worldly [means]. Of these two, that produced by [spiritual] means is the one to which yogins [who are on the way to Isolation] attain. 19. [Concentration not conscious of objects] caused by worldly [means] is the one to which the discarnate attain and to which those [whose bodies] are resolved into primary- matter attain. The discarnate, that is, the gods, attain to the [concentration not conscious of objects which is] caused by worldly [means]. For in so far as their mind-stuff uses only their own subliminal-impressions they experience a quasi-state of Isolation, and [then] pass beyond [the period during which] the fruit corre- sponding to their own subliminal-impressions ripens [for their enjoyment]. [But at the end of this period they must return to the world.] Likewise those whose bodies are resolved into primary-matter experience a quasi-state of Isolation, during which the mind (cetas), with its task still undone, is resolved into primary-matter. But this lasts only till the mind-stuff, under the pressure of its [unfulfilled] task, returns [to the world].
In order to show what is to be accepted and what rejected he points out with the words <£This same ... as every one knows3> a subsidiary distinction [to be found] in the concentration of restriction. The word ^Cthis» means the con- centration of restriction ; it is <£of two kinds. It is produced either by [spiritual] means [i. 20] or by worldly [means]. )» He refers to that concentra-
i. 19 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [44
tion of restriction produced [or] caused by faith and other [means] as will be described [i. 20]. The world ! (bhava) is undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya). It is called the world because living beings are born [or] grow (bhavanti) in it. Those whose wishes have been fulfilled (tdudika), who have attained to passion- lessness, find the self (atman) in the not-self, either in the elements or the sense- organs, which are evolved-effects (viMra), or in evolving-causes (pralcrti), which are undeveloped [primary-matter], or in the personality-substance or in the five fine-substances (tanmatra). — The [concentration] produced by worldly [means] is that concentration of restriction produced [or] caused by the world. Of these two [concentrations] that produced by [spiritual] means is for yogins who are on the way to liberation. By specially mentioning [the fact that spiritual means are for yogins], he denies that the other [means] have any relation with persons who are merely desirous of liberation [that is, who are not yogins]. To whom then do the worldly [means] appertain? He replies to this with the sutra. 19. [Concentration not conscious of objects] caused by worldly [means] is the one to which the discarnate attain and to which those [whose bodies] are resolved into primary-matter attain. In other words [this concentration] is attained by both the discarnate and by those [whose bodies] are resolved into primary-matter. This he discusses in the words «The discarnate, that is, the gods.2> By serving one or the other of the organs or elements they have become identified with them. And inner-organs are permeated by subconscious-impressions from these [organs or elements]. After the body falls to pieces they are resolved into organs or into the elements. Their central-organs (manas) contain nothing left but subliminal-impressions. And they are stripped of the outer six-sheathed body.2 [Thus they may be termed] discarnate. For in so far as their mind-stuff uses only their own subliminal-impressions, they experience a quasi-stsde of Isolation. Being discarnate they attain [to this]. And the similarity [of this state] with Isolation is in the absence of fluctuations. Its dissimilarity is in the presence of subliminal-impressions with their task [un- fulfilled]. In some [manuscripts] there is the reading 'by the enjoyment of nothing but subliminal -impressions '. The meaning of this would be ' that of which the enjoyment is nothing but subliminal-impressions'. The meaning is that there are no fluctuations of mind-stuff. When they have reached their
1 Vijnana Bhiksu objects to this interpre- striction which is temporary and which
tation and interprets the compound leads again to fluctuations is called
(bhava-pratyaya) as that which has bhava-pratyaya ; that which follows
birth (janma) as its cause. But he upon belief ($raddha) as the result
seems to assume that the discussion is of higher passionlessness is upaya-
in respect of the classification of two pratyaya. This latter is fit for persons
kinds of unconscious concentration. aiming at liberation. The former is a
Whereas it would appear that the pseudo-yoga and is to be rejected, classification is of the two kinds of 2 See Moksa-dharma, MBh. xii. 305. 5 f . =
restriction of fluctuations. That re- 11332-3.
45j Concentration not conscious of an object [ — i. 20
limit, they pass beyond or go beyond [the period during which] the fruit corresponding to the subliminal-impressions ripens. Yet once again they enter the round-of -rebirth. And so it has been declared in the Vayu[-purana], ' ' Ten periods of Manu the devotees of sense-organs remain here below ; a full hundred, the worshippers of elements. " ' Similarly those [whose bodies] have been resolved into primary-matter, — in so far as they have become identified with one or the other of the five fine-substances or the personality -substance or the Great [thinking-substance] or the undeveloped [primary-matter] by serving [one or the other] of these, — have their inner-organs permeated by subliminal- impressions from one or the other of these. After the body falls to pieces they are resolved into one or the other [of these] from the undeveloped [primary- matter] downwards. The words «Cwith its task still undone3> mean that its purpose is unfulfilled. For that mind would have its purpose fulfilled, if it could also generate the discernment of the difference. The mind, however, which has not generated the discernment of the difference has not fulfilled its purpose and its task is still undone. Thus, as he says, they experience a quasi-state of Isolation, during which the mind (cetas), with its task still undone, is resolved into primary -matter. «But this lasts only till the mind-stuff, under the pressure of its [unfulfilled] task, returns [to the world], » Even after it has been reduced to a state of uniformity with primary-matter, it reaches the limit [of its time] and yet once again appears, that is, it becomes discriminated from this [primary- matter]. Precisely so after the rains are passed, a frog's 2 body, after having been reduced to an earthy state, when sprinkled with water from the cloud, experiences yet once again the state of being a frog's body. And in this same sense it has been said in the Vayu[-purana], "But those who-identify-them- selves-with-illusions-of-personality (abhimanika), remain a thousand [periods of Manu] ; those who identify themselves with the thinking-substance, ten thousand, and from them fevers [of desire] have passed away ; those who meditate upon undeveloped [primary -matter], remain for a full hundred thousand ; but after attaining to the Self, who is out of relation with qualities, there is no tale of time."1 Thus inasmuch as this [state which is resolved into primary- matter] leads to a recurrence of births, its worthlessness (heyatva) has been established.
20. [Concentration not conscious of objects,] which follows upon belief [and] energy [and] mindfulness [and] concen- tration [and] insight,3 is that to which the others [the yogins] attain.
1 Not yet traced in either edition. paBBa, Buddha says that he too, as well
2 In the corresponding passages i. 27, as Alara Kalama, inculcates: Majjhima
p. 6427; ii. 17, p. 14012 (Calc. ed.), we Nikaya, i. p. 164. Cf. 'The Balance
find ' plant ' for ' frog '. of Powers,' Visuddhi Magga, book 4,
s These five, saddha, viriya, sati, samadhi, p. Ill of 1st Rangoon ed.
i. 20— ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [46
[That concentration not conscious of objects, which is] caused by [spiritual] means is that to which yogins attain. Belief is the mental approval [of concentration] ; for, like a good mother,1 it protects the yogin. For him [thus] believing and setting dis- crimination [before him] as his goal there is the further (upa) attainment of energy. For him who has reached the further attainment of energy mindfulness is at hand. And when mindful- ness is at hand the mind-stuff is self-possessed and becomes concen- trated. When his mind-stuff has become concentrated he gains as his portion the discrimination of insight, by which he perceives things as they really are. Through the practice of these means and through passionlessness directed to this end there [finally] arises that concentration which is not conscious [of any object]. But for yogins he describes a series of means for the attainment of concentration. 20. [Concentration not conscious of objects,] which follows upon belief [and] energy [and] mindfulness [and] concentration [and] insight, is that to which the others [the yogins] attain. It might be objected that those who reflect upon sense-organs might also be just the persons to have belief. To this he replies in the words ^Belief is the mental approval [of concentration]. » This [approval], moreover, has as its object a reality which is quite accessible by verbal-communication or by inference or by the instruction of teachers. For it is this mental approval, [which is itself] an extreme delight [and] a great volition, [that is called] belief. Those who are under the illusion that the self is in such things as sense-organs, have not an extreme delight. Because it is a disapproval [of concentration which they feel] ; the reason [for this disapproval is that] it has its origin in downright infatuation. This is the meaning. — Why does he speak of just this [particular] belief [in concentration not conscious of objects] ? He replies, «for, like a good mother, it protects the yogin» from calamities which follow upon a deviation from the way. This is a particular kind of volition and it generates an exertion directed towards the object desired. So he says «For him [thus] believing.» The exposition for the words «for him» is in the words ^setting discrimination [before him] as his goal.» [For such a man] «there is the further (upa) attainment of energy.» «Mindfulness» is contemplation (dhyana). «Self-possessed» is undistracted. «Becomes concentrated2> means having (yukta) the concentration of the [eight] aids to yoga. And by mentioning the concentration which is inseparably connected with the abstentions (yama) [ii. 30] and with the observances (niyama) [ii. 32], the abstentions and the observances and the other [six aids] are hinted at.
1 Compare Metta Sutta in Sutta Nipata, i. 87, p. 26, Fausboll's ed.
47] Methods and intensities [ — i. 21
In this same way [concentration] conscious [of objects] arises for one who is endowed with all the aids to yoga. Therefore he says <3Cwhen his mind-stuff has become concentrated.^ Discrimination of insight, the exceptional quality [prdkarsa) [of mind-stuff], is attained. In the words «through practice of these means» he states that concentration not conscious [of an object] follows after conscious [concentration]. After reaching the stages in this same concentration, one after another, and as a result of passionlessness for the various objects, con- centration not conscious [of an object] arises. Now this is the occasion for Isolation. For the insight into the difference between the sattva and the Self is followed by restriction which causes the mind-stuff to cease from working at its task, since now, inasmuch as all its duties are done, its purpose is fulfilled.
Now these yogins are of nine kinds, as being respectively followers of the gentle and the moderate and the vehement method ; that is to say, the follower of the gentle method, the follower of the moderate method, and the follower of the vehement method. Among these, the follower of the gentle method is also of three kinds : with gentle intensity, with moderate intensity, and with keen intensity. Likewise the follower of the moderate method [is found with the three intensities]. Likewise the follower of the vehement method [is found with the three intensities]. Now, among those who follow the vehement method, 21. For the keenly intense, [concentration] is near. [For them] there is gaining of concentration and the result of concentration.
Some one raises the objection that if belief and the other qualities are means for [attaining] yoga, then all [the yogins] without distinction would possess concentration and its results. Whereas it is observed that in some cases there is perfection (siddhi) ; in other cases the absence of perfection ; in some cases perfection after a delay ; in other cases perfection after still more delay ; [and] in other cases quickly. In reply to this objection he says «Now these yogins are of nine kinds.» Those are called [followers of gentle or moderate or vehement methods], in whose case, through the force of subliminal-impressions and the invisible-influences (adrda) of previous births, the methods, that is, belief and the other [means], become gentle or moderate or vehement. «Clntensity)» is passionlessness. And its gentle or moderate or vehement character is due to the force of previous subconscious-impressions and invisible- influences. Among these [yogins,] he describes those who are of such a kind
i. 21 — ] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [48
that perfection is [for them] very quick, in the sutra 21. For the keenly intense, [concentration] is near. This is the statement of the sutra ; the comment completes the phrase. The result of concentration conscious [of an object] is [concentration] not conscious [of an object] ; and [the result] of this is Isolation.
22. Because [this keenness] is gentle or moderate or keen, there is a [concentration] superior (vicesa) even to this [near kind].
In that there is a gently keen and a moderately keen and a vehemently keen, there is a superior even to this [concentration]. Because there is a superior to this [near kind], the attainment of concentration and the result of concentration is near to him who follows the vehement method and is of mildly keen intensity ; still more near to him who is of moderately keen intensity ; and most near to him who is of vehemently keen intensity.
22. Because [this keenness] is gentle or moderate or keen, there is a [concentration] superior (vigesa) even to this [near kind]. This is explained by the Comment which is explained if you simply read it aloud.
Is [the attainment] of concentration most near as a result of this last [method] only, or is there some other