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THE ROYAL NAVY
A HISTORY
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESE.VT
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A History From the Earliest Times to the Present
By
Wm. Laird Clowes
Fellow of King's College, Lottdon ; Gold Medallist U.S. Naval Institute ; Hon. Member of the Royal United Service Institution
Assisted by
Sir Clements Markham, K.C.B., P.R.G.S.
Captain A. T. Mahan, U.S.N.
Mr. H. W. Wilson
Col. Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States
Thirty Photogravures
and
Hundreds of Pull Page and other
I llustrations
Maps, Charts
i:tc.
In Seven Vohtiiies Vol. X\.
LONDON
S.v.Mrsox Low, Mar.st(i\ and CoMI'ANN i.niiri-n ^t. DunSt.iii'S SjoiiSc, dftttcr tt.iiu, ii.C. 1 90 1
LONDON :
PRIXTtD BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED.
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME VI.
When, in June, 1899, I wrote the Introduction to Volume IV. of this History, I announced that, at m}' u)-gent instance, the Pub- lishers had generously agreed to allow me to extend the work from five volumes to six. Since then much has happened. It was permissible to hope that the remaining eighteen months of the nineteenth century, and, in fact, the concluding years of her late Majesty's most glorious reign, would be spent in peace ; yet scarcely was Volume IV. in the hands of the public ere there broke out in South Africa one of the most troublesome and tedious wars in which the British Empire has ever been engaged ; and, not long after- wards, it became necessary to embark upon extensive operations in China. On both scenes of action the Navy has borne an onerous and honourable part, and has done magnificent work which cannot fitly be described save at some length.
Since, therefore, I am anxious to complete the History up to the end of the nineteenth century, and, at the same time, to do such justice as I can to the services of the Navy as well at the close as at the beginning and middle of that eventful hundred years, I have again induced my Publishers, Messrs. Sampson Low, Marston «fc Co., Ltd., to agree to an extension of the plan of tlie book. It will now consist of seven volumes, and will bring the story up to the end of the year 1900, a date which, for practical pui-poses, is synchronous with that of the end of the Victorian era. This arrangement has permitted me to deal at somewhat greater length than at first I deemed possible with all the previous operations in China, with thc^ naval side of the war with Kussia, and with many minor affairs which well deserve to be chronicled with .some fulness.
The present volume is concerned with the war with the United States in 181'2-1.'j, and with the development and work of the Itoyal
%1>
63778
vi INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME VL
Navy from that time onwards until the conclusion of the war with Russia. For it are responsible Colonel Eoosevelt, now President of the United States, Sir Clements Markham, and m,yself.
Colonel Eoosevelt, when he kindly promised to write for me the interesting and suggestive chapter which is to-day before the reader, was not even Vice-President. He was only President of the Board of Police Commissioners of New York. Even when he completed the chapter, and corrected the proof-sheets of it, he was only Assistant-Secretary of the United States' Navy. I feel it my duty to mention these facts in order that I may make clear to his countrymen, should they be curious in the matter, that although the name of the President of the United States is affixed to the chapter, the opinions expressed in it are those, rather, of a naval administrator who, be it remembered, when little more than a boy, WTote what was then the best American account of the war which he now describes again, more briefly, it is true, yet by the light of fuller knowledge. Since the days of his service in the Navy Department, Theodore Eoosevelt, already sportsman, big-game hunter, zoologist, and politician, has gained eq^^al distinction as a soldier and as a statesman. The sorrowful circumstances which in the last few days have led him so suddenly to the Presidency must, I fear, confine his wonderful energies to one channel only for some time to come. I am very fortunate in having secured, at a comparatively quiet period of his most active career, the assistance of so brilliant, able, and busy a man.
In his book, ' The Naval War of 1812,' published when he was but four-and-twenty, Theodore Eoosevelt dealt with the struggle from the exclusivel}' American point of view. He has now attacked the subject from the more purely critical side ; and I do not hesitate to say that he has produced a piece of work which, while fair-minded and generous to a degree, is as remarkable for its analytical insight as for its impartial plain speaking. He indicates very clearly why the United States beat Great Britain so frequently in the earlier actions of the war, and why, in spite of American successes, the Great Eepublic, with a navy as it was then constituted and managed, could never hope for decisive victory. The lessons which he deduces from the history of the war should be as valuable to Britons as to his own people : and, believing as I do in the high mission of the races concerned, I trust that both may equally profit by my friend's clear-sighted conclusions.
INTBODUCTION TO VOLUME VI. vii
Many of the interesting American portraits which illustrate President Eoosevelt's chapter are reproduced from originals which have been most kindl)' lent me by Mr. Henry Carey Baird, of Philadelphia, to whose voluntary co-operation I owe much.
Sir Clements Markham contributes the two chapters which describe the naval voyages and discoveries of 1808-15, and 1816-56. In the second of these chapters, the President of the Eoyal Geo- graphical Society tells, I may remind the reader, of services quorum parsfuit; for although, perhaps, the fact is not generally remem- bered, Sir Clements was for eight years in the Navy, and was himself with one of the most interesting Arctic expeditions of that period.
For the remaining part of the volume I am alone responsible. The active services of the Navy between the years 1816 and 1856 were, speaking generally, of a character somewhat different from that which chiefl}^ marks the work of the fleet up to the close of the Napoleonic wars ; but I do not know that they are less interesting, or less usefully suggestive. In the forty years, British admirals fought no great pitched battles with formidable foes ; and although the period is that of Algier, Navarin, St. Jean d'Acre, and Sebastopol, it is more especially the period of small wars with uncivilised peoples, of steady, but nearly noiseless, extension of the Empire, and of onerous policing of the ocean. It witnessed the practical extinction of piracy, and of the over-sea slave trade ; and, in connection with those subjects, there will be found in the following pages the record of many almost forgotten deeds of heroism. It witnessed also many scarcely-remembered exploits which were undertaken in defence of British interests in all parts of the world, and for the protection and advancement of British trade. The reader will perceive, perhaps with some surprise, that although the period was, upon the whole, one which it is customary to call a time of peace, scarcely a year of it passed without seeing the Navy actively and gallantly engaged in some corner of the world.
For assistance rendered to me in connection with Chapters XLIII. and XLIV., and with the Appendices, I have gratefully to acknowledge my indebtedness to, among others. Admiral of the Fleet the lit. Hon. Lord John Hay, Sir J. fl. Commerell, and Sir A. McL. Lyons; Admirals Sir E. G. Fanshawe, Sir E. Ommaimey, Sir H. Chads, the Et. Hon. Sir J. C. D. Hay, Bart., Sir G. (). Willes, and Henry Boys; Paymasters-in-Chief J. W. M. Ashby, and
VUl INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME VI.
R. E. A. Richards ; Fleet-Paymaster Frederick Cleeve ; and Chaplain the Rev. A. G. Kealy, R.N. ; some of whom are now, alas, no more. 1 have also to express my gratitude to the Navy Depart- ment, Washington ; the Marine-Section of the K. und K. Reichs- Kriegs-Ministerium (through the courtesy of my old friend Captain Leopold Ritter von Jedina, of the Aust.-Hung. Navy) ; the Imperial Russian Admiralty ; and the Ministry of Marine in Paris.
Once more I have to apologise for the delayed appearance of a volume, and to beg both my most patient and kindly Publishers and the public to excuse it on the ground of my continued ill-health. I have personally undertaken the indexing of the previous five volumes. To my regret, I have been obliged to entrust the laborious task of indexing the present volume to another hand ; but I have been fortunate in securing for the work the services of Miss E. M. Samson, to whom my thanks are due for the manner in which she has carried out what I know to be a most difficult undertaking.
Aval du Credx, Sahk. Sept. 15, 1901.
ADDENDUM.
The folloiving paragraj)h, ichich should have preceded the jmragraph, on p. -in, hcguvnncj " The year 1837," was accidentalhj omitted when the copy was sent to tJie printers : —
In spite of the operations of Chads, the Malays continued to give trouble to the Indian Government, whose province it then was to superintend relations with the tribes of the Archipelago ; and, early in 1837, Captain Robert Contart M'Crea, of the Zebra, 16, was ordered, in consequence of representations from Calcutta, to capture a contumacious Malay chief, the ex-rajah of Quedah, who had taken refuge at Bruas, on the coast of Perak, and to convey him as prisoner to Penang. M'Crea executed the service in the month of April, but not without difficulty. His boats, which he led in person, had to approach the chief's hiding-place along a narrow and tortuous stream, both sides of which were fringed with dense jungle, and then to sustain a sharp action for an hour and a half with a brig, and with a strong and well-manned stockade. The aft'air cost heavy loss to the attackers, and still heavier to the defenders, but was so ably carried out that the East India Company subsequently presented M'Crea with a piece of plate in token of its satisfaction.
CONTENTS
VOLUME VI.
CHAPTER XLl.
I'AdE
The V\'.\r with iiif. Untied States, 1812-1S15 .... 1
Colonel Theodore Boonevelt, President nf the United Stntex.
CHAPTER XLII.
VOVAOKS AND DISCOVER IKS, 1803-1815 181
Sir Clements B. Marl-lunn, K.C.B., President of the Boi/al Geographicctl Surh'tj/.
CHAPTER XLIII.
Civil History of the Royal Navy, 1816-18">0 .... 184 TT'. Laird Cloires.
CHAl'TEJ; XLIV.
iMiLiTAHY History of the Royal Navy, 1S16-1850 . 222
W. Laird Chnrrs.
Appen'di.x to Chapter XLIV. :
Lisi OF Il.iM. Ships Wheckeh, Foinueiiei), I'.ihnt, Takkn,
(in I)i:.stiuivi;i), IMi;-18.5G >'')04
Xll CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XLV. Voyages axd Discoveries, 1816-1856. . . . 507
Sir Clements B. Marlcham, K.C.B.
Appendix to Chapters XLIII.-XLV. :
List of Flag-Officers Promoted prom the close of the War
IN 1815 TO the End of 1856 (Active List only) . . 538
INDEX 55)
i
LIST OF ILLUSTKATIONS.
VOLUME ri. PHOTOGRAVURE PLATES.
The Battle of Navarin ...... Frontispiece
Sir David Milne, G.C.B., Admiral .... Facing p. 224
Defeat of the Squadron op Dom Miguel by Napier „ 2G4 The Hon. Sir Robert Stopford, G.C.B., G.O.M.G.,
Admiral ........ „ 322
Sir Charles Napier (2), K.C.B., Admiral. . „ 417
FULL-PAGE ILLUSTRATIONS.
Scene of the Principal Naval OPER.vriONS on the
Coast of North America, 1812-15 . . . Faciixj p. 2
The Capture of the U.S.S. "Chesapeake" bv H.M.S.
" Shannon," June 1st, 1813 .... „ 80 Capture of the U.S. Brig " Argus " by H.M. Sloop
"Pelican," Aug. 14th, 1813 .... „ 86
Bombardment of Aloier, Avv.. 27th, 181G. . . ,, 228
Map of Burmah ....... „ 238
The Mouth of the Canton River .... ., 2S7
The " Duke of Wellington," 131, fitting out at
port.smouth, 1854 ...... ,, 412
Scene op the Operations in the Baltic Sea, 1854-55 „ 415
The Operations in the Sea of Azov, l!S5."i . „ 454
XIV
ILLUSTRATIONS.
ILLUSTRATIONS IN THE TEXT.
Douglas's Double (Reversible) Flint Lock, for guns or mortars,
c«. 1818
Admiral the Hon. Sir George Ceanfield Berkeley, G.C.B. Rear-Admiral Sir Salusbury Pryce Davenport (previously
Humphreys), Kt., C.B., K.C.H
American Commemoration Medal of the Capture op the
"Guerriere" in 1812 American Commemoration Medal, by Spencer, op the capture
OF the "Frolic," in 1812 ......
Captain Stephen Decatur, Jun., U.S.N. ....
Captain William Bainbridge, U.S.N. ....
Captain James Lawrence, U.S.N. .....
Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Bowes Verb Broke, Bart., K.C.B. Provo William P.aery Wallis, .et. 22 ... .
Signature of Sir Provo AVilliam Parry Wallis, G.C.B., Admiral
OF the Fleet ........
Commander Samuel Blyth, R.N. .....
Admiral the Hon. Sir Alexander Forester Inglis Cochrane, G.C.B
Captain David Porter, U.S.N. ......
Captain Isaac Chauncey, U.S.N. .....
American Medal Commemor.ative of the Battle of Lake Erie
1813
Captain Oliver Hazard Perry, U.S.N
Captain Thomas Macdonough, U.S.N
Captain Joshua Barney, U.S.N
Sir James Alexander Gordon (1), G.C.B., Admiral of the Fleet Captain Lewis AVarrington, U.S.N. . Captain Johnston Blakely, U.S.N. Captain Charles Stewart, U.S.N.
Captain James Biddle, U.S.N
Badge of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath (Military
Classes) ••.... Star op a G.C.B. .... Circular Stern of H.M.S. "Asia," 84, built .at Bomb.ay, 1824
2 17
19
35
39
42 49 75 77 83
83 90
99 101 111
118 121 131 143 145 160 162 169 174
181 184 192
ILLUSTRATIONS.
xv
H.M.S. " Rethibction," 10 guns, 1641 tons (B.M.), 400 H.P. Nom H.M.S. "Terrible," 20 gdns, 1847 tons (B.M.), 800 H.P. Nom. Screw versus Paddle. .....
Fl.\g Officers' and Captains' Gold Medal, 1794-181 Naval War Service Medal, 1793-1815 Naval Long Service and Good Conduct Medal The Victoria Cross ......
Star of a K.C.B. ......
Medal Co5i.memorative of the Bo>ibard.ment op Algier, 1816
Admiral Sir Robert "Waller Otway (1), Bart., G.C.B.
Plan op the Bay of Navarin, Oct. 20th, 1827 .
Detailed Plans of the Battle of Navarin . . .2
Commemorative Medal of the Battle op Navarin
H.R.H. Prince William Henry, Duke of Clarknck, Admiral op
THE Fleet, I,ord High Ad.miral. ....
Admiral Sir Henry Ducie Chads, G.C.B. ....
The China Medal, 1840-42
Bombardment of St. Jean d'Acre, November 3rd, 1840 Admiral of the Fleet the Hon. Sir Henry Keppel, G.C.B,
D.C.L ...
The Battle of Obligado, 1845 ......
Admiral Sir James Whitley Deans Dundas, G.C.B. . Vice-Admiral Edmund, Lord Lyons, Bart., G.C.B., D.C.L. . Signature of Admiral the Rt. Hon. Sir Astley Cooper Key
G.C.B., F.R.S
Bomarsund, 1854 .......
Bombard.ment op Seuastopol puo.m the Sea, 17tii Oct., 1854 Captain Sir William Peel, K.C.B., V.C. ....
Sir William Nathan Wrighte Hewett, K.C.B., V.C, Vice
Admiral .........
Captain Edmund Moubray Lyons .....
Rear-Ad.miral the Hon. Richard Saunders Dundas, C.B. . Cronstadt, 1855 ........
Sweaborg, 1855 : Plan op Attack .....
Admiral the Rt. Hon. Sir Astley Cooper Key, Ci.C.B., F.H.S. Signature op Sir John Edmund Commerell, V.C, G.C.B., Admiua
OF THE Fleet ........
The Baltic Medal ........
194 195 197 213 214 215 221 223 230 2.50 255 259 261
271 274 303 320
324 340 405 408
414 423 441 445
447 157 477 483 492 495
503 506
XVI
ILLUSTRATIONS.
Arctic Medal ..........
Sketch Map Illustrating Arctic Discovery in the Nineteenth
Century ..........
Rear-Admiral Sir William Edward Parry, Kt., D.C.L., F.R.S. . Rear-Admiral Sir Francis Beaufort, K.C.B., D.C.L., F.R.S. ,
Hydrographer 18:29-1855 .......
Rear-Admiral Sir James Clark Ross, Kt., D.C.L., F.R.S. . Captain Sir John Franklin, Kt., D.C.L., F.R.S. Signature of Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton, G.C.B. Signature op Sir William James Lloyd Wharton, K.C.B., F.R.S.,
Retired Rear-Admiral .......
PAGE
507
509 512
515 525
528 536
537
I
NAVAL HISTOEY.
CHAPTEE XLI. the war with the tnited states, 1812-15.
Theodoke Koosevelt,
Vice-President of the United States of America.
Outbreak of the War: Causes of hostility — American unpreparedneBS — Jeft'erson's peace policy — In-itation engendered by facilities for naturalisation — The Milan and Berlin decrees, and the Orders in Council — Hardships brought about bj' the edicts — Cleveland's experiences — Basil Hall's testimony — British seamen in the American marine — American seamen pressed by the British — Berkeley's order — Affair of the Leopard and the Chesajjeake — Jelferson's "connnercial war" — Napoleon's du]>licity — British blockade of the American coasts — Affair of the President and the Little Belt — Declaration of war — Indifference of the Amei'ican people — British over- confidence — Efficiency of the I'nited States navy — Ships of the United States — 'J'onnage and armament — Superiority of the American frigate — ^The American personnel — British seamen in the American navy — Poorness of British gunnery. The Early Americax Vi'jtories : The /'resident and the Belvidera — The Essex and the Alert — The Constitution and the Ouerriire — The Wasp and the Frolic — 'J'he L'nited States and the Macedonian — The Constitution and the Java — The Hornet and the Peacock — American privateers — Effects of commerce-destroying — British discouragement— Admiralty precautions — Jurien de La Graviere on the war. The Turn ok the Tide: The American coast blockaded — Effect of the blockade — Raids on the coast — Retaliation b}' the privateers — Failure of expecta- tions ou both sides- — Fleets the true commerce-destroyers — The Shannon and the Chesapeake — The ]io\ver of good oi'ganisation — The Pelican and the Art/us — The Enterprise and the Boxer — Failure of the attack on Norfolk — Outrages at Ham|iton — Inailequacy of the American gunboats — The Juiion in Delaware Bay — Attack on the Asp — Capture of the Surveyor — Affair in the Stone River — Capture of the Ljottery — Polkinghorne and the privateers — Cochrane succeeds Warren — -Cruise of the Essex — The l^hofle and Cherub, and the Essex and Essex Junior. The W ARrAHE ON the Lakes : The forces opposed — Lake Ontario — Defence of Sackott's Harbour — Capture of the Julia and (Jrowler — Chauncey and Yeo — The affair at Big Sandy Creek —A contest of shipbuilding — Lake Erie — Cutting out of the Caledonia — Barclay and I'erry — Battle of Lake Erie — American rci)u]Bo at Macinaw — Capture of the Tigress and Scorpion — Cutting out affair at Port Erie — Lake Chani]ilain — Capture of the Growler — Macdonougli and Downie — Battle of Piattsburg Harbour. The Bi,o(kai>e ANn the CitiisKiis : Destruction of Barney's gunboats — C'apt\n'e of Washington — Gordon at Alexandria — l!c|ndse at Baltimore — Lockyer in Lake Borgne — Repulse at J''ort Bowyer — The case of the Erebus — Increase of American privateering — The Chasieur, of Baltimore— British iiidigna- vor,. VI. fl
?>
THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15.
[1812.
tion— Capture of the St. Lawrence— "X^ie General Armstrong— The Prince de Neu/chufeJ—Cai-,t.ure of the Frolic— The Peacock and the Epervier— The Wasp and the Reindeer— The Wasp and the Afon—Loss of the TTns^j— The Endymion and the President — Capture of the Levant and CyoHf— Escape of the Constitution — The Eornet and the Penguin— 'Esica\^e of the Eornet— The Peacock and the iVa?t<(7its— End of tlie war— Novel weapons in tlie American navy— A drawn quarrel.
is often difficult to
F
-?5ss4'-^'p'
Douglas's dox.t)le (reversible) flint lock, for guss or mortars, ca. 1818. (From Cli. Dtipiit.)
realise that, in a clash between two peo- ples, not onh' may each side deem itself right, but each side may really be right from its own standpoint. A healthy and vigorous nation must obey the law of self-preservation. When it is engaged in a life and death gi'apple with a powerful foe, it can- not too closely scan the damage it is incidentally forced to do neutral nations. On the other hand, it is just as Uttle to be expected that one of these neutral nations, when wronged, will refrain from retaUatiou merely because the injuries are inflicted by the aggressor as a regi-ettable, but necessary, incident of a conflict with some one else.
This holds true of the bickering war between Britain and America which closed the gigantic Napoleonic struggles. During nearly a quarter of a centmy of tremendous warfare, Britain and France stood as opposing champions in a struggle which dwarfed all previous contests and convulsed the entire civilised world. As has been seen, every other nation of Eui-ope was at one time or another drawn into this struggle, and almost every other nation sided now with one, and now with the other, of the gi-eat central pair of combatants. Russia and Spain, Austria and Prussia, Holland and Turkey, appeared, now as the subservient allies, now as the bitter enemies, of Eepubhcan and Imperial France. The Island Monarchy alone never wavered, and never faltered. In the count- less shifting coalitions framed against France, there was alwaj^s one unshifting figure, that of Britain. Kaiser and King, Tsar and
IK
IK
Scene of the Principal Naval Operations ON THE Coast or North America. t8/2-f5.
9 ,fl >.o Sf, V 5.0 , 'V°
ITofaet pagt 2.
I
I
1812.] CAUSES OF HOSTILITY. 3
Cortes, might make war, or sue for peace ; but, save for one brief truce, the people of Britain never for a moment relaxed that deadly strain of hostility which at last wore out even Napoleon's giant strength.
It was a life and death struggle ; and to win, Britain had to spend her gold, her ships, and her men like water. Where she was thus lavish of her own wealth and her own blood, it was not to be expected that she would pay over-scrupulous heed to the exact rights of others, above all if these rights were exercised seriously to her owia disadvantage. While the fight stamped to and fro, the combatants were far too busy with one another to care whether or not they trampled on outsiders. In the grim, relentless, long- drawn warfare, neither side had anj- intention of throwing away a chance by quixotic over-regard for the rights of others ; and both sides were at times seriously to blame for disregarding these rights on occasions when to regard them would not have been quixotic at all, but an evidence of soimd common-sense.
The scarlet-clad armies of Britain played a great part in the closing j-ears of the struggle, and developed as their leader the chief of all the generals who fought under or against Napoleon. Never- theless it was the Navy of Britain, it was the British sea power, which threw the deciding weight into the contest. The British Navy destroyed the fleets of France and the fleets of the Spanish, Dutch, and Danish allies of France, and blockaded the French ports, and the ports of all powers that were not hostile to the French. In order to man the huge fleets with which she kept command of the seas, England was forced to try every expedient to gather sailors ; and in order to make her blockade effective she had to lay a heavy hand on the ships of those neutral powers that found their profit in breaking the blockade.
The United States of America was the only neutral power which at once both tended to drain the British Navy of a certain number of its seamen, and at the same time offered in her own seamen a chance for that same Navy to make good the loss. Moreover, it was the one neutral nation which throve apace during the years of European warfare by trading with the hostile powers. So long as they were not too much harassed, the American merchants and seamen wore greatly benefited l)y tlu; war in iMU-opc. The destruc- tion of tlie French merchantmen by the British warships, and the constant harrying of the British merchantmen by the French
4 THE WAIt WITH THE UXITED STJTES, 1812-15. [1812.
privateers, tended to drive trade into neutral bottoms ; and America was the only neutral nation prepared to profit greatly by this tendency. She made the loss of England her gain. Her merchants shipped cargoes to French ports ; and her merchant captains, as their trade grew apace, and as they became short-handed, welcomed eagerly all British seamen, deserters or otherwise, who might take service under the American flag in the hope of avoiding the press-gang and the extreme severity of British naval discipline.
The Americans were merely exercising their rights ; but naturally their attitude exasperated not only Britain, but also France. Each of the two main combatants was inclined to view with suspicion the neutral who made a cold-blooded profit out of the sufferings of both. Each took harsh, and often entirely unjustifiable, measures to protect himself. Each in his action was guided very natm-ally by his own interests as he saw them. It was Britain with which America ultimately came to blows, because Britain possessed far gi'eater power of inflicting injury ; but, according to his capacity. Napoleon showed a much more callous disregard for American rights.
The British claimed the right to forbid vessels to sail to or from ports which they annoi;nced as blockaded, and to search neutral ships for contraband goods. They also acted upon the doctrine that "once a subject, always a subject," and that their warships could at any time take British sailors, wherever found, on the high seas. The intense vexation and heavy loss caused by the right of search need not be dwelt upon. The impressment of American seamen was an even more serious business. Thousands of British sailor- men were to be found on American vessels. Britain re-claimed these at every opportunity ; but she did not rest content with this. Each British war vessel regarded itself as the judge as to whether the members of the crew of a searched vessel were British or Americans. If the captain of such a war vessel were short-handed, he was certain to resolve all doubts in his own favour; and, con- sequently, thousands of impressed Americans served, sorely against the grain, in British warships.
The whole situation was one that could not but provoke intense irritation. There was much fraud in the natm-alisation of British seamen as Americans ; and, on the other hand, there was much brutal disregard of the rights of American sailors by British war- ships. The American merchant cared nothing for the contestants, save that he wanted to sell his goods where he could get the best
1812.] CAUSES OF nOSTILITY. 5
price ; while the British officer was determined that the American should not render help to France. From their respective stand- points, each nation had much to saj' in its own favour. Consistentlj' with retaining her self-respect, America could not submit quietly to the injuries she received. On the other hand, Britain could not afford, because of any consideration of abstract right, to allow any neutral nation to furnish Napoleon with another weapon. War was almost inevitable.
At the time each people as a whole of course firmly beUeved that its own cause was entirely righteous, and that its opponents were without any moral justification for their acts ; though the best- informed Englishmen, those who managed the councils of their countr}', evidently felt at bottom an uneasy sense that their course was not entireh' justifiable, as was shown by the too tardy repeal of the Orders in Council. The difference in feehng caused by the diflerence of point of view was illustrated by the attitudes of the British and Americans towards one another in 1812 and 1862 respectively. In 1812 the bolder American merchants embarked eagerly in the career of running cargoes into the ports of blockaded France, precisely as half a century later the British of the stamp of Hobart Pasha swarmed forward to command the blockade-runners which plied between the British ports and the ports of the Southern Con- federacy. At the earlier date the Americans resisted and the British upheld the right of search ; fifty years later it was the American, Wilkes, who exercised the right, while the British made ready for instant war unless the deed should be disavowed.
It was entirely natural that Great Britain should strive in every way possible to minimise the aid whicii America, by the exercise of her rights as a neutral, gave to France. It was equally natural that the more reckless and overbearing spirits among the British naval officers, while carrying out this policy, should do deeds that were entirely indefensible, and which could not but inllauic the Americans to madness. No American ship was safe from confisca- tion, no American seaman was safe from impressment, either on the high seas, or on the American coast ; and insult and outrage followed one another in monotonous succession.
The nation whicli submitted without war to such insults erred on the side of tame submission, not of undue truculence. But it must be remembered that France was all the time, according to her capacity, behaving quite as badly as Great Britain. Her sea strength
6 THE WAll WITH THE UXITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
had been shattered by Britain, so she could not do America anything hke as much harm ; but no British Minister vied with Napoleon in vicious and treacherous disregard of the rights of both friend and foe. Nevertheless, France offered the chance of making money, and Britain did not. Britain could do her own carrying trade, while the carrying trade of France was largely in American bottoms. Man}' Americans were delighted to balance against the insults and injuries they received from the mighty combatants, the profits which flowed into their coffers only because the combat did not cease.
There was but one possible way by which to gain and keep the respect of either France or Britain : that was by the possession of power, and the readiness to use it if necessarv' ; and power in this case meant a formidable fighting navy. Had America possessed a fleet of twenty ships of the line, her sailors could have plied their trade unmolested ; and the three years of war, with its loss in blood and money, would have been avoided. From the merely monetary standpoint such a navy would have been the cheapest kind of insurance ; and morally its advantages would have been incalculable, for every American worth the name would have lifted liis head higher because of its existence. But unfortunately the nation lacked the wisdom to see this, and it chose and re-chose for the Presidency Thomas Jefferson, who avowed that his " passion was peace," and whose timidity surpassed even his philanthi'opy. Both Britain and America have produced men of the " peace at any price" pattern; and in America, in one great crisis at least, these men cost the nation more, in blood and wealth, than the political leaders most recklessly indifferent to war have ever cost it. There never was a better example of the ultimate evil caused by a timid effort to secure peace, through the sacrifice of honour and the refusal to make preparations for war, than that afforded by the American people under the Presidencies of Jeflerson and Madison. The "infinite capacity of mankind to withstand the introduction of knowledge " is also shown by the fact that this lesson has not only been largely wasted, but has even been misread and misinterpreted. National vanity, and the party spirit which resolutely refuses to see crimes committed against the nation by party heroes, are partly responsible for this. The cultivation of a poHtical philosophy which persistently refuses to accept facts as they are, and which in America is no dearer to the unlettered demagogue than to the educated,
1812.] AMERICAN UNPIIEPAHEDNESS. 7
refined theorist whose knowledge of political affairs is evolved in the seclusion of his own parlour, has also operated to prevent Americans from learning the hitter lessons which should be taught from the war of 1812. The wealthy man who cares only for mercantile prosperity, and the cultivated man who forgets that nothing can atone for the loss of the virile fighting virtues, both also forget that, though war is an evil, an inglorious or unjustifiable peace is a worse evil. As for England, she knows little or nothing about the war, and so of course has been equally blind to its lessons. In one way, however, England does not so much need to be taught these lessons, for there are few of her politicians or publicists of any note who fail to see the necessity of her possessing a navy more formidable than any other navy on the face of the globe.
These men had numerous prototypes in the first decade of the present century. The Federalists, who were crystallised into a party under Washington, did have some appreciation of the fact that peace is worth nothing unless it comes with sword girt on thigh. Accordingly, in 1798 and 1799, under the spur of the quasi-war with France and the depredations of the Moorish pirates, the Federalists set out to build a navy. They only made a beginning. The people behind them were too ignorant and too short-sighted to permit the building of the great ships of the line which could alone decide a war ; but they did build half-a-dozen frigates, which were the best of their kind in existence. In 1801, however, the Jeffersonian democrats came into power, and all work on the navj' stopped forthwith. Jefferson hated and dreaded war; and he showed the true spirit of the non-military visionary in striving to find some patent substitute for war, or, if war could not be avoided, then some patent substitute for the armies and fleets by which war must be fought. Fatuously unable to learn the lesson taught by the revolutionary contest, he hoped to find in levies of untrained militia a substitute for a regular army. As for the navy, he at one time actually hoped to supply its place by a preposterous .system of what may be called horse-gunboats, that is, gunboats which could be drawn ashore and carried on wheeled vehicles to any point menaced by a hostile fleet. Men who get discouraged by the attitude of latter-day politicians may draw some hope and comfort from the reflection that the nation actually lived tbrough the experiment of trying Jefferson's ideas. Nevertheless, the trial of this same experiment caused l)itter loss and nini'tification.
8 THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
At the present day no student of international law would justify the attitude of Great Britain in the quarrel ; but the international standard was different among nations at the beginning of the nineteenth centui-y ; and, moreover, Great Britain was fighting for her life, and nice customs curtesy to great crises as well as to great kings.
The United States was still primarily a country of dwellers on the sea-coast. The bulk of the population lay along the Atlantic sea-board. There were but three states west of the Alleghanies — Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio ; and all three were still frontier commonwealths. From Salem to Savannah the men of every sea- port city — and as yet there were no cities of note which were not seaports — looked upon foreign trade as the surest means to wealth and social distinction. American shipwrights were already famous : readers of that delightful book, ' Tom Cringle's Log,' will recall at once the way in which Scott speaks of the swift American schooners ; and their full-rigged ships also were among the best of their kind on the ocean. Under the stimulus given by the European war to their trade the merchants embarked more and more eagerly in foreign ventures, and ships were turned out of the yards in ever-increasing numbers. From Maine to Maryland there was a hardy population of sailor-folk, who manned, not only the merchantmen, but also the fishing-fleet and the whalers that went to the North Atlantic and the South Seas. Under the abnormal growth of the American merchant marine, however, the growth of the sailor population was outstripped, and it became impossible to man American ships purely with American seamen. Seamen are roving creatures at all times, and in every country they shift readily from one flag to another. Seafarers from various European states, notably from Portugal and the Scandinavian countries, found their way in numbers aboard the American ships ; but it was the sailors of the British Islands who formed the chief resource in making up any deficiency in the numbers of the native Americans. The needs of Britain's gigantic Navy were very great, and every method was resorted to in order to keep level its quota of men. Life on a British warship was hard, and the British seamen hved in terror of the press-gang. Readers of Marryat's novels will remember the large part this institution played in the sea life of that period. Wages on board the American ships were high, and the service not particularly severe. In consequence, British seamen entered the
1S12.] BJUTIfill SEAMEN IN THE AMEIUCAN SEIiVICE. 9
American merchant marine literall)' by thousands. The easy naturalisation laws of the country were even more easily circum- vented. There was very little difficulty indeed in any British seaman getting naturalisation papers as an American. The captains of British war vessels were continually meeting in the American ports scores of British seamen who passed them by with insolent defiance, confident in their possession of American naturalisation papers.
Seeing that this occurred at the very time when American trading ships were crippling their British rivals by their competition, and were fm-nishing supplies to Britain's dreaded and hated rival, the anger alike of British Government officials, of British merchants, and of British naval officers, can be readily understood. It was sufficiently irritating to see an American ship carry to a French port goods which the British wished to keep out of that port, and ■which, in happier circumstances, might have been in a British bottom ; but it was still more exasperating to know that this very ship might number among her crew a considerable proportion of British seamen, at a time when the British fleets needed every man they could crimp or press. Moreover, such a system of neutral trade and of easy naturalisation put a premium upon perjury, and the British grew to look with suspicion upon every statement of an American merchant master, and every paper produced by an American merchant seaman.
The French had little in the way of a grievance against the Americans. Very few French seamen served under the American flag, certainly not enough to be of any consequence to the French navy. The French trade that was driven into American bottoms would otherwise have been extinguished. On the other hand, American merchantmen performed a real service to France when they entered the French ports. There was one point, however, on which the American attitude was precisely as exasperating to France as to Britain, and for the same reason. As regards their dealings with the insurgent negroes of Haiti and with the effort to blockade the Haitian ports, the French stood toward the Americans just as Britain stood toward them in regard to France. In each case the American merchants showed, as might have been expected, the same desire to send their cargoes to the people who wished to pay for them, without regard to tlie rights or wrongs of any struggle in which these people might lie engaged. The Americans sent
10 THE WAR WITH THE USITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
small fleets of merchantmen to carry goods to the negroes in Haiti, who were engaged in a life and death fight with the French, just as they sent far larger fleets of merchantmen to cany goods to the French, in their deadly grapple with the British ; and the French felt as aggrieved in the one case as the British did in the other.
But the case of Haiti was exceptional. Speaking generally, no harm, and, on the contrary, much good, resulted to France from the American neutral trade. Nevertheless, Napoleon adopted toward the Americans a course quite as brutal as the British attitude, and more treacherous. In this he was mainly actuated by a desire to force the Americans into war with Great Britain ; but he was swayed by various and complicated motives from time to time— motives which it would be impossible to discuss at proper length here. The intentions of the French people toward the American Eexmbhc, as shown by the actions of the French Emperor, were as bad as could be.
The poHcy of the two nations towards America was promulgated in a series of edicts — those of Napoleon taking the fomi of Decrees dated at Milan, Berlin, and elsewhere ; and those of the advisers of King George appearing as Orders in Council. At different times widely different interpretations were put upon every decree and order, according to the strenuousness of the American protest, and the degree of exasperation of Britain or France. Napoleon in particular, whenever it suited him, intei-preted his own decrees in a sense directly opposite to their palpable purport ; or, if there was a momentary gain in view, simply denied that he had ever issued them. In Britain the followers of Fox were supposed to be more friendly to America than the followers of Pitt. In theory they were; but in practice the attitudes of the two parties were not materially different. The essential features of the Orders in Council were, that they prohibited American ships from trading with France, unless the}' first cleared from some British port ; and they declared the coast of most of continental Europe to be blockaded, and provided for the seizure of American vessels boitnd tliither. They also imposed similar restrictions upon the very lucrative trade of America with the West Indian Islands. Napoleon's decrees, on the other hand, provided that any American vessel which touched at a British port, or submitted to search by a British cruiser, should be treated as hostile, and be confiscated accordingly. Each nation asserted its right to claim its own seamen, as a matter of course.
1812.] THE IMPBESSMENT OF SEAM EX. 11
These two series of edicts, if fully caniod out, meant the absolute annihilation of the American merchant marine so far as foreign commerce was concerned, for almost every country in the world was engaged on one side or the other in the Napoleonic struggles. In point of intent, the action of the French was a little the worse ; and some of Napoleon's seizures of American vessels in European ports were marked by a bad faith which made them peculiarly repulsive. The attitude of each nation amply wan-anted America in declaring war on both. This was the course which was actually proposed in Congress, and which should have been followed. But it was perhaps too much to expect that the struggHng transatlantic republic, which, in point of regular navy and army, hardly ranked as a fifth-class power, should at the same time throw down the glove to the two greatest empires of the world. Moreover, the Americans very naturally cared much less what the French and British meant to do, than what they actually did ; and when it came to doing, the British were vastly better fitted than the French to carry out their threats.
French privateers and cruisers occasionally mishandled an American vessel, and both ships and cargoes were confiscated when in French ports, sometimes even on a large scale ; but it was not for the self-interest of the French to molest ovenxiuch the only neutrals who could Ining tliem the goods of which they stood in need ; and there was practically no trouble about the French im- pressing seamen from American ships, because there were very few Frenchmen in these ships, and those few coiild not hope to disguise their nationality. The American seaman was inclined to look down upon the French, but he had not nnich cause either to fear or hate them.
With the British, all this was different. In the first place, the Englishman cordially disliked the American, because the American was feeding his foes, and was robbing him both of his men and of his trade. The fraudulent naturalisation of British seamen was carried on openly in most American ports ; and the American flag was used to protect, not merely American skippers engaged in carry- ing goods, which the Britisli said should not be carried, to I"' ranee, but also not a few Frenchmen and Spaniards, and a larger nund)er III' recreant Britons, who wished to share the profits of the imsi- ness. The British ships of war were chronically undermanned, and every connnander had good reason to belie\i' that almost all
12 THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
American merchant vessels contained some British seamen to whose service he felt he was lawfully entitled. It was an article of faith with him, as with his country, that he had a right to take these seamen wherever he found them on the ocean. As a rule he dishked, and half despised, the Americans ; ^ he was puzzled and angered by the chicanery of fraudulent naturalisation papers and the like wherewith they sought to baffle him ; and in revenge he took refuge in brutality. He was himself the judge as to whether or not he was satisfied in regard to the nationality of any given seaman ; and he always gave himself the benefit of the doubt — even when there was no doubt. Not only did he impress British seamen who had been fraudulently naturalised as Americans, but quite as often he impressed British seamen who had been properly naturalised and were American citizens, and, even more often, American citizens who were such by birth, and not merely by adoption. The two peoples could not always with entire certainty be told apart ; and when the British captain was short-handed he did not endeavom* to tell them apart. Many thousands of British seamen served in the American merchant marine ; but there were several thousand American seamen who had been impressed into British ships of war. One of the commonest incidents of the time was for an American merchantman to be left helpless on the high seas, unable to reach her port of destination, because the majority of the crew had been taken off bj'^ some British man-of-war.
In one of Cooper's sea novels, ' Miles Wallingford,' the action of the story centres upon the experience of an American merchant captain with a British frigate and a French privateer ; and, like many another good novel, it is as essentially true to life as any professed history. When not long from New York, the ship was overhauled by a British frigate and sent into a British port as a prize, on the ground that she was sailing for a German port under French influence, and that there was some doubt as to the cargo
' Althuugb. a feeling of dislike for one another may have animated officers and men on both sides, such feeling was by no means miiversal ; and there are many examples of warm private friendships having subsisted before the war between British and American naval officers, and having been continued after it, even in spite of hostile meetings having occurred during the conflict. A notable example of this kind of friendship is to be found in the long and affectionate intimacy which subsisted between Captain Isaac Hull, U.S.N., and Captain James Richard Dacres (2), R.N., an intimacy heightened rather than decreased by the conduct of both on the occasion of the capture of the Ouerriere by the (Jonstitatioii. — \V. L. C.
1812.] CLEVELAND'S GSIEVANCES. 13
papers; while most of the crew, Americans and foreigners ahke, were taken aboard the frigate. B}- sui-prise, the remaining Americans re- captured the ship fi-om the British prize crew, only to have their ship overhauled anew by a French privateer, and again declared to be a prize, upon the ground of having been previously captured by the British. The Americans once more succeeded in regaining posses- sion of the vessel ; but, having only four hands with w-hich to work her, she was cast away ; so that the voyage ended with the ruin of the owner of the ship, and the impressment of her entire crew.
This particular incident only occurred in a novel ; but it was of a kind which occurred hundreds of times in actual life. It was but rarely that an American merchant captain of that day did any writing ; yet one out of the very many Salem shipmasters has left a record of his ocean trips at the end of the last and the beginning of the present centuries.^ He usually owned the ship he navigated, and her cargo also ; and he sailed at different times to the chief ports of Europe and Asia, and also to many a coast where the ports were open roadsteads and the inhabitants bloodthirsty savages. He was able to hold his own against mutineers, savages, and pirates ; but he was twice brought to ruin by civilised France and Great Britain.
In 1807, when trading to the West Indies, after having already been repeatedly searched by British cruisers, he was taken by Eear-Admiral the Hon. A. F. I. Cochrane, and his ship was con- demned by a rascally little court at Tortola, whither he was sent because a more respectable court would doubtless have released him. The confiscation of his goods stripped him to the bone, so that he had to begin life over again ; and, in writing of the event in after years, he remarked : " Compelled to navigate for the support of my family, and deprived in consequence of superintending the education of my children, worn with anxiety and sick at heart with hoj)e deferred, it will be seen that I was for many years an exile from all that rendered life dear and desirable ; and this as a consequence of the robbery of my hard-earned fortune by Admiral Cochrane."
Two years later he again got a ship, which he took to Naples, whither he was enticed, with a number of other American merchant- men, by one of the treacherous proclamations of Najsoleon. Having got the ships into his power. Napoleon, acting through Murat,
' ' Vuyiiges of an Aiiiericaii Xavigator.' By Kichard J. C'lcvtlauil, \>\\ VIA, l-i;l.
14 THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
had them all seized and confiscated, without even the formality of a trial. In comparing the two disasters the sufferer commented upon the difference between them as being of not much more con- sequence than the distinction between " the act of the highwayman who demands your money at the muzzle of a pistol, and that of the swindler who robs you under the form of law." The marvel is, not that such outrages were resented, but that they were ever endured.
No better description of the attitude of the two parties, British and American, toward one another was ever given than is contained in the waitings of a most gallant British officer. Captain Basil Hall, E.N. In 1831 he published two little volumes of 'Voyages and Travels,' which contained a chapter called "Blockading a Neutral Port." In this he described what he saw when a Midship- man on board the 50-gun ship Leander, while she was lying off' New York harbour, to carry out the instructions of the British Govern- ment as to supervising the American trade with Prance. I quote at some length, condensing a little, from his description because it is the best ever given by a responsible authority of what really occurred under the Orders in Council ; and it is written with entire good temper and truthfulness : —
" Tlie blockading service at any time is a tedious one; but upon tliis occasion we contrived to enliven it in a mariner wliich, whether legitimate or not, was certainly highly exciting, and sometimes rather profitable, lo us.
" With the outward bound vessels we had little to do, but with those which came from foreign parts, especially from France, then our bitter enemy, we took the liberty — the American said the improjjer liberty. The ships we meddled with, so much to the displeasure of the Americans, were tliose wliich, to outward appearance, belonged to citizens of the United St:ites, but on board which we had reason, good or bad, to Kusjiect there was cargo owned by the enemy. Nothing appears to be so easy as to forge a ship's papers or to swear false oaths ; and, accordingly, a great deal of French property was imported into America in vessels certainh' belonging to the United States, but covered, as it was called, by documents implying an American or neutral right in it. In the very same way, I suppose, much Spanish property was for a long course of years imported into South America in English bottoms when Spain was at war with her colonies. England in that case acted the part of a neutral, and learned in like manner for the lucre of gain to trifle with all the obligations of an oath. The adroit neutral, by watching bis time, can always minister to the several necessities of the combatants, sometimes to one and sometimes to the other, according as the payment is good or bad, and in such a manner as to be sure of his o^vn profit, reckless at whose cost. At the same time he must naturally lay his account with provoking the displeasure of the powers at war, who in their turn will, of course, do all they jxissibly can to prevent the neutral from lending assistance to their opponents respectively.
"Conflicting nations accordingly have always claimed, and, when they can, will never cease to enforce, this right of searching neutral ships in order to discover whether or not there be enemies' property on board.
1812.] SUPERVISING AMERICAN TRADE. 15
" Every morning at daybreak ilnring our stay utT New York we set about arresting the (jrogress of all vessels we saw, firing ofl" gvms to tlie right ami left, to miike every shii) that was running in heave to, or wait until we had leisure to send a boat on board ' to see,' in our lingo, ' what she was made of.' I have frequently known a dozen, and sometimes a couple of dozen, ships l^'ing a league or two otf the port, losing their fair wind, their tide, and, worse than all, their market, for many hours, sometimes the whole day, before our search was completed. I am not now inquiring whether all this was right, or whether it was even necessary, but simply describing the fact.
"When any circumstances in the ship's papers looked suspicious, the boarding officer brought the master and liis documents to the Leaiider, where they were furtlier examined by the Captain; and, if anything more im|iortant was then elicited by the examination of the parties or their papers to justify the idea that the cargo was French and not American, as was pretended, the ship was forthwith detained. She was tlien manned with an English crew from the ships of war and ordered off to Halifax, to be there tried in the Admiralty Court.
"One can easily conceive how this sort of proceeding, in every possible case, must ■ be vexatious to the neutral. If the cargo be all the while, botu't fide, the jiroperty of the neutral whose flag it is sailing under, the vexation caused Viy this interruiition to the voyage is excessive. In the event of restoration or acquittal, the owner's loss, it is said, is seldom, if ever, adequately compensated for by the awarded damages.
" We detained, at that period, a good many American vessels on the ground of having French or Spanish property on board. Three or four, I remember, were restored to their owners by the decision of the Admiralty Court ; and two of them were forcibly recaptured by the Americans on their way to Halifax. On board one of these ships the master and the few hands left in her to give evidence at the trial rose in the night, overpowered the prize master and his crew, nailed down the hatches, and having put the helm up, with the wind on land, gained the coast before the scale of authority could be turned.
" Tliere was another circumstance, connected with our proceedings at that time, of still more serious annoyance to the Ameiicaus, and one requiring in its discussion still greater delicacy of handling. I need hardly mention that I allude to tiie impressment of those seamen who were found serving on board American merchatit ships, but who were known to be English subjects. It seems quite clear that, while we can hold it, we will never give up the right of search, or the right of impressment. We may, and ought certainly to, exercise so disagreeable a power with such temper and iliscretion as not to provoke the enmity of any friendly nation. But at the time I speak of, and on board our good old ship the Lettnder, whose name I was grieveil, but not surprised, to find was still held in detestation three or four and twenty years afterwards at New Yoi'k, I am sorry to own we had not much of this discretion in our proceedings ; or, rather, we had not enough consideration for the feelings of the people we were dealing with. We have since learned to respect them more— or, as they prefer to express it, they have since taught us to respect them : be it either way, it matters not much ; and if it please the Americans more to say they have instructed us in this point of good manners, than to allow that we have come to a knowledge of better habits, well and good.
" To place the full annoyance of these matters in a light to be viewed fairly by I'.nglish peo])le: let us suppose that the Americans and French were to go to war, ainl that England for once remained neutral, and that an American squadron stationed itself off Liverpool. If the American ships were to detain olV the jiort, within a league or so o{ the lighthouse, every British ship coming from France or from n French colony ; and if, besides looking over the pajierB of these ships to see whether all was regular, they were to open every jirivate letter in the hojie of detecting some trace of French owner- ship in the cargo, what should we say? If, out of twenty ships, one or two were to be conqiletely ilivertcd from their course from time to time, anil sent ofl" under a prize master to New York fur adjudication, I wonder how ihe Liverpool fnlks would like It?
16 THE WAl! WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
Conceive, for instance, tli.it the American squadron employed to blockade the Frencli ships in Liverpool were short-handed, but, from being in daily expectation of bringing their enemy to action, it had become an object of great consequence with them to get their ships manned. And suppose, likewise, that it was perfectly notorious to all parties that on board every English ship, arriving or sailing from the port in question, there were several American citizens calling themselves Englishmen, and having in their possession 'protections' or certificates to that efl'ect sworn to in regular form, but all Known to lie lalse. If the American man-of-war, off the English port, were then to lire at and stop every ship, and, besides overhauling her papers and cargo, were to take out any seamen, to work their own guns withal, whom they had reason, or supiposed, or sai<l they had reason, to consider American citizens, or whose country they guessed from dialect or appearance, I wish to know with what degree of patience this would be submitted to on the Exchange at Liverpool, or anywhere else in England.
" In putting a parallel case to ours oft' Xew York, and supposing Liverpool to be blockaded by the Americans, on the ground of having to watch some French ships, I omitted to throw in one item which is necessary to complete the jiarallel. In 1804, when we were blockading the French frigates in New York, a casual shot from the Leander hit an unfortunate ship's mainboom; and the broken spar, striking the mate, John Peirce by name, killed him instantly. The sloop sailed on to New York, where the mangled body, raised on a platform, was paraded through the streets in order to augment the vehement indignation, already at a high pitch, against the English. Now, let us be candid to our rivals, and ask whether the Americans would have been worthy of our friendship, or even of our hostility, had they tamely submitted to indignities which, if passed upon ourselves, would have roused not only Liverpool, but the whole country into a towering passion of nationality ? "
The British Minister, Erskine, laid the situation fairly before his Government, writing to them that American ill-will was naturally excited hy the "insulting behaviour" of British captains "in the very harbours and waters of the United States," while the whole coast was blockaded as if in time of war, and every American ship vigorously searched in sight of the shore. ^
According to the best estimate, some twenty-five hundred British seamen were drawn annually into the American merchant marine ; and, on the other hand, about a thousand seamen, supposed to be British, but in large part American, were impressed from American merchantmen by British warships every year ; while hundreds of these merchantmen were seized b}' British cruisers, not merely on the high seas, but within gunshot of the American coast. The Americans clamoured in anger, but took no effectual steps in retalia- tion. The seafaring people were wiUing to risk a war; but the merchants were not, for, after all, the neutral trade was very remu- nerative, and, inasmuch as they pocketed the profits, they were willing to pocket the accompanying insults and injuries. Even the outrages on the coast met with no more response than the tedious protests of diplomacy, and an occasional outburst of indignation in some
' Adams, iv. 143.
1812.]
THE "LEOPARD" AND THE ''CHESAPEAKE:'
11
town which refused for the moment to furnish provisions to a peculiarly offensive British frigate. It could hardly be deemed verj- spirited retaliation, this refusal to give green vegetables to the men who slew or imprisoned American citizens. But finally something occurred which really did rouse the whole nation, for the British suddenly extended their theory of the right of search so as to include, not merely the merchant vessels, but the warships of the United States.
ADMIRAL THE HON. SIB GKDRGK l KA.NJ-lKl.ll IIKHKELEY, CCB.
(Frnin liiitlt'i/'s lithograith iiftir tin ititrtrait hij J/m- Piiiti.)
The British ships on the American coast were under the com- mand of Vice-Admiral the Hon. George Cranfield Berkeley, who was stationed at Halifax. Desertions were rife from iiiuong these ships, and, indeed, were not infrequent from the American sliips themselves. Naturally, whenever a I'ritisli sliij) was lying off an American port, the American seamen aboanl her were eager for a chance to get ashore and desert ; and some of the British seamen wore delighted to follow suit. In ISO? the Admiral issued an order reciting the fact that a certain iuniil)er of deserters had escaped VOL. VI. f
18 THE KAB WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
from various British vessels, which he enumerated, and directed the captains of the ships under him to reclaim these deserters wherever found ; specificaUy ordering them to search even an American man- of-war which might be suspected of having them aboard. At that time a British squadron, including both two-deckers and frigates, lay off Norfolk. When they received the news, the American frigate Chesapeake was about to put to sea. She had aboard her one of the deserters alluded to, and the 50-gun ship Leopard, Captain Salusbury Pryce Humphreys, was despatched to overhaul her and re-claim hiiu.
The Chesapeake rated thirty-eight guns, and on this voyage carried forty. She was inferior in strength to the Leopard, about in the proportion that a 38-gun frigate was inferior to a 44 ; that is, the inferiority was not such as to warrant her striking without resistance. The Chesapeake was mider the command of Captain James Barron when she put out ; and, of course, neither he nor anyone. else aboard her dreamed that there was the slightest fear of attack from the British ships which were lying at anchor or cruising in the harbour. The Chesapeake s decks were lumbered up, and none of her guns were ready for action, for they were without gunlocks, and could only be fired by means of slow matches, or of firing-irons previously heated in the fire. When the Leopard approached, Barron still felt no suspicion of the errand on which she came, and he was dumbfounded when he was informed of the purpose to search his ship. It was, of course, a proposition to which no naval officer who did not wish to be hanged for cowardice or treason could submit ; and Barron refused. After a few minutes' hesitation, he began to prepare for defence ; but, long before the preparations were completed, the Leopard opened fire. After sub- mitting to three broadsides, which killed or wounded twenty-one men, the Chesapeake struck. She had been able to fire in return but a single gun, which Lieutenant AVilliam Henr_y Allen discharged by means of a hot coal which he brought in his hands from the galley. The British then boarded her, and took out four deserters from British ships, three of these deserters being Americans, and only one a British subject ; and the Chesapeake returned to port in an agony of shame and rage. Captain Barron was court-martialled, but was acquitted of all charges save neglect to utilise fully the short period given him by the Leopard in which to make ready for the fight. Decatur, however, always considered him more
f
1812.]
AMElilCAN EXASPERATION.
19
blameworthy than was shown In' the judj^inent ; and in after hie the quarrel between the two men gave rise to a duel in which Decatur was slain.
The event was a terrible tragedy ; but one touch of comedy was supplied by Admiral Berkeley's letter approving the deed. In this he warned Captain Humphreys, of the Leopard, not to pay heed to American criticism of a feat which was as lawless as any deed of piracy ever committed on the high seas, because he "must make
BEAK-ADMIRAL SIR SALUSDURY I-RVCE llAVKXl'liKT (PRKVIOUSI.Y HaMPHBEYS),
KT., C.B., K.C.H.
(.'Wti'r Pwjr'ft Uthii'iraph, In thr ' Nm'nJ Chntnirh.' IHIL', tt/ Iliitiiiihrrijit uh ii PoM-Cavtain )
allowances for the heated state of the populace in a country where law, and every tie both civil and religious, is treated so lightly." '
Such an outrage convulsed the whole country for the moment, and spurred to action even Jefferson, the most timid and least warlike of presidents ; but Jefferson, even when angry, was utterly unable to uphold the honour or dignity of the nation in any dispute with a foreign power. Thougli Ik; led the people wrong, it must be rememljcrt'd that they were more than willing to ' Marshall; 'Naval Biognipliy,' ii. 8'.i5.
c '2
20 THE WAl! WITH THE VXITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
follow his lead ; for the Americans of that clay lacked national feeling, and were possessed of a party spirit rendered more than usually ignoble because of the fact that the rival factions fought under the badges of France and England, and considered all American questions solely from the standpoint of the foreign nation whose interests they happened to champion. The President, the Congress, and the people as a whole all showed an unworthy dread of the appeal to arms.
Instead of declaring war, Jefferson put in practice one of his favourite schemes, that of commercial war, as he called it. In other words, he declared an embargo on all American shipping, refusing to allow any of it to leave American ports, and hoping thus so to injure the interests of England and France as to force them to refrain from injuring America : a futile hope, rightly destined to meet with the failure which should attend the efforts of men and of nations that lack that most elementary and needful of all virtues, the orderly courage of the soldier. The temper of Jefferson's mind, and the extraordinary military foolishness of the American people as a whole, may be gathered from the fact that, in preparing for war, all he could suggest was that the ships of war should be laid up so as not to tempt the enemy to capture them ; and that the United States should rely upon the worthless militia on shore, and the flotillas of equally worthless gunboats along the coast. ^ The British Government, through Canning, disavowed Berkeley's act and recalled him, but accompanied the disavowal with requests and demands in connection with the Orders in Council which were in themselves almost as great insults. Jeffer- son could not make his embargo work. It did some damage to Great Britain and France, but by no means enough to force either to yield, while it wrought such ruin in America as very nearly to bring about a civil war. It was a mean and ignoble effort to avoid war ; and it spoke ill for its promoters that they should prefer it to the manlier course which would have appealed to all really brave and generous natures. At the very end of his administration Jefferson was forced to submit to the repeal of his pet measure, and the substitution of a non-intercourse act, which merely forbad vessels to sail direct to France or England : a measure which, if it ac- complished no more good, at least did very much less harm.
The British Government resolutely declined to withdraw the
' Adams, iv. 159.
1812.] EFFECT OF XAPOLEOX'S DECliEES. 21
Orders in Council, or to iihiuulon tho impressment of seamen from American ships ; but, inasmuch as the measures taken by the American government bore equally heavily against France and Britain, they ceased to blockade the American ports, or to exercise the right of search on the American coasts ; for they insisted that America must not favour France at the expense of Britain, and hope to escape retaliation. An inteiininable diplomatic wrangle followed, the British and the French ahke accusing the Americans of favouring their opponents ; and the Americans endeavouring to persuade each set of combatants that its conduct was worse than that of the other, and should be abandoned. Finally, in 1810, Napoleon made in the last and worst of his decrees certain changes which the Americans thought were equivalent to a repeal. Napoleon and his administrators were steeped in such seething duplicit}', mendacity, and corruption, that negotiations with the French at that period afforded a peculiarly difficult problem. He allowed one set of puljlic officials to issue mandates showing that the repeal of the decrees was real, and he permitted action to be taken in accordance with these mandates ; while another set of officers, or even the same set on some other occasion, might ignore the alleged repeal and enforce the original decrees. Just prior to going through the form of a pretended repeal, he had enforced a sweeping confiscation of American ships by an act of gross treachery, and he evaded making restitution for this ; while, later, one of his squadrons burned American merchant vessels at sea. However, on the assumption that the repeal of the obnoxious decrees had been declared, the American government discontinued the operation of the non-intercourse law as against France. Thereupon the British Government, insisting that the decrees had really not Ijeen repealed, renewed the blockade of the American coast, and there began once more the familiar series of outrages ; American ships being confiscated, and American sailors impressed, off the mouth of American harbours, and within gunsliot of tlie American shore. Even tlie greed of gain, and the timidity of the doctrinaire politicians who l)elieved in a conquest to be achieved purely by peace, could not withstand this, and the war spirit rose steadily among the American people ; although without tliat accompaniment of forethought, and of resolute, intelligent prepara- tion, the lack of which tends to m;ike war spirit merely bluster.
At the time the conduct of the French was in intention rather worse than that of the English, and tlic damage which the French
22 THE WAI! WITH THE UXITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
inflicted on the property within their clutches was ahnost as great ; Irat they had made a pretence of repeahng the obnoxious decrees, whereas Great Britain positively declined to repeal the Orders in Council, or to abandon the right of impressment. Moreover, what was far more important, the French were remote and could not do the damage they wished, whereas the British warships were in sight of the American coast, and their actions were the every-day theme of indignant comment. In such circumstances it was inevitable that the people, smarting under their wrongs, should feel inclined to revenge them against the nearer and more obvious aggressor ; though this did not excuse the American government for the failure to take a stand as decided against France as against Great Britain.
In 1811 there occuiTed another collision between armed ships of the two nations. The great frigate. President, under the command of Captain John Eodgers, encountered the British sloop of war Little Belt, under the command of Commander Arthur Batt Bingham, not very far from the scene of the Chesapeake's humiliation. The en- counter took place at night, under a misunderstanding which each alleged to be the fault of the other. Shots were exchanged, and a regular tight, lasting about a quarter of an hour, took place, when the Little Belt, which was not of a quarter the force of her antagonist,^ was of course silenced, having thirty-two of her men either killed or wounded. Not a man was touched on board the President.- Each accused the other of having fired the first shot and brought on the action. But, taking into account the great dispai-ity in force between the combatants, and the further fact that Eodgers carried a letter of instructions from the Secretary of the Navy, which, in effect, directed him to err on the side of aggressiveness rather than to run any risk of a repetition of the Chesapeale affair, it is difdcult not to come to the conclusion that the President was the offender. The incident deeply exasperated the British captains along the coast, while it put the Americans in high feather. They accepted it as an offset to the Chesapeake affair, and no longer dwelt much upon the need of redress for the latter.
All of this really rendered war inevitable ; but as the American government grew more, the British Government gi-ew less, ready to
' The Litth Belt carried eighteen 32-pr. carronades and two 9-prs., with a com- plement of 121 men and boys; the President, a "44-gun" frigate, seems to have mounted thirty-two 24-prs. and twenty-four 12-pr. carronades. — AV. L. C.
^ Rodgers's letter. May 23rd, 1811 : Secretary Hamilton to Eodgers, June 9th, 1810; Bingham's letter, May 23rd, 1811.
1812.] DELUSIONS OF BOTH SIDES. 23
appeal to the sword. Finally, in June 1812, Madison i5ent in his declaration of war, tin; two chief grievances alleged being the right of search and the impressment of seamen. Almost at the same time, and therefore too late to do anj' good, the British Government repealed the Orders in Council : a step which, if taken a j^ear before, would not only have prevented war, but very possibly would have made America declare war on France.
Deeply to the national discredit, the American government and people had made no adequate preparation for the conflict into which they plunged. The statesmen who had been in control of the administration for the last dozen years, Jefferson and his followers, were utterly incompetent to guard the national honour when menaced by a foreign Power. They were painfully unable to plan or carry out proper measures for national defence. The younger democratic-republican leaders, men like Claj' and Calhoun, were unlike their elders in being willing to fight, but they had not the slightest conception what war meant, or hov/ to meet the formidable foe to whom they had thrown down the glove. Instead of keeping quiet and making preparations, they made no preparations, and indulged in vainglorious boastings. Clay asserting that the militia of Kentucky alone would conquer Canada ; and Calhoun, that the conquest would be made almost without an effort. The memory of these boasts must have cost bitter mortification to the authors a couple of years later. The people as a whole deserved just the administrative w'eakness with which they were cursed by their chosen rulers. Had Jefferson and the other leaders of popular opinion been wiser and firmer men, they could have led the po(ii)lo to make better preparations ; but the people themselves did not desire wiser or better leadership. The only party which had ever acted with dignity in foreign affairs, or taken proper measures for the national defence and national honour, was the party of the Federalists; and the Federalists had sunk into a seditious faction, especially in New England, where discontent with the war reached a treasonable pitch before it ended.
Though at the last the British Government had seemed reluctant to go into the war, anticipating no good from it, no question as to the result crossed the mind of any British statesman, soldier or sailor. The Mtiniiiii/ Post, the organ of the Government, expressed the general feeling when it said in an inspired article that " a war of a very few months, without creating to " (England) " the expense of a
24 THE WAlt WITH THE USITED STATES, 1S12-15. [1812.
single additional ship, would be sufficient to convince" (America) "of her folly by a necessary chastisement of her insolence and audacity." ^ Indeed, there was one factor which both sides agreed at the outset could be neglected, and that was the American navy. The British could hardly be said to have considered it at all ; and American statesmen so completely shared the British belief in British in- vulnerability at sea, that there was a general purpose to lay up the American ships in port ; and this course was only prevented by the striking victories with which the navj" opened its career.
The American navy itself did not in the least share the feelings of its friends and foes. The officers knew that their ships were, on the whole, better built and better armed than any foreign ships of their classes ; and they had entire confidence in their own training and courage, and in the training and courage of the men under them. The navy had been in existence only fourteen years. It was probably fortunate that the service of none of the officers extended back to the revolutionary struggle, when the American warships were really, for the most part., merely ill-disciplined privateers. The first experience of the navy, in the struggle with France, had been honoui-able. A French frigate and corvette were captured in single fight, while the West Indian seas were almost cleared of French privateers, and no American vessel was lost. Then came the war with the Barbarj' States, which lasted four years, and was a still better training school ; for though it was mostly a wearisome blockade, yet there were bombardments, single ship encounters — in which the vessels of the Moorish pirates were captured — and desperate cutting-out expedi- tions, in which the Yankee cutlass proved an over-match for the Moorish scimitar. It was in that war that the commanders who later won distinction against the lords of the sea, gained their first experience of hard and dangeroiis fighting, and of commanding men in action. They improved the experience thus gained bj' careful training in time of peace.
In 1812 the American navy regarded itself with intelligent and resolute self-confidence. The people at large not merely failed to possess this confidence, but also showed criminal neghgence in refusing to build up a navy. The very Congress which declared for war actually voted down a ];ill to increase the navy by twelve battleships and twenty frigates. The Federalists supported the proposition, but the great bulk of the dominant party, though ' Morniny Post, November 12th, 1807.
1812.]
THE AMEltWAX XAVY.
clamorous for war, yet decliiu'd to take the steps which alone could have justified their clamour ; and in so doing the}" represented only too well the people behind them. Their conduct was humiliating to the national honour : it was a crime, and it left a stain on the national character and reputation. Contempt is the emotion of all others which a nation should be least willing to arouse ; and con- tempt was aroused by the attitude of those Americans who, in iNl'i and before, refused to provide an adequate navy, and declined to put the country into shape which should render it tit for self-defence. There are plenty of philanthropists and politicians in the America of to-day who show the same timid, short-sighted folly, and supine indifference to national honour ; nor is the breed wholly lacking in England.
In 1812 the navy of the United States, exclusive of two or three condemned hulks and a score or so of worthless gunboats, consisted of the following vessels : —
Katk.
(Guns.)
|
Dath of uuiluing. |
TOSNAC |
|
1797 |
157G |
|
1797 |
1576 |
|
1800 |
1576 |
|
1797 |
^ 1265 |
|
1799 |
1208 |
|
1799 |
1244 |
|
1799 |
860 |
|
1799 |
560 |
|
1805 |
480 |
|
l!-0(i |
4.50 |
|
1803 |
298 |
|
1803 |
250 |
|
1803 |
185 |
|
1803 |
185 |
|
1799 |
165 |
|
IHIO |
UH |
44 44 44 38 38 38 32 28 18 18 16 16 14 14 12 12
United States . ... Frigate
Constitution „
President „
Constellation „
Congress „
<'liesapeuke . .... „
Essex .... . ,,
Adams Corvette
Hornet Ship-sloop
Waup „
Arijns Jjrig-sloop
Syren
Nautilus „
Vi.ien „
Enterprise Brig
Viper „
Tonnage was at that time reckoned arljitrarily in several different ways. One of the tricks of naval writers of the period, on both bides, was to compute the tonnage differently for friendly and foreign ships, thus making out the most gratifying disparity in size, for the benefit of tlu^ national vanity.'
' The British inetliud of coinpntiiig tonnage lieing iliflereiit from tlie AmtTican, ami even tlie iiietli(Kls of iiieasuremeut being dilVerent, it is not jiosKihlc to make an absolutely accurate comparison of tlie tonnage of the combatants. According to the British methods, the American frigates would measure from 100 to 1.50 tons le.ss than the figures given above. I have discussed the matter fully in the apjvendix to my ' Naval War of Is 12." .liuiics, tlic l'.rilii*h historian, ihone of the writers who, ei<|>eciHlly
26 THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
The four smallest brigs were worthless craft originally altered from schooners. The other twelve vessels were among the best of their respective classes afloat. At that time there were two kinds of gnns in use in all navies : the long gim and the carronade.' The carronade was short and hght, but of large calibre. At long ranges it was useless ; at short ranges, owing to the greater weight of the shot, it was much more useful than a long gun of less calibre. American sloops and brigs were armed only with carronades, save for two long bow-chasers ; frigates were armed with long guns on the main-deck, and with carronades and two long bow-chasers on the quarter-deck and forecastle, or what the Americans called the spar- deck. The onl}^ exception to this rule was the Essex, which was armed with forty 32-pr. carronades and six long 12's. In comparing the relative force of any pair of combatants, the most important item is the relative weight of metal in broadside ; but, in considering this, allowance must always be made for the difference between carronades and long guns, the latter being, relatively to their calibre, much more powerful and efficient weapons. The annalist of each side usually omits all considerations of this kind when they tell against their own people.
The only other class of ocean vessels used by the Americans during the war may as well be alluded to here. It consisted of a class of fine ship-sloops, of -509 tons, each carrying twenty-two guns, which put to sea in 1814.
Almost all the American ships carried more guns than they rated. The 44-gun frigate usually carried fifty-four, consisting of thirty long '24's on the main- deck, and on the spar-deck two long bow- chasers, and either twenty or twenty-two carronades — 32-pounders in the Constitution, and 42-pounders in the President and the United States. The ConstcUation, Congress, and Chesapeake carried forty-eight guns, twenty-eight long 18's on the main-deck, and on the spar-deck two long 18's, and eighteen 32-pr. carronades. The ship-sloops carried 32-pr. carronades, and long 12's for bow-chasers. The brig-sloops carried 24 or 18-pr. carronades, according to their size.
in dealing witli the lake flotillas, adopts diflerent standards for the two sides : and his latest editor has attempted to justify him, by ignoring the fact that the question is, not as to the accuracy of James's figures by any one standard, but as to his using two diflerent standards as if they were the same.
' For fuller information as to the carronade, see Vol. Ilf., pp. 330-333. — W. L. C.
1S1_'.] THE FlilGATE CLASSES. 27
The British vessels with which the American ships most frequentlj' came in contact were the ;S8-gmi frigates and the 18-gUD brig-sloops. The 38-gun frigates were almost exactly similar in size and armament to the American ships of the same rate. The brig- sloops were somewhat less in size than the Hornet ; they were supposed to carry eighteen guns, two bow-chasers and sixteen 3'2-pound carronades.
The system of rating, like the system of measuring tonnage, was thus purely artificial. The worst case of underrating in the American navy was that of the Essex, which rated thirty-two and carried forty-six guns, so that her real, was 44 per cent, in excess of her nominal force. Among the British ships with which the Americans came in contact, the worst case of underrating was the Cyaiie, which was rated at twenty-two and carried thirty-three guns, making a difference of 50 per cent. The Wasp carried eighteen guns, the Hornet twenty. The English brig-sloops almost always carried one light carronade beyond their rating, and sometimes, in addition, a hght stern-chaser, or two bow-chasers, thrust into the bridle ports.
The conflicts which at the time and afterwards attracted most attention were the first three frigate fights, all of which took place between the American 44's and the British SB's. In each case the American ship was markedly superior in force. The countrymen of each combatant tricni, on the one side, to enhance the glory of the victory by minimising this difference in force, and, on the other, to explain away the defeat by exaggerating it. The Americans asserted, not merely in their histories, but even by resolutions in Congress, that the ships were practically equal in force, which a glance at the figures given above will show to be an absurd imtruth. The British, on the other hand, sought consolation in declaring that the American frigates were " disguised line-of- battle ships." This has been solemnly repeated at intervals to the present day. It is of course pure nonsense. The American 44's were the finest frigates afloat; luit tlicre had already l)een 24-pounder frigates, not only in the British, but also in the French and Danish navies. One of the British frigates with which the Americans came in contact was the 4()-gun frigate Endijmion. The Endymion, like the Constitution, carried long 24*8 on her main-deck, and 32-pound carronades on her spar-deck. In 1815 she had fifty-one guns, including a shifting 24-pound carronade, making ii l)roadsido
28 THE KAi: WITH THE EXITED UTATES, lSlli-15. [l!sl2.
of 698 pounds. The Constitution that year carried fifty-two guns, and threw a broadside of 704 pounds. The difference in weight of metal was therefore just six pounds, or one per cent., which is certainly not enough to mark the difference between a 40-gim frigate and a "disguised line-of-battle ship." As a matter of fact, the difference between the force and the rating was greater in the case of the Endijmion than in that of the Constitution.
The United States was not the first nation that invented the heavy frigate, but was the first to use it effectively. The French '24-pounder carried a ball about five pounds heavier than that of the American 24, and the 36-pound carronade which the French put on their spar-decks caiTied a heavier ball than the American or British 42-pounder ; for the French pound was about 15 per cent, heavier than the English. Nevertheless the French, as well as the Dutch and Danish, heavy •24-pounder frigates had failed to distin- guish themselves, and had been captured by the British just as easily as the 18-pounder frigates. In consequence, the belief was general that the 18-poimder frigates were really better as fighting machines than those with 24-pounders. The American successes upset this theory, because the Americans built heavy frigates which were even better than those built liy the French and Dutch, and put into them officers and seamen who were able to handle and fight them as no frigates at that time were handled or fought by any other nation.
The size and seaworthy qualities, and the excellent anuament of the American vessels did the utmost credit, both to those who had planned them, and to those who had built them. There was one point in which there was a falling off' as compared with the British. The American foundries were not verj' good, and in consequence the guns were more Hable to accidents ; and almost all the shot were of Ught weight, the shortage varying from two or three to as much as ten per cent. As a result, the real weight of the American broadside was always somewhat less than the nominal.
The personnel of the American navy consisted of 500 officers, but twelve of whom were captains, and 5230 seamen and boys, of whom 2346 were destined for the cruising war vessels, the remainder being for service at the forts and navy yards, in the gun-boats, and on the lakes. The officers were almost exclusively native Americans. In the crews native Americans also overwhelmingh- predominated ; there were, however, a certain number of foreigners aboard almost
1812.] THE NAVIES COMPARED. 29
every vessel, the proportion of English being probablj' larger than that of any other nationality, in spite of the fact that Great Britain was the country with which the Americans were at war. This pro- portion of foreigners, and especially of Englishmen, varied in the different ships. The captains, under instructions from the Secretary of the Navy, got rid of as many English as possible at the outbreak of the war, fearing lest they might be reluctant to fight against their countrymen. A good many remained, possibly as many as ten or even fifteen per cent, of the total in some of the ships, but certainly a smaller percentage on the average.
The British Navy was so large as to put all comparison between it and that of the United States out of the question. But the British Navy could not be diverted from the use to which it had so long been put. It was a knife at the throat of Napoleon, and it could not be taken away. However, this applied only to the great Heets, and there was no need of great fleets for use against America. A few two-deckers, and a score or two of frigates would, it was believed, suffice to keep in check the entire American navy, and to blockade all the important American ports.
The British Navy stood at the height of its splendour and triumph, and higher than any other navy either before or since. During twenty years of almost uninterrupted warfare it had cowed or destroyed the navies of all other European powers. In fleet action after fleet action it had crushed to atoms the sea might of France, of Spain, of Holland, and of Denmark ; in hundreds of single ship fights, in which the forces engaged on each side were fairly equal, the monotonous record of Britain's triumphs had been broken by less than half-a-dozen defeats. The British officers felt absolute confidence in tluir juowess, and they despised their new foes. As a whole they had begun to pay less attention to gunnery since Nelson's death ; and this lack of care and their overwhelming pride and self-confidence— good qualities, but bad if carried to excess — made them less fit than formerly to contend on tMjual terms for the mastery of the ocean with enemies more skilful than any they had yet encountered. Their European antagonists had been com- pletely cowed, and always entered into a fight half beaten in advance; l)Ut in the .\niericans they had to meet men of a difi'erent mettle.
In June, 1812, there were half-a-dozen British frigates, and one
30 THE WAB WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
old two-decker, the Africa, 64,' immediately off the American
coast. Had the American ships been ready they could doubtless
have overcome these, even when collected into a squadron, as they
were as soon as the new-s of the outbreak of the war became known.
Such a victory over a squadron would have been an incalculable
benefit to the Americans ; but the administration had no thought
of such action. It wished to lay up the American frigates in
port, and was only prevented from doing so by the urgent re- f-l
monstrances of two of the naval captains. The Secretary of the fj
Navy wrote letters to Captain Isaac Hull urging him to act, even
against a single foe, with timid caution ; but Hull, fortunatelj-, was
willing to bear the responsibility which his superior shirked.^
However, even a bold administration could have done little at the
moment. The ships were not ready, and all that could be done was
to send Captain John Eodgers on a cruise with his own frigate, the
President, 44, the United States, 44, Captain Stephen Decatm-, the
Congress, 38, Captain John Smith, the Hornet, 18, Captain James
Lawrence, and the Argus, 16, Captain Ajrthur Sinclair. Rodgers
put to sea on June '21st, hoping to strike the West Indies' homeward7
bound fleet. ^ Two days out of the port he encountered the British
frigate Behndera, 36, Captain Richard Byron (2).* Byron had been
infoi-med of the likelihood of war by a New York pilot boat ; and as
soon as he made out the strange ships he stood away before the
wind. The Americans made all sail in chase, the President, a very
fast ship off the wind, leading, and the Congress coming next.
At noon the President was within less than three miles of the Behndera, steering N.E. by E. As the President kept gaining, Byron cleared for action, and shifted to the stern ports two long 18's on the main-deck and two 32-pomid carronades on the quarter- deck. At 4.30^ Commodore Eodgers himself fired the President's starboard forecastle bow-chaser ; the corresponding main-deck gun was next discharged ; and then Eodgers fired his gun again. All three shots struck the stern of the Belvidera, killing and wounding nine men ; but when the President's main-deck gun was discharged
' The Africa, built in 1781, was, iu 1812, flagship of Vice-Admiral Herbert Sawyer (2), who, since 1810, had been Commander-in-Chief on the Halifax station. — W. L. C.
* IngersoU's ' Second War between the United States and Great Britain,' i. 377, 381. ^ Captain John Rodgers to tlie Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 1st, 1812.
* Brenton, v. 46. ' Cooper, ii. 151.
1812.] ESCAPE OF THE "BELVIDEHA:- 31
for the second time it l)urst, l^lowing up the forecastle deck and kilHng and wounding sixteen men, among them the Commodore himself, whose leg was broken. Nothing causes more panic than such an explosion, for every gun is at once distrusted ; and in the midst of the confusion Byron opened his stern-chaser, and killed or wounded six men more. Had the President pushed steadily on, using only her bow-chasers until she closed, she would probably have run abreast of the Belinchn-a, which could not then have success- fully withstood her ; but, instead of doing this, she bore up and tired her port broadside, doing little damage ; and this manoeuvre she repeated again and again ; while the Belvidera kept up a brisk and galling tire with her stern-chasers, and her active seamen repaired the damage done by the President's guns as fast as it occm-red.' Byron cut away his anchors, the barge, yawl, gig, and jolly-boat, and started fourteen tons of water, gradually shifting his course, and beginning to draw ahead, and the President, which had lost much ground by yawing to dehver her broadsides, could not regain it.- The upshot of it was that Captain Byron escaped and got safely into Halifax on June 27th, having shown himself to be a skilful seaman and resolute commander.* Subsequently, when engaged in the blockade of the Chesapeake, he proved himself to be as humane and generous to non-combatants as he was formidable to aiTued foes.
Rodgers's squadron continued its cruise, but returned home two months later vvithout accomplishing anything save the capture of a few merchantmen. When Byron brought the news of the war to Halifax, a squadron of ships* was immediately despatched to cruise against the United States, under the command of Captain Philip Bowes Vere Broke, of the Shannon. Meanwhile the Essex, 32, had to put to sea under Captain David Porter, after he had in vain implored the Navy Department to allow him to change her main- deck carronades for long guns. She cut out a transport with a couple of hundred soldiers from a convoy of troopships bound to Quebec, under the protection of the British frigate Minerva, 82,
' James, vi. llii.
- Sir Howard Douglas, ' Naval Gunnery,' 419 (3rd edition).
' In this atVair, Lieutenants John Sykes (2), William Henry Bruce (2), who waH wounded, and the Hon. (jeorne Pryse Campbel], and the Master, Mr. James Kerr, of the BelriUera, siieoially distinguislied themselves. (Uyrou'-s Disj).) — W. I.. C.
' Africa, G4, Slmnnon, 38, Belvidera, 3IJ, and Jiolus, 32, subseiiuenlly leiiil'orced by tlie Ouerriere, 38. The squadron left Halifax on July 5th. — W. L. I'.
32 THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, isii.'-15. [1812.
Captain Eichard Hawkins ; and she captured the British ship-sloop Alert, 16/ Commander Thomas Lamb Poldeu Laugharne, after an exchange of broadsides, made prize of eight merchantmen, and then returned to New York."
On July 12th another ship, destined to become one of the most famous in the American navy, put out of the Chesapeake. This was the 44-gun frigate Constitution, affectionately known as " Old Ironsides." She was commanded by Captain Isaac Hull, than whom there was no better single ship commander in the service. Her crew was almost entirely new, drafts of men coming on board up to the last moment ; but they were of excellent stuff, being almost all native Americans, cool, handy, intelligent, and eager to learn their duties. Under the care of the experienced officers and under-officers they were got into shape as men-of-war's men without the slightest trouble. Just before starting, Hull wrote to the Secretary of the Navy : " The crew are as yet unacquainted with a ship of war, as many have but lately joined, and have never been on an armed ship before. . . . We are doing all we can to make them acquainted with their duties, and in a few days we shall have nothing to fear from any single-decked ship." ^
There was need of hurry. On the afternoon of July 16th, when some leagues off Barnegat, Hull sighted Captain Broke's squadron, which had just previously captured the American brig Nautilus, 1-1. This squadron then consisted of the Shannon, 38, Captain Broke, the Belvidera, 36, Captain Richard Byron, the Guerriere, 38, Captain James Eichard Dacres (2), the Africa, 64, Captain John Bastard, and the Jiolus, 32, Captain Lord James Nugent Boyle Bernards Townshend. The Guerriere became separated from the rest of the squadron, and the Constitution beat to action and stood toward her, the wind being very light. The Guerriere also stood toward the Constitution, but, early on the 17th, when only half a mile away, she discovered the rest of the British squadron on her lee beam. She signalled to these vessels, and they did not answer — a circum-
' The Alert was one of twelve colliers which had been purchased into the Navy in 1804, and fitted with 18-pr. carrouades. In 1812 two only of these craft, the AleH and the Avenger, remained on the list. In the brief action the Ahrt had three men wounded. Laugharne, his Master, and his Purser were most honourabh' acquitted for the loss of the ship; but the first lieutenant, Andrew Duncan, was dismissed the service for misbehaviour. — W. L. C.
^ Navy Department MSS., ' Captains' Letters,' 1812, vol. ii.. No. 128, etc.
' Navy Department MSS., ' Captains' Letters,' 1812, ii. No. 85.
1«12.] CHASE OF THE "CONSTITUTION." 33
stance which afterwards caused a sharp controversy among the Captains ; whereupon, conehiding that they were Commodore Eodgers's squadron, she tacked and stood away from the Comtitu- tion some time before discovering her mistake. It was now nearly dayhght.
As morning broke all the British ships were in chase of the Cuiistltiitiun, heading eastward. At 5.30 it fell entirely calm, and Hull rigged four long 24's aft to serve as stern-chasers. At 6 a.m. the SJiaiuion, the nearest frigate, tried a few shots, which fell short. Then most of the boats of the squadron were got out to tow her, and she began to gain on the American. Hull tried kedging. All the spare rope was bent on to the cables and payed out into the cutters, and a kedge was run out half a mile ahead and let go ; whereupon the crew clapped on and walked away with the ship, overrunning and tripping the kedge as she came up with the end of the line.' Mean- while fresh lines and another kedge were carried ahead, and the frigate glided away from her pursuers. From tune to time there were little puffs of air, and every possible advantage was taken of each. At one time the Gueiridre opened fire, but her shot fell short. Later in the day the Bdindera, observing the benefit which the Constitution had derived from warping, did the same, and, having men from the other frigates to help him, she got near enough to exchange bow and stern-chasers ; - but fear of the American guns rendered it impossible for either the Belvidera or the Shannon to tow very near.
The Constitution's crew showed most excellent spirit, the officers and men relieving one another regularly, and snatching their sleep on the decks. All through the afternoon and until late in the evening llic tdwiiig and kedging went on, the British ships being bai-cly out of gunshot. Then a light breeze sprang up, and, the sails of the Constitution being handled with consummate skill, she gradually drew away, and throughout the following day continued to gain. Ill tlie evening there came on a heavy rain squall, of whicli 11 nil took such skilful advantage that he greatly increased his lead. .\t 8.1.5 on the morning of the '20th, the l^ritish ships gave up the pursuit. During the three days' chase Hull had shown skill and seamanship as great as would be demanded by a successful battle, and his men bud jirovcd their liardiiuiod. (lisci])linc. and readiness
' Cooper is the beht iiutlioiiiy lor tliit- diasc. '' Marsliall's ' Naval Biogiaiiiiy,' ii. 020. vol,. \l. D
34 THE WATI WITH THE VXITED STATES, 181:^-15. [1812
for work. If they could do as well with the guns as with the sails, Hull's confidence in his ability to meet any single-decker was more than justifiable ; and Hull was eager to try the experiment. He did not have long to wait.
The Constitution put into Boston, and on August 6th made sail to the eastward. Hull acted without orders from the Department, for the administration was as yet uncertain as to whether it could afford to risk its frigates in action. But Hull himself wished for nothing so much as a chance to take the risk, and he knew that, not being one of the senior officers, he would speedily be superseded in the command of the Constitution. Accordinglj-, he sailed, right in the track of the British cruisers, to the coast of Kova Scotia, where the British fleet had its headquarters. In the afternoon of the 19th, in latitude 40" 30' N. and .55" W., he made out a frigate bearing E.S.E. and to leeward.^ She proved to be his old acquaint- ance, the Giierriire, under Captain James Richard Dacres (2).* It was a cloudy day, and the wind blew fresh from the N.^V. The Gucrriere backed her maintopsail, and waited for the Constitution, which shortened her sail to fighting rig, and ran down with the wind nearly aft. The Guerriere was on the starboard tack, and at
5 o'clock she opened with her weather guns, the shot falling short. She then wore round and fired her port broadside, the shot this time passing over the Constitution.^ As she again wore to fire her starboard battery, the Constitution yawed a little and fired two or three of her port bow-guns. Three or four times the Guerriere repeated this manoeuvre, wearing and firing alternate broadsides with little or no effect ; while the Constitution 3'awed to avoid being raked, and occasionally fired one of her bow-guns. The distance was very great, however, and little or no damage was caused. At
6 o'clock the Guerriere bore up and ran off with the wind almost astern on her port quarter mider her topsails and jib. The Constitu- tion set her main-topgallantsail and foresail, and at 6.5 p.m. closed within half pistol-shot distance on her adversary's port beam.* Then for the first time the action began in earnest, each ship firing as the guns bore. By 6. '20^ the two were fairly abreast, and the Con-
^ Letter of Captain Isaac Hull, Aug. 28th and 30th, 1812.
- Letter of Captain Dacres, Sept. 7th, 1812.
' Xavy Department MSS., ' Logbook of Constitution,' vol. ii.
■* ' Autobiograpliy of Commodore Morris,' p. IG-i.
* 6.5 P.M. by the Giierriere's time. — W. L. C.
1812.]
THE "CONSTITUTION" AND THE "GUEIih'IEh'E."
35
stitiifioii shot away the (iucrrivrc'.s inizenmast, wliich I'cll over the starboard quarter, knockiut; a big hole in the counter, and brought the ship round against her liehn. The British ship was being cut
AMKHICAN" COMMKMOrtATION Mr.DAl. 01' TIIK CAI'TUllK OK TIIK " i;rEIil(lKl!i: " IS 18TJ.
to pieces, while the American liad hardly siil'fci-cd at all. The Coii- stitiifid/i, liiidiug that she was ranging aluitil, put lur liclni M|i(irt and luffed slidi-t i-dund her enemy's hows, raiding her with tlie starhiiai'd ;,'iiiis ; llien she woi'e. and again I'aked v\illi her [lort
1. -2
36 THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
battery. The Englishman's bowsprit got foul of the American's mizen-rigging, and the vessels then lay with the GuerrUre's star- board bow against the Constitution's port quarter.^ The English- men's bow-gmis played havoc with Captain Hull's cabin, setting fire to it ; and on both sides the boarders were called away. The British ran forward, but Captain Dacres relinquished the idea of attacking when he saw the crowds of men on the American's decks;- while the Constitution s people, though they gathered aft to board, were prevented by the heavy sea which was running. Both sides suffered heavily from the closeness of the musketry fire ; indeed, it was at this time that almost the entire loss of the Con- stitution occurred. In the Constitution, as Lieutenant William S. Bush of the marines sprang upon the tafh-ail to leap on the Guerrieres deck, a British marine shot him dead ; Charles Morris, the first heu- tenant, and John C. Alwyn, the master, had also both leaped on the taffrail, and both were at the same moment wounded by the musketry fire. In the Guerriere almost all the men on the forecastle were picked off. Captain Dacres himself was shot and womided by one of the American mizentop men while he was standing on the star- board forecastle hammocks cheering on his crew ; the first and second lieutenants, Bartholomew Kent and Henry Eeady, and the master, Eobert Scott, were also shot down. The ships gradually worked round until they got clear. Immediately afterwards the Guerrikre's foremast and mainmast went by the board, lea\'ing her a defenceless hulk, roUing her main-deck guns into the water. At 6.30 the Constitution ran off for a little distance, and lay to until she had repaired the damages to her rigging. Captain Hull then stood under his adversary's lee, and the latter struck at 7 p.m., just two hours after she had fired the first shot ; the actual fighting, however, occupied but little over twenty-five minutes.
The Constitution was a very much heavier ship than the Chierri&re. She carried thirty-two long 24's and twenty-two 32-pr. caiTonades, while the Guerrihre carried thirty long 18's, two long 1'2's, and eighteen 32-pr. carronades ; the Constitution's crew numbered 456 all told, while the Guerriere's numbered but 282, and 10 of these were Americans, who refused to fight against their countrymen, and whom Captain Dacres, very greatly to his credit, permitted to go below. Fourteen of the Constitution's men
^ Cooper in Putnam's Miujazim; i. 475.
- Dacres's addreBs to the court-martial at Halifax.
I
1812.] BlilTISII OVER-CONFIDENCE. 37
and 79 of the Gucrricrea were killed or wounded.' The damage done to the Constifutian was trifling, while the Guerriere was so knocked to pieces that she had to be abandoned and burned by the victors, who then set sail for Boston, which they reached on August 30th. " Captain Hull and his officers," wrote Captain Dacres, "have treated us like brave and generous enemies; the greatest care has been taken that we should not lose the smallest trifle."
Rarely has any single-ship action caused such joy to the victors, such woe to the vanquished. The disparity of force between the combatants was very nearly in the proportion of three to two. Against such odds, when there was an approximate equality in courage and skill, neither Dacres '^ nor any other captain in the British Navy could hope to succeed. But hitherto the British had refused to admit that there was or could be any equality of courage and skill between them and their foes. Moreover, the disparity in loss was altogether disproportionate to the disparity in force. No one could question the gallantry with which the British ship was fought ; but in gunnery she showed at a great disadvantage compared to the American, and she was not handled with as much judgment. Like all the other British captains on the American coast, Dacres had been intensely eager to meet one of the large American frigates, and no doubt of his success had crossed his mind. British captains, in single-ship contests, had not been accustomed to weigh too nicely the odds against them ; and in the twenty years during which they had overcome the navies of every maritime power in Europe they had repeatedly conquered in single fight where the difference in force against them had been far heavier than in this instance. This was the case when, in 1799, the British 38-gmi llS-pr. frigate Hihijl captured the French 44-gnn -il-iir. frigate Forte; when, in 1805, the Phamix, 36, captured tlir Didon, 40 ; when, in 1808, the San Fiorenzo, 3(5, captured the Piedmontcune, 40; and in many other instances. The exultation of the Americans was as natural as was the deprcission of the British ; though both feelings were exaggerated.
' 'I'lie Oucrriire lost 15 killed, iinludiiiij; LicukMiiiiit Henry Heady, and 03 (<; mortally) wounded, including CapUiu ])acre«. Lieutenant Bartholomew Kent, Master Robert Scott, Master's Mates Samuel Grant and William John Snow, and Midshipman James Euslie.^W. L. C.
^ Captain Dacres was tried at Halifax on October 2nd, and, with his ollicers and crew, imanimously and honourably .aoiuitted. — \V. I-. C.
38 THE WAl! WITH THE UXJTED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
Captain Hull owed his victory as much to superiority of force |
as to superiority of skill ; but iu the next sea fight that occui-red *
the decisive difierenee was in skill. On October 18th the American 18-gun ship-sloop ]]'as2), Captain Jacob Jones, mounting sixteen 3'2-pr. carronades and two long 1-2's, with 137 men all told, sailed from the Delaware. She went south-eastward to get into i
the track of the "West India vessels ; and on the 16th ran into a heavy gale in which she lost her jib-boom, and two men who were on it. On the 17th the weather had moderated somewhat, and late in the evening she descried several sails in latitude 37° N. and longitude 65" W} These were a convoy of merchantmen guarded by the British 18-gun brig-sloop Frolic, carr3-ing sixteen 32-pr. carronades, two long 6's and two 1'2-pr. carronades, with a crew of 110 men. She was under the command of Commander Thomas "WTiinyates, and had also suffered in the gale of the 16th, in which her mainyard had been carried away.' The morning of the 18th was almost cloudless, and the Wasj^ bore down on the convoy under short fighting canvas ; while the Frolic hauled to the wind mider her boom-mainsail and close-reefed foretopsail, the merchantmen making all sail to leeward. At 11.30 a.m. the action began, the two ships running parallel on the starboard tack ^^•ithin sixty yards of one another, the Wasp firing her port and the Frolic her star- boai'd guns. By degrees the ships fell off until they were almost before the wind. There was a heavy sea running, which caused the vessels to pitch and roll : and the two crews cheered loudly as the ships wallowed through the water. Clouds of spray dashed over both crews, and at times the muzzles of the guns were rolled under ; ^ but in spite of the rough weather the batteries were well served. The Frolic fired far more rapidly than the Wasp, delivering three broadsides to her opponent's two, and shooting while on the crests of the seas. The shot, in consequence, tended to go high. In the Wasp the captains of the guns aimed with skill and precision, as the engaged side of their ship was getting down. They therefore fired into their opponent's hull; so that, though they fired fewer shots, a much larger proportion hit. Four minutes after the action began, the Wasp's maintopmast was shot away and fell with its yard
' Letter of Captain Jones, Nov. 21tli, 1812. The American letters can generally be found iu ' Xiles's Register.'
2 Captain Whinyates' letter, Oct. IStb, 1812. ' ' Xiles's r.egister,' iii. 324.
1811'.]
nil-: ■■FimLic" ASD Till-: ■■ir^.s/v
39
across the port foretopsail braces, rendering the head-yards un- manageable. Ten minutes later the gaff and niizen-topgallantmast came down ; and twenty minutes after the action had begun, every brace and most of the rigging was shot away, so that it was almost
AMEIUCAX COMMEMORATIUS MKDAI., IIY Sl'KNCKIi, OK TllK lAI'llllK ol' IIIK
" i-hoi.hV in ISli;.
impossible lu Ijracu any of the yard.s. ISut wink' the Wasp suffiTcd thus aloft, the Frolic was suffering far lucirc licavily below. Her gaff ami her heail Itraces were shot away, iiiul Iht Inwci- masts wdundcil ; but her hull was cut to ])i<'ccs, Tlic slaugiilci' was very great
40 THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
among her crew ; nevertheless, the survivors fought on with splendid courage. Gradually the JVasp forged ahead, while the two vessels drew closer together, so that at last the Americans stnack the Frolic's side with their rammers in loading. The Frolic then fell aboard her antagonist, her jibboom coming in between the main and mizen-rigging of the Wasp, and passing over the heads of Captain Jones and Lieutenant James Biddle as they stood near the capstan. The brig was raked from stem to stern ; and in another moment che Americans began to swarm along the Frolic's bowsprit, though the roughness of the sea rendered the boarding very difficult. A New Jersey sailor. Jack Lang, was the first man on the bowsprit. Lieutenant Biddle then leaped on the hammock cloth to board ; but one of the midshipmen who was following him seized his coat-tails and tumbled him back on deck. At the next swell he succeeded in getting on the bowsprit behind Jack Lang and another seaman, and he passed them both on the forecastle ; but there was no one to oppose him. Not twenty of the British were left unhurt, and most of those were below. The man at the wheel was still at his post, doggedly attending to his duty, and two or three more were on deck, including Captain Whinyates and Lieutenant Frederick Boughton Wintle, both so severely wounded that they could not stand without support. It was impossible to resist longer, and Lieutenant Biddle lowered the flag at 12.15, after three-quarters of an hour's fighting.
A minute or two afterwards the Frolic's masts went by the board. Every one of her officers was wounded, two of them mor- tally.' The Wasp lost but ten men, chiefly aloft. Nevertheless, the desperate defence of the Frolic in the end accomplished the undoing of her foe, for in a few hours a British 74, the Poictiers, Captain John Poo Beresford, hove in sight, and captured both victor and vanquished, the Wasj) being too much cut up aloft to make her escape.
The two ships were of practically equal force : in broadside the British used ten guns to the American's nine, and threw a few pounds more weight of metal, while they had twenty-five fewer men. The disparity in loss was enormous. The Frolic was
' The Frolic went into action witli 110 men and boys all told on board. Of these, 15 were killed and 47 wounded, besides some who were slightly hurt. Among the woumled were Commander 'Wlunyates, Lieutenants Charles M'Kay (mortally), and Frederick Boughton Wintle, and Master John Stejiliens (mortally). — \V. L. C.
1812.] CRUISE OF THE "UNITED STATES." 41
desperately defended ; no men in any navy ever showed more courage than Captain Whinyates and his crew. The battle was decided by gunnery, the coolness and skill of the Americans, and the great superiority in the judgment and accuracy with which they lired, giving them the victory. Their skill was -rendered all the more evident by the extreme roughness of the sea, which might have been expected to prevent, and, in the case of the Frolic, actually did prevent, very great accuracy of aim. In forty-five minutes the American ship cut her antagonist to pieces, conquering a foe who refused to admit defeat until literally unable to retm-n a blow.
On October 8th Commander Rodgers left Boston, on his second cruise, with the President, United States, Congress, and Argus. Three days out they separated. The President and Congress cruised together, nearly crossing the Atlantic, but did nothing more than capture a dozen merchantmen, though they twice chased British frigates— once the Nymphe, 38,' once the Galatea, 36.- They returned to Boston on December 31st. The Argus got in about the same time, having herself been chased for three days by a British frigate.^ She had to start her water and cut away her boats and anchors to escape ; but she kept her guns, and during the chase actually succeeded in taking and manning a prize, though the delay allowed the pursuer to get near enough to open tire as the vessels separated.
The fourth ship of Rodgers's squadron met with greater luck. This was the frigate United States, 44, Captain Stephen Decatur. She was a sister ship to the Constitution, but mounted 4'2-pr. carronades instead of 3'2's, and had a crew of 478 officers and men all told. On October 2oth, in latitude 29^ N. and longitude 2'J' 30' \\ ., she descried a sail on her weather-beam, twelve miles distant.* This was tlu; liritish 38-gun frigate Macedonian, Captain John Surinam Carden. Unlike the G'^e/vie/r, which had been captured tVdin the French, she was a new oak-built ship, rather larger than any of the American 18-pr. frigates. She carried a crew of 301 men all told. Her armament was like the (lucrrierc's, except that she had two
' Captain Faniiery I'rudam lOpwurth. 'I'lie Nymphe was sighted .ind cliaHt-d mi October 10th.— VV. L. C.
' Caiitain Woodley Losack. Tlie Qalatai was siglitcd on October JSlot. — W. L. C. " Letter of Captain Arthur Sinclair, Jan. 4th, 1813.
* Letter of Captain Decatur, Oct. .'JOth, IH12.
42
THE WAI! WITH THE V SITED STATES, 1812-15.
[1812.
long 18"s fewer on the main-deck, and two long 9's extra on the spar-deck. Like the Giierriere, she had an 18-pr. carronade extra, so that she presented twenty-five guns in broadside, throwing 547 pounds of shot; while the United States had twenty-seven guns in broadside, throwing nominally 846 pounds of shot, although owing to the short weight of metal the actual broadside was probably under 800.
C.\PT.\IS STEPHKX DECATUlt, JL'N., U.S.X. CFrom A, B. DiinuiiTfi *'uijrai'imj of thr jinrlrnit hii T. SttUr/.i
The Macedonia)! was reputed to be a crack ship. Captain Garden had exercised every care to gather a crew of picked, first-rate men. He had also taken every opportunity to get rid of all the shiftless and slovenly seamen. Both he himself and his first Heutenant, David Hope, were merciless disciplinarians, and kept the crew in order by the unsparing use of the lash, in which thej- seemed positivelj' to delight. They were feared even more than
1812.] THE ''MACEDnXlAN" AND THE ''UNITED STATED." 43
they were hated, and the disciphne ol' the sliip was seemingly perfect ; hut they made the men under them detest the service.'
Lieutenant Hope said afterwards that the state of disciphne on hoard was excellent ; and that in no British ship was more attention paid to gunnery.'- The results of the action showed, however, that the discipline was that of a martinet, and that in intelligence and judgment the gunners of the Macedonian could not compare with those in the United States, where the sailors w^ere admirably drilled, and yet were treated so humanely that the captured crew speedily wished to enlist among them.
Captain Garden knew nothing of the defeat of the Guerritire, and was most anxious to engage the United States. Once, while at Norfolk before the war, he and Decatur had met and joked one another as to which ship would win if they met in battle. The Macedonian's people were entirely confident of victory, although among the crew there was a generally expressed wish that the antagonist were a French, instead of an American, frigate, because they knew that they could whip the French, and they had learned from the Americans on ].)oard that the Yankee frigates carried heavy metal.
Of these American seamen there was a considerable number among the crew of the Macedonian. A British seaman, who served long on the Macedonian, in writing out his reminiscences in after- life, gave a vivid picture of how they happened to be on board. In one place he described the work of the press-gang at a certain port, adding " among (the impressed men) were a few Americans ; they were taken without respect to their protections, which were often taken from them and destroyed ; some were released through the influence of the American Consul ; others, less fortunate, were carried to sea, to their no small chagrin." When the ship was at Norfolk, as already mentioned, the sailors were denied all liberty to get on shore for fear lest they should desert. " Many of our crew were Americans ; some of these were pressed men ; others were much dissatisfied with the severity, not to say cruelty, of our discipline ; so tliat a uniltiludc
' 'Tliirly Vcai> I'nuii lldiiic, (ir ;i Vuicf I'nmi llic Main-deck, being the E.\))erieiicf i>l" Saiimel Leucli,' lil'twiitli ciUtinii, 1847, jip. Sli, ili), etc. Leech was aii Kuglisliiiian who was a saihjr in tlie Mnn-ddnian ; ho at'leiwanlB entcieil tlie Tnited Stales service, with otlieis of the Macnhmiaii's crew. He belonged to the Uritisli XonconforMiiHt typo, which has so many points in common willi tlie average American citizen. lli» rambling reminiscences are liy no means without value.
* Marshall's ' Navy Biography,' ii. 1018.
44 THE WAli WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
of the crew were read}- to give leg-bail, as they termed it, could they have planted their feet on American soil." ^ Before going into action some of these Americans requested permission not to fight against their countrj'men ; but Captain Garden, unlike Captain Dacres, refused to grant this permission, and ordered them to the guns under penalty of death. One or two of them were killed in the action. The crew of the United States was mainlj' composed of native Americans, but among the foreigners on board there were a number of Englishmen, as well as many Americans, who had served in the British fleet. ^ All did their duty equally well.
As soon as it was evident what the United States was, the Macedonian beat to quarters, the bulkheads were knocked away, the guns were cast loose, and in a few minutes all was ready. In the excitement of the battle the men forgot their wTongs, real and fancied, and went into action in good spirits ; and throughout the fight they continued to cheer heartily. The junior midshipmen were stationed below on the berth-deck with orders to shoot any man who ran from his quarters ; and the captain exhorted the men to show fidelity and courage, quoting Nelson's famous words, " England expects every man to do his duty."^
The Macedonian then bore down toward the United States, which stood toward her with the wind a little forward of the port- beam. Captain Garden, from over-anxiety to keep the weather- gage,* hauled by the wind, and passed far to windward of the
' Leech, i^p. 80, 102.
^ "That Britons were opposed to Britons in the Macedoinan action is no less true than lamentable. Most of her gallant defenders recognised old shipmates in the British Navy among those who had fought under the American flag. We have already stated that a quartermaster discovered his first cousin in the j^erson of a traitor Two other seamen met with brothers from whom they had been long separated ; and Mr. James, in his ' Xaval History,' informs us that an officer's servant, a young lad from London, named AVilliani Hearne, found his own brother among the United State' crew. . . It is also worthy of remark that many of the guns on board the United States were named after British ships, and some of our most celebrated naval commanders. Captain Garden, observing ' Victory ' painted on the ship's side over one port, and ' Nelson over another, asked Commodore Decatur the reason of so strange an anomaly. He answered : ' The men belonging to those guns served many years with Lord Nelson, and in the Victory. The crew of the gun named ' Nelson ' were once bargemen to that great chief. . . .' "" — Marshall : ' Nav. Biog.' ii. 1019. But it does not necessarily follow that men who had served with Nelson were British subjects ; and it is admitted on both sides that before 1812 very many Americans had served with honour in the British Navy.— W. L. C.
' Leech, 127, etc.
' Sentence of court-martial lield on board the San Domingo, 74, at Bermuda, May 27th, 1813.
1812.] SURRENDER <iF THE ''MACEDONIAN." 45
American. Decatur eased off and fired a broadside, which fell short; he then held his luff, and, the next time he fired, his long main-deck guns, the only ones used, told heavily. The Englishman responded %\-ith his long 18's, but soon found that at long bowls the American had the advantage, not only in weight of metal, but also in rapidity of fire, for the broadsides of the United States were delivered almost twice as fast as those of the Macedonian} Captain Garden soon altered his mind and tried to close ; but he had lost his chance by keeping his wind in the first place, and, when he bore up and down with the wind on his port-quarter, he exposed himself to heavy punishment. The United States at 10.15 a.m. led her maintopsail aback and used her whole port broadside. The British ship replied with her starboard guns, hauling up to do so, while the American alternately eased off and came to, keeping up a terrific fire. The guns of the Macedonian caused some damage to the American's rigging, but hardly touched her hull, while Garden's ship sufl'ered heavily both below and aloft, and her decks began to look like slaughter-pens. The British sailors fought like tigers — some stripped to the shirt, others to the naked skin. Those who were killed outright were immediately thrown overboard. One man, who was literally cut almost in two by a shot, was caught as he fell by two or three of his shipmates, and, before the last flicker of life had left him, was tossed into the sea. Lieutenant Hope showed that, though a cruel task-master, he at least possessed undaunted courage. He was wounded, but as soon as the wound was dressed retui7ied to the deck, shouting to the men to fight on ; and he alone advised against striking the flag, preferring to see the ship sink beneath him.^ The Macedonian gradually dropped to leeward, while the American forereached until the firing ceased. Finding herself ahead and to windward, the United States tacked and ranged up under the Macedo)iian's lee, at 11.15, when the latter struck her colours, an hour after the action began.
The United States had suffered very little. Some of her spars were wounded, and the rigging was a good deal cut up ; but her hull had not been touched more than two or three times. As the ships were never close enough to be within fair range of grape and musketry, only a dozen of her men were killed and wounded. The Macedonian, on the other hand, had received over a hundred siiots
' JameH, vi. IGU. ^ Leech, 131.
46 THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, ].S12-15. [1812.
in her hull : her mizenmast and her fore and maintopmasts were shot away, and on the engaged side all her carronades but two, and two of her main-deck guns, were dismounted, while one hundred and four ' of the crew were either killed or wounded. -
When the Americans came on board to take possession, the British crew, maddened by the sight of their dead comrades, heated with the fury of the battle, and excited by rum they had obtained from the spirit-room, evinced a tendency to fight their captors. But the latter showed so much good humour, and set to work with such briskness to take care of the wounded and put the ship to rights, that the two crews soon became the best of friends, and ate, drank, sang, laughed, and yarned together with hearty goodwill. A rather unexpected result was that the majority of the captive crew soon showed a disposition to enlist in the American navy, especially when they found out how much more kindly the seamen were treated in the American ships. The Americans, however, not only refused to enlist them, but also kept close guard over them to prevent their escape, as it was wished to send them to England in a cartel to exchange for American prisoners.^ However, in one way or another most of them managed to get away, a few only venturing to enlist in the American navy, as death would naturally be their portion if they were recaptured and recognised by the British.
Decatur discontinued his cruise to take back his prize to the United States. He reached New London in safety, and the Macedoyiian became part of the American navy.
In this fight the Macedonian's only superiority over the United States was speed. In force she was very much inferior, about in the proportion of three to two, so that only marked superiority in seamanship and gunnery could have given her the victory. As a matter of fact, however, the superiority was the other waj'. Decatur handled his ship faultlessly, and ^yilliam Henry Allen, first lieu- tenant of the United States, had trained the men to the highest
' The killed numbered 38, including Boatswain James Holmes, Master's Mate Thomas James Nankivel, and Mr. Dennis Colwell, schoolmaster. Among the 68 wounded were Lieutenants David Hope and John Bulfonl, Master's Mate Henry Eoebuck, Midshipman George Greenwa}', and Mr. Francis Baker, first-class volunteer. Captain Garden and his officers and men, upon trial for the loss of the ship, were most honourably acquitted, the court specially commending Garden's gallantry, and the good conduct and discipline of all concerned. — W. L. C.
2 Captain Garden's Letter, Oct. 28th, 1812.
^ Leech. He is the authority for most of the incidents of the action, as seen from the Macedoyiian.
1S12.] DEFECTIVENESS OF BIIITISII GUNNERY. 47
point of efficiency in the use of the ^'un.s. The ^un practice of the Macedonian's crew was apparently poor, but this was probably as much the fault of the Captain as of the gunners, for he first kept off too far, so as to give all possible advantage to the •24-pounders of the Americans, and then made liis attack in such a manner as to allow his skilful adversaries to use their guns to the best advantage. The Macedonian was bravely fought, and was not surrendered until there was no hope of success left. Still, the defence was not so desperate as that of the Essex, nor indeed did the ship lose so heavily as the Java or Chesapeake. Captain Carden had bravely encomitered heav}' odds, for during the preceding twenty years the traditions of the British Navy had taught him that it was possible to wan against such odds. This had been proved scores of times in single figlit at the expense of the French, the Spaniards, the Dutch, the Danes, and the Turks. But only a real superiorit}' in skill could have warranted the effort. An eminent British officer. Sir Howard Douglas, sums up the action very justly, though he ascribes wluilly to inferior gunnery what should be in part ascribed to lack of judgment on the side of the commanding officer. He says : —
"As a display of courage the cliaracter (jf tlie service was nobh' upheld; but we would be deceiving ourselves were we to admit that the comparative expertness of the crews in gunnery was equalh' satisfactory. Now, taking the difference of effect as given by Captain Carden, we must draw this conclusion — that the comparative loss in killed and wounded (10-1 to 12), together with the dreadful account he gives of the condition of his own ship, while he admits that the enemy's vessel was in comparatively good order, must have arisen from inferiority in gunnery, as well as in force."
Elsewhere the same writer comments upon the dangers to which encounters with skilful opponents exposed captains who had been led liy repeated triumphs over men of inferior discipline ;ni(l abiliiy to feel that defeat was out of (juestion, and to " contemn ;ill man(j!uvring as a sign of timidity." It was the old lesson uf the ill effects of over-confidence, complicated by the effects of follow- ing under wrong conditions the course wliich a great man had followed under right ones. Timid mamiaivring was an eiror, especiall}' in the presence of an unskill'ul or inferior foe; and it was to such manoeuvring that Nelson alluded when — or if — he said. " Never njiml niamouvring — go at them." Nelson knew very wi'll when to mann'uvre and when not to, and his own genius and the skill of his captains and seamen enabled him to defy heavy odds. But it was a very different thing for would-be imitators of Nelson's
48 THE WAU WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
tactics who lacked his genius, and who had to encounter superiority in skill as well as superiority in physical force.
On October 26th ' the Coustitiition, Captain William Bainbridge and the Hornet, Captain James Lawrence, sailed; and, after cruising to and fro, arrived off San Salvador on December 13th. There they found a British ship of twenty guns, the Bonne Citoyenne, Captain Pitt Burnaby Greene, ahnost exactly of the Hornet's force, and Lawrence challenged her captain to single fight, the Con- .ttitution giving the usual pledges not to interfere. The challenge was refused, for a variety of reasons ; among others, because the Bonne Citoyenne was carrying home half a million pounds in specie. Leaving the Hornet to blockade her, Bainbridge ran off to the southward.
At 9 A.M. on December '29th, while the Constitution was running along the coast of Brazil about thirty miles off shore, in latitude 1^" 6' S. and longitude 32^ W.,- she made out the British frigate Java, Captain Henry Lambert, inshore and to westward.^ The Java at once bore down in chase, while the Constitution stood toward her on the starboard tack.* The Java was of the same strength as the Guerriere, except that she had a crew of about four hundred men,^ and carried two long guns less, and two carronades more.** The Constitution had sent ashore two of her carronades, and had four hundred and seventy-five men in her crew.
The Java was much the swifter ship, for the weak point in all
' James says that the Conslitutlon and Hornet left Boston on October 30th. — W. L. C.
- James (vi. 126) gives the time of sighting as 2 p.m. (an obvious erroi-), and the position as hit. 13° 6' S., long. 30° ^V.— W. L. C.
^ Letter of Captain Bainbridge, Jan. 3rd, 1813.
* Letter of Lieutenant Henry Ducie Chads, Dec. 31sf, 1812.
^ James explains that on August ITtli, 1812, the Java, 38 (ex-Betiommee), had been commissioned at Portsmouth to carry to Bombay the newly-appointed governor, Lieut.-General Hislop and a su]iply of stores ; and says that her ship's company included about GO raw Irish landsmen, and 50 disatiected seamen from the Coqudtf, 18, besides a considerable number of Marine Society boys — in all, 397 persons of every description, mainly inexperienced. She had sailed from Spithead on November 12th, in charge of two Indiamen, and, on December 12th, had captured the American merchantman William, into which she had put a prize crew of 20, all told. The Indiamen had afterwards parted company, and the Java had put into San Salvador for water. — W. L. 0.
^ See Roosevelt's 'Naval War of 1812,' p. 12G, for full discussion of the figures given above. The official accounts coutrailict one another flatly. The reason for the great number of men aboard the Java was because she was carrying part of the crews for three other British ships.
1S12.] THE "JAVA"' AND THE "CONSTITUTION." 49
the American 44's was their lack of speed. In point of phj'sical force the combatants stood more nearly on an equality than in either of the other frigate duels, the odds being about five to four, or rather less — odds which were a heavy handicap to the Java, but which were not sucla as to render the contest by any means hopeless if the weaker party were even slightly superior in skill and fighting efficiency.
CAPTAIN WILLIAM BAINBBIDGE, U.S.N.
(_Froin G. Pnrh'fs fii'jrcning, after the portrait hit .7. W. Jarvix )
The Constitution stood away from the land towards the S.E., while the Java made sail on a parallel course to windward, aixl gained rapidl}'. At half-past one the Constitution shortened lior canvas to fighting rig, and ran easily off on the port tack. The Java also shortened sail, and came down off the wind toward bor adversary's weather (juartcr. The colours of the two ships floated from every mast in proud defiance, the decks were cleared to fighting trim, and the men stood ready at quarters. At '2 p.m. they opened VOL. VI. E
50 THE WAI; WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
fire at long range, the Biitish with the lee and the Americans with the weather guns. The firing was very spirited, and at the beginning the ships suiiered about equall}', for the first broadside of the Java was well aimed, killing and wounding several of the Constitution s crew. The Englishman kept edging down until he got well within range of grape and musketry. Being swifter, he soon forereached, intending to wear across his antagonist's bow and rake him ; but Bainbridge anticipated the movement, and himself wore in the smoke. The two antagonists again ran oft' side by side, with the wind on their starboard beams, the Englishman still a-weather, and steering freer than the Constitution, which had luft'ed to close.' The action went on at pistol-shot distance ; but in a few minutes the Java again forged ahead out of the weight of her adversary's fire, and then kept oft" as before ; and, as before, the Con- stitution avoided this by wearing, both ships once more coming round with their heads to the east, the American still to leeward. The Java kept the advantage of the wind, and still forereached a little ; and she sought to rake the Constitution as the latter from time to time luft'ed in the endeavour to close ; but after the first broadside or two her gunnery had fallen off. Most of the loss which she inflicted was inflicted early in the action.
Bainbridge, finding that his foe outsailed him, and that he was therefore constantly in danger of being raked, set the Constitution's foresail and mainsail, and came up close on the Java's lee beam. The weight of his fire then told heavily, and among other losses the Java's jib-boom and the end of her bowsprit were carried away. The Constitution in her turn forged ahead, and again wore on the smoke. The Java hove in stays, but the loss of her headsail made her fall off very slowly ; and the American frigate, passing across her stern two cable-lengths away, raked her heavily. As the Java fell off she rephed with her port guns, and the two vessels bore up, and ran oft' with the wind nearly aft, the Java still to windward. She was suffering heavily, and the Constitution very Httle. The ships were well within musketry range, and the British lost many men by the fire from the American topmen, and still more from the round and grape ; but the crew showed no signs of flinching, and fought on hke tigers. Captain Lambert saw that he was beaten at the guns, and that he was being cut to pieces both below and aloft ;
' Kavy Departmental MSS., Log of Constitution.
1H12.] SURRENDEH OF THE "JAVA." 51
and he resolved to try boarding. The hehii was put a-weather, and the Java came down for the Constitution s main-chains. The boarders and Marines gathered in the gangways and on the fore- castle, the boatswain having been ordered to cheer them with his pipe that they might make a clean spring.* But boarding was a hazardous experiment to try against an enemy not already well beaten at the guns. As the Java came down, the Americans raked her with terrible effect, taking out her foremast and maintopmast. The stump of the Java's bowsprit caught in the Constitution's mizen-rigging, and she was raked again, while the American marines and topmen, by their steady fire, prevented any effort to board.
Finally the ships got clear ; and once again they ran off abreast. Again the Constitution forereached, and, wearing, luffed up under the Java's quarter, raked her with the starboard guns, and wore again, recommencing the action with her port battery. Once more the vessels were abreast, and the action went on as furiously as ever, the Java refusing to acknowledge defeat. The vweck of her top- hamper lay over her starboard side, taking fire every few minutes ; and at that time her able and gallant commander was mortally wounded by a ball fired by one of the American maintop men.'- Lieutenant Henry Ducie Chads then took the command, though painfully wounded. The British sailors continued to fight with un- daunted resolution, cheering lustily; but nothing could stand against the cool precision of the Yankee fire. The decks of the Java looked like a slaughter-house ; one by one her masts fell ; her guns were silenced; and she lay a sheer hulk on the water, when, at 4.5 p.m., the Constitution, thinking that her adversary had struck, ceased firing and passed out of action to windward. There she spent an hour in repairing damages and securing her masts ; then, in practically as good condition as ever, she stood towards her foe, who stnick his flag.
The American ship had suffered but little either in hull or alol't, and, after an hour of repairs, was again in good fighting trim. Thirty-four of iier crew were; kilk'd or WDunded,^ for tiie Jara iiad been more skilfully handled and more stubbornly fought than either the Guerricre or the Macrdnuian. Tlic British ship was a riddk'd and
' Aliimtfs of court - iiiartiiil ]\M on l«ianl II. M.S. Gladiator, PortHiiioutli, Ajiril 2;;rcl, 1813.
^ Keixirt of the Surgeon of the Jm'a.
' Keport of tlie Surgeon of the ConMitution.
i; '2
52 THE WAB WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1812.
dismasted hulk. "The Java sustained unequalled injiuies beyond the Constitution," ran the statement of one of her officers.^ One hundred and twenty-four of those on board her were killed or wounded.'- Captain Bainbridge reported that the Java was " ex- ceedingly well handled and bravely fought," and paid a deserved tribute to the worth and bravery of Captain Lambert ; ^ while Lieutenant Chads in his report stated that " our gallant enemy has treated us most generously," and Lieutenant- General Hislop presented Bainbridge with a handsome sword. Owing to the dis- tance from home, the Java was destroyed, and the Constitution presently returned to the United States.
The fight was remarkable becaiise of the rather complicated nature of the manoeuvres, and the skill with which they were performed. As regards the tactical ability with which the ships were handled, there was nothing to choose ; and certainly no men could have fought more gallantly than the Java's crew ; but there was a very great difference in the comparative efficiency- of the two crews as fighting machines, especially in gunnery. The differ- ence in the damage done was utterly out of proportion to the difference in force. Probably the material of the Constitution s crew was slightly better than that of the Java, for the seafaring folk from among whom it was recruited were peculiarly handy and resourceful, and they enlisted freely in the American ships, regarding the quarrel as peculiarly their own ; while the British frigates were manned by- pressed men from many different sources, who were full of fight, but who had little cause to love their task-masters. The main reason for the difference in fighting efficiency, however, was that one crew
' ' Kaval Chronicle,' xxix. 432.
- The Java went into action with a crew of 377 all told, including supernumeraries, . 20 others having been sent on board the William. Of these, 22 were killed, and 102 wounded. Among the killed were Master's Mates Charles Jones, Thomas Hammond, and William Gascoigne, Midshipmen William Salmond and Edward Keele, and Clerk (supernumerary) Thomas Joseph Matthias. Among the wounded were Captain Henry Lambert (who died on January 4th, 1813), Lieutenant Henry Ducie Chads, Master Batty Eobinson, Second Lieutenant David Davies, R.M., Boatswain James Humble, and four Midshipmen, besides, among the supernumeraries, Commander John Marshall, Lieutenant James Saunders, Master's Mate William Brown, and General Hislop's aide-de-camp. Midshipman Keele, who was only thirteen years of age, was not killed outright, but died in a few hours. Mr. Humble lost a band, and had a wound near the elbow, but, after having a tourniquet put on, returned to his duty.— W. L. C.
^ Captain Henrj- Lambert had received his post commission on April 10th, 180.0. — W. L. C.
1813.] THE "PEACOCK" AND THE "HORNETS 53
had been carefully trained, and the other had not. The Java's crew had been on board her six weeks, and, when the Constitution fought her first battle, the crew had been on board her only five weeks ; but the Constitution's crew from the very ])eginning were incessantly practised in firing, both with blank cartridges and also at a target; whereas the Java, during the entire six weeks, had tired but six broadsides, all of blank cartridges, and her crew had been exercised only occasionally even in pointing the guns. Thtis the Americans were trained to shoot with a precision entirely foreign to their opponents. Moreover, they were better trained to play difiVrcnt parts, so that, for instance, the sudden loss of a gmi captain did not demoralise the rest of the crew, who were able immediately to supply his place from among themselves. The petty officers, also, among the Americans were better paid than in the British ships, and were of a better class ; and the American ofiicers showed greater zeal and intelligence in getting their men into order, and in drilling them in the essentials, never losing sight of the fact that efficiency in fighting was the first consideration, to which all considerations of show came second.
The Hornet continued to blockade the Bonne Citoijenne until January ■i4th, lal3, the latter still refusing to fight and jeopardise the treasure she had on l^oard. Then the Montagu, 74,' arrived, and the Hornet, under cover of the darkness, stood out to sea. She made a few prizes, one of much value. On February 24th, 1813, near the mouth of the Demerara Kiver, Captain Lawrence, being near shore, discovered a man-of-war brig lying at anchor; ami while beating roiuid Caroband bank in order to get at her, he discovered another man-of-war brig edging down on his weather quarter.'- Both were British. The one at anchor was the Espieijle, of sixteen 32-pr. carronades, and two 6 prs.. Commander John Taylor (1) ; tlie other was the Peacock, Commander William Peake, which for some unknown reason had exchanged her ;32-pr. carronades for 24's.' She had left the Espihjle's anchorage that morning at ten o'clock. The Hornet at once turned to attack the newcomer, being anxious to get rid of her before her companion inside the bar could come to her assistance.
' Caiitaiii Mauley Hall Dixon, bearing tlie flag of Hear- Admiral Mauley Dixon commanding ou llio lira/.ilian statiim. — W. L. C * LeUer of Caiitain Lawrence, JIareli 'JOtli, 1813. ' James, vi. 11)4 (Ed. 1«37).
54 THE KATt WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1813.
At 4.20 P.M. the Peacock hoisted her colours, and the Hornet beat to quarters and cleared for action. Lawrence kept close hauled to get the weather-gage. When he was sure that he could weather the enemy, he tacked at 5.10 and stood toward her, hoisting his colours. The ship and the brig were now both on the wind — the Hornet on the starboard, and the Peacock on the port, tack. At 5.25 the}' exchanged broadsides as they passed one another, but a few yards distant, in opposite directions, the Americans firing their lee, and the British their weather guns, as they bore. The contrast in the gunnery of the two crews was almost absurd. As the British were using the weather battery, the guns, unless somewhat depressed, were sure to throw the shot high, and for this the crews made no allowance. Not a shot penetrated the Hornet's hull, the entire broadside passing through the rigging. One of her men in the mizen-top was killed by a round shot, and two in the main-top were wounded ; ' a few ropes were cut, the foremast was wounded, and some holes were made in the sails ; but her fighting efficiency was not impaired in the slightest degree. On the other hand, the Hornet's guns, being fired from the lee side of the ship, naturally shot low, and her men aimed as if at drill, ahnost every shot striking the Peacock's hull, while, inasmi;ch as the Peacock was heeled over, many of them struck below the water-line, making holes through which the water gushed in torrents as soon as the brig was again on an even keel
When the two vessels were clear. Captain Peake put his helm hard up and wore, firing his starboard guns ; but Lawrence had watched him closely, and himself bore up, and at 5.35 ran the English- man close aboard on the starboard quarter. Another broadside, added to the musketry fire, did the business. Captain Peake fell ; and at 5.39, - just fourteen minutes after the first shot, the Peacock surrendered. Immediately afterwards her main-mast went by the board, and she began to settle, hoisting her ensign union down as a signal of distress. Both vessels cast anchor ; and Lieutenant Shubrick, being sent on board the prize, reported her sinking. Lieutenant Connor was then sent in another boat to try to save the brig ; but though the captors threw the guns overboard, plugged the shot holes, and worked the pumps, the water gained so rapidly
' Navy Departmental MSS., Logbook of Hvrnet, Wasp, .and Argus, 1S09-1813. ^ British accounts, and James, make the action to have lasted from 5.25 to 5.50 P.M.— W. L. C.
1813.] SINKING OF THE "FEAOOCK." 55
that the attempt was abandoned, and the Hornet's officers used what remained of the lading tropical twiHght in removing the wounded and prisoners. Just as dark fell the brig suddenly sank, in water which was so shallow that her foi'ctop remained above the surface. There was, of course, much confusion. Three of the Hornet's men and nine prisoners went down with the Peacock. Four other prisoners lowered the stern -boat and escaped unobserved to the land, while four more saved themselves by running up the rigging into the foretop. Lieutenant Connor and the rest of the Hornet's men who were on board, and the remainder of the Peacock's crew, who had not been shifted, escaped by jmuping into the launch which was lying on the booms, and paddling her towards the ship with pieces of boards.
Seven of the Hornet's men and six of the Peacock's were on the sick list, leaving-^fit for action one hundred and thirty-five of the former,* and one hundred and twenty-two of the latter.- The Hornet carried twenty, and the Peacock nineteen^ guns, each presenting ten in broadside ; but, as already mentioned, the Peacock's carronades were 24's, and the Hornet's 32's. There was a very real disparity in force, but in this particular instance the disparity in force in no way affected the result. The Peacock's guns simply did not hit, so that their calibre was a matter of no possible consequence. The Hornet was hardly scratched, and lost but three men, all aloft ; while the Peacock was sunk in fourteen minutes, nearly one-third of her crew being killed or wounded.* She was bravely fought, but her gunnery was phenomenally bad. It appears that she had long been known as " the yacht " on iu;couiit of the tasteful arrangement of her deck. The breechings of the carronades were lined with white canvas, and nothing could exceed in ])riliiaiicy the polish upon the traversing bars and elevating screws.^ Of course, a slovenly ship does not often make a good fight, for slovenliness is an indication of laziness, carelessness, and inefliciency ; l)ut man— and above all the fighting man— shall not hve by neatness alone, nor yet merely by
' Letter of Liciitcii.int Connor, April 2Gtli, 1813.
^ Letter of Lieutenant Frederick Augustus Wri;;!!!, April I'.itli, ISi:'..
' Accordini; to James, tlie Fracoc/c niounteil only sixteen •J4-pr. c:irron:uies, an.l two long G-iirs., and had nine, not ten, guuH in broadside. — W. L. C.
' Of her crew of l'_".i men ami boys, the Fnicock had live killed, incduding Com- mander Peako, a Connnander of .January lilst, IHOG, iiud 33 wounded, threo niortuUy.— W. L. C.
' James, vi. lill (Ed. 1837).
56 THE WATi WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1813.
precision in the performance of duties not connected with the actual shock of arms. Commander Peake had committed the not un- common mistake of confounding the incidents and the essentials of discipUne.
Throughout the fight the Espidgle was but four miles distant/ and was plainly visible from the Hornet ; but for some reason, which never was inWy explained, her Commander did not obsei-s'e anything, and knew nothing of the action until the next day. Lawrence, of course, took it for granted that he must know, and would shortly come out ; and, by nine o'clock in the evening, new sails had been bent on, and the decks cleared, so that the Hornet was again ready for action. She was then, however, overcrowded with people and short of water, and, as the Espidgle showed no signs of coming out,^ the Hornet stood for home, which she reached in March. On their arrival at New York the officers of the Peacock published a card expressing their aptpreciation of the way in which they and their men had been treated. The note ran in part, " We ceased to con- sider ourselves prisoners, and everything that friendship could dictate was adopted by you and the officers of the Hornet to remedy the inconvenience we would otherwise have experienced from the unavoidable loss of the whole of our property and clothes owing to the sudden sinking of the Peacock." ^
So far the American navy had achieved success beyond what any one could have either hoped for or dreaded, and the British government had paid dearly for its contemptuous disregard of the power of the United States at sea. It was utterly unprepared for the skill and energy shown by the Americans. More ships of the
' Upon this point there is, however, a conflict of evidence. Lieutenant Frederick Augustus AV right, of the Peacock, testified that the Espiigh' " was not visible from the look-outs stationed at the Peacock's mastheads for some time previous to the commence- ment of the action." James, too, says (vi. 194, ed. 1837) : " The wreck of the Peacock was visible for a long time after the action, and bore from Point Spirit, which is about six miles to the eastward of the entrance to Demerara river, N.E. by E. ; making the distance between the Espiegle and Peacock, during the action, nearly 24 miles." — W. L. C.
- Commander John Taylor (1), of the Espiegle, was tried at Portsmouth, in 1814, on various charges, and was, in consequence, dismissed the service; but though tlie charges included a count of having failed in his duty when he was in pmrsuit of the Hornet, it was held that that particular charge was not proved. Commander Taylor was reinstated, as " the junior Commander," in 1817. (Marshall, iv., pt. iii. 537, and the Navy Lists.) — W. L. C.
' This and the other letters are given in full in ' Niles's Itegister ' for this and the following months.
1813.] AMElilCAN FHIVATEEBS. 57
line and frigates were gradually assembled on the American coast ; but, during the first eight months or thereabouts, no effective blockade was established, and the American cruisers slipped in . and out as thej^ wished. The British picked up a couple more American brigs, the Viper and the Vixen,^ and captured many American merchantmen, but tbis was all.
The offensive powers of the Americans were displayed not merely in the use of their regular war-vessels, but in the careers of the privateers. The mere declaration of war with Great Britain meant the destruction for the moment of the major part of the foreign trade of America ; and the more daring spirits who had formerly gone into this trade at once turned to the business of privateering. The American privateers swarmed out into the Atlantic, and especially round the West India Islands, the trade with which was at that period verj- profitable to England. At times, in the past, the French privateers had inflicted very great damage upon British trade, but the British men-of-war had so completely gained the upper hand of their adversaries that very few French ships, public or private, were left at sea. The activity and success of the American privateers, therefore, took the British government and the British mercantile interest completely by surprise. Hun- dreds of merchantmen were captured in the Atlantic, and in the West Indies the privateers cut vessels out of harbours protected by batteries, and landed to plunder the plantations. The island of Jamaica was for some time practically blockaded by them. At first the British warships could do little with them ; and the merchants cried out bitterly because of the failure to protect them.
As rapidly as possible the British naval authorities gathered the swiftest frigates and sloops to employ against these cnaisers ; and there resulted a process of natural selection so severe tliat the type of privateer soon became altered. At the outset almost any era It was used ; but before the first year of the war had closed all the small and slow vessels were captured or shut up in port, and a peculiar species of craft was developed. Slu! was of large size, with a nunierous crew, so as to man the prizes, and was armed with one heavy gun, or " long tom," and several lighter pieces for use at close quarters.
' 'l"be Vijier, 10, Lieut. J. D. Ileiiby, was captured on January 17th, l!Sl.'!, Iiy tlio Narcissus, 32, Capt. Jolm Kiclianl Luiiiley. Tlio VUeii, 12, Lieut. Geo. U. Keail, had beeu taken on the previous November 22ud, by the ISouthamptuii, 32, Capt. Sir James Lucas Yco.— W. L. C.
58 THE IVJH WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1813.
She was sometimes a schooner, and sometimes a brig or a ship, but
always built on fine lines, and with extreme lightness, so as to i
possess astonishing speed. There were no more beautiful craft in
existence than these graceful, venomous, swift-sailing privateers ;
and as commerce destroyers they had not then their equals in the
entire world. ^
The first nine months of the war ended with the balance entirely in favour of the Americans. Even at the outbreak of hostilities the British had, scattered along the American coast and among the West India Islands, three or four times as many ships as there were in the American navy, and to those there had been added many others, including heavy two-deckers ; but they had not settled down to any definite plan for seriously interfering with the cruises of the regular warships, or for sweeping the privateers from the seas. The American trade had suffered severely ; but so had the British. Infinitely more important, however, than such material suffering, short of actual crippling, were the shame and smart felt by the British pubhc at the American naval victories. Commerce destroying was annoying and vexatious, and it might prove suffi- ciently serious to incline an abeady disheartened combatant to peace ; but no amount of destruction of commerce could cripple a thoroughly resolute antagonist, nor, giving heart to the nation which inflicted the loss, make it thrill with that warlike pride and determination to conquer which do so much toward winning victory. The two prime objects to be attained in successful warfare are to cripple the antagonist and to give heart and confidence to one's own side. The first object could not be attained by the little American navy, for it was powerless to inflict appreciable damage to the colossal sea might of England ; but the second object it could and did achieve. On land the American attempts to invade Canada resulted in humiliating disasters, and the efl^ects of the victorious sea fights were very great in offsetting the mortification and depres- sion which those disasters caused.
In England the sea fights caused as much excitement as in America, though of a wholly different land. Neither the British government nor the British people, and least of all the British
' Adams, vols. vii. and viii., has treated better than any other historian the careers and importance of the privateers. If he could have seen Mahan's book before writing his own, he would doubtless have laid more stress on the unsatisfactory results of trying to substitute commerce destroyers for fighting ships.
1813.] BRITISH DEJECTION. 59
Navy, had dreamed it possible that on sea thej- would suffer any serious annoyance from America. The prowess of the American frigates and sloops, the hawk-like predatory speed of the American privateers, and the energy displayed by men-of-warsmen and privateersmen alike, were so many disagreeable surprises. The material loss to the merchants was heavy, whereas the matei-ial loss to the navy was trifling, so far as affecting Great Britain's naval strength was concerned. Nevertheless, it was this last loss which infinitely outweighed the other, as was inevitable and proper with a proud, self-confident, and warlike nation. In seven months Great Britain had suffered from the infant navy of the United States, in five single-ship contests, severer moral loss than she had suffered in all the single-ship contests of the preceding twenty years' warfare with the nations of Europe.
Such a result was almost paralysing, and naturally produced inordinate boastfulness and self-exaltation on the one side, and bitter shame and anger on the other. The victors, the greater to exalt their glory, sought to miniuiise the difference of force in their favour, and insisted that the contending ships were practically on an equality ; which was not only absurdly untrue, but a discredit to their own intelligence, for, of course, it was highly to the credit of America to have built ships more efficient than any then afloat. The vanquished, to extenuate their defeats, attributed them entirely to the difference in force, and enormously exaggerated this, crying out that the American 44's were " disguised 74's," and that building them was a characteristic piece of "Yankee cunning" to lure brave British captains into unequal combat. The attention paid in Parliament and in the London press to these victories was a sufficient tribute to their importance. The Times, smarting under the need to lay stress upon a difference in force which J^ritisli seamen had been accustomed to disregard, wrote,
" Good God ! that a few short montlis should have so altered the tone of British sentiment! Is it true, or is it not, that our Navy was accustomed to liold the American in utter contempt ? Is it true, or is it not, that tlie Guerriere sailed uji and down tlie American coast witli her name painted in large characters on lier sails, in boyish deliance of Commodore Uodgers V"
Eighty-five ]5ritish ships were on the American station at the beginning of hostilities.
" \Vc have since sent out more linc-of-battleshipB and licavier frigates. Surely wo mvist now moan to smother tlie American Xavy. A very short lime before the capturo
60 THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1813.
of the Guerriere, an American frigate was an object of ridicule to our honest tars. Now the prejudice is actually setting the other way, and great pains seem to be taken by the friends of ministers to prepare the public fur the suriender of a British 74 to an opponent lately so much contemned."
The Pi?ot, the chief maritime authority, gave i'uU expression to the feehngs with which the British pulilic generally regarded these events : —
" The public will learn, with sentiments which we shall not presume to anticipate, that a third British frigate has struck to an American. This is an occurrence which calls for serious reflection — this, and the fact stated in one paper of yesterdaj*, that Lloyd's List contains notice of upwards of live hundredBritish vessels captured in seven months by the Americans, five hundred iiierchantmeu, and three frigates ! Can these statements be true, and can the English people hear them unmoved ? Any one who had predicted such a result of an American war this time last year would have been treated as a madman or a traitor. He would have been told, if his opponents had condescended to argue with him, that long ere seven months had elapsed the American tiag would be swept from the seas, the contemptible navy of the United States annihilated, and their maritime arsenals rendered a heap of ruins. Yet down to this moment not a single American frigate has struck her flag. The}- insult and laugh at our want of enterprise and vigour. They leave their ports when they please, and return to them when it suits their convenience ; they traverse the Atlantic ; the\' beset the West India Islands; they advance to the very chops of the Channel; they parade along the coasts of South America ; nothing chases, nothing intercepts, nothing engages them but to yield them triumph."
Canning, in open Parhament, expressed the bitter anger felt by the whole governing class. He stated that the loss of the frigates had affected the country as it could be affected only by the most violent convulsions of nature, and he retm-ned to the subject again and again, saying, " It never entered into my mind that the mighty naval power of England would be allowed to sit idle while our commerce was swept from the surface of the Atlantic." And again, " It cannot be too deeply felt that the sacred spell of the in- vincibility of the British Navy was broken by these unfortunate captures."
Most significant of all was the fact that the Admiralty issued an order forbidding the 18-pounder frigates thereafter to do battle with the American '24-pounder frigates. This was not a confession of inferiority, as has been said by some American writers ; but it was distinctly a renunciation of any clairn of superiority. The American 44 was no more superior to the British 38-gun frigate than the French 74 was to the Enghsh 74, for the main-deck battery of the French two-decker carried a gun which threw a shot weighing forty-three Enghsh pounds, whereas the main-deck guns of the
1813.] COMMENTS OF JUlilEN DE LA GRAVIERE. 61
British ships of the hue were only 32's. The difference, therefore, was greater in favour of the French ships of the Hne, as compared with their British opponents, than the difference between the victor and the vanquished in the famous single-ship duels of 181'2. The victories of Nelson and Jervis had been gained against odds much greater than those encountered by the frigates which succumbed to the Constitution and the United States. Time and again, moreover, the British had won against odds as great, or greater, in single combat. The French 18-pounder gun threw a shot weighing twenty-one pounds English ; whereas, owing to the short weight of the American shot, the American ■24-pounder usually threw but a little over twenty-two ; so that, as compared with the old opponents whom the British frigate captains had so often vanquished, their new American foes threw but one and one-half pound more metal from each gun of the main battery.
The difference in the size and stoutness of the ships, in the numbers of the crews, and in the calibre of the guns accounted for much in the result, but it by no means accounted for all ; and in the two sloop actions it was of httle or no moment. The other element, which entered quite as decisively into the contest, was the superior efficiency of the Americans, especially in gunnery. The British had grown over-confident and careless. They had learned to lean over- much upon what Canning called " the sacred spell of the invinci- bility of the British Navy," and they needed to learn the lesson that this sacred spell can always be readily broken by any opponent who, with equal courage, shows superiority in skill, and especially in cool forethought and preparation. Superiority in courage and skill combined can wrest victory from great odds, and no amount of skill will atone for the lack of daring, of unflinching resolution, and of dogged capacity to stand punishment ; but where courage is equal, skill will always win ; and where courage and skill are both ('(|ual, then the side which has the best ships and guns will over- whelm the other, no matter what may be the Hags under which the combatants fight.
The best commentary on the five victories thus far described is that given by the French Admiral, Jui-ien de La Gravi^re : and it is significant of the pidlnund impression they created that, in a work devoted to the gigantic naval battles of the fleets that fou'dit under and against Nelson, a French admiral, to whom the contest between the British and the Americans had no otlier
62 THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1813.
interest than the lesson it taught, should have devoted so much space to these duels, singling them out above all the other single- ship contests of the twenty-five years' war.
" When the American Congress declared war on England in 1812," he says,' " it seemed as if this unequal conflict would crush her navy in the act of being born ; instead, it but fertilised the germ. It is only since that epoch that the United States has taken rank among maritime powers. Some combats of frigates, corvettes, and brigs, insignificant without doubt as regards the material results, sufficed to break the charm which protected the standard of St. George, and taught Europe what she could have already learned from some of our combats, if the louder noise of our defeats had not drowned the glory, that the only invincibles on the sea are good seamen and good artillerists.
"The English covered the ocean with their cruisers when this unknown navy, composed of six frigates and a few small craft hitherto hardly numbered, dared to establish its cruisers at the mouth of the Channel, in the very centre of the British power. But already the Constitution had captured the Guerriere and Java, the United States had made a prize of the Macedonian, the Wasp of the Frolic, and the Hornet of the Pmcoch. The honour of the new flag was established. England, humiliated, tried to attribute her multiplied reverses to the unusual size of the vessels which Congress had had constructed in 1799, and wliieli did the fighting in 1812. She wished to refuse them the name of frigates, and called them, not without some appearance of reason, disguised line-of-battle ships. Since then all maritime powers have copied these gigantic models, as the result of the war of 1812 obliged England herself to change her naval material ; but if they had employed, instead of frigates, cut-down 7-i's, it woidd still be diffioult to explain the prodigious success of the Americans. . . .
" In an engagement which terminated in less than half an hour, the English frigate
Guerriere, completely dismasted, had fifteen men killed, sixty-three wounded, and
more than thirty shot below the water-line. She sank twelve hours after the combat.
The Constitution, on the contrary, had but seven men killed and seven wounded, and
did not lose a mast. As soon as she had replaced a few cut ropes and changed a few
sails, she was in condition, even by the testimony of the British historian, to take
another Guerriere. 'Ihe United States took an hour and a half to recapture the
Macedonian, and the same difterence made itself felt in the damage suffered by the two
shij5s. The Macedonian had her masts shattered, two of her main-deck and all her
spar-deck gvms disabled, more than a himdred sliots had penetrated the hull, and over
a third of the crew had sutTered bj' the hostile fire. The American frigate, on the
contrary, had to regret but five men killed and seven wounded ; her guns had been
fired each sixty-six times to the Macedonian's thirty-six. The combat of the
Constitution and the Java lasted two hours, and was the most bloody of these three
engagements. The Java only struck when she had been razed like a sheer hulk ; she
had twenty-two men killed and one hundred and two wounded.
******
" This war should be studied with unceasing diligence ; the pride of the two peoples to whom naval aflairs are so generally familiar has cleared all the details and laid bare all the episodes ; and through the sneers which the victors should have spared, merely out of care for their own glory, at every step can be seen the great truth, that there is only success for those who know how to jirepare it.
***♦*«
" It belongs to us to judge impartially these marine events, too much exalted ' ' Guerres Maritimcs,' ii. 284 (edition of 1881).
1813.] THE TUJiN OF THE TIDE. 63
perhaps by a national vanity one is tempted to excuse. The Americans showed in tlie war of 1812 a great deal of skill an<l resolution; but if, as they have asserted, the chances had always been jierfcctly equal between them and their adversaries, if they had only owed their triumphs to the intrepidity of Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge, there would be for us but little interest in recalling the struggle. We need not seek lessons in courage outside of our own history. On the contrary, what is to be well considered is that the ships of the United States constantly fought with the chances in their favour, and it is on this that the American Government should found its true title to glory. . . . The Americans in 1812 had secured to themselves the advantage of a better organisation (than the English)."
After speaking of the heavier metal and greater number of men of the American ships, he continues : —
" And yet only an enormous superiority in the precision and rapidity of their fire can explain the difference in the losses sustained by the combatants.
" The American fire showed itself to be as accurate as it was rapid. ( )u occasions when the roughness of the sea would seem to render all aim excessively uncertain, the effects of their artillerj- were not less murderous than under more advantageous conditions.
" Nor was the skill of their gunners the only cause to which the Americans owed their success. Their ships were faster ; the crews, composed of chosen men, manoeuvred with uniformity and precision ; their captains had that practical knowledge which is only to be acquired b}' long experience of the sea ; and it is not to be wondered at that the Constitution, when chased during three days by a squadron of five English frigates, succeeded in escaping, by surpassing them in manojuvring and by availing herself of every ingenious resource and skilful expedient that maritime science could suggest .... To a marine exalted by success, but rendered negligent by the very habit of victory, the Congress only opix)se<l the best of vessels and most formidable of armaments."
Throughout the year 1812, and the beginning of the year 181H, Britain had made no effective use whatever of her tremendous power at sea, so far as the United States was concerned. She had suffered from overweening self-confidence in her own prowess, and from overweening contempt for her foe. During the first year of war the utter futility of the American land attacks on Canada could fairly be matched by the utter inefficiency of the efforts of the British ])oth to destroy the little American navy, and to employ their own huge Navy so as to make it a determining factor in the struggle. But by the spring of 1813 this was changed. The British were a practical people, and they faced facts — thereby showing capacity to turn these facts to their own advantage. The dream of British naval invincibility, the dream that the British warships could win against any reasonable odds, was a pleasant dream, and the awakening was extremely disagreeable. Neverthe- less, a dream it was, and the British recognised it as such, and acted accordingly, with the natural result that thereafter tiie Aiuericans
64 THE WAB WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1813.
suffered more than the British at sea. The 18-pounder frigates were forbidden to engage single-handed the •24-pounder frigates of the Americans/ and where possible they were directed to cruise in couples, or in small squadrons, so as to be able with certainty to overpower any single antagonist, great or small. No sufficient steps were taken to bring the average standard of fighting efficiency, especially in gunnery, up to the American level, and in consequence there were some defeats yet in store ; but the best captains in the British Navy were already as good as any to be found in America, or anywhere else, and it was now the turn of the Americans to suffer from over-confidence, while the British, wherever possible, made dexterous use of their superior forces. After this period no British frigate was captured, while three American frigates surren- dered, one to an opponent of superior fighting efficienc}', and the other two to superior force, skilfullj- used. The American sloops did better, but even their career was chequered by defeat.
The important factor on the British side was the use of the Navy to blockade the American coast. When war was declared, the Napoleonic struggle was at its height, and the chances seemed on the whole to favour Napoleon. But, by the spring of 1813, the Grand Army had gone to its death in the snowclad wastes of Bussia, and Wellington had completely bested the' French marshals in Spain, so that it was merely a question of time as to when he would invade France. In Germany the French were steadily losing ground ; and all the nations of Europe were combining for the overthrow of that splendid, evil, and terrible genius before whom they had so long cowered. Britain could, therefore, afford to turn her attention to America in earnest. As yet she could not spare adequate land forces, but she could and did spare a sufficiency of battleships, frigates, and sloops to make a real blockade of the American coast. After May 1813 the blockade was complete from New York southward. In the autumn it was extended further east ; but it was not until the following year that it was applied with the same iron severity to the New England coast, for the British government hoped always that the seditious spirit in New England would manifest itself in open revolt.
After the blockade had been once established, commerce ceased ; and the only vessels that could slip out were the fast-sailing privateers
' The order recites that they are " forbidden to engage " ami are to " retreat " from such a foe. — ' The Croker Pajiers,' i. 44.
1813.] INADEQUACY OF THE AMERICAN NAVY. (J5
and regular cruisers, whose captains combined daring, caution, and skill in such equal proportions as to enable them to thread their way through the innumerable dangers that barred the path. The privateers frequentlj' failed, and even the regular cruisers were by no means always successful ; while the risks were too great for merchantmen habitually to encounter them. Georgia touched Florida, and so could do a little trade through the Spanish dominions ; and the northern N"ew England coast lay open for some time to come ; but elsewhere the ships rotted at the ports, though the shipwrights found employment in building the swift privateers, and the sailor-folk in manning them.
The white-sailed British frigates hovered in front of everj- seaport of note, standing on and off with ceaseless, unwearying vigilance by day and night, in fair weather and foul, through the summer and through the winter. In the great estuaries fleets rode at anchor, or sailed hither and thither menacing destruction. No town, large or small, could deem itself safe ; and every great river was a possible highroad for the entrance of the enemy. Thei-e was not a strip of the American coast over which the Americans could call themselves masters, seaward of the point where the water grew deep enough to float a light craft of war.
The one lesson which should be most clearly taught by this war is the folly of a nation's relying for safety upon anything but its own readiness to repel attack ; and, in the case of a power with an extended seaboard, this readiness implies jthe possession of a great fighting navy. The utter failure of Jefferson's embargo and his other measures of what he termed " peaceable coercion," teach their part of the lesson so plainly that it would seem impossible to misread it; but the glory won by their little navy has tended to blind Americans to the fact that this navy was too small to do anything except win glory. It lacked the power to harm anything but Britain's pride, and it was too weak to parry a single blow delivered by the British along the coast, when once they realised that their task was serious, and set about it in earnest. Twenty ships-of-the-line, as good of their Icind as were the frigates and sloops, would have rendered the blockade impossible, even if they had not prevented the war ; and, judged merely from the monetary standpoint, they would have repaid to the nation their cost a thou- sand times over by the commerce they would have saved, and the business losses they would have averted. As it was, the Americans VOL. VI. F
66 THE WAR WITH THE I'XITED STATES, 1812-15. [1813.
were utterly powerless to offer any effective resistance to the British blockade ; for it is too late to try to build a fleet, or take any other effective steps, when once the war has begun. The nerveless administration at Washington did not even take steps to defend the capital city.
It is the fashion to speak of the people as misrepresented by the politicians ; but in this case certainly the people deserved just the government they had. Indeed, it is ciu-ious and instructive as well as melancholy to see how powerless the Americans as a whole were to make good the shortcomings of which they had been guilty prior to the declaration of war. It is especially instructive for those Americans, and indeed those Englishmen, who are fond of saying that either country needs no protection merely because it cannot be directly invaded by land, and who try to teach us that the immense reserve sti'ength which each nation undoubtedly possesses can be immediately drawn on to make good any deficiencies in preparation at the outbreak of a war. This is much like telling a prize-fighter that he need not train because he has such an excellent constitution that he may draw on it to make good defects in his preparation for the ring. The truth seems to be that, in naval matters especially, nothing can supply the lack of adequate preparation and training before the outbreak of war. The lead which is lost at the beginning cannot be regained save by superhuman effort, and after enonuous waste of strength. It is too late to mature plans for defence when the enemy is close at hand , for he continually breaks up and renders abortive the various little movements which, if given time, would become formidable. There is more chance of remedying defective preparation on land than on sea, merely because the fighting machinery for use on the sea is so delicate and complicated that ample opportmiity must be given, not merely to produce it, but to learn to use it aright. This was true in the days of the American and French Eevolutions ; it is infinitely truer now, when the fleets of Eodney and Nelson have been left as far behind modern navies as they stood ahead of the galleys of Alcibiades and Hanno.
The failure of the Americans to devise any adequate measure for breaking the British blockade is partially due to this fundamental difficulty in making preparations when the time for preparation has passed. There was also a curious supineness among the people as a whole, which was, if anything, even more noticeable among those States which were clamorous for war than among those which, to
1813.] LACK OF PUBLIC SPIJIIT J.X AMERICA. G7
their deep discredit, clamored for peace. Virginia aud the Southern States did not falter in their determination to continue the war, and the New England States betrayed an utter lack of patriotism in their cotuicils, and greatly hampered the national government in its feeble efforts to uphold the national honour. Nevertheless, astounding to relate, the New England States actually did more than the South Atlantic States in the war itself, and this, not because they did so much, but because the South Atlantic States did so little. Massachusetts and Virginia were the typical States of their two sections, and Massachusetts gave more men and more money to carry on the war than did Virginia, apart from furnishing a very large proportion of the sailors who manned the war ships and privateers, while Virginia furnished hardly any. Not even the continual presence of the British at their very doors could rouse the Virginians to respectable resistance ; and the Marylanders were not much better. It was in the Chesapeake that the main part of the blockading fleet lay ; it was along the shores of that great bay that the ravages of the British were most severely felt ; yet the Virginians and Marylanders, during the two years when the enemy lay on their coasts, insulting them at will, never organised any attack whatsoever upon them, and took inadequate and imperfect measures even for defence. The truth seems to be that the nation was yet in the gristle, and that its awkward strength was useless, as it could not be concentrated or applied to any one object. There was no public training, and indeed no public feeling, which could put at the disposal of the national government large bodies of dis- ciplined men sufficient for effective use to a given end ; and the men in control of the national government had been bred in a political school which on its administrative side was so silly that they could not have used this power even liad it l)cen given them. New York and Philadelphia were never directly menaced during the war ; but once or twice they thought they were, and the way in which they proposed to meet the danger was by setting the citizens to labour on earthworks in the neighbourhood, each profession, trade, or associa- tion going out in a body on some one day — the lawyers on one day, the butchers on another, the United Irishmen on another, and so on and so on. This conception of the way to perform military duty does not require comment : it would be grossly unfair to compare it with the attitude even of unwarlike medieval l)urghers, for after all the medijpval burghers bad snnio idea of arms, and the shop-keepers,
V 2
68 THE WAB WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1813.
day-labourers, and professional men of New York and Philadelphia had not.
Where such was the conception of how to carry on the war, there is small cause for wonder that the war was allowed to carry on itself pretty much as it pleased. Had the people displayed the energy, the resolution, and the efficiency which their descendants on both sides showed half a century later in the Civil AVar, no amount of courage or of military sagacity on the part of the British could have prolonged the contest for any length of time. But there was no such showing. No concerted or resolute effort was made by the people as a whole. Individual shipbuilders and contractors showed great energy and capacity. Individual ship-captains at sea, in- dividual generals on land, did remarkablj' well, showing military aptitude of a high order : and every such commander, by sea or by land, was able to make the seamen or the troops under him formid- able and well-disciplined fighters in an astonishingly short space of time ; for the Americans, whether afloat or on shore, were cool, hardy, resolute, and fertile in resources and expedients. But no commander ever had more than a small squadron or a diminutive army with which to work, for the great mass of the Americans did nothing to bring the war to a close. The task, about which the people as a whole refused seriously to concern themselves, and which the government lacked decision and character to perform, was left to the shipwrights, to the seafaring folk, to the admirably trained officers of the little regular navy, and, on shore, to such commanders and troops as the campaigns themselves gradually developed : and all acted more or less independently of one another, or with only such concert as their own intelligence demanded.
The pressm-e brought to bear on America by the British blockade was exceedingly effective, but it was silent, and so historians have tended to forget it. They have chronicled with pride or regret, according to their nationality, the capture of an occasional British by an American sloop, but they have paid Httle heed to the ceaseless strain on the American resom-ces caused by the blockade. Its mere existence inflicted a direct material loss to the American people a hundredfold greater than the entire American navy was able to inflict on Great Britain from the beginning to the end of its gallant career in this war. The very fact that the workings of the blockade were ceaseless and almost universal makes it difficult to realise their importance. It told heavily against the coasting trade, though
<
1813.] BLOCKADE OF THE AMERICAN COASTS. 69
less heavily than against foreign commerce; and it revived an almost archaic industry, that of the waggoners, who travelled slowly, parallel with the coast-line, to carry with an infinitely greater labour and expense the goods that had formerly gone in the sloops and schooners. The return to this primitive method of interchange implied much of the suffering of primitive times, for it meant that one part of the country might lack the necessaries of which another part possessed an over-abundance. As soon as the blockade was established it created the widest inequahties in the prices of com- modities in different parts of the country.' Flour cost nearly three times as much in Boston as in Kichmond, and lice four times as much in Philadelphia as in Charleston, while imported articles like sugar rose five-fold in price. Exports practically ceased by the close of 1813. In that year they amounted to but two hundred thousand dollars in New York as against over twelve million in the year preceding the outbreak of the war, while, during the same period, Virginia's original exports of five million dollars fell off to twenty thousand. The import duties diminished with even greater rapidity, until finally they could only be raised in New England. The ruin was widespread. As yet the people of the United States were not manufacturers, but small farmers, traders, and seafarers. The trader of the towns saw all his trade destroyed, and could give no employment to the sailors who had formerly worked for him ; while the farmer grew crops which could not be moved to any remunerative market, so that no ready money came in to him ; and yet for whatever he needed, save what he himself produced, he had to pay five times as much as formerly.
The coast dwellers in Virginia and Maryland were forced to experience, not merely the weight of the blockade, but also actual physical contact with the enemy. Another British squadron lay in the Delaware, and forays were made here and there along the coast. New York was blockaded, but very little was done save to put a stop to commerce. There was another squadron at Nantucket, with Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy, Nelson's flag captain, as conunodore. Hardy's ships closed southern New England to the world, Imt they did very little in the way of attacking or harassing the coast itself, for Hardy, one of the most gallant captains who ever lived, a man wlio had won his spurs in the greatest sea fights of all time, and wim prided himself on his ability to meet anucd
' AdiiiiiH, vii. 263.
70 THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1813.
foes in battle, felt impatient at mere marauding, and comitenanced it witli reluctance.
The directly opposite policy was pursued in Chesapeake Bay. There Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren was in command, but the chief work was done by Eear-Admiral Sir George Cockburn. Cockburn organised a few of the lightest ships of Warren's fleet, and some captured schooners, into a flotilla with which he could penetrate at will the creeks and rivers. He was a capable, brave, energetic man, hating his foes and enjoying his work ; and he carried out with scrupulous fidelity the order to harass the American coast. Not merely did he attack any militia that might from time to time assemble, but he also destroyed towns and hamlets, and worked widespread havoc throughout the country that lay within striking distance of tide-water. Houses were burned, farms plundered, stores pillaged, and small towns destroyed, while the larger places, and even Baltimore, were thrown into a panic which caused the inhabitants to neglect their business, but did not cause them to take such efficient measures for self-defence as the exercise of reasonable forethought would have demanded. Usually Cockburn and his followers refrained from maltreating the people personally, and most of the destruction they caused was at places where the militia made some resistance ; but, when plundering once began, it was quite impossible for the officers to restrain some of the verj- men who most needed restraint.
The people were of course greatly exasperated at the marauding, and the American newspapers far and near, and most American writers then and afterwards, were loud in their denunciation of the Eear-Admiral and his methods. Exactly how far these were or were not defensible, it is difficult to sa}'. It is of course a mere matter of convention to discriminate between the destruction of private property on sea and on land. Armed vessels, British and American, destroyed or captured any private propertj' of the enemy which they could find afloat ; and if there were sufficient cause, or if there were an object of sufficient importance to be attained, the combatants were certainly warranted in destroying such property ashore. Cockburn "s course was in many respects the same as that of Sheridan's at one crisis in the Civil War ; and there was certainly little in it to warrant the warmth of the execrations heaped upon him by his foes — which were indeed somewhat in the nature of a tribute to his efficiency. At the same time it may be admitted that
1813.] AMERICAN COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 71
his work was not of the kind in wliicli the hest type of fighting man would find anj- pleasiu'e, or which he would carry on longer than was absolutelj^ necessary ; and for some of the revolting details there was small excuse. There is room for question as to whether the comparatively trifling loss inflicted on the Americans did mucli lieyond irritating them. It certainly failed to cow them, though equally certainly it failed to rouse them to effective resistance.
In short, it may be doubted whether the course followed In' Cockburn reflected any particular credit upon, or caused much, if any, benefit to, the British side. There can be no doubt, however, of the discredit attaching to the Americans for their conduct. A people which lets its shores be insulted with impunity incurs, if not greater blame, at least greater contempt, than the people which does the plundering. If here and there Cockburn burned a hamlet or two which he ought to have spared, his offence was really small when compared with the disgrace brought on the American name by the supineness shown by the people of the threatened neighbour- hoods. They did nothing effectively of any kind for their own defence. Indeed, for the most part they did nothing at all, except gather bodies of militia whenever there was an alarm, and so keep the inhabitants constantly worried and harassed by always calling them to arms, and j'et merely providing almost worthless defenders. And the nation as a whole was as much to blame as the States directly menaced.
The retaliation of the Americans took the form of privateering. By the time the blockade began to be effective, the American privateers had developed into a well-recognised t3'pe. Small vessels had been abandoned. Brigs and ships were common, and so wei'e schooners of large size. Everything was sacrificed to speed ; and the chief feature of the armament was the single long-range gun, fitted to bring-to a fleeing merchantman at a considerable distance. The privateers thus had neither the armament nor the build, not to speak of the discipline, which would have enabled them to with- stand regular men-of-war of the same size in close action, although the crews were large, the better to man the prizes. In other words, the privateer was a commerce destroyer pure and simple, built to run ;ind not to fight; although, even as a connuercc dcstrnyer, she was less effective than a government vessel would be, because she was built to make money in a particularly risky species of
72 THE WAR WITH THE USITED STATES, ISIC-IS. [1813.
gambling ; and so, instead of destroying prizes, she sought to send them in, with the result that nearly half were recaptured when once the British began to make their blockade effective. A good many privateers went out from the ports of the Southern States, and Baltimore was a famous centre for them ; but the great majority sailed from the New England and Middle States.
The ravages of these privateers were very serious.^ The British trade suffered heavily from them, much more than from the closing of the American ports — the argument upon which Jefferson had placed so much reliance in his vain effort to bring Britain to terms. In fact, the closing of the American ports by the war made com- paratively little difference to England, because it was almost im mediately accompanied by the opening of the trade with continental Europe. The crushing disasters that befell Napoleon's gi'eat army in Russia meant the immediate relaxation of his system in the Baltic ; and after he was driven out of Germany, toward the close of 1813, all the German ports were again thrown open to the British merchants, so that their trade grew by leaps and bounds, and the loss of the American market was far more than made good by the gain of markets elsewhere. After the overthrow of France, in the spring of 1814, England was left without an enemy, except- ing the United States, and her commerce went where it pleased, unharmed except by the American privateers.
When she was thus left free to use her vast strength solely against America, it seemed inevitable that the latter should be over- thrown. But, in the war of 1812, w^hat seemed probable rarely came to pass ; and the failiu-es on both sides caused the utmost astonish- ment at the time, and are difficult to fully explain now. At the oiitbreak of the war the general opinion in America was that Canada would speedily be conquered ; and the general opinion in Europe was that the United States' navy would be brushed from the sea, and that the American privateers would be got under just as those of France had been got under. Neither expectation was fulfilled. During the first two years the Americans made no head- way in the effort to conquer feebly-held Canada. When, in 1814, Britain tmned her undivided attention to an enemy which with one hand she had held at bay for two years, the inevitable out-
' Adams, in his 'History,' gives the best account both of the blockade and the privateers. The details of some of the voyages of the latter are preserved in Coggeshall's ' History of American Privateers.'
1813.] THE LESSONS OF THE PRIVATEERS. 73
come seemed to be her triumph ; yet she in her turn failed in her aggressive movements against the United States just as America had failed in her aggressive movements against Canada, and her giant Navy proved unequal to the task of scourging from the seas the American men-of-war and privateers. Contrary to her ex- perience in all former wars with Em-opean powers, she found that the American privateers were able to operate far from their base, and to do great damage without any great fighting navy to back them up ; and as the war progressed they grew ever bolder in their ravages round the coasts of the British Isles themselves.
There are two lessons, which at first sight seem contradictor}', to be learned from the history of the privateers in this war. In the first place, their history does teach that very much can be accomplished by coimnerce destroying, if more directly efficient methods cannot be used. The American privateers rendered in- valuable service to their country by their daring, and the severity of their ravages. In those days sailing vessels were not hampered as vessels would be hampered under like conditions in the days of steam ; they did not need coaling stations, and there was much less danger of their getting out of repair. The American privateer was a faster ship than any previously seen on the waters, and she was more daringly and skilfully handled than any ships of her kind had ever been handled by Europeans. She could usually overtake any merchantmen, and usually escape any man- of-war. Of course, in the end she was almost certain to encounter some man-of-war from whom she could not escape ; but this might not be until after several profitable voyages ; and though, on the average, privateering was a business in which the losses equalled the gains, yet the chances of success were as great as the risks, and it was a kind of gambling which appealed peculiarly to adven- turous spirits. The commerce destroying put a severe strain on the British mercantile and seafaring communities.
Nevertheless, admitting and emphasising all this does not mean the admission that privateering was the way in which America could best have used her strength. The privateers did great and real damage to England, and though at first they caused more irritation than alarm, they inflicted such punishment upon the merchants and the seamen as materially to increase the disposition of the British for peace. ]^ut what they accomplished cannot be compared with what was accomplished by the British Navy. The
74 THE WAR WITH THE USITED STATES, 1812-15. [1813.
American privateers harassed the commerce of England, hut the British blockading fleet destroj^ed the commerce of America. The ravages of the one inclined the British people to peace ; hut the steady pressure of the other caused such a bitter revolt against the war in parts of America as nearly to produce a civil conflict. The very success of the privateers was a damage to the American navy, for all the seamen wished to enlist on board them instead of on board the regular ships of war. Eegular ships were better commerce destroyers, and, above all, battleships would have ac- complished far more, had the energies of the nation been turned towards their production instead of to the production of private armed ships. In the coast towns the number of seamen who served on board the privateers could have manned scores of fast govern- ment vessels built on the same lines ; and, as these vessels would not have tried to save their prizes, thej' would have inflicted more damage on the enemy. Undoubtedly this would have been an advantage so far as it went ; and perhaps, after the outbreak of the war, it was too late to try to build a great fighting fleet. But in reality what was needed was an infinitely more radical change. The substitution of the government commerce destroyer for the privateer would have done some good, but it could not have accomplished anything decisive. What was needed was the substi- tution for all these commerce destroyers of a gi-eat fighting fleet. Such a fleet b}- its mere existence would doubtless have prevented the war. It would certainh', if handled as well as the frigates, sloops, and privateers were handled, have prevented a blockade, even if war had been declared ; and American commerce, instead of being destiwed outright, would merely have sufl'ered heavily, just as the British commerce suffered. The men emploj'ed in the privateers would have manned enough ships of the line to have brought all this about. A fighting fleet would have prevented the losses and humiliations which the commerce destroyers were utterly powerless to avert. Moreover, it would have done more real and lasting damage than the commerce destroyers could possibly do. Commerce destroying was a makeshift. It was a very useful makeshift, and much good came from the way in which it was utilised ; but it must not be forgotten that it was only a makeshift, and that the commerce destroyers were in no sense satisfactory substitutes for great fighting ships of the line, fitted to wrest victory from the enemy by destroying his powers, both of
1«13.] THE "C/IKSAPEAKEr 75
offence aud defence, and able to keep the war away from the home coasts.
The reverses which the British Navy had encomitered in all the earlier sea fights were mortifying to a degree. It was now the turn of the Americans to suffer similar mortifications. Perhaps the chief cause of the British disasters had been an ignorant self-confidence combined w'ith an equally ignorant contempt of the enemy, which rendered the British indifferent to odds, and indifferent also to that thorough training which could alone make their ships into efficient fighting machines. The same undue self-confidence and undue disregard for the prowess of the enemy were now to cause the
CAl'T.VIX J.VMKS LAWRESCK, U.S.S. [Fnun nit I'DijViiviiitj htj E'lirin.)
Americans the loss of one of their frigates and the death of one of their most gallant captains.
In May, 1812, Captain James Lawrence, the connnander of the Hornet, was promoted to the connuand of the Chesapeake, 38, which was being fitted out at Boston. Her crew had just been discharged, and, as she was regarded as an unlucky ship, and as there had been nnuli dissatisfaction over their failure to get prize money, many of the crew refused to re-enlist, preferring to sliip in some of the numerous privateers. A few of the Constitiitiuii's old crew came on board, and those, and the men who had been in the Chesapeake during her former voyage, were excellent material. The rest were raw hands, including an unusually large number of
76 THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1812-15. [1813.
foreigners. About forty of these were British. There were also a number of Portuguese, one of whom, a boatswain's mate, almost brought about a mutiny among the crew, which was only pacified by giving the men prize cheques. The last draft of the new hands was not only entirely untrained, but also came on board so late that when the ship was captured their hammocks and bags were still lying in the boats stowed over the booms. A man like Lawrence would speedily have got such a crew into shape. A cruise of a very few weeks would doubtless have enabled him to put the ship in as good trim as the Hornet was when under his command. But she was in no condition to meet an exceptionally good frigate before she was eight hours out of port. Even his officers, with one exception, were new to the ship, and the third and fourth lieutenants were not regularly commissioned as such, but were only midshipmen, acting for the first time in higher positions. Lawrence himself was of course new to both the officers and the crew.
In such circumstances it was clearly his duty to trj- to avoid an encounter with the enemy until his ship should be in good condition to fight. Unfortunately for him, however, his experiences in the war had given him the same unreasonable feeling of superiority over his foes as the latter had themselves felt a year earlier. He had spent three weeks in blockading a sloop-of-war, the Bonne Citoyenne, which was of equal force with his own, and which yet resolutely declined to fight. He had captured another sloop-of-war which was, it is true, inferior in force, but which was also infinitely inferior in point of fighting efficiency ; and this capture had been made in spite of the presence of another sloop-of-war, which, never- theless, did not venture out to attack him. He had, as he deemed, good ground to believe that his foes were so much inferior in prowess as to make success almost certain. Indeed, had the frigate which he was about to attack been no more foiTuidable, as regards the skill of her captain and the training of her crew, than the ships which the Americans had hitherto encountered, Lawrence's conduct might very possibly have been justified by the result.
But the British frigate Shannon, 38, which was then cruising off Boston harbour, was under Captain Philip Bowes Vere Broke, who had commanded her for seven years, and who was one of the ablest captains in the British sei-vice. A British naval historian has explained why it was that the Shannon proved herself so much more formidable than her sister frigates.
1813.]
PHILIP BOWES VERE BROKE.
77
"Tlieie was another iK)iiit in which the generality of the British crews, as compared with any one American crew, were miserably deficient : that is, skill in the art of gunnery. While the American seamen were constantly firing at marks, the British seamen, except in particular cases, scarcely did so once in a year; and some ships covild be named on board which not a shot had been tired in this way for ujnvard of three years. Nor was the fault wholly the captain's. The instructions under which he was bound to act forbade him to use, during the first six months after the ship had received her armament, more shots per month than amounted to a third in number of the upper- deck guns; and after these six months only half the quantity. Many captains never put a shot in tlie guns till an enemy apjieajed : they employed the leisiu'e time of the men in handling the sails and in decorating the*ship."
BEAR-ADMIRAL SIR PHILIP BOWES VEUE liHOKE, BART., K.C.B.
(/•'(■«»( Blooits UlhO'jraiiU after a iiortmil imintal about 1814, when Broke was a I'osl-Caittaiii.)
Captain Broke was not one of this kind.
" From tlie day on wliich iie had joined her, the 14th of September, I80G, the Shannon began to feel