THE ROMAN EMPIRE
THE ROMAN EMPIRE
ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY FROM THE ACCESSION OF DOMITIAN (81 A.D.) TO THE RETIREMENT OF NICEPHORUS III.
(lo8l A.D.)
BY
F. W. BUSSELL
FELLOW AND TUTOR OF BRASENOSE COLLEGE, OXFORD RECTOR OF SIZELAND
VOLUME II
LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON NEW YORK, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA
1910
All rights reserved / -
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CONTENTS
PART I
POLITICAL INFLUENCES MOULDING THE
NOMINAL AUTOCRACY OF THE C^SARS
(400-1080)
DIVISION A
FROM PRESIDENT TO DICTATOR-FROM DICTATOR TO DYNAST
CHAP. PAGE
I. The Prince, the Senate, and the Civil Service in the
Eastern Empire (400-550) .... 3
II. The Failure of the Autocratic Administration (535-
565) 33
III. The Elements of Opposition under the Successors of
Justinian (565-618) 67
IV. Revival of Imperialism and of Military Prestige
under the Heraclians : Resentment and Final Triumph of Civilian Oligarchy (620-700) . . 82
V. Period of Anarchy and Revival of Central Power
under Armenian and Military Influence . . 98
VI. Character and Aims of the Pretenders and Military Revolts in the Ninth Century : Gradual Accept- ance of Legitimacy (802-867) . . . . 127
DIVISION B TRIUMPH OF THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGITIMACY
VII. Changes in the Administrative Methods of Autocracy and in the Official World from the Regency (Michael III.) 138
VIII. The Sovereign and the Government under Basil I.,
Leo VI., and Alexander (867-912) . . .178
vi CONTENTS
CHAP. PAGE
IX. The Sovereign and the Government during the
Tenth Century : the Struggle for the Regency
and Conflict of the Civil and Military Factions :
Rise of the Feudal Families . . . .195
X. "Legitimate" Absolutism, or Constantine IX. and
his Daughters (1025-1056) 256
DIVISION C
GRADUAL DISPLACEMENT OF THE CIVIL MONARCHY BY FEUDALISM
XI. Conflict of the Two Orders 287
XII. Conflict of the Three Nicephori : The Misrule of Borilas ; and the Revolt of the Families of Ducas and Comnenus (1078-1081) .... 317
PART II
ARMENIA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE EMPIRE (520-1120)
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE ARMENIAN ELEMENT
DIVISION A GRADUAL ADMITTANCE (540-740)
General Introduction 335
I. Early History of Armenia down to the First Period
of Justinian I. (530-540) 343
II. Relations of Rome and Armenia from Justinian to
Heraclius (540-620) . . 357
III. The Dynasty of Heraclius and the Eastern Vassals . 371 IV. Under the Heracliads and Isaurians . . . -379
DIVISION B PREDOMINATING INFLUENCE WITHIN (740-1040)
V. Armenians Within and Without the Empire from
Constantine V. to Theophilus (c. 740-840) . . 390
CONTENTS vii
CHAP. PAGE
VI. Armenians Within and Without the Empire from Michael III. (842), to the end of Romanus I. (944)— (840-940) 407
VII. Relations of Armenia and Armenians to the Empire, from the Sole Reign of Constantine VII. (945) to the Deposition of Michael V. (1042) — (940- 1040) 419
DIVISION C
ANNEXATION, RIVALRY, AND ALLIANCE WITHOUT
(1040-1120)
VIII. Armenia and the Empire from Constantine X. to the
Abdication of Michael VI. (1040-1057) . . 437
IX. Armenia and Western Asia from Isaac I. to the
Retirement of Nicephorus III. (1057-1081) . 450
X. Armenians under the Empire and in Cilicia during
the Reign of Alexius I. (1080-1120) . . . 465
APPENDIX
The Aristocracy and the Provincial Regiments ; or Emperor, Senate, and Army during the Great Anarchy (690-720) ..... 485
INDEX 497
[It should be noted that the Index is only to Volume II., and that there is none to Volume I.]
ANALYSIS
PART I
POLITICAL INFLUENCES MOULDING THE NOMINAL AUTOCRACY OF THE C^SARS
(400-1080)
DIVISION A
FROM PRESIDENT TO DICTATOR— FROM DICTATOR TO DYNAST
CHAPTER I
THE PRINCE, THE SENATE, AND THE CIVIL SERVICE IN THE EASTERN EMPIRE (400-550)
§ 1. Immobility of the Classical State : Reign of Law.
§ 2. The Civil Service and routine.
§ 3. Later decline of Civilian influence (600-800).
§ 4. Civilian pre-eminence in Vth century.
§ 5. The Theodosian academy for officials : function of the Senate.
§ 6. Respect for precedent : autocracy suspicious of itself.
§ 7. The Russian Czardom : its limitations.
§ 8. Efforts to control the lesser agents (450-500) : wise influence of senior officials in Senate.
§ 9. Official responsibility : no demand for popular control.
§ 10. Public opinion and nationality unknown : the middle-class and the mercantile interest.
§ 11. Oligarchy under formula of Absolutism : careful training for the Bureaux : State-service the sole career.
§ 12. Venality of office ; its excuse : legal fiction of Simony : modern conception : " place of profit : " failure of monarchical supervision.
x ANALYSIS
CHAPTER II
THE FAILURE OF THE AUTOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION (535-565)
§ 1. The witness of contemporaries : (A) the Notary with a grievance.
§ 2. The Prefecture degraded successively under (a) Con- stantine, (/?) Arcadius, (y) Anastasius, (8) the Dardanians.
§ 3. Lydus as critic of the imperial policy : the ultimate ruin of the office under John.
§ 4. (B) Procopius' " Secret History," evidence ruined by hyperbole and inconsistency.
§ 5. Procopius as witness to (i.) domestic disorders : (a) civic riot, (b) religious schism.
§ 6. Procopius as witness to (c] fiscal oppression, (d) impover- ishment of realm, (e) penury and strait of the exchequer.
§ 7. (ii.) External policy : (a) military enterprise and extra- vagance, prevalent misery and despair, the reign of Antichrist : (b) defensive system : (i) invaders bribed : (2) chain of fortresses built : (3) deficient support of Army : (iii.) internal policy : jealous centralisation and curtailment of franchise: modern critics at fault : Justinian's acts ; their excuse and motive : real character of the emperor emerges clearly from Procopius' diatribe.
EVIDENCE FROM THE CONSTITUTIONS OF JUSTINIAN (535-565) The Emperor and his Officials
§ 1. (C) Justinian judged by himself: (a) his conception of his post ; universal supervision : (/?) difficulties of this claim ; the bureaucrats out of hand ; their insolence and exactions : Justinian reduces fees payable on institution to office, abolishes Vicars, raises stipend and dignity of governors.
§ 2. (y) Counterpoise to mutinous hierarchy in (i) Bishops and (2) magnates : (3) popular supervision never suggested : imperial attitude to the people, cynical but indulgent: (i) costly displays for gratification of urban mob ; (2) solicitude for countrymen ; (3) wages of artisan : wisdom of these provisions : striking analogy with modern Socialism.
§ 3. Special classes : (i) the Military.
§ 4. (2) The Monks.
§ 5. (3) The Senate.
§ 6. (4) Justinian's appeal to his people.
ANALYSIS xi
CHAPTER III
THE ELEMENTS OF OPPOSITION UNDER THE SUCCESSORS OF JUSTINIAN (56*5-618)
(Being a continuation of" The Prince, the Senate, and the Civil Service"}
§ 1. Opposition of privileged class to Liberal Imperialism.
§ 2. Dying avowal of Justin II. : reforming zeal powerless.
§ 3. Conciliation of local authorities : episcopate as a counter- poise.
§4. Isolation of the emperor : no public support.
§ 5. No desire to restrict titular prerogative : private interest and contempt for law.
§ 6. Complete failure of Maurice to restore order (600) : inter- vention of the denies.
§ 7. Official tradition extinguished under Phocas.
CHAPTER IV
REVIVAL OF IMPERIALISM AND OF MILITARY PRESTIGE UNDER THE HERACLIANS: RESENTMENT AND FINAL TRIUMPH OF CIVILIAN OLIGARCHY (620-700)
§ 1. Position of Heraclius insecure : officials, army, provinces ; their disaffection. ',
§ 2. Senate resumes influence : prerogative reasserted during wars.
§ 3. Dependence (of Heracliads on Senate.
§ 4. Autocracy revived by Constans (650) : armies and priests : the military revolt (670) : armies and priests.
§ 5. Imperial prestige under Constantine IV. (680) : Jus- tinian II. hostile to official class (690) : imperial control of finance.
§ 6. Ministerial irresponsibility : revolt of magnates : over- throw of central power.
§ 7- Triumph (700) of the civilian and official oligarchy.
CHAPTER V
PERIOD OF ANARCHY AND REVIVAL OF CENTRAL POWER UNDER ARMENIAN AND MILITARY INFLUENCE
A. The Rejected Candidates (695-717)
§ 1. Benefits conferred by the Isaurians : perils of Elective Monarchy. § 2. The revolutions of 695, 698.
xii ANALYSIS
§3. Vengeance of Justinian (restored 710): revolt of the Armenian Vardan.
§ 4. Civilian's profit by shortsight of military conspirators : re- prisals of army under Theodosius III.
§ 5. Striking success of Leo III. : support of Islam.
§ 6. This development analogous to earlier revolutions : Roman tradition revived by plebeians and aliens.
B. Religious Reform and Political Reorganisation (717-775)
§ 1. Obscurity and bias of "Isaurian" Annalists: popular approval at revival of Personal Rule.
§ 2. Some events in Leo's reign (717-740).
§ 3. Rebellion of Artavasdus : conflicting accounts of Con- stantine V. (750).
§ 4. Summary of chief events (740-775).
§ 5. Indirect evidence entirely against this disappointing result.
§ 6. Recovery due to resumption of direct monarchic control, especially in Finance.
C. The Emperor, the Church, and the aim of Government in
the Period of Iconoclasm (717-802)
§ 1. Barbarism of the empire after 550 : influence of priests.
§ 2. Orthodox opposition to Iconoclasm : Leo seeks to weaken Church's influence.
§ 3. Anti-Clericalism and State-supremacy : value of counter- poise to State-absolutism.
§ 4. The Protestants of Armenia against Hellenism : success and reaction under Constantine VI. (c. 800).
CHAPTER VI
CHARACTER AND AIMS OF THE PRETENDERS AND MILITARY REVOLTS IN THE NINTH CENTURY : GRADUAL ACCEPT- ANCE OF LEGITIMACY (802-867)
§ 1. Suspension of dynastic principle : throne open to Armenian adventurer.
§ 2. Socialist "Jacquerie" in Asia Minor (c. 820),
§ 3. without definite political aim : intolerant spirit of the age.
§ 4. Feuds of monk and soldier : emperors ignorant or hetero- dox : weakening of regimental spirit.
§ 5. Revolt of Persian contingent at Sinope : close of the Era of " Pronunciamentos."
§ 6. Restoration of Image-worship : intolerant dread of heretics.
§ 7. Paulician persecution largely political : successful revival of central prestige (c. 840).
ANALYSIS xiii
DIVISION B TRIUMPH OF THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGITIMACY
CHAPTER VII
CHANGES IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE METHODS OF AUTOCRACY AND IN THE OFFICIAL WoRLD FROM THE REGENCY (MICHAEL III.)
A. Economic and Social Causes determining the Development
§ 1. A new departure : Regency and Legitimacy : personal monarchy in abeyance.
§ 2. Palace-government : the people press the claims of undis- guised Autocracy.
§ 3. Obscure economic causes at work : (i) change in population ;
§ 4. (2) Agricultural changes ; (a) communal villages : encroach- ment of the Magnate.
§ 5. (2, b) Private estates.
§ 6. First definite reforms (c. 740) democratic in character.
§ 7. Reaction (c. 850) in interest of Church and Magnate : soldiers' fiefs absorbed.
§ 8. Estates of officials : struggle against encroachment of grandees.
§ 9. Attempt to restrict Monastic property (c. 965).
B. The Government and the Landed Interest
§ 10. Economic fallacies of Byzantium ; Bullionism : land, unique investment for capital.
§ 11. Lecapenus (c. 930) and the landed gentry : Nicephorus (c. 965).
§ 12. (3) Legislation of" Isaurians" against Plutocracy.
§ 13. Problems of State and Capital : the rich kept aloof from affairs under earlier empire.
§ 14. Legal reforms of " Isaurians" repealed by 900 : mercy in the Code : (4) revival of Ecclesiastical influence : (5) revival of private wealth.
C. The Sovereign and the Governing Class under Michael III.
§ 15. Family of Theodora the Armenian : emperors always wed subjects.
§ 16. The Regency: character of Michael III. § 17. Cynical enlightenment in Church and State. § 18. Murder of Caesar Bardas and of Michael III. § 19. Accession of Basil further strengthens Armenian influence.
xiv ANALYSIS
CHAPTER VIII
THE SOVEREIGN AND THE GOVERNMENT UNDER BASIL I., LEO VI., AND ALEXANDER (867-912)
§ 1. Transfer of throne to the " Arsacid," 867, supported by official class.
§ 2. Domestic reforms and foreign policy of Basil.
§ 3. His family : relaxation of moral restraint : secular and imperial Patriarchs.
§ 4. Byzantine public service free from conditions of nationality: rise of the great Eastern families : perils of divided command.
§ 5. Abortive conspiracies against Basil and his son (870-910).
§ 6. Leo VI. under Stylian and Samonas : remarkable Saracen favourite.
§ 7. Wasteful ease of the Court (c. 900) : disregard of precedent and due promotion.
§ 8. Defects and merits of the new pacific Conservatism (Finlay).
CHAPTER IX
THE SOVEREIGN AND THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE TENTH CENTURY : THE STRUGGLE FOR THE REGENCY AND CON- FLICT OF THE ClVIL AND MILITARY FACTIONS : RlSE OF
THE FEUDAL FAMILIES
A. Ducas and Phocas to Lecapenus (912-920)
§ 1. The Palace-Ministry under Alexander : the Bulgarian peril and the Council of Regents.
§ 2. Popular demand for a strong man : failure and death of Ducas.
§ 3. Zoe's Regency and vigorous anti- Bulgarian designs.
§ 4. Zoe's policy thwarted by dissensions of military leaders.
§ 5. Competition of Phocas and Lecapenus.
§ 6. Success and rapid promotion of Lecapenus : separation of the imperial functions ; active Regent and legitimate Recluse.
B. Romanus and his Sons (919-945)
§ 1. Family of Romanus I. : popular Legitimism.
§ 2. Conspiracies against Romanus I. : public indifference at his overthrow.
§ 3. His diplomatic conduct of foreign affairs : Bulgarian alliance.
§ 4. Curcuas and his long control of the Eastern frontier.
§ 6. Parental supervision of Romanus.
ANALYSIS xv
C. The Regency in Abeyance (945-963) and Restored (963-976)
§ 1. The Great Chamberlains : Bringas and the two Basils.
§ 2. Literary culture and amiable character of Constantine VII.
§ 3. His ministers, cabinet, gifts to officials, diplomacy.
§4. Romanus II. and his advisers: the new Regency of Theophano.
§ 5. The East and the family of Phocas.
§ 6. Duel of Bringas and Nicephorus : Patriarch's decisive action.
§7- Nicephorus II. takes personal command of the war: his valour, unpopularity, and political errors.
§ 8. John Zimisces and the settlement of Bulgaria.
§ 9. John and the Eastern campaigns.
§ 10. Suspicious death of Zimisces (976) : hidden conflict in the Roman Empire.
D. Abortive attempts to revive the Regency: Personal Monarchy triumphs over both Departments, Civil and Military (990- 1025)
§ 1. The young Augusti : revolt of Sclerus (976) : Asia Minor detached from the empire.
§ 2. Defeats of the Imperialist forces : Phocas (restored to favour) overthrows Sclerus.
§ 3. Military annoyance at Basil's initiative : revolt of Phocas.
§ 4. Extinction of revolt by sudden death of Phocas : amnesty and high honours to Sclerus.
§ 5. Personal government of Basil II. (990-1025) : true Caesarian ideal : rare phenomenon ; effective control of one.
§ 6. Overthrow of New Bulgaria in the West.
§ 7. Masterful spirit and reserve of Basil : change in the methods of government.
CHAPTER X
"LEGITIMATE" ABSOLUTISM, OR CONSTANTINE IX. AND HIS DAUGHTERS (1025-1056)
A. John the Paphlagonian, or the Cabal of the Upstarts (1025-1056)
§ 1. Reign of Constantine IX. : his indolent and capricious temper.
§ 2. Romanus Argyrus and his Paphlagonian bailiff.
§ 3. Catastrophe and humiliation in the East : lieutenants retrieve imperial failure (1030).
§ 4. The hasty marriage of Michael the Paphlagonian.
xvi ANALYSIS
§ 5. The artxieties of Michael IV. : adoption of an heir. § 6. Loyal feeling towards dynasty under Michael V. : indignant populace storms the palace and reinstates princesses.
B. Central Policy and Pretender 3 Aim during the Reign of Constantine X. (1042-1054)
§ 1. Zoe's choice of a third husband : anomalous relations ot Monomachus and Scleraena.
§ 2. Usual series of ineffective revolts : Magniac's attempt : various futile plots.
§ 3. Rebellion of Thornic and the troops of Macedonia.
§ 4. End of Thornic : excuses for the military party.
§ 5. Ludicrous palace-intrigues : clemency of Constantine X.
§ 6. The Ministers, Lichudes and John : death of Constantine X. (1054.)
§ 7- Character and scope of Psellus' contemporary chronicler.
§ 8. Indolence, courage, and favouritism of Constantine X.
§ 9. His merits underrated.
DIVISION C
GRADUAL DISPLACEMENT OF THE CIVIL MONARCHY BY FEUDALISM
CHAPTER XI CONFLICT OF THE Two ORDERS
A. The Military Protest and the Counter- Revolution : the Peace- Party and the Soldiers (Comnenus and Diogenes'), 1057-1067
§ 1. Theodora and Michael VI. (creature of a faction).
§ 2. The Warriors slighted by Prince and Premier : retire to Asia Minor (1057).
§ 3. Hasty insurgence and failure of Bryennius.
§ 4. Catacalon joins Comnenian mutineers : futile negotiations with Michael VI.
§ 5. Triumph of the Comneni : origin of the family.
§ 6. Strong clerical opposition to Isaac I. : his abdication.
§ 7. Civilian influence predominant under Constantine XI. : misplaced energy and chivalry.
§ 8. Emperors' brothers during Xlth cent.: the two Johns : dis- grace and sudden elevation of Diogenes (1067).
B. The Military Regency and the Ccesar John : Beginnings of Latin Intervention: the Misrule of Nicephoritzes (1067-1078)
§ 1. Novel influences : Varangians and Latin soldiers of fortune. § 2. Civilian reaction after defeat of Manzikert : Romanus deposed by Caesar John.
ANALYSIS xvii
§ 3. Ministers and generals under Michael VII.: Nicephoritzes : Russell revolts and captures Cassar John, and proclaims him emperor : seized by Turks, Russell regains his freedom,
§ 5. But is reduced by Alexius : movement in the Balkans : dis- appointment of Bryennius, who prepares a revolt,
§ 6. And assumes the purple : the Capital invested and relieved.
§ 7. Strange situation of the empire in Europe and Asia (1078).
CHAPTER XII
CONFLICT OF THE THREE NICEPHORI: THE MISRULE OF BORI LAS; AND THE REVOLT OF THE FAMILIES OF DUCAS AND COMNENUS (1078-1081)
§ 1. Union of Alexius with the house of Ducas : insurrection of Eastern troops under Botaneiates.
§ 2. Abdication of Michael VII. : Borilas enters the palace and takes vengeance on Nicephoritzes.
§3. Weakness and extravagance of Nicephorus III.: Alexius ends the revolt of Bryennius at Calabrya.
§ 4. Revolt of Basilacius in Illyria : misgivings of Alexius, once more victorious.
§ 5. Restless state of European and Asiatic provinces : futile rebellion of Constantine XII. : like earlier Slavonic immigrants,
§ 6. The Turks penetrate into Asia Minor : " Nicephorus V." founds a Turkoman principality.
§ 7. Alexius declines to serve against him : West Asia indepen- dent and aggressive.
§ 8. The Ministers plot against Comnenians : Alexius invested : sack of the capital and resignation of Botaneiates (1081).
PART II
ARMENIA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE EMPIRE (520-1120)
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE ARMENIAN ELEMENT
DIVISION A
GRADUAL ADMITTANCE (540-740) General Introduction
§ 1. Interest of viiith century : Eastern Dynasties of Rome and Armenia.
§ 2. Early Armenian history : Arsacids and conversion of Tiridat (c. 300) : decay of Roman influence in viith century. VOL. II. b
xviii ANALYSIS
§ 3. Armenian Nonconformity, obstacle to union : not to entry of Armenian into Roman service.
§ 4. Armenian pretenders and sovereigns (700-8 50) at Byzantium. § 5. Summary of conclusions.
EARLY HISTORY OF ARMENIA DOWN TO THE FIRST PERIOD OF JUSTINIAN I. (530-540)
§ 1. Armenia in the new expert service of Rome.
§ 2. Christianity, source both of alliance and of estrangement.
§ 3. Origin and early history of the Armenians : rivals of Assyria : the Arsacid dynasty (150 B.C.-20O A.D.).
§ 4. Romans and Persians in Armenia : independence ex- tinguished (385) : the religious difficulty (400-500).
§ 5. Cabades the Socialist renews the war with Rome.
§ 6. Feudal policy of Justin (520), and eastern campaigns of Belisarius.
§ 7. Cause of Justinian's failure in East and West : fiscal system.
II
RELATIONS OF ROME AND ARMENIA FROM JUSTINIAN TO HERACLIUS (540-6*20)
§ 1. Loyal service of Armenia to the empire : in the East and Italy : the Vassal State of Lazic and sub-infeudation.
§ 2. Armenian valour in Africa : first Armenian plot : recall and conspiracy of Artaban (548).
§ 3. Persarmenia under religious persecution joins the empire.
§ 4. Doubtful issue of the quarrel over Persarmenia (575-580).
§ 5. Tiberius' offer to resign Roman claims to Persarmenia : mutinous state of Persian and Roman armies alike.
§ 6. Chosroes dethroned and restored by Rome in concert with Armenian nobles : welcome peace broken by the murder of Maurice.
§ 7. Chosroes' war of vengeance against Rome : mutinous inde- pendence of Taron.
Ill THE DYNASTY OF HERACLIUS AND THE EASTERN VASSALS
a. To the Death of Constant III. (620-668)
§ 1. Heraclius' attempt to secure religious conformity in Armenia.
§ 2. Ambiguous position of Armenia between the two powers : advent of the Arabs : patriotic resistance under the Vahans.
ANALYSIS xix
§ 3. Nationalism ruined by feudal paralysis sack of Dovin (640): steady northward advance of the Arabs (640:^^.).
§4. After the visits of Constans III. Nationalists aim at autonomy.
§ 6. Waning of Roman influence : Armenia tributary to caliph.
IV UNDER THE HERACLIADS AND ISAURIANS
ft. From Constantine IV. to the Death of Leo III. (670-740)
§ 1. Revolt of Armenian princes in East and West : Sapor and Mejej (668).
§ 2. Recovery of Armenia under suzerainty to caliph : secret compact of Justinian II. and the caliph : removal of the Mardaites.
§ 3. Troubled state of Armenia after the visit of Justinian II. : Arab inroads and removal of the capital.
§ 4. Terrible vengeance of caliph (700) against Romanising party : Armenian exiles flock into Roman service.
§ 5. Early adventures of Conon in the East : two Armenian emperors ; problems (i) of Armenian settlements and (2) origin of Leo III.
§ 6. Unqualified submission to the caliph (from 710).
DIVISION B PREDOMINATING INFLUENCE WITHIN (740-1040)
ARMENIANS WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE EMPIRE FROM CONSTANTINE V. TO THEOPHILUS (c. 740-840)
§ 1. Revolt of Artavasdus and transplantation of Constantine V. : Armenian monopoly of military command.
§ 2. Vigorous policy of Harun ; constant duel at Byzantium between Armenian generals and Orthodox reaction.
§ 3. Treason of Tatzates, owing to hate of courtiers : violent Armenian and military opposition to Images (785): first deposition of Constantine VI. frustrated by the Armenian troops.
§4. Constantine VI. estranges his Armenian supporters: his removal ; plots of the sons of Constantine V. : peril of the capital and removal of Irene by the Stauracian party.
§ 5. Exceptional post created for Armenian general in Asia : his discontent and revolt: his Armenian officer Leo joins Nice- phorus : Armenian conspirator only overcome by Armenian aid.
xx ANALYSIS
»
§ 6. A false Constantine VI. supported by Harun : Armenian ministers and conspirators : success and elevation of Leo the Armenian (813).
§ 7. Serious menaces to the State under Michael II. : Armenian help and alliance indispensable to Rome.
§ 8. Services to the empire of Armenia under Theophilus ; Alexis and Theophobus : Armenia itself attached to caliphate.
VI
ARMENIANS WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE EMPIRE FROM MICHAEL III. (842), TO THE END OF ROMANUS I. (944)— (840-940)
§ 1. Roman expeditions to north-east ; Bardas and Theoctistus : rise and elevation of Basil the Armenian : Basil invested by the new Bagratid monarch.
§ 2. Notable Armenian families emerge ; Maleinus, Curcuas, Phocas, Argyrus.
§ 3. Intimate and tactful relations of Leo VI. with Armenia : expansion of empire towards East.
§ 4. Multiplication of petty sovereignties in Armenia in decay of caliphate.
§5. Appeal of Armenian king to empire (911): consistent Im- perialism of Armenian royalty : nobles and people thwart alliance.
§ 6. Submission of the Taronites to the empire (c. 930) : ex- tension of Roman influence by diplomacy and by war.
§ 7. Universal suzerainty of Rome in Armenia : exploits and success of Curcuas the Armenian.
VII
RELATIONS OF ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS TO THE EMPIRE, FROM THE SOLE REIGN OF CONSTANTINE VII. (945) TO THE DEPOSITION OF MICHAEL V. (1042)— (940-1040)
§ 1. Religious differences separate Armenia from Rome : rise and elevation of Zimisces the Armenian.
§ 2. Zimisces and the Crusading Ideal ; his eastern exploits and close relations with Armenian royalty.
§ 3. Armenian actors and influence in rebellion of Sclerus (976): displeasure of Basil and outbreak of religious persecution : Armenia suffers from the Moslem and is reconciled to Basil II.
§ 4. Legend of Armenian origin of Samuel the Shishmanid : Armenian officers of Basil II. (990): Talk bequeathed to Rome ; Basil II. removes religious disabilities.
§5. The Great Durbar of 991; Basil II. receives fealty of Armenian kings : valiant resistance in Vasparacan to Seljuks : Sennacherib of Vasparacan surrenders to the empire : feudal fiefs within the empire.
ANALYSIS xxi
§6. Discontent and rebellion in Georgia (1022); proposal to surrender kingdom of Ani to Rome : curious delay in completing the transfer; varying accounts: anarchy and treason in Ani: Michael IV. (1040) prepares to enforce the claim : furious resist- ance of Bahram the Nationalist.
§ 7- Bahram raises Gagic, last King of Ani (1042) : straightfor- ward dealing of the emperors : relations of the Armenian kingdom to the empire (c. 1042).
§ 8. Close connection of Iberia with empire under Romanus III. (11034) : Armenian governors for the empire : principality of Tarsus.
DIVISION C
ANNEXATION, RIVALRY, AND ALLIANCE WITHOUT (1040-1120)
VIII
ARMENIA AND THE EMPIRE FROM CONSTANTINE X. TO THE ABDICATION OF MICHAEL VI. (1040-1057)
§ 1. Voluntary cession of King of Ani (c. 1045) ; exploits of Catacalon, Roman governor, against emir of Dovin.
§ 2. The Seljuk advance : its significance in world-history.
§ 3. First pillage of Vasparacan : division in the Roman councils ; they wait for Liparit : (feudal character of Liparit).
§ 4. Defeat of Liparit ; negotiations for peace with Rome : the Patzinaks create a diversion in Europe ; Eastern armies weakened : strange trio of generals against Patzinaks (1050).
§ 5. The courtiers charge Armenian princes of Arkni with dis- loyalty : curious plot to annihilate Armenian " Huguenots" : Nor- mans posted in East, owing to distrust : attack of Togrul fiercely renewed (1053) but baffled : Catacalon, Duke of Antioch.
§ 6. Fresh Seljuk attack ; treason of the son of Liparit : pillage of Chaldia : Emir of Akhlat extinguishes revolt of Hervey the Norman.
IX
ARMENIA AND WESTERN ASIA FROM ISAAC I. TO THE RETIREMENT OF NICEPHORUS III. (1057-1081)
§ 1. Catacalon and Armenian military faction again in power (1057): Armenian influence on Rome: desultory raids of Seljuks with varying success (1057-59).
§ 2. Religious and political dissensions of Armenia and the empire : Armenian alliance with infidel and Seljuk advance : fall of the Principalities of Sivas and Arkni.
xxii ANALYSIS
§ 3. Serious aggressive policy of new Sultan (1062) ; capture and sack of old Armenian capital, Ani : secret cession of last inde- pendent state to Rome : further range of Seljuks unhindered.
§ 4. Armenian disaffection : treason of the captain Amerticius : evil effects of civilian parsimony : no adequate Imperial forces on Eastern frontier.
§ 5. Lukewarm support extended to Romanus IV. : his cam- paigns and Armenian officers : suspicion of Sivas princes : catastrophe of Manzikert (1071).
§ 6. Scanty results of Manzikert (1071): Michael VII. still receives cession of land and awards principalities : Ani, content with Seljuk rule, refuses to restore royalty : the interval used by Rome for domestic sedition : triumph of the Military faction over House of Ducas (1078).
§ 7. Revolt of Armenian Basilacius in Macedonia : revolutions at Antioch : seizure by Armenian Philaret : events in Armenian kingdom of Cilicia.
§ 8. Disappearance of natives in Armenia : foundation of inde- pendent kingdom of Cilicia : the Patriarchal Sees.
§9. Western migration of Oriental Christians: Asia Minor overrun : Cilicia an outpost of Armenian nationality and Imperial tradition.
ARMENIANS UNDER THE EMPIRE AND IN CILICIA DURING THE REIGN OP ALEXIUS I. (1080-1120)
§ 1. Anomalous position of Empire under Comnenians : fluc- tuating success of Seljuks in Asia Minor, severed from East by Roman territory : strange exploits of Philaret, Duke of Antioch.
§ 2. Adroit diplomacy of Alexius ; jealousy and divisions of Seljukids : Armenians high in the Imperial service.
§ 3. Mild rule of Malek in Armenia proper : conciliation of Armenians: his wise reign followed by civil strife (1092-1097).
§ 4. Seljuks at Nice : Armenian plot against Alexius ; the Duchy of Trebizond: general state of East on the arrival of the Crusaders.
§ 5. Reconquest of Nice ; Latin replace Armenian principalities : Latins fraternise with Armenians : their services to the Crusaders.
§ 6. Rivals to Seljuks : Latins at Antioch and Edessa ; the Danishmand: Imperial recovery in East, expedition to Cilicia, 1103, 1104: curious treatment of the Roman general.
§ 7. War of Seljuks and Armenia of Cilicia : amity of Armenia and Tancred of Antioch: Boemund becomes Vassal of the empire : (changes in Roman administration : the Duchy).
§ 8. Another Armenian conspiracy : desultory fighting in East between Franks and Armenians : difficulties of Rum : Alexius checks an inroad from Khorasan.
ANALYSIS xxiii
§ 9. Armenian sovereigns and the earthquake : Baldwin of Edessa reduces the Armenian principalities : state of Asia Minor, 1 120, restless policy of Rum: homage to Alexius ; his death.
APPENDIX
THE ARISTOCRACY AND THE PROVINCIAL REGIMENTS ; OR EMPEROR, SENATE, AND ARMY DURING THE GREAT ANARCHY (690-720)
§ 1. Predominance of the provincial regiments: the empire now Asiatic.
§ 2. Permanent Thematic armies : revolutions of 695, 698.
§3. Justinian restored: revolutions of 711, 713: shortsight of military conspirators.
§ 4. Mutinous troops and revolt under Theodosius III.
§ 5. Civilian capital defenceless before new military concen- tration.
§ 6. Armeniacs and Anatolics upset Obsician influence (716, 717).
INDEX TO VOL. II.
PART I
POLITICAL INFLUENCES MOULDING THE
NOMINAL AUTOCRACY OF THE C^SARS
(400-1080)
VOL. II.
DIVISION A
FROM PRESIDENT TO DICTATOR— FROM DICTATOR TO DYNAST
CHAPTER I
THE PRINCE, THE SENATE, AND THE CIVIL SERVICE IN THE EASTERN EMPIRE (400-550)
§ 1. WE approach the central problem of this entire Immobility of period in an inquiry into the function and the aims of the Civil Service under the empire of the East. 0J LOW. A supplementary inquiry might indeed discuss (a) the composition and dignities of the Byzantine Senate, and (b) the strict and well-defined provinces of the various civil departments. It was the chief endeavour of the princes in the era of reconstruction to assure the central control over all other branches of the administration. Constantine, while recognising the independent sanction of the Church, seeks to pre- serve its integrity and unanimous belief as a valid instrument of government in the new State. The profession of arms constituted a distinct career, and was open to the sturdy foreigner. The Civil Service, the special creature of the imperial system, looking to Hadrian and Severus Alexander as its chief patrons, was now still further reduced to order, method, and routine ; in the education and training of future officials, in the regular stipend, promotion, and pension, which followed and repaid devoted service in some field of the administration. It is often remarked that the classical ideal is a stationary rather than a progressive society. "That State," says Aristotle, " is the wisest and best administered
4 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
Immobility of which gives most to the Law and least to the per- ^tate^Re^n sona^ w^ °* tne ruler-" A religious sanction was of Law. invoked to secure legislation from the tampering interference of reformers ; the legendary hero who produced the uniform and consistent code, was him- self divine, or was at least inspired by a god. When the secular and critical spirit looked with cool inquiry on this pretension, Plato sought by religious fiction or dogmatic illusion to bind his neophytes to a blind obedience. In effect, every citizen is to be born in a Hellenic community with a rope round his neck, such as was worn by the proposer to deliver Salamis. The legislation of Rome opened and expanded from a narrow tribal code, under the genial influence of Imperial, Christian, Stoic, and Juristic doctrine. The Ecumenical State could repose safely on no other foundation but the law of nature and of reason ; and it was a commonplace of the time (as of many subsequent schools of shallow enlighten- ment) that the two were identical. While we are following the restless wanderings of Hadrian, the ascetic musings of Marcus, the wild vagaries of Commodus, or the pitiless repression of Severus, we are apt to forget the quiet but systematic justification for the imperial system, which the Jurists proposed. The equity, which should be the basis of the world-wide State, as it realised the idle dream or academic thesis of dialectical and abstentionist Stoicism, was to be found under the empire, and was the unalterable pivot of the whole. Some indeed might regret the methods adopted to secure freedom and equality, — man's original condition, dictated by the powerful law of nature and the approving sanc- tion of his own heart ; or might regard the emperor as the unique means of attaining and preserving a " golden age." The content of this law was con- stant and inviolable, and could not be altered when once unfolded before mankind. To it the edicts of princes must conform, and there was abroad some
CH. i THE ROMAN EMPIRE (400-550) 5
vague notion on the right of insurrection, in case Immobility of the sovereign defied or contradicted it. The Decla- *£* Cl mations of the elder Seneca, and a hundred lesser of Law. passages in first century writers, extol this law of nature above the partial and transient enactment of princes or peoples.
§ 2. We must remember that the whole tendency The Civil
of the reconstructive age (28=5-337) was to save the Service and
& V O JJ// routine.
central power from alien encroachment and its own
weakness. The ideal was not the will of the emperor for the time being, but the permanent and abiding policy of the State. Everything hitherto tentative and indecisive in outline, a compromise of intentional vagueness, was brought forth into open daylight and given sharply cut features, often rude, blunt, and unsuspected. The autocracy no longer depended upon Rome ; why then should the empty and mis- leading pretence be maintained that from the Senate emanated all power in the State ? The law was by then made clear and uniform ; and the next three centuries will see the codifying process at work, which is to place the maxims and principles of government above the reach of individual caprice. Similarly, the agents of government were marshalled in order ; the various characters and duties set forth in distinct relief, quite as much in the desire for swiftness and uniformity as in anxious apprehension. The Civil Service attains important proportions, and by a curious freak, the sworn ministers and lieu- tenants of Caesar are summed up and collected, at least by the reign of Theodosius II., in the ancient and honourable title of Senators. Between the ancient house and the imperial agents there had always existed a standing feud ; the aristocrat tended to become an irresponsible amateur, the praetor or lieutenant of Caesar was careful and business-like as under the eye of the master. But the centrifugal force was now conquered ; there is but one order of public servants, directly amenable to the emperor.
6 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
The Civil We are dealing in this section only with the Civil Service and Service of the Eastern realm ; and we may here well
routine.
start with this identification. These officers form a hierarchy with definite training, precise duties, and regular precedence ; the Senate, still the informal council of assessors which custom rather than law bade the magistrate consult, was composed of the chief acting and past ministers of the Crown. And it was the aim and object of the reconstructive age in adapting the scheme of government to its new and unexpected needs, to make its method fixed and its procedure certain. This fixity of outline, as we saw, is a heritage from the past ; the Hellenic idealists conceived it possible, like modern prophets of Utopia, to reach or to recur to a perfect and immobile condition of society, in which reform and improvement would have no further use. To us who recognise the helplessness of man's judgment before inexorable laws, and the cyclic development which forbids us to cherish hopes of an eternal equi- librium, it seems incredible that these Illyrian or Pannonian sovereigns, themselves darting out of nothingness into dazzling light, could have imagined that it lay within their competence to stereotype and to crystallise mankind. " A spirit of conservatism," says Finlay, " persuaded the legislators of the Roman Empire that its power could not decline, if each order and profession of its citizens was fixed irrevoc- ably in the sphere of their own peculiar duties by hereditary succession." We are about to examine the application of this principle in the administrative sphere, and to inquire into the influence of this new body, as it slowly built up its policy and tradition to overmaster the moment's caprice in the ruler, or unhappily succumbed to the rudimentary instincts of self-seeking and greed.
Later decline § 3. The needs of the empire were twofold : iLflwnce1 domestic order and guard against foreign inroads. (600-800). Sooner or later the most carefully devised plan for
CH. i THE ROMAN EMPIRE (400-550) 7
securing civil supremacy was destined to fail. The Later decline
artificially protected area, with its also artificial °f Chilian
. J . ' . influence
governing class (never, as in other countries, a domi- (600-800).
nant caste), frequently had to postpone internal reform to the pressing need of military defence. I am inclined to believe that the years 400-800, from Theodosius II. to Nicephorus I., witness the zenith and decline of the civilian spirit, of that predomi- nance of the bureau, which the sturdy soldier Diocletian established, in the vain hope that unarmed and peaceful officials would remain always in dutiful obedience to the sovereign. I would suggest the following division of years in an attempt to estimate the vicissitudes of its influence.
(a) From the New University of Theodosius II. to the end of Justinian (430-565), during which the collective Civil Service represented by the Senate, acquired by merit and preserved with success a commanding position in the State, (b) From Justin II. to the solemn compact of Heraclius (565—618). Here we see emerging the elements of opposition to the vigilant control of the prince, — the interest in most things civilian and the emoluments of the notary and the advocate have declined, and while society rushes blindly into superstition and barbarity, the advisers and agents of the sovereign do their best to thwart his well-meant reforms and exempt themselves (like a feudal " noblesse ") from the uniform opera- tion of law. (c) From Heraclius to the deposition of Justinian II. (618-695). Here the conflict of the official class with the monarchy takes a different complexion in an altered age ; the old civil hierarchy breaks down, and in many regions of the empire becomes extinct; for since 618 two new and im- portant factors have been admitted into partnership, with independent right, the Church and the Army : and the official class of " Senators " (persecuted, as Bury well says, in the " drastic but inept " measures of this latter sovereign) bear a different stamp to the
8 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
Later decline disciplined agents of his greater namesake, and have i{flwncen something of the selfish independence of the feudal (600-800}. nobles, something, too, of the crafty greed of an Eastern vizier, not a little of the genuine (if mis- placed) piety of the devotee. (W) From the elevation of Leontius to the accession of Leo III. (695—7 1 7) ; a period in which the permanent armies of Asia Minor combat not indeed with an effective monarch, but with the officials of the capital, who, like a Venetian oligarchy, attempt to engross political power and secrete their gains behind the majestic figure of a puppet Caesar, (e) From the accession of Leo to the downfall of Irene, the epoch known as Icono- clastic and Isaurian (717-802). Here the personal monarchy of Constantine again emerges, and the civilian interest has to submit to military law ; a " state of siege," as it were, is proclaimed, and sharper and sterner measures are adopted against the ascetic celibate and the corrupt functionary : it is the victory of the " Themes/' of the army, and, above all, of the Asiatic spirit, which, assuming in distant Armenia the austere lineaments of ancient Rome, revives the falling State and ensures not only Byzantium but the rest of Europe ; the civilian body dwindles in importance and esteem, the Senate deferentially rati- fies the sovereign's decrees in formal " beds of justice " ; the palace, the camp, the monastery are the centres of influence and interest. Civilian pre-' § 4. We will confine ourselves at present to the
first Period (c- 43°~565 A-D-)> which owing to the remarkable change in the energy and fortunes of Justinian's old age might well be shortened by some dozen years. Here Senate and Emperor co-operate ; the interest of ruler and subject are identical, and mature merit, passing through the useful lessons of a private lot, arrives leisurely and by no sudden leap at sovereign power. There is no definite anti- imperial feeling among the ruling class, though we detect dire presages of the coming conflict. For
CH. i THE ROMAN EMPIRE (400-550) 9
the difficulty of our problem lies in this ; we have Civilian pre- abundant evidence of the wise influence, the con- e™nence m
V
tinuous policy, the steady pre-eminence of the civilian element in the fifth century ; and especially in the long and impersonal reign of Theodosius II. Yet we do not lack traces of selfishness in greater and minor agents alike, of the resentment roused by imperial firmness, of the claims of rank to exempt from liabilities. Now in the Roman Empire it is not possible to fall back upon the facile distinction between a military and feudal nobility, and the sovereign's agent expressly created to coerce them. Elsewhere we find the same political development ; the king and his band bursting gaily into a rich and smiling country and dividing the spoils ; the king, drawn over against himself into popular sym- pathies, curbing the petty tyrannies of the lords, and gradually (as Plato saw) assuming the character of a popular champion ; hence the various offices in- vented to curtail local power in the common interest of prince and people, " comites " and " palatines " to watch " dukes " ; " missi " and " gastald " to stand up for the centre against the circumference. But, in spite of the long survival and certain influence of great families in Greece and Rome — in spite of the dynastic tendency from the very outset underlying the scheme of Augustus — birth never constitutes by itself a claim to distinction or power among the classic nations. Nobility was of rank not of blood ; and although nature will again and again " recur " to combat or reinforce civic Idealism, the theory survives to the end of our period that only standing in the service of the State gave rank, title, or prece- dence. Thus we have some of that Teutonic sub- jectivity, the feudal baron, sometimes the defender, sometimes the oppressor of the district ; and the commonwealth never surrendered a large measure of its duties to private enterprise. (For, in passing, it may be explained why England is to the present
10 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF mv. A
|
Civilian pre- moment an aristocratic country: it is because a very £reat Part of the duties elsewhere exercised by paid functionaries of the centre fall to the gratuitous discharge of those whose birth summons them to certain office and functions ; who are trained in that anomalous yet successful school of English educa- tion to be the natural leaders of a great community, or the impartial rulers of less civilised races. Else- where we have intimated that the attitude of such a class is always largely hostile to the government and loyal to the titular sovereign ; for it cares little for the favours of the former, and for its standard of public rectitude and devotion it borrows nothing of its tradition, invokes none of its definite laws ; but it values the lightest honour which the latter bestows, an ample reward ; lastly, it depends, as the nobility must in modern times, upon the esteem of the people at large, also animated by a general feel- ing of distrust of those anonymous central cabinets where power resides to-day, and by a vague terror of State autocracy, never so dangerous as when cloaked under democratic forms.) To the bad and to the good side of feudalism alike the empire was a stranger. The State was impersonal ' ; subjectivity was ruthlessly crushed or forced in the imperial figures to act an impersonal role. It was constantly at- tempting to reduce independent departments under the central sway ; Diocletian did not rest until he had secured the submission of army and adminis- tration to the central unit, which, like Schelling's Absolute, was at the same moment both and neither. It would be an error to assert that the system strove for logical symmetry like a modern paper constitution. But it developed, as do all ideal (that is, artificial) systems, into centralism and uniformity. And in- deed there had never been any doubt of this ; though office might come, like Santa Glaus, in the night to the cradles of slumbering politicians, yet in the end it was office, not the accident of birth, that bestowed
CH. i THE ROMAN EMPIRE (400-550) 11
power and admittance to the Senate. When we find Civilian pre-
some notable fretting against restraint or common eminence *n ,• , i i • « • Vth century.
justice, some boasted or claimed immunity, it is no feudal peer; it is a creature of the State who has become, like the "monster," stronger than its author.
§ 5. The Civil Service of China is examined but is The not taught by the State ; the growth and early train- Theodosia^
academy for
ing are spontaneous, and only the mature result is officials: taken under its patronage. In Byzantium since the function °f reign of Theodosius II. there existed a college for the discipline of future officials (Cod. Theo., xiv. 9, 3 ; Just., xi. 1 8, i).
A high test of merit and ability was exacted for a professor's post ; the " Senate" were the examiners ; and the lucky candidate might expect, after a certain term of service, to enter the official hierarchy with the title of Count. It is to us not a little singular to see an "emeritus" professor from Germany in the habiliments of a Privy Councillor, or an honorary Court Chamberlain ; but such recognition by the monarch, acting in the name of the State, is quite in keeping with Roman practice and tradition. We may well believe that the Senate as an advisory as well as an examining body possessed large powers in the reign of Pulcheria. In spite of the charges of Eunapius that offices were venal, it is clear that assembly and executive worked well together ; and that the constitution under an amiable hereditary prince, a conscientious empress sister, and a competent imperial council, resembled later and better forms of that absolutism which supplanted Feudalism and disorder in Western Europe. Bury well points out that the early empire steered a doubtful course be- tween Scylla and Charybdis — a cabinet of imperial freedmen, Dio's Kata-apeloi, and a sheer military des- potism. Remedies for each peril were discovered in (a) permanent council and Civil Service ; (b) severance of the civil and military careers. But the
CONSTITUTIONAL
i
HISTORY OF DIV. A
The
Theodosian academy for officials : function of the Senate.
double danger recurred in a novel form — the new cabinet of chamberlains and dependents of the Con- stantinian Court, and the foreign and preponderating element in the armies. It is impossible not to fore- cast the secret influences of "aulic cabals." Yet as the earlier princes charged with the responsible government of a world found it necessary to put trust in faithful domestics, so the later influence of the Court Chamberlain, however distasteful to the patriot and the civilian, had some intelligible ground. For the most public-spirited assembly insensibly alters its tone, and acquires features of individual avarice and collective resistance to all change how- ever urgent. The tone of civilian society is not the same under Anastasius as under Theodosius II. Now and again the " Senate " appears by name in some more important relation than a court ceremony. It seems to have disappointed the hopes of Verina, who in 475 drove out her son-in-law to place her para- mour Patricius on the throne ; it elevated her brother Basiliscus, the unsuccessful admiral of the great expedition to Carthage. Longinus, Zeno's brother, is appointed president of the council to reinforce the Isaurian counterpoise to the German auxiliaries. And when Anastasius has overcome the peril arising from this dangerous alliance in the Isaurian mutiny, it is once more the Senate who proclaim Vitalian an enemy of the State. He is no " breaker of the king's peace," no lt comforter of the king's enemies," but aXXoTpios rtjs TroXtre/a?, a foe to the just and imper- sonal system of the City State. Once again it is the Senate who inquire into the conspiracy in Justinian's last days, when, with the leniency we come to expect in an emperor, all who seem guilty are pardoned and set free. It is clear, then, that Justinian gave it a judicial function, which may have lasted or been from time to time revived down to the final abrogation of privilege in the latter half of the ninth century.
CH. i THE ROMAN EMPIRE (400-550) 13
§ 6. Where earlier critics saw nothing but unmis- Respect for
takable decay under feeble and capricious princes. Precedent '• . , ,• i , T , autocracy
modern research has disclosed manifest tokens of suspicious of
recuperation and steadfast policy. Finlay, as he itself. struggles between his evidence and his intuitions, presents no very clear picture, and is constantly impaling himself on the horns of a dilemma ; yet he does justice to the " systematic exercise of imperial power," the identical interest and common aim of sovereign and subject, and the gradual internal re- covery which followed the clear decision of the Eastern world to tolerate no Teutonic protectorate.
All these princes seek to follow precedent duti- fully ; and Anastasius is in singular agreement with Tiberius I. (Cod. ]., i. 22, 6), when he writes to the governors and judges not to allow a private rescript to override the law ; the imperial will may be disregarded if it does not tally with usage. Tiberius, it will be remembered, had likewise at- tempted to guard autocracy against its idler or incautious moments : " minui jura quotiens gliscat potestas, nee utendum arbitrio cum de legibus agi possit." Where shall we find the true critic of an often faulty executive, an often hasty legislature ? The emperor is warring against himself ; he is attempting to guard against abuse of prerogative by an exercise of it. In the United States, the Con- stitution is sovereign over popular impulse ; the Supreme Court decides if a measure is consistent with its provisions. It is the standing complaint of liberal historians that no such safeguard or division of function existed in the empire ; that the executive and legislature and judicature were often at one ; that the private subject had no redress in the courts against oppression ; that the governor was also judge in his own cause. It is not easy to see how this system could be successfullyamended while retaining the hypothesis and formula of the Commonwealth : for this paradox was essential, that which combined with a minute
14 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
Respect for subdivision of labour and function the most imperious Pautocrac' centrausm- During an epoch of comparative peace suspicious of a respectable civilian body may safely be charged itself. with imperial duties ; but at a crisis, the single will
and its trusty military retinue must be once more invoked. Such a period of civil rule marks the fifth century, — marks again the latter portion of the sixth. There was no initiative, and for the moment no need of initiative, in the Emperor Theodosius II. The machine could go on very well of itself. There was abroad an honest desire to reform, re- trench, and rule wisely. The groundwork and stability of the next reigns — Marcian, Leo, Zeno, Anastasius, and Justin — were laid firmly under the last of the Dynastic series. If the emperor was weak or " constitutional," the Senate, a permanent body with continuous traditions, assumed the control of public business. Of the sovereigns who succeeded Theo- dosius (450-578) no less than six hail from those northern parts of the Balkan peninsula which for centuries supplied Rome not merely with recruits but with an unbroken line of princes. Whether Illy- ricum or Pannonia, Dardania or Thrace, it is re- markable that for over three and a quarter centuries (250-578) these provinces should have so exclu- sively provided rulers for the world. It cannot be doubted that Marcian (450-457), in whose nomination Pulcheria, Aspar, and the Senate seem to unite amicably, was a notable member of that body, who supported under the last reign the prudent policy that lay behind the fugitive personality of her brother. The chief aim of this policy was to enthrone law above caprice, to circumscribe despotic or fitful power by fixed institutions and uniform procedure ; the motto of these sagacious civilians might well be the Horatian advice to the playwright, Nee deus intersit.
| 7. It is scarcely out of place to remark that there is a similar tendency even among the professed sup-
CH. i THE ROMAN EMPIRE (400-550) 15
porters of modern autocracy. We cannot forget the The Russian apology which the late M. Pobyedonostseff made for his sovereign in the matter of the Kieff affair. Prince tions. Kropotkin had with much waste of sentimentality objected to students being sent into the army as a disciplinary measure ; a measure just suited to the young Russian, which with us would take the form of sending a spoilt and precocious boy to learn his place in a public school. For this step the Pro- curator makes a really needless apology. But when it comes to placing the responsibility, he is, as Tacitus would say, " sounding the depths and publishing the secrets of empire." The emperor was not respon- sible, it appears ; the action was taken solely by the Ministers of the Interior and of Education. "The decree/' he writes, " concerning the military service of disorderly students was published independently of any initiative on the part of the emperor. The ministers in a cabinet meeting, summoned in con- sequence of these university disorders, deemed it necessary to have recourse to this punishment, and this resolution was submitted for the emperor's ap- proval. The application of this penalty in each case was to depend on a special committee . . . and its decisions were to be valid in law without needing an imperial sanction. The Kieff affair was settled in this way, and the will of the emperor had no share in it. . . . It should be remembered that our emperor never issues such orders on his personal responsibility. He contents himself with confirming the decisions of the various executive councils and the resolutions of his ministers in cases prescribed by rule. ... I was totally ignorant of the Kieff affair, which concerned two ministers." This must mean that the emperor, like the ideal sovereign of Laurentius, only confirms the decisions of his cabinet,and is not responsible for their mistakes. We need not sympathise with the pacificist scruples of the prince about the drafting of disorderly youths into a sphere of much-needed discipline ; nor do we
16
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF mv. A
tims.
The Russian exactly agree with him in seeing here the embryo of constitutional government and responsible ministries! Indeed, the above seems the very worst system of government the heart of man could devise ! The autocrat is powerless, although in the eyes of the world solely accountable for every slip or misdeed. The ministers, so far from being responsible either to him or to the nation, are practically omnipotent in their several departments ; and do not even trouble to consult the sovereign, although he has to bear the brunt or odium of their injustice. And, like the official class in our period, " they increasingly assume the right under the shelter of the emperors signature, of modifying by mere decrees the fundamental laws of the empire." But at Byzantium, we notice the better features only. The age might well be re- garded as the triumph of bureaucratic government. The dignified assembly was well served by trained and organised officials who had learned not merely general lessons in the Theodosian academy, but the minute duties of their future career. Nor is it without significance that just at this time appears the Code as a further support to a just and uniform administration, of which Finlay well remarks, "that it afforded the people the means of arraigning the conduct of the ruler before the fixed principles of law."
§ 8. The legislation of the time bears ample witness to a sincere desire for the reform of abuses in the higher circles, to the prevalence of an unscrupulous or antinomian spirit in the lesser agents. Marcian found himself besieged by complaints, " catervas adeuntium infinitas" of the imperfect distribution of justice ; the judges were neither strict nor impartial (Novella, i.). There was complete accord between the elderly Senator, called like some Doge of Venice to be chief among his peers, and the conclave who had ratified or proposed his election. No fault was found in the pompous phrases in which he couched
Efforts to control the
(430-500).
CH. i THE ROMAN EMPIRE (400-550) 17
his sense of imperial responsibility : " Curce nobis est Efforts to utilitati humani generis provtdere" (Novella, ii.). He control the remits the follisy as somewhat later Anastasius will (^-500). * abolish the Chrysargyron, beyond chance of recall ; and thus relieved the senatorial class from a heavy burden, which even the emperor himself paid as a member of the order : for the modern gulf between the sovereign and the proudest subject, which is a symbol of State absolutism, did not exist for the Roman emperor. He also lightened those liturgical offices, like that of the Greek Choragus or our own High Sheriff, which subjected wealth to certain liabilities for the people's amusement : hitherto Senators of the provinces were called up to act as praetors in the capital and provide games for an idle proletariat. The two original praetors of the city had been increased to eight, all bound to some costly contribution to public works or public cere- monies ; for the ancient world, in spite of (or shall we say because of ?) its plutocratic basis, exacted much from the opulent, and had no patience with the cynical luxury, the immunity and aloofness of the wealthy which is so significant a trait of " demo- cratic " States. Marcian no doubt reduced the number of exhibitions, and he refused to summon from a remote district a rich proprietor to squander his means on a people who scarcely knew his name. Residents alone were in future eligible to these oner- ous and archaic posts ; and the consuls were invited to share with the praetors the charge of the public works and buildings, which had pressed heavily on those who were not required for the less useful expense of the games. Leo I., following the same wise policy of simplicity and retrenchment, reduced these ceremonious offices to three ; and Justinian completed the work of relief in the abolition of the consulate. This act, idly supposed to mark an ignoble jealousy of antique Roman glory, seems to the dispassionate student to have been dictated by VOL. II. B
18
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
Efforts to control the lesser agent (450-500).
the soundest motives. Emperor and State were quit of a dignity which entailed nothing but a con- venience for the chronicler and a disorderly "lar- gess " ; to the mass of the people indeed the term vTrareia, robbed of its proud associations, bore no other significance, and we do not hear that even the usual rumblings of discontent " inani murmure ademp- tum jus questus," follows this revolutionary economy. Zeno (474—491) maintained the same attitude ; like Leo the Thracian, he lightened fiscal burdens in the interest of the landed proprietor ; and the pre- occupation of their sovereigns with this class is not a little significant of the critical position of agricul- ture and of economics. It is hazarded that his dependence on the " official aristocracy " is proved by his refusal to nominate his brother Longinus as successor ; it may well be that both emperor and Senate had already come to the same conclusion that he was unfit to rule ; for he had for several years occupied the chair of President of that Assembly.
The abolition of the Chrysargyron and the curious
ence of senior apprOval aroused will demand special notice. We
officials in
need only note here the consistent policy of modera- tion and economy shown alike, no doubt under senatorial guidance, by the elderly palace official from Dyrrhachium and the mature Guardsman, who succeeded an Isaurian chieftain as Roman emperors. It must be remarked that this imperial council enabled princes, chosen almost at hazard, to play a useful and dignified part without any pre- vious special training ; it respected precedent and maintained a continuous and unbroken policy. Yet in justice to these conscientious rulers, who availed themselves of their advice, the more liberal and beneficial measures were owed to the independent thought of the sovereign himself. A wise suppres- sion of sinecures also marked this era, and a restric- tion of the excessive influence of certain high offices.
Wise infill-
Senate.
CH. i THE ROMAN EMPIRE (400-550) 19
We do not know how far these civil reforms were Wise influ- due to the spontaneous action of the monarch ; but ence °fsenior
„ J ... . ,. . ^ officials in
we are well aware how this judicious retrenchment senate. was viewed in the prejudiced eyes of Laurentius or Procopius. Amid vague blame or overt calumnies, the genuine desire of the emperors (including Jus- tinian) for a wise check on public expenditure is clearly marked. The unavailing regrets of the Lydian for the past glories of the prefect's office and retinue, mark not the jealous suppression by the monarch of an inconvenient partner or rival, but rather a natural process, which extinguished with the litigious centralism of the courts of the capital the effective civilian control of the outlying provinces. The Civil Service indeed has passed its palmiest days. It is subject to an insensible decline, for which no single actor is responsible. The Senate, when we open the records of the next period, does not reflect high public spirit, a sense of duty, a corporate tradition. The " princes " of the Court of Justin II. are stigmatised by him as selfish placemen and dangerous advisers, against whose influence he warns his successor. By what gradual and silent steps this transformation was effected we do not know ; but we may safely infer that the change was hastened by the despondent lethargy which overtook Justinian in his later years.
§ 9. The marvel of the endurance and stability Official of the Eastern realm has fascinated historians. To responsibility. what can we ascribe the startling contrast in the fortunes of the two capitals ? It has been well said : " While the West crumbled, the East saved not itself only but the world." These adoptive emperors organised that system, which being hastily dismissed as Byzantine, has been so " unjustly calum- niated." The successors of Diocletian coquetted with his scheme ; but the real consummation was reserved for the princes who follow the extinction of the Theodosian house. Constantine introduced
20 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
Official heredity and favoured the barbarians ; the elder responsibility. Theodosius endorsed this policy, and left behind him a working scheme which the feeble stubbornness of his son, or the intrigues of ministers, soon destroyed. At the best, the Roman constitution in the fifth cen- tury is incoherent and opportunist ; a definite system was the merit of the immediate predecessors of the great Justinian. They laboured for that State or centre-supremacy which was achieved under his ener- getic rule, and vanished in his lethargy. Officers of the civil and military hierarchy were made amenable to " ministerial departments," and thus ultimately all depended on the sovereign, according to the fixed principle of modern times. The sovereign was safe and inaccessible. The treasure was guarded against peculation. Conspiracy, rebellion, theft — such are the dangers of a feudal society ; to a large extent pretexts and opportunities for these crimes against public peace were withdrawn.
No demand Finlay, as becomes a Grecian liberator, indicts the BYzantine Government for not placing some effective safeguard in the hands of the people against the malversation or petty oppression of subalterns. He is convinced that in the highest class the public opinion was wholesome, and the Senate in its aims and methods patriotic; the "Illyrian" emperors whom they supported, vigorous and well-meaning. But a vigilant watch over the obscurer instruments of the " sacred will and pleasure " was impossible. And in spite of murmurs, it would not appear that the people at large demanded control ; and still the overworked princes struggled in vain with an Atlan- tean load. He well says that " legislative, executive, and administrative powers of government were con- founded as well as concentrated in the person of the sovereign " ; and he remarks with justice that " despotism can ill balance the various powers of the State, and is but ill qualified to study with effect and sympathy the condition of the governed or the
CH. i THE ROMAN EMPIRE (400-550) 21
disorders of society." But these strictures of nine- No demand teenth-century liberalism do not suggest any genuine f°rP°P^lar alternative to the imperial policy. The whole cul- ture and ability of the empire was cleverly gathered together on the side of the government ; and there is no sign whatever of a strong or sullen country opposition, such as silently thwarted the Whig administration in our own land during the early Hanoverian reigns. To us who have before our eyes the experience and the lessons of the post-reformation development in the field of politics, it seems a truism to assert that it is a profound error (i) to accumulate the wealth of a country in the coffers of a State (as Constantius Chlorus wisely (Dio C. contin.) : ajmeivov Trapa TOW iSiwrats Tr\v TOV /3acri\eco$ eviroplav civai rj /miKpw 7repiK€K\etcr0ai ")(a>pi<p) J or (2) to concentrate power without counterpoise and balance elsewhere. The best feature in the doubtful success of modern Representation, has been the serious character and responsibility of the recognised Opposition, of those critics of a ministry whose work and function they may at any moment be called upon to undertake. But in the fifth century such a method of securing the people against their petty tyrants was inconceivable ; and the sole remedy appeared to be to aggrandise the central prerogative, as alone equitable and im- partial. We praise the attempts of these sovereigns, from Marcian to Justin I., to control autocracy and supply the final will in the State with ample pre- cedent and guiding lines not to be overstepped without danger. It would have been idle to have then suggested to a statesman or a Senator to elevate a Supreme Tribunal (as in the United States) over the executive and legislative powers. There is little sign that the artificial system known as the Roman Empire possessed outside the church and clergy a body of independent opinion with fixed principles which would act in this manner. And it would have seemed a cowardly shifting of responsibility
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
No demand for popular control.
Public opinion and nationality unknown.
for a prince to advocate such a curtailment of his own authority as to render impersonal law wholly superior to the will of the sovereign and the needs and crises of the State ! So far as it was possible (as we have seen) the emperors of the sturdy Illyrian line desired to simplify and to regularise ; the codes of Theodosius II. and of Justinian were in a sense a kind of constitutional guarantee. Indeed, like Severus I., the prince frequently pro- fessed his obedience to law and his deference to custom and tradition ; but the attempt was never made to reduce government to a faultless and mechanical procedure irrespective of personal vigil- ance, or to relieve the elected ruler of the ultimate duty of deciding on the best course. The widow- woman was right ; if the emperor refused to hear her complaint she could retort with justice, Mrj /BaariXeve.
§ 10. The modern critic is not to blame in laying down such general maxims as these : " Patriotism and political honesty can only become national virtues when the people possess a control over the conduct of their rulers, and when the rulers them- selves publicly announce their political principles." But the emphasis of this sentence, quite unsuspected by its author, lies in the word " national." Now the East has never made nationality the basis of public institutions ; and there is no indication in our period of any genuine and homogeneous opinion, representing that sentiment for country and tradition, which we term patriotism. It would seem that the empire, like the Russian autocracy to-day, held to- gether and gave a precarious and artificial unity, to a curious assortment of interests and to a medley of creeds. It will always be debated on this side and on that, whether a beneficent hegemony is better than the restless strife and wrangle of small autonomous districts. Here we have hope, disorder, and develop- ment ; there assured comfort and a stationary, perhaps
CH. i THE ROMAN EMPIRE (400-550) 23
a petrified society. Modern Utopias, often without Public suspecting their sympathy with archaic ideals, again reinstate the latter conception ; and the States-General unknown. of Europe, or the more poetical " Federation of Mankind," really revert in theory to the Roman Empire, pagan or mediaeval, seamless, one and in- divisible. But this conception, which shall stop the blind strife of democracies and abolish the com- petition of trade, is strongly anti-national, as the imperial system was supra-national. The true tendency of democratic States is to be seen in the protectionist colonies or commonwealths of the Anglo-Saxons, with their permanent or spasmodic " Xenelasia," or in the curious hesitation which admits pauper aliens into England and yet finds an apology for the anti-Chinese or anti-Japanese campaign ; such, for instance, as lately issued in riot and bloodshed on the west coast of America ; in republic and monarchy alike. The spirit of nation- ality, indeed, is not liberalism, but its negation ; and we term the empire liberal because it kept before the eyes of warring sects and heresies, of dis- affected yet helpless provinces, the ideal of a larger Unity, and did its best to break down the barriers of race, district, and creed. We may say that the codes realised one condition of sound rule laid down above by our critical historian ; the general lines of policy and administration were made public ; and as regards the first, we cannot in fairness ask that greater confidence should be displayed than is shown by Emperor Justin II., who desires the chief men and clergy of a province to help in choosing their governor. The critic stands on more secure ground The middle- when he accuses not the rulers but the unseen c^Cantile & tendencies of the age, both physical and economic, interest. If the welfare and freedom of a country depend, as we may readily admit, upon its middle class, thrifty, industrious, and proprietary, it must be confessed that the Eastern realm was in a parlous state. "The
24 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
The middle- State/' says Hegel (Ph. d. R., 297), "if it has no
class and the middie class is still at a low stage of development. mercantile *
interest. In Russia, for instance, there is a multitude of serfs
and a host of rulers. It is of great concern to the State that a middle class should be formed." " The middle and upper classes of Society," says Finlay, " were so reduced in numbers that their influence was almost nugatory in the scale of civilisation." We approach here a problem alike of ancient and modern times, the blame of which cannot be set down to the errors or the absence of human inter- ference. Natural causes and voluntary surrender of rights changed mediaeval Europe from a federation of free towns, gathered into peace under a just hegemony, into a vast and desolate country-side, peopled by petty sovereigns and serfs. It was nobody's fault. Natural causes again press out to- day the small proprietor, the yeoman, and the petty salesman ; and once more seem to divide society into the two halves, the trust (or the government) and its dependents. The decay of the intermediate rungs in the social ladder cannot then be laid at the door of this oligarchic autocracy, which reduced the burdens of the middle class and sought to include even the " powerful " within the control of law. Indeed, we are tempted to suppose that, in spite of fiscal exaction, the Byzantine monarchy was throughout its history supported by the goodwill of a silent but influential mercantile class ; such as in the end directs most civilised policies, under all kinds of vague and indifferent formulae of government.
We have somehow to account for the vitality and recuperative powers shown by the Eastern empire. Pillaged by Persian and Saracen, drained by the monastic system, impoverished by erroneous if well- meant finance — it rose again and again into opulence, such as drew upon it the envious and greedy eyes of successive invaders. If Octavianus was largely indebted to the knightly class for his triumph, his
CH. i THE ROMAN EMPIRE (400-550) 25
heirs never forgot this sage alliance. The stability of the realm and its government depends on its satisfying the conditions of mercantile exchange ; it guarded property, it kept clear the lines of inter- course between the various centres of traffic, and it patrolled the seas ; nor do I conceive that the em- phatic words of Constantine VII. are wholly a piece of archaic pedantry or conceit, when he tells us that the Byzantine ruler is master of the sea to the Pillars of Hercules.
§ 11. Thus in this age the constitution tends through Oligarchy a wise oligarchy to the forms of absolutism. And ^.^/a of this implies, not caprice but routine ; not perpetual Absolutism. recurrence to a personal will, but a very infrequent appeal. A civilised State is in the fetters of tradition and usage; it defers needlessly to precedent. For in spite of the stirrings of advanced thinkers and noisy politicians, the inert and conservative mass of the people enter into a semblance of power only to stereotype the conventional. Under Justinian, the prince as representing the State, mature and sagacious, maintained control over all departments — the military leaders, the civil administrators, and the clergy. After the African disaster under Basiliscus (whose very failure or treason, as elsewhere in Byzantine annals, made him seem worthy of a throne !) nothing venturesome was attempted for more than fifty years ; efforts were directed solely to domestic reform down to the memorable " Nika " riots, which closed the door on the classic period and confirmed the monarch in his bold forward policy and his stern measures of repression. There was to be no repeti- tion of that dramatic scene of aged and apologetic royalty, when Anastasius sat discrowned waiting for the people's verdict. In spite of the odd incident of Vitalian's rebellion, order and system had been introduced into the State; in the subordinate ranks of government, discipline ; in the treasury, wealth ; in the highest and most responsible circle, wise
26 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
Careful train- measures and consistent schemes. The training and Bureaux8- ^e ^unc^ons °f ^e various grades had been state-service specialised. State-service was not an episode in the the sole ordinary life of a citizen ; but an engrossing pro-
fession which demanded expert skill. The very deftness of the adept needed for the intricate details was fatal to any claim for popular control. The emperor's Council represented a Universal, of which the several parts, isolated in their local interests, could form no conception. Nothing could well be con- ceived more antithetic to the demands of democracy than this government by the expert. Hegel derides this vain claim for personal intervention : " Another assumption (Ph. d. R.y 308) found in the prevalent idea that all should have a share in the business of State, is that all understand this business. This is as absurd as it is widespread — despite its absurdity." Once more (315): "There is widely current the notion that everybody knows already what is good for the State ; and that this general knowledge is merely given voice and expression in a State- assembly. But indeed the very reverse is the case." The Byzantine bureaux were as carefully organised as the legal profession to-day. The empire depended upon the employment of tried and trained ability ; and stood opposed to the Oriental despotism, where the influence of favourites, slaves, and aliens is superior to native forces. To this constant tradi- tion and discipline it owed the singular duration and recuperative power which it so strikingly displays. A modern parallel might indeed be found in the Roman priesthood. Taken at an early age from the middle and lower classes of society, they are imbued with a systematic educational tradition, a tested and final system of dogma and philosophy, and just that supranational spirit and sympathy which unites them as a corporation in an allegiance other than that which birth or country supplies. Neither system is easily adaptable to novel conditions of society. A
CH. i THE ROMAN EMPIRE (400-550) 27
bureaucracy is almost incapable of reforming itself ; Carefultrain- and the venal stagnation of an official class is perhaps ^f°r the a heavy price to pay for public order. When it is state-service
boasted that the singular merit lies in the supremacy the sole e . . M1 ., . f ,, , . career.
of system to capricious will, it is forgotten that in
human history the impulse to reform is nearly always supplied by a St. John Baptist, not by a privi- leged corporation. The world-spirit stirs first the individual conscience, the Gemeinde only through it. The record of imperial governments, from Rome to modern China or Russia, is often the story of unavailing personal effort, against respectful but stubborn officialism. The supremacy of law, which is to secure the subject against the arbitrary exer- cise of the central power, may sometimes become identified with the interest of a class. It is the tendency of long-dominant bodies to identify and to confuse in all good faith their own welfare with the general good. Nothing is gained by recognising the formal proposition, that law should be superior to the executive, or to the momentary wishes of the prince, unless we constantly analyse and examine suspiciously what we imply by law. This dignified term may not seldom connote a thoroughly obsolete code, or the stealthy manipulation of general maxims for private ends. The supremacy of law, devised as a remedy against disorder and oppression, may become on occasion the chief hindrance to much- needed reform. The Roman Government drew to itself and took under its patronage all that was anywhere excellent ; it admitted of no rival ; every- thing must enter into its magic circle and serve its end, or perish. When the pagan crusade against the Church failed, uncompromising hostility gave place at once to imperial favour and trust. The elements that could not be overcome must be absorbed or assimilated. There was no independent or semi- feudal nobility to criticise or to thwart. All titles of nobility were official. Outside the service of the
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF mv. A
Careful train- ing for the Bureaux : State-service the sole
career.
Venality of
excuse.
Commonwealth, there was no calling open to ambition or to merit ; it was part of the imperial system to see that this was the case. The cultivated ranks of society were bound to the system by every sentiment of sympathy and self-interest. It has been well said that the Byzantine bureaucracy formed rather a "distinct nation than a privileged class " ; and it is no wonder if the inheritors of great traditions and a culture then unique should have believed that the safety of the whole was bound up in their corporate prestige or individual comfort. So in later times, when the palace has engrossed or engulfed every minor rivulet, the careful main- tenance of State-ceremony will appear a " divine science " ; and like the preservation of exact ritual and formula in a primitive tribe, this " liturgy " will seem the mysterious and imperishable secret or pal- ladium of the public welfare.1
§ 12. " Formerly in France," says Hegel (Ph. ct. R., 277), "seats in Parliament were saleable, and this is still the case with army officers' positions in the English army below a certain grade. These facts depended or depend upon the mediceval Constitution of certain States, and are now gradually disappear- ing." I am not here concerned with the accuracy or the scope of this remark ; I am using his phrase as a suitable opening to a short inquiry into the venality of office. It is clear that such a system has not excited in the past, even in civilised societies, the odium and contumely directed against its still sur- viving vestiges to-day. The most curious and frank provisions are to be found in the code for the pay- ment to the Emperor Justinian or to his consort a fee on entering office.2
Now the horror excited even by the suspicion of paying rather than receiving money for official
1 Lyd.t ii. 13; C. Theod., vi. 5; C. Just., xii. 8: ut dignitatum ordo servetur.
* Cod. Just., i. 27, i, 2; Cod. Just., xii. 24, 7.
CH. i THE ROMAN EMPIRE (400-550) 29
rank is amusingly strong with us to-day ; but it must Venality of not lead us wilfully to distort the past or to hold up ° pious hands of protesting innocence. The sum de- manded might be regarded as a preliminary deposit, a guarantee of good faith and competence, a fee on registration or institution, such as with our sensitive yet easily cajoled conscience conceals much the same practice to-day. A company rightly demands that a director shall have a certain stake in the enterprise he controls ; and one reads without alarm the judi- cious warning that the holding of a prescribed number of shares qualifies for a seat at the directoral board. Yet put in another form, all sorts of respectable scruples would be aroused, if it were to be publicly announced that these places could be purchased. As regards political rather than mercantile dignities, it is only the voluntary blindness of the puritan ostrich that can fail to detect a close parallel in modern times, and in a State justly renowned for high morality and sense of honour in its public life. Yet we indulgently tolerate the purchase of official rank and that very real political and social influence which a peerage conveys. It should indeed be noticed, in further extenuation of the ancient practice, that there is no pretence to-day that the State has benefited by the lavish contribution to the party-chest ; it is cynic- ally acknowledged that the money has been sub- scribed to add the sinews of war to a faction, which for the time may stand for the nation, but at no given moment is strictly representative of anything but itself. And it must be candidly stated that, however harmlessly such a recognised venality of title may operate in practice, it is a serious menace to the genuinely representative character of the sovereign, who is thus compelled by custom to confer honours not for national but for factious and factitious ser- vices, and to recruit the " senatorial " order only from the ranks of prejudice and party. It may be hoped that in the not unlikely enlargement of the
30 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
Legal fiction direct and personal sphere of monarchy, some safe- of Simony, guard will be devised for the precious independence of the sovereign ; since it stands above party, and is not merely the spokesman, but also the best judge of general good. The same lamentable puritanic confusion of thought has opened one form of practice in ecclesiastical matters to universal obloquy, while retaining another unnoticed. It is in vain that the purist or the logician proves that the sin of simony can strictly be committed only by a prospective member of the episcopal bench, who has to deposit certain moneys before the State will authorise consecration. It is clear that in this case such payment is the in- dispensable condition, or at least preliminary, before receiving a spiritual gift. No such stigma can pos- sibly attach to the purchaser of an advowson-right with the intention of presenting himself to the bishop on a vacancy. A benefice is not a spiritual gift, and no spiritual gift is purchased. No limit whatever is put upon the judgment and discretion of the diocesan. Only a right is conveyed to exercise a function (pre- sumed to be already valid), subject to a prelate's sanction and institution, in a particular district. The term simony (a legal fiction which has imposed on many candid minds) has no application in such a case. As in other instances, an office is venal, and no doubt in a sphere where such a premium on wealth ought not to exist ; but the opponents of clerical patronage, one safeguard at least against over-centralisation, should be careful to discover the really weak parts in the harness, and refrain from setting up imaginary crimes to tilt against.
Modern con- The modern conception of office is in its very ceptton: nature antagonistic to this practice. The tendency profit.' of political reform is on the surface towards a some-
what watery democracy, but beneath the current sets strongly towards State-monopoly. There is a certain prejudice or suspicion abroad against unpaid officials who render gratuitous service, because such duties
CH. i THE ROMAN EMPIRE (400-550) 31
seem the natural outcome and fitting responsibility Modern con- of their social position. Of such independent rivals c( the State is jealous, as of a relic of bygone feudalism ; but it is apt to forget that this conception of unpaid service as a citizen's duty is also an integral notion in the purest forms of republic. The regimen of Justinian suffered from exactly the same faults as any modern centralised constitution. The sole paymaster was the State ; and in a public career opened the unique vista to the aspirant. Hegel is at one with the Byzantine rulers and with modern centralism when he says (Ph. d. R.y 294): "The State cannot rely upon service which is capricious and voluntary ; such, for instance, as the administration of justice by knights-errant." But something of the spontaneous, it must be avowed, is lost in systematising, in sur- rendering all public business to paid officials. To find one's sole means of livelihood or hope of advance in the State-service, transforms the whole idea of civic duty from sentiment into self-interest. Progress in " popular " government and liberal measures is marked to-day by an increase of functionaries and of expenditure. The first " citizen "-monarchy enjoyed by the French, replaced in the time of Louis Philippe, a genuine if slumbering sense of honour by a desire to procure a place under government ; which to the present moment combines with Napoleon's absolut- ism in checking indefinitely the emergence of a vigorous and patriotic governing class. The early emissaries of Caesar were few and conspicuous ; their misdeeds and their penalties resounded through the empire. But when agents of the sovereign power were multiplied, directly responsible only to the equally corrupt vicar just above them in the hierarchy, control of this infinite multitude ceased. Custom gave them security of tenure ; for the civil servant was a partial judge of faults and temptations to which he himself was no stranger.
And in concluding the general survey we cannot
supervision.
32 HISTORY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE DJV. A
Failure of forget that the increase of prerogative and the employ- monarchical ment of centralised or absolute forms did not ensure the imperial control over the lesser agents, who wrought mischief with his name and reputation by making out of them screens for wrongdoing. The more remote provinces might drift into practical autonomy, as Naples, Venice, Amalfi ; but the more usual fate was to fall into the hands of some nominal agent of Caesar, who had all the airs and vices of an independent feudal vassal. In such a condition, then, we leave, for the present, the general question of the administration under the " Illyrian " or adop- tive emperors, from 450-550. The result of the good intentions but inherent weakness of the system will be seen in the second period, when we con- sider the merits, the fortune, and the failure of the successors of Justinian.
CHAPTER II
THE FAILURE OF THE AUTOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION
(535-565)
§ 1. IT must now be confessed that the ideal of The witness
government portrayed in our last chapter, and especi- °/con-
11 • j.t- • xi_ j.- r f j.- temporaries.
ally m the ninth section, was a dream of perfection
which never visited the earth. In this supplement it will be necessary to examine the testimony of those who lived at the very time that the central government was enunciating its loftiest aims and most earnest platitudes ; and, without discouraging the general reader by excessive detail, to survey more closely than is consistent with the plan of the present task, contemporary witness, — in this age unusually abundant and strangely at variance. Three works are of especial interest — (i) the Novels of Justinian ; (2) the Secret History of Procopius ; (3) the Treatise on Magistrates by John Lauren- tius the Lydian. I will begin with this last ; its wider political interest and historical knowledge entitle it to the first place. Procopius is a veno- mous purveyor of scandal and superstition ; Justinian, a solemn preacher of morality and the duties of a sovereign ; but Lydus, though a disappointed civil servant with a genuine grievance, has (in spite of much inaccuracy and questionable matter) both impartiality and sympathy with the difficulties of a ruler. Chiefly, however, his historical acumen gives him a right to the first hearing ; for as a student of political causes he deserves, from the wide range of his learning and the boldness of his speculation, more credit than can be given to the senile ravings of Procopius' secret desk. He has a theory of the
VOL. II. 83 C
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
The witness of con- temporaries.
(A) The Notary with a grievance.
The Pre- fecture
successively under (a) Oonstantine,
decay, indeed ruin and shipwreck, of the State ; and I must carefully disentangle, from the mass of irre- levant antiquarian lore, his penetrating analysis of the reasons for this decline.
It must be remembered that the Philadelphian notary is a learned specialist, biassed in spite of him- self by his narrow training and official routine. He identifies the ruin of an advocate's professional pros- pects with the overthrow of the State. He has served forty years (510—550) and lost his pension; therefore the very foundations of the earth are out of course. He is a representative of that cultured Neo-Platonic Hellenism, which was out of place in the age of Justinian ; the world could not be ruled by men of uncertain faith and pedantic archaism. He recognises, while deploring, that the prefect of the East could be no more a man of polite letters and cultured ease ; he must become an unscrupulous tax-gatherer. Nor could his chief function lie in dispensing justice ; in the growing poverty of the realm there were no cases or suits, and no litigants pressed with generous fees to secure the services of notary and advocate.1 Every allowance must be made for the peculiar attitude of Lydus. He was a survivor from a bygone age, and his political ideal was an anachronism. Those whom the Great Plague spared had need of a very different kind of government ; and the future lay with the Church which Lydus could not understand, and with the military officers who had once bent low in homage before the Prefect.
§ 2. He traces back the abasement of the pre- fecture (and with it of the empire) to the innova- tions of Constantine.2 He has but an imperfect
1 iii. 9 : irpa.yfj.aTuv /*TJ 6vr<av rots fonj/coois (? trouble or material for litigation), more fully explained in 14 : raura irdvra. 7ra/>a7r6XwXe . . . ry re /i-Jj elvai irpdyfj-ara rots 1^77*6015 irevla Kara00etpcyt6'<us, /crX.
* As to the chief changes in the conception of magistracy, Lydus is well aware that in Republican times office was autocratic, but jealously restricted in time (Tac. Ann. i. I, adtempus sumebantur}. He quotes from
CH.II THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 35
acquaintance with the great constitutional changes The Pre-
of the fourth century; but he knows that the office fecture
underwent a certain modification, was confined to successively
the Eastern frontier, abandoned the supervision of under (a)
the army, and became exclusively engrossed in legal Constantine>
and financial functions. He repeats with solemn
emphasis the curious passage (ii. 10-12 ; iii. 40-42)
which describes this change ; and it is perhaps a
unique instance in our age of political theory. The
next moment in the transformation of office and
empire falls under Theodosius and Arcadius : when
the sovereign ceases to go out to war, when the now
civilian office of the prefecture becomes tyranny
under Ruffinus by the side of legitimate authority.
Had he lived in the tenth century, he might have
said the same about the Regents or associate-
emperors. He tells us that the old theory was that
the emperor was both man of letters and man of
war ; * but when he ceased to discharge any effective
duties in person, power fell into the hands of the
new vizierate. After the overthrow of Ruffinus, its (P)Arcadius,
Aurelius (Dig. i. xi.) : rots dpxaiois . . . i) Tracra irpbs Kcupbv et-ovvia . . . tiriffrevero i. 14 ; and says himself, on the consulate of a year only, Tra.vTo.xov 'Pw/xcuwj/ rats tvaXXayais ;£cup6»'TWj>, i. 37- Efficiency demands first the indefinite extension of exceptional commissions (as with Pompey) ; next, the duration of office is lengthened to the term of life ; lastly (with more doubtful results), to the term of a dynasty. All minor offices were merged into the Principate, which thus united and indefinitely prolonged ; after his fatal war against Senate and Pompey (6\ttipioi> ?r6Xe/iov, i. 38) Caesar became debs, dpxiepefc, tina-TOs, fjt.6va.pxos, ttrtTpoiros T&V aTravraxov fiaaCKfav, iTnrapxos, <rr partjy bs, <pti\aj- 7r6Xews, irpwros dyftdpxw. The tendency then (as Lydus recognised), was no longer to pass office round among the citizens, but to make government an expert profession, de- manding not merely special training but special descent; he has a curious passage on the early hereditary character of Caesarism (rb ird\ai ^ T<£ TVXOVTI dXXoi fj.6vots rots fK rrjs Kalffapoy o~eipas KartoCffiv lyx€lplfcltf r& Kpdros, ii. 3).
1 iii. 53. Trajan's officers ot ro?5 re X670is rots re 2/37015 ets roaairrt]v etfK\etai> rty TroXirelav dvfoTi}<rav. But after the troubles of Justin's reign, especially the Persian war, TO \onrbv \oyu<ois -rrdpodos oik fy tirl T^V So iii. 33. Constantine 7roXt)s &v ev rrj iratdetio'ei \byuv K.
, j3a<rtXei)s . . .
36 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF mv. A
The Pre- authority was reduced * and matters went on with-
degraded ou* cnange until the ill-starred African expedition
successively in Leo's reign. To this disaster Lydus attaches
l(p^Arcadius *ke gravest importance ; and he believed that the
' Commonwealth never recovered from the blow.2
He entertained the most sinister opinion of Leo and
his Isaurian son-in-law ; and saw in the unfortunate
holders of the once proud title of Prefect, mere
fiscal agents who sought in vain to collect funds from
(y) Anas- a ruined people. For Anastasius, under whom he tasius, f 1- • \ i t , .,
began his public service (510 or 511), he had the
liveliest affection and esteem ; 3 but he traced to the influence of Marinus the most disastrous step in further deterioration. This low-born " deskman," 4 Scriniarius, was raised to the prefecture in the pre- vailing indigence ; and it is certain that Anastasius left a substantial treasure as reserve-fund for future
Mi. IO : P. rvpavvtda fj.e\€T7i<ravTa . . . eis fidpaQpov rr) Ka.Tap'p'i\l/ai. AvriKa fj-kv ydp 6 j3curtXet)s r^s CK rdov &ir\wv laxtios d0at/3etrat . . . <paf3ptK&v (oTrXoTroucDv) (ppovriSos . . . 5rj/j.o(rlov 5p6fJ.ov (a charge soon restored to the Prefect, but under careful supervision). So in. 7. P. ... TTJV i!nra.pxov dpxty Kpr)fj.vt<ravTos. So iii. 23, where the changes of the terrified Arcadius after R.'s tyranny are set forth.
2 See iii. 43, 44: vavdyiov TTJS 0X77$ TroXirefas. "For neither the public treasury nor the prince's privy purse sufficing, all the equipment of war perished at once in that luckless enterprise ; and after this disaster the exchequer was no longer able to play its part but long forestalls all its receipts (oik^rt rb Tafueiov twfipKeffev eavry &XX& Tr/jojSaTra^ . . . irpb Kaipov T& /i^Trw tv £\ir[5i. . . . ws airtpavTov elvai ri\v airoplav rov Srj/noaiov). For the sins of Leo and Zeno (of whom Justinian speaks, rrjs ef!<re(3ovs X^ews), see 45.
3 [Anastasius] iii. 47 : "For this one merit that he alone after Con- stantine lightened the burden of taxation (rty TWV $vx&v &cot/0i(re da<rfjio\oytaj>), though death prevented the full relief, may God forgive all the sins he ever committed ; for he was but a man." In 51 he has, like Psellus five hundred years later, a very proper judgment of the dangers of a pacific and civilian regime, which prevailed in the early years of the sixth century under Anastasius : etp-^vrj 5£ paBeTa rty ircurav £xalbvov iro\iTelav K. ou% TJKKTTa rbv ffTpa.Tit!)n)v, irdiwcw 6fj.ov TTJV TTJS a^X^j pqffT&v'irjv £rj\otivT(j)v K. Stw/c6rra>y ra jSacriX^ws eiriTrjSeijfJiaTa.. This sentence might well form the text of the whole later period after Basil II.
4 iii. 36. There was no doubt about the plenary authority of Marinus, TT]v S\tjv dvafa<rd(Ji.evos T£V Trpay/jidTuv diolKir]<rii>. The taxes disappeared and the retinue vanished did rrjv T&V Qdpuv ^Xdrrdxriv els iraireXr) dTrtiXetav rd rfjs rd^ews Kar^crr^. For his enormities, see iii. 49, 50, 51.
CH.II THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 37
needs. But the office no longer employed cultured The Pre- notaries and dignified advocates ; it was contented "^f^J^ with menial satellites of extortion and inquisition.1 successively
With the advent of the reigning house from Dar- u™der (v)
,. . Anastasius,
dania (518) the tempest burst upon the empire.
The Persian war, started by the faithless Chosroes, (5) the called for exceptional expenditure ; the European Dardanians. provinces were wasted by Getse and Antes ; the emperor embarked in colossal and untimely enter- prises of recovery ; and to crown the confusion, John of Cappadocia succeeded to the remnants of the degraded office. He gives us those full and racy details of his scandalous life, transferred to the pages of modern historians, who neglect the more edifying parts of Lydus. The fragments contain a description of his successor Phocas, and the attempt of this Prefect to introduce some order into the hopeless chaos of imperial finance. Finally, we have the account of the Cappadocian's misdeeds, tempered by a solemn statement that Justinian knew nothing of them. At the moment when Theodora is about to depose the too powerful minister, the narrative is interrupted by a lacuna. It is to the first misrule of the Cappadocian that he traces the revolt of Nika, costing (as he asserts with some exaggeration) 50,000 lives. It is thus clear that Lydus confuses the order of time in order to heap all responsibility for disaster on a single culprit's head. The wars of aggrandisement and the Persian campaigns were subsequent to the Nika insurrec- tion ; and John enjoyed his longest tenure of the office some time later.
§ 3. Such is the criticism passed on two and a Lydus as half centuries of Roman methods of government
1 iii. 39. Freedom is the distinguishing feature of the Roman P° ICV' Commonwealth, and this is now entirely out of favour. The modern official was ignorant of tradition and precedent, and of the limit and purpose of all civil authority. Some day they will learn to respect liberty, and cease to injure the subjects (bfiplfav ptv rty e\evdeplav K. TOI)S virytcoovs ol rbv 8pov TTJS
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV.A
Lydus as critic of the imperial policy.
The ultimate ruin of the office under . John.
(300-550). Lydus believes (no doubt rightly) that the want of money was the root of all evil ; that, while municipal franchises were abolished, armies starved, and costly expeditions lost through careless neglect or inadequate equipment, the second office in the empire was degraded into a mere robber of the well-to-do. For this, no imperial demon in human form was responsible, as in the foolish rodomontade of Procopius. It is plain that Lydus believes the emperor to exert very little power, to know very little of the true condition of the land, and to have abandoned, with his warlike skill and eloquence, all real control.1 When Ruffinus and John set up the state, not of a powerful minister but of a rival emperor, the sole remedy was no doubt to break up the single office and make of the debris a host of squalid and petty magistracies. Side by side .with the significant statement of Agathias that Justinian was the first genuine autocrat in fact as well as theory, it is interesting to note the limits on absolutism which Lydus recognises. He is under no illusions as to the emperor's power. Since Leo's disaster, the State is bankrupt ; and these " transient and embarrassed phantoms," the Prefect-Chancellors of the Exchequer, struggle vainly against ruin. The emperor can do nothing but throw himself into the
1 He blames neglect of former princes (seemingly he includes all the successors of Theodosius), ii. 15, 16 : TOI>S tyirpoffdev /Se/Sao-tXetf/coras fao-rAvi] ditXvo-e (cp. ii, where Theodosius, foreseeing his sons' foffrdvij, legislates (!) against emperor's personal conduct of war, ripy rrjv dvdplav eXaXb'wo-e). So the emperor was supreme judge in the Court of Final Appeal ; but this good use lapsed into desuetude owing to growth of idle- ness, just as Synesius complained before Arcadius (16, o-yvydeias eh Tpv<f>T)v diaXvOefovjs K. TWV ^Trpoffdev &fj.a rots oTrXois K. afrrriv TTJV (J.expl \6yuv (frpovrlSa TWV KOLVUV diroirTv<rdvTUv). In spite of several errors, Lydus is clear ( I ) that the prefect became a sovereign and irresponsible vizier, and the emperor a puppet, both in war and judicial duties : (2) when the pre- fecture was reduced and broken up, the emperor strove in vain to recover his authority. The golden days of the empire lasted so long as sovereigns led in battle and provincial governors were vigilant for justice, not rapine ; iii. IO : T&V ptv tfiirpoadtv J3a<ri\{<>w eirl robs TroX^iovs oputivTuv K. TWV rds l6vv6vTi»)v TOIS v6/xois dXX' ov rats fcXoircus Trposaypvirvoiji>Tui>.
CH.II THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 39
arms of any unscrupulous scoundrel who promises The ultimate
to supply funds for the imperial needs. It was of no avail to elevate a high ideal of State-duty and j0hn. personal service, while resort was had to torture and oppression, while taxes were collected at the cost of noble lives. This picture of the necessitous monarchy will explain much that is absurd or un- intelligible in Procopius ; and, while both civil servants (of a bygone age) have each their griev- ance, Lydus' moderation of tone and temperate criticism gains him credence and puts him on a far higher level among historians.
Such is the main thesis of Lydus for our purpose. Antiquarian though he be, a personal motive led him to trace the Roman offices in the periods of king- ship, republic, and empire. And interesting as is the survey of their archaic origin and use (with all his amusing errors of time or fact), the vigorous part of his story deals with his own time and his own injuries. As a philosophical statesman or theorist of government, he has passages of great judgment and shrewdness, and demands more attention than he has yet received from the student of constitu- tional history.
§ 4. With Procopius the case is altogether different. (B) Proco- I fully accept the results of Professor Bury's learned c
researches, and acknowledge with regret that this vindictive and foolish fairy-story is the posthumous work of a consummate hypocrite. . . . Procopius would seem to have borrowed from current Chris- tianity nothing but its superstition, and to have completely abandoned the temperate judgment which makes us value his story of Belisarius' campaign. Yet the work is by no means lacking in material for a kinder opinion. We can easily recognise the lineaments of the same Justinian that Lydus reveals.1
1 M. Diehl has drawn attention to the amiable weakness of character betrayed in Justinian's later portraits ; and it is clear that a careful physiognomist would detect its presages even in features of the earlier
40 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV.A
(B) Proco- Here we find behind the mask of an ogre or bogey, PRist I8e>cret an untiring and painstaking ruler of limited capacity, evidence surrounded by men he could not trust, and finding
ruined by hjs unique expedient in an autocracy which he could hyperbole and . , . T T , . .1
inconsistency. n°t maintain. Hampered at every turn by the want
of money, he became the victim and the dupe of any minister who promised to replenish his coffers. He was unable and unwilling to inquire too closely into the methods of the fisc. In place of trained servants, the prefect was surrounded by alien bailiffs and executioners. Even Lydus' accounts of tyranny, exaction, and torture, both in the capital and in his own birthplace, Philadelphia, may well be ex- aggerated. But Procopius defeats his own end, and while defending a notorious criminal, tries to blame the emperor for ingratitude in his treatment of John of Cappadocia. It is hopeless to expect consistency in this venomous attack. Justinian is alternately made out to be the incarnation of devilish cunning and an amiable and easy-going dupe. His uncle was like a mule, following any one who grasped the halter, shaking his ears with a grotesque solemnity. But the nephew is a sheep, at the mercy of the last speaker, ignorant, weakly affable, and incorrigibly untruthful. Yet he is also Domitian * reincarnate for the ruin of the empire, or Satan himself come to earth to wreak his vengeance on the whole human race and slay as many as possible, knowing that his time is short. He is the single author of all the
coins and conquests. Succeeding too hurriedly to enterprises which seemed past belief, he spent thirty years in a vain attempt to recover his position in the zenith from which Nemesis deposed him in the very moment of triumph. In spite of his weakness and (as we cannot doubt) his own sense of his shortcomings, of the limits to absolute benevolence, he never relinquished the struggle ; he is one of the bravest and most persevering sovereigns in history, and bears no slight resemblance to another victim of ambition and overwork, Philip II. of Spain.
1 Proc. insists on the remarkable physical resemblance of the two monarchs. Even Lydus, ii. 19, seems to compare the two, though with- out expressly stating it, Kevodoj-os ykp &v 6 Ao/*ertav6s rots tdiov 8£ rvpdvvov dvarptireiv rob TrdXcu
CH.II THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 41
calamities which befell the State ; and the enlarge- (B) Proco- ment of the realm on which Lydus dwells with pride and admiration, is a chief point in the indictment of evidence Procopius. The reader must sternly disregard the ruined by scandalous account of Theodora's youth (so dear to the odious taste of Gibbon and his age) and the legends of the imperial goblin, his aims and policy and habits. Yet notwithstanding, we can extract evidence from the lucid intervals in this fantastic nightmare, which bears out the witness of other authors and is even consistent with his own published works. Yet the reckless rancour of the Anecdota will always prejudice the rare student of a problematic age. It is hard on a first acquaintance to credit Procopius with any better aim than wil- fully to caricature the characters of men and the events of a period, to which he had consecrated so much serious pains and literary labour.
§ 5. Wherever he speaks of the personal initiative P. as witness
of Justinian and Theodora, or of the myriads o{ to (\.) domes- J . J tic disorders,
mortals sacrificed in war, or plague, or levy, to
satisfy their greed of carnage, we must discount his
accuracy. But he is not at fault on certain features
of the time which the unhappy emperor would
have been the first to admit. They may be arranged
in the following order. The State as a whole was full
of (a) civic riot and license, and of (/3) religious mutiny (a) civic riot,
and disaffection. Anastasius had been the victim
of a tumult in which the imperial dignity was
gravely compromised. The circus factions in every
great city fought and destroyed one another, like a
modern mob at a football match, or a crowd at a
race-course when suspicious of unfair play. The
ordinary police i were unable to cope with this
wild disorder, in which, besides the conventional
1 Lydus, ii. 15, deplores the popular tumults which made peace more dangerous than war (6 5^/ios tfeijXdrois dixovolcus dvairrdfjievos . . . &v ^e/ca fiapVTepav rt> drjfj.6criov 8a.ir6.vrjv {xplcrTaTcu irpbs <f>v\aK7jv rr)S elp-^vrjs $ wpbs dvaxo.tTtcrfji.bv TUV iroXefduv) , and the maintenance of domestic order more costly than the repression of foreign foes.
42 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV.A
P. as favouritism of the Colours, there mingled an element
^(^civi^riot °* theological enmity and misplaced metaphysical acumen. These frequent scenes of riot which baffled the vigilance of the urban prefects grew in intensity throughout the empire, until the fires of aimless sedition were quenched in the suppression of the Nika; and the last degraded remnant of ancient classical freedom was abolished.
The vacillating conduct of the emperor to the partisans, the nervous division of imperial favour between the two chief factions, bears strong witness to a real danger and menace to public order. But it also completely disposes of the usual allegations as to the miserable state of the populace throughout the empire. In the famous dialogue between the factions and the imperial Mandator, there is some question of official oppression by a certain Calo- podius, none of general public grievance or in- tolerable tax. This licentious leisure and insolent repletion of the urban mob proves nothing, I am well aware, as to the state of the country districts or the happiness of the peasant. But it is at least certain that in the first quarter of the sixth century the town-proletariat, indulged and feared, relieved from care by a pauperising Church and a Socialist government, found ample leisure for a tumultuous amusement which shook the throne and dissolved society.
(b) religious The empire was (/3) full of religious disaffection : schism, Justinian is represented as the persecutor of as-
trologers, Montanists, Manicheans, Hebrews, and Samaritans (Anecd., §§ n, 28); and we know that this last body created a serious rising in Palestine, elected a rival emperor Julian, and sold their lives dearly. It is then unfair to hold the emperor ac- countable for a universal feature of the time, namely, a widespread discontent with Hellenic orthodoxy, which is largely to blame for the ease of the Arabian conquests just a century later.
CH.II THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 43
§ 6. Another characteristic of the age was an P. as inarticulate fiscal grievance under a mistaken system ^l^ss to of economy, to which no alternative was ever sug- oppression, gested. One serious charge in the Anecdota is that Justinian never remitted arrears of taxation ; it being the custom, both before and after that prince, to require taxes on an impossible scale and condone those arrears which necessarily arose, as an act of imperial grace and at regular intervals. The Byzan- tine Government might well have listened to the advice given by a well-known teacher to an ambitious but disappointing youth ; "Take a lower ideal and live up to it." Nor can the emperor be blamed for desiring that the laws should be set in operation (Tiberius' leges exercendas esse), and the taxes duly collected unless expressly repealed. It is impossible to defend a fiscal system, which ruined the poorer owners and made notable victims among the great. But it is a little remarkable that no alternative scale of taxation was proposed ; and modern critics (as I have said before) can scarcely complain if the wealthy were rated that the indigent might be re- lieved. There is no doubt that in this period the (d) impover- realm was rapidly impoverished, both in men, in capital, and in natural resources. The emperor, helplessly confronting an impracticable task, watched with alarm the growing wastes, attempted to collect the rates on derelict property from the unhappy neighbours of the fraudulent fugitive, and was obliged to shut his eyes to the odious means by which the prefect filled the exchequer. While officials waxed wealthy and the country poor, the sole method left to the monarch was the Oriental device : a vizier was permitted to enrich himself at the expense of the subjects that the State might confiscate and become his sole legatee. Of this there is no lack of proof at this time.
Justinian is by turns accused as spendthrift and (e) penury avaricious, wasteful and hoarding (§§ 5, 8, 19). It
44 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV.A
P. as is easy to explain this inconsistency by a simple fact,
JJJJJJJ^ that he was at his wits' end to secure money for the strait of the conduct of government, the prosecution of his aims.1 exchequer. Once embarked on his gigantic schemes of recovery, which he regarded as a sacred duty, there was for him' no turning back. He was forced by circum- stances to forget in practice his high ideals of pure justice and official innocence. He sold office as Pulcheria had done a century before, while forbid- ding all such civil simony (§§ 20, 21). He modified the rigid outline of impersonal law to suit the needs (and the purse) of eager applicants for privilege ; and Leo the Cilician became a trusted minister because he taught Justinian this easy mode of replenishing the treasury (§§ 13, 14). This same indigence and thrift crept into every department of State ; he allowed Alexander in Italy and Hephaestus in Alex- andria to cut off the corn-supplies and estrange the poor (§ 26). Although these distributions of political bread were discontinued without protest under Heraclius in a still severer crisis, it is clear that only the direst need would compel an emperor to run counter to the demands of a dangerous urban mob.
(ii.) External § ?• We have spoken of the civic factions, and of
rfjur- religious and fiscal troubles, for which the times and
enterpriseand not tne administration must be blamed. We come
extravagance, now to Justinian's warlike aggression, and to his
system of national defence; both forming serious
counts in Procopius' virulent indictment. We have
already dealt with the former ; the recovery of the
ancient limits of the empire seemed not a wanton
aggrandisement, but a plain duty and an obvious
task. We have already shown that there is a re-
verse side to all imperialism ; for the people in an
age of conquest rarely benefit by their glorious
history. The arguments and the common sense of
1 Lydus, iii. 54, £Set 5£ x/s^drwv K. ovStv fy &vev atruv . . . Xpvfflov oto direipov expfy firoppplffai rty
CH.II THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 45
the Little Englander would be unimpeachable, were (ii.) External it not for a justifiable fear that without Greater P°licy • , Britain there would be no more Little England. enterprlsTand The party of Quaker protest against ambition and extravagance, militarism has a constant value ; and the general question of the necessity or merit of Justinian's victories will always be debated. But the plaintiff destroys his credit, and alienates an impartial jury, prevalent by his extravagant hyperbole. He regards Justinian ™isery and as the unique cause of all the disasters which befell the world ; he notes his thirst for blood, and esti- mates at a modest total of a myriad myriad myriads the number of deaths during his reign. Italy and Africa are reduced to a desolate wilderness ; and he computes among his victims the Teutonic strangers and persecutors whom he expelled. But as planning the deliberate ruin of the entire globe, he is also held responsible for all deaths by natural catastrophe, by deluge and flood, earthquake and pestilence. There can be no doubt as to the well-deserved and unhappy renown of this sixth century. Popes like Gregory the Great, emperors like Tiberius and Maurice, seem conscious that in such universal disaster the " end of all things drew near." The age was dis- solving, and all was prepared for the reign of Anti- the reign of Christ. Yet it is strange to find the most serious Antichrist- preacher of this superstitious dread among the dwin- dling ranks of cultured Hellenism. For Procopius the reign of Antichrist had already begun ; the devil himself sat enthroned in the palace, as a holy monk averred and as events abundantly proved. It is tempting to believe that these absurd accretions to a charge-list, in itself formidable enough, were the work of a Nonconformist interpolator, who hated Justinian more for his heterodoxy than for the public ruin he brought on mankind. But we may take apart the losses of war, the damage of recovery, and the con- stant repetitions of far-off conquest which were entailed by the fiscal system, the disorders of the
46
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV.A
(ii.) External policy : the reign of Antichrist.
(b) Defensive system :
(1) Invaders bribed.
(2) Chain of
fortresses
built.
army of occupation, the constant lack of money and men. For these Justinian must in a measure be held to account, yet is it possible for his ancient or modern critics to suggest an alternative policy ?
As to the system of national defence, Justinian soon found this a graver task than chivalrous crusades against Arian usurpers in Africa or Italy. Here we may note three distinct and deliberate designs, all of which succumb to the sweeping censure of the Anecdotist : (i) Payment to the barbarians (§§ n, 19, 30) instead of repressing their inroads. Justinian (it was said), himself a barbarian (§ 14), loved these wild tribes better than his own subjects (§§ 21, 23); he punished these without mercy for daring to defend themselves against his darling and privileged marau- ders ; and (perhaps as a counterpoise to the citizens who detested him) he filled Byzantium with an in- credible number of aliens. — Now it is quite clear that there were two good reasons for the attitude of Justinian so absurdly exaggerated in the previous sentence. (a) Confident in the majesty and the mission of Rome, he believed it possible to reduce all barbarians into humble vassals of the empire. Evi- dence of this will be seen in the division which treats of the Eastern nations : it seemed a consistent aim of these two reigns (518—565) to infeudate, as it were, those kings, whose people could never become im- mediate subjects, and bind them by titular dignity and costly gifts to a certain loyalty. But a far more serious reason existed : (/3) he had no forces at his dis- posalio repel these migrants and unwelcome visitors. No doubt he overestimated his resources at the opening of his reign ; and it is clear that the capital and the neighbouring district were inadequately pro- tected ; that the double line of fortress-defence along the Danube was powerless to keep out intruders.
For (2) the fortifications on the frontier were a special feature of Justinian's policy. He preferred to guard rather than waste human life ; and the very system
CH.II THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 47
which earned a warm and apparently sincere approval (ii.) External in Procopius' official work on Edifices is held up to de- ^fo^am of rision in the Anecdota as a purposeless waste of money, fortresses
(3) He starved the soldiers (§ 24) and the military ^^ chest. Here again we can find a mixture of definite (3) Deficient intention and sheer necessity. He could neither s^PP°rt °f maintain nor control the armies which were de- manded by his active campaign and national defence. The unrestrained supremacy of the army meant the triumph of the barbarians; and statesmen had not for- gotten Gainas and Tribigild under Arcadius : perhaps some turned over the cryptic pages of Synesius' political allegory. The Prefect controlled the com- missariat, dissuaded from ambitious expeditions, and distrusted the several foreign contingents which obeyed a native captain and cared little for the policy or the subjects of the empire. The effective forces of a vast territory shrank to a figure incredibly small ; and after the great reaction which nullified the rapid successes of early years, hasty levies and private enterprise became the sole resource. The straitness of the exchequer and the jealousy of the civilians amply accounted for the imperfect system or the often trumpery make-shifts of national defence. Here, again, the prince, with the best intentions in the world, was the helpless creature of circumstance.
There is besides one further count in our f ormid- (iii.) Internal
able indictment, trie centralising tendency which sup- Pph^:
. ' f . r, Jealous cen-
pressed the privileges of the Senate, persecuted and tralisation
confiscated the persons and estates of senators, and and curtail- abolished municipal franchise and the faint remnants of local spirit. We know that under Justinian the cleavage between citizen-contributors (uTroreAeF?) and the official world became intensified; and every authority that did not depend directly from the centre was suspected and curtailed. Thus the Greek garrisons were disbanded ; the populace was disarmed ; and (though this point is exceedingly obscure) some further blow was struck at the freedom of borough
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV.A
(iii.) Internal policy : Jealous cen- tralisation and curtail- ment of franchise.
Modern critics at fault.
J.'sacts: their excuse and motive.
towns already weakened by the bureaucratic methods of Marinus the prefect of Anastasius. It is exceed- ingly difficult to criticise when evidence is both slight and conflicting. Can we blame the monarch of a State, whose whole aim is conservation and order, if he confines the use of weapons to a responsible class of police-sergeants and soldiers ? Is it not con- ceivable that at no very distant date the most rudi- mentary needs of government will oblige the freest and the most absolute States in the world, England and Russia, to disarm the great proportion of their subjects under the severest penalties ? Did the be- haviour of the circus-factions justify the prince or his advisers in leaving further temptations in the hand of turbulent partisans ? It is quite possible to draw up a damning charge, as Mr. Gladstone did in the very similar case of the Neapolitan prisons, from the ideal standpoint of a generous but ignorant Liberalism : Justinian may be represented as the wanton murderer of public liberty and local fran- chise, the jealous suppressor of free-thought in the Platonic Schools, the vindictive tyrant who abolishes the consulate because it was an abiding witness to long-lost freedom.
But all this righteous indignation is wide of the mark. Where we know so little of circumstances and policy, we must withhold our judgment ; yet it is easy to supply a ready and perhaps superficial reply to each of these counts. Local liberty (whether of assembly or self-defence) was a mere pretext (we may say) for feudal lawlessness, or muni- cipal corruption, or civic tumult. The lecture-halls of Damascius at Athens were already silent, and we must pardon Justinian if he shared a belief common to all governments until quite recent years, that they are responsible for the souls of their subjects and the spiritual belief which will save them from perdi- tion. The abolition of the consulate was a welcome end to unmeaning parade and needless expense : the
CH. TI THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 49
proud name itself, a mere synonym for a lavish dole, J.'sacts:
brought no tender memories of Brutus or Poplicola their excme f _ „, . . and motive.
to the populace of Rome or Byzantium.
In conclusion, we can easily detect the truth Real char- underlying this savage attack. Justinian was amiable ^peror and conscientious, but vain, easily led, and sadly emerges ignorant (like most absolute rulers) of the real state ^/t//™m
® \ ' Jrrocopius
of affairs. He was an "innovator" (§ 1 1), because, like diatribe* Rameses of Egypt, he wished to see his own name on new institutions or offices, and desired to leave his own permanent stamp on the Commonwealth for which he toiled with such unsparing industry. For the Roman world was in a transitional stage, and the sixth century was marked by a wholesale dis- appearance of archaic elements, — of culture, nation- ality, ideals, methods, and religion. It is doubtful if any one else could have succeeded better where Justinian failed. The Teutonic monarchies of Africa and Italy were already doomed when he set out on his costly enterprise of recovery. He held the Colossus together, whether for the good of mankind or not, I cannot say ; there are no general principles acknowledged in the sphere of government and politics to which I can refer, nor can I plead a moral conviction in a matter where the special needs and circumstances vary from age to age, and where con- scious human effort or wish has so scanty a result. But one is happily permitted to say this much of a great and noble character, with complete assurance ; he followed the path of duty and conscience and honour, where these ideals seemed to beckon him ; he bestowed ungrudging personal service and sleep- less vigilance upon a task that (as he believed) Heaven itself had set him ; and he cannot be blamed if the weight and burden of empire overtaxed his strength and his capacity. No criticism of the closet can deprive him of the undying honour and the un- challenged place which he occupies and will always retain in the imperial series.
VOL. II. D
50 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
EVIDENCE FROM THE CONSTITUTIONS OF JUSTINIAN
(535-565)
THE EMPEROR AND HIS OFFICIALS
(C)J. judged § 1. We may now ask what was the ideal of by himself. sovereignty and government which floated before the mind of Justinian, never lost sight of though never to be realised in fact. His absolute power, by which alone he believed that the general welfare could be secured, resembled that of the French Bourbons or the monarchy of Frederic the Great. The State was embodied in his person and his will, but this supreme majesty was neither mute nor uncommuni- cative ; it condescended to explain its motive, as in the humanitarian preambles of French law, and to justify its authority as the servant of the public, en- trusted with the care of ruling by God's will and the popular choice. Justinian is continually pleading the greatness of his task, the needs of the State, the distress of his exchequer, the misrule of his officials. He has no misgivings in his mandate ; he receives instructions from above and from below. He is the vicegerent of God and the first magistrate of the people. It will be well to see in what light he re- garded his heavy and responsible duties, and what convictions sustained him in his arduous task and continual disappointments.
(a) His con- (a) The Imperial Position. — There is no doubt about ceptionofhis the popular character of Caesarism; the emperor is universal the people's delegate or tribune to keep them in supervision, peaceful plenty and save them trouble, Nov. 16;* to watch over the worldly interests, as the priest- hood over the spiritual welfare of the subject-class,
i Ed. Leipzig 1881, Zach. von Ling. : " We watch night and day coun- selling our subjects' good" (Virus &v -xf^ffrbv re K. aptanov 6e<£ irap1 ijfjiuv TOIS VTnjKbois bodeit] . . . (bare rofa fyter^oovs irirrjKbovs kv eviradelq.
CH. ii THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 51
N. 1 2 ; l to restore the old paths and keep precedent (a) His con- alive, N. 21, p. 136 ;2 to respect the individual ^'?n °/* citizen without endangering the general good, N. 21, universal p. 137 ;3 to carry out Heaven's will in making men supervision. good, N. 28,* p. 4i3,5 extirpating heresy and root- ing out all occasion of evil or secret sin ; to keep off false and malignant charges from the innocent, N. 38, p. 23o;6 to replace the oversight or carelessness of past emperors, and to meet any sudden crisis, watchful and prepared, N. 9, p. 17 ;7 to put away any grievance between army and people, N. i5o,8 or (what might be still more difficult) between tax- payers and collectors, N. 152, p. 280 ; and, most important of all, to insist on unity of religious
1 " Two greatest gifts of the heavenly mercy to man (ieputrvvi) re K. /3a<nXe£a), the one ministering in things divine, the other ruling and taking care of human affairs (T&V dvdpuirtvuit ^dpxovffd re K. eTrt/^eXou^vr?) ; both issue forth from the same source to adorn human life (&c ytttas re K. rrjs O.VTTJS dpxrjs fKarepa irpotova-a) • and no aim is so dear to sovereigns (•n-epicriroijda<TTov fia.(n\evaiv) as the holy dignity of priests. For true har- mony will arise in the State, if the one be always blameless and enjoy free speech to heaven, while the other rule aright the Commonwealth entrusted to it" (dpdus re K. TrpoffyKOVTUS KaTa.KO<TfJi,oiri rty irapadode^av
2 The Mandata Principis (address. Tribonian) in a Latin preface; nobis reparantibus omnem vetustatem jam deperditam jam deminutam. 8 $<T7rep yap rails idiurais ddtKOVfi^voi-s f$or)dov/j.ev, oi/rw K. TO dr)[j.6<riov
4 " It is obvious to all right-minded and sensible men that our whole end and prayer is, that the subjects whom God has entrusted to our care may live well, and find favour with Him " (Tratra rjfuv (nrovdy K. f\>xn rb robs iri(TTevdti>Tas rjfjuv irapa TOV 9eoO /ca\<2s pi.ovv K. TTJV avrov evpeiv evjj.tveia.it).
8 Constit. 66 : the date at which 6 0e6$ rots 'Pw^aiw^^TrcVT^cre Trpdyfj.a<ni> (cf. exord. N. 103, vol. ii. 42). ->
6 rj/Jiuv Sia TOUTO K. TTOVOVS viroffTavruv K. datrdvijs 'iva n't) nvi r&v 7]/J,eT. vin}Kbwv rts <TVKO<j>avTia K.
7 535 A.D. '~Evr)ffxo\ tj/Jifrois r)p.lv irepl ras awdffrjs iroXireias (ppovriSas K. ovdev alpovfjL^vois tvvoeiv dXX' tiirus Htpvat fjiev ripefAoiev EavStXoi Se ffiiv M.avpovcrioLS vtraicoijoiev Ka/JXT/Sov^oi de TTJV iraiKaiav diro\a^6vTes e-)(o^v tXevdepiav Tfavoi re vvv irpQ/Tov vwb TTJV 4Paj/ua/wi' yevbfjLevoi iroKireiav ev vTnjKbots Te\o1ev . . . firipptovffi K. ISiwriKal QpovTtdes Trapa rwc
545 A.D. liepl Trap6dov liTpanwrwv ...£&<$ dfyftlovs 0i;X<£rre(r^at
52
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
(a)Hiscon-
universal supervision.
belief, the very foundation of the State, NN. 147,* i29.2 He often refers to the ample increase of territory which God has given him ; all his subjects, new as weu as o\^ are a sacred charge in which the purpose of Heaven is clearly manifest, N. 93, p. 5 1 1 ; 3 and it behoves him to take care of the smallest detail of government, N. 96, p. 529.* The Roman Commonwealth is not a makeshift or a compromise, but the final form of polity, approved by God ; he prays that it may be eternal, N, 66, p. 4i2.6 It throws back its roots into the dim past : he himself is a descendant of ^Eneas ; the second founders of the kingdom were Romulus and Numa ; and the third or imperial phase was introduced by Augustus, when by a necessary transfer made with all goodwill, the Senate (N. 80-8 1), hitherto execu- tive as well as consulting or advisory body, gave up their accumulated prerogative into a single hand. It has two chief aims, mercy and freedom ; for all its laws are directed to kindliness ((piXavOpwTria), N. 71, p. 43 1,6 and liberty, N. 70, p. 42 2. 7 Under-
1 " First and greatest blessing to all men we believe to be the ortho- dox confession of the true and blameless creed of Christians (opdrjv 6fj.o\oyiav), so that in all ways it may be strengthened, and that the holy bishops throughout the world should be united in harmony (els 6/j,6voiav ffvva<p07)vai), and believe and preach the right faith with one voice (QUORUMS) , and that every pretext of the heretic be taken away." With these conscientious convictions as to a ruler's duty Justinian's Caesaro- papism needs no further justification.
2 " We believe hope in God to be the sole aid for the whole life of our commonwealth and realm, knowing that this gives salvation of soul and safety of empire, so that it is fitting that all our legislation should depend on this alone, and look continually to this end ; for this is the beginning, the middle, and the conclusion of our laws."
3 538 A.D. rots vir?]K6ois oiroffovs ij/juv 6 6ebs irpbrepbv re TraptSwice K. Kara (AiKpov del vpoffTidn^ffL.
4 He begins his Constit. on Alexandrians and Egyptian prefectures, el K. TO, (rfj.iKp6Ta.Ta T&V irpayfj,d.T(t)v TTJS eavTuv dj-iovjjLev irpovolas TroXXy /j.a\\ov TO. /A^yicra, /crX.
5 ra rplTa irpoolfjiia . . . Trjs jSa<ri\e/as (Julius and Augustus), oiiru Tyv -irdKiTeiav ijfj.iv t&vpriffei TIJV vvv KpaTOvaav, etrj 5" AQdvaTOS, e£ ticdvtav
TTpOLOVffaV.
6 537 A.D. tirelSrf irpbs <j>i\a,vd puirlav airas TJ/JUV r? i/6/*oj
(\fvdeplas yap
v6fj.ov.
CH. ii THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 53
stood and implicated in all this was the duty of an (a) His cow- unceasing vigilance in controlling the agents of ceP^n °f 'his government ; and it is on this side that Justinian universal has to admit his failure. supervision.
(/3) Official Misdemeanours. — The policy of the early (0) Difficulties
fourth century was (as we have seen) to sever offices, of this claim;
J ' . .the bureau-
to create a number of new posts, to divide responsi- Crats out of
bility, and to interest as large a proportion as possible hand- of the inhabitants of the empire in the duties and emoluments of government and the maintenance of public order. This proportion might rival that which exists to-day in the similar governments of Russia or France, both happy hunting-grounds for obscure and underpaid officialism, which is the real danger in the socially democratic State. The result had been eminently unsatisfactory. Each limited command became an area for petty misdemeanours and peculation. It was impossible to arouse in these low-born and selfish functionaries a sense of public duty. A hereditary noble (like a national sovereign) has everything to lose by disregarding the popular will or welfare. The whole system of the early Roman patronate was built on this sensitive- ness of privilege and dignity ; Lydus deplores the decay of this generous hospitality among the Roman politicians, and it had without doubt ceased to char- acterise social intercourse. The State confronted the unit directly ; and intermediate modes of bene- volent activity vanished. But in aiming at this proud title of Universal Provider of Happiness, the Republic forgot into what hands the effective con- trol was falling ; and the people at large became the prey of ignoble agents, without sense of dignity or personal honour, concerned only in spoiling the poor or the defenceless rich, and courting the favour of the rank immediately above them in the Hierarchy.
The aim of Justinian was to retrieve the errors of the Constantinian system, which had reduced the exactions.
54 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV.A
Their in- prince to a puppet, under pretext of increasing his Power> anc* nad zealously extinguished a nobility either of the sword or of the robe. He desired to enhance the dignity of office, to make the wearer conspi- cuous and therefore open to the influence of public opinion. He was at least well aware of the mockery of the title, "responsible government." He well knew that the emperor alone was really responsible for all his servants' faults ; and was held to ac- count for every miscarriage of justice or inequitable tax. Yet the great body of administrators formed a privileged corporation, sworn to defend its members, to deceive the emperor, and to plunder the sub- jects. To relieve this, Justinian proposed to raise the position of the provincial governor, and to unite under his sole authority the various staffs or retinues (officium, ra£*?), which had secured impunity for petty pilfering in the envious subdivision of control. Something analogous to extra-territorial and foreign- consular jurisdiction would seem to have existed ; acrvXov, aSucoi TrpocrTdcrtat, N. 5 and 6.1 It is clear that local senators (eiri-^pioL /3ov\€vrai) secretly purchased indemnity for wrongdoing and oppressed lowlier neighbours, N. 6.2 An unjust official as John in the Hellespont could commit great injuries before justice could be taken, N. 37.° A vague and im- personal complaint runs through the Constitutions for the provinces, that magistrates and officials op- press the people, N. 53, p. 357,4 and despise
1 534 A.D. airayopevffai irdffi rots . . . eirapxt&v &pxovffi \byov iraptx€iv ^ Sij/Aarfcus atrlais, but for private purposes only, and then for a strictly limited period.
2 He calls it their plot (eirifiovXT)), and insolence (dpa.fftr'rjs), whereby they retire to sacred places and defy justice, retaining public moneys in their hands (TCI, bii/j-uffia tv X€Pff^ Aa/^Sdveiv, ^ffu iep&v
3 This official on pretext of rate-collections (irdXtTiKwv irbpwv ifroi . . . ff6\€fj.i>lui>) went to every length of robbery (otSev&s a,Tr£ffx€TO T&v ^ apirayyv ^x^r^v yKforw), bringing his wealth to our blessed city and leaving all penury in Hellespont.
4 536 A.D. He raises the status of the Arabian Moderator, so that he may defend the subject from the official exactions of subordinates,
CH. ii THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 55
justice, N. 89, p. 494,1 being themselves the worst Their in- offenders, N. 38, p. 227," and N. 44, p. 264.3 The capital was crowded with litigants, who despaired of redress before any local tribunal, N. 103 4 (II. 44). The rule which obliged a governor to wait in his province fifty days after the expiry of his term was constantly violated, N. 117 ; and at the very close of
7-775 T&V ISiurwv u>0eXe£as, /AT; ' avyxwpeiv TV TeptjSX^Trry Aovid ^njre r<p <f>v\dpx({> (the Saracen chief) /xr/re nvi rCiv Svvaruv oif/cow d\\a nrjre r$ deiy iraTpifj.ovl({) r) TOIS 0etois ^/xcSv TrpijSdrots ?) cti/nj? ry dely ijfiuv ol'/cy rrjv ol avovv tirayayflv TOIS TJ/J,€T. virortKevt frfj.iav, [Ai]8£ KaraK\iv€<rdai paStws /j-ydt Tpt/j.€it> dXX' dvSpeiws ru>i> vTrrjKduv £t-i}yeiff6ai. In this important passage Justinian asks him (like the old Defensor] to save the subjects from every oppression, explicitly naming not merely the military Duke, the Saracen or Bedouin chieftain, the rich landlords with their strong retinues, but the accredited agents of the imperial estates themselves, and, if we are right in so interpreting, even from members of the imperial family : he is to show no respect of persons but stand up boldly against injustice.
1 538 A.D. "Justice the unique or basal virtue, without which the others lose their merit, especially that courage to which our ancestral tongue has given the name virtue exclusively (irdrptos <puvTj). TatiTijv, he continues, tv rats -^/-cer. tirapxia-is opuvres irapewpafdv'qv . . . avafipwcrai . . .
2 535 A.D. Wherein he appoints prcetors for the people of the capital. He restricts the high office (of Stipendiary Magistrate) to the highest rank and most exemplary probity ; it is to be given gratuitously, and furnished with a paid assessor (TrdpeSpos). We have learned that these officers have hitherto had most undesirable retinues (irpbs virovpyiav elvcu rdy/jara Trovrjpa Xj7<rT07V(6crras re K. /3eve0iaXfoi/s (poison-experts) ), and a crowd of such like who deserve to be punished themselves rather than serve the ends of justice [rendering probably corrupt]. For this class of thief- takers or recognisers exist for no good purpose at all, but they tell the criminals (yivd<rKov<ri rovs KX&rras) for this one purpose, to hunt profit (and hush-money) for themselves and their officers (who are quite as much to blame). In effect, they resembled the New York police.
3 T6 ij£v y&p tirirpbiruv K. r&v rpaKrevruv 6vo/j.a of>5' elvai. iravTeXQs (3ov\6/j.e6a (he is remodelling the proconsular government of Cappatiocia, 536 A.D.) Tr/aos TO, Zfj.Trpoa'dev P\£TTOVT€S Trapa.5eiyfji.aTa K. rty iroXM]v aiiTuiv ^TT'flpet.av ty rots d#X£ots tirijyoi' (rvvT^Xeffiv.
4 His language here throws a strange light on the suspicions and dislike shared by prince and people alike towards the official class ; el <rvfj.prj TIVI TU>V i]/j.€T. btrrjKbwv ev inro\pia ^xfiv r°v &pxovra> the bishop must consult with the governor to arrange matters ; to prevent costly delay in the capital owing to a well-justified distrust in local equity, tva fjtij airo\in- Trav6/j.evoi r&v Idluv irarplSuv K. avrol dwl j-frijs KaKoira8Cj<n K. ra IT pay para. avr&v jSXdTTTTjrat. A special section is devoted to an appeal to the bishop if it happened that any of our subjects suffered injury (dSuc^i/cu) at the hands of his excellency the governor himself (\afAir pvrarov).
56 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
J. reduces his reign, N. 166 (II. 378),1 Justinian repeats the {TimtUution old indictment of official extortion, and sadly con- to office, f esses that his efforts have been of little avail. In order to remove all excuse for malversation, he corrects the table of fees payable to court-notaries on promotion, which like the necessary payments before ecclesiastical preferment in the Anglican Church were a constant source of friction and complaint. These fees were now statutably fixed, N. 16 ; an oath against official Simony was to be administered, N. 1 6, I23,2 and no one was to purchase a post under abolishes government, because places of trust were to be Vicars, gratuitously bestowed on merit, and merit alone. No governor might send a vicar or delegate to exercise his functions, and the emperor wishes to remove and abolish altogether the hated name of deputy (ro- ?), N. 1 66 (II. 376).3 Where civil and mili-
1 "This too has come to our knowledge (556 A.D.) that some of the governors of provinces are carried along such sacrilegious paths on the plea of filthy lucre that [without fees] ithey allow neither testaments to be made or published, nor marriage nor interment to take place."
2 The prototype perhaps of our ecclesiastical oath on Institution to a Benefice: the official swears severally by the Persons of the Trinity, by the Blessed Virgin, by the four Gospels "which I hold in my hands," and by the Archangels Michael and Gabriel, to be a good official, and send away none of the profits to others : &<nrep &ni(rdov irapt\a.p<>v r^v apxty, ofirw K. KaBapbs Trepl TOJ)S viroreXels, satisfied with the stipend apportioned to my office out of public funds.
3 He prohibits all vicars, jSio/cwXCrcu, and \y<rTodiwKT<u. No political or military official is to perambulate the province without urgent cause (irepufrcu rty tirapxiav). [These tours or progresses were clearly an in- fliction.] They are expressly forbidden to burden the subject-class with corvtes or forced subsidies, fji-ffre 5£ dyyapdais $ rotj KaXovpfrois ^TrtS^/^TiKots j) eTtyy oiq.d'/iTroTe ^fjiig. fiapiuveiv TOI)S i]fJi.€T. VTroreXeis, /iiyre 5£ ffvvrjdelas 6vo/j.dfeiv f) Sifreiv . . . /ca06Xov ybp ovSfra T&V apx^vruv, TTO\. re K. ffTpaTiWTiK&v, frSyfJioiivTa Karot rty x^/oav £xetj/ rotroT-rjp^T^v <rvyxupovfJ.ei>. If there must be deputies sometimes, let them at least never be called by this title ; ^5^ Trpdara^iv /my 5' 6i>o/ma ZX€TU TOTroTijprjTov. Twenty years before (535 A.D,, N. 16 and 21) he had fulminated against the vicars, as we know, to this effect: otdevl dpxovri . . . tyk/Jifv (whether polit. or milit.) tKirefjareiv tv TCUJ iroXetri T^S tirapxLas fy &PX€l T0^>s /eaXovjt. TOTroT-rjp^Tds : those who have the insolence to promote others into their own rank (efj TT]v eaurwv rd^iv fapipdfav), will now assuredly be deprived of office. N. 2i,§ 10, TOTTOTTjpijT&s . . . Traffiv dTrayopetofJicv Tpbirois (here too their
CH. ii THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 57
tary offices are thrown together, and the respective raises stipend
retinues united under a single head, the full stipend
rr . ,, . of governors.
of each separate office is to be paid to the new and
more dignified official, that he may have no occasion to recoup himself by extortion for a paltry pittance, N. 1 6. Administrators are forbidden to insult the citizens by arrogant pride in rank or military grade (a£/a, fyvr]) ; or to sell their favours, N. 16, § 7. He once or twice sums up the chief duties of a governor ; first, the inoffensive collection of taxes, next, the maitennance of public order, N. 2I,1 pp. 137-8 ; and he enlarges these simple instructions into a veritable text-book of an administrator, the mandata principis. His whole aim is to raise the standard of virtue and the responsible rank of officials ; new titles are invented and old ones revived (NN. 38, 44), and nothing is left outside the jurisdiction of the unique authority; seeing that independent commands artfully created, whether of soldier or publican, had proved a failure, N. 44, p. 27o,2 and had either played into each other's hands or promoted disorder. All these failings of the pro- vincial executive are found again in the long series of Constitutions dealing with the changes of title and power in the chief magistrates of the departments.3
name is coupled with unruly soldiers in the escort, and oppressive tasks, services, or contributions of the subjects, 5airdvri<ris, ayyapeia, and § 1 1
1 "ETretra (i.e. next after the supreme duty of filling the treasury) e<m ffk irpovoelv rov /trj rods S'/ifJ.ovs r&v TrtiXewv fr dAXijAots
but that peace should prevail everywhere in the cities, from your con- stantly preserving equal treatment for all our subjects in this respect also, and neither for gain nor any predilection showing marked favour to any party (irpbs TI rdv ftepuv airoK\lveiv).
2 VTTO /miav yap rb irpay/j.a ffvvdyo/JLev tirl rfjs x^Pas °-PX^v) ^va M TV Siea-Traffdai x^e^fftl (ne is speaking of Cappadocia).
3 These Novels form the most interesting commentary or supplement to the historians whose meagre details we constantly deplore. At least eighteen are solely devoted to the status of the governor, N. 23 Pisidia, 24 Lycaonia, 25 Thrace, 26 Zsauria, 31 Helenopontus ; 32 Paphlagonia, 44 Cappadocia, 45 the Armenias, 52 and 67 the Isles (Cyclades, &c.), 53 Arabia, 54 Palestine and Phenice, 79 Sicily, 96 Alexandria and the Augustal, 158 Pontus, 161 Phrygia and Pisidia. It is not the purpose of the present work to enter into the details of provincial government
58 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF mv. A
(?) Counter- § 2. (y) Novel Means to Check the Official Agents. — poise to Justinian sought help from the bishops and chief
mutinous J
hierarchy in inhabitants to restrain the civilian peculation or
(I) Bishops military tyranny. When Justin II. (as we must and (2) mag- nates, again remark) asked the local notables to sug- gest an acceptable governor for their district, he was only following and extending a scheme of which his uncle had set the example. In the same spirit Merwings, or rather their powerful premiers, exempted abbeys and their estates from the direct visit or levy of the Count ; and betrayed, like the Roman emperors, their profound distrust of their own nominees. Constantine had wisely seen that the new and unworldly corporation of the Episco- pate would be a valuable ally in the difficulties of government, and a useful counterpoise to the emissaries of the central power. To them Justinian entrusted the supervision of his lieutenants ; (while he raised their dignity, he showed no marked belief in their virtue). Bishops possessed the right, indeed the duty, of formal complaint (N. 103, passim) ; they were to watch and report on the conduct of the governors ; they confronted the half - barbarian soldiers, and saw that the peaceful subject suffered no injury, N. I42,1 150 (p. 264, 266),2 N. 164
already well set forth by Professor Bury, H.L.R.E., and by Diehl, in his excellent chapter on the subject of administrative reforms. I hope also to prepare very shortly a detailed inquiry into these and kindred matters in a work dealing with the Literary Critics of the Roman Empire from 300-550 A. D.
1 If a requisition (efoirpa&v) has to be made, it must be done without annoyance to the house (^Sa/iws rots of/cots irapevox^&v), and soldiers, if they are indispensable, must be old and seasoned, not raw and insolent recruits (/XT; Acexp^fflw peoX^rrois o-rpariwrais d\\a rots tv irpdy^affiv rer/H/i^ois K. rty ITO\ITI.KT]V rd^tv ^Trurra^ois). The local bishops must see that our will is obeyed ; rty T&V etpyptvwv TT&VTWV irapa<f>v\aKTjv rots Kara rbirov eiriffKotrois re K. d/s^owrtj' trriTptTrct (that is, the emperor ; for the novel survives only in a summary of its gist. Athan. xx. 5).
2 One aggrieved by soldiers must have his wrongs righted by governor and by bishop (apparently acting in concert) ; if no ruler be found in those parts, he must appeal to the most holy bishop of the city, or to the Ecdic of those country regions under whom the estate lies (^ . . .
CH. ii THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 59
(559J,1 N. 166, 378.2 They had, indeed, to con- (y) Counter- descend to " serve tables " : for in Italy a curiously pmse. to assorted committee of Pope and Senate saw to the hierarchy in integrity of weights and measures ; while, throughout (!) Bishops the empire, bishops were urged to bring to justice ^agnates. and a sense of their guilt those infamous merchants who castrated the young for the service of the court and church, a class which throughout Byzantine history was " always forbidden and always re- tained."
Though Justinian was sincerely anxious to secure (3) Popular the help of this order of clerics and notables, ™^™sion he did not venture to suggest any form of popular suggested. control, such as we attempt to-day with indifferent success. He might seem aware that a democracy prefers to grumble at its petty oppressors, or to laugh enviously at corruption ; and in the chaos of creed and race and faction, to which only the empire lent a semblance of unity, a people's painstaking vigilance must have been sought in vain. Genuine democracy is the most difficult and exacting, as well as the most elevated, of all forms of government.
9} T$ frd^ T&V rbtruv, KT\). Justinian ends with ordering the prefect to make known to the bishops and the civil rulers these provisions for the security of the subject-class (vtrtp r?)s avrwv d|8Xa/3e£as diarvTrudevra).
1 This Pragmatic Sanction deals with the government of Italy (554 A.D. ), and entrusts the nominations of local magistrates to the bishops in conjunction with chief inhabitants (elsewhere called rots TrpwTftiovvi). % 12. Provinciarum . . . judices ab episcopis et primatibus uniuscujusque regionis idoneos eligendos et sufficientes ad locorum adminm ex ipsis videlicet jubemus fieri provinciis quos administraturi sint, sine suffragio (mi)-litis. (The justice must be a native of the district, and be guaranteed competent by his chief neighbours, ecclesiastical and secular ; and the soldier must have no share in his appointment (?), — if we accept the plausible correction of Zacharias. )
2 iraaav d£ dtSofj-ev Adetav rot's /caret rbv rbirov 6(Ttwrarois eiriffKbTrois K. rots irpUTetiovffi rCov irbXeuv ra roiaura ^yxei/>?^u,ara KuiXtietv . . . K. TO. irepl TOUTUV T]fMv /j.ir)vv€iv. Sometimes the local squire or magnate is told off to spy upon the civil servant ; sometimes the governor is armed with ample powers against these provincial grandees with their armed follow- ings (5o/>tf</>opoi) and their insolence and injuries to the poor. But the bishop is always trusted to prevent wrong and report infringement of rights to the anxious emperor.
60
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
(3) Popular supervision never
Imperial attitude to the people, cynical but indulgent.
The Roman Empire was founded in a cynical moment by a master of irony, who saw through human nature with a keenness given to few. Demo- cratic in aim it certainly was, in that loose sense current in our own days, which implies that measures are directed for the public welfare without respect of class or privilege, and aim especially at the content- ment and comfort of the poor. But the empire had no illusion whatever about democracy, in its high and ideal sense, which in truth is the only one admissible. It had no belief in the popular capacity for the long strain and never-ending duties of the republican. The people at large placed not the slightest value on constitutional privilege. They desired to be rid of a host of bad masters and incompetent rulers ; but they had no intention whatever of taking their places. They knew very well what they wanted from government ; and in the long and perhaps surfeited silence of these centuries, we may well suppose they were satisfied with their bargain. The consideration of the imperial system for the lower classes is well known. They are to be amused as well as fed, and delighted by the gorgeous spectacle of circus, theatre, and court function. The ruined cities of Northern Africa clearly show that one chief duty of the smallest municipality, founded in defiance of natural law among the sands, was to provide for the cleanli- ness and amusement of the populace. Christianity had not, it would appear, conferred on these classes a marked aptitude for self-government ; it had, according to some critics, merely made representa- tive institutions impossible. It might (so they allege) have been possible to agree on the need of sanita- tion, public baths, and public spectacles ; but if the province of government and imperial concern is to be extended to the problems of the next world, it is clearly out of the question to allow the voice of the heterodox to be heard or to respect minorities.
CH.II THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 61
The people's part was to trust their supreme ruler (l) Costly
and representative to do his best for them on pain dlsPl^yf°f
gratification
of dismissal. They were not to be deprived of ofurbanmob;
those costly shows, which since republican times
had exhausted noble houses by the vain parade of
a moment : Justinian introduced a welcome thrift
into these expensive dignities, and limited the con-
sular largess, just as a Puritan and Labour Ministry
might curtail the Lord Mayor's Show. But he was
careful not to abolish these spectacles entirely,
N. 8 1, p. 468,1 and when the last vestige of re-
publican office disappeared in Byzantium, the place
of the magistrates' displays was taken by the un-
ceasing liturgy and ceremonial of the court.
Yet with all this consideration for the " cockney " (2) solicitude element, Justinian does not forget the needs the peasant (N. 123, 139, 148 are devoted to the various problems of agriculture and ownership 2). And to all dependent classes of his empire he ex- (3) wages of plicitly interdicts the use of arms, N. io8,3 and has artisan- no sympathy with the higher wages for craftsman and artisan, which they demanded after the Great
1 " On the Consular Largess.'1'' He limits this scattering of dole to seven occasions of pompous exit, et yap TOVTO ^irivevbijTai Sta rb ras #&ij irpbs \f/vx&y<>>ylav ayeiv rbv 8rj/j.ov . . . ovdevbs rofrruv 6 r^er.
2 Especially in Novel 29 does he forbid the seizure of land for debt ; and fixes (or attempts to fix) the rate of usury for advances on landed security.
3 On Arms (539 A.D., addressed to Basilides, Mag. Off.}. The aim is, of course, the prevention of civic tumult, not suspicion of insurrection (d/SXajSets K. dveirypedcrTovs tpvXdrTfiv K. KuiKtieiv rods TroX^uovs, of)s £K rrjs cavr&v dj3ov\tas alpoti/jLevoi rods tear' dXX^Xwi' tpydfrvrat <f>6vovs). The manufacture of weapons is a State monopoly which may be invaded by no private person ; and no one but authorised soldiers or sergeants with license may possess ; § 3. aSeia TrcwreXcDs otdevl ..." neither to private inhabitants of cities nor husbandmen tilling the country districts (rots ra Xcopia yewpyov<riv ayp6rais) to use arms against each other and dare murders, while the exchequer is despoiled of the taxes of those who cultivate the soil, deserting their livelihood (?) or running away through panic." This was no idle fear ; the armed households of the great, and masterless retainers (as in Japan, the lonin or ownerless yaconiri) caused disturbance on the countryside. § 4 gives a list of prohibited weapons ; somewhat in the style of the Philistine edict in the time of Saul.
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
(3) wages of artisan.
Wisdom of
these
provisions.
Striking analogy with modern Socialism.
Plague, N. 146 (544 A.D.) ; just as in Western Europe, after the Black Death, some 800 years later. — The emperor has been sternly rebuked for both these regulations ; matters, as the unbiassed student can easily see, of strict political necessity. Circus- frays and the Samaritan revolt had made men familiar with private feuds and vendetta. It was impossible, with the barbarian at the gate, to allow mere factious turbulence. The compassion of liberal or nationalist historians is entirely wasted on a people, or rather a congeries of peoples, who had long ago resigned the noble duty of self-defence. Justinian, who had no reason to trust party-spirit, who had manifest proof of religious and tribal rancour, was in every way justified in this pro- hibition. Nor can we criticise from any modern standpoint his (possibly futile) attempt to fix the scale of wages or the interest on mortgage-loans. Whenever the State is recognised as omnipotent by popular consent, the Government — Imperial or Socialist — will be compelled to take cognisance of such things. Where every class looks to the State for guidance, aid, and authorisation ; where nothing passes current without the peculiar stamp of govern- ment sanction ; various restrictions on a perilous liberty must be both expected and tolerated. The hours of labour, the scale of payment, the price of commodities, the value of land, the assessment of appreciated estates — all must be submitted to some final control and central committee. It is not for us to blame the empire for a system which, amid some misgivings and protest, is being adopted by many statesmen " as a panacea for the evils of Freedom." J
1 N. 60 (537 A.D.), the emperor is obliged to limit the number of privileged manufactories in Constantinople to eleven hundred, and to beg the residue to pay their imposts regularly : he says, not without reason, r<£ /caret fUKpbv K. ^0' diravras yirXwffOai TO. 7^X77 ftpa-X^ ^v &J"7"cu rb Trap' fK&ffTov 8i86/j.£voj>, fj-trpiov 5£ K. Kov<f>ov . . . &ny irapa, TrXeibvuv (rv\\cytv He did not intend to fall into the later Merovingian dilemma, when the
CH. ii THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 63
§ 3. It remains to speak briefly of a few classes in Special the State on which the Novels of Justinian shed f^8^ mi perhaps a gleam of sombre light, (i) The military tary. element is set in vivid contrast with the civilians. The emperor is much concerned to prevent unfair pressure on the district where soldiers are quartered ; they must be content with the produce of their cantonment, and not demand exotic luxuries from other provinces ; they must be considerate to the defenceless citizens whom it is their duty to defend, not to oppress (N. 138, 142, 150). Justinian is aware of the debt which the Commonwealth owes to its gallant (and often alien) defenders : after heaven, the empire rests on their loyalty and devotion (cf. the use of the term KaOaxruafjLevoi). He is anxious, too, that his barbarian allies should learn to respect the rights of civilians, just as Theodoric had to defend the effeminate Roman noble from the good-humoured contempt of his Gothic " pro- tector " (N. 150, II. 265).1 He does not hesitate to rebuke this dangerous element if it deserves it ; he threatens (N. 96, I. 540) 2 some mutinous soldiers with expatriation to the detested Danubian frontier, or the Crimea, still more remote ; it will not be forgotten that this punishment precipitated the military revolution which overthrew Maurice some sixty-four years later.
sovereign, — knowing no means of defending the public except by re- stricting his own officers' jurisdiction, of rewarding his friends except by lavish grant of practical immunity, — found himself in the end without subjects, taxes, or kingdom.
1 " These injunctions we desire to be carefully observed in the passage, not merely of our own Captains and their troops, but of all other forces sent by us into alliance with our Commonwealth from any nation what- ever " (^ oiouSijTrore Zdvovs ets yv^o.")(la.v , . . ?re fj.it ofltvuv).
2 "Their splendid tribunes shall suffer confiscation, and their chief men (let these also beware of decapitation !) and the whole regiment shall be removed to the furthest limits of the Danubian district, there to serve their term patiently as guard of the frontier " (rb irav rdy^a fj-eraffrav tv rots Tro/3/Jwr^/jw TOV . . . Aavvftiov r67rois .... irapa<pv\aKrjs ZveKa irposKap- Tfprjtrov).
64 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF, mv. A
(2) The § 4. The emperor is frequently engrossed in Monks.i monastic questions, relating to the order and dis- cipline of monks in their religious houses. If the monks will pray, the soldiers will fight well, and the Roman armies will win peace for the world. There is an especially mediaeval touch here ; and we recall the opening chapter of Lydus (which he does not follow up) dealing with the identity of the magis- trate, the priest, and the soldier in primitive times.
(3) The § 5. There is frequent reference to the Senatorial Senate. ciass as well as to the Senate of New Rome. Both
in Latin and Greek (N. 80, Si)1 he explains the transference to the emperor of the anxious duties of executive, and makes much of the dignified retire- ment, which all enjoy but the select emissaries of Caesar. He takes care that " senatorial estates shall remain in senatorial families" (NN. 101, 106, 109). He gives rules for the release from the duties of this rank (rv^tj, N. 90), the old Latin venia ordinis; but he will not allow Jews and Samaritan senators to evade their responsibility (N. 62), though they might not exercise their privileges. He is anxious to preserve the deferential distinctions of rank, though he will not have this carried to an absurd extreme. For example, the illustrious class (N. 91) were often reduced to poverty and unable to support their dignity ; all but the most exalted were expressly relieved of the duty of employing an advocate (eVroXeu?) when sustaining a suit, and might appear and plead in person, if they could not afford the heavy fees, which, the joy of Lydus' heart, were a bane and a grievance to a pauper nobility. Yet Justinian is clear that disorder in a State arises when men overstep the natural limits of caste, and the due
1 " In the most ancient days the Senate's authority shone forth so bravely that by its guidance at home and abroad the whole world was made subject to the yoke of Rome ... for by its common counsel all things were carried out. But after that the prerogative of Roman people and Senate, in a happy moment for the general welfare (felicitate Rei- publicse) were transferred to the Imperial Majesty," &c.
CH. Ji THE ROMAN EMPIRE (535-565) 65
reverence owing to rank is set at naught (afyco/uLdrwv (3) The
Senate'
§ 6. The social and administrative condition of the (^Justinian's empire has already exhausted more than the space aPPeal to his allotted to it ; nor have the various questions of the pe°P country magnates, the vindices, the ecdics, the Defensor, been treated adequately. We may well conclude this section, already over-long, by quoting a direct personal appeal to his subjects ; wherein he exposes the genuine anxiety with which he attempts to con- ciliate two ends, unhappily incompatible — the welfare of the people and the maintenance of the costly imperial system. (N. 16, § 10 : " It is right that you our subjects and contributories, knowing how great is the care and forethought we bestow on you, should in all cheerfulness pay your public taxes, and not need compulsion from the rulers, — and show us by your deeds that you return due gratitude to us for our loving-kindness. Then shall ye reasonably enjoy from your rulers all care and consideration for your cheerful service ; knowing this well, that since on the rulers' shoulder rests the whole peril of the State,1 and it is admitted that they take office at their own risk, it is your part therefore to abstain in every way from sullen churlishness, and not in your disobedience oblige them to have recourse to their lawful sternness, with which it is but right they should be invested, seeing that the collection of the public revenue is a necessity which cannot be gainsaid.
" Listen then, subjects of mine, whomsoever God has given to our ancestors or to ourselves (N. 89, 538 A.D.), that we issue this law to give and provide you with all security : ye shall not journey long and toilsome ways, ye shall not weep over the in- juries of the great, nor shall ye blame us that we neglect to help you. But each one, seeing close at hand and under his own eyes due punishment and
1 Or responsibility for the taxes, S^&rta. VOL. II. E
66 HISTORY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE mv. A
(4) Justinian's requital waiting for all his wrongs, will sing aloud
S the 3reat and S°od God' who enliShtened mY under- standing so as to issue these wise laws." Such was the aim and such the scope of Justinian's legislation : his failure to attain this end must be traced to causes of which he himself was but dimly conscious, and over which he could exert no effective control.
CHAPTER III
THE ELEMENTS OF OPPOSITION UNDER THE SUCCESSORS OF JUSTINIAN (565-618)
(Being a continuation of " The Prince, the Senate, and the Civil Service ")
§ 1. THE death of Justinian was a signal, long Opposition of
awaited, for the smouldering discontent to break privileged
class to
into flame. It existed no doubt in nearly all classes Liberal of a commonwealth called upon to give up much Imperialism. for imperialism, and receive perhaps little in return. But the chief seat of the influence which thwarted the central control was now the Senate. The hindrance to the designs of a benevolent autocrat was found among his own ministers ; and once more was displayed to the world the peril of a privileged class, concentrating in itself the whole power and talent of the State. It is a palpable anachronism to connect this with monarchical insti- tutions. The history of mankind shows clearly that a monarchy, even as a foreign victor, gives to a people national self-consciousness, and guarantees them from servitude to " many and fierce masters." "The truth is," writes Mr. Price in an introduction to Thierry's great work, " that to the Norman Con- quest we owe both our national unity and our national institutions. . . . England was overcome by the Normans because she possessed no national unity. ... Had not Anglo-Saxon feudalism been uprooted by the centralised despotism of the con- queror, England would probably be broken into independent States, like Germany and Italy ; or like France have been forced, at the close of the Middle Ages, to exchange anarchy for despotism." The
67
68
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
Opposition of committee
privileged
class to
Liberal
Imperialism.
of Platonic Guardians, the Knights of Rhodes, the Brahmin or Roman hierarchy, the Russian official, even the Anglo-Indian civil servant, and above all, the secret influences of a monopolist republic (such as floats as an ideal before the dreamer's vision) — these are instances of the tempta- tion which besets the most conscientious as well as the most unscrupulous of rulers. The pages of Laurence the Lydian show us the persecution of the rich by the pretorian prefect, the "war against private wealth," so conspicuous in political pro- grammes to-day. But in the later years of Justinian, the rich, identified with the imperial council and exercising power by right of official dignity as well as private means, gained in weight (and perhaps in solidarity), and like the republican senate domineered over a subject world. We are often called upon to record the grievances of the noble class under the firm control of monarchs ; we trace with regret the mutual suspicions which so often transformed the Senate into the victim of a persecutor. But when once the stern hand is relaxed, our sympathy is at once estranged ; and we feel that for the peace and welfare of the world, the " feudal " rule of Senators was neither to be regretted nor recalled. Law was no longer uniform and supreme ; a large class of higher and lower officials demanded exemp- tion. Justin II. endeavoured to enforce the law at all hazards ; and offered himself as the first example, if he deserved censure. "To him," says Zonaras, " came one promising if he were made prefect with power over all for a fixed time, no sufferer should be found " (« eirapxo? yevoiro K. KCLTO. TTOLVTODV e^owta SoOeit) SI topuTfjievov Kaipov jjLrjTLva cvpeOtjvat TOV aSiKovjuievov). The story, it would seem, is clearly apocryphal in its details ; it finds its original or suspicious parallel in the " Arabian Nights " ; and we may be sure that such a sudden elevation to the pre- fecture of the city was not possible with the
CH. in THE ROMAN EMPIRE (565-618) 69
careful routine and rules of methodical promotion Opposition of which then prevailed. "As he sat in judgment privileged
J & class to
one came with a charge against a very notable Liberal senator (TWV €7ri(Tt]iuiOTepwv crvyK\i>)TiKa)i> eva), whom Imperialism. he summoned to appear ; but he refused (juLereKaX eo-aro . . . aXX' OVK airrivTrjcrev) — a second notice fared no better ; and the accused, scorning it, went off to dine with the emperor (SevTepov eOero ju.rfvvju.a . . . KaTa(f)pov^<ra^ «V TO /3a<n\ucov aTrfjei (rvjULTrdariov). When he learnt this, the prefect went to the palace and found the king sitting with his guests and spoke : ' I promised, O king, to leave not one wrong-doer, and my promise I will keep, if thou wilt lend the support ; but if thou dost shield and entertain the unjust, I can do nothing. Give them not liberty to scorn the law, or take back my charge/ And the king said, ' If I am he, make me descend from my seat and obey the summons ' (TOVTO . . . dvvtrOijareTai el KOL TY\V CK TOV Kparovs crov eTTiKOvpiav AC. Tr\v poirrjv el $e /maXXov airro? TWV dSitcovvToiv
•> $^ >r it ->\ -- < wfw t
ovoev JULOL ecrrai avvarifjiov' rj yovv /mrj yueraofoou 7rappr]cri.a$ rj Travcrov HJLC r^? ap^y? ; K. 6 /3a<ri\€v$ el auro? eyw (ptjariv, a$iKwvy e^avdarrrjo-ov ime evrevQev). "Then the prefect made the man accused rise from his place and follow him, and finding him guilty chas- tised him with stripes, and to the man aggrieved he gave back out of the other's estate the exaction many times over. So that the greedy were afraid and came to terms with those they had wronged " (yvovs aSiKovvTa . . . e/coXao-e TCU? els crco/ma TrXyyais . . . oQev Sei(rdvTe$ 019 qv Trpoalpearis TrXeoveKTiKtj TOV a ave(TTa\^(rav K. rof? t]SiKr]/uLei>oi$ els <TV/uL/3d<rei$ e Such, then, is the story ; it no doubt reflects the current tradition or the character of Justin II. and his courtiers. We find a parallel in the story of Butelinus under Heraclius ; and the career of Theophilus offers points of resemblance. The colouring is later and almost purely Asiatic, but the
70
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
Opposition of privileged
ClttSS tO
Liberal Imperialism.
Dying avowal of Justin II. :
meal power- less.
plain facts are credible (Zonaras, xiv. 10). The historian has a favourable opinion of the Illyrian
/'T"\ "\ ' It* ^ '>* *
emperor ( L\\vpio$ . . . «? aTravra TrepioeQos Tr\v ). Theophanes has TO> yevei 0/>a£ ox^u^o? re K. eTrt&ej»ia$. As we can trace some part at least of the decline to the old age and relaxed energy of Justinian ; so the impunity of evil-doers is referred to the seclusion of Justin through ill- health (vocrepov TW^MV crcoyuaro? . . . Sia TOVTO JULVJ Trpoicov . . . a?? jmrjoevos OVTOS TOV CKOIKOVVTO? e-Troirja-e). Once when he went forth he was much harassed by applicants for redress of wrong (TTOTC TrpoeXOcav ^va)^\^6r] Trapa TroXXeoi/ a>? aSiKovjmevcov), whence the avenging of the oppressed was to him a subject of anxious thought (fj TWV aSiKovjULevcov e/c&'/c^cn? <$ia (fipovridos). We are re- minded of Marcian's il Catervce adeuntium infinite" throngs of applicants with a grievance. The account of Scylitzes of the same episode agrees in the general outline, and argues a common source ; he particularises the culprit as jmayia-rpos T*?.
§ 2. Theophanes, who does not give the legend of tjjg temporary vizier, gives in full Justin's speech at the adoption of Tiberius Constantine, to which we have called attention in the text : it was taken down by shorthand writers (John of Ephesus), and forms a very human document, widely differing in its na'ive simplicity from the studied and eloquent orations usually put into the mouth of princes by classical historians. I will quote only the more salient points : ju.ij etri'^ap^ cu/mctcri. /mrj eTriKoivdovfl? (fiovcov. jmrj ^cocr^?. /mrj eiV e^Opav OfiouoOflS ejmol' yap w? avOpo)7ro$ errrcucra. KOI yap Trrafcrr^? , K. a7re\afiov Kara ra? ayuapr/a? /ULOV. aXXa TOI$ Troiricracri /mot TOVTO CTH. TOV /3q/u,aTOS TOV
KCIKOV avr KGLKOV
Xrou. jULtj eTrdpy ere TOVTO TO cr^/xa o>? KO\ e/ue. OVTQH Trpoare^e Tra&iv a)? eaura). yvwOi r/? ?? K. r/? vvv el . . .
oXo« OVTOl T€KVa (TOV €lOrlv K. Sov\Ol. . . . TOVTOVS OV$
/3\€7T€i$ 0X01/9 T?? TroXire/a? /3\e7rei$. Trpo^e^e TO)
CH. in THE ROMAN EMPIRE (565-618) 71
<rov. /ULtj (pdvTag [cTTjOaTftora?] Se^T). jmr] Dying avowal
(rot Tive? ori 6 TTOO a-ov OVTOO SieyeveTO. Tavra °J ^ustin H- •'
a* »JL> * * ' a < * * ' reforming
/mauaov a(p u>v eTravov. 01 eyovTes ovcrias, zeal power-
v avrwv, rol<5 $e /mrj r^awn Sooprja-ai. The few- version of Theophylact (iii. n, ed. de Boor, 133) repeats almost verbatim, but in place of the meaning- less [(TTparicoTas] we read oru/co^a^ra? ; he also omits ovg before /SXeVe/?. And the general sense of the passage 1 In these broken words Justin warns Tiberius against his own errors : " Be not made like me in the people's hatred ( = do not incur my unpopularity). I have sinned and been led astray, and I will accuse those who have brought me to this at the Last Day. Do not be elated by your position; remember what you once were and what you are now ; and look at me, what I have been and what I have become ! These before you are your children and servants. You see them all before you, — all the members of the civil order. Do not neglect your soldiers ; welcome no informers. Do not be led away by the guile of those who tell you, ' His late majesty always did this and that.' Learn wisdom by my sad failure. Let those who have wealth continue to enjoy ; and give to such as are in need." Now the charges are vague, and the melancholy Justin, appeased like Saul with cunning playing on the harp, must not be held to the letter of a suspicious temperament conscious of a great oppor- tunity lost. But he blames his advisers for his faults ; and points with emphasis to the subordinate position of the ministers and clergy standing round. The TroXirela comprises the ranks of the civil hierarchy, just as later TroAmKo? is opposed to (TTpaTiwTiKos. One is much tempted to read some " caution " into the double /SXerrexy ; beware of, " you do well to look at them." I translate <rot in its usual meaning, "to thee," not "of thee" with Bury; and am inclined to attach considerable weight to the sentence. Can we not read in the text just that
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
zeal power- less.
Dying avowal insistence on precedent, which is one of the most ; entangling of silken meshes cast by bureaucracy round the vigorous limbs of a reforming sovereign ? Any administrator will recognise the tone of the permanent Under-Secretary in the words : " We never did so in Mr. X.'s time." For bureaucrats have a fabulous golden age (like poor Laurentius), to which standard they coldly refer the proposals of the new minister, and are apt, with Talleyrand, to discourage zeal. In the final words we may dis- cover that, where private wealth still existed apart from the privileged order, it was insecure ; and that Justin had learnt by bitter experience that the « government " was always " against the people." Theophylact supplies us with a sonorous and peri- phrastic description of the audience before which this adoption was made. We remember Galba's hesitation in a similar case, and the ominous last decision, ft iri in castra placuit." Here we find Senate, clergy, and patriarch assembled (r^? crvyK\riTov j8oyX?9 e? TCIVTOV yevo^vrjg TOV re tepariKOv KGLTa\oyov . . . aima TO) cTricrraTOvvTi K. TO. r§9 6KK\r)<rlas TrrjSaXia SuOvvovTi). (We may remark that our author makes a very needless apology for the simplicity of Justin's words, which he will leave in all their naked and unpolished rudeness : their heart- felt sincerity is a very welcome oasis in the desert of his elaborate periods.) Against this solid phalanx of indurate tradition or individual greed, what weapons did a comes excubitorum possess, suddenly raised to the throne by one who made no concealment of his own failure ? It is small wonder that Tiberius Constantine continued this apologetic and depre- catory tone, and sought to conciliate favour by gifts, not as Justin advised, to the really poor, but to the powerful or independent.
§ 3. We may deal subsequently with the eulogy of Corippus, and the debt that Africa owed to the Questor Anastasius and the Emperor Justin II. Yet
Conciliation of local authorities.
CH. in THE ROMAN EMPIRE (565-618) 73
this keen interest in a freshly recovered province is Conciliation typical also of his entire policy ; and I may be allowed ° to quote the words of Diehl (L'afr. Byz., 458), because I feel sure that this partial reform in an outlying district was of a piece with a genuine attempt at a universal reorganisation: " A 1'interieur du pays, 1'adrninistration des finances reorganisees s'effor£ait par une meilleure perception de I'impot d'assurer les rentes neces- saires aux defenses (Novella, 149, A.D. 569) ; pour reprimer la cupidite des fonctionnaires on remettait en honneur les vieilles regies relatives a 1'obtention gratuite des magistratures ; pour arreter leurs in- solences, on rappelait a tous les agents, civils et militaires, le respect du aux privileges de 1'Eglise et a la personne des eveques ; officiellement on invitait les pre"lats a adresser au prince toutes les observa- tions qui leur sembleraient utiles, < arm (dit le rescrit imperial) que connaissant la verite" nous d£cidions ce qu'il convient de faire.' (Zach., Nov. iii. 9, 10) (A.D. 568)- Hortamur cujusque provincial sanctissimos episcopos, eos etiam qui inter possessores et incolas princi- patum tenent, ut per communem supplicationem adpotentiam nostram eos deferant, quos ad administrationem provincice suce idoneos existiment." I may also subjoin the admir- able words of Bury (ii. 75): "A remarkable law of Justin (568) is preserved in which he yields to the separatist tendencies of the provinces to a certain extent ; it provides that the governor of each pro- vince should be appointed without cost at the request of the bishops, landowners and [principal] inhabitants ... it was a considerable concession in the direction of local government, and its importance will be more fully recognised if it is remembered that Justinian had introduced in some provinces the practice of investing the civil governor (who held judicial as well as administrative power) with military authority also. It is a measure which sheds much light on the state Episcopate as of the empire, and reminds us of that attempt of a Honorius to give representative local government to the
74 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
Episcopate as cities in the south of Gaul, — a measure that came too
late to cure the P°litical lethargy which prevailed." I would only suggest that the word separatist is per- haps too strong ; it is one of Finlay's beliefs that this desire for honesty in local administration was disloyal and centrifugal. I cannot myself be satisfied that there was any desire to detach from the parent-trunk or set up an independent home-rule. The only safeguard was in imperial and central control against the abuses of men who, like viceroys of old time, regarded a post of trust as a prize, and sought a convenient opportunity for reimbursing the price paid to secure it. We may be sure that this appeal to local feeling and choice vanished in the gradual collapse of the civil system up to the time of Heraclius. We have quoted this passage, however, not to encroach on the interesting problems of local autonomy or prince-bishoprics under the empire, but to show the earnest desire of Justin II. to main- tain the best side of autocracy. The Novel empha- sises the large admixture of the clergy in the ordinary body of government, as well as its presence on ceremonious occasions. This influence grew and culminated in the days of Heraclius ; and the patri- archs of Constantinople and of Alexandria seemed to have claimed no small authority on high politics and finance. But as the Eastern realm had avoided the dangerous support of a Barbarian protectorate, so it refused to allow the State to become a mere department of the Church. With all its faults, it managed to fulfil the modern maxim of all political theorists, — the supremacy of the civil power against sword and dogma. Both these dangers of western and mediaeval Europe recur in a variety of forms ; but during our period there is no concession to the independent claim of priest and soldier. The Icono- clastic movement was largely a recurrence to a pre- Constantinian policy. And it was this temporising scheme of Constantine, which, in the age we are now
CH. in THE ROMAN EMPIRE (565-618) 75
discussing, bade fair to overthrow the central fabric. Episcopate as Powerful prelates and recalcitrant nobles, — here are a c™nter~ two well-known types of feudalism ; and Justin II., with all his desire for improvement, had to conciliate and to make use of such agents as he found ready.
§ 4. The dim records of the reigns of Tiberius II. isolation of (578-582) and Mauricius (582-602) (who break theemperor: the line of Illyrian princes) are fitfully illumined by the tropes and similes of Evagrius or Theophylact. Tiberius indeed found a support for the throne in the demes; Maurice reverted to the help of the nobles pending his struggle with an inefficient and seditious army. The latter need mean nothing more than that he kept the civilian supremacy intact, and in the end yielded to their protests, by a rapid return from a campaign which he proposed to lead in person. Historians attempt to give these detached points of disaffection, union and focus in a legendary public opinion, which is depicted as austere and unanimous. Finlay specially oscillates between extremes ; he complains of the now limited efficacy of absolutism, or he represents hostility to the government as wide- spread, popular, and deserved. It is, I think, true that this latter never seriously existed ; when we read of the " threatened conflict between official privilege and popular feeling," or of the " hate inspired by the administration," we are apt to imagine a concrete and wholesome body of opinion, — born no doubt in the higher and idealist circles (where all revolutions begin), and filtering down, until all classes are allied in opposition to the ruling system. It may well be doubted if such a desirable state of things ever existed. No country has ever been united against its rulers ; a successful overthrow is the work of just that small minority which has the courage of its views and a well-defined programme of attack. The removal of a king, the exile of a noble caste, merely unveils the seething animosities of classes ; and after any change of government, the larger but silent
76
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
Isolation of the emperor : no public support.
No desire to restrict titular prerogative.
portion of the citizens regret the past. In the curious circumstances of the empire in the closing years of the sixth century, there is no trace of serious opposition or of unanimity. Far less are we likely to discover a vestige of a rival constitution.
§ 5. The noble party, the " Senators/' were pro- foundly interested in the resolute maintenance of autocracy. Neither then nor in the Twenty Years' Anarchy (695—717) is there a sign of later Whig proposal to restrict prerogative. But they determined that the sovereign should be a creature, and that a still unlimited prerogative should lie in their hands. Nor were they at one upon the right method of government. The dominant class had lost that wider interest and public spirit which marked its councils a century ago. Each member of a dis- integrating order sought his own good at the ex- pense of the whole ; alone the emperor, " Athanasius contra mundum" had a policy. This selfish and antinomian individualism ran through the classes ; and perhaps only among the priests rose to pride in a corporation, for which they demanded independ- ence. Neither religious dispute nor the factions of the hippodrome show any serious criticism of the aims or manner of administration. It is in vain to seek for earnestness of purpose or combined action. Political interest was soon exhausted in a vague and scornful discontent, or in personal rancour and petty spite directed against conspicuous men. Finlay oddly represents the exempt classes of " monks, charioteers, and usurers " as successfully claiming to be above the law. Now the unique justification of insurgence would lie in this demand, to make the law just and uniform and to submit the highest power in the land to its requirements. To oppose (as in Russia to-day) an autocracy, largely guided by precedent and custom and irregular only in the minor malversations of petty agents, by a com- plete anarchy, — is a grotesque ambition, on a par
CH. in THE ROMAN EMPIRE (565-618) 77
with the buccaneering sympathies of delicately nur- Private
tured childhood, their fearful delight in pirate and interest and ... . t , ... contempt for
highwayman, but not to be classed with serious iaw,
schemes of political reconstruction. The whole claim of Liberalism (so far indeed as it makes itself articulate and intelligible) is that the personal whim shall everywhere yield to the impersonal or general welfare, — that law shall fetter arbitrary despotism, and calm debate shall fix the lines of government and the principles of justice. No one is clearer than Finlay himself in making this demand, in showing the inconsistency of those well-meaning princes, who while they tried to save autocracy from itself did not provide an " Ephorate " or a " Body of Censors " to guarantee the supremacy of the imper- sonal. Now can it for a moment be maintained that this disinterested deference to law, absolutely essen- tial in a free State, was in the air at this time ? Is not the sole claim of each individual, of each class, each district, each sect, to be " above the law " ? Is not the emperor struggling in classic and statuesque isolation for the archaic principles against pure sub- jectivity ? The green or blue faction, the monks of a certain community, the citizens or sectaries of a distant province, might, like the Nihilist to-day, do and suffer loyally in the supposed interest of a fraction of the State ; but a more comprehensive view of the whole was for ever denied to them. When this particularist spirit had invaded the once catholic sphere of the Senate, the case of the State became hopeless. Nothing could prevent the split- ting into heterogeneous and unsympathetic groups, social and regional. And this without any matured plan or purpose of autonomy. For we must again repeat that the popular interest was confined to an alert criticism of persons, rarely of measures ; and while it rejoiced in every change of ruler, never elevated itself to a calm survey or judgment of the whole system.
78 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
Complete § 6. " Maurice/' it is said with truth, " causes a
^Maurice to rev°luti°n by attempting to re-establish the ancient restore order authority of the imperial administration." But we (600). must be careful how we interpret this. The secret
of the Augustan " constitution " (if we give this explicit name to his crafty yet beneficent compro- mise) lay in the control of officials : the one peren- nial difficulty which meets us under all governments and is quite independent of the form of constitution. We do not mean that the already absolute powers of the administrator were to be increased ; that the helpless autocrat should have a useless addition of formal prerogative, the subordinate agents supplied with larger authority. Maurice desired in a corrupt and centrifugal society to restore order and control ; and when law is openly despised or in abeyance, nothing avails but strong personal power, which for the time is the sole remedy. Limited on all sides by "rapacious nobles," an idle populace, a turbulent faction, and a « licentious army," the prince saw no hope but in the energetic exercise of his theoretical but latent force. A despondent tone rings with dismal monotony through this period, and finds an echo in the legends of imperial dreams, warnings, and expiations. The emperor, forced back on the natural supporters of the throne, found no aid forth- coming. Had he tried, in his endeavour to enlist his subjects' help in the work of reform, to establish a responsible council or representative body, as we might suggest to-day, there was no guarantee that this responsibility, this representative character should be maintained. It was not to be expected that such a body would be free from the factious group-spirit, the narrow and religious bitterness, the personal rancour or self-seeking, — already conspicuous in all ranks of general society. It does not follow that out of a disorderly and disaffected chaos held arti- ficially together, like Russia to-day, a sovereign assembly will be more patriotic, united, or disinter-
CH. in THE ROMAN EMPIRE (565-618) 79
ested than the society it represents. It will rather be Complete the focus of the national feuds, the quintessence ^^uricfto the national disorder. And it is an unvarying ex- restore order perience that the tone of parliaments is below the (600)- average level of public opinion ; and is singularly un- fitted to express the higher and more liberal outlook. The decisive factor in the situation turned out to be Intervention the very influence against which Maurice had reacted, — the party-spirit of the circus. To those who know human nature (not through supposed representatives, but directly) there is nothing alarming in this appeal to the rudimentary judgment of the average man. The half-constitutional influence oddly bestowed in the last reign had perhaps a good effect ; the factions were wanting neither in spirit nor in a certain gene- rosity. But the experiment of making an urban mob the arbiter of national destiny has proved a signal failure. The turbulence of the capital, easily stirred by a chance word, a clever epigram, or an imprudent edict, carries off with it as a reluctant partner of its often sanguinary triumph the silent common sense and sober judgment of the provinces. Republican Paris has in this matter no advantage over despotic Byzantium ; and indeed, in spite of religious cruelty, the annals of the people throughout our epoch con- trast favourably with those of most other European capitals. Their infrequent intervention is generally creditable and their tumult easily curbed. Yet it was impossible then, as now, to entrust the business of the State, either in crisis or routine, to average good-will or boisterous good-nature.
§ 7. The Senate retires, so far as the annalists Official tell us, into a discreet and possibly corrupt and powerful obscurity during the twenty years of under Phocas. Maurice's reign. They emerge only to be grossly deceived. The new factor decides, and the people are supreme. Senate and Patriarch Cyriac were asked to come out to the Hebdomon to witness the elevation of Germanus ; and to their dismay behold
80 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
Official Phocas crowned ! It is the demes who support,
tradition intimidate, or openly insult the imperial centurion, underPhocas. and we are reminded by their delightful frankness of the genuine if unauthorised influence which a mob can exercise in a despotic State. Again, it is the demes who welcome the deliverer from Africa, deprived of political status by Phocas ; and it is the demes again who join gladly in hewing " Agag in pieces before the Lord." We may suspect that, in the savage inquiries into plots and conspiracies, the Senate, the civil and official class, as the suspected supporters of the Maurician regime, had suffered most. And perhaps this curious period of disintegra- tion and delay could not have found a more suitable hero or climax than in Phocas. He represents, what I believe to have been widely spread, a mere ignorant and capricious subjectivity ; which so far from demanding the submission of all classes to law merely seeks to be itself emancipated. Alone in the fifteen centuries of Roman rule, there is no vestige of policy in palace or council-chamber. In these years only does the imperial dignity sink to the level of some malevolent and suspicious monarch of the East, living like a threatened wild beast in a dim and noisome lair and sending forth only groans of rage and hatred. His reign is the apotheosis of a rude and blustering feudalism, without conception of duty, equity, or the trust of office. It is, I think, possible to extricate out of the scandalous gossip that does duty for history under the late empire, and even with the earlier Caesars, some thread of earnest and serious work and deliberate plan in the weakest or most vindictive of princes. But Phocas, whom we will not salute with Pope Gregory's " Gloria in Excelsis" stands as the mere accident and transi- tory emergence of the subjectivity which had ruined the classical traditions and the empire. And it may be well to close this section here ; for the official class, cowed but still haughty, only issues forth
CH. in THE ROMAN EMPIRE (565-618) 81
under Heraclius into the light of day, assumes for Official a time large powers, takes on it the airs of a regency, tradltt°n
. , , extinguished
and is once more rightly or wrongly deposed and underPhocas.
forced into that secondary position which it will occupy during the remainder of the seventh century.
VOL. II.
CHAPTER IV
REVIVAL OF IMPERIALISM AND OF MILITARY PRES- TIGE UNDER THE HERACLIANS : RESENTMENT AND FINAL TRIUMPH OF CIVILIAN OLIGARCHY
(620-700)
Position of § 1. THE spectacle of the demes fraternising with a
Heraclim
insecure.
Herachus £ew Disorderly mutineers to overthrow Maurice must
have bitterly disheartened any true friend of the commonwealth who was capable of forming an impartial estimate. It may be questioned if in truth such a critic existed. Men of all classes seemed to rejoice at the fall of a conscientious prince, and to have believed that nothing was needed to restore the State but a change of ruler. It is very well for historians of our own time to see in this revolution the outcome of a grave popular hostility, directed against the existing order, the ruling and official aristocracy, the governing party in the Church. But it seems clear that public opinion was then in- capable of rising to any universal and collective idea. Definite opposition was never formulated in terms intelligible to modern ears. There were no solemn deputations urging the emperor to change his ministers, to lighten taxation, or to redress abuse. The strange sight is afforded to us of a sovereign, friend and champion of Reform, struggling in vain with a people who resisted and hated it. The stern lesson, which brought these recalcitrant and refrac- tory classes once more under discipline, was learnt in the scandalous disgrace of the new reign, the decimation of the nobles under pretext of con- spiracy, and the menace of the Avar and Persian invasion. Great public events turned then, as they
insecure.
CH. iv THE ROMAN EMPIRE (620-700) 83
rarely do in history, upon personal character and Position oj incident. Had not Phocas murdered Maurice, the ?eraclius
IIISOMIVO
benefactor of the Shah, war would not again have broken out between these ancient and indecisive belligerents. Had Phocas again resembled, in ever so slight a degree, the usual military ^pretender, he would have adorned with strenuous virtues a throne won by crime, and reinforced a nerveless or mori- bund civilian rule. Few popular cries have echoed with such wide emphasis as the words which re- minded Phocas he still possessed a rival : /xa'0e rqv KaTOLG-Taa-iv, 6 Mai/jO/JC£0? OVK cnreOavev. For had he or his son Theodosius escaped to the asylum of the Persian Court, and in the end regained the purple, is it impossible to conceive a firm alliance against Saracen zealots, and an impregnable bulwark for the south-east of Europe ? It was an era, like the tenth century in Rome, of individuals, not of ideas, and the objective trails heavily behind subjective caprice. The annals of the Heraclian house are scanty and obscure ; yet we need no psychology to fill up in imagination the early years of the African deliverer. Did not the official class resume, in the new security, the old habits of dictation ? Was not the encroachment on central authority, intermitted in the terror of Phocas' suspicious rule, resumed and extended ? There must have been a " political contest " of the highest importance between mon- archy and civil "feudalism," which is a worse form than the blunt but straightforward rule of the strong arm. Heraclius, in his design to shift the seat of government, desired to remove himself and the " Roman " traditions (little more was left) from the unpatriotic and costly misrule of the Bureaux, from the peril of the local militia. Disintegration had already so far set in, that it did not at first seem to matter whether the fragments of empire were conveyed or entombed ! Africa had set the example of insurrection ; and although his arrival
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
provinces their
Position of was a welcome relief, it was not forgotten that a
Heraclius u foreign » conqueror had occupied the throne, and insecure.
brought with him a band of foreign supporters.
Officials, Various types and hints of the mutinous spirit
presented themselves ; the Eastern heretical sects, Egypt, Naples and John Compsa, the Exarchate
disaffection. and Eieutherius, Rome and the pontiff, even the " prerogative tribe " itself, the Carthaginian province. The armies of Rome were reduced to a dangerous private legion in Cappadocia, and the African levies which were loyal to Heraclius. Cappadocia, indeed, could boast of being the native land of both Maurice and his murderer; and the tie which bound these provincial regiments to Priscus was (as we saw in the text) feudal and personal. Indeed, we may find in them some parallel to that Isaurian brigade which under Leo I. and Zeno (467-491) might form a useful counterpoise to Teutonic predominance, but roused a dangerous civil war under Anastasius. The ideal ruler of Priscus, their commander, was also the ideal of the now reviving civilian circles ; a gentle and inaccessible sovereign, confined in his palace like the king of the Mossyni, bearing the whole weight of an autocracy which he did not exercise, the whole brunt of the odium he had not deserved. Quite like a mediaeval baron, Priscus bluntly expresses his surprise at the emperor's visit to his fastness ; ll he had no business to quit his capital and visit the outlying detachments of troops." So in modern China, we can picture the resentment of a viceroy, hitherto a petty sovereign in his sphere, if a regular system of imperial visit and progress were to be established. The " Mandarinat " (if I may continue the suggestive parallel) of Byzantium equally resented the personal command of the sovereign in a distant war. With ready foresight they presaged the extinction of their influence, the suppression of their posts. If the new emperor threw in his lot with the military element and pur-
CH. iv THE ROMAN EMPIRE (620-700) 85
sued with success a vigorous policy, their reign was Officials, over. Heraclius, who in these strange years of dormant energy had never relinquished his design their of restoration, recovered control over the feudal disaffection. retinue of Priscus by guile and an adventurous appeal, over the civilian bureaux who surrounded and stifled him, by forming a new alliance, — with the wealth and growing influence of the Church.
§ 2. The Senate still treats with the foreign foe Senate as in ancient times. It had proscribed Vitalian ^^ . under Anastasius, and it negotiated with the Persian prerogative
general. The text is to be found in the Paschal reasserted
aunno wars
Chronicle; and it is clear that in A.D. 618 the Byzan- tine government was a Venetian oligarchy, with a Doge first among his peers ; or perhaps a Spartan aristocracy in a peaceful interlude when the military power of the kings was in abeyance. It is sent from "rulers" (rwv apyovrav wuv), and it seeks to lay blame on Phocas and exonerate Heraclius. It preserves a semblance of Roman pride with a signifi- cant alloy of religious pietism ; it is not the Persian valour which has robbed the realm of its finest provinces, but the righteous indignation of Heaven. Already appear traces of this triple alliance of Emperor, Church, and Army, which revives the faint- ing spirit of the State, gives a loftier sanction to patriotism, wins back the lost, and strikes the foe in his hiding-place : makes a soldier's death the prize of martyrdom (<rre<pos Aa/3ft)/xey /maprvpcov), and tones the military bluntness with metaphysical ideals (Con- stantine IV. and the appeal for a trinity of emperors). Reinforced by this potent support, Heraclius is able in two decisive measures to abolish the "political" bread (which pauperised a seditious capital), to acquire funds from the one wealthy corporation that remained, and to proclaim a Holy War.
We must not forget that the position which Heraclius was summoned to occupy bore a painful resemblance to the majestic impotence of a mediaeval
86 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
Senate king. There was no army beyond his own retinue,
resumes ancj a suspected provincial force under a leader to
lprerogative whom he was too much indebted; there were no
reasserted funds in the treasury ; and there was no public
during wars. ^ir{i Qr opmiom Hjs great stroke of diplomacy
created these three indispensable factors of recovery in a national crisis. The interested and privileged were terrified by his proposal to sail for Carthage, and being sobered by the threat lent help ; the patriarch, whose influence depended on imperial choice, not on hallowed associations, became the financier and banker of the great scheme. After some expostulation, Heraclius was permitted to head the army in person and revert to the strictly " imperatorial " tradition, in abeyance for more than two centuries. He leaves the regency to the now dutiful Senate, with the Patriarch Serge and the Patrician Bonus. When we ask for the actual achievement of Heraclius, we are at first in a dilemma : he seems to lose more than he wins back. But he recovers Asia Minor, and Roman tradition banished from Illyricum and Pannonia, once fruitful in princes, is to find a home there. Et w yap ?i/ 'H^a/cXao? OVK av rjv Aewv. The solid, continuous, and opulent territory was formally reunited to the centre ; and we have noticed that Leo's Byzantine monarchy is strictly territorial, and dismisses distant rights and prerogative, of which the meaning is already forgotten or obscured in the rising gloom. Dependence | 3. The few years after the death of Heraclius I. are the brief In,dian summer of senatorial prestige. This body assumes the arbitrament of affairs and settles the succession. Martina summons a conclave of Senate and Patriarch to approve the will of Heraclius, in its way as strange as the testament of Maurice. But the people, who are also publicly consulted in the Hippodrome, refuse to sanction a divided throne and a female regency. Before the clamour of the mob Martina has to yield, like
CH. iv THE ROMAN EMPIRE (620-700) 87
another Agrippina. The reign of Heraclius Con- Dependence stantine II. was suspiciously short, and rumour of Heracliads accused Martina of poison. At last, with Heraclius III. and David Tiberius III., she sat on the throne, only to be soon exiled with tongue slit, in company with her son with nose cut. This unique and legitimate penalty imposed by a Senate on an emperor and empress-dowager is veiled in darkness. We may perhaps suspect a strong religious influence behind the Senate in this matter. Fiery monks made the most of Heraclius' incestuous alliance with a niece ; and pointed to the little Constantine (whom we call Constans II. or III.) as " seized" of the sole right to rule. No doubt his childish hand signed the warrants for this mutilation, and he professes his gratefulness and allegiance to the Senate in language which deserves to be cited : " My father Constantine reigned for a long time with Heraclius, my grand- sire, but after him for a very brief space. For a stepmother's jealousy abruptly severed all this ex- cellent promise, and dismissed him from life. And this crime she wrought for the sake of her own son, born in unholy wedlock with Heraclius. But her and her son your most righteous vote under Heaven has cast from the throne, so that we may not look upon the empire of the Romans as most villainous and con- trary to all law ; for to prevent this is the especial care of your worshipful and honourable assembly. Where- fore, I beseech you to lend me your aid as my councillors and judges of the common weal of the subjects." (xptjcrTOTOLTas e\7n$a? 6 WTpvias (pOovo? o-uvSiaT/UL^ag TOU j^jji/ a7nj\\aj~ev . . . jjj/ /xaXicrra
TOV TGKVOV t] VjU.eT€pCL (TVV 0€(f) ^fjd)O$ Ttj
SiKdicos e£e/3a\ev, irpo? TO JULIJ iSeiv €Kvoju.a>TaTOv T*\V fiaari\eiav 'PcOyUcaW. Touro /maXa eyvcoKvia rj vjuiCTepa V7T€p(pvt]9 <Tefj.voTrpe7reia. Ato TrapaKaXco V/ULGL? e^etv <TVJU.- Bdv\ov$ K. -yi/aj/xoi/a? -nj? KOivtj? TWV vTrrjKOODV (rcoTtjpias, Theophanes ad ann., 642.) In translating the some- what obscure words of the young prince, I am
88
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF DIV. A
Dependence of Heracliads on Senate.
Autocracy revived by Constans (650) : armies and priests.