HANDBOUND AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS 5'* THE Psychological Review EDITED BY J. McKEEN CATTELL COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY J. MARK BALDWIN PRINCETON UNIVERSITY WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF ALFRED BINET, ECOLE DES HAUTES-ETUDES, PARIS; JOHN DEWEY, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO; H. H. DONALDSON, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO; G. S. FULLERTON UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA; WILLIAM JAMES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY; JOSEPH JASTROW, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN; G. T. LADD, YALE UNIVERSITY; HUGO MONSTERBERG, HARVARD UNIVERSITY; M. ALLEN STARR, COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS, NEW YORK; CARL STUMPF, UNIVERSITY, BERLIN; JAMES SULLY, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON. Volume III. 1896. PUBLISHED BI-MOXTHLY BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, 66 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK; AND LONDON. Copyright 1896 by THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. P7 THE NEW ERA PRINTING HOUSE, LANCASTER, PA. CONTENTS OF VOLUME III. ALPHABETICAL INDICES OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS WILL BE FOUND AT THE END OF THE VOLUME. ARTICLES. PACK. Psychology and Physiology : GEORGE STUART FULLERTON i Studies from the Harvard Psychological Laboratory (III.) : Com- municated by HUGO MUNSTERBERG : — The Place of Repetition in Memory: G. W. SMITH 21 Association (II.) : MARY WHITON CALKINS 32 The Saturation of Colors: L. M. SOLOMONS 50 Fluctuations of Attention (I.) : J. P. HYLAN 56 Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Psy- chological Association: E. C. SANFORD : 121 Address of the President : J. McKEEN CATTELL 1 34 Consciousness and Time : C. A. STRONG , 149 Studies from the Harvard Psychological Laboratory (IV. ) : Com- municated by HUGO MUNSTERBERG : — The Physical Characteristics of Attention: R. MAC- DOUGALL 158 Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of the University of Chicago : — (I) Reaction Time: A Study in Attention and Habit : JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL and ADDISON W. MOORE 245 (II) A Study of Visual and Aural Memory Processes : Louis GRANT WHITEHEAD 258 Studies from Harvard Psychological Laboratory (V.) : The ^Esthetics of Simple Forms : EDGAR PIERCE 270 A New Perimeter: JAMES E. LOUGH 282 The Accuracy of Recollection and Observation : FREDERICK E. BOLTON 286 The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology : JOHN DEWEY 357 iv CONTENTS. PAGE. Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of the University of Chicago : (III) The Organic Effects of Agreeable and Disagree- able Stimuli: JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL and SIMON F. MCLENNAN 371 (IV) Simultaneous Sense Stimulations : AMY TANNER and KATE ANDERSON 378 Some Remarks upon Apperception : J. KODIS 384 Types of Imagination : RAY H. STETSON 398 On Individual Sensibility to Pain: HAROLD GRIPPING 412 The Third Year at the Yale Laboratory: E. W. SCRIPTURE 416 Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of the University of Iowa : On the Effects of Loss of Sleep : G. T. W. PATRICK and J. ALLEN GILBERT 469 Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of Harvard Univer- sity: (I) The Relations of Intensity to Duration of Stimula- tion in our Sensations of Light : JAMES E. LOUGH 418 (II) Normal Motor Automatism: LEON M. SOLOMONS and GERTRUDE STEIN 492 On the Conditions of Fatigue in Reading: HAROLD GRIPPING and SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ 513 The Accuracy of Observation and Recollection in School Chil- dren: SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ and HENRY E. HOUS- TON 53 1 The Third International Congress of Psychology: EDWARD FRANKLIN BUCHNER 589 Richard Avenarius : J. KODIS 603 Some Preliminary Experiments on Vision without Inversion of the Retinal Image : GEORGE M. STRATTON 611 Physical and Mental Measurements of the Students of Columbia University: J. McK. CATTELL and LIVINGSTON FAR- RAND.., .. 618 DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. Physical Pain and Pain Nerves: C. A. STRONG 64 Community of Ideas of Men and Women: JOSEPH JASTROW 68 The Functions of the Rods of the Retina : C. LADD FRANKLIN. . . 71 CONTENTS. V PAGE. Something More about the 4 Prospective Reference ' of Mind : WILBUR M. URBAN 73 Our Localization in Space: JAMES H. HYSLOP 89 Three Casesof Synaesthesia : WILFRED LAY 92 The Metaphysical Study of Ethics: JOHN DEWEY 181 Investigation of Cutaneous Sensibility : FRIEDRICH KIESOW 188 Suspension of the Spatial Consciousness; Focal and Marginal Consciousness: C. L. HERRICK 191 Natural History of the Criminal : DR. KURELLA 195 Thinking, Feeling, Doing : E. W. SCRIPTURE, JAMES R. ANGELL 196 Consciousness and Evolution: GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD, J. MARK BALDWIN, 296 Pain-Nerves : HERBERT NICHOLS 309 The Relation between Psychology and Logic : GEORGE M. STRAT- TON 313 The Testimony of Heart Disease to the Sensory Facies of the Emotions: C. L. HERRICK 320 A Psychological Interpretation of Certain Doctrines of Formal Logic: ALFRED H. LLOYD 422 Community of Ideas in Men and Women : MARY WHITON CAL- KINS, JOSEPH JASTROW 426 Remarks on Professor Lloyd Morgan's Method in Animal Psy- chology: HIRAM M. STANLEY 536 Recognition: ARTHUR ALLIN, MARY WHITON CALKINS 542 The Community of Ideas of Men and Women : AMY TANNER... 548 Psychical Research: WILLIAM JAMES 649 Psychology and Logic — Further Views : G. H. HOWISON 652 The Psycho-Sensory Climacteric; C. L. HERRICK 657 PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. Biervliet's Elements de Psychologic ; Le Bon's Psychologic des Foules: A. B 97 Telepathy, etc. : W. J 98 The Condition of Experimental Psychology: G. TAWNEY 100 Hypnotism : FRIEDR. KIESOW 105 Vision: C. LADD FRANKLIN 106 Memory: J. R. ANGELL 108 Experimental: J. McK. C., H. C. WARREN, C. H. JUDD no The Feelings: W. J., A. B 113 vi CONTENTS. PAGE The Conscience: JOHN GRIER HIBBEN 114 Jones' Philosophy of Lotze: W. J. SHAND 115 Time: S. F. MCLENNAN 118 Donaldson's The Growth of the Brain: JAMES J. PUTNAM 198 Baldwin's Mental Development in the Child and the Race: JOSI AH ROYCE 2O I Stanley's Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling: J. M. B 211 Ethical (Bryant's Studies in Character, Watson's Hedonistic Theories): JOHN DEWEY 218 Lesions of the Cortical Nerve Cell in Alcoholism : LIVINGSTON FARRAND 222 Senile Dementia : ADOLF MEYER 224 Hypnotism: FRIEDRICH KIESOW, GUY TAWNEY 226 Vision: C. LADD FRANKLIN 229 Experimental: CHAS. H. JUDD, T. L. BOLTON 232 Consciousness: H. N. GARDINER 235 The Psychology of Rhetoric: BLISS PERRY 237 Kiilpe's Psychology : G. T. W. PATRICK 323 Conant's Number Concept : JOHN DEWEY 326 Groos' Spiele der Thiere: WESLEY MILLS 329 The Psychology of Art: H. N. GARDINER, W. R. NEWBOLD... 331 Fouillee's Temperament et charactere : JEAN PHILLIPPE 335 Heinrich's Psychologic in Deutschland: W. G. SMITH 327 Miiller's Psycho-physik der Gesichtsempfindungen : CHR. LADD FRANKLIN 338 Weinmann on Specific Energies : C. W. HODGE 342 Allin on Recognition : MARY WHITON CALKINS 344 Pathological: FRIEDRICH KIESOW 347 Experimental : E. B. DELABARRE, C. H. JUDD, GUY TAWNEY. . . 349 Ethical: J. H. TUFTS, GUY TAWNEY 353 Sully's Studies of Childhood : WM. L. BRYAN 432 McLellan and Dewey's Psychology of Number: ALEXANDER ZIWET 434 Romanes' Darwin and after Darwin ; Cope's Factors of Organic Evolution: J. McKEEN CATTELL 437 Tyler's Whence and Whither of Man : WARNER FITE 443 Mosso'sFear: HERBERT NICHOLS 445 Haddon's Evolution in Art: H.R.MARSHALL 447 Hibbens' Inductive Logic : JAMES H. HYSLOP 448 Vision and Galvanotropism : C. LADD FRANKLIN, WILFRED LAY 450 CONTENTS. vii FACE. Pathological: H. N. GARDNER, FRIEDRICH KIESOW 454 Experimental: H. C. WARREN, J. P. HYLAN 456 Epistemology : GUY TAWNEY, H. C. WARREN, E. A. SINGER, JR. 459 Recent French Works (T. Lachelier, A. Fouille"e, T. Halleux, Ch. Mirallie", Fr. Paulhan) : A. BINET 551 Eucken's Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt : A. C. ARMSTRONG, JR 556 Ethnology and Anthropology: LIVINGSTON FARRAND 558 L'Anne"e psychologique : H. C. WARREN 562 Leuba's The Psychology of Religious Phenomena: WILLIAM ROMAINE NEWBOLD 569 A New Factor in Evolution: J. McKEEN CATTELL 571 Vision: C. L. FRANKLIN, E. B. DELABARRE 573 Localization of Touch : HERBERT NICHOLS 577 Memory: H. N. GARDINER, W. G. SMITH 578 Synopsia: MARY WHITON CALKINS 581 Psychical Research : J. McKEEN CATTELL 582 The Emotions: H. N. GARDINER 583 Epistemology: C. W. HODGE, H. N. GARDINER 584 Titchener's Outline of Psychology: H. C. WARREN 662 Rehmke's Psychologic : E. A. SINGER, JR 666 Halleck's Psychology and Psychic Culture : E. A. KIRKPATRICK. 669 Leibnitz, New Essays: JOHN E. RUSSELL 671 Ribot's Psychologic des sentiments : A. BINET 673 Berenson's Florentine Painters of the Italian Renaissance: GEORGE SANTAYANA 677 Morselli on Insanity: W. J 679 De Sanctis on Sleep and Dreams: W. J 681 Subliminal Consciousness : W. J 682 Paulsen's Introduction to Philosophy: J. MARK BALDWIN 684 Schopenhauer's Philosophy : WILLIAM ROMAINE NEWBOLD 686 Harris on Moral Evolution: AMY TANNER 688 Ethics: NORMAN WILDE 691 Vision: C. LADD FRANKLIN, J. E. LOUGH... 692 Motor Phenomena of Mental Effort: F. TRACY 698 Das Gefiihl und der Alter: HAROLD GRIPPING 699 Meumann's Psychologic des Zeitbewusstseins : GUY TAWNEY 700 New Books 119,239* 334> 466» 587> 7°4 Notes 119, 239, 355, 467, 588, 704 VOL. III. No. i. JANUARY, 1896. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY.1 BY PROFESSOR GEORGE STUART FULLERTON, University of Pennsylvania. In a paper which I read two years ago before this Associa- tion, I endeavored to make clear the nature of the work done by the psychologist, and to set forth the assumptions upon which he must proceed and the method he must employ. I maintained that he must assume the existence of an external physical world, and the existence of certain copies or representatives of it inti- mately related to particular bodily organisms. These transcripts of the external world, supplemented by certain elements not supposed to have their prototypes without (feelings of pleasure and pain, etc.) are called minds. I stated that it was the task of the psychologist, with the aid of introspection, observation and experiment, to obtain a knowledge of such minds, and to reduce their phenomena to laws. I held further that, whether we regard mental phenomena as parallel with nervous processes, or as belonging to the same series with them and forming a part of the one chain, that does not affect the fundamental assump- tion of the psychologist, the assumption of an external world and of minds which mirror it, nor does it affect his general method of procedure, the employment of introspection, observa- tion and experiment. These positions seem to me to be commonplaces of psy- chology, and so generally accepted, explicitly or implicitly, that they may be taken without question. They appear also to de- aRead before the Philadelphia meeting of the American Psychological As- sociation, 2 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. fine with some exactness the field which belongs to the psy- chologist, and to make possible a line of demarkation between psychology and other scientific disciplines. As, however, the sciences differentiate themselves clearly from one another, and acquire definiteness, only as they approach a high state of de- velopment, and as psychology and the sciences which lie nearest to it must be admitted to be still in their infancy, it is not to be wondered at that the question of boundaries should often be mooted, and charges and countercharges of trespass made with some warrant. It was but lately that psychology was scarcely recognized as a separate science at all, being treated as a branch of philosophy, and psychological facts being served in a sauce of epistemological speculations. From this condition of affairs the science is gradually emerging. The separation is by no means complete in fact, as a glance at many of our psycholo- gies will show, but we may console ourselves with the thought that the state of affairs is better than it was, and that human knowledge is gaining through the change. In our own day the living question is that of the relation of psychology to physiology, and of the line of demarkation between them. We hear charges that the psychologists sometimes oc- cupy themselves in doing work which is purely physiological, and one who reads the text-books of physiology cannot but see that the writer is frequently on ground not properly his own. Where are we to draw the line between the two fields ? And if a clear line can be drawn, how far is it desirable that a division of labor should take place ? It is to a brief discussion of these questions that this paper is devoted. I have said above that whether we regard mental phenomena as parallel with nervous processes, or as belonging to the same series with them and in causal relation with the world of things, it need not affect our view of the fundamental assumptions of psychology or of psychological method. But in discussing the line of demarkation between psychology and physiology, this question of the nature of the relation between mind and body may become an important one, and it will be convenient to treat my subject under two heads ; that is, to inquire into the relations of these sciences on the assumption that mental states and bodily PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. 3 do not belong to the same series, but are merely parallel (the so- called automaton theory) ; and then to consider the effect of re- garding the two sets of phenomena as forming one causally re- lated whole. I. Assuming, then, that mental states have no influence upon bodily, and that the so-called .sensory-motor arc consists of an unbroken chain of physical processes, what are the limits of the science of physiology ? The task of the physiologist lies in the study of the functioning of living bodies. These bodies form a part of the physical world, a world complete in itself, and which demands for none of its phenomena an explanation drawn from any other sphere. To explain physical actions, however com- plicated, the physiologist should have recourse to bodily pro- cesses, which in turn find their explanation in other physical processes, and these in still others, and so on without end. The rhythmic contraction of a heart, the fall of an eyelid stimulated by an irritation of the conjunctiva, the unconscious gnawing at a fingernail, and the intricate chain of actions which result in the production of a work of art or a scientific treatise, all must be explained in the same way, as one explains the unfolding of a leaf or the reddening of an apple. In each case we have the functioning of a living body, a physical thing, and our causes and effects must all be physical. This complete physical explanation of the functioning of organisms is, of course, only an ideal, and an ideal which, in the present condition of the science of physiology, smiles at us from a hopeless distance. Whether it be the contraction of a heart, or the fall of an eye-lid, or the biting of a finger-nail, or the penning of a sentence, the chain of physical causes which bring about these results lies hidden in that darkness which en- closes the glimmering taper of our science. Exact knowledge of the antecedents of any bodily movement does not exist, and in its absence the physiologist is forced to give such fragmen- tary explanations as he can, often even overstepping the limits of his own science and using conceptions which are really out of place in it, but which he seems to be compelled to use faute 4 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. de mieux. He has no right to speak of sensations, of feelings, of ideas ; they are not in his world. The functioning of a brain, as he is concerned with it, results in motions immediate or re- mote, not in feelings and thoughts ; and to make use of such in his reasonings amounts to confessing, either that he chooses to be a psychologist as well as a physiologist, or that, having found his own road impassable, he has been forced to continue his journey upon that of his neighbor. How little the physiologist is in a position to furnish such an explanation of the functioning of organisms as I have outlined above is impressed upon one who reads critically our standard text-books upon physiology. One sees that, if we eliminate from the chapters which treat of the nervous system the anatom- ical portions and the psychological portions, the residue is surprisingly small. Certainly nowhere do we find such a de- scription of the antecedents of a bodily movement as I have held up as our ideal. Let me take for illustration the well known work by Professor Foster, which is so widely used as a text- book. The learning and candor of the author, as well as his caution in the expression of opinions, make him, I think, a de- sirable representative of his class. I shall quote a few passages from various parts of his book.1 The necessary limits of such a paper as this force me to omit much that directly bears upon the subject under discussion. The question is as to the exact chain of physiological events be- tween a sensory stimulus and the resultant muscular movements. We have to consider the occurrences in the nerves and in the nervous centres, both spinal and cerebral. As Dr. Foster begins with the motor processes, I shall consider these first. As to the changes in a nerve during the passage of the nerv- ous impulse our author is frank in his admission of ignorance. He regards it as clear that the impulse is something quite dif- 1 1 shall quote from the sixth London edition. That the book may stand as a representative of its class becomes clear when one examines almost any of the more recent works on the subject; e. g., Waller's 'Introduction to Human Physiology, (London, 1893); Bernstein's ' Lehrbuch der Physiologic' (Stutt- gart, 1894) ; Munk's ' Physiologic des Menschen und der Saiigethiere' (Berlin, 1892) ; or the ' Vergleichende Physiologic der Haussaiigethiere ', edited by Ellenberger (Benin, 1892). PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. 5 ferent from the ordinary electric current, but what it is he does not venture to say (Part I, pp. 127, 156). The mechanisms with which the spinal cord is provided ap- pear also to be mere matter of conjecture. Concerning these mechanisms Dr. Foster speaks as follows : "If we regard the spinal cord, and apparently we have a right to do so, as result- ing from the fusion of a series of segments or metameres, each segment, represented by a pair of spinal nerves, being a gang- lionic mass, that is to say, a mass containing nerve cells with which nerve fibres are connected, we should expect to find that the fibres of a spinal nerve soon after entering in, or before issuing from the spinal cord, are connected with nerve cells lying in the neighborhood of the attachment of the nerve to the cord. We should, we say, expect to find this ; but owing to the difficulty of tracing individual nerve fibres through the tangled mass of the substance of the cord, our actual knowledge of the termina- tion of the fibres of the posterior root, and origin of the fibres of the anterior root, is at present far from complete " ( III, 876). In a later section we come upon this passage: "From these and similar phenomena we may infer that the nervous network spoken of above1 is, so to speak, mapped out into nervous mechanisms by the establishment of lines of greater or less resistance, so that the disturbances in it generated by certain afferent impulses are directed into certain ef- ferent channels. It may be added that though conspic- uously purposeful movements seem to need the concurrent action of several segments of the cord, and as a rule the greater the length of the cord involved, the more complex and the more distinctly purposeful the movement, still the movements evoked by even a segment of the cord may be purposeful in character; hence we must conclude that every segment of the nervous network is mapped out into mechanisms" (III., 909). A little further we find: "But if the spinal cord possesses mechanisms for carrying out coordinated movements, which in the case of voluntary move- ments are discharged by nervous impulses descending from the brain, we may infer that in reflex actions the same me- 1 i. e., The grey matter of the cord. 6 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. chanisms are brought into action, though they are discharged by afferent impulses coming along afferent nerves instead of by impulses descending from the brain. The movements of reflex origin, in all their features, except their exciting cause, appear identical with voluntary movements ; the two can only be dis- tinguished from each other by -a knowledge of the exciting cause. And it seems unreasonable to suppose that the spinal cord should possess two sets of mechanisms in all respects identical, save that the one is discharged by volitional impulses from the brain and the other by afferent impulses from afferent nerves " (III., 910). We are then, it seems, forced to assume the existence in the cord of various mechanisms for carrying out movements. What these mechanisms are and how they act we do not know. We know only that something happens in the cord, not what hap- pens. Our ignorance regarding the structure and functions of the bulb appears to be also great. -I shall cite but two extracts: "Thus of the various tracts or strands of the spinal cord two only are known definitely and certainly to pass as conspicuous unbroken strands through the bulb to or from higher parts ; namely, the pyramidal tract to the cerebrum and the cerebellar tract to the cerebellum ; all or nearly all the rest of the longi- tudinal fibres of the cord reaching the bulb end, as far as we know at present, in some part or other of the bulb ; and we may infer that some or other nerve cells of the bulb serve as relays to connect these fibres of the cord with other parts of the brain " (III., 949). "Meanwhile enough has been said to show that the bulb differs very materially in structure from the spinal cord. The grey matter of the bulb is far more complex in its nature than is that of any part of the cord ; and the arrangement of the several strands and tracts of fibres is far more intricate. The structural features on the whole, perhaps, suggest that the main functions of the bulb are two-fold ; on the one hand, it seems fit- ted to serve as a head centre governing the spinal cord, the vari- ous reins of which, with 'the exceptions noted, it holds, as it were, in its hands ; on the other hand, it appears no less adapted to act as a middleman between parts of the spinal cord below PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. 7 and various regions of the brain above. As we shall see, experi- ment and observation give support to these suggestions " (95 1 ) . It is scarcely necessary for me to add that the experiment and observation referred to do not remove the questions as to the functions of the bulb and the mechanisms it contains from the field of conjecture. The section entitled "The Disposition and Connections of the Grey and White Matter of the Brain " opens with the follow- ing passage : "As we pass up from the bulb to the higher parts of the brain, the differentiation of the grey matter into more or less separate masses, which we have seen begin in the bulb, becomes still more striking. We have to distinguish a large number of areas or collections of grey matter more or less regu- lar in form and more or less sharply defined from the surrounding white matter ; to such collections the several terms corpus, locus, nucleus and the like have from time to time been given. These areas or collections vary greatly in size, in form and in histo- logical characters ; they differ from each other in the form, size, features and arrangement of the nerve cells, in the characters of the nervous network of which the nerve cells form a part, and especially perhaps in the extent to which the more dis- tinctly grey matter is traversed and broken up by bundles of white fibres. Guided by the analogy of the spinal cord, as well as by the results of experiments and observations directed to the brain itself, we are led to believe that the complex functions of the brain are intimately associated with this grey matter ; and a full knowledge of the working of the brain will carry with it a knowledge of the nature and meaning of the intricate arrange- ment of the cerebral grey matter. At present, however, our ignorance as to these things is great ; and, though various theo- retical classifications of the several collections of grey matter have been proposed, it will perhaps be wisest to content our- selves here with a very broad and simple arrangement" (III., 952). This modest exordium is followed by a number of frank con- fessions of ignorance which appear fully to justify it. We find such statements as : " Our knowledge of the finer histological details of the various masses of grey matter is at present too 8 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. imperfect to afford any basis whatever for physiological deduc- tions, and it will be hardly profitable to dwell upon them" (1022). "In the present state of knowledge it is impossible to come to any satisfactory conclusion concerning the meaning of the variety and arrangement of the cells and other constitu- ents of the cortex" (1032). These two citations are of a suffi- ciently sweeping character to cover the whole ground ; I shall, however, allow myself the space necessary to present two some- what more lengthy extracts. They are as follows: "In the spinal cord we were able to divide all the fibres into afferent and efferent respectively, though even here we meet with some diffi- culty. Dealing with the cerebral cortex, which, as we have al- ready seen, is certainly especially concerned in voluntary move- ments and in the development of full sensations, we may be tempted to consider the fibres connected with the grey matter similarly divisible into motor and sensory ; and we may go on to suppose that the fibres joining the cortex as axis cylinder pro- cesses of recognizable cells are motor fibres, and that all the other fibres joining the grey matter in some way are sensory fibres. But in doing so we are going beyond our tether ; in all probability the nervous processes going on in the cortex are far too complex to permit such a simple classification of the func- tions of fibres as that into motor and sensory ; and any attempt to arrange either fibres or regions of the cortex as simply motor or sensory is probably misleading" (1033). "The exact nature of the part played by the cortex and the pyramidal tract in voluntary movements our present knowledge is inadequate to define. When we pass in review a series of brains from the lower to the higher and see how the pyramidal system is, so to speak, grafted on to the rest of the brain, when we observe how the increasing differentiation of the motor cortex runs parallel to the increasing possession of skilled educated movements, we may perhaps suppose that ' a short cut ' from the cortex to the origins of the several motor nerves, such as is afforded by the pyramidal fibres, from the advantages it offers to the more primitive path from segment to segment along the cerebro-spinal axis, has by natural selection been developed into being in man the chief and most important instrument for carrying out volun- PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. 9 tary movements ; but, we repeat, it remains even in its highest development a link in a chain, and a knowledge of how the whole chain works is at present hidden from us" (1063). So much for the nervous antecedents of movements. The few extracts I have given justify, I think, my statement that the physiologist is not in a position to give any accurate account of the chain of causes which led to the fall of an eyelid or the pen- ning of a sentence. What happens in the brain is unknown ; what happens in the lower centres is also unknown ; the nature of the nervous impulse is still problematic. It is not for the psychologist to throw stones, and I lay emphasis upon this ignorance on the part of our fellow-workers in science only because it seems to me an important source of confusion as to the limits of the science of physiology. Sciences grow in defmiteness as they develop, and the lines which mark them out from one another become more distinct. Here we are dealing with something very vague and very dim, and one may expect a body of knowledge so dim and vague to have a misty and uncertain boundary. Our author expresses in various places a desire to remain on purely physiological ground and to avoid a mixture of psychol- ogy in his discussions. He puts forward a few cautious state- ments which would rather incline one to believe that he sympa- thizes with the view of the relation of nervous processes to men- tal phenomena assumed to be true in this part of my paper. "Looking at the matter," he says, "from a purely physiological point of view (the only one which has a right to be employed in these pages), the real difference between an automatic act and a voluntary act is that the chain of physiological events between the act and its physiological cause is in the one case short and simple, in the other long and complex" (III., 1004). A little further we find the same thought : " In short, the more we study the phenomena exhibited by animals possessing a part only of their brain, the closer we are pushed to the conclusion that no sharp line can be drawn between volition and the lack of volition, or between the possession and absence of intelligence. Between the muscle-nerve preparation at the one limit, and our conscious willing selves at the other, there is a continuous grada- 10 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. tion without a break ; we cannot fix on any linear barrier in the brain or in the general nervous system, and say, f beyond this there is volition and intelligence, but up to this there is none' " (III., 1007). And at the close of the discussion of voluntary movements we come upon still another striking passage : "Lastly, without attempting to enter into psychological ques- tions, we may at least say that the birthplace of what we call the ' will ' is not conterminous with the motor area ; the will arises from a complex series of events, some of which take place in other regions of the cortex, and probably in other parts, of the brain as well. With these parts the motor area has ties concerned not in the carrying out of volition, but in the genera- tion of the will. So that, looking round on all sides, it is obvi- ous, as we have said, that the motor area is a mere link in a complex chain" (III., 1069). These passages are, to be sure, capable of more than one interpretation, and I shall again refer to them later ; but it is at least clear from them and from others that the author has de- sired to avoid unnecessary trespass on psychological ground. That he constantly make use, however, of psychological con- ceptions the most cursory examination of his book makes evi- dent. We read that a common effect of the arrival at the central nervous system of impulses passing along afferent nerves is a change in consciousness, or a sensation (III., 850, 851) ; that the effects of ' shock ' may be a temporary diminution or loss of consciousness, of volition, of reflex movements and other nervous actions (903) ; that a muscle may be thrown into contraction by the will (906) ; that choice may be determined in some cases by an intelligence (909) ; that mechanisms in the lumbar cord may be brought into play by the will (914) ; that, in the case of a frog deprived of its whole brain, the signs of the working of an intelligent volition are either wholly absent or extremely rare (999) ; that the operations of the will are limited by the ma- chinery at its command (1002) ; that we may, perhaps, speak of a mutilated animal as the subject of sensations, but that there is no satisfactory evidence that it possesses either visual or other perceptions, or that the sensations which it experiences give rise to ideas (1006) ; that in an ordinary voluntary movement PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. II an intelligent consciousness is an essential element (1068), and that the will, blundering at first in the maze of the nervous net- work, gradually establishes easy paths (1069). These statements from one who declares that in his pages things must be looked at from a purely physiological point of view, and who realizes that the science of psychology occupies a distinct field upon which it is not desirable that he should encroach, are very suggestive. May we not assume that they find their explanation in the fact that poverty of physiological data forces the physiologist off his own ground? A physiolo- gist, like everyone else, is conscious that he experiences sensa- tions, has perceptions, reflects and wills. What actions of the brain correspond to these physiological facts? Dr. Foster has frankly admitted that he does not know. Yet we must assume that there are nervous occurrences which thus correspond, and it is desirable to mark distinctions between these hypothetical occurrences. How mark these distinctions? There appears to be no other way to do it than to abandon physiology and turn to psychology. It ought, however, in the interests of clear thinking, to be distinctly recognized that this is a makeshift, and argues that the science which must thus be pieced out by scraps taken from another one is in a very imperfect state of development. Such a makeshift ought not to be allowed to obliterate the line dividing the two sciences thus forcibly brought together. If the parts of Dr. Foster's treatise concerned with the motor aspects of the nervous system have seemed to wander from the field of pure physiology, the parts concerned with its sensory aspects must be regarded as sinning in a still higher degree. The discussion opens with a section entitled " On the Develop- ment within the Central Nervous System of Visual and of some other Sensations," and this is followed by one entitled "On the Development of Cutaneous and some other Sensations." To the thoughtful reader of his pages the author's reasons for selecting these psychological titles seems clear. We are in- formed that " in dealing with sensory effects we must expect and be content for the present with conclusions less definite and more uncertain even than those gained by the study of motor 12 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. effects" (III., 1077). We find that, speaking of the function- ing of the cortex in vision, " the only clear and consistent state- ment which can be made with any confidence is the broad and simple one that the hind region of the cortex is in some way intimately concerned in vision " (III., 1083) ; and that" although the matter is thus in many of its details at present outside our exact knowledge, we may probably conclude that in the com- plex act of complete vision, while part, especially the more psy- chical part, is carried out in the cortex, more particularly of the occipital region, part is accomplished in the lower centres, the tegmental masses. As to the several functions of the three masses,1 we know almost absolutely nothing" (1084). We learn that the olfactory nerve " is undoubtedly the nerve of smell " ( 1085 ) , and that, " though the evidence on the whole goes to show that the cortex at the front end of the hyppocampal gyrus is especi- ally connected with smell * * * * yet the whole matter stands on a somewhat different footing from the sense of sight" (1087). We learn further that " though sensations of taste enter largely into the life of animals, and indeed of man himself, we have no satisfactory indications which will enable us to connect this special sense with any part of the cortex" (1088). We are told that "the connections of the auditory nerve with the cere- bral hemisphere belong to the same category as those of other afferent cranial, and, we may add, spinal, nerves ; we have no very clear anatomical guide toward any particular part of the cortex" (1088) ; and that though the method of degeneration suggests a connection with the cortex of the temporal lobe, "the matter needs further investigation" (1089). As to cuta- neous and other sensations arising through impulses along the nerves of the body generally, our author speaks as follows : "The fairly convincing evidence that the occipital cortex has special relations with vision, and the less clear evidence that other regions have special relations with smell and hearing, suggest that special parts of the cortex have special relations with the sensations now under consideration. But in the cases of the senses of sight and smell we had a distinct anatomical li. e., The lateral corpus geniculatum, the pulvinar, and the anterior cor- pus quadrigeminum. PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. 13 leading ; and we have seen how uncertain is the evidence where such an anatomical leading fails, as in hearing and taste. In the case of sensations of the body at large, the anatomical lead- ing similarly fails" (1091). In view of the above statements we cannot regard it as sur- prising that the author comes to the conclusion that " it is diffi- cult to say anything definite concerning the transmission of sensory impulses and the development of sensations " (III. , 1 109) . Neither is it surprising that he has chosen psychological titles for his discussions. The only thing which appears to be known with sufficient definiteness to be named appears to be the sensation. The corresponding nervous process is covered with thick darkness — darkness which may be felt. And it is not surprising that in a section of his work with the unexception- able physiological title , ' On the Time Taken up by Cerebral Operations,' we should find the following odd mixture of physiology and psychology : " The events taking place in the central stage are of course complex, and this stage may be sub- divided into several stages. Without attempting to enter into psychological questions, we may at least recognize certain ele- mentary distinctions. The afferent impulses started by the stimulus, whatever be their nature, when they reach the central nervous system undergo changes, and, as we have seen, prob- ably complex changes, before they become sensations; and further changes, now of a more distinctly psychical character, are necessary before the mind can duly appreciate the characters of these sensations and act accordingly. Then come the psych- ical processes through which these appreciated sensations, or perceptions, or apperceptions, as they are sometimes called, de- termine an act of volition. Lastly, there are the executive pro- cesses of volition, the processes which, physical to begin with, end in the issue of coordinate motor impulses, or, in other words, start the distinctly physiological processes of the efferent stage. We may thus speak of the time required for the perception of the stimulation, of the time required for the action of the will, and of the time required for the complex psychical processes which link these two together" (III., 1122). We may admit that the author has not attempted to enter into psychological 14 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. questions ; we may even admit that he has attempted to keep out of them ; but surely he has wandered on to ground which the most liberal use of language would not permit us to call physiological ; and we cannot help raising the question whether what is not psychological is to be distinguished from what is simply by the fact that it is briefly and superficially treated. Sensations, perceptions, apperceptions, volition — are not these the things with which psychology deals ? In his chapters on the senses (IV., pp. 1—305) Dr. Foster appears to have forgotten that he has resolved to avoid psycho- logical questions. These chapters cover some three hundred pages, and may, I think, be fairly described as a treatise on the peripheral sense organs, with rather full psychological appen- dices. The eye is discussed at length, and from that one passes to visual sensations, visual perceptions and visual judgments. What happens between the retina and the 'hind part of the cortex,' and what happens in that region of the cortex, are passed over in silence. The reason for these omissions the previous section on the development of sensations within the central nervous system makes clear. What happens between the retina and the cortex is not known. The chapter on sight is accordingly necessarily restricted to a discussion of the eye and of the psychology of vision. In the next chapter we similarly pass from a study of the ear to auditory sensations, perceptions and judgments. In the chapter following that, we find a section on the olfactory mucous membrane fol- lowed by one on olfactory sensations ; and one on the periph- eral organs of taste followed by one on gustatory sensations. The chapter on * Cutaneous and Some Other Sensations' resembles those which precede it. There is some discussion of peripheral organs and much psychological material. It seems evident to the thoughtful reader of Dr. Foster's pages that he is everywhere forced out of his field by poverty of established physiological data. He travels on a parallel road because he finds his own impassable. In the preceding I have confined myself to the examination of a single work on physiology. I have done so for con- venience. The work is fairly representative of its class, and PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. 15 I might have chosen in its place any one of a considerable number. The results of the examination appear to me to make it evident that we are as yet very far indeed from having real- ized the ideal set for the physiologist in the explanation of bodily movements. They appear also to make it evident that the physiologist is much given to trespassing on psychological ground. Far be it from me to imply that physiologists have no right to do psychological work, or that some of them may not do certain kinds of such work better than many psychologists. I do not even mean to maintain that, in the existing state of the science of physiology, it may not be wise for the physiologist to occasionally trespass in the interests of his own proper work. On this point I shall speak further in a few moments. What I wish to emphasize now is this : a completed science of physi- ology would, on the hypothesis which serves as a basis to this part of my paper, be wholly independent of psychology, and a book on physiology would have no excuse for containing psy- chology. As it is, such books contain a great deal of psycho- logical material ; and it should not be overlooked that this is psychological, and that, in dealing with it, the usual psychologi- cal method must be followed. It should never be assumed that, because it is found in works professedly concerned with another science, it is anything more than a ' quatorzieme,' invited, nay, compelled to come in, to fill an unwelcome gap. Its presence in physiological discussions should not be allowed to obscure the line dividing two sciences, each of which has its appropriate method of investigation. II. In what precedes I have rested upon the assumption that bodily states and mental are not causally related in the strict sense of the words — that the two series are, so to speak, par- allel. In other words I have assumed the truth of the so-called ' automaton ' theory. It is to be noted, however, that, whatever may be the opinion of the physiologist on this point, his language does not favor such a view of the relation of mind and body. One who repudiates the theory — and I think it is a bold man who will dare to maintain that the present state of our knowledge 1 6 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. justifies us in holding that the theory is proved to be true and must necessarily be accepted — one who repudiates the theory may view the relation between mind and body in either of two other ways. He may regard mental states as belonging to the physical series in the sense that they are effects of physical causes, and in their turn causes of physical effects ; or he may regard the mind as a something at least partially independent of the physical series, and, as it were, breaking in upon it. In either case the chain of purely physical events between the peripheral stimulus and the resultant movement is broken by the interpolation of something of a different kind. The sensory- motor arc is partly physical and partly psychical. How does this effect our views as to the relations of the two sciences, physiology and psychology? The former of these two ways of viewing the relation beween mind and body is, I think, most in harmony with the language used by physiologists generally. Certainly, it is most in har- mony with that used by Dr. Foster, as the extracts already given sufficiently indicate. Even the passages which, as I said above, might be taken as indicating that Dr. Foster favored the ' automaton ' theory, may perhaps be understood as supporting this doctrine. The afferent impulses started by a physical stim- ulus are supposed, when they reach the central nervous sys- tem, to become sensations ; the will is said to arise from a com- plex series of events which take place in various regions of the cortex and probably in other parts of the brain as well ; and we are told that mechanisms in the lumbar cord may be brought into play by the will. Here we have, if we take the author's words as they stand, a composite arc — physical, psychical, and physical. I am not inclined, however, to take such statements too seri- ously. Physiologists do not appear to pick their words very carefully, nor do they appear to have given much serious thought to this question of the relation of mind and body. It would be obviously unfair to read into their statements more than they have themselves seen in them. Nevertheless, it is worthy of mention that, even if their language is chosen only for convenience and is meant to be interpreted loosely, it is PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. ij clearly misleading in case they do not hold to the view I am discussing ; and it would be much better did they exercise a lit- tle care in expression. If, on the other hand, looseness of expression is an indication of looseness and vagueness of thought, it is highly desirable that it be vigorously attacked and speedily brought to an end. But whatever be the real opinion of the physiologist regard- ing the matter, it remains to discuss this view of the relation of mind and body. If we accept it we have, it is true, from initial stimulus to resulting movement, but the one causal series. It is, however, a series made up of two quite different kinds of elements. We have, on the one hand, physical changes which may be studied, as are all physical changes, by directly objec- tive methods. We now know very little about the changes in a nerve during the passage of the nervous impulse, but there is no reason to think that we may not justly expect to investigate these changes by the same methods as those employed in the investi- gation of physical and chemical problems. On the other hand, we have also to reckon with psychical facts, sensations, percep- tions, volitions ; and in whatever series one may be inclined to place these, it seems incredible that one should expect to study them just as one would study the changes in a muscle during contraction. It is not inconceivable that with improved appara- tus we may some day arrive at an ocular demonstration of the translocation of molecules there supposed to take place. But would the most ardent physiologist expect an exhaustive study of the brain to reveal directly sensations of color or sound, or feelings of pleasure or pain? I am not now speaking of mole- cular changes corresponding to such psychical facts, but of the facts themselves. Surely there is but one way of reaching such facts, and that is by the use of introspection ; and there is but one method by which they may be studied — the psycho- logical method of introspection, observation and interpretation. Hence, even if we have to do with the one causal series, we have two kinds of facts and two distinct methods, and it seems, on the whole, convenient that the work should be divided be- tween two men. We have abundant evidence that a given man may employ the one method very well and the other very badly. 1 8 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. On this view of the relation of mind and body the physiologist would not, it is true, be wholly independent of psychology ; he would be occupied with series of occurrences which end in or are initiated by psychical facts, and he would be interested in these facts as he is interested in the physical stimuli which give rise to nervous impulses. They would, however, constitute no part of his own proper field of labor ; and to give the total ante- cedents of a given bodily movement, the combined work of the physiologist and psychologist would be needed. It is hardly worthy of remark that, in the present state of our knowledge, the question as to the exact spot in the sensory-motor arc at which the psychical patch is to be inserted, is one which no sen- sible person will give himself the trouble of asking. On the wisdom of making mental states effects of bodily causes and setting them in the one series with these, it is not necessary for me here to comment. If the mind be regarded as a something independent of the physical series of causes and effects, and, so to speak, breaking in upon it, the case is much the same as in the above. We have a physical series interrupted at a given point by something of a different nature, and which must be investigated by a dif- ferent method. The physiologist appears to have a definite task — the study of the physical series ; he may leave the ex- amination of the gap between its two parts to the psychologist, whose work is sufficiently marked out from his own by the method employed, the method of introspection, observation and experiment, and interpretation. So much for the theoretical boundary line between physiology and psychology. It is, I think, a sufficiently definite one. It is, however, a line, and not a fence ; one may easily step over it, as, indeed, many do step over it. The question naturally arises, is it wise to step over it, and if so, when? I think this question may be answered in a general way by saying that, when, for any reason, an excursion into other territory will further one's progress in one's own, such an excursion is justifiable. If the physiologist can, through a study of psychical phenomena, arrive at some hint of their physical concomitants, or, if you will, causes, it seems quite right that he should make use of such a PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. 19 means to his end. The two theories of color vision commonly discussed in books on physiology very well illustrate this point. I have said somewhere above that practically nothing is known about the occurrences between the retina and the 'hind part of the cortex' in the act of vision. I might have added that compara- tively little is known about what goes on in the eye itself. What has taken place in the retina when one has become conscious of seeing the color red or the color blue, physiology has never succeeded in directly demonstrating. Both the Young-Helm- holtz and the Hering theories are attempts to guess at the nature of such physical occurrences by the aid of knowledge gained in another field, the psychological. Such a mode of procedure seems proper enough, but it is well to remember that were the science of physiology more completely developed, this excursus into psychology would be unnecessary. Where such an excursus has not a physiological end in view, but is merely psychological throughout, it does not appear to me justifiable. There are a number of chapters in Dr. Foster's fourth volume which seem to be of this nature. Their place is in a text-book on psychology and not one on physiology. In the place which they actually occupy they serve, I think, only to conceal poverty of physiological material and to confuse the reader's mind as to the limits of the two sciences. The above sentences and, indeed, the whole argument of this paper support the conclusion that, with increase of knowledge, the amount of psychology to be found in text-books on physi- ology will be a diminishing quantity. This does not, however, imply that psychology will grow independent of physiology, as the latter will grow independent of the former. Physics and chemistry are independent of physiology, but it is not indepen- dent of them. The psychological method includes introspec- tion, observation and experiment, and interpretation of what is thus brought to light. And the difference between guessing roughly at what is passing in a man's mind by watching the movements of his face, and studying systematically and min- utely the human body with the same end in view, is not a dif- ference in kind. The objective method in psychology implies the employment of physiology in the search for psychological 20 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. truth ; and, as I pointed out two years since in the paper already mentioned, the every-day psychology of the practical man who needs to know something about what is passing in his neigh- bor's mind is, after all, psychology, and only differs from that of the scholar in being less systematic, exact and reflective. If a study of the cerebral cortex will better reveal what we are seeking to discover than a study of the face, then by all means let us transfer our attention to that. Let us not, however, grow so interested in the study of the body as to forget that we are psychologists. Let us not take up physiological' work which has no psychological aim. Now and then, I think, psycholo- gists do this. When they do it I believe they are guilty of un- justifiable trespass, and would probably better serve the world by remaining on their own ground. STUDIES FROM THE HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. (III.) COMMUNICATED BY PROFESSOR HUGO MUNSTERBERG. A. THE PLACE OF REPETITION IN MEMORY. BY W. G. SMITH. Smith College. The investigation of which I wish to give a short account was undertaken with the view of affording material for a further step in the experimental analysis of the processes involved in learning and recollection.1 Every one knows that repetition plays an important part in the process of acquiring knowledge, but hitherto there has been no attempt experimentally to study this factor beyond the experiments of Ebbinghaus relating to the effect of repetition on the duration of memory. The aim of the following experiments has been to determine the extent and character of memory at different stages of repetition. Series of nonsense syllables formed the subject-matter which had to be learned ; the reagent made no attempt to learn a series by heart, but simply reproduced as much as he could recollect after he had repeated it a certain number of times. The experiments were carried on in the Harvard Psycho- logical Laboratory with the kind assistance of Prof. Miinster- berg in the spring and summer of 1895. I am able to present the results gained from eight subjects. In some cases the experi- ments are not so numerous as might be desired ; on the other hand, owing to the large number of subjects, any conclusion which may be drawn can hardly be vitiated by merely individual peculiarities. Only the initial stage of the research can be pre- sented here, but as I have no immediate prospect of making any substantial advance in the investigation, it seems best to bring forward now the results so far as they have been gained. IThis research may be regarded as a continuation of the work on memory which formed the subject of an article in Mind, N. S., IV., p. 47. 22 W. G. SMITH. The following method was adopted in the experiments. Series of syllables were printed on slips of paper by means of the typewriter in such a form that the subject could easily read what was printed. In each series there were ten syllables form- ing one line ; in each syllable there were three letters, the vowel being in the middle. Syllables which were too harsh in sound, or which might suggest too easily an intelligible word or phrase were rejected. No two successive syllables were allowed to have the same vowel, and the same consonant could recur only after several others had intervened. Modified vowels were not used, and consonants whose pronunciation was ambig- uous, e. g., h, c, were either not used at all, or were used only under certain conditions. The syllables were formed and ar- ranged after a method similar in certain respects to that fol- lowed by Muller and Schumann ; the object was to let chance rule as far as possible in the formation of the series. When the supply of new and unobjectionable syllables was exhausted the syllables which had been already used were rearranged to form fresh series. In the actual experiments the slip of paper bearing the syl- lables was inserted in a frame which was fastened behind an ob- long horizontal opening in a screen made of black cardboard. Behind this opening and before the slip of paper was a shutter which could be raised or lowered at any moment. The sub- ject, who sat at his ease before the screen, was required to read the series aloud, one syllable after another, at a rate determined by a metronome standing near him. The rate of the metro- nome varied with the different individuals, that rate being chosen for each reagent which seemed to be most convenient for him. As a matter of fact the two rates chosen were 80 and 100 per minute. Only in one case was the rate changed in the course of the experiments ; this was done because the subject complained that the old rate had become too slow for him. The object of introducing the metronome was to secure that the sub- ject should, as far as possible, give the same time and attention to each syllable. Where a series had to be repeated several times the subject made a pause of two beats each time he came to the end, and then began the repetition again. The shutter cov- HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 23 ering the series was raised only after the subject had given a signal that he was ready and had accommodated himself to the rhythm ; before the experiment began he was told whether one,1 few, or many repetitions were required. The signal for closing was given, except when there was only one repetition, by a tap on the table which came in the pause preceding the last repetition. The subjects were asked to repeat the series with regular attention and without any special effort or strain at any point ; the purpose of the closing signal was to secure that the value of the experiment should not be lowered by any acci- dental fluctuation of attention just before the close of the experi- ment. By these precautions the disturbing effects of fatigue, of variations of attention and of emotional changes were to a large extent avoided. Where, notwithstanding the precautions, there occurred a disturbance of any kind which seemed to en- danger the value of the result a new experiment was made. Irregularities in the formation of the series, or in the conduct of the experiments, were made a ground of rejection of the result when the subject had been disturbed thereby, or when the character of the irregularity seemed to render the value of the experiment doubtful. The experiments were arranged with a view to ascer- taining the value of the memory at five stages in the process of learning, the series being repeated, according to the direc- tions of the experimenter, once, thrice, six times, nine times or twelve times. As far as possible an equal number of ex- periments was made each day for the various stages of repe- tition. Owing, however, to various distractions and also to the loss of time involved in cross-questioning the subjects in regard to their state of mind during the course of the experi- ments, this rule could not always be carried out. In no case have the experiments of any day been accepted on which there was not at least one experiment with each stage. Preliminary experiments for practice were made with each subject both at the beginning of the investigation and at the beginning of each day's work. 1 The phrase ' one repetition ' is so convenient that the inaccuracy in- volved in its use may be pardoned. 24 W. G. SMITH. The results of these experiments are presented in the tables given below. In the first Table are given the numbers which represent the values of the memory at each stage of repetition, these numbers being the final averages gained by taking together the averages of the eight reagents. The object of the second Table is to show the relative frequency with which syllables in the various parts of the series are recollected. In Table III., which is printed at the end of this article, are given the individual averages which form the basis of the values given in Table I. The description of the divisions and details of Table I. applies without alteration to Table III. The written records handed in by the subjects have been analyzed in Tables I. and III. from two points of view, and the resulting values have been arranged in two divisions. In the first division, on the left hand of the page, the records are analyzed from the point of view of the syllable. The first column gives the average number of syllables in each ex- periment, which are correct both in their component letters and in the position assigned to them by the subject, while in the second column are collected the syllables whose only fault is that they have been put in the wrong place. In the third and fourth columns are given the incomplete syllables, i. e., those which have dropped a letter or exchanged one of their letters for a false one ; in the third column appear the incomplete syl- lables whose place is correct, while those whose position is wrongly given are in the fourth. In the second division, where the different classes of error are marked by Arabic letters, the syllables are regarded as made up of separate letters ; in this way several points which could not well be brought out in the first division receive recognition. In column a is given the average number of letters which are omitted. In the next two columns are recorded the letters which are rightly recollected, but have been put in a wrong position ; those under b have retained their position in complete or incomplete syllables, while the syllables themselves have been wrongly placed ; those under c have lost all trace of their original arrangement. The next column, d, contains the letters which have been reproduced oftener than they appeared in the original series. Column e is intended to HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. give material for a further analysis of the errors recorded under £, and contains the average number of vowels in each experi- ment whose original arrangement has been entirely lost. The average of all errors taken together is given under m ; the figures in this column have been gained, not by adding the averages in the other columns, but by a separate summation of the errors in each experiment. Cases of inversion where the original order of the letters is simply reversed occurred so rarely that the column which had been set apart for their recep- tion was left unused ; errors of this kind found a place in column 3 or 4 in the first division, and in column b in the second divi- sion, the mode of estimation being slightly modified for them. Errors due to insertion of a wrong letter were likewise rare, and appear only in the total averages under m. The Roman nu- merals in the first vertical column represent the different stages in repetition. In Table II. the numbers in the horizontal columns opposite the Roman numerals give the percentage of times that the syl- lables in the ten places in the series, whether in complete or incomplete state, are reproduced by the subject; the analysis takes into account only the original position of the syllable and neglects entirely the place assigned to it by the subject. Owing probably to the fact that the experiments were not sufficiently numerous to eliminate accidental variations, the results of the analysis regarding the original position of the recollected sylla- bles are somewhat irregular if we look only at the individual results. The general tendency, however, is plain and since that tendency is expressed with sufficient clearness in the figures gained by taking together the averages of all the subjects I have decided to present only the final averages. TABLE I. I 2 3 4 a b c d e m I. . . 2.2 0-35 .1 0.6 15.5 2-5 3-o .0 0.7 22.2 III. . . 2-5 0.9 .1 0.9 13.0 4-3 2-5 •35 0.6 21.4 VI. . . 2.8 0.9 .1 0.9 11.9 4-5 2.6 •5 0-5 20.5 IX. . . 3-4 0.9 .1 0.6 10.9 3-95 2.2 •5 0.6 18.9 XII. . . 3-9 0.8 .0 0.7 IO.O 3-75 2.1 •3 0.6 17-3 26 W. G. SMITH. TABLE II. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I. . . 81 52 24 16 16 24 26 26 62 84 III. . . 84 67.5 39 38 34 33 29 44 69 92 VI. . . 81 61 42 42 34 32 46 54 74 85 IX. . . 89 67 49 4i 32 33 48 64 77 93 XII. . . 92 58 46 41 56 57 57 61 84 9i It will be noted on comparing the values given in Table I. with those in Table III. that, while the general features of the re- sults are reproduced in Table I. with great distinctness, there is yet among the different individuals a considerable amount of variation. The values given by the subject St. in col. m are opposed to those of all the other subjects, though in the case of two others, H. and Sn., the numbers do not conform very closely to the typical curve. It is unfortunate that another subject, whose memory proved itself better than that of any other, was unable to continue his attendance long enough to give a satisfactory number of experiments. The three subjects, H., Cu. and P., who have carried out the largest number of ex- periments, present fairly typical examples of the different kinds of memory ; in order to give some proof of the trustworthiness of the average values assigned, the probable error of the averages in col. m has been calculated l and the figures inserted to one place of decimals under r. Before going on to draw any conclusion from the results we may note shortly the limitations of the research. The results obviously can only be taken as representative of the process of learning series of syllables of a certain length, repeated aloud in a more or less artificial manner. The only test of the value of the memory at the different stages lay in the accuracy with which the subject recollected the syllables immediately after the learning was finished. Without doubt the results would be differ- ent if we allowed some time to elapse between learning and recol- 1 In experiments such as those of Ebbinghaus, as has been remarked, the probable error is an unsatisfactory test, because while the number of repetitions may become indefinitely large it can never fall below i . Here, on the other hand, the total number of errors may be zero, but it can never rise above a certain point. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 2J lection. Probably in this case the errors in the first stages would increase much faster than those in the later stages of repetition. Finally, in these as in other memory experiments, we have a very mixed result in which factors, such as the memory images of sight and hearing, are inextricably mingled together. The results given in the tables confirm in general the accepted fact of the efficacy of continued repetition in impress- ing any kind of subject-matter on the memory. That even with the reagents who remember best its effect is so small is some- what surprising. Probably the explanation of this feature is to be found partly in the artificiality of the experimental condi- tions ; partly, also, in the fact that the subjects were directed not to try and learn as much as possible, but simply to repeat, with all possible regularity, what was presented to them. The advantage of this rule was that there was very seldom any com- plaint made of fatigue due to the experiments. A comparison of the average values in the earlier and later halves of the series of experiments carried out by the subjects who have fur- nished the largest number of experiments shows that in the majority of cases there is a slight increase in the value of the memory in the second half, a result probably due to practice. It is interesting to observe a confirmation here of another fact which meets us in common life. In any pursuit or compe- tition the candidates start fairly equal ; it is towards the end that they begin to separate from each other. Here we are met by the fact that on the whole the different individuals do not differ very greatly in the number of errors which they commit after one repetition, while as we go on to twelve repetitions the differ- ence increases markedly. The difference between the best and the worst memory after twelve repetitions is very much greater than after one repetition. A better way of proving the same fact consists in giving the mean variation of the final averages (Table I. m) at each stage : — I. ill. IV. IX. XII. mv. 1.8 3.0 3.8 3.7 5.1 The first repetition is undoubtedly the best ; /. e., more is learned by it than by any other repetition, or, in fact, by all the other repetitions put together. There seems to be a slight increase in 28 W. G. SMITH. the value of a repetition as we pass from the third to the twelfth ; this result shows itself in cols. I and m, but not in col. a, where errors of omission alone appear ; in fact the change in col. a is in the opposite direction, the increase in the number of letters recollected, caused by the successive repetitions, appearing to grow smaller as the number of repetitions increases. If we look more closely into the figures for each stage we find certain regularities which hold for almost every subject. The number of syllables which are correctly remembered (col. i) increases regularly with the increase in number of repeti- tions, while the total of errors (col. m) and also the errors of omission (col. a) decrease as regularly. The other classes in both divisions comprising the errors of disorder show values which remain pretty constant throughout; i. £., the number of errors, while remaining absolutely constant, decreases relatively to the total number of syllables and letters remembered. It is one of the limitations of this investigation that it does not enable us to analyze exactly the errors due to the various kinds of con- fusion and disorder and separate them from errors of omission. To do this it would be necessary to employ a method which was followed by Bigham in his research on memory.1 According to this method the subject would be supplied with a list of the syllables, arranged in chance order, which were being used in an experiment and would be required to rearrange them after the repetitions were finished. What we seem to have in the present experiments is a continual process of promotion during the learning ; a syllable or letter, at first forgotten, appears bye and bye in one of the classes which represent failure to remember the right order and then passes into the classes of syllables or letters correctly remembered; in this way the figures representing errors of disorder might be expected to remain fairly steady. Cases of inversion of syllables practically did not occur at all ; inversions of letters and insertion of false letters occurred rarely, as before remarked. What the precise explanation of these facts may be I have no means of saying. With Ca. and R. the figures in col. 3 are much larger than in cols. 2 or 4 at each stage, while with H. and St. the figures in col. 4 are regularly the largest. Sn., on the other hand, shows the 1 PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, I. pp. 34, 453. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 29 largest numbers in cols. 2, b and c. Such results point to the need for purposes of explanation of a more exact knowledge of the psychical processes of each individual. Observations were made in the course of the experiments on the nature of the memory and its variations at the different stages, but I have not been able to any great extent to correlate these obser- vations with the numerical values given in the tables. The memory in every case seemed to be of a mixed character, now visual, now auditory and now motor images being more promi- nent. A comparison of the figures in cols, c and e seems both interesting and significant. If consonants retained their hold on memory to the same extent as vowels the figures in the last column ought to range about a third of those in col. c ; as a matter of fact they range somewhere about a fourth, the figures tending to approach nearer to a third in the later stages. The conclusion seems justified that vowels impress themselves better on the memory than consonants. There was a tendency in most subjects to associate foreign ideas with the syllables or make the syllables into intelligible phrases, though towards the end this tendency was lessened. With one individual, Ca., this was a very troublesome feature from beginning to end, and there was hardly an experiment where I had not one or more instances of this associating tendency. I have summed up the associations made at each stage by this subject, and without any great stress being laid on the figures they may be presented as an illustration of the fact, which was otherwise confirmed, that this associative tendency grows with the number of repeti- tions. I. III. VI. IX. xn. No. of Assns. 6 9 23 34 33 It was decided that an experiment should be rejected only where connecting associations were formed, i. e., associations which connected two syllables in the series into a single intel- ligible phrase.1 This rule proved in the end too severe, as the associations very often occurred in the more laborious ex- periments of the later stages, and in the end it was decided to ac- 1 Examples : div nur — divine nurture ; mon sud — Monday Sunday. The range of these associations will be understood when it is mentioned that they included English, Scotch, German, French, Russian, Latin, Greek and Hebrew words. 30 W. G. SMITH. cept the experiment when an association was formed between the first two or last two syllables at any stage, or between syllables in any part of the series when the number of repetitions was twelve ; in all these cases there was a considerable probability that the syllables would have been remembered in the absence of the association. There does not seem to be any definite connection traceable here between excellence of memory and the mode of reproduc- tion. The subject with the best memory and the subject with the worst both wrote from the beginning straight on, the syllables at the end of the series being thus written last. In the great majority of cases the first two syllables are reproduced first ; often the last two come next ; this is specially marked in the case of the reagent P. However, although the last syllable does not come first in the reproduction, it is in most cases best remembered. The subjects were left free throughout the experiments to introduce a rhythm into the repetition if they pleased. In most cases there was a slight rhythm present. In a few instances its effect is visible in the detailed results which form the basis of the second table ; in these cases there is a greater difference between the figures in the second and third and also the eighth and ninth places than between those in the first two and last two places. On the whole, however, its effect is less than might have been expected. It appears from Table II. that a syllable in the second half of a series has a somewhat greater chance of being re- membered than one in the first half ; the best places are at the be- ginning and the end, the chance of being recollected lessening at first rapidly, then more slowly as the middle of the series is approached. During the pause of two beats between the repe- titions the subjects waited without trying to memorize ; in most cases their eyes were fixed inattentively on the beginning or end of the series which was being presented. Two of them complained that in this way an undue advantage seemed to be given to the first and last syllables. One of the two adopted the device of shutting the eyes during the pause ; in spite of this, the first and last pairs of syllables are in this case specially well remembered. There does not seem any reason to suppose that looking at the syllables in this inattentive way has any very marked effect upon the memory. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. TABLE III. I 2 3 4 a b c cl e m r I. . . 0.7 O.I i.i I.O 16.9 2.6 5-i 2.0 1.4 27.1 o-5 III. . . 0.7 0.5 i-3 i-5 iS-3 5-0 4.6 1.6 1.4 27.2 0.4 H. 21 VI. . . I.O 0-5 I.O «-7 14.2 4.9 4.6 1.4 I.O 25-7 0.4 IX. . . 1.4 0.4 i-3 0.9 H-5 3-2 4.8 1.8 i-3 24-5 o-5 XII. . . 1.0 0.4 i-7 i-3 13-7 4.0 5-3 i.i 1.2 24.2 0-5 I. . . 2.O o-3 i-3 0.4 16.7 1.8 2.7 0.6 o-5 21.8 o-3 III. . . 2.6 0.6 i-7 0.6 13.2 2.7 2.2 I.O 0.4 19.2 o-S Cu. 21 VI. . . 3-2 o-5 i-7 0.8 n-3 3-o 2.O »-3 °-3 17.7 0.6 IX. . . 4.6 o-3 1.4 0-5 9.2 2.O i-7 2.8 0.4 16.0 0.9 XII. . . 4.9 0.6 i-3 0.4 8.1 2-7 1.4 2.0 0.4 H-3 0.7 I. . . 2.6 0.2 1.25 o-5 iS-3 2.15 2.1 0-35 0-5 20.05 0-5 III. . . 3-o 0.9 i.i 0.6 13-6 3-5 I.I 0.9 °-3 19.2 0.6 P. 20 VI. . . 4.0 0.35 0-95 0.65 "•3 2-5 1.85 0.7 0-5 16.4 0.6 IX. . . 4-25 0.6 I.O 0-5 10.45 2-95 i-35 0.8 0-35 15-6 0.7 XII. . . 4-75 0.65 I.O 0.25 9.1 2-5 i-55 0-55 0.4 13-7 0.7 I. . . 3-3 0.5 I.O 0.6 13-8 2.6 2.1 0.7 0.7 19-3 III. . . 3-7 0.7 0.9 0.8 11.4 34 1.6 i.i 0.4 17.7 Ca. 18 VI. . . 3-9 i-3 1.25 0.6 8.0 5-3 2.6 1.4 0.9 17.0 IX. . . 4.4 0.8 I.O 0.7 7.2 3-7 1.8 0.8 0.6 i3-7 XII. . . 6.2 0.7 0.8 0.3 6.0 2.8 0.7 1.2 o-3 I I.O I. . . 2-3 0.6 0.6 0.4 17-5 2.6 1.8 0.25 0.4 22.1 III. . . 2.4 i.i 0-75 o-5 H-5 4.4 2.0 0.6 0.4 21.6 L. 16 VI. . . 2-3 0.6 0.9 0.8 15-6 3-5 1-7 0.6 O.I 21.4 IX. . . 3-5 0.9 0.9 O.2 !3-4 3-25 I.4 0-3 0.2 17.9 XII. . . 3-i 0.7 0-5 0-5 iS-i 2.9 i-5 0.25 0.4 19.9 I. . . 2-75 O.2 1.6 0.8 10.6 2-3 4.9 3-6 1.2 21.9 Of T9 III. . . VT 2.25 0.4 1-7 i-7 9-5 S-o 4-5 4-7 1.2 23-8 O L. 1 ~ V i.. * • IX. . . 2.1 1.4 1.4 i-3 IO. s[ 9.0 5-4 7-i 4-5 4.1 4.1 3-9 1'5 i-5 24.9 24-75 XII. . . 2.8 0.7 !-3 i-7 9.2 5-5 3-9 3-6 1.2 22-5 I. . . 1.4 0.9 0.5 0.7 18.5 4-25 1.6 0.25 o-3 24.6 III. . . 1-5 2.25 0.25 0.6 i5-i 7-9 i-75 O.2 o-5 25.1 Sn. 12 VI. . . 1.6 2-3 0.4 0.9 13.2 9.0 2.1 0.8 0.4 25.2 IX. . . 2.6 2.1 o-5 0.4 13.0 7.8 1.2 0.25 O.2 22.25 XII. . . 2.25 2.2 0.4 0.9 12.7 8-3 i-3 0.4 °-3 22-75 I. . . 2.2 O.O 1.4 o-75 14.7 i-5 3-75 0.9 0.7 20.8 III. . . 3-75 0.4 1.25 0.6 11.7 2.7 1.9 0.7 0.4 17.2 R. 12 VI. . . 4-25 o-3 i-3 0.6 10.75 2.2 i-3 1.5 0.25 15.9 IX. . . 4-3 0.4 1.25 O.2 I I.O 1.6 1.8 1.4 0.25 16.2 XII. . . 6.1 O.2 i-3 0.4 6.1 i-3 1.2 i-3 0-3 9.9 1 The letters in the first vertical column represent the names of the reagents, while the figures give the total number of experiments made at each stage. It may be mentioned that Ca. made 16 instead of 18 experiments with stage VI. 32 M. W. CALKINS. B. ASSOCIATION. (II.) BY MARY WHITON CALKINS. Wellesley College. Experimental investigation may best supplement the purely introspective study of the nature of association by describing in relatively concrete terms the probable direction of trains of as- sociated images. To this end there is necessary such a consid- eration of the so-called suggestibility of objects of conscious- ness as shall answer the question : what one of the numberless images which might conceivably follow upon the present per- cept or image will actually be associated with it? Ordinary self-observation has long recognized that the readily associated objects are the 'interesting' ones, and has further enumerated frequency, recency, vividness or impressiveness, and primacy (the earliest position in a definite series of events) as the factors of interest, and therefore the conditions of asso- ciation. A given object, then, is likely to be suggested by one with which it was frequently, recently or vividly connected, and by one with which it stood at the beginning of a series. Logically prior to the discussion of suggestibility is the study of the suggestiveness of objects of consciousness, that is, the consideration of the question : what part of the present total content of consciousness will be associated with a following im- age? The suggesting object may, of course, be of varied ex- tent. In the rare cases of 'total redintegration,' practically the entire present content is connected, as a whole, with what follows. Far more often, some one accentuated part of the total object of consciousness is the starting point of the associa- tion; and this emphasis of attention is once more upon the ' interesting ' part of the entire content, that is upon some vivid, recent or repeated object, or upon one which has had the early place in a series. Finally, neither the total content of con- sciousness, nor a single accentuated portion of that total, but a group of these single factors or objects of consciousness may form the starting point of the association. These distinctions may be summarized, somewhat as follows : HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 33 I. Contents of consciousness are * suggestive.' a. As totals (Total Redintegration.) b. As complex. 1. Groups of objects are suggestive (through 'constel- lation.') 2. Single portions are suggestive, through their interest, due to (a) Repetition (Frequency.) (b) Vividness. (c) Recency. (d) Primacy. II. Objects of consciousness are « suggestible,' through their interest, due to a. Frequency of connection. b. Vividness " " c. Recency " " d. Primacy " " The experimental investigation whose results are here re- ported concerned itself with the conditions of suggestibility. The massed records of the first part of the study were published in this REVIEW, volume I, pages 476 to 483. The figures of this earlier summary are incorporated with those of the later experiments in this paper, and the account of the methods used and of certain of the conclusions reached is here in part repeated to secure completeness. All the results were twice set down, once in the books kept for the individual subjects, and again in the books which contained the grouped records of the different sorts of experiment. These experimental ledger pages have been bal- anced, and all the figures given in the tables represent the con- curring results of both forms of record. Constant notes were kept of subjective experiences, but have not been reported, for none of them tended to modify the conclusions drawn from the experiments themselves except where the occurrence of natural associations made it necessary to reject entirely the results of particular experiments. 34 M. W. CALKINS. EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CONDITIONS OF SUGGESTIBILITY. The relative significance of frequency, recency, primacy and vividness, was studied in about 2,200 experiments. This number does not include the introductory experiments under- taken in order to select satisfactory methods nor the practice experiments of each subject. There were 17 subjects, no one of whom assisted in more than 275 nor in less than 40 experi- ments ; and the average number was 130 for each subject. Most of the visual experiments were repeated with 40 members of the writer's Wellesley College class, with an average of 12 experiments each. The results coincide very closely with those of the more extended study in the Harvard laboratory; they are not included except in one or two instances which will be noticed. All the subjects were entirely or comparatively igno- rant of the aims and the problems of the investigation, which was not discussed until the conclusion of the work. The experiments were of two main types, visual and audi- tory ; the visual experiments are divided again into the succes- sive and the simultaneous ; finally, all the experiments may be classed, with reference to their purpose, as simple or compar- ative. I. SIMPLE SERIES. a. i. Successive Arrangement. Visual Series. The method already described1 was retained throughout, except that the time was kept, in the second half of the experi- ments, by listening to the beats of a metronome, which rung a bell every four seconds ; the metronome was enclosed in a sound-proof box, so that the subjects were not disturbed by the beats, which reached the experimenter through a rubber tube. A color was shown during four seconds, against a white back- ground, followed by a numeral, also exposed four seconds. Each series consisted of 7, 10 or 12 such pairs of quickly suc- ceeding color and numeral, each presentation lasting only four PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, I., p. 477. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 35 seconds and each pair of stimuli separated from the next by an interval of eight seconds ; at the close a test series was shown, made up of the colors only, in changed order, and the subjects wrote down whatever numeral, if any, was suggested by each color. The experimenter was hidden from view throughout. In the first group of experiments, some one color appeared several times in each series, once in an unimportant position with any chance numeral, but also once or more in some empha- sized connection — either repeatedly with the same numeral (a 'frequent' combination), or at the very beginning or very end of a series (cases of 'primacy' and of 'recency'), or with a numeral of unusual size or color (an instance of 'vividness'). The following are representative series : Visual Series, 213. Vividness. First Series : Vivid, 4. Second Series, 5. I. Brown, 34; peacock, 65; orange, 51; green, 792 (v) ; blue, 19 ; violet, 48 ; green, 2? (n) ; grey, 36 ; strawberry, 87 ; dark red, 54. II. Blue, grey, dark red, brown, green (z>), orange, straw- berry, grey, peacock. Visual Series, 127. Recency. I. Peacock, 46; blue, 38 (n) ; brown, 51; grey, 74; yel- low, 29 ; blue, 52 (r) . II. Grey, blue (r), peacock, yellow, strawberry, brown. The problem of the experiment is the discovery of the pro- portion of cases in which the accentuated color, e. g., green (as in series 213, above), suggests the numeral — here 792 — with which it was emphatically combined, instead of suggesting the other numeral with which also it was shown. The later experiments, in the first place, fully corroborated the results already published. Thus the general likelihood of the recall of numerals in series of this character, leaving out of consideration all the emphasized numerals, was 26.1% in the l°ng> 35 •*% in tne short series.1 No new series were intro- *Cf. for per cents, of earlier results (26.4% and 35.3%) PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW I., p. 479. 36 M. W. CALKINS. duced with only two occurences of the repeated numeral, since the per cent, of recall in these cases1 had been so little above the normal ; but the likelihood of associating the numeral three times repeated with a color was 63.7%, while the normal or unaccentuated numeral appeared in only 24.9% of the cases.2 In 19.2% of all the test series, * both' the frequent and the normal were remembered. This is easily explained when the normal comes late in the series, for the recurrence of the color, already repeated, draws attention to the following numeral, even when that is not accentuated. To eliminate this influence of position, the place of the normal in the series was constantly changed from beginning to middle and end. The table of individual records is given only for the one-fourth (or 3 of 12) frequency series ; it shows that the results are not due to any misleading massing of the figures, for the preponderance of frequency associations appears for each subject. As before, the column headed 'Half includes cases in which one digit only was re- called, and these are estimated in calculating the per cents., as half correct. TABLE I. FREQUENCY (3:12), VISUAL. XT Number of Both. Normal only. Frequent only. Series. Full. Half. % Full. Half: % Full. Half. % B. 20 4 i 5 2 C. 24 3 i 23 91 Ha. 13 2 26 Ns. 5 3 Pt. 22 3 I 14 I Shp. 62 21 St. 17 2 II 12 L/- " 3 5i Me. 6 3 N. ii 3 i 2 E.P. 6 122 .P. 12 I 22 i2 3 i 5 i Sh. 12 3 Si. ii i i 31 So. 12 3 Total, 200 37 3(19.2%) 7 9 (5.7%) 84 10(44.5%) Jcf. PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, IV., p. 475 2Cf. for per rents, of earlier results (63.4% and 23.3%), PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, I., p. 149. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 37 The greatest difficulty of these experiments was unquestion- ably in the study of vividness as a condition of suggestibility. The category is a vague and elusive one, seeming to include all those forms of the interesting which cannot be referred to the repetition, the recency or the primacy of the experience. In the main, therefore, the * vivid ' is either the < unusual/ or it is the object of instinctive, and therefore of psychologically in- explicable, interest. TABLE II. VIVIDNESS, VISUAL. XT Number of Both. Normal Only. Vivid Only. Series. Full. Half. % Full. Half. % Full. Half. % 1 13 6 2 i 4 2 16 3 91 12 7 [ I 17 2 1 6 i 7 8 52 10 6 i ii 12 7 2 12 4 ! I 2 II 31 : i 6 Total, 346 43 3(12.8^)25 6 (8%)ii3 47(39.4%) Thus, in close likeness to the results of the former experi- ments, 1 the vividly-associated numerals are remembered in about one-half (52.2% )1 of the series, while the normal as- sociations with the same colors are only one-fifth (20.8%) 1 of the entire number. The lessened strength of these sorts of vividness, as compared with that of the three repetitions, is shown by the greater number of cases in which neither numeral is remembered. J. P., however, is the only one of the subjects whose records, only 10 in number, show no influence at all of vividness. The individual records in the experiments on recency 2 offer only one variation from the type, again in the case of J. P. ^f. for earlier results (48% and 20.8%) op. cit., page 481. 2Cf. for earlier results (53.7% and 22.2%) op. cit., page 480. B. 33 C. Ha. 39 4 Mi. 42 Ns. 47 6 Lg. 10 2 Lh. 35 5 Me. 43 ii N. 9 E.P. 29 4 J'P* 10 R. ii 3 Sh. 9 3 Si. 10 i So. ii i M. W. CALKINS. The last numeral is recalled in 53.7 %l of the possible cases; the other numeral associated with the same color, only in 25.7 %-1 TABLE III. RECENCY, VISUAL. Names. Hy. if Me. Nr. E.P. Sh. Si. So. Mi. B. Ha. Ns. Number of Series. 4 9 19 27 18 18 12 15 1 10 9 10 Both. Full. Half. I 2 Normal Only. Full. Half. Recent % Full. Only. Half. I I 3 ii I I I 8 3 I 3 2 3 9 I 4 I 3 I 2 8 I I 4 3 3 I 3 i 3 8 2 i i I i i 2 I 2 3 I i 4 Total, 200 27 1(13.7%) 20 8 (12%) 71 18(40%) The influence of recency has been studied also in the series which were arranged without this particular purpose, by recording all cases in which the last numeral was correctly as- sociated with the color on which it had followed. In these cases the likelihood of recall does not surpass that of the average num- eral, though the * recent ' color was shown third in the second half-series : the recall of the recent numeral occurred only in 26.4% of 276 series. The swiftly decreasing influence of re- cency, well-known from such experiments as those of Ebbinghaus on memory, is thus clearly indicated : even the intervention of only two colors between the last combination of color and numeral and the reappearance of the color was sufficient to annihilate the effect of the recency. Finally, the suggestibility of a numeral which had already appeared at the very beginning of a series was compared with that of another numeral combined with the same color midway in the series. JCf. for earlier results (53.7% and 22.2%) of. cit., page 480. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 39 TABLE IV. PRIMACY, VISUAL. XT Number of Both. Normal Only. Primacy Only. ies' Series. Full. Half . % Full. Half . % Full. Half. % Hy. 8 12 Lg. 14 i Lh. 20 2 83 21 Me. 19 2 2 3 62 Mi. 2 i i N. 18 i 2 62 E.P. 20 4 33 21 J-P- 21 315 R. 22 I 3 I 12 I Sh. 17 3 23 62 Si. 17 2 12 41 So. 22 3 2 41 32 Total, 200 18 2 (9.5%) 31 18 (20%) 48 12 (27%) The table shows very clearly that with long series, primacy is a significant factor only in individual cases. Thus, its in- fluence is very marked on R.'s associations, and may be ob- served in the records Me. and Sh. Lh. on the other hand associates the later numeral, that is the * normal,' much more often, and with four of the other subjects the normal has a slight advantage. A record of cases was also kept in which the first of the series was remembered, without special competition with any other numeral, but .the proportion was barely the average one in the long series ; in the short series on the other hand the first numeral was associated in more than two-fifths of the cases — in 43 % , that is 8% more often than the average numeral and only 8 % less often than the recent. The ineffectiveness of primacy in the long series seems at first sight to contradict the testimony of common experience and of experiment,1 for, in committing long series to memory, the learner is certainly very apt to remember the first pre- sentation. This difference, however, is easily explained : in memorizing the subject sets himself to learn the series as a whole, and he may not only accentuate the first presentation, but recur to it while learning the rest of the series ; moreover, when he repeats the series, or records it in writing, he almost invariably gives first the earliest presentation. In the associa- 1 Cf . the work of Dr. W. G. Smith on memory. 4° M. W. CALKINS. tion experiment on the contrary, the first presentation was always repeated toward the middle of the test-series, thus mul- tiplying the chances that the combination would be crowded out of the memory. 2. SIMULTANEOUS ARRANGEMENT. These general results have been amplified, and at the same time verified, by introducing series in which the connected color and numeral were simultaneously shown. This method might have been used more often, since the simultaneous combi- nation of Stimuli is perhaps more common in ordinary experi- ence than the successive ; but the experiments of the successive type, in which the combination of color and numeral is emphasized by the long pause between each pair, were employed as affording a close comparison between the visual and the auditory series. So far, however, as these subjects are concerned, the results of the simultaneous series are so closely parallel with those of the suc- cessive ones, that no characteristic differences appear. Color and numeral were shown side by side in an opening 10x4 cm., by slipping them into double passe-partout frames, made for the purpose. Each frame held a color and a numeral sep- arated by a narrow band of white. The intervals of exposure were six seconds, and in a few series four seconds ; the pauses were usually six seconds, occasionally four seconds. In each of the three most important simple forms of the experiment, 50 tests were made. The average of recall, leaving out of account the emphasized numerals was 25.4% for the 100 long series and 30% for the 50 short series, thus falling, as has been said, slightly below the average of recall in the successive series. Moreover the percentage of emphasized numerals which were associated was slightly greater than in the successive series, because of the larger number of cases in which both numerals were recalled. This result, however, maybe due to the greater degree of practice when these simultaneous tests were made. The number of experiments is so small that the individual records are not given, but they are closely parallel to those of the successive series. In the table which follows, the figures for the 'half correct, which are small, are combined with those of HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 41 the fully correct, and the corresponding per cents., with those of the successive series, are added in parenthesis. TABLE V. SIMULTANEOUS COMBINATION. Nature Number Both. Normal only. Emphasized. of of Sim. Sue. Sim. Sue. Sim. Sue. Series. Series. No. % % No. % % No. % % Freq. 50 n 22% (19%) ij^ 3% (5-7%) 24 4§% (44-5%) Viv. 50 15 30" (12.8") 4^ 9" (8 ") 19 38" (39.4 ") Rec. 50 10 21" (13.7") 5^ n" (12 ") 19 38" (40.7 ") b. Auditory Series. All the varieties of experiment which have so far been de- scribed, except those in primacy, were repeated with nonsense syllables and numerals, as the association-elements, both pro- nounced to the subjects. These series were arranged in pairs of a nonsense syllable and a numeral each, with four seconds allowed to the pronunciation of each pair, and four seconds in- terval both between the pairs and between the two parts of the series. One series will serve as illustration of all. Series 33 ^b. Vivid, Auditory. I. Zet, 24; Kip, 62; Tox, 96; Wez,3i9 (v) ; Vit, 38; Lup, 45 ; Nuk, 29; Wez, 73 (n) ; Vab, 57; Muv, 41. II. Vit, Kip, Muv, Zet, Wez, Nuk, Lup, Vab, Tox. The results of the experiments are generally parallel to those of the visual tests, with certain suggestive variations which will be noticed later. The general average of recall, disregarding the accentuated pairs is shown in TABLE VI. CORRECT ASSOCIATIONS, AUDITORY. Q . Number of Possible Correct Actual Correct Associations. Series. Associations. Full. Half. % Long. 254 2405 498 22 (25.3%) Short. 100 581 118 39 (23.6%) 42 M. W. CALKINS. TABLE VII. FREOJJENCY (3:12) AUDITORY. XT.,™ Number of Both. Normal on Ij Series. Full. Half, % Full. Half . < /•. Frequent only. & Full. Half. % Hy. 5 i I H 8 i 3 i Lh. 12 3 i 5 2 Me. 15 9 4 2 Nr. i i 7 2 E.P. H 5 i 5 2 •) H 9 2 3 R. i5 7 3 Sh. 8 i 6 2 Si. X4 8 3 3 So. 16 2 I 9 3 Total, 150 77 ~T(38%) ~~+(2% i) 5*" 23 (42%) The position of the normal in the series was carefully varied, as in the visual experiments. The following table shows, how- ever, that whatever the position of the normal, associations with the repeated numeral are much in excess, though they decrease where the normal is midway in the series so that the repetition affects it also. TABLE VIII. FREOJJENCY, AUDITORY. Position Number of of Both. Normal Only. Full. Half. Normal. Series. Ful1' Half ' % Early. 42 n (26 %) Middle. 57 26 (45-6") 3 (2.1 Late. 51 20 2 (41 ") i i (3 150 ~57 ~2~ (38 ") ~T ~4~ (2 Frequent Only. Full. Half. % 25 3 10 13 17 7 "52" 2^~ (28.9") (40 ") (42 ") Two methods of making a numeral impressive were em- ployed. Sometimes, as in the example given, a numeral of three digits was used. At other times the emphasized numeral was read in a very loud tone. The next summary shows that both methods were effective, but that the voice-stress was a little more impressive. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 43 TABLE IX. VIVID, AUDITORY. Nature Number of Vivid. f iJotn. Series. Full. Half. % j>orrr Full. tai uniy. Half. % r i Full requent uniy. . Half. % Digits. 97 H 3 05-9' K) 4 9 (9-7%) 26 29 (4I-7%) Loud. 103 22 (21.8 ") 6 6 (8.7 ») 31 7 (33-4 ") Total, 200 15 ~4~ 09 < *J 10 15 (8.7%) 57 36 (37-5%) Hy. 4 If. 19 2 Lh. H 2 2 Me. 22 5 I Nr. IO E.P. 12 2 JRP- 23 26 8 3 I Sh. 23 7 Si. 20 3 So. 27 4 The individual records show greater variation from the type than the reports of frequency-association. TABLE X. VIVID, AUDITORY. XT Number of Both. Normal only. Vivid only. Series. Full. Half. % Full. Half . % Full. Half. % i 2 04 i 62 12 10 2 13 I 7 2 i 45 45 74 1 68 31 2 3 2 83 Total, ^oo "36" ~~4(i99&) "7^ "15" (8.7%) "5T7 ~36(37-5$>) The influence of the position of the normal shows itself, as in the other series, in the larger number of cases in which * both ' are remembered, when the normal comes after the vivid combination. TABLE XI. VIVID, AUDITORY. Position Number Both> Normal only Vivid only. Normal. Series. FulL Half ' % FulL Half' % FulL Half' % Early. 108 13 (12%) 7 4 (8%) 40 22 (46%) Late. _92 2$_ ^(27 '') _^ _ii_ (9 ") j7_ _i£ (26 ») Total, 200 36 4 (19%) 10 15 (8.7%) 57 36(37-5%) The records of the recency experiments show the very strik- ing effect of auditory recency. There are no individual varia- tions from the general type, and the number of cases in which the normal is remembered does not rise above one-eighth. In about half the records the * recent ' is wholly or partially re- membered in every case. 44 M. W. CALKINS. TABLE XII. RECENCY, AUDITORY. -^ Number of Both. Normal Only. Recent Only. Series. Full. Half. % Full. Half. % Full. Half. % Hy. 5 5 Lg. 9 i Lh. 6 51 Me. 93 4 l N. 8 43 E. P. 10 91 J. P. 10 2 I 4 2 R. n i i 7 i Sh. 10 i 51 Si. ii 2 ii 5 2 So. ii 10 i Total, 100 "To" (io%)~2 2" (3%) "66" T3~(7 Auditory experiments to determine the effectiveness of primacy were undertaken, but were soon discontinued because they showed from the beginning the insignificance of this fac- tor in long series. In the short auditory series, however, as in the visual, the first position proved very important : the first numeral was associated in 38.4% of the possible cases, that is, in 14% more than the average number. The general relations of the auditory to the visual series ap- pear in the next table in which only per cents, are given : XIII. COMPARISON OF VISUAL AND AUDITORY ASSOCIATIONS. Type of Series. Correct Ass. Both. Normal. F, V or R. Total F, V or R. Total Normal. F. Vis. 26% 19% 6 % 44-5% 63-5% 25 % F. Aud. 25" 38" 2 " 42 « 80 " 40 " Viv. Vis. 26" I3" 8 " 39-4" 52 « 21 " Viv. Aud. 25" 19" 8.7" 37-5 " 56.5" 27.7" Rec. Vis. 33 " 14" 12 " 40. " 54 " 26 " Rec. Aud. 23" 10" 3 " 72.5" 82.5" 13 " II. COMPARATIVE SERIES. In showing that frequency, vividness, primacy and recent- ness are conditions of association these experiments have so far, of course, merely substantiated ordinary observation. The real purpose of the investigation is attained only by a comparison of these factors. Already it has appeared that the per cent, of correct ' frequency ' associations is slightly the largest, and that recency is the principle of the combination in the next greatest number of cases. In order, however, to carry out the HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 45 comparison under like conditions, these principles of combination were compared within the same series. To this end, long r succes- sive ' series were arranged in which the significance of frequency was contrasted with that of vividness by showing a color three times with the same two-digit numeral (f) and once with a three-digit numeral (v) ; others, in which the color three times shown with a numeral (f ) appeared also at the first of the series with another numeral (p). Short 'successive' series were formed in which the last color (r) had appeared once before with a three-digit numeral (v) , or at the very beginning of the series (p), or twice before with a repeated numeral (f). In the following summary of results of the comparison of fre- quency and primacy, half the records are those of Wellesley sub- jects. The individual records are not given because they are few in number and show no variation. The experiments were not continued further because their result was so unmistakable verify- ing the conclusion already reached by the study of primacy alone, that this is evidently an unimportant feature of long series. TABLE XIV. FREOJJENCY AND PRIMACY. Number of Both. Prim. Only Freq. Only Series. Full. Half. % Full. Half. % Full. Half. % 80 15 2 20% 3 2 5% 44 3 56.8% The comparison of frequency with vividness shows far less inequality, and yet there is a definite excess of correct associa- tions with frequency. In half the cases where there was any association at all, both the frequent and the vivid numeral were recalled. The records are these : TABLE XV. FREOJJENCY AND VIVIDNESS. Names" Series. Hy. 7 Lg. 13 Lh. 23 Me. 26 Na. 17 E. P. 20 J. P. 1 8 R. 23 Sh. 1 6 Si. 14 So. 23_ Total, 200 Both. Vivid Frequent. Full. Half. % Full. Half. % Full. Half. % 2 2 8 2 i5 I 3 4 12 3 6 4 2 i I 8 2 16 I 2 I 4 7 3 I i 2 6 ii I 3 4 3 6 6 I 9 5 9^ (45-5%) "16" T(9%) 44 27(28 •7%) 46 M. W. CALKINS. This shows a total of 74.2% (28.7+45.5) of associations with the numeral frequently combined with the color presented, and 54.9% (9-4-45.5) of associations with the numeral vividly combined. Frequency, however, is not invariably the more determining factor: the records of E. P., Lh., and Sh. show only a small difference between ' frequent' and ' vivid' associa- tions, while J. P. has more with the vividly combined numeral. The greater significance of frequency of combination was brought out more strongly by lengthening and filling the in- terval between the half-series. After the pairs of colors and numerals had been shown to the subjects, short anecdotes or news-items, of about one hundred and fifty words were rapidly read aloud. The test series, of colors only, was then shown and the subjects tried as usual to associate the numerals. The table shows that the per cent, of association was a little lowered, but that the per cent, of frequency associations is greater than after the unfilled interlude. The frequently combined numerals seem to be more tenaciously associated. This method might with advantage have been extended to the other experiments. TABLE XVI. FREQUENCY AND VIVIDNESS. INFLUENCE OF FILLED INTERLUDE. Inter- No. of Both. Viv. Only. Freq. Only, lude. Series. Full. Half. % Full. Half . % Full. Half. % Unfilled. 89 49 (55 %) 7 i (8-4%) l6 Jo (23.6%) Filled. in 42 (37.8 " ) _9 _3_ (9-4 " ) j8 17 (32.8 " ) Total, 200 91 (45-5") 16 4 (9 ") 44 27 (28.7") The influence of position in the series does not alter the general relation of frequent and vivid associations, though the greatest number of * frequent associations only ' does occur where the vivid numeral is nearest the beginning of the first half-series and so at a relative disadvantage. The greatest like- lihood of remembering 'both' occurs when the vivid is near the middle of the series so that it is influenced by the repeti- tion and itself influences the remaining repetitions. All this appears in the following table : HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 47 TABLE XVII. FREQUENCY AND VIVIDNESS. INFLUENCE OF POSITION IN SERIES. Position Number of of Vivid. Series. Early. 68 Midway. 72 Late. 60 Total, Both Full. Half. Vivid. Full. Half. Freq. Sec. Full. Half, 25 (36«7%) 7 i C11 %) 20 9 (36%) 42 (58.3 10 5 i (7'6^) I2 5 (20") "91" (45-5 ")~i6 T(9 ")~44 "27(28.7") The results of the comparison of recency with the other con- ditions of suggestibility is made in the three following tables : TABLE XVIII. RECENCY AND VIVIDNESS. 200 Name. LN UII1UCI UJ Series. L JJUL11. Full. Half Hy. 5 I 9 6 Lh! 26 6 Me. 22 4 Mi. IO 2 Nh. 10 3 E.P. 24 J.P. 17 3 i R. 8 i Sh. II 6 Si. 9 So. 2 B. 6 Ha. 8 3 Ns. 9 2 Total, 200 ~59 ~a Vivid Only. Full. Half. ° Rec. Only. Full. Half. % Name. >umDer 01 Series. : r>< Full B. 6 Ha. 8 2 Lg. 9 6 Lh. ii 2 Me. 17 7 Mi. IO 6 Nr. 3 i Ns. 9 3 E.P. 8 3 J.P* 7 3 R. IO 7 Sh. IO 6 Si. 7 So. IO _4_ Total, 125 5° 2 (30%) 36 23(23.7%) 22 TABLE XIX. RECENCY AND FREQUENCY. Both. 9(13.2- Frequent Only. Full. Half. °/ Recent Only. '0 Full. Half. 2 3 2 I I i 2 2 i 5 2 i 3 I I 2 2 I I 2 2 I I i I 2 I 2 2 i 2 I 3 3 (41. 2%) 22 13(22.8^)17 4(I5-2< 48 M. W. CALKINS. TABLE XX. RECENCY AND PRIMACY. XT Number of Both. JName. Series. Full. Half. % Primacy Only. Recent Only. Full. Half. % Full. Half. Ha. 4 I i i Lg. 13 6 I i 3 Lh. 4 2 I Me. 8 2 I i i 2 Mi. 4 I 3 Na. 8 I 2 i i Ns. 3 I I E.P 3 2 J.P. 4 2 I R. I3 4 4 2 I Sh. 12 2 I I 3 3 I Si. 10 3 I So. H 3 3 i 6 Total, IOO 25 i(25-55 &)io r"r(I5-. 5%)25 ~T(28 The discussion of these results will be facilitated by compar- ing the per cents, of the total number of the recent and of the contrasted associations in the different cases : Rec. and Viv. Rec. and Freq. Rec. and Prim. RECENT Assoc. 43-2% 56.2 " 54 " CONTRASTED Assoc. % W 53-7% (F)64 « (P)4i « It appears that in this direct competition recency yields both to frequency and to vividness as a condition of suggestibility. The vivid numeral seems even to suppress the recent, for in the recent- vivid series the recent is recalled 10 % less often than in the series where the recent is compared with an ordinary num- eral (See Table VI.). On the other hand, the effect of re- cency is as usual, to raise the likelihood of the recall of the con- trasted numeral, but not to the level of the frequent associations. The associations with the first numeral of the series are de- cidedly less than those with the recent, though far more numer- ous than in the longer series. Individual differences, however, are to be noticed here, and would doubtless appear more strongly in a larger number of experiments ; they may also be observed in a few records of the other short series, as in that of So., who has few vivid, and many recent, associations. From this mass of figures a few conclusions emerge into prominence. Some of these have been already formulated, but the more important ones may be briefly stated again : HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 49 In these experiments frequency has been the most constant condition of suggestibility. The proportion of the frequent as compared with the normal associations is one-tenth greater than that of the vivid or of the recent. When directly compared with the vivid and the recent the proportion is still greater, though the number of associations of the contrasted numeral is larger than that of the associations with an ordinary one, because of the tendency of the repetition to accentuate the compared factor. This significance of frequency is rather surprising. For though everybody recognizes the importance of repetition in forming associations, we are yet more accustomed to * account for' these by referring to recent or to impressive combinations. The possibility that the prominence of frequency in our results is not fairly representative of ordinary trains of association is strengthened by the fact that it is contrasted with forms of vivid- ness which are only two or three of many, and which do not approach the impressiveness, for instance, of richly emotional experiences. But this does not affect the importance of fre- quency as a corrective influence. Granted a sufficient number of repetitions, it seems possible to supplement, if not actually to supplant, associations which have been formed through impres- sive or through recent experiences. Moreover, the trustworth- iness of the ordinary observation, which relegates frequency to a comparatively unimportant place among the factors of sug- gestibility, may be seriously questioned : I have found many cases, during experiments in free association in which the sub- ject, asked to explain the association, does not always mention repetition, even when it has obviously occurred, but seems, as it were, to take it for granted. The prominence of frequency is of course of grave importance, for it means the possibility of exercising some control over the life of the imagination and of definitely combating harmful or troublesome associations. None of our generalized totals, it must be added, are proof against the caprice of the individual, who may have his own favorite type of association which resists opposition. So the preference of one of our subjects — So. — for the recent may be traced through almost all the series, often in contradiction of the general result. 50 L. M. SOLOMONS. C. THE SATURATION OF COLORS. BY L. M. SOLOMONS. The experiments of which a provisional account is given here were the outgrowth of an effort to determine whether least perceptible differences of color saturation obeyed Weber's law, and though they have branched out into the wider field of the general relation of white and black to the colors they are still best presented from this point of view. In any color mixture we may distinguish two kinds of in- tensity : the intensity of coloring, and general light intensity. For example, if we take a red disk and compare it with a color wheel containing a large amount of white and a little red, the merest novice at color judgments will say that the red disk is the more intense red, while the wheel possesses greater general light intensity. To the former element, the intensity of colora- tion, we give the name saturation, reserving intensity for general light intensity. Now, if in a color wheel we increase the -amount of color, we change in general both the saturation and the intensity. Therefore in determining least perceptible differences (which will hereafter be denoted by the abbreviation L. P. D.) it is necessary to make sure that we are not judging by intensity. Our first plan was to mix the color — red — with a gray of the same intensity, so that increasing the red decreased the white, thus keeping the intensity constant. These experiments gave no very satisfactory results, though the failure to obey Weber's law was manifest. The reason soon became clear. When we increase the red we decrease the white. Now to assume that the saturation increment is measured by the increase of red is to assume that the saturation of a mixture depends only on the amount of color, and not at all upon the amount of white. This is not true. If we take two color wheels putting in one, say 180° red and 180 black, and in the other 180° red and 180 white, the former appears very much more saturated than the latter, though the actual amount of red is the same. With such large differences HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 51 as in the above example the difference of saturations is obvious to anyone. But to compare two mixtures of very different in- tensity with regard to their saturation, with any degree of ac- curacy, seems at first almost a hopeless task. But with a little practice, beginning with large differences and working down, the judgment becomes quite possible, and eventually exceed- ingly accurate. Owing to the training required the experi- ments were made only by Miss Stein and the writer. • The result of a long series of observations showed that the saturation of a mixture of color and white is entirely independ- ent of the intensity, and of the actual quantity of color, and depends only on the ratio of the color to the white. The law is perfectly obeyed within the limits of experimental error (a few degrees) . The equality point was always determined by the method of least observable difference, though it was not long before the judgment of the equality point became more accurate than in most judgments, being nearly always placed in the same position, for movements in both directions. The colors used were red and blue. The teleological significance of the law is obvious. It enables us to identify objects in vary- ing light intensity. The characteristic of a colored object is the proportion of the colored light to the white light that it re- flects. The actual quantity of colored light depends upon the intensity of the incident light. It is therefore of the greatest importance for the recognition of objects that the intensity of coloration should depend upon the ratio of colored light to white, and not upon the actual quantity of colored light. Meantime a series of measurements of L. P. D. made out the following facts : For a constant saturation the L. P. D. is constant measured in terms of actual amount of color added, that is, if in a mixture of 50° white and 50° red the red must be increased by 4° to give a L. P. D ; in a mixture of 100° red and 100° white, the red must also be increased by 4° ; sec- ondly, the L. P. D. increases with the saturation. To find out the exact law of increase it is necessary to have a measure of saturation. By direct observation we only determine when two satura- tions are equal. Now the law that they are equal when the 52 L. M. SOLOMONS. ratios of the color to the white are equal admits of more than one interpretation. For when the ratios of color to white are equal the ratios of color to white + color or any proportion thereof, as white -f y2 color, are also equal. Calling S the sat- uration, we have the general formula S = w _^ac satisfying the law of equality of saturation for all values of a. We have seen that for constant saturation the saturation increment for a L. P. D. varied inversely as the intensity — for the actual color incre- ment being constant, the saturation increment corresponding to it will vary inversely as the total quantity of light. Assuming it to vary directly as the saturation, we should have the formula l beins the intensity> that is» the actual increment of color, Jc, varies directly as the ratio of color to intensity. Since the result is independent of the quan- tity W+ac it might seem preferable to give the law the simple, verifiable formulation Jc * -|, and from a physical standpoint this would of course be preferable. But psychologically it is bad because the quantity c has no psychological equivalent. The psychical fact, intensity of coloration,, depends upon a physical ratio ^rn: — ^ we are to keep to psychical facts we must use the quantities saturation and intensity. Remember- ing therefore that Jc * ~ is the best expression of the observed physical fact it is yet well, I think, to retain the somewhat hy- o pothetical formula JS * -^ as more suggestive from the psycho- logical point of view. As to the accuracy with which the law J c * T *s obeyed, many difficulties have arisen in the effort to fully verify it. Several very short series of observations have obeyed it within the limits of experimental error. In attempting to get long series of observations it was found that owing to the constant increase of skill in the subject, as well as other causes of varia- tion, the different parts of the series are not strictly comparable. By planning the series with these facts in view, however, ac- . curate results may I think be obtained. The above L. P. D. law contains two anomalies which re- quire investigation. The first is that though the saturation in- HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 53 crement varies inversely as the intensity when the change is produced by increasing the proportion of color and white in the wheel, it is not affected, at least not to any easily observable extent, by variations in the intensity of the incident light. The other is that if we adopt the usual conception of a L. P. D., viz., that it represents a simple increment of sensation, the L. P. D. law contradicts the saturation law. For if we call the sensation of saturation S and the physical quantity correspond- ing to it ( w!,a£) s» we nave tne law dS = ~ I By integration this formula gives S=I logs, which contra- dicts the saturation law that S depends on s only and is inde- pendent of I. A similar contradiction exists in the other form- ulation of the law. The explanation of the above brings up two questions. What is the general relation between intensity and color quality, and what is the real significance of a L. P. D. ? A number of experiments were carried out in connection with the former problem, most of which have no immediate bearing on the subject in hand. I wish to describe only one series, the results of which are important. An apparatus was arranged, whereby two color wheels were placed in lights of different intensities. The arrangement was a very simple one, the wheels being placed opposite a window divided into two portions by a vertical board. By placing a screen between the two wheels perpendicular to their plane and that of the window, each wheel received light only from its own side of the window. The subject sat in front of the board dividing the window and had both wheels well in view. By varying the size of the openings the light could be varied at pleasure. Place a white disk in a weak light, and a black and white in a strong light. It is not -possible, by varying the proportion of black and white in the well-lit disk to get the two to look alike. It is possible to get them of the same general light intensity, or of the same shade of gray, but not both together. When the light intensity is the same the well-lit disk is a very dark gray and the other a white, dimly seen. When of the same shade, the well-lit disk is very much more intense. It is the same with colors. A blue disk is seen distinctly as a pure blue, even 54 L. M. SOLOMONS. when the light is so feeble as to make it scarcely visible, while a blue and black disk appears a dark navy blue, no matter how strong the light. There is much individual difference here. A white disk in weak light appeared much more like a gray to Miss Stein than to me, but in no way could either of us get equality between the strong and weak light wheels. It should perhaps be stated that these experiments were first carried out with the object of really securing such an equality, and our in- ability to do so was a serious inconvenience ; so that the result was anything but desired by us. We made every effort to see the disks alike. If, however, we look at the disks through black tubes, held to the eye so as to shut out everything else from the field of view, there is no trouble about perfect equality. The white disk in dim light looks gray, the blue, navy blue, etc. The conclusions are obvious. Intensity as such does not affect color quality at all. It remains a separate and distinct element in every color presentation. Blackness cannot be re- garded as the inverse of intensity, nor as a sensational element at all. For it depends not upon the character of the light com- ing from the given body, but upon its relation to the immediate field of view. It must be regarded as an element added to every presentation by some reflex process, and giving the rela- tion of the object to its immediate field of view — or to the inci- dent light. It is not a mere question of comparison with other objects, for in all the above experiments there were two objects seen, yet the most intense disk was also the blackest. Nor was it simply a question of seeing objects ' as we know them to be,' instead of as they appear. For in our efforts to obtain equality all sorts of variations were made in the proportion of black and white and color in the two disks, of which the subject was un- aware ; yet it was not possible to get equality as long as the two disks were seen in different backgrounds. The teleological significance of the law is obvious. It makes blackness a < body property,' independent of the intensity of the illumination. This compels us to adopt a four-fold, instead of the usual three-fold, representations of colored objects. They can vary in four independent ways : I. color quality, or tone ; 2. saturation ; HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 55 3. intensity; 4. blackness. Anyone of these may be made to vary while the others remain constant. This is a purely psy- chological classification of course, giving the different sub- jective effects which a colored object produces. That color quality may vary, the other elements remaining constant, is clear theoretically, though to actually compare the saturation of different colors is difficult. Saturation may be made to vary independently by simply changing the proportion of color to white, while keeping the sum of their intensities constant. Intensity by simply increasing the incident light, and black- ness by increasing the incident light and at the same time decreasing the amount of color and white in the disk so as to keep the intensity constant, while its relation to the intensity of the field changes. When the saturation of any color becomes zero we call it a gray, and grays may vary in intensity and blackness. The above four elements, and no fewer, completely describe any color combination. White is not given explicitly, but saturation and intensity together determine the amount of white, if whiteness is different from intensity, so that the above formulation is entirely independent of all special color theories. The general result of all this, it will be noticed, is to accentuate the subjective aspect of color theory. We can now understand the law of L. P. D. of saturation. Consider for a moment the process of making a judgment of saturation. Suppose we have one disk of 40° red and 20° white, and another 120° red and 60° white. The only differ- ence between them is in blackness and intensity. The inten- sity, however, is easily abstracted from. It does not 'fuse' into the general presentation but remains as a fairly distinct element. The black, however, is an organic part of the per- cept bound up with the rest. The process of perceiving the two disks to be equal is abstracting from the black element. Once able to separate that, and they are seen equal. The training required for judging saturation is simply the training in isolating the black element in a color presentation. Our ex- perience amply confirms this theoretical deduction. This has actually been the difficulty encountered in making judgments, and our records are full of such notes as ' judgment uncertain 56 L. M. SOLOMONS. on account of inability to separate black' — notes taken, it should be stated long before their theoretical significance was suspected. It is clear now why the L. P. D. varies inversely as the quantity of color and white in the disk, but not as the intensity of the incident light. Changing the intensity in the first way changes the blackness, while changing it in the second way does not. The law should really be stated J S * SB where B is blackness. If we regard the L. P. D. as measuring prima- rily the ease or difficulty of a judgment, then we can understand why it varies directly as the amount of black. The process of isolating the black becomes the more difficult as the amount of black becomes greater — as the black becomes a more promi- nent feature of the presentation. The ordinary conception of a L. P. D. leads to a contradiction in the case of saturation be- cause we have not here the simple case of comparing two quan- tities ; but there is another process to be gone through in addition to the primary judgment — the isolation of the black. It is necessary therefore to go back to the primary significance of a L. P. D. in order to properly understand the law. We have begun a series of experiments on the effect of tir- ing on saturation. The results are very encouraging, but as yet too few to permit of much theorizing. On tiring with white, the saturation of a color is increased by a constant proportion of its value for the same time of tiring. The increase seems to be proportional to the time of tiring for the times tried — 5 to 15 seconds — but the experiments have not gone far enough yet to give more than provisional results. D. FLUCTUATIONS OF THE ATTENTION (I.). BY J. B. HYLAN. The facts of the oscillation of feeble impressions are still under discussion. The alternate increase and decrease of weak sensations may be of peripheral or of central origin ; the peri- pheral sources may be nervous or muscular, the central process may go on in the cortical end apparatus of the sensory nerves or HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 57 in that psycho-physical system which we call attention. It is clear that only in the last of these four cases is the fluctuation really fluctuation of the attention, the name usually given to the phenomenon. There is no doubt but that the discussion has so far been based on a rather small number of facts ; it was the purpose of my investigation to secure more experimental results which might throw light on the question. I used optical, tactual and thermal stimuli. The subjects were Messrs. Singer, Hooper, Gehring, Logan, Rice, Hart, J. Pierce, Miss Stein, Miss Shipman, Miss Miles and the writer. The fluctua- tions were registered by small finger movements of the subjects and measured in fifths of a second. We began for practice with the grey circle of Masson's disc. The results were as usual ; the fluctuations are irregular, but the average of the periods during which the circle is seen and the average of the time during which it is not seen balance each -other for most of the subjects. There was no conscious strain upon the eyes ; to the one observer the disc seemed to move to and from the eyes and the eyes seemed to fail rather than the circle to disappear. Our new experiments were made with dark grey spots as a background instead of the circle and the first question was as to how the oscillations vary if several spots are in the field of vision. A square of black cardboard had in the center a dark gray spot 2 mm. across, and both 10 cm. above and 10 cm. below this were other similar spots. The subject was placed at a dis- tance of about 1 20 cm. from the square, at which distance the two outer spots were just visible. The line of vision was directed to the middle spot, which never disappeared, and the fluctuations of the two others were registered independently of each other. Each subject received at first some training in the attentive ob- servation of the indirect field of vision. In the first group of experiments the fluctuations of the upper or of the lower spot alone were examined and no attention was given to the other. The result was that the oscillations of the spot below the center were slower than those of the spot above, and the periods of appear- ance show a clear preponderance over the periods of disappear- ance for the lower spot, while they balance each other for the 5§ /. B. HYLAN. upper spot. With three subjects the lower spot would disappear and then come back immediately. In the second group the attention was divided between the upper and lower spots without any intentional fluctuation between them. While in the first group the fluctuation of the lower spot was slower, here the periods of fluctuation for both spots coincide ; for instance, with one observer, Hr., the periods were : " Both seen 7 sec., both un- seen 3, both seen 7, both unseen i, both seen 2, both unseen 5, both seen 3, both unseen 3, both seen 4, both unseen 7." But there is also here a difference between the upper and the lower spot ; the lower tends to remain longer in view. The entire oscillation is equally long for both, but the proportion between the seen and the unseen part is often different ; the lower often disappears later and appears earlier ; the time difference is mostly too short to be registered. No difference as to the duration of the disappearance of the spots was discovered whether one or two eyes were used, but some subjects noticed a tendency to see the fluctuations of the two spots somewhat independently of each other when one eye only was used. In the next group one gray spot 10 cm. to the right and one 10 cm. to the left of the center were added to those above and below. The constant result was that the fluctuations become more independent ; the four points might disappear together, but often some are visible and others invisible. The upper spot always disappeared first, then the lower and then the horizontal ones ; the time of disappearance is in the same order, being longest for the upper. If one eye only was used, the time of disappearance in general increases,, the upper spot often dropping out altogether ; the right and left spots fluctuate more readily with one eye than with two. Going back to the two spots, only one above and one below the center, we studied the influence of an intentional variation of attention. The object was to fix the eyes continually on the center, but to direct the attention alternately to the one or the other spot seen in indirect vision. With some practice all learned to alter the attention without moving the eyes. As the attention changed, some had a feeling of muscular movement in the head. When the attention changed, some (Sr., J. P., H., M.) usually noticed that the spot grew gradually brighter for some seconds,, HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 59 but with others it grew dimmer or remained unchanged. With all the observers the spot to which the attention was changed disappeared from vision after a short time, while the object from which the attention shifted often remained bright and with some (R., G., P.) it grew even brighter when the change took place. If the one spot disappears from view in spite of the subject's special effort to see it, and the other grows brighter when the attention is consciously diminished, we have probably no right to call the oscillations of intensity fluctuations of attention. It is a question whether, perhaps, the muscles directing the movement of the eye might become fatigued, so that a drooping of the eye would bring a fresh part of the retina in range after the spot had disappeared. This suggested the following experi- ment. A heavy black cross was placed upon a white back- ground, with a small gray spot beneath it. After the cross had been looked at a moment, an after-image was seen on any part of the background to which the eyes were turned. The subject fixed his eyes upon the center of the black cross, marked by a small gray spot. If the drooping of the eye causes the dis- appearance or reappearance, it is evident that an after-image of the cross will extend over the outlines of the figure in the direc- tion of the movement. The results were uniform for all sub- jects. It was observed that while the eyes remained fixed, and the attention wandered to different parts of the cross, the luminous after-image would shift a little towards the part to which the attention was directed, though no conscious change of the eye's position took place. After looking at the cross for a little time, the after-image seemed to be placed behind the cross and to be.;j#en all around it. The gray spot fluctuated, though the afterimage did not shift with the fluctuations. Sometimes the fluctuations took place when the after-image was shifting or had slightly shifted, but oftener when the after-image was con- centric with the cross. This seems to show that there is no relation between the fluctuations of the gray spot and uncon- scious movements of the eye. The results of experiments with regard to the inner muscles of the eye were not quite so uniform. One spot was fixed on a vertical glass plate, the other spot on a card 50 cm. behind it ; if the eyes accommodate for one, it is o /. B. HYLAN. distinctly seen, while the other is blurred. The results show that with all subjects there is a tendency to alternate between the accommodation for the nearer and the farther spot, but with most subjects this fluctuation is much slower than the oscillation of one spot alone, and especially the oscillation of the spot on the cardboard was often observed without corresponding variation in the distinctness of the spot on the glass ; the one might be visible while the other was distinct, and might become invisible while the other was blurred. The oscillation seems consequently to be independent of the ciliary muscles, a conclusion which earlier experiments had already suggested, and which results also from our experiments with four spots which were in the same plane, and did not necessarily disappear together. The second research had to do with touch and temperature. As here the same object gives at the same place both a touch sensation and a cold sensation, their fluctuation and their rela- tions must be suggestive for the understanding of the process. To the beam of a balance weighing two-tenths of a gram was attached a metal tube for studying cold and hot spots. The tube allowed a current of water supplied by rubber tubing to pass continually through it, thus keeping the temperature con- stant. The point of the tube applied to the skin was about i mm. in diameter. Light flexible tubing was used which allowed the balance to move freely. The temperature of the water both before and after passing through the tubing was taken and the average used for the temperature of the point. The water was carried through the tube on the principle of a siphon. The re- moval of weights from the opposite pan of the balance gives a known pressure of the point upon the subject's hand. As the hands could not be moved, the signals were given by spoken words which the experimenter registered, the time lost by the reaction being of no importance compared with the long periods in question. In passing the cold point over the hand, all the subjects found three distinct effects according to the location of the point. Some spots were entirely insensible to cold. Passing from that a moderately cold spot would often appear from which the sen- sation would be dull and not definitely located beneath the point. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 61 Next would come a cold spot from which the sensation would be intense and definitely located beneath the point. After a long application of the cold point for several minutes the cold sensation often spreads around the point of application and some- times streams up and down the hand and arm. Sometimes the cold sensation is located after a few minutes at a distance of 2 to 3 cm. from the point, usually coming back after a time. To the measurements of fluctuations that follow, acute cold spots only were taken, which were marked and tested as cold spots on several days. The back of the hand or wrist was always used. It was first found that a less pressure of a cold object was necessary to give a cold sensation than a touch sensation. With ice water of 2— 3°C. the cold sensation came out strongly under a pressure of 0.2 gr., while a touch sensation was not perceived unless the pressure was 0.5 gr., for several subjects 0.8—1.0 gr. In the first group we studied cold sensation only, using water of 2°C. with a pressure of 0.2 gr. ; none of the subjects had any touch sensations. With two subjects no fluctuations were ob- served, as the cold sensation after its final disappearance did not return for five minutes or longer. The others felt the oscilla- tions distinctly, for instance : Nr. cold sensation unfelt 34 sec., felt 20 sec., unfelt 23, felt 18.4, unfelt 15, felt 7, unfelt 8.6, felt 17, unfelt 29.2, felt 22.4, unfelt 6, felt u ; on another day with Hn. unfelt 46 sec., felt 30, unfelt 9, felt 14, unfelt 30, felt 24, unfelt 6.5, felt 22.4, unfelt 7.5, felt 13.5. With some sub- jects the fluctuations were quicker, for instance : Ht. unfelt 9 sec., felt 3, unfelt 2, felt 4.5, unfelt 4, felt 25, unfelt 50, felt 9, unfelt 2, felt 6, etc. The sensations of cold are much stronger when the point is first applied than afterwards. The feeling grows gradually less, often changing into a dull ache before dis- appearing. When it appears again it is mostly less intense than at first, though it sometimes gradually increases again to a high degree of intensity. As a rule there is a gradual decrease of intensity as the sensations successively return. The times dur- ing which the cold is not felt are not the only fluctuations ; very often while the cold is being felt, it fluctuates in its intensity. When the pressure was as much as i gr. all the subjects felt 62 j. B. HYLAN. a tactual sensation in addition to the temperature sensation, and with all subjects the two fluctuated independently. While with the higher pressure some of the subjects got no continuous fluctuation, as the sensation did not return after the first or second disappearance ; here there was practically no limit to each series. A typical series would be : 2°C. i gr. pressure. At first cold and touch then after 45 sec. cold disappears while touch remains, 23 sec. later cold appears again, 42 sec. later cold disappears, 20 later cold appears, 21 later cold disappears, 54 later touch also disappears, 81 later cold appears again, 59 later touch appears again, 106 later cold disappears, 15 later touch disappears, etc. A prolonged series may be character- ized by the following case (a=appears, d=disappears, t= touch, c=cold) : Hn. 2°C. i gr. pressure, c. t. — 7 sec. d : c. — 5 sec. a : c. — 6 sec. d : c. — 42 sec. a : c. — 13 sec. d : c. — 64 sec. d : t. — 17 sec. a : c. — n sec. a : t. — 7.5 sec. d : c. — 9 sec. d: t. — 8.5 sec. a: t. — 21.5 sec. a. c. — 2.5 sec. d: t. — 6 sec. d: c. — 2 sec. a: t. — 14 sec. d: t. — 2.5 sec. a: c. — 22.5 sec. d: c. i sec. a: t. — 7 sec. a: c. — n sec. d: c. — 2.5 sec. d: t. — 6 sec. a: c. — 15 sec. d: c. — 61.5 sec. a: t. — 8 sec. d: t. — 31.5 sec. a: c. — 2 sec. a: t. — 6.5 sec. d: c. — 27.5 sec. a: c. — 12 sec. d: c. — 19 sec. a : c. — 5 sec. d : t. — i sec. d : c. — 15.5 sec. a : t. The same experiments were made with a pressure of 3 gr. and of 5 gr. The general type of the results was the same, but a curve representing the average of all subjects, and separa- ting the touch fluctuations from the cold fluctuations, shows distinctly that the periods of disappearance for the touch sensa- tion increase with increasing pressure. The stronger the pressure, the greater the tendency of the pauses to exceed the periods of sensation. This is contrary to the results with light and, as we shall see, also contrary to the results with temperature. It may be explained, perhaps, by the fact that an unusual pressure keeps the blood away from the place of contact and brings on numbness, but it is difficult to see why that numbness disappears again. The two kinds of fluctuations tend unmistakably to be independent of each other, but a constant law of the disappear- ance and reappearance cannot be formulated, as the fluctuation of the temperature sensation especially seems dependent upon a HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 63 great variety of conditions. The central psychophysical control of the peripheral blood supply seems an important factor among others. The position of the hand and the temperature of the room was of course kept as constant as possible. In the next group of experiments the pressure remained un- varied, always 2 gr., but the temperature changed between 2° C. and 18° C., producing, therefore, cold sensation of different intensity, but the sensations, at least at first, were always of cold. The individual results show great differences and irregularities, but the average of all experiments with all subjects shows a dis- tinct tendency for the intervals without sensation to become longer as the temperature rises. In general with 2° C. the duration of the sensations and of the pauses are nearly equal. With 10—12° C. the pauses are more than twice as long, and with 18° C. three to four times as long as the period of sensation. In some experi- ments, however, the temperature seemed to have no influence at all on the length of the fluctuations. It might be asked whether the cold sensations did not interfere with the touch sensation, so as to produce an abnormal result. Experiments were made, therefore, with the temperature of the water too high to give a cold sensation or in spots which are not sensitive to cold, but nothing in the results indicated that the cold tended to interfere with the fluctuations of the touch sensation. In experiments to be described later two tubes were used, suspended from the beam of the balance, giving two cold sensa- tions and two touch sensations at the same time, or cold and hot sensations together. DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. PHYSICAL PAIN AND PAIN NERVES. My article in the July number of this Review on ' The Psychology of Pain' has had the good fortune to elicit discussion from Dr. Nichols in the September number and from Dr. Marshall in the November number, and I trust I may now be permitted to say a few words in reply to their criticisms. My thanks are due to Dr. Nichols for making it plain that the con- ditions known as analgesia and hyperthermalgesia may be explained on a different hypothesis from that advocated in my article ; on the hypothesis, namely, that the skin possesses, in addition to the ordinary nerves of touch and temperature, three distinct sets of pain nerves, one for tactile pains, another for heat pains, and a third for cold pains. Dr. Nichols is better acquainted than I with the literature of the sub- ject, and will know whether the hypothesis of pain nerves commonly takes this form. The hypothesis I had in mind was that of a single set of pain nerves, excitable indifferently by all kinds of painful stim- uli ; and I think it will be admitted that the fact that tactile pains and temperature pains may be exaggerated or lost independently has the appearance of disposing of this hypothesis. At least I find a careful physiologist like Foster arguing without hesitation that, where sensa- tions are lost independently, the impulses must proceed by separate paths. On this principle, the alternate loss of tactile pains and tem- perature pains would oblige us to choose between three sets of pain nerves and no pain nerves at all. I am gratified to gather from Dr. Nichols' remarks that he agrees with me on this point, and frankly assumes not one but three sets of cutaneous pain fibres. As between this modified view and the ' shunt theory ' of Wundt, it seems to me that the arguments are not so clearly in favor of the former as Dr. Nichols would have us suppose. In the first place, the occurrence of pains unconnected with tactile and temperature sensa- tions is just as explicable on the Wundtian theory as on that of Dr. 64 DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 65 Nichols. In pathological cases the path of the moderate impulses is presumably blocked by lesion ; in normal cases these impulses may reach the brain, but be lost in the tumult of the excessive impulses : in neither case could they produce their usual effect in consciousness. But Dr. Nichols objects to Wundt's theory on the ground of " its demand for a much more complicated and duplex arrangement of our sensory nervous systems — cranial as well as cord — than present anat- omy gives any suggestion of." This is a most unfortunate objection in the mouth of Dr. Nichols, since it applies with even greater force to his own theory. The two theories agree in assuming six distinct or partially distinct paths in the cord — for touch, heat, cold, tactile pains, heat pains, and cold pains — the partial anaesthesias not being ex- plicable as due to blocking on the assumption of any smaller number. But on the Wundtian theory the three pain paths may be partially dis- tinct without being distinct throughout ; the grey matter may form a common path for pain impulses, and the different kinds be distinct only at their entrance points ; while on Dr. Nichols' theory they must be distinct throughout. So that in the most unfavorable case the Wundtian theory assumes no greater complexity in the cord ; whereas the theory of Dr. Nichols assumes double the complexity in the peri- pheral nerves. When therefore Dr. Nichols speaks of his own as ' a very simple theory,' it is evident that the word 'simple' is to be taken in the sense of 'comprehensible,' not in that of 'economical.' That Nature should have provided for our protection against injury by equipping us with a special set of pain nerves seemed plausible enough ; but if it should turn out that she has supplied us with three such sets (not to mention special nerves for muscular pains, colics, toothaches, etc.), the discovery would be calculated to enlarge somewhat our notions of her beneficence. Meanwhile I see nothing in the facts to compel our assent to so prodigal an hypothesis. Mr. Marshall, not alive to the advantages of the Wundtian theory, had explained analgesia and the ' lateness of pain ' as due to the re- tarding or blocking of the impulses of a fourth cutaneous sense, ad- ditional to those of touch, heat and cold. I pointed out that on this theory the affective coloring of touch, heat and cold can never amount to positive pain, and that in a painful burn the pain and the heat must be called forth by different nerve fibres. To this deduction Mr. Marshall demurs, suggesting that the anaesthesia and analgesia of his ' cutting-pricking sense ' may be accompanied by analgesia with- out anaesthesia of the other three senses. I reply that this rather 66 PHYSICAL PAIN AND PAIN NERVES. arbitrary suggestion deprives the fourth sense of the theoretical value which was Mr. Marshall's original ground for assuming it. If the three other senses have, to use his own phrase, any ' pain-giving ca- pacities' at all, then abolition of the fourth sense will not explain analgesia, and the introduction of such a sense is an unnecessary com- plication of the problem. But, as I have already said, the fact that tactile and temperature pains may be separately lost seems to disprove the view that pain is the exclusive function of a fourth sense. Turning now to the introspective question, Mr. Marshall thinks that many of my objections to the ' aspect theory ' do not touch the ' quale theory' which he advocates. The 'quale theory,' as I under- stand him, recognizes no such duality within the mental state as would justify our speaking of two aspects. The hedonic coloring is a mere attribute, or dimension, of the tactile or temperature sensation (I hope I give his idea correctly), not a new content additional thereto. And yet, in discussing the ' lateness of pain,' Mr. Marshall does not hesi- tate to speak of ' a certain sensation other than the pain to which this pain belongs' (Pain, Pleasure and ^Esthetics, p. 18). So that even on Mr. Marshall's view the relation is not such as to forbid our inquiring : ( i ) whether the conjunction of the pleasure or pain with the sensation or other cognitive element is a necessary one, in such wise that we can never have sensations uncolored by pleasure or pain, and never have pure pains, that is, pains unattached to sensations or other cognitive elements ; (2) whether the pleasure or pain is rightly con- ceived as an attribute of the sensation, analogous to intensity. The affirmative answer to the first question is what I have called the ' aspect theory;' the affirmative answer to the second question is the theory of feeling-tone. Now Mr. Marshall holds that pleasure or pain is an attribute like intensity. He also holds that we never have pure pains. And he repeatedly asserts that either pleasure or pain ' must . . . be- long to every element of consciousness ' (Pain, Pleasure and ^Esthetics, pp. 3, 45, 47) ; though this does not prevent his admitting that 'there are cases where it must be supposed that neither pleasure nor pain exists' (PsvcH. REV., Nov. 1895, p. 597). Mr. Marshall thus sub- scribes to the theory of feeling-tone, and if he escapes being a thor- ough-going subscriber to the aspect theory, it is only by inconsistency and self-contradiction. I therefore cannot help thinking that, so far as my arguments against these theories have cogency at all, they are equally destructive of his 4 quale theory.' Whether we ever have indifferent sensations and pure pains is, of course, a question of fact. But, granting that we do, the gist of my DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 6f argument was, that an attribute which may modify its subject but need not, and which may exist by itself and in that case has an intensity of its own, is not an attribute, but a separate sensation. Now the ex- istence of indifferent sensations Mr. Marshall inconsistently admits. And his explanation of pure pains — of the fact that " in cases of ex- treme pain we usually fail to distinguish the forms of sensibility to which the pain is attached " — is in my opinion so artificial as practically to surrender the case. This fact he explains as a phenomenon of at- tention. He says that, just as an experimental psychologist may be- come so absorbed in attending to the intensity of a sensation as to lose appreciation of its quality, so in this case we fail to distinguish the sensations because our attention is wrapped up in the pain. I should reply by denying that the experimental psychologist can per- form any such feat. If it is a real intensity to which he is attending, and not a mere thought about intensity — if, for instance, he is trying to decide which is the louder of two tones — surely he must keep the qualities sensationally present in order to do so, as much as if he were deciding as to the comparative length of two lines. Whereas no amount of introspective search on the part of the sufferer from tooth- ache suffices to discover a sensational quality connected with the pain. If the predominance of the pain were a phenomenon of attention, we ought to be able to turn our attention from the pain to the accompany- ing sensational quality, which we are not. This quality simply is not there — 'we only feel the pain,' says Professor James. But, if so, the pain is not an attribute, but a substantive content, a sensation. But, even admitting all this, Mr. Marshall would still object to call- ing pain a sensation, on the ground that it answers to no special form of stimulus in the environment. I reply that neither do hunger, thirst, nausea, and fatigue, yet we classify them as sensations. The attempt to analyze these states into ' cognitive elements ' on the one side and pain on the other seems to me most futile and absurd. But, though themselves simple, they usually call forth an emotional reaction in the shape of a feeling of displeasure, in virtue of which we say, for example, that hunger is unpleasant. And I hold that what is true of these organic sensations is also true of pain. The proposition that pain is unpleasant is no more a tautology than the proposition that hun- ger is unpleasant. These are not, in other words, analytic judgments, but synthetic ones. I am gratified to find my own introspection on this point confirmed by so high an authority as Professor James, who says in a recent article, speaking of localized bodily pain: "I think that even here a distinction needs to be made between the primary 68 COMMUNITY OF IDEAS OF MEN AND WOMEN. consciousness of the pain's intrinsic quality, and the consciousness of its degree of intoler ability, which is a secondary affair, seemingly connected with reflex organic irradiations" (PsvcH. REV., Sept. 1894, p. 523, note). This puts the whole matter in a nutshell. The total experience of extreme pain, which on the traditional theory could only be classed as a c feeling,' something neither a cognition nor a volition, now falls apart into a sensation on the one hand and an emotional re- action on the other. And this explains how slight pains may some- times be interesting and almost pleasant, and how bad tastes and odors may be excessively unpleasant without being in the proper sense painful. The separation of physical pain from displeasure, in short, though it may seem at first sight ' a bold assumption,' will, I think, be found both a necessary and a fruitful one. C. A. STRONG. COMMUNITY OF IDEAS OF MEN AND WOMEN. I was pleased to learn by the July number of the PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW that my experiments upon mental community had been re- peated at Wellesley College ; but before reading far in the report of the experiments, my pleasure was changed to regret by finding that the method of experimentation and of computation had been diverged from in essential points. It did not surprise me, therefore, that the results reached were in part different from those published by me. I think it can be readily shown, however, that the Wellesley results do in no serious way tend to invalidate those reached upon Wisconsin stu- dents ; arid that on the one hand in the Wellesley report the contradic- tion between the two is exaggerated, and on the other the reflections made upon results reached by such statistical methods at Wisconsin or elsewhere are unwarranted. The first of the two points at issue relates to the ratio of different words found amongst lists of natural associations prepared by groups of men and women students. The lists each contain one hundred words. I had found in 50 such lists prepared by students at the Uni- versity of Wisconsin, only 2024 different words ; among 25 men's lists, 1375 different words; among 25 women's lists, 1123 different words; or in percentages, 40.5 %, 55.0 %, 44.9 %. At Wellesley, although 25 lists prepared by women students were available, only 15 (why this was done is not told) were used in the computation ; and because in these 15 lists as many as 1 103 different words are found, the results are supposed to antagonize those published by me. But the most essen- DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 69 tial requisite for the fairness of such a comparison has been neglected, namely, that the number of lists in the two cases shall be the same. I had taken special pains to call attention to this point in a footnote in my first article (New Review, Dec., 1891, p. 562), where it is distinctly stated that the ratio of repetition depends upon the number of per- sons writing the lists as well as upon other factors ; and again, in my second article in an experiment involving a different kind of word association (Educational Review, December 1891, footnote to p. 448), I had shown the general course of the law connecting frequency of repetition with the number of contributors to the word associations. Indeed, the mere fact that as given above the percentage of different words for 100 students is 40.5 ; while that for the groups of 50 stu- dents composing the same 100 it is 55.0 % and 44.9 % respectively, is a sufficiently obvious indication of the phenomenon in question. It is therefore entirely to be expected that the number of different words in the 15 Wellesley lists will be relatively larger than in either of the 25 Wisconsin lists. The law above referred to demands this. A fair com- parison must be between two sets of 15 lists each from Wellesley and Wisconsin, or sets of 25 each from the two colleges. But, further, I do not hesitate to predict that even on the basis of such a comparison the Wellesley words will be found to show a smaller degree of commu- nity than the Wisconsin lists, and that because, as I shall attempt to show presently, the words written at Wellesley seem to be less natural and unreflective than those written at Wisconsin ; and, as indicated in the note to my first article, the ratio of repetition depends, too, upon the character of the task. I had shown, for instance, that the repetition of words is greatest amongst the first words of each list, where the as- sociations are most spontaneous and natural. The second point at issue relates to the manner of distribution of the words written by the students, into twenty-five different classes as indicative of the relative prominence of these categories in the mascu- line and in the feminine mind. The strong preference of the femi- nine mind for certain concrete and familiar classes of words, in par- ticular for articles of dress, interior furnishings, foods, etc., anoT the absence of abstract words, which appeared in the Wisconsin lists, entirely fail to appear in the Wellesley lists. The clue to this differ- ence is to be found in the manner in which the lists were prepared. The lists which I used were written as rapidly as possible, and by each student at his or her own home, under as natural surroundings as possible. The Wellesley process is thus described : "That the thought process might be as free as possible, no restriction was made. The 70 COMMUNITY OF IDEAS OF MEN AND WOMEN. students were not even asked, as in the case of Dr. Jastrow's class, to write as rapidly as possible, but this difference in the method cannot possibly be supposed to account for the wide difference in results." Here I must beg to differ; I am of the opinion that it does very largely account for the difference in the results and I am glad to be able to strengthen my opinion by that of Mr. Havelock Ellis, who in his work on ''Man and Woman" (pp. 166—170), extensively cites my results. In a card to the Editor of this REVIEW he wrote as follows : " In the July Psychological Review I noticed a record of experi- ments supposed to invalidate Jastrow's on community of ideas. I am sorry it has not been pointed out that they do nothing of the kind. It is essential that the words should be written as rapidly as possible (the italics are Mr. Ellis's) . In this case ample time was given for conscious or unconscious selection. The results showed a difference which might largely have been foretold." The large number of ab- stract words is one of many indications of the unconscious selection going on in the Wellesley lists, and one list alone contained fifty ab- stract terms. I lay especial stress in the comparison of masculine and feminine mental traits upon securing as natural a material as possible, and the writing as rapidly as possible is a help toward this result. I remember that in writing my first paper I hesitated between using only the first fifty or the entire one hundred words of each list, feel- ing that the first half, when the words were natural and spontaneous, was in many respects the more typical. In brief, then, I regard the Wellesley lists as more reflective, less spontaneous than my own and the differences between us as in large measure due to this difference in method. It remains to add (i) that as above indicated the proportion of different words will be larger when the words are unduly of the re- mote and abstract kind, so that the difference in method in the two results also goes to account for the higher percentage of different words in the Wellesley lists, and (2) that as I have indicated elsewhere (Educational Review, December 1891), it is only in the unrestricted spontaneous kinds of association that I found community of ideas greater in women than in men, and further that in dealing with such small groups as fifteen or twenty-five persons large room must be allowed for accidental variation. (See PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. I., No. 2, pp. 152-158). I, therefore, see in the Wellesley attempt to corroborate my results nothing that markedly conflicts with the conclusions I drew from my own experiments, and furthermore I find in them a positive contribu- DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 71 tion in that they show that a difference in methods of experimentation and in the treatment of material will bring about definite and predictable differences in the results reached ; and that they thus emphasize the value and reliability of the statistical method, when efficiently ap- plied, in the study of mental phenomena. JOSEPH JASTROW. MADISON, Wis., October 14, 1895. l THE FUNCTIONS OF THE RODS OF THE RETINA. v. Kries has written a long article (Zeitschr. f. Psych., IX., 81- 1 23) in which he sets forth the reasons for considering that the rods are the seat of the faint-light sensation (which is the name by which I have designated the sensation of gray which remains after colors are no longer distinguishable), of the peripheral sensation, and of the sensation of the totally color-blind. His argument is extremely effec- tive, and ought to carry conviction to every one who studies it thor- oughly. I confess that I am somewhat surprised at his constantly referring to this idea as his hypothesis, and as the ' just developed ' hypothesis. I had supposed that it was a fundamental part of my theory of light-sensation ; and I am the more surprised at this because v. Kries expressly says in one place : "It may here be mentioned that the assumption according to which the rods are capable only of the production of the colorless sensation is found in the theory which has been developed by Chr. Ladd-Franklin." Apparently it is because he is unable to adopt my theory (nor even to understand it, he says) that he considers it proper to ignore the fact that the hypothesis in re- gard to the function of the rods is not now put forward, with any strong evidence in its favor, for the first time. (Max Schultze already in 1866 suggested this as the function of the rods, on the ground that many night-seeing animals have rods only, or chiefly, in the ret- ina.) As regards v. Kries' criticism of my theory, I have two remarks to make. In the first place, the assumption which he considers so objectionable a feature, and which he finds it impossible to form any conception of — the assumption, namely, uthat the atoms of the outer layer have become separated into three groups at right angles to each other," is not an essential part of the theory — is, in fact, merely a mode of expression adopted for the purpose of giving the molecules 1 1 must explain that the delay in the appearance of the above rejoinder is due to a long illness and resulting accumulations of duties. 72 FUNCTIONS OF THE RODS OF THE RETINA. conceived of a certain degree of symmetry. All that is essential in the idea is that a photochemical substance which in the rods goes to pieces all at once under the influence of light of any kind has been so modified in the cones that it can go to pieces in three different stages, under the influence respectively of three different groups of wave- length. Merely to give a resting-place to the imagination, I make a diagrammatic representation of two molecules, of a just sufficient de- gree of complexity to answer this purpose, in this way, for instance : G. At . The real molecules (if such exist) are, of course, of very different appearance from this, and of immensely greater complexity. My hypothesis that the vibrations which are going on in the outer por- tions of the molecule are so timed as to cause the molecule to be dis- integrated by ether vibrations of the velocity of the visible portion of the spectrum, but not by those which are either more rapid or less rapid, is at the same time an hypothesis to account for selective chemical dissociation in organic substances in general. It is far from being re- mote from current physiological or chemical speculation. Jensen, in a late number of PJiuger's Archiv (LXII., 172-201) makes use of it to account for the extraordinary fact that, in animals so low down as the foraminifera, a state of contractory excitation is caused by the cut off pseudopodia of a different individual, while the pseudopodia of the same individual, though cut off in exactly the same way, produce no effect whatever; he makes the suggestion, since no morphological ground can be assigned for this difference, that an explanation must be sought in the idea, first made use of by Pfliiger in his memorable paper of 1875, that every portion of living matter is a system of countless little differently tuned harps, and that non-synchronous ly vibrating portions of protoplasm act destructively upon one another when brought into contiguity. The origin of the idea in my own mind dates from the reading of a paper by Ebbinghaus. My second remark is this : The very difficulty which my theory was gotten up to meet (given a separate grey process and complemen- tary, not antagonistic, colors) has not apparently occurred to v. Kries as being a difficulty at all, and hence it is not surprising that he does not feel the necessity for my assumption. He says that in lay- DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 73 ing down a definite relation between the monochromatic and the trichromatic elements, I give up the advantage which should be gained by separating them. But is there not a tremendously definite relation between the sensations in question ? The grey sensation due to the decomposition in the rods is absolutely indistinguishable in quality from the grey sensation due to the decomposition in the cones. What could be more natural then — more indispensable in fact — than to give this remarkable resemblance a physical basis in the theory ? Nor can I see that anything whatever is lost by so doing. Far from my not having ' remarked ' the connection between my assumptions and the Purkinje phenomenon, I had already suggested an explanation of that phenomenon in my paper in Mind, Vol. III., N. S., p. 103 (which v. Kries seems to have overlooked) and have since pointed out the in- evitableness of this explanation in the light of the more recently added facts. Prof. v. Kries attributes importance to the observation of Ebbing- haus and myself that a grey made of red and green is a very different thing from a grey made of blue and yellow, and considers that Hering himself must admit that it is thoroughly destructive of his theory, so soon as Hering shall have convinced himself of the correctness of the observation, v. Kries himself finds it extremely easy of confirmation. C. LADD FRANKLIN. SOMETHING MORE ABOUT THE 'PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE' OF MIND. In the last number of this REVIEW (November, 1895), Prof. Baldwin handled the problem of the completeness and satisfactoriness of the purely scientific answer as to the nature of the functions of knowledge. After showing the impossibility inherent in the very nature of the scientific historical categories of their saying the last word about any organized developing real, he applies the argument, a fortiori, to those developing reals which we call the functions of consciousness. Any thing of organization is only known by its activities, and my present conception of it is of the sum of its known activities up to the present moment. This is the scientific or his- torical view of a thing, or to use Prof. Baldwin's term, the 'retro- spective reference ' of mind. Under this view we can determine the 'how,' the manner of the development of a given thing; but does this give us the right to consider its past history the whole reality, the 'what' of the object of our study? Assuredly not, for we are 74 THE ^PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE* OF MIND. immediately confronted with a new series of activities, which could not be predicted and which may change our entire conception of the thing. Thus was reached, by an elaboration of this idea, a theory which makes an element of teleology necessary to the worth of the historical fragments themselves. It is seen that the mind works equally under the category of description or retrospective reference, and teleology or prospective reference, if it wishes to conceive the 4 what,' the reality, of a thing. One must remain a positivist, con- cern himself alone with the ' how ' and give up the problem of the 4 what/ if he denies the validity of the prospective way of looking at things ; at least so should he do, if he would be consistent. And this is especially true of the functions of mind, which to know aright im- plies not only an understanding of their historical evolution, or of their present epistemological meaning, but likewise of the ideal end toward which they point. But says the Naturalist : All this is true enough psychologically ; yet this very prospective way of looking at things, on account of the possession of which you are dissatisfied with the historical categories, can be shown to have been naturally evolved, and, proud as it is, must owe its existence to the very past which it claims to transcend. 44 If the mind has developed under constant stimulus from the exter- nal world, and if its progress consists essentially in a more and more adequate representation in consciousness of relations already ex- isting in the external world, then it follows that these internal repre- sentations can never do more than reflect the historical events of ex- perience." How then can there be any phase of reality not subject to plain statement in terms of natural law ? This is, however, but a new attempt to state the whole nature of a still active developing real in terms of its past, in this case the category of teleology itself. But the error rises likewise from a second and more subtle cause, namely, the failure to recognize the real relation between the historical categories and teleology, as it is deeply rooted in the psychology of knowledge. This relation we may state, at least tentatively, in the following way : What we call the category of teleology is simply an induction from, or a statement in historical terms of, just those elements in each of the historical categories that escape our description. Or, better, it is an attempt so to describe these prospective indescribable elements. This may seem to be so many words, or, if to be understood, to be a direct violation of our principle which says that the prospective reference must not be put into historical terms. But let us explain. In our study of the 4wliat' of mind, its 4 behavior generalized,' we find one DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 75 peculiarity about its activity, that is not open to observation as in the case of other organized developing things. It is true that every grow- ing, moving organism will have much more to tell us of its nature years hence ; but while, as we have seen, this may then throw our past reckoning out of count, at present it tells us nothing of the future. It is nothing more than a * vague pressure toward the infinite.' But in the activities of mind we think there is something more. They have, as it were, taken us into confidence and revealed to us their hopes for the perfect, the highest, the absolute. Each historical cate- gory, as expressed in the judgments of time, space, causality, etc., contains, we shall attempt to show, a 4 strain of prospective refer- ence,' which is the very life-blood of its function. Spencer recog- nizes this infinite reference of the categories, but fails to make use of its implications for his theory of knowledge, seeing in it only an ar- gument for his metaphysical assumption of an unknowable but ab- solute ground. We may very properly ask why do these categories look toward an absolute, of which we know nothing ; why, if they have nothing but the phenomenal in themselves, do they look for that with which they have no kinship ? Extend these modes of thought to in- finity, and unless there be something of the absolute in their consti- tution, the journey will have failed to bring them there. As a matter of fact this infinite prospective reference has not only a meaning for meta- physics, but for the very psychology of knowledge itself ; it is the mov- ing principle of the categories, the constitutive element in their activity. To discover this we must analyze a little more minutely the psy- chological character of the 'infinite prospective reference.' The Old Psychology1 placed among the fundamental intuitions of mind, as fulfilling in inductive search the criteria of universality and necessity, the two categories of teleology and the infinite. In a general way, this seems to be true to the facts of psychology ; but their close relation to each other and to the other categories of mind is not indi- cated. From a psychological point of view the intuitions of the infin- ite and of teleology are really one and the same, or rather have their roots in the same psychological principle. The intuition of the infin- ite possible future is simply the prospective reference in its 'first intention' devoid of reflection or application to the explanation of particular phenomena. The idea of telos or end is understood, how- ever, when the vague, infinite reference of mind is reflected upon in connection with the application of the retrospective categories to the explanation of the particular phenomena of the world series. 1James McCosh, for instance. 76 THE '-PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE' OF MIND. This makes clearer the conception already brought forward that the teleological principle in mind is simply the prospective reference of all the historical categories, brought under one descriptive term. For when we apply any one of the descriptive categories like time or causation to particular phenomena, this vague infinite reference com- pels us to look forward as well as backward, and as we are then deal- ing with particular phenomena or representations, the end or telos of this infinite reference must likewise be of the nature of a representa- tion, if it is to explain the representations, and thus is the element of ideality or teleology introduced. Against the objection, already sug- gested, to thus characterizing the general prospective reference, or teleology, as the prospective reference of all the historical categories, put under one general term, the answer can be made that such a de- scription is only symbolic ; for we are simply describing it negatively, as that part of the retrospective categories that forever escapes descrip- tion in their own terms, in terms of natural law. It now remains for us to make good, by psychological analysis of the retrospective categories, the claim that each contains this strain of 4 prospective reference.' For then we shall have shown that teleology is a constitutive element in each, and, in the second place, secured a new point of view from which to consider the problem of knowledge. That we may not take our categories at random — and also for an- other reason which will appear later — in prosecuting this research, let us make use of the schematism of Schopenhauer's ' Vierfache Wurzel.' Following the static analysis of Kant, he proceeds to analyze the laws of Vorstellen — that narrow knife-edge of representations that lies be- tween the two halves of the universe, subject and object — into four distinct classes, each of which has its own category and is ruled by a particular application of the 'Law of Ground.' Beginning, then, with the most mechanical of the categories, those of the second class, Space and Time (and for the reason that they are so mechanical, we shall find them the least propitious for our search) , let us see if they do not contain also a strain of prospective reference. The space of our study, it must be remembered, is not the space of geometry, of the so-called pure intuition, from whatever source that may come, but of the empirical intuition involved in our intu- ition of the external world as it may be shown to be historically evolved — in short, psychological space. For it is only this space which is a category of description, of history. Here, it is true, as well as in the sphere of geometry, the law of ground is simply the law of place, which says that any point determines as ground the po- DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 77 sition of every other point. But when this law of ground is applied geometrically it is essentially a retrospective, reflective, point of view, and is discernible only by reflectively impressing upon the empirical vision the laws of an abstract geometrical space. It is a necessity, which, just like logical necessity, is of the second intention ; the law of the simple space intuition, as of all intuition of reality, is simply, as Paulsen has shown, an aesthetic ' Zusammenhang' or harmony.1 Now what is the nature of this primary empirical space intuition, which we hold in common with lower forms of the animal world? Its chief characteristic is that it is subjective and psychological. It is an intuition, an outreaching from a particular 4here.' It becomes such by the very fact that it has the 4here.' Space without the 1 here' is objective and geometrical. As empirical intuition it may be studied from two points of view, that of natural history, and, sec- ondly, that of its meaning for the intuiting consciousness. As his- torically evolved, as seen under the aspect of natural causation, there is no reason for doubting that the empirical space consciousness is, as Spencer claims, but a more complex expression of the primitive adjustments of rudimentary organisms to environment. The only thing to be avoided is the tendency to become metaphysical, to leave the outer world of adjustments and find a metaphysical explanation for space in time or still lower in sensation. But the historical side is not the whole of the category. This gives its past. It has also, as we have seen, its epistemological present with its sharply defined ' law of ground ' for dealing reflectively with the details of the intuition. It has also, finally, a future reference, a teleological meaning for the ' here,' from which the spatialization goes out. If genetically, we must construe the space intuition as a growing complex of adjustments to environment, we surely cannot say, a priori, that its development is complete. As a matter of fact, the synthesis is constantly growing and including new elements in its grasp. To be sure, the geometrical law of ground always does remain ruling, as a matter of history. But the reason we can say that things are necessarily in certain rela- tions of place is simply because our historical experience of space has been such as to make this law of ground always applicable. But space as a function is nothing more than a growing grasp of the manifold of experience, and its only principle from the point of view of its prospective reference is a certain esthetic harmony of place. 1 ' Einleitung in die Philosophic,' p. 229. Man kann es nicht stark genug betonen : Notwendigkeit ist im logiken Denken, aber nicht in der Natur; alle Naturgemassigkeit ist spontane Zusammenhang aller Teile. 7 THE '•PROSPECTIVE REFERENCED OF MIND. This teleological harmony — the ruling motive of the activity of space intuition — has come about on the following wise. Or, rather, one should not say come about, but made its appearance to conscious- ness. In the primitive animal the motive to the rudimentary adjust- ment to environment was an external one, the pressing of sensational environment upon him and thus the necessity of getting into harmony with it. In the spiritual human consciousness, however, the motive to spatialization with the extension of the category is the harmoniza- tion of all representations of a spatial nature, no matter by what means they have entered consciousness, in one all-inclusive ken. To this end it works not alone through sight and touch, which are the his- torical media of the intuition, but by the imaginative use of the mathematical symbols. Can it be said that the planets are not in my space because I have not measured their distances with the naked eye, and can only express their relations in the borrowed symbols of num- bers ? If so, then the house across the river, which I see from my window, is not in my space. For it is quite sure that geometrically its relation to the river is quite different from that which it holds in my perspective. It becomes, then, mere foolishness to attempt to take all of the teleology out of the dynamic space intuition, to separate it from its empirical content, and subject it as a dead, statical res completa, to analysis ; for contradictions immediately develop themselves, such as all keen critical thinkers from Zeno to Bradley have had no difficulty in bringing against its reality. The reality of space exists, however, for the intuiting subject, before whom lies the spacial ideal, uncon- scious, perhaps, of finding in the composition of all the representations that have entered his spacial consciousness, a place for each in har- mony with the great whole. Its ideal, its striving, is ever to overcome the limitations of the individual 'here,' and bring all reality that is external, the limitless world of a limitless space, into the ken of the knowing subject. In the category of time the prospective reference is still more clearly shown. Here again we must distinguish between the time of mathematics and that of the empirical intuition with its 'now;' for only as it is related to this empirical ' now' is time the form of inner experience. This gives it the psychological character of an intuition, just as did the 'here' in the case of space. Succession is its law, to be sure, but as pure succession, independent of the ' now' of the in- tuition, it offers to reflection the same sort of difficulties as did space. Its nature refuses to be completely stated in retrospective terms; DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 79 Bradley's criticism shows here likewise that, taken as a res completa, abstracted from its content and from the dynamic synthesis which is its nature, succession immediately develops intellectual contradictions. If the ' now ' is but a point in the succession, and through its media- tion one attempts to understand the connection of the past with the future, the 'now' will itself break up into atomistic and mutually repelling moments, so that the series will fall into contradiction. The reality of time consists, however, in the fact that it goes out as a dynamic synthesis from a 'now;' and the latter, instead of being a point of connection between the past and future of a series, is in real- ity the measure of our grasp upon the changing content of conscious- ness. The reason that the present can be a bridge between the past and the future is simply that in a vague indefinite sense it already feels the future. Historically, time, like space, was evolved through the reaction of primitive sensibility upon a manifold of sensations and was simply the successful attempt to hold them in its grasp. But the mo- tive of time is now no longer one of sensation ; it has to do with the harmonious grouping of all the contents of consciousness, no matter by what means they have entered. Not all are equally definitely placed, for the law here is not one of simple succession, but rather an aesthetic princi- ple of temporal subordination according as they have meaning for the ' now.' This now is continually prospective and is ever looking for- ward to the wider complex which it will grasp in the hand of the future ' now.' And as the category of time develops genetically, the ' specious present,' by its growing richness of meaning, marks what of the flowing stream the individual has been able to synthesize, and again points to an intuition of things which shall grasp all in a time- less 'now.'1 We now seek to discover the prospective reference in the two important retrospective categories of science; namely, Causa- tion and Identity, or (lest Identity have a too metaphysical sound) the ' Same and the Different,' according to Mr. Spencer's terminology. Causation, the typical category of the Understand- ing, is, as an intuition, dependent upon time and space relations; but, when considered intellectually, it is an attempt to account ration- ally for change in space and time. But if we take the temporal re- lations existing between A and B, and try analytically to discover a real bond between them, we find, as Bradley points out, the same difficulties that appeared in the case of space and time, in fact, in rela- tions of any kind. The A and B will persist in falling apart, for 1 Prof. A. T. Ormond ' Basal Concepts in Philosophy.' Chapter on Time. 8o THE ^PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE' OF MIND. every attempt to introduce a mediating term ends in further disremp- tion. But that this is so, follows from a static and analytical view of what is a dynamic intuition of the subject — from a strange oblivion to the prospective element in this, as in all intuitions. Lotze, equally well, saw the difficulties that gather around the causal relation when it is analyzed statically into its merely spatial and temporal condi- tions. For once analyzed, the space and time as well as the causal idea itself are then seen only under the retrospective point of view. For consider, that the judgment of causation is primarily not due to a definite knowledge of the space and time relations. These are only analyzed after the intuition has taken place, in order to give analy- tical grounds for the intuitive judgment. In order to explain the causal judgment itself and, indeed, in order to make it consistent and rational when analyzed into its grounds, the element of teleology or organization must be recognized in it. Says Lotze in his Metaphysic : "The natures of things that act on each other, the inner states in which, for the moment, they happen to be, and the exact relations which ex- ist between them, all constitute the complete ground or reason from which the resulting effect issues. Thus the consequence is contained in the reason." This is, of course, only discoverable, however, analy- tically in retrospective thinking. But, he continues, there is resident in the notion of causation, "the idea of some one plan, which is the complex of reality, which only once completes itself and nowhere hovers as a universal law over an indefinite number of instances, and which assigns to each state of facts that consequence which be- longs to it as a further step in the realization of the one history." l This is the essential prospective reference of the. category. It is this persuasion that in the harmony of the whole there is a necessary place for every experience of nature in relation to the others, that compels us to order the particulars under this rubric of causal relations. As an intuition this category presents to us a union of the prospective ele- ments of both time and space, so that it seeks a harmony which in- cludes in its plan both relations of place and of succession. As a mat- ter of fact we do tacitly assume such a state of affairs, for every time we make an hypothesis, under the guidance of which we seek to dis- cover causal relations, we rest upon the teleological element in our causal notion, which says to us that the particular facts must mean something like this hypothesis. In regard to the typical category of the Reason, Identity, or, in its empirical expression, the ' same and the different,' only a few words 1 Metaphjsic, p. 107. DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 8 1 are necessary. Natural science has very properly followed Hume in saying that in the sphere of perception, 4 first intention,' there is no such thing as identity, but only close resemblance ; and he is likewise perfectly justified in saying that these empirical judgments, historically considered, may be all reduced to habit and custom. But that ideal identity, which lies at the root of our judgments, the ideal which is so strong that we are always compelled to say that particulars are the same, although our experience afterwards (when we historically and analytically investigate the grounds for the judgment) invariably shows us that we were mistaken and had to do only with close resem- blances— this side of the judgment requires other explanation than that of history, of custom or habit. It is really none other than the prospective reference to be found in this category; absolute iden- tity is the distant ideal to which in its empirical expression the judg- ment never attains. Like a will-o'-the-wisp, it always escapes us, and, when we come up to our actual judgments and historically exam- ine them they are seen to be concerned alone with close resem- blances. But the genetic development of this category in an indi- vidual consciousness shows a closer and closer approximation to the 'norm' or ideal, showing that it does function as a regulation ele- ment in experience. To attempt to show this prospective element in the sphere of ethics or in the will would be gratuitous, for motive, end, is the peculiar law of activity in this sphere. All empirical expressions of the will can be understood only under the law of motivation. Whatever be its historical origin, the existence of a prospective ' must ' in this sphere is never denied ; it is in the historical categories that the problem of the prospec- tive reference lies, for here, so it is thought, ' is,' actuality, expresses all. So much for the psychological analysis of the categories them- selves, by means of which we were to discover in their very constitu- tion a strain of prospective reference — not only an infinite reference which points vaguely to an absolute ground, but their very life- blood, the withdrawal of which causes them to fall into pieces, giv- ing us only appearance and illusion. This is not so very different from the Platonic doctrine that all knowledge is only a remembrance, long since held for philosophical poesy. That doctrine is, however, but a symbolic way of expressing a fact that cannot fail to impress the mind that ponders the problem of knowledge. Is the present, individual knowing consciousness sim- ply a spider at the end of a thread of its own spinning ; or is there an instinct which determines the point to which that thread shall reach, a 82 THE '-PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE* OF MIND. vital living connection with the consciousness that lies in the future time as well as with that of the historic past ? How else shall I ex- press those prospective judgments that do not seem to implicate will but only memory ? The past alone does not explain them, ' nervous habit ' and ' social custom ' express only one side of the truth. Para- doxical and vague as the terms may seem, the prospective element in our knowledge functions can best be described as a future forward memory which, equally with the past, governs the activity of the present. This becomes still more clear if these categories be united under some more ultimate one. It is in the basal category of sufficient reason, which has its peculiar law in each of these retrospec- tive categories, that the prospective reference is most clearly marked. On its historical side, as an evolved psychological principle, it is ex- plainable in terms of 'nervous habit' and 'accommodation;' it is the simple psychological principle of interest, with reactions made defi- nite by habit. As an epistemological principle it is also seen under historic categories, for the law of ground in these different spheres of space and time, causality or the understanding, identity as typical of the reason, and motivation in the case of the will, is only discoverable when these judgments have taken their place as states in the historical, psychological series. For the descriptive terms of universality and necessity by which we test them are only discoverable in an inductive study of the static consciousness as instanced in the case of both Kant and the Natural Realists. In the case both of history and analysis we look upon them as definite formulas or laws and by that very fact are compelled to put them under retrospective categories. But the principle of sufficient reason, as well as the particular cate- gories in which it finds application, has a third and more ultimate side. As such it is simply the dynamic impulse to knowledge which presses on to further and more complete synthesis of mental content, using the categories as its instruments ; it is prospective always ; its grounds only coming into conscious recognition when the judgments are viewed historically. But now arises a most important question. If historically Sufficient Reason is nothing more than nervous habit, if its epistemological grounds are likewise purely retrospective, what can be said of its prospective reference, except that it is a blind forward impulse ? Of what value is it to have shown the individual categories to be prospective in their nature, if the active principle which gets them in motion cannot be defined more definitely than that it is an impulse to know ? Have we not gotten back again to the ' vague in- finite' reference, into which we attempted to infuse an element of DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 83 teleology? The strength of this criticism cannot be well overrated, and at first it may seem that, in having escaped the relativity that arises out of the natural history view of Spencer, we have fallen into the pes- simistic fatalism of Schopenhauer. For this is none other than the position of this famous Kantian. Epistemologically the categories are absolutely valid in their own spheres, for phenomena, but they are simply necessary unchangeable mirrors through which the otherwise blind Will looks upon itself. But all movement is in Will ; therefore no teleology to knowledge, for Will is blind. What difference for knowledge whether the principle that has brought its categories into being is one of blind force, operating under the law of natural selec- tion, or a blind irrational evil, with no meaning in its movements? Now, it cannot be denied that from one point of view there is an element of blind fatalism in the psychological principle of Sufficient Reason. The act of judgment itself, which is the expression of the subjective impulse called Sufficient Reason, is really a leap into the dark, in its first movement.1 Its synthesis of elements is always pro- spective, and it is only in the light of this synthesis, largely aesthetic, that the grounds arise upon which we develop our reasons for the same. But by this time the judgment has already become an event of history. So that the synthetic act itself is always without con- scious grounds, always remains mysterious and illusive, making its necessity something almost fatalistic. This is, undoubtedly, a true picture of the simple psychological im- pulse to knowledge, objectively considered. There is, however, a subjective concomitant, a reflex, so to speak, in the case of every judg- ment, which is so uniform in its meaning that it cannot fail to suggest a teleology to the forward movement of the psychological impulse itself. I refer to the element of necessity or belief with which we are compelled to pronounce a positive or negative judgment on any complex of form and content. In the sphere of ' first intention,' of sensation and perception, this is pure psychological necessity, or, in Prof. Baldwin's terms, ' reality feeling.' In the sphere of reflective judgment it becomes grounded or logical necessity, and its correspond- ing descriptive expression is belief. Now, it is important for our purpose that we see that there really exists no essential distinction be- tween the absoluteness of these two necessities. Whatever may be 1 Kant has the same idea of the Judgment (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Ed. 1781, p. 78) :" Die Synthesis uberhaupt ist die blosse Wirkung der Einbildungs- kraft, einer blinden, obgleich unentbehrlichen Funcktion der Seele, ohne die wir uberall gar keine Erkentniss haben wiirden, der wir uns aber selten nur einmal bewusst sind." 04 THE ' PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE' OF MIND. the difference in their knowledge-content, as functions they are one and the same. In one the grounds are in the elements of the percept ; in the other they lie in the conceptual relations of the elements in the judgment ; but in each case it is a necessary response to a complex of form and content, and the response itself, as long as it remains undis- turbed by any new elements of content, is absolute. Sigwart recog- nizes this in his doctrine of the necessity of all judgments ; although the grounds in one may be psychological, while in another logical. Likewise Newman, in his ' Grammar of Assent,' argues keenly for the essential likeness of both kinds of assent, although ' inferences * may afterward enhance the value of the belief for the logical under- standing. This is belief in all its aspects, when viewed as a psycho- logical function. But is not this also as fatal and irrational as Suffi- cient Reason as a psychological impulse? Yes, viewed alone as a function it is. Yet forces in the psychological sphere are as dark and in- explicable as in the physical. It is only as a bond connecting the concept of the movements of the earth and its surrounding planets that Gravitation has any meaning. As a pure force it is absolutely without any content for thought — must be relegated to the limbo of fantastic powers of enchantment and wilful activity. In the same way the pure reflex function of belief has no meaning in our study of con- sciousness, unless it be a bond between two elements of content that are ideal. Thus to say that belief is the reflex movement of con- sciousness upon any complex of form and content describes it psycho- logically ; but it is only when we conceive it as a bond between the knowing self and its complexes of content that it has any but a de- scriptive meaning for us. As a matter of fact, belief is essentially an act of appropriation to the subject, of that which Sufficient Reason, as an impulse to knowl- edge, has brought before the bar of consciousness. Belief is, above all, self-reference. This self-reference of belief is always manifest to one who is not prejudiced in favor of a sensational phil- osophy, and it is not without meaning that both Hume and Spencer find difficulty in giving even a satisfactory psychological explanation of belief. Now my final aim is simply this : to show that the continual self -reference of belief is the bond which unites the movement of Sufficient Reason, otherwise irrational, to a developing self, whose ideal is the end toward which the impulse to knowledge, in Suffi- cient Reason, is blindly moving, and that this teleology is what gives meaning 10 the prospective reference of the categories, which DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 85 this teleology has generated. The psychological forces of Suf- cient Reason and Belief are blind only as forces abstracted from the ideal self-content to which they relate. But to make good this claim, this self-reference must be analytic- ally shown to be psychologically true — from the lowest form of judg- ment to the highest. First in the reality-feeling that accompanies sen- sation and perception ; here we must not fall into the error of the in- tellectual Idealist, who commits the ' psychologist's fallacy ' of mak- ing every feeling explicitly for a knowing self. Yet we must believe that the self-reference is at least implicit, else how (on the side of knowledge) could sensations ever be held together long enough for comparison and for the emergence of relations. The sensation is not first of all for a self, consciously, but it points vaguely to a self for whom it will become explicit later on in perception. As a matter of fact, recent studies in genetic psychology1 point out that, in the development of the category of personality in the child, there are at first certain personality suggestions, very vague, to be sure, but nevertheless pres- ent, in the touch sensations that the infant receives in its earliest days. Already, in mere feeling, he learns to distinguish the personal in his external surroundings, and this reacts upon this budding no- tion of the self. As we pass from one higher synthesis to another, the self-reference becomes more marked. Time connects in a series the vanishing experiences, and by the mechanism of memory affords the possibility of an empirical self, which in turn by that constant in- crease of its grasp, points to a self which shall see all things sub spe- cie ceternitatis. Space brings with it the external world, both per- sonal and impersonal ; and by setting this over against the subject he fur- ther intensifies the self notion. With the advent of the category of causation comes a fuller notion of the self, for here energy is inter- preted in terms of the activity of the self as revealed in the acts of will. The growth from the perception of close resemblances to the judgment of identity again brings the identical self into view as the norm and source of the judgment. The self in these last categories always reacts in the form of belief, and all these relations thus believed in are taken up and unified by the knowledge of a self as the source from which they depend and the end for which they have meaning. So much Kant saw, from a purely statical and analytical point of view. Whatever may be the metaphysical worth of the category of the self, it is at least the conceptual source of unity for all the other categor- ies of consciousness. 1 Professor Baldwin's ' Mental Development in the Child and the Race.' 86 THE ^PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE* OF MIND. There are thus discoverable two important lines of 'prospective reference :' a main line in the development of the self-notion, and a number of independent forward references in the particular categories themselves — a constitutive element in their growth. Each of these lower categories is in turn connected by the self-reference of belief to the category of the self as the developing motif of the whole move- ment of Sufficient Reason. The following diagram will show this more clearly: ^ 1 1 ' 3 1 \ / X n\ /B t > / \ ,*& B\ ' \ 'X Xv The x's are the four principal retrospective categories, each with its prospective reference. The o is the category of the self, with its forward reference always in advance of the others. And by the bonds of Belief, the B's, each category is involved, in each of its activities or judgments, in the movement of the self, which is the richest cate- gory of consciousness and can then be used to interpret the others. But suppose we seek for this unifying and explaining self as some- thing among the complexes of content of which it is the ground and end. We shall then be looking for that which is the prospective reference of all the categories — all the syntheses of consciousness — among states of mind that have already taken their place in the his- torical empirical series. Our self, which seemed so much en evi- dence as it functioned ideally, has now withdrawn its support from the mechanical or retrospective categories, or, to employ a better fig- ure, has fallen into- lifeless dust among their atomic and disintegrated materials. But the self is just that point which can never be past, and for that reason can never be treated historically or found phe- nomenally. Just because it is the prospective reference of the em- perical self, by which the latter is to be explained, does it refuse to be DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 87 contained within those empirical limits. As Bradley argues, en- deavoring to reduce the self like the other categories to illusion, psy- chologically (or under historic categories) the identity of the self or ego cannot be determined ; for it must then be put somewhere within the temporal series and suffer the fate of time in his critical hands. But for that reason shall we call it illusion ! If so we are reducing to illusion that which a study of the development of consciousness has shown to be the one element which has saved the whole movement from irrationality and confusion. What then is the self ? How is it to be construed in this connec- tion ? It is the empirical states, but more. As far as the retrospective categories can take hold of it is this the self. Nor is alone the un- mediated intuition of the will the essential self, as Schopenhauer claims,^ for this cannot explain the teleological function of the self in consciousness. Such an intuition has no ideal element whatever. It is pure present or past and can only be stated in terms of experi- enced acts of that will. This intuition, however, is a part of my self-consciousness, in that it gives me my notion of self as active and forceful. There is yet a third element of prospective or ideal significance which, just because it is prospective, will almost escape all statement in descriptive terms. It is that aesthetic harmony of our conscious states which we project as an ideal, that confidence (which is such a ground-motif of self-conscious life) that every element of consciousness has a meaning for the general harmony. This may, perhaps, be better suggested by a figure. The detail of the landscape before me is made up of rocks, trees, etc. As such, when I come up to them and subject them to study under the categories of description, they lose all the meaning that lay in the grouping of the perspective. The very value of the perspective is the aesthetic unity in which it reduces mere detail to its place in the whole. The same way of looking at things may be applied to consciousness. There is an ele- ment in the self whose very value lies in the aesthetic reduction of the indefiniteness which pervades the detail. This real psychological char- acteristic of consciousness can never be stated in descriptive terms, for as soon as we approach the scene with the instruments of science we have nothing but gross, crass details bound by nothing but mechanical laws. The prospective side of the self always escapes description, although for that reason it is no less an important psychological char- acteristic. Though rejoicing in the freedom from the thraldom of a metaphysical conception of the self as substance, he who fails to see 1Vierfache Wurzel, end of paragraph 42. 88 THE 'PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE' OF MIND. nothing more in self-consciousness than an aggregate of empirical states, or an unmediated intuition of a feeling called will, is not yet entirely free from the chains of the ' stuff' idea. With the preceding discussion before our eyes, there seems now some hope, if not of correcting the faults, at least of understanding the •weakness of some current epistemological ideas. At the present day the static analysis of Kant has been extended in three important direc- tions, each of these movements being animated by the important mo- dern conceptions of the flux of things. To view knowledge as an activity, and, above all, as a development, to infuse into the rigidity of the intellectual categories the life and movement which appears in the volitional sphere — this has been the motif since the Kantian disremption of the Pure from the Practical Reason. Historically the idealistic movement came first with a thought-evolution, in which the categories are the steps of a development, with the ' Idea ' as its goal. The Evolution Theory in the hands of science, which knows no permanent or static forms in any of its spheres, makes of the absolute functions of Kant evolved products of the interaction of a primary sensibility with its environment. Like the fauna and flora of the biological world, they have taken their place historically according to natural law, and therefore get their whole meaning from the nature out of which they spring. Any forward movement is vague, and in- finite in its possibilities. The Schopenhauerian conception which puts the whole movement of knowledge in the hands of a blind Will, and conceives the categories as complete existences, is but a purely metaphysical restoration of the breach between the Reason and the Will. This is, however, the fault with all these theories : the movement is externally and metaphysically explained. It is not grounded in a psychological analysis of the knowledge factors themselves and of the self in its relation to knowledge. In the case of the Idealists the actual empirical development of knowledge is reduced to a mere con- ceptual relation of ideas, and, to the extent that the psychological roots of the concept are not known, is unpsychological. The Natural Sci- ence view, in so far as it finds the origin of the knowledge processes in the interaction of subject and object, of sensibility and environment, and by this seeks to explain them, is also metaphysical, either naively dualistic or somewhat materialistic in its monism. The third union of Will and Knowledge by Schopenhauer, is, of course, purely meta- physical. If then the ontological teleology of Hegel is untenable, there is left DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 89 either the pure relativity of Spencer, or the absolutely blind unteleo- logical movement of the Schopenhauerian Will. There is every motive then to look for a teleological, prospective reference of mind, as a constitutive element in the retrospective cate- gories themselves which the Kantian critique had looked upon as static and unchangeable : above all to give it a psychological basis, for the metaphysical application will not be far in the rear. Though the preceding study may not have been in any way of the nature of a supply to this demand, it yet affords grounds, we are con- vinced, for a somewhat more emphatic repetition of the poetical but keenly intuitive protest of Emerson against the Kantian description of Intellect and Will : ' ' Our intellections are mainly prospective. The immortality of man is as legitimately preached from the intellect as from the moral volitions. Every intellection is mainly prospective ; its present value is its least."1 JENA. WILBUR M. URBAN. OUR LOCALIZATION IN SPACE. The title to these notes may appear misleading, but I know of no •other to describe the phenomena which I wish to illustrate by an inter- esting experience that occured to me about a year ago and that I have narrated to my classes for suitable purposes. Perhaps it will be inter- esting to others. Only twice in my life have I awakened in dream and at the same time had the dream images continue for a short period so as to watch them as apparently real objects. The first one was a dream of a mountain scene in a valley with a lake and summer hotels on its shore. I watched the view for perhaps a full minute with my eyes still closed, but conscious of being awake and lying in bed. The disappearance of the scene was marked by the visible occurrence of small clefts or openings in the rocks nearest where I appeared to be standing. The scene was perfectly vivid and real, an exact representation of what such a scene would be, if I were actually looking at a landscape, pro- jected outside of me. The eject of reality and actual space relations, perspective, color and all were as distinct as when walking in the fields or the streets. But this is not the characteristic which I wish to describe or illustrate. I have probably only narrated what is a com- mon experience with others who have awakened in a dream and watched it, though it may, nevertheless, be interesting to note the fact 1 Essay on ' Intellect.' 90 OUR LOCALIZATION IN SPACE. that sensory action without its appropriate stimulus is as definite and complete as either in reality or in halucinations. The fact, however, to which I call special attention in it is that I cannot recall or did not have the peculiar feature of the second dream to be narrated, which resembled the first in its main characteristics ; that is, the visual reality and projection of the apparent object. I dreamed that I was in my old bed-room where I slept when I was a child. It was oblong in shape and I recognized it, my view of it appearing as it would if I were lying on the bed. I awakened in the midst of the dream and keeping my eyes shut (there being no reason to open them as no darkness appeared, though where I was actually sleeping it was quite dark) , I noticed paper on the walls, a kind I had never seen in my recollection. Now there never had been any paper on the room represented in the bed-room of my childhood, and observing it in the dream image I felt some surprise, because I knew that my bed-room had never had paper of any kind. This discrepancy at once convinced me that I must be wrong about the room, the moment I compared what I saw with what I remembered, a compari- son which did not suggest itself during sleep. The discrepancy had no effect. But, strangest of all, the moment that I saw the discre- pancy and saw that I was not in the room as I had known it, I be- came confused as to where I was. I noted the resemblance in shape to my old bed-room, and tried to recognize where I was and though wide awake I could not think of myself as in my apartment in New York. I had not the slightest conception where I was. I could only see the walls and wall paper of my old bed-room. After the lapse of about a minute the paper and walls vanished quite suddenly, though a general mass of Eigenlicht remained, and I at once recognized that I was in bed in my apartment. I then opened my eyes. It is remark- able that the tactual sensations did not avail to localize me, but they did not. I felt myself lying down, but I could not obtain the least concep- tion of where I was until the vision of the wall paper and walls dis- appeared, when I could recall to the visual imagination and memory the shape of the room and position in it in which I was actually sleeping. Had it not been for the discrepancy between what I saw and my memory of my old room at home, I might have still imagined that I was there. But I knew from the wall paper that this could not be, and I was puzzled to know where I was until the visual image began to break up and vanish, when I at once pictured to my mind where I was in reality. Now, the question is, was my localization conditioned upon a DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 91 memory image in the visual center which could not be found until the real image vanished ? Of course the identification, when it did come, represented my past experience with my bed-room in the apartment, and the assumption that I was where I had gone to sleep the evening before, but this had no effect until the visual image of my old room at home vanished. Nor did the tactual sensations to which I consciously deferred help me in the slightest degree to determine where I was. It all seemed to hinge on the representation in the visual memory of the room in the apartment after the real image of the old room at home had disappeared. Unfortunately I am not able to corroborate the sup- position involved in the above question by any recollection of actually localizing myself in bed in the first dream which I have narrated. I only recall the fact that I was awake looking apparently at a beautiful landscape of mountain scenery, and that I was much interested in the nature of the phenomenon. But I am not certain that I knew I was lying in bed. This may have been after the image began to disap- pear. I do remember that I was lying on my stomach, but I do not recall that I was conscious of this fact before the picture vanished. Hence I can get in it no confirmation of the possibility that the locali- zation depended upon a visual representation of my room as it was in the memory continuum of experience. Moreover, objection might be made to such a supposition from the fact that the possibility of mem- ory representation conditioned the consciousness of the discrepancy between what I saw and what I recalled of my old room at home. Hence it seems all the more puzzling to note the fact that tactual sen- sations did not tell me where I was and that the localization did not occur until the visual memory became active. But I had a waking experience which at least seems to confirm the supposition, though it may not be conclusive. I was riding in the cars of the New York Elevated Railway and had reached the Thirty-third street station. Just as the train left it I noticed across on the south side of Broadway the sign of a store for the Microbe Killer. I said to myself, "Well, this store has moved; it used to be around the corner of the next street north" (Thirty-fourth street) . I fully expected to see it where it had been as the train moved. I looked up and saw a church (Dr. Taylor's) on the north corner of Thirty-fourth and Broad- way, and I said to myself, "No, this cannot be; there was no church near where I had seen the Microbe Killer store." But I was not pos- itively convinced of the error until I could see up the street as we crossed it. I felt puzzled for a few moments to know where I had seen the store. All at once there emerged in my memory a visual rep- 92 THREE CASES OF SYN^ESTHESIA. resentation of Broad and Arch streets, in Philadelphia, where I had seen a store at which the Microbe Killer was sold, the store being on that side of the street where it would have been in New York on Thirty-fourth street, if I had been correct in my first impression. Now the interest of the case lies, not merely in its being an ordinary case of redintegration (was there any association between the words Broad street and Broadway ?) , but in the fact that the space relations in the false and the true recollections were the same and that my illusion about the store was not discoverable until I formed a visual representa- tion in memory of what I had seen in Philadelphia and could compare it with the knowledge or consciousness of any actual place in New York. But I will not urge the case as proving anything. I narrate it here with the dreams only to encourage observations of others in the same direction. I do not know that such a phenomenon as is narrated in my second dream and the waking state following it is at all common. I should like to know whether others have had a like experience. It is of special interest as suggesting how little tactual sensations have to do with space perception and localization in it except as tactual experi- ence is conceived in terms of visual space. Not that I mean to imply that we cannot obtain any notion of space whatever by tactual and muscular sensations, but that in this case at least they seemed to have no power whatever to determine it. I certainly find in my own case no reason to accept the Berkeleian doctrine of space and our localization in it, and this wholly apart from the dream experience just narrated. In this case, however, the localization was definitely related to the visual representation of my place of living. The only question that remains is to know whether such a phenomenon occurs often enough in the experience of others to give it anything more than individual significance and interest. JAMES H. HYSLOP. COLUMBIA COLLEGE. THREE CASES OF S The subjects of this report are three sisters, D, C and K, aged re- spectively 9, 10 and 12. Their father and mother are good visualizers, the father having definite number forms. There are also two younger brothers one of whom, aged about 5, visualises his alphabet so vividly as to be able to read it off backwards with unexpected rapidity. His alphabet form is traced to the perpendicular series from which he DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 93 learned his letters. No such early association can be discovered in the case of the three sisters, though they too have elaborate forms for numbers, months, days of the week and the alphabet. They are not musical. D sees the letters black on a background of indefinite color, but as if they were behind the patches of the color to which the letters cor- respond. The color is seen only when she thinks the words separately, not when she reads them or hears them spoken connectedly in a sen- tence. The position of the word and color is close to the eyes or in the head. C sees the words from a foot to a yard away. Sounds and smells are yellow to her except thunder, which is black ; but the color is very dim and she herself is somewhat uncertain about it. To K the colors are ' far away,' but seem to come nearer when closely attended to. Her brightest words are the yellow ones. All three have had these pseudo-sensations as long as they can re- member, but their peculiarity was not noticed until about a year ago. They have not influenced one another in the coloring of letters or words, as they have been observed always to disagree about the same letters in the same way. Subjoined is a table giving in the children's own language the colors, if any, of all the letters of the alphabet, days, months, certain proper names, certain common nouns selected for their phonetic or orthographical peculiarities and certain numbers. Roman numerals are colored after the letters (I, V, L, C, etc.) composing them. D K L M N O* P s- s T* U white reddish brown white blackish blue white bluish white white white blue and white white green white blue greenish yellow brown brownish black reddish green brown grey brown or green brown or black red black black yellow red brown dull red crimson black white yellow white yellow blackish red red bluish black red brown light brown white white white black white black yellow white yellowish pink blue or as initial red red white yellow very light yellow black black black yellow greenish white yellow 94 THREE CASES OF SYN^STHESIA. V w blue brownish white green grey blue black X no color yellow brown Y yellowish black black yellow Z black yellow or white brown & yellow black no color i black black white 2 white brown blue 3 red white brown 4 blackish or no color black red yellow green bluish white 6 black red and white red 7 black black light yellow 8 brown green and white bright yellow 9 black brown crimson 10 white i black, o white black ii yellow black dark 12 white black and brown darker than n 13 red black and white brown *4 no color and so on to 20 red 15 yellow white 16 white red, duller than 14 17 black yellow 18 yellow yellow 19 black crimson 20 white brown and white /"dull white, like \ steel" 3° red white brown 4° no color black and white red £ yellow black and so on to 90 like 20 duller red than 40 70 red yellow 80 white yellow 90 no color dark red 99 red 100* white white white 200 white brown and white white like 20 300 red white 3 brown oo no color 400 no color black and white red + no color 500 yellow green and white white IOOO blackish white greenish or white no color 2OOO white brown and white no color 347 red 3 white 47 black f 3 brown 4 red 7 1 yellow 896 red f 8 green 9 brown 6 t white i 8 yellow 9 crimson 6 red Dorothy * white white white Quincy yellow white yellow Grinnell green -4- red brownish green greenish brown Charlotte white -f bluish red bluish black Katharine red black white Laurence vellow white reddish brown Robert * " red red red Morgan blackish white red blue and black Maria yellow red f M light I red rest \ indistinct Isabel / Is brown ; a white ; bel \ yellow yellowish I yellow, rest yellow- ish brown John reddish brown black Sally* white yellowish white white Stephen brownish yellow brown Spencer no color / Spen vellow; cer \ white brown DISCUSSION AND RE FOR TS. 95 Hilda Madeleine Louise Mary Edith hurt pert smell spell stop break try house * Caesar fairy how few straight trait rate ate at hat that handy hand and an yellowish whitish yellow yellow white yellow brown black always yellow all colors st black op white brown black brown white white white black black sometimes white black red yellowish black written, A white, T black black and white black and white eight ate bow (—bough) bow (—bo) Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday Jan. Feb. Mar. April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. black and green white black and white white white and green white blackish yellow blue and white white white red black dark orange black and white light red white light yellow red black green yellowish white white dark red darker red hay color black and white black and white red white and brown dark red black and white red, sometimes white white brownish red green [red] yellow yellow yellow black and white black brown white f white with black \ spots brown red yellow black RA red TE black doesn't know black or no color brown black brown brown green brown red sometimes brown greenish white doesn't know white white pink f red with yellow \ stripes green black and brown black green and white color of the sun green and black darker red and white red and white pink yellow yellow yellow and black yellow and black white and black red and white white and red red not distinct red like Hilda like Maria white dull brown purplish black R red brown brown lighter brown no color blue dull red C and A white yellow, R red red yellow brownish red doesn't know; yellow no color R red no color no color H red, rest no color f T's have black \ back ground red (dull) red (dull) no color no color no color yellow no color no color no color blackish blue yellowish black blackish blue dark brownish black greenish brown very light yellow reddish brown brown red red white red red yellow brownish yellow grey no color white WILFRID LAY. COLUMBIA COLLEGE. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. GENERAL. Elements de psychologic humaine, cours professe" a I'universite" de Gand. T. T. VAN BIERVLIET Gand, Lepper. 1895. 8°. Pp. 317 and 34 fig. This is an elementary treatise on psychology intended especially for students studying for the B. A. degree, who as a rule lack physiological and anatomical knowledge. A large part of the book, almost half of it, is taken up with descriptions of the nervous system and of the organs of sense and movement, descriptions which are to be found in every physiology. The entire work is imbued with the physiologi- cal spirit, as may be gathered by observing the clear and precise lan- guage of the author, whose metaphors and similies are almost always borrowed from the natural sciences. It is evident that the author is not in the unhappy position of some of his contemporaries who hav- ing received a special literary education forget this when they begin to write. It is worthy of note that the physiological tendencies of the author do not lead him to materialism. He urges, on the contrary, that mental processes are entirely distinct from cerebral and do not correspond to anything material, that judgment and reason are not functions of the brain but faculties of an immaterial soul, and that the immateriality of the soul does not require proof, as it is practically doubted by no one. A third characteristic of this book is the complete absence of ex- perimental psychology. Researches on reaction-times are only noted in the appendix. This omission, which is apparently intentional, is surprising, as the author is the director of a psychological laboratory ; and for this reason M. Biervliet's book cannot be considered as repre- sentative of the actual state of psychology. The general plan of the work may now be indicated. After an introduction on the human body in which the author studies cells, tis- sues, and more especially the circulatory, respiratory, muscular and 96 PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 97 nervous systems, including the latest views of Cajal and of Golgi, we have the first part covering the physiology of conscious phenomena. It includes sensations and movements, but scarcely anything else, being merely a repetition of what may be found in general treatises on physi- ology. The second part on the psychology of conscious phenomena contains definitions of ideas, judgment, reason and will, including a defense of the doctrine of the immateriality of the mind and of free will. The third part on the psychophysiology of conscious phe- nomena includes imagination, memory, motor expression, character, personality and measurement of reaction-time. In speaking of mem- ory the author develops interesting though somewhat theoretical ideas on the mechanism of recognition and on localization. In spite of some drawbacks the book is certainly the best elemen- tary treatise on psychology in the French language. Psychologic des Foules. G. Le. BON. Paris, Alcan. 1895. Pp. 200. We have here a book that treats a subject with which the psycholo- gical laboratories scarcely concern themselves. The reading of such a work cannot but be salutary for the professional psychologist, if only to teach him that there is more in mental life than reaction-times. The author studies the 4 crowd,' understanding by this word, which he uses in a wide sense, a number of individuals who think and feel in the same way, but who are not necessarily collected together in one place. Thus he introduces into his book a study of the curious popular movement produced in France by General Boulanger a few years ago. Two principal conclusions are drawn: ist. That the importance of ' crowds' is growing daily and will continue to be a factor of increasing importance in the future. 2d. That the * crowd ' is of low intelligence, without reflection, reasoning or mod- eration, a prey to all extreme emotions, good or bad, incapable of self- guidance and without the power to construct or to originate. How in the face of these results an optimistic conclusion and a faith auguring well for the political future can be drawn we do not understand. A. B. 9§ TELEPATHY, ETC. TELEPATHY, ETC. Ueber umjoillkiirliches Fliistern, eine kritische und experimentelle Untersuchung der sogenannten Gedankenubertragung. F. C. C. HANSEN UND ALFRED LEHMAN. Philosophische Studien, XI. 4. pp. 471-530, In the S. P. R. Proceedings, VI., 128, is a series of experiments by Prof, and Mrs. Sidgwick on the transference of numbers from the mind of Mr. Smith to two young men hypnotized by him. The num- bers were bi-digital, running from 10 to 90, drawn from a bag and silently looked at by Mr. S. The subjects named whatever numbers they saw appear in their mental field of vision. There were 1,356 trials, with the result that any digit 'seen' or 'named' by the subject invariably corresponded much more often to the digit * drawn ' than to any other digit. In table I., for example, in a series of 354 trials, both digits were named rightly 79 times instead of the ' probable ' number of four or five times. Some cause was evidently at work inclining the subjects to guess right. The Sidgwicks think that this cause cannot have been vocal indications given by Smith and hyperassthe- tically heard by the subjects, because if the latter had been guided by sound their mistakes would have shown the effect of sound as well as their successes ; that is, the numbers named wrongly by them would have also tended to resemble in sound the numbers actually drawn from the bag, which the Sidgwicks try to show by a comparative table was not the case. The Danish writers subject this opinion to a careful criticism. Repeating the experiment with two hemispherical mirrors, 90 cm. wide, opposite each other, the head of the agent being in the focus of one, and that of the percipient in the focus of the other, they found that the numbers could be heard by the percipient, and consequently named rightly ; when the agent inwardly articulated them, even the bystanders could hear nothing and the agent's lips were tightly closed. They also found certain parts of the room within which the sound of a grain of shot dropping on a plate could be heard, whereas it could not be heard from other places. The percipient, if in such a favored place, might of course catch a vocal indication to which bystanders would be deaf. Subjecting the whole number of ' guesses,' right and wrong, to a labori- ous phonic analysis, they prove moreover that the mistakes made by the English subjects, mistakes whose nature, according to the Sidg- wicks, was such as to exclude their being due to imperfect hearing, showed a striking analogy to those made by themselves, which posi- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 99 lively 'were due to imperfect hearing. In the English observations, namely, the numbers oftenest substituted for each other were those whose common phonetic elements were the same that caused the most frequent confusions of hearing in Messrs. H. and L. The Sidgwicks' opinion is, therefore, Messrs. H. and L. conclude, superficial and hasty, and hyperaesthesia of hearing remains 4,000 times more probable than any other assignable cause, of the amount of ' thought-transference ' recorded in their experiments. The authors point also to the facility with which, in diagram-guessing, figures may be considered ' right ' which really represent quite different objects from those meant by the agent, if only the two objects have analogous elements. The paper is a genuinely scientific contribution to the elucidation of so-called thought-transference phenomena, and contrasts most agreeably with the random abuse to which their recorders are accustomed. Telepathic Dreams Experimentally Induced. G. B. ERMACORA. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research. Vol. xi. Pp- 235-3o8- This is a startling experimental record of a new genus of thought transference. The personages are : Dr. Ermacora ; the Signora Maria, a young woman with trances and automatic writing in which she mani- fests a secondary personality alleging itself to be a spirit named Elvira; Angelina, Maria's cousin, a child in her fifth year; and, finally, the Signora Annetta, Maria's mother. The two ladies and the child live together at Padua, and Dr. Ermacora is a familiar visi- tor at the house. A certain spontaneous dream of Angelina's, in which she seemed to see the so-called Elvira, led Dr. E. to try systematically whether he could determine Angelina's dreams by ordering 'Elvira' to appear to her in sleep and make her dream according to his prescription. The experiments made were seventy in number and almost every one succeeded. Dr. Ermacora, for rea- sons that he does not give, was unable to isolate Angelina from the two ladies, so the physical possibility was not precluded of Siga. Maria tell- ing the child every night, after the details of the dream had been dicta- ted in the evening, what she must report next morning. He considers it morally impossible, however, that the ladies should wilfully play a trick on him ; and believing that Signora Maria, if she coached Ange- lina at all, could only do so whilst herself asleep, he habitually locked and sealed Angelina into a separate room, and got Signora Annetta to sleep with Signora Maria, so as to detect any possible somnambu- lism. This nevertheless was not reported. He moreover prescribed 100 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. dreams, the nature of whose details was incommunicable verbally, such as dreams of persons shown in photograph to Maria-Elvira, and afterwards identified in photograph by the child as having been seen in dreams ; or dreams of instruments pictured in manufacturers' catalogues, and similarly discriminated in Maria's absence by the child from amongst other figures of instruments that contained the same mechanical elements and would have had to be described in the same words. The child's accounts also made it clear that the suggestion, whatever it was, must have been in optical, and not in verbal terms ; for she often gave circumstances of the dream in words of her own limited experience that differed from the names used in prescribing the dream — 'dog' for lamb, e. g. (she had never seen a lamb); chail' for snow; 4 dark place down stairs' for cellar (she had never been in a cellar); 'tramway' for ship (the steamboats at Venice which was the child's home are known as tramways) etc. Dr. E's conclusion is that there was communication between the subliminal selves of Angelina and Maria. It is clear, in spite of the precautions taken, that much of the evidence hinges on the honesty of Siga. Maria and her mother, which Dr. Ermacora says it is impossi- ble for him to doubt. I, knowing Dr. E. personally, and having been present at one of his experiments, do not doubt his honesty. He is a trained physicist, author of a thick book on electricity, and pos- sesses an unusual experience of ' psychic ' phenomena, and a shrewd mind in comparing hypotheses. The editors do not doubt my honesty, or they will not print this report. But the facts are so unprecedented that the whole chain of honesties will seem a weak one, and the 4 rig- orously scientific ' mind will exercise its natural privilege, and doubt- less promptly and authoritatively dismiss the narrative as ' rot.' W. J. The Present Condition of Experimental Psychology, its Methods and its Problems. VICTOR HENRI. Woprosi Philosophic. The author reviews the rapid development of the science, closing the paragraph with the assertion that psychology is passing through a transition stage at present, in which the school of Fechner and Wundt is disappearing and new school takes its place. The first experi- mental psychologists arose in opposition to the old metaphysical psy- chology, sought to place the science on a similar basis with the natural sciences, and therefore abandoned the use of self-observation, applied physical and mathematical laws to psychic facts, and empha- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. IOI sized the external conditions of psychic life. The result was auto- matic methods and results which include much hypothesis, illustrated in Weber's experiments in skin-sensations where * one point ' or * two points ' were the only answers requested or allowed to the experimen- ter's subject. The Psycho-Physic of Fechner made the matter worse, and experiments similar to Weber's in automatic character were car- ried out in the laboratories of Wundt and others. In 1868 Bonder's reaction-time experiments opened up a new field for the application of these methods destitute of self-observation — a field which was rap- idly investigated in a manner prolific of results. The difference be- tween sensory and motor reactions, discovered by Ludwig Lange, can never be explained, says the author, until the method of self-observa- tion is again resorted to. Following these experiments came others concerning the time-sense, the general sense, contrast, after-images, abnormalities, etc., all carried out without self-observation. These experiments were chiefly conducted in Germany and America, where the first laboratory was founded in 1883, by pupils of Fechner and Wundt. In France and England the writings of Comte, Hume, Mill, Spencer, Bain and Darwin laid the foundation for psychology which in these lands did not come to such sharp opposition to the old meta- physical conceptions and never neglected self-observation nor ceased to employ it. The aim in these countries was, through experiments, to establish constancy in outer conditions and so to secure a control for self -observation. Attention was chiefly directed, not to theories of sensation and psychometry as in Germany, but to the higher psychic functions ; for example, the works of Spencer, Bain, Galton, Sully, Charcot, Ribot, Binet and James. In France attention was mostly given to pathological states, and in America to the practical applica- tion of psychological results in the field of pedagogics. Thus we see, writes the author, how a German school whose chief representatives are Fechner and Wundt has developed side by side with a French- English school whose chief representatives are Galton, James, Binet and Ribot. The former seeks exactness in the measurement of the simplest processes, investigates small details and neglects self-observa- tion ; the latter investigates the complex processes, gives attention to self-observation, and studies psychic phenomena as they appear in reality. The author seems to have confused experimental psychology with psychology as a general discipline, forgetting that the writings of Prof. Wundt, and his pupils are by no means confined to the experimental branch of the subject. The fact that he is the representative of a con- 102 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. ception of the will which some have designated metaphysical is enough to establish for him a relation to general psychology. It is not true that his work has been confined to the 4 measurement of the simplest processes to little things and details.' On the other hand, how can the author classify such writers as Spencer, Comte and Mill as experimental psychologists, or even founders of experimental psy- chology ? The two volumes of Spencer's Principles of Psychology do not contain a single psychological experiment, properly so called. The same is, in general, true of Comte, Bain and Sully. The author finds that in this French-English school alone, self-observance has been used and given its due importance. But looking at the works of the authors cited, what is the fact? The relative importance of self- observance and experiment in psychology is seldom, if ever, discussed. The System of Logic of J. S. Mill emphasizes the importance of ex- periment in all empirical sciences, but aside from this, what is there ? Experimental psychology has been comparatively little pursued in England. Comte denied the possibility of direct self-observation and with it the possibility of such a science as psychology. Locke and Hume can be classed as experimental psychologists as well as Mill, Comte, Bain, Sully or Spencer. Furthermore, the author somewhat misrepresents the psychological work done in America, in speaking of it as a practical application of psychological results to pedagogics. He seems to forget that Prof. James, whom he classes with the French-English school is an Ameri- can, that the latest and most adequate discussion of the philogenesis and ontogenesis of mind is from the pen of Prof. Baldwin, and that Ladd has probably done more work in physiological and experimental psychology than any other English writer. The author's representation of the German 4 school of Fechner and Wundt,' as omitting all self-observation in their methods, is surely inaccurate, to say the least. Space cannot be taken to quote from the many utterances of Wundt in the Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung, in the Grundziige, in the Menschen und Thierseele, and in the Philo- sophische Studien, all mentioning experiment as a help, a means of regulating and controling self-observation. Looking alone at the experiments which are conducted in Prof. Wundt's Institute, as well as at those proposed but rejected, it is clear that the primal requisite to successful experimentation is, to his mind, that all the conditions of the state or process to be investigated be subject to the control of the observer, so that the experimenter is not left to choose any one of a number of unknown processes in forming his judgment, thus introduc- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 103 ing an equal number of unknown variable factors into the results. Just in this requisite, that the method of self observation be known, lies the limitation of experimental psychology. In Prof. Wundt's words, 4 only those psychic phenomena can be influenced through experiment which are open to direct physical influence.' * * * * Every psycho- logical is therefore at the same time a physiological experiment, just as there are physical processes corresponding to the psychic processes of sensation, representation and will."1 The object of Prof. Wundt has never been, as is here represented, merely to minimize the impor- tance and the actual use of self observation ; but rather to control and systematize it. A psychology totally devoid of self-observation is im- possible. The author has exaggerated some features of experiments in Wundt's Institute and made it appear that the value of self-observa- tion is here unrecognized and its necessity denied. Probably no method other than Wundt's, or one in all essentials similar to his, could have been adopted in investigating the phenomena which he has investigated. At best the author's division of psychologists on the basis of the principle of self-observation is not a happy one. Would not some such division as the following be better : I. Psychology of the nature and relations of the functions of adult consciousness, including (i) general psychology of individuals, psychometry, psycho-physic, physi- ological psychology, etc., and (2) psychology of races and crowds; and II. Psychology of the development of consciousness, (i) in the race and (2) in the child? The author divides methods on the basis of the steps involved, and not on the basis of the nature of the objects investigated, into eight classes. ( i ) Experiments where one stimulus is given and the experi- menter simply reports what he experiences. Such are all threshold determinations, experiments concerning the clearness of perception, the analysis of musical cords into single tones, elementary experiments in aesthetic pleasures, the localization of tones and localization in gen- eral, etc. (2) Two stimuli are given, either simultaneously or suc- cessively, for comparison, as in experiments concerning the sensibility to difference (Unterschiedsemfindlichkeit) , etc. (3) Several stimuli are given and the experimenter is asked to choose one possessing a cer- tain characteristic. (4) The experimenter has a certain movement to make, either as he chooses or as directed, to a given stimulus — psycho- metry and muscular-contraction experiments. (5) A copy is given and the experimenter repeats or imitates it, or seeks another which 1Menschen und Thierseele (1892), pp. u, 12. 104 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. stands in a given relation to it, as in memory drawings, and the locali- zation of a stimulated spot of skin. (6) A series of objects given to be arranged in a certain order. These six classes embrace all the psychological experiments which are possible. Two others which are properly physiological are con" ducted by means of psychological observations. (7) Reflex and voluntary movements which follow certain stimuli. (8) Pure self- observation, where, e. g., one requests an author to describe his methods of work The author next discusses the method of gathering together an- swers and working out the results. The experiment is always influ- enced by factors dependent upon the observer, upon the experimenter, or upon accidents. Each such factor is to be investigated together with their relations of mutual interdependence, and they thus furnish principles for the gathering together of results. In skin experiment, e. g., the strength of the stimulus, the strength of the sensation, the character of the sensation, the concentration of attention, the knowl- edge and previous experience of the observer, etc., are all to be con- sidered. Each factor in turn is to be altered while the others remain constant. As a matter of fact, the others do not remain unchanged from one experiment to another. Habit, adaptation, weariness, vari- ations of attention, etc., make it impossible to retain them all un- changed ; and this makes it necessary that the observer alter his plan and method somewhat with each new experiment, and exercise the utmost possible care and foresight. After each experiment any unusual experiences or side-factors should be described ; but questions must not be asked in a fixed order or number, as this leads the experi- menter to devote his attention to these side phenomena and thus pre- vent the normal progress of the experiments. In the choice of experimenters it should be remembered that some have prejudices either as to the experiments or the method ; some soon form a theory as to the problem investigated and answer according to their theory ; and very many are curious to know results and accord- ingly ask questions in regard to them. Among the general conditions are to be mentioned variations of the attention, adaptation through exercise and practice, knowledge of the object and of the method, the mood of the experimenter, sleep, hypnotism and many others. The problems of experimental psychology are represented as (i) to describe psychic phenomena as accurately and completely as pos- sible under different conditions, (2) their relations of interdependence, (3) their influence on each other, and (4) their relation to outer pro- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 105 cesses. One may investigate these problems (i) in respect to those processes which are common to all men; (2) among processes which are shared only by particular classes of human beings, children, the abnormal, the extremely aged, etc. ; (3) with regard to the individual differences of men in their psychic processes. The first group of the last classification embraces the whole of general psychology ; the last two, individual psychology. G. TAWNKY. LEIPZIG. Der Hypnotismus. Seine psycho-physiologische, medicinische, strafrechtliche Bedeutung und seine Behandlung. AUGUST FOREL. 3. verbesserte Auflage mit Annotationen von Dr. O. Vogt. Stuttgart, Verl. v. Ferdinand Enke. 1895. In the new and enlarged edition of the work of this well-known author special reference must be made to the annotations written by Dr. Oscar Vogt, of Leipzig, a pupil of Forel's, in which he — an ad- herent like Forel of the so-called association psychology — endeavors to explain the effects of suggestion as arising from the brain mechan- ism. It is, doubtless, well known that to Prof. Forel are due in a great measure the scientific diffusion and increased recognition of the suggestion theory in Germany, as well as the destruction of the Charcot theory. Since he first became interested in the subject through Bern- heim, he has fought with indefatigable zeal on the side of the school of Nancy. This work, written in the same spirit, forces the convic- tion upon the reader that the author is sure of himself and that entire recognition of his point of view is no longer far distant. The great value of the book lies in its practical usefulness. The author understands how to initiate the beginner in the clearest and most intelligible way in the practical management of all branches of the theory of suggestion with reference at the same time to all related literature. There can be no doubt but that this new edition of his work will win new friends for both author and subject far beyond the bounds of his native country. Besides the practical introduction to the subject itself, the author presents a theory of consciousness on which he lays great stress, rightly holding a psychological comprehen- sion of hypnotism indispensable to the successful execution of hypnotic experiments. Forel holds monistic views. Conciousness is to him only ' the subjective form of appearance of the activity of the nerves,' or ' the inner reflection of a part of the activity of our cerebrum.' "Living nerve-substance, nerve-activity and consciousness are only 106 VISION. three forms of appearance of the same thing in relation to us, analyti- cally abstracted by us and in no way differing from each other. Sub- jectivism, power and matter are in essence the same and appear on earth in their most perfect and complicated form as cerebrum and the soul of man." Without entering fully into these questions, I may remark respecting the theory of consciousness and the psychological deductions of the work that, holding other fundamental views, I can- not agree in all particulars with the explanations and consequences either of Forel or of Vogt, notwithstanding that to the latter I owe personal thanks for some enlightenment as to the nature of hypnotism. In conclusion I refer the reader to Wundt's 'Hypnotismus and Sugges- tion,' a work, I may here add, described by Dr. O. Vogt also in his latest publication (Zeitschrift fur Hypnotismus, etc., Ill, Juli-Sept.- Heft.) as of the highest importance. LEIPZIG. FRIEDR. KIESOW. VISION. Die Arten des Sehpurpurs in der Wirbelthierreihe. ELSE KOTT- GEN und DR. GEORG ABELSDORFF. Sitzungsber. der Akad. d. Wissensch. zu Berlin, 25. Juli, 1895. It is known that there is more than one form of the visual purple, but Kiihne was not able to determine whether the different forms con- sist of two definite types or whether there are intermediate stages. Miss Kottgen and Dr. Abelsdorff now show that the former is the case. They examined specimens of all the classes of vertebrates — sixteen species in all — and they find very close coincidence in the ab- sorption curve of the fishes, on the one hand (of which eight different kinds were examined), and of all the other vertebrates, including man, on the other hand ; for the other vertebrates the maximum absorption is at 500 ftp, and for the fishes at 540 ^/, more in the yellow green, corresponding to the fact that is more bluish in appearance. The fact that there is no visual purple in the rodless retinas of most rep- tiles they confirmed in the case of the turtle — even a concentrated solution of sixteen retinas, extracted with the greatest care in red light, gave no trace of it. The reptiles which have rods, the chame- leon, the crocodile and the boa, they did not examine on account of the costliness of the material. [The reviewer does not find that the absorption spectrum of sea water has been determined. It would be interesting if it should turn out that the agent for absorption in the eye of fishes is adapted to the light to be absorbed in deep water, which is the fish's darkness.] PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 107 Sur la theorie de la vision des couleurs. DUFOUR. Congres intern. de m^decine. Rome. 1894. This paper deserves mention as one more instance of the apparent impossibility of bringing about a widespread knowledge of facts of color-vision which ought by this time to be the property of everyone, at least, who writes upon the subject. Dufour had several cases of total color-blindness, and by experiments in the sorting of colored wools in accordance with their brightness, and by unquantitative esti- mations of the brightness of the different parts of the spectrum, he conies to the conclusion that the brightness' maximum for the totally color-blind lies in the green. But it has already been shown by Her- ing and Hillebrand, and by Konig and Dieterici, by means of the most accurate measurements, not only that the maximum is in the green, but that it is at a definite wave-length in the green. The author then maintains that upon the theory of Hering, according to which only the sensations of black and white and their mixtures remain in cases of total color-blindness, it is impossible to explain why the maximum should fall in the green ; he does not say, however, why we should find it any more easy to explain its falling in any other part of the spectrum. The fact in question is, according to Dufour, readily ex- plained upon the theory of Helmholtz, with the aid of the assumption that what the individuals in question see is really green and not grey. In saying this the writer merely shows that he is unaware that we all have this same colorless scale of sensation in a faint illumination, and in the periphery of the eye at all illuminations, and that its curve of distribution through the spectrum is coincident with that of the color- blind. It would, therefore, be impossible to suppose that the sen- sation of the totally color-blind is green, even if it were not for the fact that we have cases of monocular total color-blindness, in which it is known to be grey; and Helmholtz himself had, in fact, long ago virtually given up this position. It is far more important that who- ever argues the intricate question of color-vision should argue within the bounds of easily accessible facts, and also of elementary principles of logic, than that the theories of Hering or of Helmholtz, inadequate as they are, should be disproved in the briefest possible time. As this was the only contribution to color theory made by the Con- gress at Rome, and as it was received without discussion, apparently, it would not seem to indicate a very great interest on the part of phy- sicians in color sensations or in their theoretical handling. £tude sur les Cones et les bdtonnets dans la region de la fovea centralis de la retine chez Fhomme W. KOSTER (Utrecht) . Arch. d'Ophtalm. V. 428-437. July, 1895. 108 MEMORY. Koster has considered it to be desirable, before finishing his study of the Purkinje phenomenon, to re-examine the retina carefully with the purpose of determining the exact extent of the coneless region about the fovea; this has been done hitherto only incidentally, as it is only since controversy has arisen as to whether the rods alone are the seat of the Purkinje phenomenon or not, that the subject has been of so much importance. Koster had only a small amount of very good ma- terial, but the material is so difficult to get (it is useless to examine an eye so late as two hours after death) that he publishes his method at once in order that others may be spared the loss of time involved in tentative experimenting. His conclusions, based upon four cases, are as follows : Region in which the cones dominate (diam.) 8 mm. Region in which there are no cones at all 5 mm. Bed of the fovea .2 mm. Dimmer gives 1.4 to 2 mm as the diameter of the fovea, but he counts from the beginning of the declivity. Koster reserves discus- sion of this result until a later occasion. Die Cardinalpunkte des Auges fur Verschiedenfarbiges Licht. W. EINTHOVEN. Pfliiger's Archiv., LXI. 1895. The effect of dispersion upon the cardinal points of the eye has not been calculated except in the case of the focal points, and in that case only for Listing's reduced eye with one refracting surface. In view of recent discussion by Schapringer, Konig and others, Einthoven has found it desirable to carry out the entire calculation for the actual eye. Of chief importance for the phenomena of color diffusion in the eye is the position of the second nodal point and of the second focal point. He finds that the former is for blue rays 3^ in front of its position for yellow rays, a difference so small that it can be neglected in cases where a relative change of position of differently colored ret- inal images is to be investigated. The distance between the focal points for blue light and for red light is .248 mm., as against .193 for the reduced eye. C. LADD FRANKLIN. BALTIMORE, MD. MEMORY. On Memory and the Specific Energies of the Nervous System. PROFESSOR EWALD HERING. Eng. trans. * * * Chicago Open Court Publishing Company. 1895. Pp. 50. This is a good translation of two brief essays, the first being a PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 109 popular address delivered in 1870 before the Imperial Academy at Vienna. Like all of Hering's work, it is vigorous and suggestive, and will prove especially so to lay readers. To those at all closely in touch with contemporary psychology it will possess little interest be- yond that which always attaches to a clear statement of any doctrine, for most of its contents concern matters which are to-day psychologi- cal commonplace. The general thesis is the dependence of repro- ductive mental processes, both sensory and motor, upon the retention in protoplasmic structures, such as the nervous system, of modifica- tions occasioned by previous experiences. The important distinction between the mere reproduction, or representation, of mental states and the reproductions of true memory — in Prof. James' sense, for instance, involving the conscious recognition that the reproduced fact has been a part of one's own past experience at a definite time — is never al- luded to. The point, so often misty in other writers, is clearly made, that unconscious memory ( ?) and unconscious mental ( ?) processes are simply tantamount to neural activities of such character and inten- sity as do not awaken their counterparts in consciousness. In the broad sense all organic structures manifest a kind of memory, in so far as they retain the modifications of past experience. The more per- manent among these modifications occurring in the nervous system are transmitted from generation to generation, emerging in the new-born individual as instinctive acts — a statement which may require to be edited anew in the light of Weismann's work. In the second essay, which is much less clearly written, the prob- lem of the specific energies of the nerves is discussed more or less in the light of the foregoing doctrine. The author apparently posits ultimate and specific differences of function as properties of proto- plasm, which differences are called out, developed, and at length firmly embedded in the growing nervous system through the agency of repeated stimulations of similar character. The manifold views of other writers upon this topic gain no notice, and some of the state- ments made are flatly contradictory of the widely-credited work of other scientists — for instance, Goldscheider's work on temperature sensations. Still, it is all very entertaining, and we venture to hope the translator will see fit to render accessible to English readers Her- ing's much more important work upon the color sense. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. JAMES R. ANGELL. HO EXPERIMENTAL. EXPERIMENTAL. Observations comparatives sur la reconnaissance, la discrimina- tion et I 'association. B. BOURDON. Revue philosophique, XX. 154-185. August, 1895. As the title indicates M. Bourdon proposed to investigate the inter- relations of recognition, discrimination and association, but the result is rather three minor studies. (1) Recognition. Series of words, or letters, were read aloud in which one of the words occurring near the beginning of the series was repeated later on, and the number of times its occurrence was recognized was determined. Thus, for example, in a series in which the word restaurant was the fifth of the series and again the twenty- second it was recognized 60 times in 65 trials. The word was of course more likely to be recognized if first in the series or if the inter- vening words were few. Words were more likely to be recognized than letters, and dissyllables than monosyllables. A word is more likely to be recognized if interesting, and thus the method may be used to determine what ideas are of most interest. It would seem that those concerned with eating and drinking attract the attention most forcibly. (2) Discrimination. Three series of printed letters were used — one a passage from a book, one of letters 1.75 mm. high not mak- ing words and one of letters 1.25 mm. high not making words, and the observer was required to mark as many letters of a given sort as he could in four minutes. Thus for example in four minutes 1,693 letters were read, and 216 of the 223 a's were marked. When it was necessary to mark six different letters 503 letters were read and 255 of those 273 occurring were marked. The size of the letters did not make any evident difference. M. Bourdon concludes that the letters not marked take up about one-tenth as much time as those marked. He notes the interesting fact that most observers can mark all the a's in a list more quickly than they can discriminate all the letters, and attrib- utes this to the circumstance that in discriminating the letters there is with most observers a tendency to articulate them. This, however, is probably not the correct explanation. The present writer has found that observers can discriminate and articulate about six letters per sec. when the letters make words, and about three letters per sec. when they do not make words. The rate is limited by the time of discrimi- nation, not by the time of articulation, which is reflex and overlaps the discrimination of the following letters. Observers can mark 100 A's PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. Ill on a list of 500 letters at the rate of about one per sec., in which case they must cursorily discriminate about four letters per sec. in addition to the A's. This cursory discrimination consists in seeing that a letter is not A, which is easier than seeing what letter it is. In making the experiment the A's seem to stand out from an undiscriminated complex. In reading proof one can often see an inaccurately printed word by glancing at a page, and one can see that the word is incorrect before one recognizes the nature of the error. (3) Association. M. Bourdon collected verbal associations on the familiar lines of exhibiting words and letting the observer write down the suggested words. He classifies the results according to the per- centages of nouns, verbs and adjectives suggested, which would scarcely seem to be as satisfactory as the classifications used in similar experiments by others. M. Bourdon concludes that students of letters show greater versatility, and students of science greater stability, in their associations. It will be seen that M. Bourdon's experiments are of interest, but they were not conducted nor are they described in accordance with what the present writer regards as the best scientific method. Basing new work on work already accomplished, and giving such statement of results as may be the basis of further work, is the method that advances science. J. McK. C. De ly influence de la perception visuelle des corps sur leur poids apparent. TH. FLOURNOY. L'Anne"e psychologique, 1894. L, 198-208. Although psychologists generally agree in discarding innervation sensations, says M. Flournoy, yet the immediate knowledge of the outgo of energy in voluntary effort seems so directly evident to con- sciousness, that there is a call for some thorough and crucial demon- stration of its fallacy, apart from pathological cases. For this pur- pose the writer selected ten objects of different sizes, but exactly the same weight (112 grams); the largest was a wooden box of 2,100 cu. cm. content, the smallest a metal case of 10 cu. cm. filled with lead. The subjects (50 in number, in the first set of experiments) were asked to arrange the objects in order of weight. The wooden box was judged lightest by 84% ; the next largest article was given second place by 50% ; and throughout the series the average judgment made the object heavier as it decreased in size, the metal case being placed last by 90%. The individual variations show, however, that habitual associations also affect the judgment of certain objects. 112 EXPERIMENTAL. To eliminate any possible effect from the area of skin touched, M. Flournoy devised a second set of tests, in which the weights were lifted only by means of a string and ring. Out of 31 persons, 29 placed the box first (i. <?., as lightest), and 30 placed the metal case last. These results directly contradict those reported by Charpentier, in the Arch, de Physiologic (1891, p. 127). On closing the eyes, the difference disappeared. Of 44 persons asked to state the weight of the objects, the average made the (supposed) heaviest 253 g. and the lightest 52 g. The diver- gence was greater in women than in men, and in literary men than in scientists. Of 30 asked to assign the relative weight, the average made the (supposed) heaviest 5.2 times the weight of the lightest; but when asked to add weights to the lightest till it equalled the heavi- est, the average result was a mere doubling of its weight. The illusion persists even after its illusory character is known ; it is present in 'persons of every age. It is shown to be due to the volume of the object, rather than the area of contact. Finally, it is a direct argument against the innervation feelings, which ought to cor- rect or even over-balance such an error of judgment. As an impor- tant datum bearing on the subject, I should suggest to M. Flournoy that he examine the case of postal clerks, who are commonly supposed to be able to detect slight differences of weight by mere lifting. PRINCETON. H. C. WARREN. Recherches graphiques sur la musique. A. BINET ET J. COURTIER. Revue Scientifique, 6 Juillet, 1895. MM. Binet and Courtier have devised an apparatus for recording the normal movements of piano players which promises results valu- able to both music and psychology. It consists of a rubber tube six millimeters in diameter running along directly under the keys and connected at both ends with an elastic drum which carries the record- ing style. The tracing is taken, as usual, on smoked paper. Errors that might arise from inertia of the apparatus are avoided by inserting in the tube a diaphragm with capillary opening. When a key is struck the style is deflected in such a way that the height of the deflection is proportional to the force of the pressure; the length of the deflection records the time; and finally the form of the curve gives a detailed account of the manner in which the movement was carried out. The whole apparatus is out of the player's sight and the tube is so adjusted that it does not increase appreciably the resistance of the keys, thus insuring entirely normal movements. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 113 A number of interesting results are described, showing that irregu- larities which escape even trained ears are plainly seen in the curves and that the differences which distinguish good execution from poor are easily studied. A series of experiments made with this apparatus will be reported in the next number of l'Anne"e psycho logique. C. H. JUDD. LEIPZIG. THE FEELINGS. Review of A. Lekmann's Work, ' Die Hauptgesetze des Mensch- lichen Gefuhlslebens.' TH. LIPPS. Gottingsehen gelehrten An- zeigen, 1894, Nr. 2, pp. 85-117. A strongly written attack on the ' Lange- James ' theory of emo- tion, Lipps maintaining that the primary psychological phenomenon in feeling is always the disturbance produced by the stimulus upon the Subject's system of ideas. The consequent bodily alterations hardly contribute at all to the emotion properly so-called, since the sensations which they yield are easily distinguished therefrom, as when Lipps himself is so ' touched ' with sympathetic happiness in reading of romantic situations that he gets a distinctly painful constriction of the throat, which not only does not constitute, but positively conflicts with his emotional happiness. Moreover, if feelings were made of sensa- tions, how could a c self ' arise ? A certain group of sensations makes my body, because it is tied to feelings and strivings. These latter are the immediate /, and render mine whatever sensational content they go with, rendering alien whatever sensational content they separate from. They cannot themselves be sensational content. W. J. Les emotions : Etude psycho-physiologique. Lange. Trad. Francaise de G. DUMAS. Paris, Alcan. 1895. Pp. 198. A few words only are needed to anounce the French translation of this well-known book for the theory of emotions, which it elaborates, is at present causing much discussion among psychologists. It is, however, interesting to note that the principal argument by which Lange seeks to prove that the emotions are the result of vasomotor changes is that it is incontestable that many emotions have a purely physical cause ; for example, the exhilaration due to wine, the excite- ment and anger produced by certain drugs and the various emo- tions which in many diseases accompany abnormal conditions of the body. It would seem that the critics of the new theory of Lange and of James have not taken sufficient account of this argument. A. B. H4 THE CONSCIENCE, ITS NATURE AND ORIGIN. The Conscience, Its Nature and Origin. WILLIAM W. CARLILE. International Journal of Ethics, October, 1895. Pp. 63-77. This article is in the main a protest against the view of Herbert Spencer that it is the experience of rewards and punishments accorded in this world during many generations to right and wrong action re- spectively that has evolved the conception of duty. Such a view pos- tulates a psychological hypothesis of transformations that follow the analogy of chemistry, i. e., a metamorphosis from pleasure and pain elements into ethical ideas of justice, the right, the true, etc., which we cannot expect to understand. Such hypotheses, transcending the understanding, lead to paradoxes and absurdities, and rule out the reductio ad impossibile in mental science, where a refutation of a false induction may be attained by a simple appeal to fact. In psychology, it is impossible to appeal to a fact, to an ethical sentiment, for instance, in the same way as appeal may be made to the physical phenomena evidenced by the senses; nevertheless, appeal may be made to the circumstances which occasion the sentiment in question. Thus an objective reference may be made indirectly. And this is analogous to the operation of mechanical forces, that is, where the cause is seen in the effect, and not an obscure metamorphosis akin to chemical changes. Causation in the sphere of ethical phenomena must be in- telligible. It will not do, therefore, to derive a sense of justice, either directly or indirectly, from fear of punishment. How, then, can a law enforce itself without hint of penalty ? The answer may be suggested by two acknowledged psychological phenomena. One is that a representation in the mind of the act con- templated always precedes the actual volition and consequent realiza- tion of the volition in conduct. And the second is that the concep- tion of ourselves is moulded on the conception of others. A judg- ment of self is the reflected judgment of others. Therefore when we are tempted to a mean or wrong act it must first appear before our minds as a presentation that may be rendered actual in conduct, and, moreover, it is represented sub specie alius. The contemplated act arouses resentment against any who would commit, or whom we think of at the moment as committing it, but wholly in an impersonal way ; then we transfer the resentment to ourselves considered as com- mitting it. This transfer makes the act personal. The consequent feeling of disapprobation has arisen through a direct line of causation, after a mechanical and not a chemical analogy. This transfer of re- sentment accounts for the prohibitive aspect of conscience ; its posi- tive aspect as an incentive to all virtue is accounted for by a like PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 115 transfer of gratitude. This view is, therefore, superior to the Kantian view which accounts only for a negative virtue. This view is illus- trated in the ethical grandeur of Hellenism, which the author thinks has been unfairly disparaged by Matthew Arnold. I am, on the whole, in sympathy with the writer's main contention that fear of punishment, however developed, and through increasingly complex associations, be they ever so many, can never be transformed through a psychological metamorphosis into a sense of honor, or of jus- tice, or a regard of duty for duty's sake alone. Yet I feel that he can not summarily rule out all explanations of psychological phenomena, which are of the chemical rather than the mechanical type ; for in- stance, the relation of the purely physiological to the psychological phenomena can not be explained by transformations of the mechanical kind, where the cause is seen in the effect. Moreover, the compari- son between self and others and the consequent transfer of the feeling of resentment or of approbation does not wholly account for the rise of the moral sentiments. We might ask, whence the original feeling of resentment in an impersonal way concerning the acts of others ? And in the transfer to self there seems to me to be a supplementary com- parison overlooked by Mr. Carlile, namely, the comparison between the possible self, conceived as agent of the contemplated act, and the ideal self, of which the act in question would be unworthy. There is, moreover, a tendency on the part of the writer to identify the true and the right, where, for instance, he says that ' Ought ' is the for- mula of deduction in speculative truth as well as in ethics. The ethical ' ought,' however, has a deeper significance and produces peculiar psychological effects, as the consequent emotions attendant upon its presence in the mind, and depending upon the will's response to its behests. The true may cause but the minimum of emotional functioning, and may deliver no command to the will ; the right, how- ever, speaks always with authority, stirring emotional depths, and re- sulting in conduct accordingly. JOHN GRIER HIBBEN. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY. The Philosophy of Lotze — Doctrine of Thought. H. JONES. New York. Macmillan & Co. 1895. Pp. vm. + 375. This volume, the first of two on the philosophy of Lotze — the sec- ond will deal with his metaphysics — is a criticism from the Neo-He- gelian standpoint of the Lotzean Epistemology contained in the Ii6 -THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE. Logic. In brief, it attempts to show that the Lotzean view, by its inherent contradictions, refutes itself, and thereby demonstrates more clearly the validity of a Hegelian position. The author's English is fresh and vigorous, and usually clear ; but at times his desire to be lucid, especially in expounding Lotze, leads him into needless and oftentimes wearisome repetitions. The first chapter outlines Lotze's general position in philosophy. He is critical rather than constructive ; in fact, says Jones, he has no real system. He attempts a via media, avoiding on one side the limita- tions of the merely scientific view, and on the other the extreme pan- logismus of Hegel. ' The main endeavor of his life was to refute ' the Hegelian identification of knowledge and reality (p. 34). He also undertook to vindicate the unrecognized claims of feeling. The resemblance between Kant and Lotze that each bases his metaphysics upon ethics is emphasized and made the premise for the very doubtful conclusion that 'those who really know Kant have little need of Lotze' (p. 17). Now since, reasons Jones, Lotze's extreme diver- gence in his Metaphysics from Hegel is based logically upon his divergence from the latter in his view of thought, it follows that the refutation of the Lotzean Epistemology will involve the complete destruction of his Metaphysics. The remainder of the book is the attempted refutation. The essence of Ch. II. is an elaboration of the three following ' limitations ' of thought made by Lotze : i . Thought is not reality, nor is reality thought ; knowledge by its very nature is subjective. This is not scepticism, says Lotze, for thought should not claim to be things, but only to be valid of them. 2. Not only is thought simply an activity of the soul, it further is only a part of the soul's activity. Feeling and conation are equally coordinate, incommensurable ulti- mates. Lotze argues (Jones disagreeing) that since to the feelings, we owe our impulses towards, and our ideals of, the True and the Good, and hence the data for our judgments of worth, a philosophy of the feelings is more important than a philosophy of mere thought. 3. A third ' limitation' is the assignment of thought to only the higher (formal) intellectual functions. Ch. III., IV., V., and VI., deal with the third 'limitation,' aim- ing to show that ' thought shorn of its pretensions ' is nugatory. Ch. III. treats of Perception and Conception. Lotze defines the function of thought as making coherent the ideas given by associative con- sciousness as merely coincident. Jones points out that Lotze leaves it ambiguous whether thought discovers the coherence or produces it. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 117 He evidently misinterprets Lotze's position, representing him (p. 105) as holding that we first know a subjective state, which thought then objectifies. On the contrary, one of Lotze's firmest convictions is that the first mental act involves no knowledge whatever. Viewing thought as formal, Lotze soon recognizes that conception cannot furnish necessary coherence among coincident phenomena, and so passes to Judgment (Ch. IV.). But beginning with the categor- ical, and passing successively through the Conditional and Disjunctive, he fails to find the necessary coherence. Nor is he more successful in Inference (Ch. V.). Subsumptive Inference in its three forms, Syllogism, Induction and Analogy, cannot produce coherence. "These processes, if synthetic, appear invalid, and if valid, they seem tauto- logical." Inference by Substitution can give us coherence, but only of abstract quantity and not of real phenomena. Inference by Pro- portion possesses a similar weakness. Classification by type fails be- cause it is not concerned with the real world of change. Finally, Systematic Explanation can give coherence, only provided the whole system is known, but since this is impossible, this method also is in- adequate. In Ch. VI., Jones argues that thought as formal cannot perform even the function assigned it by Lotze. The argument does not seem conclusive. He says: "We have to condemn either Lotze's view of thought as formal, or all knowledge as uncertain, except mathe- matics." (p. 257.) A few pages further he admits the uncertainty of all knowledge. "Scientific systems, including mathematics itself, will remain hypothetical, and the truth they contain will rest upon unver- ified assumptions." (p. 266.) Ch. VII. and VIII. deal with the first and second limitations of thought advanced by Lotze in Book III. Part of Ch. VII. is devoted to an exposition of the first limitation, criticism being reserved for Ch. VIII. The rest of the chapter treats of the second limitation, being a criticism of Lotze's view of feeling. Lotze regards feeling as the test of the ultimate principles of knowledge. Jones demurs. The very fact that Lotze regards these principles as needing scrutiny proves that the test is really logical, viz., the coherence of elements in a system. Again, he attacks Lotze's view that our belief in a real world is based on feeling, not thought, because feeling is the source of our judgments of value. But, says Jones, it is absurd to speak of judgments of any kind without thought. Lotze confuses feeling with the knowledge of objects as worthful that accompanies the feeling (p. 298). This criti- cism seems irrelevant. Lotze did not mean that a judgment of worth Il8 TIME AND THE SUCCESSION OF EVENTS. could be made without thought, but that feeling supplies the content or data (moral emotions, etc.), which thought can never furnish. In Ch. VIII. on The Principle of Reality in Thought and its Pro- cesses, one is surprised to find the easy manner in which Jones dis- poses of Lotze's basal position that 4 Thought is valid of reality.' It is not 'worthy of serious discussion' (p. 333, note). The ignoring of this point materially strengthens the criticisms upon Lotze. The value of the work, as a whole, lies chiefly in the many admir- ably clear expositions of Lotzean theory, its criticisms and the ambi- guity of several of the terms used constituting its chief weakness. W. J. SHAW. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY. Time and the Succession of Events. J. L. MC!NTYRE. Mind, July, 1895. Pp. 334. Mr. Mclntyre in general criticizes the Kantian doctrine and ex- pounds Lotze. The modern problem is — ' Does time belong to the ultimatey real' ? If it is only an appearance for us, ultimate reality becomes in- comprehensible, whether it be called the ' unknowable ' of Spencer or the 4 harmonious experience' of Bradley. If it belongs to the Real, we must show in what sense it can be predicated. Our criterion must come from experience. Merely logical criteria, as Bradley's 4 self contradiction ' too plainly shows, are purely formal and tell us nothing. For him there can be no positive statement. Any such would involve unity and diversity. We are reduced to a barren identity. Leibnitz denied the absolute reality of time, but admitted a real succession of events. Kant held that time was an a priori form. Lotze took up the argument where Kant left off and showed, that while empty time is a mental abstraction, the appearance of change involves change in the Real. A concrete succession of events must be admitted in the real. Every event is an act, every act is the act of a subject, not it, but expressed in it. The succession of events im- plies the immanent action of an absolute subject. As unity it is above time and incomprehensible. But the subject can only be a unity in expressing itself in the diverse succession of events. These are in- separable aspects of the real. Past and future are alike constructions : The permanent changing present alone is the real. An adequate con- ception of this ' present ' is difficult to form. S. F. MCLENNAN. NEW BOOKS. 119 NEW BOOKS. Der Kampf um einen Geistigen Lebensinhalt . R. EUCKEN. Leipzig, Veit. 1895. Pp. viii + 4OO. 7.50 M. Die Moderne Physiologische Psychologic in Deutschland, mit Be- sonderer Beriichsichtigung des Problems der Aufmerksamkeit. W. HEINRICH. Zurich, Speidel. 1895. Pp. iv+2O5. 40 M. Psicologia per le Scuole. G. SERGI. 2d ed., revised. Milano, Du- molard. 1895. Pp. vii-f 227. Mental Development in the Child and the Race. Methods and Processes. J. MARK BALDWN. 2d ed., corrected. New York and London, Macmillan & Co. J895. Pp. xvi + 496. $2.60. Johnson's Universal Cyclopedia. New edition, Vols. V-VTII. New York, Johnson Co. 1895. The Conception of God. J. ROYCE. Address before the Philo- sophical Union of the University of California. With comments by S. E. MEZES, J. LE CONTE and G. H. HOWISON. Berkeley, California, Executive Council of the Union. 1895. Pp. 84. 50 cts. Mental Physiology. T. B. HYSLOP. London, J. & A. Churchill. 1895. Pp. viii+539. Sur le mecanisme du sommeil. L. ERRERA. Bruxelles, Hayez. i895. Histoire de la philosophic atomistique. LEOPOLD MABILLEAU. Paris, Alcan. 1895. Pp. vii + 5^o. Etude sur le temps et Vespace. LECHALAS. Paris, Alcan. 1895. Le psychisme experimental. A. ERNY. Paris. Flammariom. 1895. Theorie de I'dme. ALAUX. Paris, Alcan. 1895. The Psychic Development of Young Animals. WESLEY MILLS. Montreal. 1895. Geschichte der neueren Philosophic, iter Bd. Aus ddnischen iibersetzt. REISSLAND, Leipzig. 1895. NOTES. • THE Archivfur system. Philosophic (Heft 4, Bd. L, Oct., 1895) publishes a ' Bibliographic der philosophischen Litteratur des Jahres 1894* comprising 1298 titles, together with a ' Namenregister ' to the same. It gives no arrangement of titles, either alphabetical or other, under the different sections, but, on the other hand, the headings are frequent and the classification detailed. There is no section devoted to 'Neurology.' 'Biology' has n titles, and ' Physio logisches Grundlagen' (under 'Psychologic'), 35. 120 . NOTES. THE first number of a new journal called Zeitschrift fur imman- ente Philosophic has appeared. It is edited by M. R. Kauffmann, with the cooperation of W. Schappe and R. v. Schubert-Soldern, all of whom have articles in the first number. (Berlin, Salinger, quar- terly, 9 M. per volume.) The editor states the object of the journal as follows: "Noch Moglichkeit alle Anhanger der Grundprincipien des idealestischen Monismus und diesem verwandten Auffassungen in gemeinsamer Thatigkeit zu vereinigen." It has no literature or other auxilliary sections. IN May of the present year the Universities of St. Petersburg, Moscow and Kieff replied to an inquiry from the Minister of Educa- tion unanimously favoring the establishment of laboratories of psy- chology in all of these universities. A committee of eight professors from the University of Kieff has petitioned for about $3,000 for the establishment of a laboratory of psychology, and a yearly appropria- tion of $300. A LABORATORY of experimental psychology has been fitted up at the University of Kansas under the charge of Olin Templin, professor of philosophy. KANT'S manuscripts, belonging to the University of Dorpat, have been placed by the Russian Government at the disposal of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, which is preparing to issue a complete edition of the philosopher's works. PROFESSOR E. HERING, who succeeds Ludwig at Leipzig, offers lectures on the 'Physiology of Sensations and Movements.' DR. HERBERT NICHOLS, formerly instructor in psychology in Harvard University, has been appointed lecturer in psychology in Johns Hopkins University. DR. EDGAR PIERCE has been appointed instructor in psychology in the University of Michigan. DR. C. VON TWARDOWSKY, privatdocent in the University of Vienna, has been elected assistant professor in philosophy in the Uni- versity of Lemburg. DR. JOHANNES GAD, of Berlin, has accepted a call to the chair of physiology in the University of Prague, vacated by Professor Hering. MSS. intended for publication in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW or in the MONOGRAPH SUPPLEMENTS, and books, etc., intended for re- view during the year 1896 should be sent to Prof. J. McKeen Cattell, Garrison-on-Hudson, N. Y. VOL. III. No, 2. MARCH, 1896. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH ANNUAL MEET- ING OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, 1895. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY AND TREASURER FOR 1895. The fourth annual meeting of the American Psychological Association was held at the University of Pennsylvania, De- cember 27 and 28, 1895, that place having been selected with reference to the simultaneous meetings of the American So- ciety of Naturalists and other affiliated societies. There were present the following members : Baldwin, Cattell, Chrysostom, Farrand, Fullerton, Gardiner, Griffin, Hyslop, James, Ladd, MacDonald, Marshall, Miller, Mills, Newbold, Nichols, Patrick, Sanford, Seth, Shaw, Strong, Warren and Witmer — twenty- three in all. Morning and afternoon sessions were held on both days, President J. McKeen Cattell presiding. Abstracts of the papers presented so far as they have been received by the Secretary are appended. At the regular business meeting and in the intervals of the regular program, the following business was transacted. Elec- tion of officers for the ensuing year : President, Prof. George S. Fullerton ; Secretary and Treasurer, Dr. Livingston Far- rand ; Members of the Council, Profs. E. H. Griffin and E. C. Sanford. Elected to membership on nomination of the Council : Dr. H. Austin Aikins, Western Reserve University ; Dr. C. H. Bliss, University of the City of New York ; Dr. Franz Boas, Museum of Natural History, New York; Prof. E. D. Cope, University of Pennsylvania; Prof. J. E. Creighton, Cornell University ; Prof. Warner Fite, Williams College ; Mr. J. E. 122 FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING. Lough, Harvard University; Prof. C. S. Minot, Harvard Medical School ; Dr. E. A. Singer, Harvard University ; Dr. W. G. Smith, Smith College ; Dr. Norman Wilde, Columbia University. On motion of Professor Baldwin, the Association voted that a committee of five, including the President of the Association, be appointed to consider the feasibility of cooperation among the various psychological laboratories in the collection of men- tal and physical statistics, the committee to report at the next regular meeting of the Association. The following members were later appointed on this committee : Baldwin, Jastrow, San- ford, Witmer and Cattell (chairman). The question of the formation of a philosophical society or a philosophical section within the present Association was, after a brief discussion, re- ferred to the Council with full power to act. It was voted that members attending the International Psychological Congress in Munich, in 1896, be empowered to act as delegates of the Asso- ciation, when qualified by notice given by them to the Secretary of the Association. A vote of thanks for the hospitality shown by the University of Pennsylvania and the local committee of arrangements was unanimously passed. The time and place of meeting were, by vote, referred to the incoming President to be fixed by him in conference with the presidents of the Society of Naturalists and other societies meeting simultaneously. REPORT OF THE TREASURER: Receipts: From retiring Treasurer (Prof. J. McKeen Cattell) ..$127 17 Dues 180 oo Sale of Proceedings 50 $307 67 Expenditures : Printing $13 60 Postage , 7 15 Stationery I 73 Expressage 90 $23 38 Balance on hand $284 29 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION. 123 Of this amount $100.00 is on deposit in the Mechanic's Sav- ings Bank, Worcester, Mass., and $158.00 in the Worcester Institution of Savings. These deposits have drawn interest to an estimated amount of $7.00. Audited by the Council and found correct. E. C. SANFORD. Secretary and Treasurer, 1894-95. ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS. (1) Address of the President. By PROF. J. McKEEN CAT- TELL, Columbia University. The address reviewed the history and recent progress of psychology and the part played in its development by experi- ment and measurement. Psychology is by no means a new science, but its growth during the last few years has been rapid, and it now rivals the other leading sciences in productiveness of research and publication and in academic position. Science is either genetic or quantitative, and psychology is advancing in both directions. The problems that can be treated in the labora- tory were reviewed, and it was claimed that these have added directly and indirectly new subject-matter and methods, have set a higher standard of accuracy and objectivity, have made some part of the subject an applied science with useful appli- cations, and have enlarged the field and improved the methods of teaching psychology. In conclusion, the relations of psy- chology to the other sciences and to philosophy were reviewed, and their interdependence was emphasized. [This address is printed in the present number of THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW.] (2) Psychology and Physiology. By PROF. GEORGE S. FUL- LERTON, University of Pennsylvania. This paper was in a sense a sequel to the paper read two years before, entitled 'The Psychological Standpoint.' It at- tempted to draw the line between two sciences which touch each other closely, and was divided into two parts. The first part 124 FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING. assumed the * automaton' theory of mind to be the true one, /. e?., the theory that mental states form no part of the sensory- motor arc, but are, so to speak, parallel with neural changes. The second part assumed ideas to be either a part of the chain of causes resulting in bodily motions or a something standing outside of that chain and, as it were, breaking in upon it. The author expressed no opinion as to the truth of any one of these theories, but merely inquired where the line dividing psychology from physiology should be drawn in any case. He examined at length a standard work on physiology, that of Professor Foster, and showed that dearth of established physiological data forced the author constantly to abandon his own field and take to psychology. In general, he maintained the thesis that psy- chology is sufficiently marked out from other sciences by the method it must employ, the method of introspection, observation and experiment, and interpretation ; and he deprecated the in- troduction into text-books on physiology of psychological material as tending to conceal lack of physiological knowledge and to lead to confusion as to the boundaries of the two sciences. [The paper appeared in the January number of THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, 1896.] (3) Series of Physical and Mental Tests on the Students of Columbia College. By DR. LIVINGSTON FARRAND, Co- lumbia University. The tests described are made on the undergraduates of the College at entrance and repeated on the same students at the end of their Sophomore and Senior years. The object of the tests is to obtain a record for comparative purposes of certain mental and physical characteristics of the students at different times during a period of rather active in- tellectual growth and at the same time to furnish material for a statistical study of the particular points examined. Stress is laid to a certain extent upon the more purely mental inquiries, such as memory, rate of perception and motor response, accu- racy of perception, color vision, etc., but enough physical tests are included to afford a comparison between bodily and mental development, if any relation between the two exists. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION. I25 (4) Neuro-Social Data. By DR. ARTHUR MACDONALD, Bu- reau of Education, Washington. TABULAR STATEMENT GIVING QUANTITATIVE MEASUREMENTS OF SENSIBILITY IN PERSONS OF DIFFERENT AGES AND DIFFERENT CLASSES OF SOCIETY. 1 » 1 til Is m* a O *Zn ^ rt S 1 i? H*| II •V i 1 o 1 Ilil |§1 |e|| 1. 1 •d sly fell till H ca 3 | i ials §o| B * S Nil 0 < <5 <4 «d r.wr. l.wr. r.wr. l.wr. right. left. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 mm. mm. cent. cent. kilos. kilos. I Women (highly edu- cated) 23 av. 38 17.3 16.2 2°. I 1° 7 I 2C3 1.22A.CT. II Young Women L V • ^W •*•/••> ' ' **"\ \»« mus.) (wealthy classes).. II un.30 13-6 12.4 4.6 4.4 2.9 2.4 (hand.) III Young Men (wealthy classes) IO 4 i <9Q 12 4. 12.7 4.4. 3.7 4..7 4.2 " IV Boston, Army of ?... 35 av.28 *? / 15-6 T j i T / 9-5 9-5 " V Washington School VI Children (boys)... Washington School 526 6-18 16.3 15-5 3-9 3-8 Children (girls)... 55 1 6-18 14.8 13-8 4-5 3-9 VII Boys (parents well- to-do) 205 6-18 16.2 15.2 4.0 3-9 VIII Boys (parents poor).. 119 6-18 16.6 15-9 4.0 3-7 IX Girls (parents well- to-do) 183 6-18 T A t T i r i r\ •3 C X XI Girls (parents poor).. i<JO 133 318 6-18 6-14 14.9 J5'7 13-8 14.0 3-9 3-6 XII Boys, aft. " 208 17.2 16.3 A!C 4.2 XIII Girls, bef. " 1 86 6-12 x ^ tm 1*8 3.8 XIV Girls, aft. " 362 13-18 1C I IA'O 1*3 4.O XV Col. Chil., boys y*** 33 6-19 13.9 13-5 2.0 T w XVI ". girls 58 6-16 15.2 14.1 2-5 2.4 The tests for temperature discrimination were made with Eulenberg's thermaesthesiometer ; those for pain with the au- thor's own algometer applied to the temporal muscle. All the psychical conditions were made as uniform as possible, es- pecially with the children. Should these results be confirmed by experiments on larger numbers of individuals, the following statements would be probable : Middle-aged women of the educated classes are much less 126 FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING. acute in the sense of locality on the wrist, but much more acute to heat than young women of the wealthy classes (Nos. I. and II., columns 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). Young men of the wealthy classes are much more sensitive to locality and pain than the men in the Boston Army of the Un- employed (Nos. III. and IV., columns 3, 4, 7, 8). Young women of the wealthy classes are much less sensi- tive to locality and heat, but much more sensitive to pain than young men of the wealthy classes (Nos. II., III., columns 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). As to pain, it is true in general that women are more sensitive than men, as shown in a former investigation. But as remarked then, it does not necessarily follow that women cannot endure more pain than men. Boys are more sensitive to locality and heat before puberty than after. Girls are more sensitive to locality before puberty, but their sensibility to heat is about the same before and after puberty (Nos. XL — XIV., columns 3, 4, 5, 6). Colored boys are more sensitive to locality and heat than white boys. Colored girls are less sensitive to locality, but more sensitive to heat than white girls (Nos. VI., and XVI., columns 3, 4, 5, 6). Colored boys are more sensitive to locality and heat than colored girls (Nos. XV. and XVI., columns 3, 4, 5, 6). The left wrist is more sensitive to locality, heat and pain than the right wrist; only one exception. (No. III., columns 3,4)- (5) An Experimental Investigation of the Processes of Idea- tion. By MR. OLIVER CORNMAN. Introduced by PROF. LlGHTNER WlTMER. (6) On Direct Control of the Retinal Light. An informal Communication by PROF. GEORGE T. LADD, Yale Uni- versity. After a few explanatory remarks Prof. Ladd presented the following syllabus of experiments on the phenomena in question which he illustrated by reading extracts from one of the detailed reports secured by one of his experimenters. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION. 127 VOLUNTARY CONTROL OF THE EIGENLICHT. Be seated in a quiet room, with the face turned away from the direct light, and shut the eyes long enough to let the after- images fade away before beginning the experiment. In a preliminary way, note the presence of the ' Eigenlicht,' and record your opinion as to its (i) color, (2) persistence and (3) shape or distribution. If successful in this, try the following : EXPERIMENT I. — By persistent and attentive willing, ar- range the color-mass of the * Eigenlicht ' into the shape of a cross composed of two equal bars at right angles, thus : Record your experience in regard to (i) the time it took to produce the cross, (2) how long it could be retained, (3) modifi- cations of shape, if any, (4) color, and (5) effect of fatigue. If successful in the above, try the following : EXPERIMENT II. — Produce, as in Exp. I. (i) a circle, (2) two concentric circles, and (3) a triangle. Record results in full. EXPERIMENT III. — Try to produce the circle successively in the colors red, green and violet. Note your power to control the color by will. EXPERIMENT IV. — Try to project the image of the circle in each of the above three colors separately on a blank sheet of white paper, and note what you see. Try Exp. I. twice a day for ten successive days (morning and evening), and record date, time of the day, and duration of the experiment. (7) Consciousness and Time. BY PROF. C. A. STRONG, University of Chicago. The paper presented objections to the account of the rela- tions between consciousness and present time given by Professor James in his Presidential Address at the Princeton meeting (De- cember, 1894), and suggested an alternative account. Professor James held that the present instant is a mere boun- dary line between the past and the future ; that both the time 128 FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING. consciousness is in and the time consciousness is of must be durations or intervals, and that consciousness must therefore in- clude within its span those portions of the past and of the future which lie nearest to the present instant. Hence the view that " there is literally no such datum" as that of present time, and that "past and future are already parts of the least experience that can really be." Hence, also, the need of assuming, in ad- dition to the simultaneous unity of consciousness implied in the perception of likeness or difference, a successive unity, as im- plied in the perception of passing time. In opposition to this account it was urged that, since the present instant is a mere boundary line, an interval or duration may be considered abstractly ', from the point of view of that in- stant, and it will then appear to consist of a portion of the past plus a portion of the future ; but that, if we wish to consider it concretely, and in the way it actually happened, we must con- ceive it as a line of successive presents, as an onward progress from an earlier present to a later present. Though present time is a point, it is not a resting, but a moving point, and it is this character of motion which affords the room consciousness needs in order to exist. Though change is thus a character of present time and of consciousness which is in it, consciousness may be in present time without being aware of change ; for change, when real, is always infinitesimal, an invisible feature of the histology of consciousness. The consciousness of the succession of two feelings cannot arise simultaneously with the first, nor midway between the two, but only when their succession is an accomplished fact. This consciousness is thus in its nature retrospective, and the relation is perceived between images existing in consciousness simulta- neously. The consciousness of succession therefore implies only a simultaneous unity of consciousness, the same unity im- plied in the consciousness of likeness or difference ; not a suc- cessive unity, which is a monstrosity, a contradiction in terms. Knowledge even of the nearest past is representative, not intui- tive, and involves no self-transcendence except that involved in ordinary memory. [This paper appears in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW for March, 1896.] AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION. 129 (8) Some Conditions of Will Development. By BROTHER CHRYSOSTOM, Manhattan College. The conditions of Will Development naturally fall under two heads : intrinsic, or such as are part and parcel of the volun- tary agent ; and extrinsic, or such as act upon him from with- out. The first of the intrinsic conditions is the nature of the will itself, which, according to the testimony of consciousness, is indetermined at least in the means which it employs to attain a given end. The objection against such testimony raised in the name of Double Consciousness does not hold, for it is based upon a confusion of the idea of the ego with the ego, or self, the former, however, varying with the normal or pathological state of the subject. A succeeding state of consciousness cannot result from an antecedent state, since the latter has already passed away. Hence a unity of subject must be granted ; but, since it is variously affected, its phenomena are many. The subject is there- fore, really distinct from its phenomena, the ego from its idea. The will is, however, determined to a certain degree by ac- quired habit or disposition and by intellect. Indirectly, heredity exercises a marked influence over it. The law of heredity ap- plies with special force to the exercise of external sense and of imagination. Its influence is modified by environment, and this, in turn, is partly subject to will. Herein lies the great op- portunity of teacher and pupil, the former aiding the latter to build up a manly and well-balanced character, and both utilizing for this end the occasions presented by the events of daily life. (9) A Psychological Interpretation of the Rules of Definition in Logic. By PROF. ALFRED H. LLOYD, University of Michi- gan. This paper, though in the hands of the Secretary, was omitted for lack of time. (10) Discussion on Consciousness and Evolution. By PROFS. WILLIAM JAMES, E. D. COPE, J. MARK BALDWIN, CHARLES S. MINOT AND GEORGE T. LADD. [It is hoped that this discussion may be printed in full at some later time.] 130 FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING (u) An Experiment on the Effects of the Loss of Sleep. By PROF. G. T. W. PATRICK, University of Iowa. The patient, a healthy young man of 28, accustomed to regular sound sleep of eight hours, abstained wholly from sleep for ninety hours, having watchers all the time. At intervals of six hours tests were made upon him in respect to pulse, temper- ature, weight, steadiness, discrimination-time, simple reaction- time, discrimination of taste and smell sensations, sharpness of vision, lower and upper threshold of pain, strength of grip and pull with dynamometer, memory and attention, time of adding columns of figures, discriminative sensibility of the skin, muscle sense, motor ability, fatigue, pulse after fatigue, measurement and analysis of urine. At the end of ninety hours the subject was allowed to sleep. He slept soundly ten and a half hours and awoke wholly refreshed. He made up altogether but 25 % of the sleep lost. The result of the various tests and their comparison with normal condition will be published in full later. Persistent hallucinations of sight were one marked result of the sleep fast. Pulse, reaction-time and muscular strength decreased. The weight of the subject, sharpness of vision, and discriminative sensibility for taste and for sound increased. During the ten and-a-half hours' heavy sleep which followed the experiment, the subject was awakened every hour for the purpose for ascertaining the depth of sleep and constructing an * absolute' sleep curve to compare with the normal sleep curve. The subject was awakened by an electric current passing through the leg, the strength of current necessary being taken as a measure of the depth of sleep. The deepest sleep was found at the end of the second hour, next the first hour, then the third hour, decreasing then rapidly till waking. (12) Further Researches on the Psychic Development of Young Animals and its Physical Correlation. By PROF. WESLEY MILLS, McGill University. The author announced that he had made investigations on several other animals, viz : The Mongrel Dog, the Cat, the Rabbit, the Guinea Pig, and on Birds. The subjects had been AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION. 131 treated as in his first contribution, on The Pure-Bred Dogs, and the papers embodying the facts, etc., were now in the press. As the handling of the subject in its present form involved an enormous mass of details he would not attempt more than the mere announcement of his work now, but hoped to read a gen- eralized account of the whole at the next meeting. (13) Variations in the Patellar Reflex as an Aid to the Mental Analysis. By PROF. LIGHTNER WITMER, University of Pennsylvania. (14) Experiments on Induced Hallucinations. By PROF. JAMES H. HYSLOP, Columbia University. The experiments reported in this paper were undertaken at my suggestion by a lady acquaintance whose experiences in early life suggested the possibility that looking into a crystal would induce hallucinations. She herself was doubtful about the undertaking and disbelieved in its possibility. The trial, however, showed that they would occur very easily, and twenty- three of them were recorded and described as having some in- terest. Some of them appeared to be located on the surface and some to originate from the center of the crystal. Some were clearly reproductions of past experiences or scenes modi- fied by association or the addition of materials not in the orig- inal experience. One especially seemed to show association between two possible experiences of a different type, but with- out any element of recognition. All of them exhibited imagery which illustrated the constructive action of dreams, and emerged as capriciously and as independent of the present mental state as dreams. The two cases in which coincidental features were afterward discovered represented nothing of an objective value in this re- spect and deserved mention only as subjective facts which oc- cultists might confuse with objective evidence. In other re- spects their value could only be to show the existence of an influence by the crystal to produce, under proper conditions, genuine hallucinations and to show the capricious character of the effects. (This paper will appear in full in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research.} I32 FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING. (15) Cases of Dream Reasoning. By PROF. W. ROMAINE NEWBOLD, University of Pennsylvania. Prof. Newbold reported three cases of what is loosely called dream reasoning. The first occurred in the experience of Dr. W. A. Lamberton, Professor of Greek in the University of Penn- sylvania. In the spring of 1870 he worked for several weeks upon the problem : Given an ellipse, to find the locus of the foot of the perpendicular let fall from either focus upon a tan- gent to this ellipse at any point. Finding all attempts at an analytical solution fail, he gave it over, intending to return to it when his thoughts had got out of the rut in which they had been running. About a week later upon awaking one morning he saw projected upon a blackboard in his bedroom a complete figure containing not only the lines given by the problems, but also a number of auxiliary lines, thus giving at a glance a geo- metrical solution of it. The case presents two special points of interest. In the first place, it proves the existence of complex pro- cesses corresponding to those of ordinary reasoning, but existing apart from the personal consciousness. It is impossible to de- termine whether these processes took place during sleep or sub- consciously in waking life. Second, the sensory externalization of the solution is a most curious feature. Professor Lamberton is a very poor visualizer and has never in his life had any other hallucination. The other two cases reported were experiences of Dr. H. V. Hilprecht, Professor of Assyriology in the University of Penn- sylvania. When a student under Professor Delitsch he dreamed that the real meaning of the name Nebuchadnezzar was * Nebu protect my boundary,' deriving the element 'kudurru' from the, at that time, little known verb < kadaru,' to enclose. This explanation has been universallv accepted. This easily expli- cable case is of interest chiefly in view of a later and more re- markable dream. In March of 1893 Dr. Hilprecht dreamed that an Assyrian priest appeared to him and informed him that two fragments which he had been in vain endeavoring to decipher belonged together and were portions of a votive tablet erected by King AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION. 133 Kurigalzu. This was found to be true. Other details in the dream could be neither verified or disproved. No information was given in this dream which could not have been reached by normal processes of reasoning, but its dramatic form makes it most interesting. We are compelled to suppose that the two items of information — namely, that the fragments were parts of one original and that that original was a votive tablet — were reached by normal associative processes and that the old priest and other dramatic details were afterwards thrown about the conceptual elements as one drapes a gown on a lay-figure. This would involve the assumption of a translocation of the time series ; the conclusion must have been first given and the dream must have been constructed, as it were, backwards. For such time hallucinations in dreams there is considerable independent evidence. ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, 1895. PROFESSOR J. Me KEEN CATTELL, Columbia University. In the struggle for existence that obtains among the sciences psychology is continually gaining ground. We bear witness to the fact meeting here on terms of equality with the other natural sciences. This Association demonstrates the organic unity of psychology, while the wide range of our individual interests proves our adjustment to a complex environment. While our confidence in the future of psychology rests on a knowledge of its intrinsic vitality, we are able for the convincing of others to offer the brute argument of material success. The academic growth of psychology in America during the past few years is almost without precedent. The work begun by James at Harvard, Ladd at Yale, and Hall at Johns Hopkins not more than about fifteen years ago has become an important factor in our universities. Psychology is a required subject in the under- graduate curriculum wherever studies are required, and among university courses psychology now rivals the other leading sci- ences in the number of students attracted and in the amount of original work accomplished. In addition to the objective test of university recognition we may regard productiveness in publication. There are in Amer- ica three journals of general science, in all of which psychology is treated as are the other sciences, and there are special journals as follows : mathematics, 3 ; astronomy, 3 ; physics, i ; chem- istry, 2 ; geology, 2 ; botany, 2 ; zoology, i ; physiology, o ; psychology, 2. A comparison of these journals will not dis- credit those devoted to psychology ; and it should be noted that we have in addition to these at least two journals of philosophy and two journals of education in which psychology occupies a 134 ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT. 135 prominent place. It would be difficult to select by an objective criterion the most important books published in America during the past ten years, but if we may regard the judgment of for- eign nations as the most probable verdict of posterity, the books written by members of this Association will stand well to the front among American contributions to science. We must admit that the rapid growth of psychology in America has been due to conditions of the soil as well as to vi- tality of the germ. The more complete absorption of the col- lege president by executive work has made necessary the trans- ferring of his former prerogative of teacher of philosophy to the special student, while the development of the university with elective courses has permitted the easy introduction of a new study. It follows that a comparison of the progress of psychology in America with its progress in other countries is less flattering to our amour-propre as psychologists than to our patriotism. Still Germany maintains its prestige in psychology, and psychology maintains its prestige in Germany. Psychological courses are an increasingly large part of the philosophical courses, and the laboratories of psychology are being acknowledged as equal in rank to those in other sciences. There are two excellent jour- nals of psychology, one of which is attracting part of the best work formerly published in physiological and physical journals. In France the Annee -psychologique bears witness to much re- cent work in experimental psychology, while interest in social, individual and pathological psychology is unabated. In Eng- land the traditional psychology is being enriched by absorption of the most important foreign work, while new contributions are offered on the side of philosophy and on the side of the bio- logical and the medical sciences. In Russia, in Scandinavia and in Italy professorships and laboratories are being estab- lished. While the recent progress of our science has been great, we do not admit that psychology is a new science. It is not a * sport,' not even a fortuitous variation. If science is to date from the year of ' the master of those who know,' then we may take pride in the beginnings of psychology whose foundations 136 /. Me KEEN CATTELL. were more securely laid by Aristotle than those of any other science. Like the little boy answering the first question of the Catechism we may say ' * God made one foot big and I growed the rest." But with our superior knowledge of embryology we may further believe that we did not start even as an infant of the size of the famous one in * Midshipman Easy,' but began our inarticulate growth long before * mewing and puking ' we came hither. Even the ' new psychology' began at the beginning, and de- veloped -pari passu with the other sciences. Take, for example, a subject, not of leading importance, but typical of the problems studied in our laboratories — after-images. We have in after- images a case where we investigate the relations of the change in consciousness to the physical stimulus on the one hand and to the bodily organism on the other, where we make experi- ments and measurements on phenomena known to us only on the side of the individual consciousness, a case where we may hope for useful applications in education, in medicine, etc. We have in after-images phenomena related to and throwing light on a large range of mental activity — imagery, memory, hallucinations, space-perception, etc., and even of interest (see, for example, what Royce has to say in Vol. III. of the Philosophical Review) in their bearing on epistemology and metaphysics. Now after-images, phenomena thus typical of modern experimental psychology, were described by Aristotle with such exactness that we may feel sure that he himself made experiments upon them, whereas he refers to them as though they were familiar to his readers. Experiments upon after- images have been made by men eminent in widely separated fields of mental activity — by Augustine, Newton, Buff on, the elder Darwin, Goethe and many more — long before the date usually assigned to the development of psychology as an experimental science. I have perhaps selected a favorable example, but I think there are but few subjects now in course of investigation in our laboratories whose origin and gradual development could not be traced a long way back. I may mention parenthetically that the earliest explicit for- mulation of the problems of experimental psychology, as I ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT. 137 understand them, is to be found not in Lotze, nor in Fechner, nor in Wundt, but in the most visionary and poetic of poets, him- self a problem in heredity, character and intellect far beyond the reach of our psychology. Shelley wrote1 about eighty years ago: "A scale might be formed, graduated according to the degrees of a com- bined scale of intensity, duration, connexion, periods of recurrence, and utility, which would be the standard, according to which all ideas might be measured, and an uninterrupted chain of nicely shadowed distinctions would be observed, from the faintest impression on the senses, to the most distinct combination of those impressions ; from the simplest of those combinations, to that mass of knowledge which, including our own nature, constitutes what we call the uni- verse." While psychology traces its descent through a long and no- ble line, we need not hesitate to mark a natural, but at the same time a notable, development under our own eyes and hands. A little while ago the psychologist might still say with Brown- ing's Cleon: "And I have written three books on the soul, Proving absurd all written hitherto, And putting us to ignorance again." But we are past the time for systems of psychology ; now handbooks of psychology are prepared. We have, like the other sciences, a small area lighted by ascertained fact and ac- cepted theory, outside this is the penumbra, and beyond is dark- ness through which none of us pretends to see. We, indeed, estimate differently the importance of different departments and the hopefulness of different lines of research, but in this respect we only exhibit the human nature in whose study we are en- gaged. The student of mechanics proposes to account for all physical phenomena by Newton's laws, the student of electricity by electric vibrations, etc. An eminent chemist recently re- marked that chemistry is evidently the basis of psychology. It is, however, possible that we over-emphasize the differ- ences that do exist. Certainly there is no member of this Asso- ciation who believes that science should be a tohu-ivabohu of facts, nor any who believes that reasonable theories can be de- 1 Shelley's Works, Forman's Edition, VI., 285. Speculations on Metaphysics. 138 /. Me KEEN CAT TELL. vised without regard to facts. Probably none of us would claim that he could draw a straight line and say : * * on this side is sci- ence, on that side is philosophy." Possibly none would say : "these observations have no scientific validity, because they rest on in- trospection," or " these determinations have no psychological in- terest, because they are mere measurements." Rather we all join in the admirable words of our President at the New York meeting : " Let us all always be just ; nay, let us be something more than merely just ; let us be generous. And let our generosity include all workmen of all times, with their works, from Aristotle's De Anima to the latest thesis by the youngest aspirant for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy." While science advances along many paths, there are certain highways most traveled and most direct. What these are in psychology at the present time the analogy of the other sciences may perhaps indicate. We cannot, I think, doubt, but that modern science is either quantitative or genetic. I say ' either ' because there is at present a partial divorce between the physical sciences in which the relative permanence of the phenomena makes the quantitative point of view easy and the genetic difficult, and the biological sciences in which the con- verse conditions obtain. This divorce is, however, due rather to our ignorance than to our knowledge. In the progress of science the physical sciences will become increasingly genetic and the biological sciences increasingly quantitative. Astronomy learned the laws of Kepler before it learned the nebular hypo- thesis. The physicist could not find in the star-dust the prob- lems of modern physics and chemistry. There is variation and survival in the inorganic as well as in the organic world. The biologist in turn should no longer rest content with describing the genesis of species and of individuals, but should measure variations and changes, and determine causal relations by the methods of exact science. It would seem likely that methods prevailing in the other sciences should also hold in psychology, more especially as we must admit that most of these sciences have passed through the stage in which psychology now is — or until recently was — and have reached a clearer self-consciousness. But we do not need ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT. 139 to depend exclusively on the often delusive argument from an- alogy. Recent work in psychology speaks with sufficient em- phasis in favor of tracing the genesis and the degeneration of mental states on the one hand, and their quantitative definition on the other. I think we may claim without undue self-assertion that the most important contributions to genetic psychology made during the past year have come from members of this Association. Baldwin has treated with an elaboration hitherto unequalled, the mental development of the child and of the race ; Stanley has studied the evolutionary psychology of feeling ; and Royce has analysed the genesis of the contents of the individual con- sciousness in its dependence on social environment and evolution with great acuteness. While much of the definite outcome is still sub judice, there is none to question the validity of the ge- netic method. When we turn to the quantitative method in psychology we find, I fear, more difference of opinion. We have, indeed, our many laboratories, all of which are at least silent witnesses in its favor. But several of our leading members have expressed, at the meetings of this Association and in their published writ- ings, doubts as to the validity, or at all events as to the value, of mental measurements. Now it is easy to adopt a skeptical point of view in such a matter. By the nature of things men of science and students of philosophy are quit of the enthusiasm of the proselytizer and reformer. The every-day up-hill work of the laboratory is scarcely more stimulating than the routine of the factory or of the farm. Each, as Clough's Dipsychus tells us, "Must slave, a meager coral-worm To build beneath the tide with excrement What one day will be island, or be reef, And will feed men, or wreck them." But this skeptical point of view can be applied with equal success and equal futility to any science, or to the conduct of daily life. We may, if we see fit, wonder why anybody does anything. By common consent the discovery of argon in the atmosphere was the most important scientific advance of the 140 /. Me KEEN CATTELL. past year, but it has not as yet been found that argon is of any practical use, and, so far from helping us to understand the uni- verse, this substance but adds to its apparent complexity. Why not let the last decimal be, and enjoy the air in the springtime — or devise means to keep out of it if one happen to live near Boston ? Miinsterberg has written : " Die Messung ist niemals Selbst- zweck in der Psychologic, eben dadurch unterscheidet sie sich von der Physik." Now it seems to me, on the contrary, that measurements have just the same place in psychology as in the material sciences, except in so far as they have not been as yet so successfully prosecuted. The immediate end of science, whether physical or mental, is to describe the world — it may be added, and to explain it, though if we had a complete and uni- fied description, it is not clear what would be left to explain. We wish to describe the world, partly because our knowledge can be applied in useful ways, and partly because the effort sat- isfies mental needs, as do art and religion. Measurements in the physical sciences are in a way means to the ends mentioned, but in so far as a description of the world is an end in itself, measurements are a part of this description, and by far the most exact, general and economical method of description hitherto devised. It may be that in psychology the field for quantitative defi- nition is more limited than in the case of the physical sciences. The lack of many or wide-reaching numerical formulas ex- pressing mental relations may be due not so much to the recent- ness of our attempts to discover these as to the nature of the subject-matter with which we are dealing. Indeed it is evident that as a mere matter of definition we have to a large extent limited the physical sciences to a quantitative treatment of time, space and energy, relegating qualitative differences to con- sciousness. But it is also true that the quantitative point of view in physical science has only gradually and but recently emerged from a chaos of animistic and teleological conceptions. The unitary point of view developed by physical science is truly a matter for marvel. The awe inspired in the great mystic of rationalism by the starry heavens and the moral law may well pervade the student of physics in the presence of the unforeseen grandeur and simplicity of his own handiwork. ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT. 141 It is, indeed, true that measurements give as yet only a par- tial description even of the physical world, and the progress of science may make this less rather than more adequate. The ether, elastic and solid as it is supposed to be, seems on the point of breaking under the load laid upon it. Atoms are stumbling blocks, however small we may assume them. Lud- wig, chiefly instrumental in establishing for a while a mechani- cal theory of living tissues, lived long enough to witness the emergence of a neo-vitalism. Indeed Ludwig himself, on being asked why he did not prepare a new edition of his Physiology said, " Such a work must be written by a young man ; an old man is too well aware of his ignorance." We are as the earth in the Hebrew cosmogony, when the light had been separated from the darkness, but the sun had not yet been set in the firm- ament. Both the success and the failure of material science may en- courage the experimental psychologist. He may hope to ac- complish much by measurements, even though he may foresee that he will not accomplish everything. Whether he be en- trusted with one talent or with many, he can serve in better ways than in standing and waiting. This commingling of hopeful endeavor and hopeless limita- tion drawn from the analogy of physical science may be more directly deduced from the work hitherto accomplished in the psychological laboratory. This has indeed been called trivial and pedantic, and has been wounded even in the house of its friends. Statistics, averages and probable errors seem re- mote from the complex fulness of human nature. There seems imminent danger from a neo-scholasticism with measurements in the place of definitions. Now when it is said that nothing has been done beyond measuring time, intensity, and complexity of sensations, move- ments and mental processes, the reply may readily be made that nothing further can be desired. Physical science meas- ures only time, space and energy. If psychology can do as much it has the same abundance of individual problems ; if it need do no more it has the same great simplicity as its goal. The use of averages and probable errors in psychology is 142 /. Me KEEN CATTELL. not pedantic, except when attempted by those not acquainted with their meaning. The probable error tells us just how many experiments we ought to make and just what reliance may be placed upon them. The theory of probabilities, enabling us to measure both our knowledge and our ignorance, is one of the great achievements of the human intellect, and is equally applica- ble in sciences attaining varying degrees of exactness. It was, indeed, pedantic for Helmholtz to give the velocity of the ner- vous impulse as 37.4927 m. per second, when the average ve- locity and the individual variations are not known within tens of meters. But it is exactly an application of probable errors that would prevent such pedantry, and if the greatest of physicists has on occasion indulged in it, we need not too severely blame the student preparing his doctor's thesis for carrying his aver- age a decimal beyond what is warranted by the theory of prob- abilities. In some cases a very considerable degree of accuracy is at- tainable and necessary in psycho-physical measurements. Thus doubling the intensity of the stimulus shortens the reaction-time about o.ooi sec., and if we wish to determine the relation be- tween intensity of stimulus and duration of reaction we must measure to the ten-thousandth of a second, and the averages and probable errors show that such a degree of accuracy is at- tainable. The apparatus used for the purpose in the psycho- logical laboratory of Columbia College has this year been bor- rowed by professors in the physical department to measure the rate of fall of bodies in liquids, and it has resulted that the con- stancy of the physical motions is less than that of the psycho- physical processes. Such problems — the correlations of quantities — are those ul- timate in exact science, and in so far as they can be undertaken in psychology it becomes an exact science. It may be said that in the example given we are concerned with the nervous system rather than with consciousness. But even if this be ex- clusively the case it may be urged that a dynamics of the ner- vous system is essential to a final psychology. Further, the correlations of quantities may be investigated in cases in which we know the changes in consciousness, but are completely ig- ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT. 143 norant of the neural processes which may accompany them. Thus we all are familiar with the many investigations on the discrimination of differences in intensity. There is room for various interpretations of the meaning of a just noticeable dif- ference, but by definition differences in sensation are equal if they be equally perceptible. We can find when differences are equally perceptible by determining the percentage of times in which they are in fact correctly perceived. But we can ap- proach the problem from a new point of view, first defined, I believe, at the New York meeting of this Association, involving the correlation of mental magnitudes. If differences be equally perceptible it takes equal times to discriminate them, and the less the difference in sensation the greater the time required. By measuring the time of discrimi- nation it is possible to determine differences in the intensity of sensation. We can thus investigate the relation of the intensity of stimulus to the accuracy of discrimination (Weber's law), and can even use the method for the comparison of disparate sensa- tions. We may find that the difference between red and blu is equal, say, to the difference between sensations due to lights from 10 and 1,000 candles, or even that the difference between the tones C and c is equal to the difference between certain vis- ual sensations. The appeal made to different minds by such problems as part of a worthy description of the world must of necessity vary with the individual mind. Our goals in religion, art, philoso- phy and science are not only wide apart, but they also shift even as we run. Our science and our philosophy are but as a doll in the arms of a little girl, who does not know what it means nor what the years will bring. I think, however, that conclusive testimony may be ad- vanced to prove that psychological experiment has had and will have both practical applications and an important share in psy- chology as a whole, whether regard be had to its individual de- velopment or to its relations with the other sciences. Professor Burdon Sanderson, in his presidential address be- fore the Ipswich meeting of the British Association, said that he was not aware of any useful application of experimental psy- 1 44 /• Me KEEN C ATT ELL. chology, and Professor Morley, president of the American Asso- ciation, said, at the recent Springfield meeting, " science cannot change human natures or the social order." These selected representatives of science in England and America, however, both hold that science has an adequate end in the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity. On the other hand Franklin, the father of American science, speaks of new discoveries as important only because they tend ' ' to extend the power of man over mat- ter, avert or diminish the evils he is subject to, or augment the number of his enjoyments." Franklin's point of view may be regarded as materialistic, but science for the sake of science is in turn in danger of dillitanteism. We may be glad that experimental psychology has practical applications in spite of quasi-official dicta to the contrary. In the United States more than one hundred and fifty million dol- lars, collected by enforced taxation, is spent annually on public schools in the attempt to * change human natures.' President Eliot says that nothing is accomplished in these schools except the training of the memory, and his colleague, our retiring president, tells us that the memory cannot be trained.1 Surely in education, which extends from birth to death, we can learn by experiments on the senses and the mind what may be done to fit the individual to his environment. It should not be for- gotten that we not only hold the clay in our hands to mold for honor or dishonor, but we also have the ultimate decision as to what material we shall use. The physicist can turn his pig iron into steel, and so can we ours ; but he cannot alter the quantities of gold and iron in his world, whereas we can in ours. Our responsibility is, indeed, very great. By one psycho- logical experiment we injure the eysight of our children in the schools, and by another psychological experiment we discover the defect and fit glasses to correct it. It seems to me certain that experimental psychology has wide-reaching practical ap- plications, not only in education, but also in medicine, in the fine arts, in political economy and, indeed, in the whole con- duct of life. lAs Professor James said at the meeting, he only holds that native reten- tiveness is unchangeable. It was not, of course, intended in this paradox to adequately represent the views of President Eliot and Professor James. ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT. 145 It also seems evident that experimental psychology has re- cently become an important factor in the development of psy- chology as a whole, both by its actual contributions and by the changes in method to which it has given rise. The psycho- physical camel will never be able to exclude the psychological Arab from his tent, but it must be welcomed, or at least toler- ated. A comparison of modern text-books of psychology, such as those by James, Ladd, Baldwin, and Dewey, with older works bears irrefutable witness to the introduction of the results of physiological and psychological experiment. I shall under- take the argumentum ad hominem in the case of James, who said at our last meeting that "curious phenomena of the disso- ciation of consciousness * * * throw more new light on human nature than the work of all psycho-physical laboratories put together." On taking down James' Psychology — which has breathed the breath of life into the dust of psychology — and turn- ing at random to the even hundred pages, I find that the first is entirely taken up with the measurement of the temperature of the brain in relation to thought ; the second is on continuity of consciousness with time measurements ; the third a description of the bodily movements giving the consciousness of self ; the fourth on the relation of the two hemispheres of the brain and of bodily movements to self-consciousness ; the fifth on the relative intensity of sensations and images ; the sixth on the association of ideas ; the seventh on observations and experiments on the mis- taken interpretation of sense-stimuli ; the eighth on the relation of movements of the eyes to the perception of space ; the ninth on the factors distinguishing the perception of reality ; the tenth on instinctive actions ; the eleventh on muscular sensations ; the twelfth on hypnotic suggestion. These topics illustrate very fairly the field covered by modern psychology. They nearly all rest upon psycho-physical observations and experiments, and in cases where observations predominate it is evident that they will soon be superseded by actual experiments from our labora- tories yielding quantitative results. Even in directions where experiment has not yet offered con- siderable contributions, it has performed an important service in setting a standard of carefulness and objectivity. It may also be 146 /. Me KEEN CATTELL. urged that experiment serves as a stimulus and starting point lor thought. Thus Wundt states that his theory of the development of the will and of its relation to * apperception ' had its origin in observations made during the course of experiments on the re- action-time. It requires peculiar genius to sit down at a desk and write out observations and theories that are new and true ; they are more likely to occur during actual work of some sort. Further, there are many who can carry out experiments in the laboratory who are incapable of constructive work. The data obtained by them may be seen by others in their larger relations. The generalizations of a Newton must be based upon the obser- vations of a Flamsteed. The introduction of experiment has also made the teaching of psychology easier and more useful. Laboratory work by students is by common consent an important part of their train- ing. Whether the experiments be in chemistry or in psychology may not greatly matter. In the chemical laboratory, when the course is intended for liberal training, the experiments are meant to educate the senses and the mind, rather than to give information concerning metals and acids. When the object of an experiment is not to learn what happens when two solutions are mixed, but to teach the student to observe what happens, we may perhaps claim that a psychological experiment has been undertaken. Whether experiments directed to the senses and the mind would serve better or worse than others for the pur- pose in view, or whether it is practicable to introduce a new study into the preparatory school or the early college years, are matters that can themselves only be settled by experiment. It is, however, certain that such preliminary work, or, lacking it, some experiments introduced into the course in psychology com- monly offered and even required in the junior year, would enable the average student to follow this course with greater in- terest and intelligence, so that he would be less likely to regard it as : "A tale Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, Signifying nothing." I venture to maintain that the introduction of experiment ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT. 147 and measurement into psychology has added directly and indi- rectly new subject-matter and methods, has set a higher stand- ard of accuracy and objectivity, has made some part of the subject an applied science with useful applications, and has enlarged the field and improved the methods of teaching psychology. In conclusion I wish to urge that experiment in psychology has made its relations with the other sciences more intimate and productive of common good. In courses in physics, for example, certain psychological subjects, vision, hearing, etc., have always been included. The treatment has of necessity been inadequate, and the student, if not the teacher, may have left the subject with confused notions, e. g.9 as to the distinction between light as a mode of motion and color as sensation. Or it may be incidentally stated that color, pitch and warmth are * subjective,' while matter in motion is alone * real.' Now the treatment of certain subjects in common with physics has set for the psychologist a higher scientific standard, whereas it may be hoped that the physicist has learned that processes of perception and thought are part of the real world which science as a whole must take into account. In physiology the treatment of certain subjects in common must ultimately result in mutual benefit. Our host Fullerton showed this morning how largely the physiology of the nervous system leaves its proper field for that of psychology. The physiologist must face the problem as to whether consciousness shall be assumed in causal interaction with the nervous system. It may not matter greatly to us whether cerebral functions are located here or there, but it would be a survival or an atavism to hold that we can fully treat processes of perception, ideation, feeling or will without regard to sense organs, movements, paths of conduction and nervous centers, or even apart from metabolism and circulation of the blood. In general biology, whose great problem is the develop- ment of life, zoology-botany and psychology cannot advance excepting hand in hand. Darwin did not hesitate to use con- sciousness as a vera causa in the preservation of species, and Cope, now presiding over our sister society, urges that it is a preeminent cause in their origin. Sensations, movements, in- 148 /. McKEEN CATTELL. stincts and habits are prominent in any theory of the evolution of species, and they must be treated in common by physical zoology and psychology. The importance of these problems is borne witness to by the fact that we have selected them for special discussion to-morrow morning. For many the leading interest in organic evolution is in its application to social evolu- tion, and it is scarcely necessary to mention the relation of psy- chology to sociology, which science is indeed simply collective psychology. Psychology has long been and properly remains the gate- way to architectonic philosophy. It may be that experiment cannot answer the final questions of philosophy, but the world- view of each of us depends increasingly on what the natural and exact sciences contribute to it. The white light of philos- ophy can only result from the proper commingling of the colors of the sciences. Systems of philosophy, elaborated prior to the development of modern science or without regard to this, may receive our admiration as poetry, but they cannot claim our ad- herence as truth. To allot to science those subjects concerning which we have knowledge, and to reserve for philosophy those questions concerning which we know nothing, is evidently sub- versive of philosophy. Epistemology, ethics, logic and aesthe- tics are regarded as philosophic disciplines, but they rest in- creasingly on psychology. Epistemology depends on the psychology of perception and may be nothing else. Works on ethics, logic and aesthetics take increasing account of psycholog- ical facts ; indeed, as our knowledge increases, the distinction between a normative and a descriptive science becomes some- what tenuous. The twilight of philosophy can be changed to its dawn only by the light of science, and psychology can con- tribute more light than any other science. CONSCIOUSNESS AND TIME.1 BY C. A. STRONG, Columbia University. The question to which I invite your attention is this : What is present time, and what is the relation of consciousness to present time? The answer that naturally occurs to one is, that consciousness is in present time, that present time is -present time, not past or future, and that there is an end of the matter. The answer given by Professor James in his Presidential Ad- dress a year ago, which is the answer of Shadworth Hodgson, is a very different one ; and as this answer seems to me unsatis- factory, I should like, with your permission, to present my ob- jections to it and my reasons for preferring the natural answer.2 According to Professor James, there is "literally no such datum" as that of present time. The present is merely a boun- dary-line between the past and the future, and is not itself ex- tended or capable of containing anything real. The only real datum, the only thing that is ever really present to us, is a short bit of duration, an interval of time, extending a little way back and a little way forward from the present instant. Or, rather, the datum is the feeling that occupies this interval and has this duration. And there is a minimum duration which the feeling must have in order to exist at all. Such a minimal feeling, when reflectively examined, is found to consist of two sub-feel- ings, one earlier and the other later, and the feeling of their succession. Thus the simplest feeling we can have already includes the consciousness of change, of passing time. The boundary-line which separates the two sub-feelings is the pres- JRead before the American Psychological Association at Philadelphia, De- cember, 1895. 2 Prof. James's address appeared in the PSYCH. REV. for March, 1895, pp. 105 ff ; see esp. pp. 111-113. Mr. Hodgson's statement is found in his Phil- osophy of Reflection I., pp. 248 ff. The view criticised is also held by Fouille*e, Psychologic des Idees-Forces, II., pp. 81 ff. 149 150 C. A. STRONG. ent instant, and with reference to it the one appears as past and the other as future. Thus past and future are " already parts of the least experience that can really be." But the consciousness of change, of passing time, is a rela- tional state, and therefore necessarily unitary. Just as the consciousness of the difference of two things requires that they should both be present to a unitary state which knows them and their difference, so the consciousness of succession requires that the earlier and the later state should both be present to a single thought. And as the consciousness of likeness or difference im- plies a simultaneous unity of consciousness, a unity running, so to speak, across the stream, so the consciousness of change, of passing time, implies a successive unity of consciousness, a unity running a short distance up and down the stream. Such a suc- cessive unity is, to be sure, a mysterious thing ; for the knowing state has to reach out beyond itself, and intuitively know together things that do not exist together. Yet such self-transcendence, such " presence in absence" we must nevertheless assume, if the relation of consciousness to time is to be made intelligible at all. In presenting my objections to this account of the matter, I must point out, to begin with, that there are two distinct rela- tions here involved : the relation of consciousness to the time in which it exists, and its relation to the time of which it is aware. I shall take for granted that consciousness does as a matter of fact exist in time, and shall inquire first as to the characters of the time in which it exists. The present instant, as a mere boundary-line, is too small for consciousness to exist in : this, I think, is Professor James's doctrine. It must be freely admitted that the present instant is a mere boundary-line, and that consciousness, in order to exist at all, must have duration. But the consequence which is sup- posed to follow from this — namely, that consciousness, driven out of the present, can find room for itself only in a little bit of the past plus a little bit of the future — does not really fol- low from it at all. This might appear, for one thing, from the consideration that the past means that which once was present, and the future that which will be present ; that the reality of the past and the CONSCIOUSNESS AND TIME. 151 future is thus derivative from the reality of the present ; and that to deny the reality of the present is therefore to knock the bottom out of reality altogether. But it might be contended that this applies only to the * specious present. ' That the consequence does not really follow, appears when we consider that the conception of an extended present involves the same false abstraction as the conception it is intended to replace. The two sub-feelings AB are supposed to be given at once, A being known as past and B as future. But this state of things exists, not for any finite length of time, but only for an indivisible instant, only at the instant x. Only at that instant is it true that A is entirely past and B entirely fu- ture. But it is in just such an instant that nothing can be real. When we look at the feelings AB from the point of view of this instant, we are conceiving the flight of time as arrested, and therefore considering the feelings in abstraction from real time. If we are to find room for consciousness, we must aban- don the point of view of any single instant, and take up the innumerable points of view of the duration itself. We must remind ourselves that the feeling A has been present and the feeling B will be present; in other words, we must consider A and B as feelings that become successively present; or, rather, we must consider these feelings as parts of a stream of consciousness every instant of which becomes successively present. Only by substituting the point of view of the interval ivy for that of the instant #, and only by considering this inter- val, not as a bit of the past plus a bit of the future, but as a line of successive -presents, shall we succeed in considering the feelings concretely, and in the way they actually happened. By adopting a sort of algebraic statement the case may be presented in its essence. Such a stream of consciousness, such a line of successive presents, may be conceived as composed of n parts, and these parts will always be successive, thus : i, 2, 3 n-2, n-i, n. However great the value assigned to », the parts will always be successive. It is evident that from these essential relations there is in the nature of the case no escape. No fraction of a second can possibly be taken so small that all of its parts will be given at once. Succession, in other words, is 152 C. A. STRONG. spun out infinitely fine, and the only thing that can be given at once is an indivisible instant. Here doubtless some hearer says to himself that I have given away my case. I have sharpened the succession down to a point, and in so doing have left no room for consciousness. I reply that this objection rests on the very same false abstrac- tion against which I have been protesting. For what sort of a point is it which we now have left? It is no longer a resting point, but a moving point ; it is the onward motion of a point from an earlier instant to a later one ; and what is such onward motion but actual duration ? The resting point was a mere ab- straction ; it left out the motion, the onward passage, the fugi- tive quality, which is the essence of time, without which it would not be time at all ; and since time itself was left out, there was naturally no room for consciousness. But the moving point is only another name for actual duration, and in present time, when so conceived, consciousness finds all the room it needs. In order adequately to conceive present time, we must combine the two conceptions of movement and a point. The conception of movement is necessary in order to render time's flight, its fugi- tive quality. The conception of a point is necessary in order to render its infinite successiveness. But here, again, some hearer doubtless says to himself that I have given away my case in another direction. In modifying the conception of present time from that of a resting to that of a moving point, I have virtually admitted that change is directly given. And, if change, then the terminus a quo and the ter- minus ad quern, the two sub-feelings and their succession, the immediate past and the immediate future. I may reply by ask- ing the objector to consider what sort of change it is which he here assumes, and what sort of change it is which is actually given. The change which he assumes is a finite change, the transition from feeling A to feeling B, these two feelings not being real at the same time. The change actually given is an infinitesimal change, the onward passage in the act of occur- ring— that onward passage in virtue of which we say that time is infinitely successive, that the succession is spun out infinitely fine. The fact is, that the succession is spun out CONSCIOUSNESS AND TIME. 153 very much too fine to be visible to the naked eye of con- sciousness. The succession, in other words, enters into the tissue of consciousness, histologically speaking, but is not an obvious feature of its gross anatomy. Consciousness is in its nature a sort of change, conscious states are nothing if not events, but this is an account of what consciousness is, not an account of what we are conscious of. A sudden, brief pain is in its nature an event, a change, but what we are con- scious of is not the change, but the pain. A changing con- sciousness, in short, is not the same thing as a consciousness of change. I hope I have now met the nearest-lying objections, and made it clear that present time, when rightly conceived, furnishes all the room that consciousness needs. Reality, as we know it, may in fact be said to be nothing but one ever-changing present. So far is it from being true that "past and future are already parts of the least experience that can really be, " and that there is "literally no such datum" as that of the present, that I think we may rather say that there is literally no other conceivable datum, and that the present is the only time that ever was, or is, or shall be. I pass now to the second of the two relations, that between consciousness and the time of which it is aware. This relation may be disposed of briefly. Though consciousness exists only in the present, and the present is a moving boundary-line, yet it must be admitted that the time of which we seem to be directly aware is not a mere boundary-line, but an actual interval, an in- terval the parts of which are given not successively, but all at once. And this is true, in spite of the fact that the consciousness of this interval exists only in the moving boundary-line. Just as, in external perception, what is really given is only a subjec- tive state, yet what we are for practical purposes aware of is a real world of space ; so, in our consciousness of time, what is really given is only the moving boundary-line, but what we are for practical purposes aware of is, say, the last half-second, the * specious present. ' The first point that requires to be settled is the temporal re- lation between the knowing state and the * specious present 154 c- A- STRONG. which it knows. When, with reference to the * specious present/ does this knowing state exist? We have all along assumed that it, as well as other states of consciousness, truly exists in time. The view that the consciousness of time is itself timeless is a Hegelism which I should be loth to attribute to Professor James. When, then, does it exist? Professor James's view seems to be that it exists midway be- tween the two sub-feelings, in some sort after the first of them and before the second. At least it is only from this position that the knowing state would have the right to regard the first sub-feeling as past and the second as future. But has this state such clair- voyant power as to be able to foresee what the second sub-feel- ing will be, before this sub-feeling has actually appeared on the scene, or even to foresee that there will be a second sub-feeling at all? A direct intuition of the past seems marvelous enough, without assuming a direct intuition of the future. I know Pro- fessor James will reply that I am reading a separate individual- ity into the sub-feelings which does not exist in his account. My answer is, that such a separate individuality is inevitable, if the sub-feelings are truly to exist in time. If one sub-feeling follows the other in time, a knowing state that coexists with the first will have no inkling of the second, and no inkling of their succession. If the knowing state exists midway between the two, it will still have no inkling of the second sub-feeling or of their succession. Only when the second sub-feeling has appeared can there be a knowledge of the two sub-feelings and their succession. Only when the succession is an ac- complished fact can a consciousness of that fact arise. In other words, the actual succession must precede the knowledge of the succession. When the knowledge arises, the feelings that succeeded each other are past and gone. But, if so, this knowl- edge is in its nature retrospective. The succession is not per- ceived between the feelings A and B as they occur, but between the images a and b which they leave behind. And psychologists have long been discussing the ' temporal marks, ' discernible in these images, which prompt the mind to perceive between them the relation of succession. This view of the case is so generally accepted, and Profes- CONSCIOUSNESS AND TIME. 155 sor James himself has given so lucid an account of it in his chapter on Time, that I am at a loss to understand his now fall- ing back into a radically inconsistent view. I can only attrib- ute his lapse to the confusion, already referred to, between the finite succession of the feelings A and B> and the infinitesimal succession which enters into the tissue of each. Dr. Ward, in his Britannica article, aptly expresses the view here defended, the view that a succession of ideas is not an idea of succession, by comparing the actual stream of consciousness to a horizontal line, and the consciousness of time to a vertical line erected upon it. We are aware of time, he says, not through the feelings A and B in the horizontal line, but through the images a and b in the vertical. Our knowledge of time thus involves a perspective effect, similar to that by which we perceive the third dimension of space. "We are aware of time," he insists, " only through the time-perspective."1 The lapse of time is, therefore, not directly experienced, but constructed after the event. The time we are directly conscious of is not the real time that elapsed. The succession of our feelings is a fact external to the feelings themselves. If it were not for memory, we should never have any conscious- ness of succession at all, any more than of past time. And this is true, because succession is essentially a relation between past and present, or between an earlier and a later past. We never lift ourselves up out of the stream of time and view it as a stream except representatively, except through memory. To wish to apprehend succession, or change, or the lapse of time directly, and not through memory, is as foolish as to wish to apprehend the past directly, and not through memory. But now, if this account of the case is correct, it seems to me that the fiction of an intuitive knowledge of the immediate past and future falls to the ground of itself. Later states can have no direct and intuitive dealings with earlier states, for the sim- ple reason that the two do not exist at once. When the earlier state is present the later state is non-existent, and when the later state appears the earlier one is non-existent. Our appar- ently direct consciousness of the immediate past is an illusion, 1Encycl. Brit., gth ed., art. « Psychology,' pp. 64-5. 156 C. A. STRONG. of the same character as that which leads us to attribute extra- mental reality to material objects. To take this illusion seri- ously is to be guilty of a sort of naive realism in the field of time. The impossibility of such a direct consciousness of past time appears, further, from the consequences to which it should lead if true. If we can be directly conscious of a feeling that occurred half a second ago, in spite of the fact that the feeling is now past and gone, why not also of a feeling that occurred a whole second ago, or a minute ago, or an hour, or a day, or a week? The consciousness would be in no wise more miraculous. Why cannot we be directly conscious of any past experience, no matter how remote ? But, if such consciousness is not to be thought of, then for the same reason the direct consciousness of half a second ago is not to be thought of. Our consciousness of even the nearest past must be ideal, not actual ; representative, not intuitive. But again, if this is true, the successive unity of conscious- ness falls to the ground likewise. " In reality," says Dr. Ward, " pasts present and future are differences of time, but in presen- tation all that corresponds to these differences is in conscious- ness simultaneously." But, if so, there is no need of a succes- sive unity of consciousness to account for the consciousness of succession. Earlier and later states cannot be bound up into a successive unity, because they do not exist together, and because they are past and gone when the perception of succession arises. When this perception arises, the relation is perceived between images existing in consciousness simultaneously. It there- fore implies only a simultaneous unity of consciousness, the same unity that is implied in the perception of likeness or dif- ference ; not a successive unity, which, to tell the truth, is a monstrosity, a contradiction in terms. Successive states of con- sciousness are not one with each other, but continuous with each other ; we may speak of a continuity, but not of a unity. The only unity is the unity of that which is in consciousness at once. A word, in closing, in regard to the broader issues involved in this discussion. The legitimate and necessary reaction from the psychological atomism of Hume and his school has led to the recognition of relational states, of the unity of consciousness, of CONSCIOUSNESS AND TIME. 157 * mental synthesis.' This reaction was a necessary and legiti- mate one ; these were features of consciousness which the Eng- lish school overlooked : but it would ill become us, in interpret- ing them, to fail to imitate that sobriety and economy of thought which has always been characteristic of the English school. No psychologist has done more to illustrate and commend these qualities than Professor James. There is no one to whom we are so accustomed to look for plain, honest, intelligible psychology, and no one to whom we so seldom look for it in vain. We have not looked for it altogether in vain in this very matter. There is one mystification, the most insidious and fatal in this subject, from which Professor James's account is signally free. I mean the conception of * mental synthesis ' as involving an agent, who finds feelings apart and puts them together into a unity. When we turn from this mystification to the facts of consciousness, all that we find really given is the essential unity of the relational state itself. We enjoy these states when they arise ; they constitute an increment to our intellectual being ; we may even put ourselves in the way of getting them. But may Heaven preserve us from the arrogance of supposing that it is we who create them. We no more create them than we create the sensations which form their terms. We do not create them, but are them. And may Heaven preserve us, not less, from supposing that, being them, we may nevertheless transcend them and hold direct converse with feelings that are past and gone. Our knowledge of the past involves self-transcendence, but the self-transcendence is representative, it is ideal. A self- transcendence that is other than ideal is neither plain, honest, intelligible psychology, nor plain, honest, intelligible meta- physics. STUDIES FROM THE HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. (IV.) COMMUNICATED BY HUGO MUNSTERBERG. THE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ATTENTION. BY R. MACDOUGALL. The researches here to be reported upon were concerned with the phenomena of functional disturbance which accompany various forms and degrees of perceptual and reflective attention. The subject was seated in a comfortable position with body relaxed and eyes closed, beside a table upon which the instru- ments were placed. The conductor of the experiments, who gave the signals and applied the stimuli, stood at his back, by which arrangement undesired knowledge of the nature of the stimulus or other matter of technique was avoided. Records were taken of the character of the breathing, of the changes in pulse form and blood supply in the left forearm and of the alterations in muscle tension in the fingers of the right hand. Upon the subject's breast was fastened a Marey tambour pneumograph, held in position by tapes passing over the shoulders and around the body under the arms. To the stem of its bulb was attached a rubber tube connecting with the chamber of a pneumatic registering pen, whose point traced the curve of respiration upon the surface of a horizontally revolving drum covered with smoked paper. During the later experi- ments a second pneumograph was added which recorded the character of the diaphragmatic respiration. The features of the pulse and of blood distribution were re- corded in one composite tracing given by an air plethysmo- graph. This consisted of a glass cylinder fifty centimeters long and ten in diameter, open at one end and at the other drawn to a neck, in which a cork, having a glass tube passing through 158 HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 159 it, was tightly fitted. Around the open end of the cylinder was stretched a rubber band twelve centimeters wide, which was cemented to the glass and formed an air-tight bandage upon the subject's arm when inserted in the cylinder. This cylinder was suspended by cords from the ceiling at such a height that the subject's arm, when inserted in it, might be in an easy position as he sat in the chair. This long radius from the point of sup- port gave great flexibility in yielding to slight motor reactions on the part of the subject, those which normally occurred in the course of the experiment — as observation proved — having no appreciable effect upon the character of the pulse and vol- ume curve. When the arm, as far as the elbow, had been placed in the glass chamber, the plethysmograph was con- nected by means of a rubber tube attached to that passing through the cork in its neck, with a registering pen similar to that used in recording the respiration. The muscles selected for observation were those of the index finger of the right hand, which, during the early experi- ments, was placed in the holder of a Delabarre muscle recorder, and afterwards in an adaptation of this instrument, by which the direct extensile and contractile changes without the lateral movements were recorded. The right forearm rested upon a stand drawn up beside the subject, the wrist being supported by a cushion, the hand turned laterally, and the index finger, slightly flexed and free from interference or support by the others, inserted as far as the first joint in the muscle recorder. The giving of the signals and the application of and relief from the various stimuli were recorded by the momentary de- flections of a registering pen operated by pressure upon a rub- ber bulb held in the hand of the conductor of the experiment. There were thus traced upon the one drum at the same time five curves, two registering the respiration, a third the pulse and blood distribution, the fourth the muscle changes, and the fifth the giving of signals and application of the stimuli. The five points of the registering pens were aligned upon the face of the cylinder with each other and with the time recorder, so that being under the control of the operator, there was possible an exact knowledge of the correspondence between the phases of l6o /?. MacDOUGALL. application, relief, etc., and the changes of the function re- corders. The smoked paper records were subsequently fixed by dipping in an alcoholic solution of gum sandarac. The trac- ings were read with the aid of triangles and millimeter scales by reference to base lines parallel to the direction of rotation of the drum. Full notes were taken of each experiment, its condi- tions and the experience of the subject during its course. FUNCTIONAL CHANGES DURING PERCEPTUAL ATTENTION. The subject sat in an easy position, with eyes closed and in- struments adjusted. A period of thirty seconds was allowed to elapse during which he remained quiet, avoiding all movement and mental effort. At the close of this period a watch was opened and brought forwards to the subject's ear, until it was just possible for him, with considerable effort, to follow its tick- ing. To this faint, rhythmical sound his close voluntary atten- tion was given during a second period of thirty seconds ; and a third of similar length, in which the effects of relief and the re- turn of functioning towards the normal type could be observed, closed the experiment. Silence was maintained through the three periods. At the close of each experiment the subject de- scribed his mental experiences, the degree, constancy, and me- chanism of his attention, disturbances, and the like, so that the quality of the subjective condition represented by the record was known in each case. The following figures exhibit the char- acter of the respiration during perceptual attention. AVERAGE LENGTH OF THE RESPIRATORY PHASES. i. Normal. Inspiration. Insp. Pause. Expiration. Exp. Pause. A .68 sees. .33 sees. i.oS sees. 1.51 sees. B .75 " .47 " 1.41 " 1.16 " C 1.35 " 1.08 " 2.59 " 2.55 " D i. 21 " .11 " 1.08 " 1.93 " E .77 " .24 " 1.03 " 1.34 " F 1.31 " .27 " 2.07 " 1.71 " G .95 " .32 " 1.31 " 1.14 HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 161 Total Respiration Depth. Total Resp. Depth. A 3.59 sees. 14 mm. E 3.38 sees. 17 mm. B 3.81 » ii " F 5-35 " 24 « C 7-45 " 36 " G 3.62 " 27 « D 4-34 " 40 " 2. During" Attention. Inspiration. Insp. Pause. Expiration. Exp. Pause. A .83 sees. .87 sees. 1.45 sees. 1.25 sees. B •73 " •39 " 1.38 » •93 " C 1. 12 " •45 " 2.70 " i. 08 <4 D •74 " .11 " i .08 " 1.38 " E .69 " .36 « 1.42 " 1.76 u F i-34 " .22 " 2.02 4t 2.09 " G .69 " •57 " •94 " 1.05 " Total Resp. Depth. Total Resp. Depth. A 4.41 sees. .19 mm. E 4.27 sees. .24 mm. B 3-43 " .15 « F 5-58 " .22 «* C 5.81 " .13 " G 3.28 •< .15 <4 D W " .28 " The characteristic changes accompanying attention to per- ceptual objects, as shown by these figures, are : (1) A tendency to reduce the length of the inspiration. The respiration of sleep and of low mental activity in general has been found to be characterized by its long inspiration and short expiration. As the mental excitement rises the latter component increases, the former decreases. The same ten- dency appears here as attention succeeds inattention. In five subjects the decrease is an absolute one, sometimes of marked extent — e. g-., 1.21 to .74 sees.; in the remaining cases, (A) and (F), though the figures show an absolute increase, a com- parison of the durations for the full respiration [3.59 — 4.41 sees.; 5.35 — 5.58 sees.] reveals the fact that there has been at the same time a relative decrease. (2) There is a general increase in the relative length of the expiration. In four subjects this increase is also positive ; in the fifth, in which an absolute decrease appears, there is at the same time a relative increase in length (1.41-3.81 sees. ; 1.38- I 62 /?. MacDOUGALL. 3.43 sees). The sixth and seventh do not conform to this type. The time-relation of inspiration and expiration is characteristic of the state of mental activity. Respiration during sleep is marked by relatively slow inspiration and rapid expiration. In drowsiness and after a full meal the same predominance of the inspiration is noticeable. With the increase of cerebral excite- ment the inspiration grows rapid, direct and strong, the expira- tion slow and interrupted. The extreme forms are seen in the sudden inspiratory sob of weeping, followed by the prolonged expiration, broken by repeated suspensions of the breath ; or in the similarly swift influx of air in laughter with its subsequent series of alternate suspensions and expulsions. Both the strong inspiration and the retardation of contraction during expiration point to an increased expenditure of energy as compared with the phenomena of sleep, where the innervation is sufficient only to inflate the lungs slowly, and where the contraction of the chest at its close is not interfered with by the contraction of the voluntary muscles. (3) There is a general increase in the rapidity of the res- piration. This is also a characteristic of heightened mental activity. The exceptions to it are noted under section (4) . (4) When the respiration decreases in rapidity the retarda- tion is due not to a proportional increase in time of all the com- ponent phases, preserving the normal type, but to an abnormal suspension of the breath with the lungs inflated [A. .33 — .87 sees. ; E. .24 — .36 sees.], to a prolongation of the expiration [A. 1.06 — 1.45 sees. ; E. 1.03 — 1.42 sees.], or to an exaggeration of the respiratory pause [F 1.71 — 2.00 sees.], all of these indicating an inference with the regular periodic innervation of the organic muscles. (5) There is a moderate tendency to superficiality of respi- ration. This is extremely marked in the case of three subjects. In three others it altogether fails to appear. Two of these are characterized also by slow respiration and retardation of the respiration. (6) In general, the attitude of attention is characterized by disturbance of function. Every departure from the normal type is significant as indicative of an interference with the automatic HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 163 character of the respiration. The breathing during attention is marked by just such wide and frequent but irregular fluctua- tions. This will be made more apparent by the following table of the comparative variations in time and depth during the normal and experimental periods. Normal. Attention. Time. Depth. Time. Depth. A i.Oi sees. 13 min. 3.15 sees. 17 min B .67 « 35 " I.OI " 45 " C •45 " 6 " •56 " 7 " D 1.05 " 5 " 2.80 " 36 " E .82 " 9 " 2.68 " 25 «« F •73 " 8 " 1.16 u 5 4t G i.o«; " 10 " '•75 4t 18 '4 The changes in variability are more readily appreciable than those in average character. The variation in the length of in- dividual respirations has increased to more than double the nor- mal. This increase in variability is uniform ; each individual record of every subject shows it. There is a similar increase in the extent of the variation in depth, amounting in extreme cases to seven times the normal, and failing to appear only in a single case, where the variations in normal and attention phases are as six to five. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PULSE AND VOLUME CURVES. As throughout the whole series of