HANDBOUND AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS 5'* THE Psychological Review EDITED BY J. McKEEN CATTELL COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY J. MARK BALDWIN PRINCETON UNIVERSITY WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF ALFRED BINET, ECOLE DES HAUTES-ETUDES, PARIS; JOHN DEWEY, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO; H. H. DONALDSON, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO; G. S. FULLERTON UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA; WILLIAM JAMES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY; JOSEPH JASTROW, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN; G. T. LADD, YALE UNIVERSITY; HUGO MONSTERBERG, HARVARD UNIVERSITY; M. ALLEN STARR, COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS, NEW YORK; CARL STUMPF, UNIVERSITY, BERLIN; JAMES SULLY, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON. Volume III. 1896. PUBLISHED BI-MOXTHLY BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, 66 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK; AND LONDON. Copyright 1896 by THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. P7 THE NEW ERA PRINTING HOUSE, LANCASTER, PA. CONTENTS OF VOLUME III. ALPHABETICAL INDICES OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS WILL BE FOUND AT THE END OF THE VOLUME. ARTICLES. PACK. Psychology and Physiology : GEORGE STUART FULLERTON i Studies from the Harvard Psychological Laboratory (III.) : Com- municated by HUGO MUNSTERBERG : — The Place of Repetition in Memory: G. W. SMITH 21 Association (II.) : MARY WHITON CALKINS 32 The Saturation of Colors: L. M. SOLOMONS 50 Fluctuations of Attention (I.) : J. P. HYLAN 56 Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Psy- chological Association: E. C. SANFORD : 121 Address of the President : J. McKEEN CATTELL 1 34 Consciousness and Time : C. A. STRONG , 149 Studies from the Harvard Psychological Laboratory (IV. ) : Com- municated by HUGO MUNSTERBERG : — The Physical Characteristics of Attention: R. MAC- DOUGALL 158 Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of the University of Chicago : — (I) Reaction Time: A Study in Attention and Habit : JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL and ADDISON W. MOORE 245 (II) A Study of Visual and Aural Memory Processes : Louis GRANT WHITEHEAD 258 Studies from Harvard Psychological Laboratory (V.) : The ^Esthetics of Simple Forms : EDGAR PIERCE 270 A New Perimeter: JAMES E. LOUGH 282 The Accuracy of Recollection and Observation : FREDERICK E. BOLTON 286 The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology : JOHN DEWEY 357 iv CONTENTS. PAGE. Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of the University of Chicago : (III) The Organic Effects of Agreeable and Disagree- able Stimuli: JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL and SIMON F. MCLENNAN 371 (IV) Simultaneous Sense Stimulations : AMY TANNER and KATE ANDERSON 378 Some Remarks upon Apperception : J. KODIS 384 Types of Imagination : RAY H. STETSON 398 On Individual Sensibility to Pain: HAROLD GRIPPING 412 The Third Year at the Yale Laboratory: E. W. SCRIPTURE 416 Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of the University of Iowa : On the Effects of Loss of Sleep : G. T. W. PATRICK and J. ALLEN GILBERT 469 Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of Harvard Univer- sity: (I) The Relations of Intensity to Duration of Stimula- tion in our Sensations of Light : JAMES E. LOUGH 418 (II) Normal Motor Automatism: LEON M. SOLOMONS and GERTRUDE STEIN 492 On the Conditions of Fatigue in Reading: HAROLD GRIPPING and SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ 513 The Accuracy of Observation and Recollection in School Chil- dren: SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ and HENRY E. HOUS- TON 53 1 The Third International Congress of Psychology: EDWARD FRANKLIN BUCHNER 589 Richard Avenarius : J. KODIS 603 Some Preliminary Experiments on Vision without Inversion of the Retinal Image : GEORGE M. STRATTON 611 Physical and Mental Measurements of the Students of Columbia University: J. McK. CATTELL and LIVINGSTON FAR- RAND.., .. 618 DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. Physical Pain and Pain Nerves: C. A. STRONG 64 Community of Ideas of Men and Women: JOSEPH JASTROW 68 The Functions of the Rods of the Retina : C. LADD FRANKLIN. . . 71 CONTENTS. V PAGE. Something More about the 4 Prospective Reference ' of Mind : WILBUR M. URBAN 73 Our Localization in Space: JAMES H. HYSLOP 89 Three Casesof Synaesthesia : WILFRED LAY 92 The Metaphysical Study of Ethics: JOHN DEWEY 181 Investigation of Cutaneous Sensibility : FRIEDRICH KIESOW 188 Suspension of the Spatial Consciousness; Focal and Marginal Consciousness: C. L. HERRICK 191 Natural History of the Criminal : DR. KURELLA 195 Thinking, Feeling, Doing : E. W. SCRIPTURE, JAMES R. ANGELL 196 Consciousness and Evolution: GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD, J. MARK BALDWIN, 296 Pain-Nerves : HERBERT NICHOLS 309 The Relation between Psychology and Logic : GEORGE M. STRAT- TON 313 The Testimony of Heart Disease to the Sensory Facies of the Emotions: C. L. HERRICK 320 A Psychological Interpretation of Certain Doctrines of Formal Logic: ALFRED H. LLOYD 422 Community of Ideas in Men and Women : MARY WHITON CAL- KINS, JOSEPH JASTROW 426 Remarks on Professor Lloyd Morgan's Method in Animal Psy- chology: HIRAM M. STANLEY 536 Recognition: ARTHUR ALLIN, MARY WHITON CALKINS 542 The Community of Ideas of Men and Women : AMY TANNER... 548 Psychical Research: WILLIAM JAMES 649 Psychology and Logic — Further Views : G. H. HOWISON 652 The Psycho-Sensory Climacteric; C. L. HERRICK 657 PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. Biervliet's Elements de Psychologic ; Le Bon's Psychologic des Foules: A. B 97 Telepathy, etc. : W. J 98 The Condition of Experimental Psychology: G. TAWNEY 100 Hypnotism : FRIEDR. KIESOW 105 Vision: C. LADD FRANKLIN 106 Memory: J. R. ANGELL 108 Experimental: J. McK. C., H. C. WARREN, C. H. JUDD no The Feelings: W. J., A. B 113 vi CONTENTS. PAGE The Conscience: JOHN GRIER HIBBEN 114 Jones' Philosophy of Lotze: W. J. SHAND 115 Time: S. F. MCLENNAN 118 Donaldson's The Growth of the Brain: JAMES J. PUTNAM 198 Baldwin's Mental Development in the Child and the Race: JOSI AH ROYCE 2O I Stanley's Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling: J. M. B 211 Ethical (Bryant's Studies in Character, Watson's Hedonistic Theories): JOHN DEWEY 218 Lesions of the Cortical Nerve Cell in Alcoholism : LIVINGSTON FARRAND 222 Senile Dementia : ADOLF MEYER 224 Hypnotism: FRIEDRICH KIESOW, GUY TAWNEY 226 Vision: C. LADD FRANKLIN 229 Experimental: CHAS. H. JUDD, T. L. BOLTON 232 Consciousness: H. N. GARDINER 235 The Psychology of Rhetoric: BLISS PERRY 237 Kiilpe's Psychology : G. T. W. PATRICK 323 Conant's Number Concept : JOHN DEWEY 326 Groos' Spiele der Thiere: WESLEY MILLS 329 The Psychology of Art: H. N. GARDINER, W. R. NEWBOLD... 331 Fouillee's Temperament et charactere : JEAN PHILLIPPE 335 Heinrich's Psychologic in Deutschland: W. G. SMITH 327 Miiller's Psycho-physik der Gesichtsempfindungen : CHR. LADD FRANKLIN 338 Weinmann on Specific Energies : C. W. HODGE 342 Allin on Recognition : MARY WHITON CALKINS 344 Pathological: FRIEDRICH KIESOW 347 Experimental : E. B. DELABARRE, C. H. JUDD, GUY TAWNEY. . . 349 Ethical: J. H. TUFTS, GUY TAWNEY 353 Sully's Studies of Childhood : WM. L. BRYAN 432 McLellan and Dewey's Psychology of Number: ALEXANDER ZIWET 434 Romanes' Darwin and after Darwin ; Cope's Factors of Organic Evolution: J. McKEEN CATTELL 437 Tyler's Whence and Whither of Man : WARNER FITE 443 Mosso'sFear: HERBERT NICHOLS 445 Haddon's Evolution in Art: H.R.MARSHALL 447 Hibbens' Inductive Logic : JAMES H. HYSLOP 448 Vision and Galvanotropism : C. LADD FRANKLIN, WILFRED LAY 450 CONTENTS. vii FACE. Pathological: H. N. GARDNER, FRIEDRICH KIESOW 454 Experimental: H. C. WARREN, J. P. HYLAN 456 Epistemology : GUY TAWNEY, H. C. WARREN, E. A. SINGER, JR. 459 Recent French Works (T. Lachelier, A. Fouille"e, T. Halleux, Ch. Mirallie", Fr. Paulhan) : A. BINET 551 Eucken's Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt : A. C. ARMSTRONG, JR 556 Ethnology and Anthropology: LIVINGSTON FARRAND 558 L'Anne"e psychologique : H. C. WARREN 562 Leuba's The Psychology of Religious Phenomena: WILLIAM ROMAINE NEWBOLD 569 A New Factor in Evolution: J. McKEEN CATTELL 571 Vision: C. L. FRANKLIN, E. B. DELABARRE 573 Localization of Touch : HERBERT NICHOLS 577 Memory: H. N. GARDINER, W. G. SMITH 578 Synopsia: MARY WHITON CALKINS 581 Psychical Research : J. McKEEN CATTELL 582 The Emotions: H. N. GARDINER 583 Epistemology: C. W. HODGE, H. N. GARDINER 584 Titchener's Outline of Psychology: H. C. WARREN 662 Rehmke's Psychologic : E. A. SINGER, JR 666 Halleck's Psychology and Psychic Culture : E. A. KIRKPATRICK. 669 Leibnitz, New Essays: JOHN E. RUSSELL 671 Ribot's Psychologic des sentiments : A. BINET 673 Berenson's Florentine Painters of the Italian Renaissance: GEORGE SANTAYANA 677 Morselli on Insanity: W. J 679 De Sanctis on Sleep and Dreams: W. J 681 Subliminal Consciousness : W. J 682 Paulsen's Introduction to Philosophy: J. MARK BALDWIN 684 Schopenhauer's Philosophy : WILLIAM ROMAINE NEWBOLD 686 Harris on Moral Evolution: AMY TANNER 688 Ethics: NORMAN WILDE 691 Vision: C. LADD FRANKLIN, J. E. LOUGH... 692 Motor Phenomena of Mental Effort: F. TRACY 698 Das Gefiihl und der Alter: HAROLD GRIPPING 699 Meumann's Psychologic des Zeitbewusstseins : GUY TAWNEY 700 New Books 119,239* 334> 466» 587> 7°4 Notes 119, 239, 355, 467, 588, 704 VOL. III. No. i. JANUARY, 1896. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY.1 BY PROFESSOR GEORGE STUART FULLERTON, University of Pennsylvania. In a paper which I read two years ago before this Associa- tion, I endeavored to make clear the nature of the work done by the psychologist, and to set forth the assumptions upon which he must proceed and the method he must employ. I maintained that he must assume the existence of an external physical world, and the existence of certain copies or representatives of it inti- mately related to particular bodily organisms. These transcripts of the external world, supplemented by certain elements not supposed to have their prototypes without (feelings of pleasure and pain, etc.) are called minds. I stated that it was the task of the psychologist, with the aid of introspection, observation and experiment, to obtain a knowledge of such minds, and to reduce their phenomena to laws. I held further that, whether we regard mental phenomena as parallel with nervous processes, or as belonging to the same series with them and forming a part of the one chain, that does not affect the fundamental assump- tion of the psychologist, the assumption of an external world and of minds which mirror it, nor does it affect his general method of procedure, the employment of introspection, observa- tion and experiment. These positions seem to me to be commonplaces of psy- chology, and so generally accepted, explicitly or implicitly, that they may be taken without question. They appear also to de- aRead before the Philadelphia meeting of the American Psychological As- sociation, 2 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. fine with some exactness the field which belongs to the psy- chologist, and to make possible a line of demarkation between psychology and other scientific disciplines. As, however, the sciences differentiate themselves clearly from one another, and acquire definiteness, only as they approach a high state of de- velopment, and as psychology and the sciences which lie nearest to it must be admitted to be still in their infancy, it is not to be wondered at that the question of boundaries should often be mooted, and charges and countercharges of trespass made with some warrant. It was but lately that psychology was scarcely recognized as a separate science at all, being treated as a branch of philosophy, and psychological facts being served in a sauce of epistemological speculations. From this condition of affairs the science is gradually emerging. The separation is by no means complete in fact, as a glance at many of our psycholo- gies will show, but we may console ourselves with the thought that the state of affairs is better than it was, and that human knowledge is gaining through the change. In our own day the living question is that of the relation of psychology to physiology, and of the line of demarkation between them. We hear charges that the psychologists sometimes oc- cupy themselves in doing work which is purely physiological, and one who reads the text-books of physiology cannot but see that the writer is frequently on ground not properly his own. Where are we to draw the line between the two fields ? And if a clear line can be drawn, how far is it desirable that a division of labor should take place ? It is to a brief discussion of these questions that this paper is devoted. I have said above that whether we regard mental phenomena as parallel with nervous processes, or as belonging to the same series with them and in causal relation with the world of things, it need not affect our view of the fundamental assumptions of psychology or of psychological method. But in discussing the line of demarkation between psychology and physiology, this question of the nature of the relation between mind and body may become an important one, and it will be convenient to treat my subject under two heads ; that is, to inquire into the relations of these sciences on the assumption that mental states and bodily PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. 3 do not belong to the same series, but are merely parallel (the so- called automaton theory) ; and then to consider the effect of re- garding the two sets of phenomena as forming one causally re- lated whole. I. Assuming, then, that mental states have no influence upon bodily, and that the so-called .sensory-motor arc consists of an unbroken chain of physical processes, what are the limits of the science of physiology ? The task of the physiologist lies in the study of the functioning of living bodies. These bodies form a part of the physical world, a world complete in itself, and which demands for none of its phenomena an explanation drawn from any other sphere. To explain physical actions, however com- plicated, the physiologist should have recourse to bodily pro- cesses, which in turn find their explanation in other physical processes, and these in still others, and so on without end. The rhythmic contraction of a heart, the fall of an eyelid stimulated by an irritation of the conjunctiva, the unconscious gnawing at a fingernail, and the intricate chain of actions which result in the production of a work of art or a scientific treatise, all must be explained in the same way, as one explains the unfolding of a leaf or the reddening of an apple. In each case we have the functioning of a living body, a physical thing, and our causes and effects must all be physical. This complete physical explanation of the functioning of organisms is, of course, only an ideal, and an ideal which, in the present condition of the science of physiology, smiles at us from a hopeless distance. Whether it be the contraction of a heart, or the fall of an eye-lid, or the biting of a finger-nail, or the penning of a sentence, the chain of physical causes which bring about these results lies hidden in that darkness which en- closes the glimmering taper of our science. Exact knowledge of the antecedents of any bodily movement does not exist, and in its absence the physiologist is forced to give such fragmen- tary explanations as he can, often even overstepping the limits of his own science and using conceptions which are really out of place in it, but which he seems to be compelled to use faute 4 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. de mieux. He has no right to speak of sensations, of feelings, of ideas ; they are not in his world. The functioning of a brain, as he is concerned with it, results in motions immediate or re- mote, not in feelings and thoughts ; and to make use of such in his reasonings amounts to confessing, either that he chooses to be a psychologist as well as a physiologist, or that, having found his own road impassable, he has been forced to continue his journey upon that of his neighbor. How little the physiologist is in a position to furnish such an explanation of the functioning of organisms as I have outlined above is impressed upon one who reads critically our standard text-books upon physiology. One sees that, if we eliminate from the chapters which treat of the nervous system the anatom- ical portions and the psychological portions, the residue is surprisingly small. Certainly nowhere do we find such a de- scription of the antecedents of a bodily movement as I have held up as our ideal. Let me take for illustration the well known work by Professor Foster, which is so widely used as a text- book. The learning and candor of the author, as well as his caution in the expression of opinions, make him, I think, a de- sirable representative of his class. I shall quote a few passages from various parts of his book.1 The necessary limits of such a paper as this force me to omit much that directly bears upon the subject under discussion. The question is as to the exact chain of physiological events be- tween a sensory stimulus and the resultant muscular movements. We have to consider the occurrences in the nerves and in the nervous centres, both spinal and cerebral. As Dr. Foster begins with the motor processes, I shall consider these first. As to the changes in a nerve during the passage of the nerv- ous impulse our author is frank in his admission of ignorance. He regards it as clear that the impulse is something quite dif- 1 1 shall quote from the sixth London edition. That the book may stand as a representative of its class becomes clear when one examines almost any of the more recent works on the subject; e. g., Waller's 'Introduction to Human Physiology, (London, 1893); Bernstein's ' Lehrbuch der Physiologic' (Stutt- gart, 1894) ; Munk's ' Physiologic des Menschen und der Saiigethiere' (Berlin, 1892) ; or the ' Vergleichende Physiologic der Haussaiigethiere ', edited by Ellenberger (Benin, 1892). PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. 5 ferent from the ordinary electric current, but what it is he does not venture to say (Part I, pp. 127, 156). The mechanisms with which the spinal cord is provided ap- pear also to be mere matter of conjecture. Concerning these mechanisms Dr. Foster speaks as follows : "If we regard the spinal cord, and apparently we have a right to do so, as result- ing from the fusion of a series of segments or metameres, each segment, represented by a pair of spinal nerves, being a gang- lionic mass, that is to say, a mass containing nerve cells with which nerve fibres are connected, we should expect to find that the fibres of a spinal nerve soon after entering in, or before issuing from the spinal cord, are connected with nerve cells lying in the neighborhood of the attachment of the nerve to the cord. We should, we say, expect to find this ; but owing to the difficulty of tracing individual nerve fibres through the tangled mass of the substance of the cord, our actual knowledge of the termina- tion of the fibres of the posterior root, and origin of the fibres of the anterior root, is at present far from complete " ( III, 876). In a later section we come upon this passage: "From these and similar phenomena we may infer that the nervous network spoken of above1 is, so to speak, mapped out into nervous mechanisms by the establishment of lines of greater or less resistance, so that the disturbances in it generated by certain afferent impulses are directed into certain ef- ferent channels. It may be added that though conspic- uously purposeful movements seem to need the concurrent action of several segments of the cord, and as a rule the greater the length of the cord involved, the more complex and the more distinctly purposeful the movement, still the movements evoked by even a segment of the cord may be purposeful in character; hence we must conclude that every segment of the nervous network is mapped out into mechanisms" (III., 909). A little further we find: "But if the spinal cord possesses mechanisms for carrying out coordinated movements, which in the case of voluntary move- ments are discharged by nervous impulses descending from the brain, we may infer that in reflex actions the same me- 1 i. e., The grey matter of the cord. 6 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. chanisms are brought into action, though they are discharged by afferent impulses coming along afferent nerves instead of by impulses descending from the brain. The movements of reflex origin, in all their features, except their exciting cause, appear identical with voluntary movements ; the two can only be dis- tinguished from each other by -a knowledge of the exciting cause. And it seems unreasonable to suppose that the spinal cord should possess two sets of mechanisms in all respects identical, save that the one is discharged by volitional impulses from the brain and the other by afferent impulses from afferent nerves " (III., 910). We are then, it seems, forced to assume the existence in the cord of various mechanisms for carrying out movements. What these mechanisms are and how they act we do not know. We know only that something happens in the cord, not what hap- pens. Our ignorance regarding the structure and functions of the bulb appears to be also great. -I shall cite but two extracts: "Thus of the various tracts or strands of the spinal cord two only are known definitely and certainly to pass as conspicuous unbroken strands through the bulb to or from higher parts ; namely, the pyramidal tract to the cerebrum and the cerebellar tract to the cerebellum ; all or nearly all the rest of the longi- tudinal fibres of the cord reaching the bulb end, as far as we know at present, in some part or other of the bulb ; and we may infer that some or other nerve cells of the bulb serve as relays to connect these fibres of the cord with other parts of the brain " (III., 949). "Meanwhile enough has been said to show that the bulb differs very materially in structure from the spinal cord. The grey matter of the bulb is far more complex in its nature than is that of any part of the cord ; and the arrangement of the several strands and tracts of fibres is far more intricate. The structural features on the whole, perhaps, suggest that the main functions of the bulb are two-fold ; on the one hand, it seems fit- ted to serve as a head centre governing the spinal cord, the vari- ous reins of which, with 'the exceptions noted, it holds, as it were, in its hands ; on the other hand, it appears no less adapted to act as a middleman between parts of the spinal cord below PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. 7 and various regions of the brain above. As we shall see, experi- ment and observation give support to these suggestions " (95 1 ) . It is scarcely necessary for me to add that the experiment and observation referred to do not remove the questions as to the functions of the bulb and the mechanisms it contains from the field of conjecture. The section entitled "The Disposition and Connections of the Grey and White Matter of the Brain " opens with the follow- ing passage : "As we pass up from the bulb to the higher parts of the brain, the differentiation of the grey matter into more or less separate masses, which we have seen begin in the bulb, becomes still more striking. We have to distinguish a large number of areas or collections of grey matter more or less regu- lar in form and more or less sharply defined from the surrounding white matter ; to such collections the several terms corpus, locus, nucleus and the like have from time to time been given. These areas or collections vary greatly in size, in form and in histo- logical characters ; they differ from each other in the form, size, features and arrangement of the nerve cells, in the characters of the nervous network of which the nerve cells form a part, and especially perhaps in the extent to which the more dis- tinctly grey matter is traversed and broken up by bundles of white fibres. Guided by the analogy of the spinal cord, as well as by the results of experiments and observations directed to the brain itself, we are led to believe that the complex functions of the brain are intimately associated with this grey matter ; and a full knowledge of the working of the brain will carry with it a knowledge of the nature and meaning of the intricate arrange- ment of the cerebral grey matter. At present, however, our ignorance as to these things is great ; and, though various theo- retical classifications of the several collections of grey matter have been proposed, it will perhaps be wisest to content our- selves here with a very broad and simple arrangement" (III., 952). This modest exordium is followed by a number of frank con- fessions of ignorance which appear fully to justify it. We find such statements as : " Our knowledge of the finer histological details of the various masses of grey matter is at present too 8 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. imperfect to afford any basis whatever for physiological deduc- tions, and it will be hardly profitable to dwell upon them" (1022). "In the present state of knowledge it is impossible to come to any satisfactory conclusion concerning the meaning of the variety and arrangement of the cells and other constitu- ents of the cortex" (1032). These two citations are of a suffi- ciently sweeping character to cover the whole ground ; I shall, however, allow myself the space necessary to present two some- what more lengthy extracts. They are as follows: "In the spinal cord we were able to divide all the fibres into afferent and efferent respectively, though even here we meet with some diffi- culty. Dealing with the cerebral cortex, which, as we have al- ready seen, is certainly especially concerned in voluntary move- ments and in the development of full sensations, we may be tempted to consider the fibres connected with the grey matter similarly divisible into motor and sensory ; and we may go on to suppose that the fibres joining the cortex as axis cylinder pro- cesses of recognizable cells are motor fibres, and that all the other fibres joining the grey matter in some way are sensory fibres. But in doing so we are going beyond our tether ; in all probability the nervous processes going on in the cortex are far too complex to permit such a simple classification of the func- tions of fibres as that into motor and sensory ; and any attempt to arrange either fibres or regions of the cortex as simply motor or sensory is probably misleading" (1033). "The exact nature of the part played by the cortex and the pyramidal tract in voluntary movements our present knowledge is inadequate to define. When we pass in review a series of brains from the lower to the higher and see how the pyramidal system is, so to speak, grafted on to the rest of the brain, when we observe how the increasing differentiation of the motor cortex runs parallel to the increasing possession of skilled educated movements, we may perhaps suppose that ' a short cut ' from the cortex to the origins of the several motor nerves, such as is afforded by the pyramidal fibres, from the advantages it offers to the more primitive path from segment to segment along the cerebro-spinal axis, has by natural selection been developed into being in man the chief and most important instrument for carrying out volun- PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. 9 tary movements ; but, we repeat, it remains even in its highest development a link in a chain, and a knowledge of how the whole chain works is at present hidden from us" (1063). So much for the nervous antecedents of movements. The few extracts I have given justify, I think, my statement that the physiologist is not in a position to give any accurate account of the chain of causes which led to the fall of an eyelid or the pen- ning of a sentence. What happens in the brain is unknown ; what happens in the lower centres is also unknown ; the nature of the nervous impulse is still problematic. It is not for the psychologist to throw stones, and I lay emphasis upon this ignorance on the part of our fellow-workers in science only because it seems to me an important source of confusion as to the limits of the science of physiology. Sciences grow in defmiteness as they develop, and the lines which mark them out from one another become more distinct. Here we are dealing with something very vague and very dim, and one may expect a body of knowledge so dim and vague to have a misty and uncertain boundary. Our author expresses in various places a desire to remain on purely physiological ground and to avoid a mixture of psychol- ogy in his discussions. He puts forward a few cautious state- ments which would rather incline one to believe that he sympa- thizes with the view of the relation of nervous processes to men- tal phenomena assumed to be true in this part of my paper. "Looking at the matter," he says, "from a purely physiological point of view (the only one which has a right to be employed in these pages), the real difference between an automatic act and a voluntary act is that the chain of physiological events between the act and its physiological cause is in the one case short and simple, in the other long and complex" (III., 1004). A little further we find the same thought : " In short, the more we study the phenomena exhibited by animals possessing a part only of their brain, the closer we are pushed to the conclusion that no sharp line can be drawn between volition and the lack of volition, or between the possession and absence of intelligence. Between the muscle-nerve preparation at the one limit, and our conscious willing selves at the other, there is a continuous grada- 10 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. tion without a break ; we cannot fix on any linear barrier in the brain or in the general nervous system, and say, f beyond this there is volition and intelligence, but up to this there is none' " (III., 1007). And at the close of the discussion of voluntary movements we come upon still another striking passage : "Lastly, without attempting to enter into psychological ques- tions, we may at least say that the birthplace of what we call the ' will ' is not conterminous with the motor area ; the will arises from a complex series of events, some of which take place in other regions of the cortex, and probably in other parts, of the brain as well. With these parts the motor area has ties concerned not in the carrying out of volition, but in the genera- tion of the will. So that, looking round on all sides, it is obvi- ous, as we have said, that the motor area is a mere link in a complex chain" (III., 1069). These passages are, to be sure, capable of more than one interpretation, and I shall again refer to them later ; but it is at least clear from them and from others that the author has de- sired to avoid unnecessary trespass on psychological ground. That he constantly make use, however, of psychological con- ceptions the most cursory examination of his book makes evi- dent. We read that a common effect of the arrival at the central nervous system of impulses passing along afferent nerves is a change in consciousness, or a sensation (III., 850, 851) ; that the effects of ' shock ' may be a temporary diminution or loss of consciousness, of volition, of reflex movements and other nervous actions (903) ; that a muscle may be thrown into contraction by the will (906) ; that choice may be determined in some cases by an intelligence (909) ; that mechanisms in the lumbar cord may be brought into play by the will (914) ; that, in the case of a frog deprived of its whole brain, the signs of the working of an intelligent volition are either wholly absent or extremely rare (999) ; that the operations of the will are limited by the ma- chinery at its command (1002) ; that we may, perhaps, speak of a mutilated animal as the subject of sensations, but that there is no satisfactory evidence that it possesses either visual or other perceptions, or that the sensations which it experiences give rise to ideas (1006) ; that in an ordinary voluntary movement PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. II an intelligent consciousness is an essential element (1068), and that the will, blundering at first in the maze of the nervous net- work, gradually establishes easy paths (1069). These statements from one who declares that in his pages things must be looked at from a purely physiological point of view, and who realizes that the science of psychology occupies a distinct field upon which it is not desirable that he should encroach, are very suggestive. May we not assume that they find their explanation in the fact that poverty of physiological data forces the physiologist off his own ground? A physiolo- gist, like everyone else, is conscious that he experiences sensa- tions, has perceptions, reflects and wills. What actions of the brain correspond to these physiological facts? Dr. Foster has frankly admitted that he does not know. Yet we must assume that there are nervous occurrences which thus correspond, and it is desirable to mark distinctions between these hypothetical occurrences. How mark these distinctions? There appears to be no other way to do it than to abandon physiology and turn to psychology. It ought, however, in the interests of clear thinking, to be distinctly recognized that this is a makeshift, and argues that the science which must thus be pieced out by scraps taken from another one is in a very imperfect state of development. Such a makeshift ought not to be allowed to obliterate the line dividing the two sciences thus forcibly brought together. If the parts of Dr. Foster's treatise concerned with the motor aspects of the nervous system have seemed to wander from the field of pure physiology, the parts concerned with its sensory aspects must be regarded as sinning in a still higher degree. The discussion opens with a section entitled " On the Develop- ment within the Central Nervous System of Visual and of some other Sensations," and this is followed by one entitled "On the Development of Cutaneous and some other Sensations." To the thoughtful reader of his pages the author's reasons for selecting these psychological titles seems clear. We are in- formed that " in dealing with sensory effects we must expect and be content for the present with conclusions less definite and more uncertain even than those gained by the study of motor 12 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. effects" (III., 1077). We find that, speaking of the function- ing of the cortex in vision, " the only clear and consistent state- ment which can be made with any confidence is the broad and simple one that the hind region of the cortex is in some way intimately concerned in vision " (III., 1083) ; and that" although the matter is thus in many of its details at present outside our exact knowledge, we may probably conclude that in the com- plex act of complete vision, while part, especially the more psy- chical part, is carried out in the cortex, more particularly of the occipital region, part is accomplished in the lower centres, the tegmental masses. As to the several functions of the three masses,1 we know almost absolutely nothing" (1084). We learn that the olfactory nerve " is undoubtedly the nerve of smell " ( 1085 ) , and that, " though the evidence on the whole goes to show that the cortex at the front end of the hyppocampal gyrus is especi- ally connected with smell * * * * yet the whole matter stands on a somewhat different footing from the sense of sight" (1087). We learn further that " though sensations of taste enter largely into the life of animals, and indeed of man himself, we have no satisfactory indications which will enable us to connect this special sense with any part of the cortex" (1088). We are told that "the connections of the auditory nerve with the cere- bral hemisphere belong to the same category as those of other afferent cranial, and, we may add, spinal, nerves ; we have no very clear anatomical guide toward any particular part of the cortex" (1088) ; and that though the method of degeneration suggests a connection with the cortex of the temporal lobe, "the matter needs further investigation" (1089). As to cuta- neous and other sensations arising through impulses along the nerves of the body generally, our author speaks as follows : "The fairly convincing evidence that the occipital cortex has special relations with vision, and the less clear evidence that other regions have special relations with smell and hearing, suggest that special parts of the cortex have special relations with the sensations now under consideration. But in the cases of the senses of sight and smell we had a distinct anatomical li. e., The lateral corpus geniculatum, the pulvinar, and the anterior cor- pus quadrigeminum. PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. 13 leading ; and we have seen how uncertain is the evidence where such an anatomical leading fails, as in hearing and taste. In the case of sensations of the body at large, the anatomical lead- ing similarly fails" (1091). In view of the above statements we cannot regard it as sur- prising that the author comes to the conclusion that " it is diffi- cult to say anything definite concerning the transmission of sensory impulses and the development of sensations " (III. , 1 109) . Neither is it surprising that he has chosen psychological titles for his discussions. The only thing which appears to be known with sufficient definiteness to be named appears to be the sensation. The corresponding nervous process is covered with thick darkness — darkness which may be felt. And it is not surprising that in a section of his work with the unexception- able physiological title , ' On the Time Taken up by Cerebral Operations,' we should find the following odd mixture of physiology and psychology : " The events taking place in the central stage are of course complex, and this stage may be sub- divided into several stages. Without attempting to enter into psychological questions, we may at least recognize certain ele- mentary distinctions. The afferent impulses started by the stimulus, whatever be their nature, when they reach the central nervous system undergo changes, and, as we have seen, prob- ably complex changes, before they become sensations; and further changes, now of a more distinctly psychical character, are necessary before the mind can duly appreciate the characters of these sensations and act accordingly. Then come the psych- ical processes through which these appreciated sensations, or perceptions, or apperceptions, as they are sometimes called, de- termine an act of volition. Lastly, there are the executive pro- cesses of volition, the processes which, physical to begin with, end in the issue of coordinate motor impulses, or, in other words, start the distinctly physiological processes of the efferent stage. We may thus speak of the time required for the perception of the stimulation, of the time required for the action of the will, and of the time required for the complex psychical processes which link these two together" (III., 1122). We may admit that the author has not attempted to enter into psychological 14 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. questions ; we may even admit that he has attempted to keep out of them ; but surely he has wandered on to ground which the most liberal use of language would not permit us to call physiological ; and we cannot help raising the question whether what is not psychological is to be distinguished from what is simply by the fact that it is briefly and superficially treated. Sensations, perceptions, apperceptions, volition — are not these the things with which psychology deals ? In his chapters on the senses (IV., pp. 1—305) Dr. Foster appears to have forgotten that he has resolved to avoid psycho- logical questions. These chapters cover some three hundred pages, and may, I think, be fairly described as a treatise on the peripheral sense organs, with rather full psychological appen- dices. The eye is discussed at length, and from that one passes to visual sensations, visual perceptions and visual judgments. What happens between the retina and the 'hind part of the cortex,' and what happens in that region of the cortex, are passed over in silence. The reason for these omissions the previous section on the development of sensations within the central nervous system makes clear. What happens between the retina and the cortex is not known. The chapter on sight is accordingly necessarily restricted to a discussion of the eye and of the psychology of vision. In the next chapter we similarly pass from a study of the ear to auditory sensations, perceptions and judgments. In the chapter following that, we find a section on the olfactory mucous membrane fol- lowed by one on olfactory sensations ; and one on the periph- eral organs of taste followed by one on gustatory sensations. The chapter on * Cutaneous and Some Other Sensations' resembles those which precede it. There is some discussion of peripheral organs and much psychological material. It seems evident to the thoughtful reader of Dr. Foster's pages that he is everywhere forced out of his field by poverty of established physiological data. He travels on a parallel road because he finds his own impassable. In the preceding I have confined myself to the examination of a single work on physiology. I have done so for con- venience. The work is fairly representative of its class, and PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. 15 I might have chosen in its place any one of a considerable number. The results of the examination appear to me to make it evident that we are as yet very far indeed from having real- ized the ideal set for the physiologist in the explanation of bodily movements. They appear also to make it evident that the physiologist is much given to trespassing on psychological ground. Far be it from me to imply that physiologists have no right to do psychological work, or that some of them may not do certain kinds of such work better than many psychologists. I do not even mean to maintain that, in the existing state of the science of physiology, it may not be wise for the physiologist to occasionally trespass in the interests of his own proper work. On this point I shall speak further in a few moments. What I wish to emphasize now is this : a completed science of physi- ology would, on the hypothesis which serves as a basis to this part of my paper, be wholly independent of psychology, and a book on physiology would have no excuse for containing psy- chology. As it is, such books contain a great deal of psycho- logical material ; and it should not be overlooked that this is psychological, and that, in dealing with it, the usual psychologi- cal method must be followed. It should never be assumed that, because it is found in works professedly concerned with another science, it is anything more than a ' quatorzieme,' invited, nay, compelled to come in, to fill an unwelcome gap. Its presence in physiological discussions should not be allowed to obscure the line dividing two sciences, each of which has its appropriate method of investigation. II. In what precedes I have rested upon the assumption that bodily states and mental are not causally related in the strict sense of the words — that the two series are, so to speak, par- allel. In other words I have assumed the truth of the so-called ' automaton ' theory. It is to be noted, however, that, whatever may be the opinion of the physiologist on this point, his language does not favor such a view of the relation of mind and body. One who repudiates the theory — and I think it is a bold man who will dare to maintain that the present state of our knowledge 1 6 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. justifies us in holding that the theory is proved to be true and must necessarily be accepted — one who repudiates the theory may view the relation between mind and body in either of two other ways. He may regard mental states as belonging to the physical series in the sense that they are effects of physical causes, and in their turn causes of physical effects ; or he may regard the mind as a something at least partially independent of the physical series, and, as it were, breaking in upon it. In either case the chain of purely physical events between the peripheral stimulus and the resultant movement is broken by the interpolation of something of a different kind. The sensory- motor arc is partly physical and partly psychical. How does this effect our views as to the relations of the two sciences, physiology and psychology? The former of these two ways of viewing the relation beween mind and body is, I think, most in harmony with the language used by physiologists generally. Certainly, it is most in har- mony with that used by Dr. Foster, as the extracts already given sufficiently indicate. Even the passages which, as I said above, might be taken as indicating that Dr. Foster favored the ' automaton ' theory, may perhaps be understood as supporting this doctrine. The afferent impulses started by a physical stim- ulus are supposed, when they reach the central nervous sys- tem, to become sensations ; the will is said to arise from a com- plex series of events which take place in various regions of the cortex and probably in other parts of the brain as well ; and we are told that mechanisms in the lumbar cord may be brought into play by the will. Here we have, if we take the author's words as they stand, a composite arc — physical, psychical, and physical. I am not inclined, however, to take such statements too seri- ously. Physiologists do not appear to pick their words very carefully, nor do they appear to have given much serious thought to this question of the relation of mind and body. It would be obviously unfair to read into their statements more than they have themselves seen in them. Nevertheless, it is worthy of mention that, even if their language is chosen only for convenience and is meant to be interpreted loosely, it is PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. ij clearly misleading in case they do not hold to the view I am discussing ; and it would be much better did they exercise a lit- tle care in expression. If, on the other hand, looseness of expression is an indication of looseness and vagueness of thought, it is highly desirable that it be vigorously attacked and speedily brought to an end. But whatever be the real opinion of the physiologist regard- ing the matter, it remains to discuss this view of the relation of mind and body. If we accept it we have, it is true, from initial stimulus to resulting movement, but the one causal series. It is, however, a series made up of two quite different kinds of elements. We have, on the one hand, physical changes which may be studied, as are all physical changes, by directly objec- tive methods. We now know very little about the changes in a nerve during the passage of the nervous impulse, but there is no reason to think that we may not justly expect to investigate these changes by the same methods as those employed in the investi- gation of physical and chemical problems. On the other hand, we have also to reckon with psychical facts, sensations, percep- tions, volitions ; and in whatever series one may be inclined to place these, it seems incredible that one should expect to study them just as one would study the changes in a muscle during contraction. It is not inconceivable that with improved appara- tus we may some day arrive at an ocular demonstration of the translocation of molecules there supposed to take place. But would the most ardent physiologist expect an exhaustive study of the brain to reveal directly sensations of color or sound, or feelings of pleasure or pain? I am not now speaking of mole- cular changes corresponding to such psychical facts, but of the facts themselves. Surely there is but one way of reaching such facts, and that is by the use of introspection ; and there is but one method by which they may be studied — the psycho- logical method of introspection, observation and interpretation. Hence, even if we have to do with the one causal series, we have two kinds of facts and two distinct methods, and it seems, on the whole, convenient that the work should be divided be- tween two men. We have abundant evidence that a given man may employ the one method very well and the other very badly. 1 8 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. On this view of the relation of mind and body the physiologist would not, it is true, be wholly independent of psychology ; he would be occupied with series of occurrences which end in or are initiated by psychical facts, and he would be interested in these facts as he is interested in the physical stimuli which give rise to nervous impulses. They would, however, constitute no part of his own proper field of labor ; and to give the total ante- cedents of a given bodily movement, the combined work of the physiologist and psychologist would be needed. It is hardly worthy of remark that, in the present state of our knowledge, the question as to the exact spot in the sensory-motor arc at which the psychical patch is to be inserted, is one which no sen- sible person will give himself the trouble of asking. On the wisdom of making mental states effects of bodily causes and setting them in the one series with these, it is not necessary for me here to comment. If the mind be regarded as a something independent of the physical series of causes and effects, and, so to speak, breaking in upon it, the case is much the same as in the above. We have a physical series interrupted at a given point by something of a different nature, and which must be investigated by a dif- ferent method. The physiologist appears to have a definite task — the study of the physical series ; he may leave the ex- amination of the gap between its two parts to the psychologist, whose work is sufficiently marked out from his own by the method employed, the method of introspection, observation and experiment, and interpretation. So much for the theoretical boundary line between physiology and psychology. It is, I think, a sufficiently definite one. It is, however, a line, and not a fence ; one may easily step over it, as, indeed, many do step over it. The question naturally arises, is it wise to step over it, and if so, when? I think this question may be answered in a general way by saying that, when, for any reason, an excursion into other territory will further one's progress in one's own, such an excursion is justifiable. If the physiologist can, through a study of psychical phenomena, arrive at some hint of their physical concomitants, or, if you will, causes, it seems quite right that he should make use of such a PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY. 19 means to his end. The two theories of color vision commonly discussed in books on physiology very well illustrate this point. I have said somewhere above that practically nothing is known about the occurrences between the retina and the 'hind part of the cortex' in the act of vision. I might have added that compara- tively little is known about what goes on in the eye itself. What has taken place in the retina when one has become conscious of seeing the color red or the color blue, physiology has never succeeded in directly demonstrating. Both the Young-Helm- holtz and the Hering theories are attempts to guess at the nature of such physical occurrences by the aid of knowledge gained in another field, the psychological. Such a mode of procedure seems proper enough, but it is well to remember that were the science of physiology more completely developed, this excursus into psychology would be unnecessary. Where such an excursus has not a physiological end in view, but is merely psychological throughout, it does not appear to me justifiable. There are a number of chapters in Dr. Foster's fourth volume which seem to be of this nature. Their place is in a text-book on psychology and not one on physiology. In the place which they actually occupy they serve, I think, only to conceal poverty of physiological material and to confuse the reader's mind as to the limits of the two sciences. The above sentences and, indeed, the whole argument of this paper support the conclusion that, with increase of knowledge, the amount of psychology to be found in text-books on physi- ology will be a diminishing quantity. This does not, however, imply that psychology will grow independent of physiology, as the latter will grow independent of the former. Physics and chemistry are independent of physiology, but it is not indepen- dent of them. The psychological method includes introspec- tion, observation and experiment, and interpretation of what is thus brought to light. And the difference between guessing roughly at what is passing in a man's mind by watching the movements of his face, and studying systematically and min- utely the human body with the same end in view, is not a dif- ference in kind. The objective method in psychology implies the employment of physiology in the search for psychological 20 GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. truth ; and, as I pointed out two years since in the paper already mentioned, the every-day psychology of the practical man who needs to know something about what is passing in his neigh- bor's mind is, after all, psychology, and only differs from that of the scholar in being less systematic, exact and reflective. If a study of the cerebral cortex will better reveal what we are seeking to discover than a study of the face, then by all means let us transfer our attention to that. Let us not, however, grow so interested in the study of the body as to forget that we are psychologists. Let us not take up physiological' work which has no psychological aim. Now and then, I think, psycholo- gists do this. When they do it I believe they are guilty of un- justifiable trespass, and would probably better serve the world by remaining on their own ground. STUDIES FROM THE HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. (III.) COMMUNICATED BY PROFESSOR HUGO MUNSTERBERG. A. THE PLACE OF REPETITION IN MEMORY. BY W. G. SMITH. Smith College. The investigation of which I wish to give a short account was undertaken with the view of affording material for a further step in the experimental analysis of the processes involved in learning and recollection.1 Every one knows that repetition plays an important part in the process of acquiring knowledge, but hitherto there has been no attempt experimentally to study this factor beyond the experiments of Ebbinghaus relating to the effect of repetition on the duration of memory. The aim of the following experiments has been to determine the extent and character of memory at different stages of repetition. Series of nonsense syllables formed the subject-matter which had to be learned ; the reagent made no attempt to learn a series by heart, but simply reproduced as much as he could recollect after he had repeated it a certain number of times. The experiments were carried on in the Harvard Psycho- logical Laboratory with the kind assistance of Prof. Miinster- berg in the spring and summer of 1895. I am able to present the results gained from eight subjects. In some cases the experi- ments are not so numerous as might be desired ; on the other hand, owing to the large number of subjects, any conclusion which may be drawn can hardly be vitiated by merely individual peculiarities. Only the initial stage of the research can be pre- sented here, but as I have no immediate prospect of making any substantial advance in the investigation, it seems best to bring forward now the results so far as they have been gained. IThis research may be regarded as a continuation of the work on memory which formed the subject of an article in Mind, N. S., IV., p. 47. 22 W. G. SMITH. The following method was adopted in the experiments. Series of syllables were printed on slips of paper by means of the typewriter in such a form that the subject could easily read what was printed. In each series there were ten syllables form- ing one line ; in each syllable there were three letters, the vowel being in the middle. Syllables which were too harsh in sound, or which might suggest too easily an intelligible word or phrase were rejected. No two successive syllables were allowed to have the same vowel, and the same consonant could recur only after several others had intervened. Modified vowels were not used, and consonants whose pronunciation was ambig- uous, e. g., h, c, were either not used at all, or were used only under certain conditions. The syllables were formed and ar- ranged after a method similar in certain respects to that fol- lowed by Muller and Schumann ; the object was to let chance rule as far as possible in the formation of the series. When the supply of new and unobjectionable syllables was exhausted the syllables which had been already used were rearranged to form fresh series. In the actual experiments the slip of paper bearing the syl- lables was inserted in a frame which was fastened behind an ob- long horizontal opening in a screen made of black cardboard. Behind this opening and before the slip of paper was a shutter which could be raised or lowered at any moment. The sub- ject, who sat at his ease before the screen, was required to read the series aloud, one syllable after another, at a rate determined by a metronome standing near him. The rate of the metro- nome varied with the different individuals, that rate being chosen for each reagent which seemed to be most convenient for him. As a matter of fact the two rates chosen were 80 and 100 per minute. Only in one case was the rate changed in the course of the experiments ; this was done because the subject complained that the old rate had become too slow for him. The object of introducing the metronome was to secure that the sub- ject should, as far as possible, give the same time and attention to each syllable. Where a series had to be repeated several times the subject made a pause of two beats each time he came to the end, and then began the repetition again. The shutter cov- HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 23 ering the series was raised only after the subject had given a signal that he was ready and had accommodated himself to the rhythm ; before the experiment began he was told whether one,1 few, or many repetitions were required. The signal for closing was given, except when there was only one repetition, by a tap on the table which came in the pause preceding the last repetition. The subjects were asked to repeat the series with regular attention and without any special effort or strain at any point ; the purpose of the closing signal was to secure that the value of the experiment should not be lowered by any acci- dental fluctuation of attention just before the close of the experi- ment. By these precautions the disturbing effects of fatigue, of variations of attention and of emotional changes were to a large extent avoided. Where, notwithstanding the precautions, there occurred a disturbance of any kind which seemed to en- danger the value of the result a new experiment was made. Irregularities in the formation of the series, or in the conduct of the experiments, were made a ground of rejection of the result when the subject had been disturbed thereby, or when the character of the irregularity seemed to render the value of the experiment doubtful. The experiments were arranged with a view to ascer- taining the value of the memory at five stages in the process of learning, the series being repeated, according to the direc- tions of the experimenter, once, thrice, six times, nine times or twelve times. As far as possible an equal number of ex- periments was made each day for the various stages of repe- tition. Owing, however, to various distractions and also to the loss of time involved in cross-questioning the subjects in regard to their state of mind during the course of the experi- ments, this rule could not always be carried out. In no case have the experiments of any day been accepted on which there was not at least one experiment with each stage. Preliminary experiments for practice were made with each subject both at the beginning of the investigation and at the beginning of each day's work. 1 The phrase ' one repetition ' is so convenient that the inaccuracy in- volved in its use may be pardoned. 24 W. G. SMITH. The results of these experiments are presented in the tables given below. In the first Table are given the numbers which represent the values of the memory at each stage of repetition, these numbers being the final averages gained by taking together the averages of the eight reagents. The object of the second Table is to show the relative frequency with which syllables in the various parts of the series are recollected. In Table III., which is printed at the end of this article, are given the individual averages which form the basis of the values given in Table I. The description of the divisions and details of Table I. applies without alteration to Table III. The written records handed in by the subjects have been analyzed in Tables I. and III. from two points of view, and the resulting values have been arranged in two divisions. In the first division, on the left hand of the page, the records are analyzed from the point of view of the syllable. The first column gives the average number of syllables in each ex- periment, which are correct both in their component letters and in the position assigned to them by the subject, while in the second column are collected the syllables whose only fault is that they have been put in the wrong place. In the third and fourth columns are given the incomplete syllables, i. e., those which have dropped a letter or exchanged one of their letters for a false one ; in the third column appear the incomplete syl- lables whose place is correct, while those whose position is wrongly given are in the fourth. In the second division, where the different classes of error are marked by Arabic letters, the syllables are regarded as made up of separate letters ; in this way several points which could not well be brought out in the first division receive recognition. In column a is given the average number of letters which are omitted. In the next two columns are recorded the letters which are rightly recollected, but have been put in a wrong position ; those under b have retained their position in complete or incomplete syllables, while the syllables themselves have been wrongly placed ; those under c have lost all trace of their original arrangement. The next column, d, contains the letters which have been reproduced oftener than they appeared in the original series. Column e is intended to HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. give material for a further analysis of the errors recorded under £, and contains the average number of vowels in each experi- ment whose original arrangement has been entirely lost. The average of all errors taken together is given under m ; the figures in this column have been gained, not by adding the averages in the other columns, but by a separate summation of the errors in each experiment. Cases of inversion where the original order of the letters is simply reversed occurred so rarely that the column which had been set apart for their recep- tion was left unused ; errors of this kind found a place in column 3 or 4 in the first division, and in column b in the second divi- sion, the mode of estimation being slightly modified for them. Errors due to insertion of a wrong letter were likewise rare, and appear only in the total averages under m. The Roman nu- merals in the first vertical column represent the different stages in repetition. In Table II. the numbers in the horizontal columns opposite the Roman numerals give the percentage of times that the syl- lables in the ten places in the series, whether in complete or incomplete state, are reproduced by the subject; the analysis takes into account only the original position of the syllable and neglects entirely the place assigned to it by the subject. Owing probably to the fact that the experiments were not sufficiently numerous to eliminate accidental variations, the results of the analysis regarding the original position of the recollected sylla- bles are somewhat irregular if we look only at the individual results. The general tendency, however, is plain and since that tendency is expressed with sufficient clearness in the figures gained by taking together the averages of all the subjects I have decided to present only the final averages. TABLE I. I 2 3 4 a b c d e m I. . . 2.2 0-35 .1 0.6 15.5 2-5 3-o .0 0.7 22.2 III. . . 2-5 0.9 .1 0.9 13.0 4-3 2-5 •35 0.6 21.4 VI. . . 2.8 0.9 .1 0.9 11.9 4-5 2.6 •5 0-5 20.5 IX. . . 3-4 0.9 .1 0.6 10.9 3-95 2.2 •5 0.6 18.9 XII. . . 3-9 0.8 .0 0.7 IO.O 3-75 2.1 •3 0.6 17-3 26 W. G. SMITH. TABLE II. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I. . . 81 52 24 16 16 24 26 26 62 84 III. . . 84 67.5 39 38 34 33 29 44 69 92 VI. . . 81 61 42 42 34 32 46 54 74 85 IX. . . 89 67 49 4i 32 33 48 64 77 93 XII. . . 92 58 46 41 56 57 57 61 84 9i It will be noted on comparing the values given in Table I. with those in Table III. that, while the general features of the re- sults are reproduced in Table I. with great distinctness, there is yet among the different individuals a considerable amount of variation. The values given by the subject St. in col. m are opposed to those of all the other subjects, though in the case of two others, H. and Sn., the numbers do not conform very closely to the typical curve. It is unfortunate that another subject, whose memory proved itself better than that of any other, was unable to continue his attendance long enough to give a satisfactory number of experiments. The three subjects, H., Cu. and P., who have carried out the largest number of ex- periments, present fairly typical examples of the different kinds of memory ; in order to give some proof of the trustworthiness of the average values assigned, the probable error of the averages in col. m has been calculated l and the figures inserted to one place of decimals under r. Before going on to draw any conclusion from the results we may note shortly the limitations of the research. The results obviously can only be taken as representative of the process of learning series of syllables of a certain length, repeated aloud in a more or less artificial manner. The only test of the value of the memory at the different stages lay in the accuracy with which the subject recollected the syllables immediately after the learning was finished. Without doubt the results would be differ- ent if we allowed some time to elapse between learning and recol- 1 In experiments such as those of Ebbinghaus, as has been remarked, the probable error is an unsatisfactory test, because while the number of repetitions may become indefinitely large it can never fall below i . Here, on the other hand, the total number of errors may be zero, but it can never rise above a certain point. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 2J lection. Probably in this case the errors in the first stages would increase much faster than those in the later stages of repetition. Finally, in these as in other memory experiments, we have a very mixed result in which factors, such as the memory images of sight and hearing, are inextricably mingled together. The results given in the tables confirm in general the accepted fact of the efficacy of continued repetition in impress- ing any kind of subject-matter on the memory. That even with the reagents who remember best its effect is so small is some- what surprising. Probably the explanation of this feature is to be found partly in the artificiality of the experimental condi- tions ; partly, also, in the fact that the subjects were directed not to try and learn as much as possible, but simply to repeat, with all possible regularity, what was presented to them. The advantage of this rule was that there was very seldom any com- plaint made of fatigue due to the experiments. A comparison of the average values in the earlier and later halves of the series of experiments carried out by the subjects who have fur- nished the largest number of experiments shows that in the majority of cases there is a slight increase in the value of the memory in the second half, a result probably due to practice. It is interesting to observe a confirmation here of another fact which meets us in common life. In any pursuit or compe- tition the candidates start fairly equal ; it is towards the end that they begin to separate from each other. Here we are met by the fact that on the whole the different individuals do not differ very greatly in the number of errors which they commit after one repetition, while as we go on to twelve repetitions the differ- ence increases markedly. The difference between the best and the worst memory after twelve repetitions is very much greater than after one repetition. A better way of proving the same fact consists in giving the mean variation of the final averages (Table I. m) at each stage : — I. ill. IV. IX. XII. mv. 1.8 3.0 3.8 3.7 5.1 The first repetition is undoubtedly the best ; /. e., more is learned by it than by any other repetition, or, in fact, by all the other repetitions put together. There seems to be a slight increase in 28 W. G. SMITH. the value of a repetition as we pass from the third to the twelfth ; this result shows itself in cols. I and m, but not in col. a, where errors of omission alone appear ; in fact the change in col. a is in the opposite direction, the increase in the number of letters recollected, caused by the successive repetitions, appearing to grow smaller as the number of repetitions increases. If we look more closely into the figures for each stage we find certain regularities which hold for almost every subject. The number of syllables which are correctly remembered (col. i) increases regularly with the increase in number of repeti- tions, while the total of errors (col. m) and also the errors of omission (col. a) decrease as regularly. The other classes in both divisions comprising the errors of disorder show values which remain pretty constant throughout; i. £., the number of errors, while remaining absolutely constant, decreases relatively to the total number of syllables and letters remembered. It is one of the limitations of this investigation that it does not enable us to analyze exactly the errors due to the various kinds of con- fusion and disorder and separate them from errors of omission. To do this it would be necessary to employ a method which was followed by Bigham in his research on memory.1 According to this method the subject would be supplied with a list of the syllables, arranged in chance order, which were being used in an experiment and would be required to rearrange them after the repetitions were finished. What we seem to have in the present experiments is a continual process of promotion during the learning ; a syllable or letter, at first forgotten, appears bye and bye in one of the classes which represent failure to remember the right order and then passes into the classes of syllables or letters correctly remembered; in this way the figures representing errors of disorder might be expected to remain fairly steady. Cases of inversion of syllables practically did not occur at all ; inversions of letters and insertion of false letters occurred rarely, as before remarked. What the precise explanation of these facts may be I have no means of saying. With Ca. and R. the figures in col. 3 are much larger than in cols. 2 or 4 at each stage, while with H. and St. the figures in col. 4 are regularly the largest. Sn., on the other hand, shows the 1 PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, I. pp. 34, 453. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 29 largest numbers in cols. 2, b and c. Such results point to the need for purposes of explanation of a more exact knowledge of the psychical processes of each individual. Observations were made in the course of the experiments on the nature of the memory and its variations at the different stages, but I have not been able to any great extent to correlate these obser- vations with the numerical values given in the tables. The memory in every case seemed to be of a mixed character, now visual, now auditory and now motor images being more promi- nent. A comparison of the figures in cols, c and e seems both interesting and significant. If consonants retained their hold on memory to the same extent as vowels the figures in the last column ought to range about a third of those in col. c ; as a matter of fact they range somewhere about a fourth, the figures tending to approach nearer to a third in the later stages. The conclusion seems justified that vowels impress themselves better on the memory than consonants. There was a tendency in most subjects to associate foreign ideas with the syllables or make the syllables into intelligible phrases, though towards the end this tendency was lessened. With one individual, Ca., this was a very troublesome feature from beginning to end, and there was hardly an experiment where I had not one or more instances of this associating tendency. I have summed up the associations made at each stage by this subject, and without any great stress being laid on the figures they may be presented as an illustration of the fact, which was otherwise confirmed, that this associative tendency grows with the number of repeti- tions. I. III. VI. IX. xn. No. of Assns. 6 9 23 34 33 It was decided that an experiment should be rejected only where connecting associations were formed, i. e., associations which connected two syllables in the series into a single intel- ligible phrase.1 This rule proved in the end too severe, as the associations very often occurred in the more laborious ex- periments of the later stages, and in the end it was decided to ac- 1 Examples : div nur — divine nurture ; mon sud — Monday Sunday. The range of these associations will be understood when it is mentioned that they included English, Scotch, German, French, Russian, Latin, Greek and Hebrew words. 30 W. G. SMITH. cept the experiment when an association was formed between the first two or last two syllables at any stage, or between syllables in any part of the series when the number of repetitions was twelve ; in all these cases there was a considerable probability that the syllables would have been remembered in the absence of the association. There does not seem to be any definite connection traceable here between excellence of memory and the mode of reproduc- tion. The subject with the best memory and the subject with the worst both wrote from the beginning straight on, the syllables at the end of the series being thus written last. In the great majority of cases the first two syllables are reproduced first ; often the last two come next ; this is specially marked in the case of the reagent P. However, although the last syllable does not come first in the reproduction, it is in most cases best remembered. The subjects were left free throughout the experiments to introduce a rhythm into the repetition if they pleased. In most cases there was a slight rhythm present. In a few instances its effect is visible in the detailed results which form the basis of the second table ; in these cases there is a greater difference between the figures in the second and third and also the eighth and ninth places than between those in the first two and last two places. On the whole, however, its effect is less than might have been expected. It appears from Table II. that a syllable in the second half of a series has a somewhat greater chance of being re- membered than one in the first half ; the best places are at the be- ginning and the end, the chance of being recollected lessening at first rapidly, then more slowly as the middle of the series is approached. During the pause of two beats between the repe- titions the subjects waited without trying to memorize ; in most cases their eyes were fixed inattentively on the beginning or end of the series which was being presented. Two of them complained that in this way an undue advantage seemed to be given to the first and last syllables. One of the two adopted the device of shutting the eyes during the pause ; in spite of this, the first and last pairs of syllables are in this case specially well remembered. There does not seem any reason to suppose that looking at the syllables in this inattentive way has any very marked effect upon the memory. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. TABLE III. I 2 3 4 a b c cl e m r I. . . 0.7 O.I i.i I.O 16.9 2.6 5-i 2.0 1.4 27.1 o-5 III. . . 0.7 0.5 i-3 i-5 iS-3 5-0 4.6 1.6 1.4 27.2 0.4 H. 21 VI. . . I.O 0-5 I.O «-7 14.2 4.9 4.6 1.4 I.O 25-7 0.4 IX. . . 1.4 0.4 i-3 0.9 H-5 3-2 4.8 1.8 i-3 24-5 o-5 XII. . . 1.0 0.4 i-7 i-3 13-7 4.0 5-3 i.i 1.2 24.2 0-5 I. . . 2.O o-3 i-3 0.4 16.7 1.8 2.7 0.6 o-5 21.8 o-3 III. . . 2.6 0.6 i-7 0.6 13.2 2.7 2.2 I.O 0.4 19.2 o-S Cu. 21 VI. . . 3-2 o-5 i-7 0.8 n-3 3-o 2.O »-3 °-3 17.7 0.6 IX. . . 4.6 o-3 1.4 0-5 9.2 2.O i-7 2.8 0.4 16.0 0.9 XII. . . 4.9 0.6 i-3 0.4 8.1 2-7 1.4 2.0 0.4 H-3 0.7 I. . . 2.6 0.2 1.25 o-5 iS-3 2.15 2.1 0-35 0-5 20.05 0-5 III. . . 3-o 0.9 i.i 0.6 13-6 3-5 I.I 0.9 °-3 19.2 0.6 P. 20 VI. . . 4.0 0.35 0-95 0.65 "•3 2-5 1.85 0.7 0-5 16.4 0.6 IX. . . 4-25 0.6 I.O 0-5 10.45 2-95 i-35 0.8 0-35 15-6 0.7 XII. . . 4-75 0.65 I.O 0.25 9.1 2-5 i-55 0-55 0.4 13-7 0.7 I. . . 3-3 0.5 I.O 0.6 13-8 2.6 2.1 0.7 0.7 19-3 III. . . 3-7 0.7 0.9 0.8 11.4 34 1.6 i.i 0.4 17.7 Ca. 18 VI. . . 3-9 i-3 1.25 0.6 8.0 5-3 2.6 1.4 0.9 17.0 IX. . . 4.4 0.8 I.O 0.7 7.2 3-7 1.8 0.8 0.6 i3-7 XII. . . 6.2 0.7 0.8 0.3 6.0 2.8 0.7 1.2 o-3 I I.O I. . . 2-3 0.6 0.6 0.4 17-5 2.6 1.8 0.25 0.4 22.1 III. . . 2.4 i.i 0-75 o-5 H-5 4.4 2.0 0.6 0.4 21.6 L. 16 VI. . . 2-3 0.6 0.9 0.8 15-6 3-5 1-7 0.6 O.I 21.4 IX. . . 3-5 0.9 0.9 O.2 !3-4 3-25 I.4 0-3 0.2 17.9 XII. . . 3-i 0.7 0-5 0-5 iS-i 2.9 i-5 0.25 0.4 19.9 I. . . 2-75 O.2 1.6 0.8 10.6 2-3 4.9 3-6 1.2 21.9 Of T9 III. . . VT 2.25 0.4 1-7 i-7 9-5 S-o 4-5 4-7 1.2 23-8 O L. 1 ~ V i.. * • IX. . . 2.1 1.4 1.4 i-3 IO. s[ 9.0 5-4 7-i 4-5 4.1 4.1 3-9 1'5 i-5 24.9 24-75 XII. . . 2.8 0.7 !-3 i-7 9.2 5-5 3-9 3-6 1.2 22-5 I. . . 1.4 0.9 0.5 0.7 18.5 4-25 1.6 0.25 o-3 24.6 III. . . 1-5 2.25 0.25 0.6 i5-i 7-9 i-75 O.2 o-5 25.1 Sn. 12 VI. . . 1.6 2-3 0.4 0.9 13.2 9.0 2.1 0.8 0.4 25.2 IX. . . 2.6 2.1 o-5 0.4 13.0 7.8 1.2 0.25 O.2 22.25 XII. . . 2.25 2.2 0.4 0.9 12.7 8-3 i-3 0.4 °-3 22-75 I. . . 2.2 O.O 1.4 o-75 14.7 i-5 3-75 0.9 0.7 20.8 III. . . 3-75 0.4 1.25 0.6 11.7 2.7 1.9 0.7 0.4 17.2 R. 12 VI. . . 4-25 o-3 i-3 0.6 10.75 2.2 i-3 1.5 0.25 15.9 IX. . . 4-3 0.4 1.25 O.2 I I.O 1.6 1.8 1.4 0.25 16.2 XII. . . 6.1 O.2 i-3 0.4 6.1 i-3 1.2 i-3 0-3 9.9 1 The letters in the first vertical column represent the names of the reagents, while the figures give the total number of experiments made at each stage. It may be mentioned that Ca. made 16 instead of 18 experiments with stage VI. 32 M. W. CALKINS. B. ASSOCIATION. (II.) BY MARY WHITON CALKINS. Wellesley College. Experimental investigation may best supplement the purely introspective study of the nature of association by describing in relatively concrete terms the probable direction of trains of as- sociated images. To this end there is necessary such a consid- eration of the so-called suggestibility of objects of conscious- ness as shall answer the question : what one of the numberless images which might conceivably follow upon the present per- cept or image will actually be associated with it? Ordinary self-observation has long recognized that the readily associated objects are the 'interesting' ones, and has further enumerated frequency, recency, vividness or impressiveness, and primacy (the earliest position in a definite series of events) as the factors of interest, and therefore the conditions of asso- ciation. A given object, then, is likely to be suggested by one with which it was frequently, recently or vividly connected, and by one with which it stood at the beginning of a series. Logically prior to the discussion of suggestibility is the study of the suggestiveness of objects of consciousness, that is, the consideration of the question : what part of the present total content of consciousness will be associated with a following im- age? The suggesting object may, of course, be of varied ex- tent. In the rare cases of 'total redintegration,' practically the entire present content is connected, as a whole, with what follows. Far more often, some one accentuated part of the total object of consciousness is the starting point of the associa- tion; and this emphasis of attention is once more upon the ' interesting ' part of the entire content, that is upon some vivid, recent or repeated object, or upon one which has had the early place in a series. Finally, neither the total content of con- sciousness, nor a single accentuated portion of that total, but a group of these single factors or objects of consciousness may form the starting point of the association. These distinctions may be summarized, somewhat as follows : HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 33 I. Contents of consciousness are * suggestive.' a. As totals (Total Redintegration.) b. As complex. 1. Groups of objects are suggestive (through 'constel- lation.') 2. Single portions are suggestive, through their interest, due to (a) Repetition (Frequency.) (b) Vividness. (c) Recency. (d) Primacy. II. Objects of consciousness are « suggestible,' through their interest, due to a. Frequency of connection. b. Vividness " " c. Recency " " d. Primacy " " The experimental investigation whose results are here re- ported concerned itself with the conditions of suggestibility. The massed records of the first part of the study were published in this REVIEW, volume I, pages 476 to 483. The figures of this earlier summary are incorporated with those of the later experiments in this paper, and the account of the methods used and of certain of the conclusions reached is here in part repeated to secure completeness. All the results were twice set down, once in the books kept for the individual subjects, and again in the books which contained the grouped records of the different sorts of experiment. These experimental ledger pages have been bal- anced, and all the figures given in the tables represent the con- curring results of both forms of record. Constant notes were kept of subjective experiences, but have not been reported, for none of them tended to modify the conclusions drawn from the experiments themselves except where the occurrence of natural associations made it necessary to reject entirely the results of particular experiments. 34 M. W. CALKINS. EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CONDITIONS OF SUGGESTIBILITY. The relative significance of frequency, recency, primacy and vividness, was studied in about 2,200 experiments. This number does not include the introductory experiments under- taken in order to select satisfactory methods nor the practice experiments of each subject. There were 17 subjects, no one of whom assisted in more than 275 nor in less than 40 experi- ments ; and the average number was 130 for each subject. Most of the visual experiments were repeated with 40 members of the writer's Wellesley College class, with an average of 12 experiments each. The results coincide very closely with those of the more extended study in the Harvard laboratory; they are not included except in one or two instances which will be noticed. All the subjects were entirely or comparatively igno- rant of the aims and the problems of the investigation, which was not discussed until the conclusion of the work. The experiments were of two main types, visual and audi- tory ; the visual experiments are divided again into the succes- sive and the simultaneous ; finally, all the experiments may be classed, with reference to their purpose, as simple or compar- ative. I. SIMPLE SERIES. a. i. Successive Arrangement. Visual Series. The method already described1 was retained throughout, except that the time was kept, in the second half of the experi- ments, by listening to the beats of a metronome, which rung a bell every four seconds ; the metronome was enclosed in a sound-proof box, so that the subjects were not disturbed by the beats, which reached the experimenter through a rubber tube. A color was shown during four seconds, against a white back- ground, followed by a numeral, also exposed four seconds. Each series consisted of 7, 10 or 12 such pairs of quickly suc- ceeding color and numeral, each presentation lasting only four PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, I., p. 477. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 35 seconds and each pair of stimuli separated from the next by an interval of eight seconds ; at the close a test series was shown, made up of the colors only, in changed order, and the subjects wrote down whatever numeral, if any, was suggested by each color. The experimenter was hidden from view throughout. In the first group of experiments, some one color appeared several times in each series, once in an unimportant position with any chance numeral, but also once or more in some empha- sized connection — either repeatedly with the same numeral (a 'frequent' combination), or at the very beginning or very end of a series (cases of 'primacy' and of 'recency'), or with a numeral of unusual size or color (an instance of 'vividness'). The following are representative series : Visual Series, 213. Vividness. First Series : Vivid, 4. Second Series, 5. I. Brown, 34; peacock, 65; orange, 51; green, 792 (v) ; blue, 19 ; violet, 48 ; green, 2? (n) ; grey, 36 ; strawberry, 87 ; dark red, 54. II. Blue, grey, dark red, brown, green (z>), orange, straw- berry, grey, peacock. Visual Series, 127. Recency. I. Peacock, 46; blue, 38 (n) ; brown, 51; grey, 74; yel- low, 29 ; blue, 52 (r) . II. Grey, blue (r), peacock, yellow, strawberry, brown. The problem of the experiment is the discovery of the pro- portion of cases in which the accentuated color, e. g., green (as in series 213, above), suggests the numeral — here 792 — with which it was emphatically combined, instead of suggesting the other numeral with which also it was shown. The later experiments, in the first place, fully corroborated the results already published. Thus the general likelihood of the recall of numerals in series of this character, leaving out of consideration all the emphasized numerals, was 26.1% in the l°ng> 35 •*% in tne short series.1 No new series were intro- *Cf. for per cents, of earlier results (26.4% and 35.3%) PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW I., p. 479. 36 M. W. CALKINS. duced with only two occurences of the repeated numeral, since the per cent, of recall in these cases1 had been so little above the normal ; but the likelihood of associating the numeral three times repeated with a color was 63.7%, while the normal or unaccentuated numeral appeared in only 24.9% of the cases.2 In 19.2% of all the test series, * both' the frequent and the normal were remembered. This is easily explained when the normal comes late in the series, for the recurrence of the color, already repeated, draws attention to the following numeral, even when that is not accentuated. To eliminate this influence of position, the place of the normal in the series was constantly changed from beginning to middle and end. The table of individual records is given only for the one-fourth (or 3 of 12) frequency series ; it shows that the results are not due to any misleading massing of the figures, for the preponderance of frequency associations appears for each subject. As before, the column headed 'Half includes cases in which one digit only was re- called, and these are estimated in calculating the per cents., as half correct. TABLE I. FREQUENCY (3:12), VISUAL. XT Number of Both. Normal only. Frequent only. Series. Full. Half. % Full. Half: % Full. Half. % B. 20 4 i 5 2 C. 24 3 i 23 91 Ha. 13 2 26 Ns. 5 3 Pt. 22 3 I 14 I Shp. 62 21 St. 17 2 II 12 L/- " 3 5i Me. 6 3 N. ii 3 i 2 E.P. 6 122 .P. 12 I 22 i2 3 i 5 i Sh. 12 3 Si. ii i i 31 So. 12 3 Total, 200 37 3(19.2%) 7 9 (5.7%) 84 10(44.5%) Jcf. PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, IV., p. 475 2Cf. for per rents, of earlier results (63.4% and 23.3%), PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, I., p. 149. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 37 The greatest difficulty of these experiments was unquestion- ably in the study of vividness as a condition of suggestibility. The category is a vague and elusive one, seeming to include all those forms of the interesting which cannot be referred to the repetition, the recency or the primacy of the experience. In the main, therefore, the * vivid ' is either the < unusual/ or it is the object of instinctive, and therefore of psychologically in- explicable, interest. TABLE II. VIVIDNESS, VISUAL. XT Number of Both. Normal Only. Vivid Only. Series. Full. Half. % Full. Half. % Full. Half. % 1 13 6 2 i 4 2 16 3 91 12 7 [ I 17 2 1 6 i 7 8 52 10 6 i ii 12 7 2 12 4 ! I 2 II 31 : i 6 Total, 346 43 3(12.8^)25 6 (8%)ii3 47(39.4%) Thus, in close likeness to the results of the former experi- ments, 1 the vividly-associated numerals are remembered in about one-half (52.2% )1 of the series, while the normal as- sociations with the same colors are only one-fifth (20.8%) 1 of the entire number. The lessened strength of these sorts of vividness, as compared with that of the three repetitions, is shown by the greater number of cases in which neither numeral is remembered. J. P., however, is the only one of the subjects whose records, only 10 in number, show no influence at all of vividness. The individual records in the experiments on recency 2 offer only one variation from the type, again in the case of J. P. ^f. for earlier results (48% and 20.8%) op. cit., page 481. 2Cf. for earlier results (53.7% and 22.2%) op. cit., page 480. B. 33 C. Ha. 39 4 Mi. 42 Ns. 47 6 Lg. 10 2 Lh. 35 5 Me. 43 ii N. 9 E.P. 29 4 J'P* 10 R. ii 3 Sh. 9 3 Si. 10 i So. ii i M. W. CALKINS. The last numeral is recalled in 53.7 %l of the possible cases; the other numeral associated with the same color, only in 25.7 %-1 TABLE III. RECENCY, VISUAL. Names. Hy. if Me. Nr. E.P. Sh. Si. So. Mi. B. Ha. Ns. Number of Series. 4 9 19 27 18 18 12 15 1 10 9 10 Both. Full. Half. I 2 Normal Only. Full. Half. Recent % Full. Only. Half. I I 3 ii I I I 8 3 I 3 2 3 9 I 4 I 3 I 2 8 I I 4 3 3 I 3 i 3 8 2 i i I i i 2 I 2 3 I i 4 Total, 200 27 1(13.7%) 20 8 (12%) 71 18(40%) The influence of recency has been studied also in the series which were arranged without this particular purpose, by recording all cases in which the last numeral was correctly as- sociated with the color on which it had followed. In these cases the likelihood of recall does not surpass that of the average num- eral, though the * recent ' color was shown third in the second half-series : the recall of the recent numeral occurred only in 26.4% of 276 series. The swiftly decreasing influence of re- cency, well-known from such experiments as those of Ebbinghaus on memory, is thus clearly indicated : even the intervention of only two colors between the last combination of color and numeral and the reappearance of the color was sufficient to annihilate the effect of the recency. Finally, the suggestibility of a numeral which had already appeared at the very beginning of a series was compared with that of another numeral combined with the same color midway in the series. JCf. for earlier results (53.7% and 22.2%) of. cit., page 480. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 39 TABLE IV. PRIMACY, VISUAL. XT Number of Both. Normal Only. Primacy Only. ies' Series. Full. Half . % Full. Half . % Full. Half. % Hy. 8 12 Lg. 14 i Lh. 20 2 83 21 Me. 19 2 2 3 62 Mi. 2 i i N. 18 i 2 62 E.P. 20 4 33 21 J-P- 21 315 R. 22 I 3 I 12 I Sh. 17 3 23 62 Si. 17 2 12 41 So. 22 3 2 41 32 Total, 200 18 2 (9.5%) 31 18 (20%) 48 12 (27%) The table shows very clearly that with long series, primacy is a significant factor only in individual cases. Thus, its in- fluence is very marked on R.'s associations, and may be ob- served in the records Me. and Sh. Lh. on the other hand associates the later numeral, that is the * normal,' much more often, and with four of the other subjects the normal has a slight advantage. A record of cases was also kept in which the first of the series was remembered, without special competition with any other numeral, but .the proportion was barely the average one in the long series ; in the short series on the other hand the first numeral was associated in more than two-fifths of the cases — in 43 % , that is 8% more often than the average numeral and only 8 % less often than the recent. The ineffectiveness of primacy in the long series seems at first sight to contradict the testimony of common experience and of experiment,1 for, in committing long series to memory, the learner is certainly very apt to remember the first pre- sentation. This difference, however, is easily explained : in memorizing the subject sets himself to learn the series as a whole, and he may not only accentuate the first presentation, but recur to it while learning the rest of the series ; moreover, when he repeats the series, or records it in writing, he almost invariably gives first the earliest presentation. In the associa- 1 Cf . the work of Dr. W. G. Smith on memory. 4° M. W. CALKINS. tion experiment on the contrary, the first presentation was always repeated toward the middle of the test-series, thus mul- tiplying the chances that the combination would be crowded out of the memory. 2. SIMULTANEOUS ARRANGEMENT. These general results have been amplified, and at the same time verified, by introducing series in which the connected color and numeral were simultaneously shown. This method might have been used more often, since the simultaneous combi- nation of Stimuli is perhaps more common in ordinary experi- ence than the successive ; but the experiments of the successive type, in which the combination of color and numeral is emphasized by the long pause between each pair, were employed as affording a close comparison between the visual and the auditory series. So far, however, as these subjects are concerned, the results of the simultaneous series are so closely parallel with those of the suc- cessive ones, that no characteristic differences appear. Color and numeral were shown side by side in an opening 10x4 cm., by slipping them into double passe-partout frames, made for the purpose. Each frame held a color and a numeral sep- arated by a narrow band of white. The intervals of exposure were six seconds, and in a few series four seconds ; the pauses were usually six seconds, occasionally four seconds. In each of the three most important simple forms of the experiment, 50 tests were made. The average of recall, leaving out of account the emphasized numerals was 25.4% for the 100 long series and 30% for the 50 short series, thus falling, as has been said, slightly below the average of recall in the successive series. Moreover the percentage of emphasized numerals which were associated was slightly greater than in the successive series, because of the larger number of cases in which both numerals were recalled. This result, however, maybe due to the greater degree of practice when these simultaneous tests were made. The number of experiments is so small that the individual records are not given, but they are closely parallel to those of the successive series. In the table which follows, the figures for the 'half correct, which are small, are combined with those of HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 41 the fully correct, and the corresponding per cents., with those of the successive series, are added in parenthesis. TABLE V. SIMULTANEOUS COMBINATION. Nature Number Both. Normal only. Emphasized. of of Sim. Sue. Sim. Sue. Sim. Sue. Series. Series. No. % % No. % % No. % % Freq. 50 n 22% (19%) ij^ 3% (5-7%) 24 4§% (44-5%) Viv. 50 15 30" (12.8") 4^ 9" (8 ") 19 38" (39.4 ") Rec. 50 10 21" (13.7") 5^ n" (12 ") 19 38" (40.7 ") b. Auditory Series. All the varieties of experiment which have so far been de- scribed, except those in primacy, were repeated with nonsense syllables and numerals, as the association-elements, both pro- nounced to the subjects. These series were arranged in pairs of a nonsense syllable and a numeral each, with four seconds allowed to the pronunciation of each pair, and four seconds in- terval both between the pairs and between the two parts of the series. One series will serve as illustration of all. Series 33 ^b. Vivid, Auditory. I. Zet, 24; Kip, 62; Tox, 96; Wez,3i9 (v) ; Vit, 38; Lup, 45 ; Nuk, 29; Wez, 73 (n) ; Vab, 57; Muv, 41. II. Vit, Kip, Muv, Zet, Wez, Nuk, Lup, Vab, Tox. The results of the experiments are generally parallel to those of the visual tests, with certain suggestive variations which will be noticed later. The general average of recall, disregarding the accentuated pairs is shown in TABLE VI. CORRECT ASSOCIATIONS, AUDITORY. Q . Number of Possible Correct Actual Correct Associations. Series. Associations. Full. Half. % Long. 254 2405 498 22 (25.3%) Short. 100 581 118 39 (23.6%) 42 M. W. CALKINS. TABLE VII. FREOJJENCY (3:12) AUDITORY. XT.,™ Number of Both. Normal on Ij Series. Full. Half, % Full. Half . < /•. Frequent only. & Full. Half. % Hy. 5 i I H 8 i 3 i Lh. 12 3 i 5 2 Me. 15 9 4 2 Nr. i i 7 2 E.P. H 5 i 5 2 •) H 9 2 3 R. i5 7 3 Sh. 8 i 6 2 Si. X4 8 3 3 So. 16 2 I 9 3 Total, 150 77 ~T(38%) ~~+(2% i) 5*" 23 (42%) The position of the normal in the series was carefully varied, as in the visual experiments. The following table shows, how- ever, that whatever the position of the normal, associations with the repeated numeral are much in excess, though they decrease where the normal is midway in the series so that the repetition affects it also. TABLE VIII. FREOJJENCY, AUDITORY. Position Number of of Both. Normal Only. Full. Half. Normal. Series. Ful1' Half ' % Early. 42 n (26 %) Middle. 57 26 (45-6") 3 (2.1 Late. 51 20 2 (41 ") i i (3 150 ~57 ~2~ (38 ") ~T ~4~ (2 Frequent Only. Full. Half. % 25 3 10 13 17 7 "52" 2^~ (28.9") (40 ") (42 ") Two methods of making a numeral impressive were em- ployed. Sometimes, as in the example given, a numeral of three digits was used. At other times the emphasized numeral was read in a very loud tone. The next summary shows that both methods were effective, but that the voice-stress was a little more impressive. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 43 TABLE IX. VIVID, AUDITORY. Nature Number of Vivid. f iJotn. Series. Full. Half. % j>orrr Full. tai uniy. Half. % r i Full requent uniy. . Half. % Digits. 97 H 3 05-9' K) 4 9 (9-7%) 26 29 (4I-7%) Loud. 103 22 (21.8 ") 6 6 (8.7 ») 31 7 (33-4 ") Total, 200 15 ~4~ 09 < *J 10 15 (8.7%) 57 36 (37-5%) Hy. 4 If. 19 2 Lh. H 2 2 Me. 22 5 I Nr. IO E.P. 12 2 JRP- 23 26 8 3 I Sh. 23 7 Si. 20 3 So. 27 4 The individual records show greater variation from the type than the reports of frequency-association. TABLE X. VIVID, AUDITORY. XT Number of Both. Normal only. Vivid only. Series. Full. Half. % Full. Half . % Full. Half. % i 2 04 i 62 12 10 2 13 I 7 2 i 45 45 74 1 68 31 2 3 2 83 Total, ^oo "36" ~~4(i99&) "7^ "15" (8.7%) "5T7 ~36(37-5$>) The influence of the position of the normal shows itself, as in the other series, in the larger number of cases in which * both ' are remembered, when the normal comes after the vivid combination. TABLE XI. VIVID, AUDITORY. Position Number Both> Normal only Vivid only. Normal. Series. FulL Half ' % FulL Half' % FulL Half' % Early. 108 13 (12%) 7 4 (8%) 40 22 (46%) Late. _92 2$_ ^(27 '') _^ _ii_ (9 ") j7_ _i£ (26 ») Total, 200 36 4 (19%) 10 15 (8.7%) 57 36(37-5%) The records of the recency experiments show the very strik- ing effect of auditory recency. There are no individual varia- tions from the general type, and the number of cases in which the normal is remembered does not rise above one-eighth. In about half the records the * recent ' is wholly or partially re- membered in every case. 44 M. W. CALKINS. TABLE XII. RECENCY, AUDITORY. -^ Number of Both. Normal Only. Recent Only. Series. Full. Half. % Full. Half. % Full. Half. % Hy. 5 5 Lg. 9 i Lh. 6 51 Me. 93 4 l N. 8 43 E. P. 10 91 J. P. 10 2 I 4 2 R. n i i 7 i Sh. 10 i 51 Si. ii 2 ii 5 2 So. ii 10 i Total, 100 "To" (io%)~2 2" (3%) "66" T3~(7 Auditory experiments to determine the effectiveness of primacy were undertaken, but were soon discontinued because they showed from the beginning the insignificance of this fac- tor in long series. In the short auditory series, however, as in the visual, the first position proved very important : the first numeral was associated in 38.4% of the possible cases, that is, in 14% more than the average number. The general relations of the auditory to the visual series ap- pear in the next table in which only per cents, are given : XIII. COMPARISON OF VISUAL AND AUDITORY ASSOCIATIONS. Type of Series. Correct Ass. Both. Normal. F, V or R. Total F, V or R. Total Normal. F. Vis. 26% 19% 6 % 44-5% 63-5% 25 % F. Aud. 25" 38" 2 " 42 « 80 " 40 " Viv. Vis. 26" I3" 8 " 39-4" 52 « 21 " Viv. Aud. 25" 19" 8.7" 37-5 " 56.5" 27.7" Rec. Vis. 33 " 14" 12 " 40. " 54 " 26 " Rec. Aud. 23" 10" 3 " 72.5" 82.5" 13 " II. COMPARATIVE SERIES. In showing that frequency, vividness, primacy and recent- ness are conditions of association these experiments have so far, of course, merely substantiated ordinary observation. The real purpose of the investigation is attained only by a comparison of these factors. Already it has appeared that the per cent, of correct ' frequency ' associations is slightly the largest, and that recency is the principle of the combination in the next greatest number of cases. In order, however, to carry out the HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 45 comparison under like conditions, these principles of combination were compared within the same series. To this end, long r succes- sive ' series were arranged in which the significance of frequency was contrasted with that of vividness by showing a color three times with the same two-digit numeral (f) and once with a three-digit numeral (v) ; others, in which the color three times shown with a numeral (f ) appeared also at the first of the series with another numeral (p). Short 'successive' series were formed in which the last color (r) had appeared once before with a three-digit numeral (v) , or at the very beginning of the series (p), or twice before with a repeated numeral (f). In the following summary of results of the comparison of fre- quency and primacy, half the records are those of Wellesley sub- jects. The individual records are not given because they are few in number and show no variation. The experiments were not continued further because their result was so unmistakable verify- ing the conclusion already reached by the study of primacy alone, that this is evidently an unimportant feature of long series. TABLE XIV. FREOJJENCY AND PRIMACY. Number of Both. Prim. Only Freq. Only Series. Full. Half. % Full. Half. % Full. Half. % 80 15 2 20% 3 2 5% 44 3 56.8% The comparison of frequency with vividness shows far less inequality, and yet there is a definite excess of correct associa- tions with frequency. In half the cases where there was any association at all, both the frequent and the vivid numeral were recalled. The records are these : TABLE XV. FREOJJENCY AND VIVIDNESS. Names" Series. Hy. 7 Lg. 13 Lh. 23 Me. 26 Na. 17 E. P. 20 J. P. 1 8 R. 23 Sh. 1 6 Si. 14 So. 23_ Total, 200 Both. Vivid Frequent. Full. Half. % Full. Half. % Full. Half. % 2 2 8 2 i5 I 3 4 12 3 6 4 2 i I 8 2 16 I 2 I 4 7 3 I i 2 6 ii I 3 4 3 6 6 I 9 5 9^ (45-5%) "16" T(9%) 44 27(28 •7%) 46 M. W. CALKINS. This shows a total of 74.2% (28.7+45.5) of associations with the numeral frequently combined with the color presented, and 54.9% (9-4-45.5) of associations with the numeral vividly combined. Frequency, however, is not invariably the more determining factor: the records of E. P., Lh., and Sh. show only a small difference between ' frequent' and ' vivid' associa- tions, while J. P. has more with the vividly combined numeral. The greater significance of frequency of combination was brought out more strongly by lengthening and filling the in- terval between the half-series. After the pairs of colors and numerals had been shown to the subjects, short anecdotes or news-items, of about one hundred and fifty words were rapidly read aloud. The test series, of colors only, was then shown and the subjects tried as usual to associate the numerals. The table shows that the per cent, of association was a little lowered, but that the per cent, of frequency associations is greater than after the unfilled interlude. The frequently combined numerals seem to be more tenaciously associated. This method might with advantage have been extended to the other experiments. TABLE XVI. FREQUENCY AND VIVIDNESS. INFLUENCE OF FILLED INTERLUDE. Inter- No. of Both. Viv. Only. Freq. Only, lude. Series. Full. Half. % Full. Half . % Full. Half. % Unfilled. 89 49 (55 %) 7 i (8-4%) l6 Jo (23.6%) Filled. in 42 (37.8 " ) _9 _3_ (9-4 " ) j8 17 (32.8 " ) Total, 200 91 (45-5") 16 4 (9 ") 44 27 (28.7") The influence of position in the series does not alter the general relation of frequent and vivid associations, though the greatest number of * frequent associations only ' does occur where the vivid numeral is nearest the beginning of the first half-series and so at a relative disadvantage. The greatest like- lihood of remembering 'both' occurs when the vivid is near the middle of the series so that it is influenced by the repeti- tion and itself influences the remaining repetitions. All this appears in the following table : HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 47 TABLE XVII. FREQUENCY AND VIVIDNESS. INFLUENCE OF POSITION IN SERIES. Position Number of of Vivid. Series. Early. 68 Midway. 72 Late. 60 Total, Both Full. Half. Vivid. Full. Half. Freq. Sec. Full. Half, 25 (36«7%) 7 i C11 %) 20 9 (36%) 42 (58.3 10 5 i (7'6^) I2 5 (20") "91" (45-5 ")~i6 T(9 ")~44 "27(28.7") The results of the comparison of recency with the other con- ditions of suggestibility is made in the three following tables : TABLE XVIII. RECENCY AND VIVIDNESS. 200 Name. LN UII1UCI UJ Series. L JJUL11. Full. Half Hy. 5 I 9 6 Lh! 26 6 Me. 22 4 Mi. IO 2 Nh. 10 3 E.P. 24 J.P. 17 3 i R. 8 i Sh. II 6 Si. 9 So. 2 B. 6 Ha. 8 3 Ns. 9 2 Total, 200 ~59 ~a Vivid Only. Full. Half. ° Rec. Only. Full. Half. % Name. >umDer 01 Series. : r>< Full B. 6 Ha. 8 2 Lg. 9 6 Lh. ii 2 Me. 17 7 Mi. IO 6 Nr. 3 i Ns. 9 3 E.P. 8 3 J.P* 7 3 R. IO 7 Sh. IO 6 Si. 7 So. IO _4_ Total, 125 5° 2 (30%) 36 23(23.7%) 22 TABLE XIX. RECENCY AND FREQUENCY. Both. 9(13.2- Frequent Only. Full. Half. °/ Recent Only. '0 Full. Half. 2 3 2 I I i 2 2 i 5 2 i 3 I I 2 2 I I 2 2 I I i I 2 I 2 2 i 2 I 3 3 (41. 2%) 22 13(22.8^)17 4(I5-2< 48 M. W. CALKINS. TABLE XX. RECENCY AND PRIMACY. XT Number of Both. JName. Series. Full. Half. % Primacy Only. Recent Only. Full. Half. % Full. Half. Ha. 4 I i i Lg. 13 6 I i 3 Lh. 4 2 I Me. 8 2 I i i 2 Mi. 4 I 3 Na. 8 I 2 i i Ns. 3 I I E.P 3 2 J.P. 4 2 I R. I3 4 4 2 I Sh. 12 2 I I 3 3 I Si. 10 3 I So. H 3 3 i 6 Total, IOO 25 i(25-55 &)io r"r(I5-. 5%)25 ~T(28 The discussion of these results will be facilitated by compar- ing the per cents, of the total number of the recent and of the contrasted associations in the different cases : Rec. and Viv. Rec. and Freq. Rec. and Prim. RECENT Assoc. 43-2% 56.2 " 54 " CONTRASTED Assoc. % W 53-7% (F)64 « (P)4i « It appears that in this direct competition recency yields both to frequency and to vividness as a condition of suggestibility. The vivid numeral seems even to suppress the recent, for in the recent- vivid series the recent is recalled 10 % less often than in the series where the recent is compared with an ordinary num- eral (See Table VI.). On the other hand, the effect of re- cency is as usual, to raise the likelihood of the recall of the con- trasted numeral, but not to the level of the frequent associations. The associations with the first numeral of the series are de- cidedly less than those with the recent, though far more numer- ous than in the longer series. Individual differences, however, are to be noticed here, and would doubtless appear more strongly in a larger number of experiments ; they may also be observed in a few records of the other short series, as in that of So., who has few vivid, and many recent, associations. From this mass of figures a few conclusions emerge into prominence. Some of these have been already formulated, but the more important ones may be briefly stated again : HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 49 In these experiments frequency has been the most constant condition of suggestibility. The proportion of the frequent as compared with the normal associations is one-tenth greater than that of the vivid or of the recent. When directly compared with the vivid and the recent the proportion is still greater, though the number of associations of the contrasted numeral is larger than that of the associations with an ordinary one, because of the tendency of the repetition to accentuate the compared factor. This significance of frequency is rather surprising. For though everybody recognizes the importance of repetition in forming associations, we are yet more accustomed to * account for' these by referring to recent or to impressive combinations. The possibility that the prominence of frequency in our results is not fairly representative of ordinary trains of association is strengthened by the fact that it is contrasted with forms of vivid- ness which are only two or three of many, and which do not approach the impressiveness, for instance, of richly emotional experiences. But this does not affect the importance of fre- quency as a corrective influence. Granted a sufficient number of repetitions, it seems possible to supplement, if not actually to supplant, associations which have been formed through impres- sive or through recent experiences. Moreover, the trustworth- iness of the ordinary observation, which relegates frequency to a comparatively unimportant place among the factors of sug- gestibility, may be seriously questioned : I have found many cases, during experiments in free association in which the sub- ject, asked to explain the association, does not always mention repetition, even when it has obviously occurred, but seems, as it were, to take it for granted. The prominence of frequency is of course of grave importance, for it means the possibility of exercising some control over the life of the imagination and of definitely combating harmful or troublesome associations. None of our generalized totals, it must be added, are proof against the caprice of the individual, who may have his own favorite type of association which resists opposition. So the preference of one of our subjects — So. — for the recent may be traced through almost all the series, often in contradiction of the general result. 50 L. M. SOLOMONS. C. THE SATURATION OF COLORS. BY L. M. SOLOMONS. The experiments of which a provisional account is given here were the outgrowth of an effort to determine whether least perceptible differences of color saturation obeyed Weber's law, and though they have branched out into the wider field of the general relation of white and black to the colors they are still best presented from this point of view. In any color mixture we may distinguish two kinds of in- tensity : the intensity of coloring, and general light intensity. For example, if we take a red disk and compare it with a color wheel containing a large amount of white and a little red, the merest novice at color judgments will say that the red disk is the more intense red, while the wheel possesses greater general light intensity. To the former element, the intensity of colora- tion, we give the name saturation, reserving intensity for general light intensity. Now, if in a color wheel we increase the -amount of color, we change in general both the saturation and the intensity. Therefore in determining least perceptible differences (which will hereafter be denoted by the abbreviation L. P. D.) it is necessary to make sure that we are not judging by intensity. Our first plan was to mix the color — red — with a gray of the same intensity, so that increasing the red decreased the white, thus keeping the intensity constant. These experiments gave no very satisfactory results, though the failure to obey Weber's law was manifest. The reason soon became clear. When we increase the red we decrease the white. Now to assume that the saturation increment is measured by the increase of red is to assume that the saturation of a mixture depends only on the amount of color, and not at all upon the amount of white. This is not true. If we take two color wheels putting in one, say 180° red and 180 black, and in the other 180° red and 180 white, the former appears very much more saturated than the latter, though the actual amount of red is the same. With such large differences HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 51 as in the above example the difference of saturations is obvious to anyone. But to compare two mixtures of very different in- tensity with regard to their saturation, with any degree of ac- curacy, seems at first almost a hopeless task. But with a little practice, beginning with large differences and working down, the judgment becomes quite possible, and eventually exceed- ingly accurate. Owing to the training required the experi- ments were made only by Miss Stein and the writer. • The result of a long series of observations showed that the saturation of a mixture of color and white is entirely independ- ent of the intensity, and of the actual quantity of color, and depends only on the ratio of the color to the white. The law is perfectly obeyed within the limits of experimental error (a few degrees) . The equality point was always determined by the method of least observable difference, though it was not long before the judgment of the equality point became more accurate than in most judgments, being nearly always placed in the same position, for movements in both directions. The colors used were red and blue. The teleological significance of the law is obvious. It enables us to identify objects in vary- ing light intensity. The characteristic of a colored object is the proportion of the colored light to the white light that it re- flects. The actual quantity of colored light depends upon the intensity of the incident light. It is therefore of the greatest importance for the recognition of objects that the intensity of coloration should depend upon the ratio of colored light to white, and not upon the actual quantity of colored light. Meantime a series of measurements of L. P. D. made out the following facts : For a constant saturation the L. P. D. is constant measured in terms of actual amount of color added, that is, if in a mixture of 50° white and 50° red the red must be increased by 4° to give a L. P. D ; in a mixture of 100° red and 100° white, the red must also be increased by 4° ; sec- ondly, the L. P. D. increases with the saturation. To find out the exact law of increase it is necessary to have a measure of saturation. By direct observation we only determine when two satura- tions are equal. Now the law that they are equal when the 52 L. M. SOLOMONS. ratios of the color to the white are equal admits of more than one interpretation. For when the ratios of color to white are equal the ratios of color to white + color or any proportion thereof, as white -f y2 color, are also equal. Calling S the sat- uration, we have the general formula S = w _^ac satisfying the law of equality of saturation for all values of a. We have seen that for constant saturation the saturation increment for a L. P. D. varied inversely as the intensity — for the actual color incre- ment being constant, the saturation increment corresponding to it will vary inversely as the total quantity of light. Assuming it to vary directly as the saturation, we should have the formula l beins the intensity> that is» the actual increment of color, Jc, varies directly as the ratio of color to intensity. Since the result is independent of the quan- tity W+ac it might seem preferable to give the law the simple, verifiable formulation Jc * -|, and from a physical standpoint this would of course be preferable. But psychologically it is bad because the quantity c has no psychological equivalent. The psychical fact, intensity of coloration,, depends upon a physical ratio ^rn: — ^ we are to keep to psychical facts we must use the quantities saturation and intensity. Remember- ing therefore that Jc * ~ is the best expression of the observed physical fact it is yet well, I think, to retain the somewhat hy- o pothetical formula JS * -^ as more suggestive from the psycho- logical point of view. As to the accuracy with which the law J c * T *s obeyed, many difficulties have arisen in the effort to fully verify it. Several very short series of observations have obeyed it within the limits of experimental error. In attempting to get long series of observations it was found that owing to the constant increase of skill in the subject, as well as other causes of varia- tion, the different parts of the series are not strictly comparable. By planning the series with these facts in view, however, ac- . curate results may I think be obtained. The above L. P. D. law contains two anomalies which re- quire investigation. The first is that though the saturation in- HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 53 crement varies inversely as the intensity when the change is produced by increasing the proportion of color and white in the wheel, it is not affected, at least not to any easily observable extent, by variations in the intensity of the incident light. The other is that if we adopt the usual conception of a L. P. D., viz., that it represents a simple increment of sensation, the L. P. D. law contradicts the saturation law. For if we call the sensation of saturation S and the physical quantity correspond- ing to it ( w!,a£) s» we nave tne law dS = ~ I By integration this formula gives S=I logs, which contra- dicts the saturation law that S depends on s only and is inde- pendent of I. A similar contradiction exists in the other form- ulation of the law. The explanation of the above brings up two questions. What is the general relation between intensity and color quality, and what is the real significance of a L. P. D. ? A number of experiments were carried out in connection with the former problem, most of which have no immediate bearing on the subject in hand. I wish to describe only one series, the results of which are important. An apparatus was arranged, whereby two color wheels were placed in lights of different intensities. The arrangement was a very simple one, the wheels being placed opposite a window divided into two portions by a vertical board. By placing a screen between the two wheels perpendicular to their plane and that of the window, each wheel received light only from its own side of the window. The subject sat in front of the board dividing the window and had both wheels well in view. By varying the size of the openings the light could be varied at pleasure. Place a white disk in a weak light, and a black and white in a strong light. It is not -possible, by varying the proportion of black and white in the well-lit disk to get the two to look alike. It is possible to get them of the same general light intensity, or of the same shade of gray, but not both together. When the light intensity is the same the well-lit disk is a very dark gray and the other a white, dimly seen. When of the same shade, the well-lit disk is very much more intense. It is the same with colors. A blue disk is seen distinctly as a pure blue, even 54 L. M. SOLOMONS. when the light is so feeble as to make it scarcely visible, while a blue and black disk appears a dark navy blue, no matter how strong the light. There is much individual difference here. A white disk in weak light appeared much more like a gray to Miss Stein than to me, but in no way could either of us get equality between the strong and weak light wheels. It should perhaps be stated that these experiments were first carried out with the object of really securing such an equality, and our in- ability to do so was a serious inconvenience ; so that the result was anything but desired by us. We made every effort to see the disks alike. If, however, we look at the disks through black tubes, held to the eye so as to shut out everything else from the field of view, there is no trouble about perfect equality. The white disk in dim light looks gray, the blue, navy blue, etc. The conclusions are obvious. Intensity as such does not affect color quality at all. It remains a separate and distinct element in every color presentation. Blackness cannot be re- garded as the inverse of intensity, nor as a sensational element at all. For it depends not upon the character of the light com- ing from the given body, but upon its relation to the immediate field of view. It must be regarded as an element added to every presentation by some reflex process, and giving the rela- tion of the object to its immediate field of view — or to the inci- dent light. It is not a mere question of comparison with other objects, for in all the above experiments there were two objects seen, yet the most intense disk was also the blackest. Nor was it simply a question of seeing objects ' as we know them to be,' instead of as they appear. For in our efforts to obtain equality all sorts of variations were made in the proportion of black and white and color in the two disks, of which the subject was un- aware ; yet it was not possible to get equality as long as the two disks were seen in different backgrounds. The teleological significance of the law is obvious. It makes blackness a < body property,' independent of the intensity of the illumination. This compels us to adopt a four-fold, instead of the usual three-fold, representations of colored objects. They can vary in four independent ways : I. color quality, or tone ; 2. saturation ; HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 55 3. intensity; 4. blackness. Anyone of these may be made to vary while the others remain constant. This is a purely psy- chological classification of course, giving the different sub- jective effects which a colored object produces. That color quality may vary, the other elements remaining constant, is clear theoretically, though to actually compare the saturation of different colors is difficult. Saturation may be made to vary independently by simply changing the proportion of color to white, while keeping the sum of their intensities constant. Intensity by simply increasing the incident light, and black- ness by increasing the incident light and at the same time decreasing the amount of color and white in the disk so as to keep the intensity constant, while its relation to the intensity of the field changes. When the saturation of any color becomes zero we call it a gray, and grays may vary in intensity and blackness. The above four elements, and no fewer, completely describe any color combination. White is not given explicitly, but saturation and intensity together determine the amount of white, if whiteness is different from intensity, so that the above formulation is entirely independent of all special color theories. The general result of all this, it will be noticed, is to accentuate the subjective aspect of color theory. We can now understand the law of L. P. D. of saturation. Consider for a moment the process of making a judgment of saturation. Suppose we have one disk of 40° red and 20° white, and another 120° red and 60° white. The only differ- ence between them is in blackness and intensity. The inten- sity, however, is easily abstracted from. It does not 'fuse' into the general presentation but remains as a fairly distinct element. The black, however, is an organic part of the per- cept bound up with the rest. The process of perceiving the two disks to be equal is abstracting from the black element. Once able to separate that, and they are seen equal. The training required for judging saturation is simply the training in isolating the black element in a color presentation. Our ex- perience amply confirms this theoretical deduction. This has actually been the difficulty encountered in making judgments, and our records are full of such notes as ' judgment uncertain 56 L. M. SOLOMONS. on account of inability to separate black' — notes taken, it should be stated long before their theoretical significance was suspected. It is clear now why the L. P. D. varies inversely as the quantity of color and white in the disk, but not as the intensity of the incident light. Changing the intensity in the first way changes the blackness, while changing it in the second way does not. The law should really be stated J S * SB where B is blackness. If we regard the L. P. D. as measuring prima- rily the ease or difficulty of a judgment, then we can understand why it varies directly as the amount of black. The process of isolating the black becomes the more difficult as the amount of black becomes greater — as the black becomes a more promi- nent feature of the presentation. The ordinary conception of a L. P. D. leads to a contradiction in the case of saturation be- cause we have not here the simple case of comparing two quan- tities ; but there is another process to be gone through in addition to the primary judgment — the isolation of the black. It is necessary therefore to go back to the primary significance of a L. P. D. in order to properly understand the law. We have begun a series of experiments on the effect of tir- ing on saturation. The results are very encouraging, but as yet too few to permit of much theorizing. On tiring with white, the saturation of a color is increased by a constant proportion of its value for the same time of tiring. The increase seems to be proportional to the time of tiring for the times tried — 5 to 15 seconds — but the experiments have not gone far enough yet to give more than provisional results. D. FLUCTUATIONS OF THE ATTENTION (I.). BY J. B. HYLAN. The facts of the oscillation of feeble impressions are still under discussion. The alternate increase and decrease of weak sensations may be of peripheral or of central origin ; the peri- pheral sources may be nervous or muscular, the central process may go on in the cortical end apparatus of the sensory nerves or HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 57 in that psycho-physical system which we call attention. It is clear that only in the last of these four cases is the fluctuation really fluctuation of the attention, the name usually given to the phenomenon. There is no doubt but that the discussion has so far been based on a rather small number of facts ; it was the purpose of my investigation to secure more experimental results which might throw light on the question. I used optical, tactual and thermal stimuli. The subjects were Messrs. Singer, Hooper, Gehring, Logan, Rice, Hart, J. Pierce, Miss Stein, Miss Shipman, Miss Miles and the writer. The fluctua- tions were registered by small finger movements of the subjects and measured in fifths of a second. We began for practice with the grey circle of Masson's disc. The results were as usual ; the fluctuations are irregular, but the average of the periods during which the circle is seen and the average of the time during which it is not seen balance each -other for most of the subjects. There was no conscious strain upon the eyes ; to the one observer the disc seemed to move to and from the eyes and the eyes seemed to fail rather than the circle to disappear. Our new experiments were made with dark grey spots as a background instead of the circle and the first question was as to how the oscillations vary if several spots are in the field of vision. A square of black cardboard had in the center a dark gray spot 2 mm. across, and both 10 cm. above and 10 cm. below this were other similar spots. The subject was placed at a dis- tance of about 1 20 cm. from the square, at which distance the two outer spots were just visible. The line of vision was directed to the middle spot, which never disappeared, and the fluctuations of the two others were registered independently of each other. Each subject received at first some training in the attentive ob- servation of the indirect field of vision. In the first group of experiments the fluctuations of the upper or of the lower spot alone were examined and no attention was given to the other. The result was that the oscillations of the spot below the center were slower than those of the spot above, and the periods of appear- ance show a clear preponderance over the periods of disappear- ance for the lower spot, while they balance each other for the 5§ /. B. HYLAN. upper spot. With three subjects the lower spot would disappear and then come back immediately. In the second group the attention was divided between the upper and lower spots without any intentional fluctuation between them. While in the first group the fluctuation of the lower spot was slower, here the periods of fluctuation for both spots coincide ; for instance, with one observer, Hr., the periods were : " Both seen 7 sec., both un- seen 3, both seen 7, both unseen i, both seen 2, both unseen 5, both seen 3, both unseen 3, both seen 4, both unseen 7." But there is also here a difference between the upper and the lower spot ; the lower tends to remain longer in view. The entire oscillation is equally long for both, but the proportion between the seen and the unseen part is often different ; the lower often disappears later and appears earlier ; the time difference is mostly too short to be registered. No difference as to the duration of the disappearance of the spots was discovered whether one or two eyes were used, but some subjects noticed a tendency to see the fluctuations of the two spots somewhat independently of each other when one eye only was used. In the next group one gray spot 10 cm. to the right and one 10 cm. to the left of the center were added to those above and below. The constant result was that the fluctuations become more independent ; the four points might disappear together, but often some are visible and others invisible. The upper spot always disappeared first, then the lower and then the horizontal ones ; the time of disappearance is in the same order, being longest for the upper. If one eye only was used, the time of disappearance in general increases,, the upper spot often dropping out altogether ; the right and left spots fluctuate more readily with one eye than with two. Going back to the two spots, only one above and one below the center, we studied the influence of an intentional variation of attention. The object was to fix the eyes continually on the center, but to direct the attention alternately to the one or the other spot seen in indirect vision. With some practice all learned to alter the attention without moving the eyes. As the attention changed, some had a feeling of muscular movement in the head. When the attention changed, some (Sr., J. P., H., M.) usually noticed that the spot grew gradually brighter for some seconds,, HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 59 but with others it grew dimmer or remained unchanged. With all the observers the spot to which the attention was changed disappeared from vision after a short time, while the object from which the attention shifted often remained bright and with some (R., G., P.) it grew even brighter when the change took place. If the one spot disappears from view in spite of the subject's special effort to see it, and the other grows brighter when the attention is consciously diminished, we have probably no right to call the oscillations of intensity fluctuations of attention. It is a question whether, perhaps, the muscles directing the movement of the eye might become fatigued, so that a drooping of the eye would bring a fresh part of the retina in range after the spot had disappeared. This suggested the following experi- ment. A heavy black cross was placed upon a white back- ground, with a small gray spot beneath it. After the cross had been looked at a moment, an after-image was seen on any part of the background to which the eyes were turned. The subject fixed his eyes upon the center of the black cross, marked by a small gray spot. If the drooping of the eye causes the dis- appearance or reappearance, it is evident that an after-image of the cross will extend over the outlines of the figure in the direc- tion of the movement. The results were uniform for all sub- jects. It was observed that while the eyes remained fixed, and the attention wandered to different parts of the cross, the luminous after-image would shift a little towards the part to which the attention was directed, though no conscious change of the eye's position took place. After looking at the cross for a little time, the after-image seemed to be placed behind the cross and to be.;j#en all around it. The gray spot fluctuated, though the afterimage did not shift with the fluctuations. Sometimes the fluctuations took place when the after-image was shifting or had slightly shifted, but oftener when the after-image was con- centric with the cross. This seems to show that there is no relation between the fluctuations of the gray spot and uncon- scious movements of the eye. The results of experiments with regard to the inner muscles of the eye were not quite so uniform. One spot was fixed on a vertical glass plate, the other spot on a card 50 cm. behind it ; if the eyes accommodate for one, it is o /. B. HYLAN. distinctly seen, while the other is blurred. The results show that with all subjects there is a tendency to alternate between the accommodation for the nearer and the farther spot, but with most subjects this fluctuation is much slower than the oscillation of one spot alone, and especially the oscillation of the spot on the cardboard was often observed without corresponding variation in the distinctness of the spot on the glass ; the one might be visible while the other was distinct, and might become invisible while the other was blurred. The oscillation seems consequently to be independent of the ciliary muscles, a conclusion which earlier experiments had already suggested, and which results also from our experiments with four spots which were in the same plane, and did not necessarily disappear together. The second research had to do with touch and temperature. As here the same object gives at the same place both a touch sensation and a cold sensation, their fluctuation and their rela- tions must be suggestive for the understanding of the process. To the beam of a balance weighing two-tenths of a gram was attached a metal tube for studying cold and hot spots. The tube allowed a current of water supplied by rubber tubing to pass continually through it, thus keeping the temperature con- stant. The point of the tube applied to the skin was about i mm. in diameter. Light flexible tubing was used which allowed the balance to move freely. The temperature of the water both before and after passing through the tubing was taken and the average used for the temperature of the point. The water was carried through the tube on the principle of a siphon. The re- moval of weights from the opposite pan of the balance gives a known pressure of the point upon the subject's hand. As the hands could not be moved, the signals were given by spoken words which the experimenter registered, the time lost by the reaction being of no importance compared with the long periods in question. In passing the cold point over the hand, all the subjects found three distinct effects according to the location of the point. Some spots were entirely insensible to cold. Passing from that a moderately cold spot would often appear from which the sen- sation would be dull and not definitely located beneath the point. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 61 Next would come a cold spot from which the sensation would be intense and definitely located beneath the point. After a long application of the cold point for several minutes the cold sensation often spreads around the point of application and some- times streams up and down the hand and arm. Sometimes the cold sensation is located after a few minutes at a distance of 2 to 3 cm. from the point, usually coming back after a time. To the measurements of fluctuations that follow, acute cold spots only were taken, which were marked and tested as cold spots on several days. The back of the hand or wrist was always used. It was first found that a less pressure of a cold object was necessary to give a cold sensation than a touch sensation. With ice water of 2— 3°C. the cold sensation came out strongly under a pressure of 0.2 gr., while a touch sensation was not perceived unless the pressure was 0.5 gr., for several subjects 0.8—1.0 gr. In the first group we studied cold sensation only, using water of 2°C. with a pressure of 0.2 gr. ; none of the subjects had any touch sensations. With two subjects no fluctuations were ob- served, as the cold sensation after its final disappearance did not return for five minutes or longer. The others felt the oscilla- tions distinctly, for instance : Nr. cold sensation unfelt 34 sec., felt 20 sec., unfelt 23, felt 18.4, unfelt 15, felt 7, unfelt 8.6, felt 17, unfelt 29.2, felt 22.4, unfelt 6, felt u ; on another day with Hn. unfelt 46 sec., felt 30, unfelt 9, felt 14, unfelt 30, felt 24, unfelt 6.5, felt 22.4, unfelt 7.5, felt 13.5. With some sub- jects the fluctuations were quicker, for instance : Ht. unfelt 9 sec., felt 3, unfelt 2, felt 4.5, unfelt 4, felt 25, unfelt 50, felt 9, unfelt 2, felt 6, etc. The sensations of cold are much stronger when the point is first applied than afterwards. The feeling grows gradually less, often changing into a dull ache before dis- appearing. When it appears again it is mostly less intense than at first, though it sometimes gradually increases again to a high degree of intensity. As a rule there is a gradual decrease of intensity as the sensations successively return. The times dur- ing which the cold is not felt are not the only fluctuations ; very often while the cold is being felt, it fluctuates in its intensity. When the pressure was as much as i gr. all the subjects felt 62 j. B. HYLAN. a tactual sensation in addition to the temperature sensation, and with all subjects the two fluctuated independently. While with the higher pressure some of the subjects got no continuous fluctuation, as the sensation did not return after the first or second disappearance ; here there was practically no limit to each series. A typical series would be : 2°C. i gr. pressure. At first cold and touch then after 45 sec. cold disappears while touch remains, 23 sec. later cold appears again, 42 sec. later cold disappears, 20 later cold appears, 21 later cold disappears, 54 later touch also disappears, 81 later cold appears again, 59 later touch appears again, 106 later cold disappears, 15 later touch disappears, etc. A prolonged series may be character- ized by the following case (a=appears, d=disappears, t= touch, c=cold) : Hn. 2°C. i gr. pressure, c. t. — 7 sec. d : c. — 5 sec. a : c. — 6 sec. d : c. — 42 sec. a : c. — 13 sec. d : c. — 64 sec. d : t. — 17 sec. a : c. — n sec. a : t. — 7.5 sec. d : c. — 9 sec. d: t. — 8.5 sec. a: t. — 21.5 sec. a. c. — 2.5 sec. d: t. — 6 sec. d: c. — 2 sec. a: t. — 14 sec. d: t. — 2.5 sec. a: c. — 22.5 sec. d: c. i sec. a: t. — 7 sec. a: c. — n sec. d: c. — 2.5 sec. d: t. — 6 sec. a: c. — 15 sec. d: c. — 61.5 sec. a: t. — 8 sec. d: t. — 31.5 sec. a: c. — 2 sec. a: t. — 6.5 sec. d: c. — 27.5 sec. a: c. — 12 sec. d: c. — 19 sec. a : c. — 5 sec. d : t. — i sec. d : c. — 15.5 sec. a : t. The same experiments were made with a pressure of 3 gr. and of 5 gr. The general type of the results was the same, but a curve representing the average of all subjects, and separa- ting the touch fluctuations from the cold fluctuations, shows distinctly that the periods of disappearance for the touch sensa- tion increase with increasing pressure. The stronger the pressure, the greater the tendency of the pauses to exceed the periods of sensation. This is contrary to the results with light and, as we shall see, also contrary to the results with temperature. It may be explained, perhaps, by the fact that an unusual pressure keeps the blood away from the place of contact and brings on numbness, but it is difficult to see why that numbness disappears again. The two kinds of fluctuations tend unmistakably to be independent of each other, but a constant law of the disappear- ance and reappearance cannot be formulated, as the fluctuation of the temperature sensation especially seems dependent upon a HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 63 great variety of conditions. The central psychophysical control of the peripheral blood supply seems an important factor among others. The position of the hand and the temperature of the room was of course kept as constant as possible. In the next group of experiments the pressure remained un- varied, always 2 gr., but the temperature changed between 2° C. and 18° C., producing, therefore, cold sensation of different intensity, but the sensations, at least at first, were always of cold. The individual results show great differences and irregularities, but the average of all experiments with all subjects shows a dis- tinct tendency for the intervals without sensation to become longer as the temperature rises. In general with 2° C. the duration of the sensations and of the pauses are nearly equal. With 10—12° C. the pauses are more than twice as long, and with 18° C. three to four times as long as the period of sensation. In some experi- ments, however, the temperature seemed to have no influence at all on the length of the fluctuations. It might be asked whether the cold sensations did not interfere with the touch sensation, so as to produce an abnormal result. Experiments were made, therefore, with the temperature of the water too high to give a cold sensation or in spots which are not sensitive to cold, but nothing in the results indicated that the cold tended to interfere with the fluctuations of the touch sensation. In experiments to be described later two tubes were used, suspended from the beam of the balance, giving two cold sensa- tions and two touch sensations at the same time, or cold and hot sensations together. DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. PHYSICAL PAIN AND PAIN NERVES. My article in the July number of this Review on ' The Psychology of Pain' has had the good fortune to elicit discussion from Dr. Nichols in the September number and from Dr. Marshall in the November number, and I trust I may now be permitted to say a few words in reply to their criticisms. My thanks are due to Dr. Nichols for making it plain that the con- ditions known as analgesia and hyperthermalgesia may be explained on a different hypothesis from that advocated in my article ; on the hypothesis, namely, that the skin possesses, in addition to the ordinary nerves of touch and temperature, three distinct sets of pain nerves, one for tactile pains, another for heat pains, and a third for cold pains. Dr. Nichols is better acquainted than I with the literature of the sub- ject, and will know whether the hypothesis of pain nerves commonly takes this form. The hypothesis I had in mind was that of a single set of pain nerves, excitable indifferently by all kinds of painful stim- uli ; and I think it will be admitted that the fact that tactile pains and temperature pains may be exaggerated or lost independently has the appearance of disposing of this hypothesis. At least I find a careful physiologist like Foster arguing without hesitation that, where sensa- tions are lost independently, the impulses must proceed by separate paths. On this principle, the alternate loss of tactile pains and tem- perature pains would oblige us to choose between three sets of pain nerves and no pain nerves at all. I am gratified to gather from Dr. Nichols' remarks that he agrees with me on this point, and frankly assumes not one but three sets of cutaneous pain fibres. As between this modified view and the ' shunt theory ' of Wundt, it seems to me that the arguments are not so clearly in favor of the former as Dr. Nichols would have us suppose. In the first place, the occurrence of pains unconnected with tactile and temperature sensa- tions is just as explicable on the Wundtian theory as on that of Dr. 64 DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 65 Nichols. In pathological cases the path of the moderate impulses is presumably blocked by lesion ; in normal cases these impulses may reach the brain, but be lost in the tumult of the excessive impulses : in neither case could they produce their usual effect in consciousness. But Dr. Nichols objects to Wundt's theory on the ground of " its demand for a much more complicated and duplex arrangement of our sensory nervous systems — cranial as well as cord — than present anat- omy gives any suggestion of." This is a most unfortunate objection in the mouth of Dr. Nichols, since it applies with even greater force to his own theory. The two theories agree in assuming six distinct or partially distinct paths in the cord — for touch, heat, cold, tactile pains, heat pains, and cold pains — the partial anaesthesias not being ex- plicable as due to blocking on the assumption of any smaller number. But on the Wundtian theory the three pain paths may be partially dis- tinct without being distinct throughout ; the grey matter may form a common path for pain impulses, and the different kinds be distinct only at their entrance points ; while on Dr. Nichols' theory they must be distinct throughout. So that in the most unfavorable case the Wundtian theory assumes no greater complexity in the cord ; whereas the theory of Dr. Nichols assumes double the complexity in the peri- pheral nerves. When therefore Dr. Nichols speaks of his own as ' a very simple theory,' it is evident that the word 'simple' is to be taken in the sense of 'comprehensible,' not in that of 'economical.' That Nature should have provided for our protection against injury by equipping us with a special set of pain nerves seemed plausible enough ; but if it should turn out that she has supplied us with three such sets (not to mention special nerves for muscular pains, colics, toothaches, etc.), the discovery would be calculated to enlarge somewhat our notions of her beneficence. Meanwhile I see nothing in the facts to compel our assent to so prodigal an hypothesis. Mr. Marshall, not alive to the advantages of the Wundtian theory, had explained analgesia and the ' lateness of pain ' as due to the re- tarding or blocking of the impulses of a fourth cutaneous sense, ad- ditional to those of touch, heat and cold. I pointed out that on this theory the affective coloring of touch, heat and cold can never amount to positive pain, and that in a painful burn the pain and the heat must be called forth by different nerve fibres. To this deduction Mr. Marshall demurs, suggesting that the anaesthesia and analgesia of his ' cutting-pricking sense ' may be accompanied by analgesia with- out anaesthesia of the other three senses. I reply that this rather 66 PHYSICAL PAIN AND PAIN NERVES. arbitrary suggestion deprives the fourth sense of the theoretical value which was Mr. Marshall's original ground for assuming it. If the three other senses have, to use his own phrase, any ' pain-giving ca- pacities' at all, then abolition of the fourth sense will not explain analgesia, and the introduction of such a sense is an unnecessary com- plication of the problem. But, as I have already said, the fact that tactile and temperature pains may be separately lost seems to disprove the view that pain is the exclusive function of a fourth sense. Turning now to the introspective question, Mr. Marshall thinks that many of my objections to the ' aspect theory ' do not touch the ' quale theory' which he advocates. The 'quale theory,' as I under- stand him, recognizes no such duality within the mental state as would justify our speaking of two aspects. The hedonic coloring is a mere attribute, or dimension, of the tactile or temperature sensation (I hope I give his idea correctly), not a new content additional thereto. And yet, in discussing the ' lateness of pain,' Mr. Marshall does not hesi- tate to speak of ' a certain sensation other than the pain to which this pain belongs' (Pain, Pleasure and ^Esthetics, p. 18). So that even on Mr. Marshall's view the relation is not such as to forbid our inquiring : ( i ) whether the conjunction of the pleasure or pain with the sensation or other cognitive element is a necessary one, in such wise that we can never have sensations uncolored by pleasure or pain, and never have pure pains, that is, pains unattached to sensations or other cognitive elements ; (2) whether the pleasure or pain is rightly con- ceived as an attribute of the sensation, analogous to intensity. The affirmative answer to the first question is what I have called the ' aspect theory;' the affirmative answer to the second question is the theory of feeling-tone. Now Mr. Marshall holds that pleasure or pain is an attribute like intensity. He also holds that we never have pure pains. And he repeatedly asserts that either pleasure or pain ' must . . . be- long to every element of consciousness ' (Pain, Pleasure and ^Esthetics, pp. 3, 45, 47) ; though this does not prevent his admitting that 'there are cases where it must be supposed that neither pleasure nor pain exists' (PsvcH. REV., Nov. 1895, p. 597). Mr. Marshall thus sub- scribes to the theory of feeling-tone, and if he escapes being a thor- ough-going subscriber to the aspect theory, it is only by inconsistency and self-contradiction. I therefore cannot help thinking that, so far as my arguments against these theories have cogency at all, they are equally destructive of his 4 quale theory.' Whether we ever have indifferent sensations and pure pains is, of course, a question of fact. But, granting that we do, the gist of my DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 6f argument was, that an attribute which may modify its subject but need not, and which may exist by itself and in that case has an intensity of its own, is not an attribute, but a separate sensation. Now the ex- istence of indifferent sensations Mr. Marshall inconsistently admits. And his explanation of pure pains — of the fact that " in cases of ex- treme pain we usually fail to distinguish the forms of sensibility to which the pain is attached " — is in my opinion so artificial as practically to surrender the case. This fact he explains as a phenomenon of at- tention. He says that, just as an experimental psychologist may be- come so absorbed in attending to the intensity of a sensation as to lose appreciation of its quality, so in this case we fail to distinguish the sensations because our attention is wrapped up in the pain. I should reply by denying that the experimental psychologist can per- form any such feat. If it is a real intensity to which he is attending, and not a mere thought about intensity — if, for instance, he is trying to decide which is the louder of two tones — surely he must keep the qualities sensationally present in order to do so, as much as if he were deciding as to the comparative length of two lines. Whereas no amount of introspective search on the part of the sufferer from tooth- ache suffices to discover a sensational quality connected with the pain. If the predominance of the pain were a phenomenon of attention, we ought to be able to turn our attention from the pain to the accompany- ing sensational quality, which we are not. This quality simply is not there — 'we only feel the pain,' says Professor James. But, if so, the pain is not an attribute, but a substantive content, a sensation. But, even admitting all this, Mr. Marshall would still object to call- ing pain a sensation, on the ground that it answers to no special form of stimulus in the environment. I reply that neither do hunger, thirst, nausea, and fatigue, yet we classify them as sensations. The attempt to analyze these states into ' cognitive elements ' on the one side and pain on the other seems to me most futile and absurd. But, though themselves simple, they usually call forth an emotional reaction in the shape of a feeling of displeasure, in virtue of which we say, for example, that hunger is unpleasant. And I hold that what is true of these organic sensations is also true of pain. The proposition that pain is unpleasant is no more a tautology than the proposition that hun- ger is unpleasant. These are not, in other words, analytic judgments, but synthetic ones. I am gratified to find my own introspection on this point confirmed by so high an authority as Professor James, who says in a recent article, speaking of localized bodily pain: "I think that even here a distinction needs to be made between the primary 68 COMMUNITY OF IDEAS OF MEN AND WOMEN. consciousness of the pain's intrinsic quality, and the consciousness of its degree of intoler ability, which is a secondary affair, seemingly connected with reflex organic irradiations" (PsvcH. REV., Sept. 1894, p. 523, note). This puts the whole matter in a nutshell. The total experience of extreme pain, which on the traditional theory could only be classed as a c feeling,' something neither a cognition nor a volition, now falls apart into a sensation on the one hand and an emotional re- action on the other. And this explains how slight pains may some- times be interesting and almost pleasant, and how bad tastes and odors may be excessively unpleasant without being in the proper sense painful. The separation of physical pain from displeasure, in short, though it may seem at first sight ' a bold assumption,' will, I think, be found both a necessary and a fruitful one. C. A. STRONG. COMMUNITY OF IDEAS OF MEN AND WOMEN. I was pleased to learn by the July number of the PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW that my experiments upon mental community had been re- peated at Wellesley College ; but before reading far in the report of the experiments, my pleasure was changed to regret by finding that the method of experimentation and of computation had been diverged from in essential points. It did not surprise me, therefore, that the results reached were in part different from those published by me. I think it can be readily shown, however, that the Wellesley results do in no serious way tend to invalidate those reached upon Wisconsin stu- dents ; arid that on the one hand in the Wellesley report the contradic- tion between the two is exaggerated, and on the other the reflections made upon results reached by such statistical methods at Wisconsin or elsewhere are unwarranted. The first of the two points at issue relates to the ratio of different words found amongst lists of natural associations prepared by groups of men and women students. The lists each contain one hundred words. I had found in 50 such lists prepared by students at the Uni- versity of Wisconsin, only 2024 different words ; among 25 men's lists, 1375 different words; among 25 women's lists, 1123 different words; or in percentages, 40.5 %, 55.0 %, 44.9 %. At Wellesley, although 25 lists prepared by women students were available, only 15 (why this was done is not told) were used in the computation ; and because in these 15 lists as many as 1 103 different words are found, the results are supposed to antagonize those published by me. But the most essen- DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 69 tial requisite for the fairness of such a comparison has been neglected, namely, that the number of lists in the two cases shall be the same. I had taken special pains to call attention to this point in a footnote in my first article (New Review, Dec., 1891, p. 562), where it is distinctly stated that the ratio of repetition depends upon the number of per- sons writing the lists as well as upon other factors ; and again, in my second article in an experiment involving a different kind of word association (Educational Review, December 1891, footnote to p. 448), I had shown the general course of the law connecting frequency of repetition with the number of contributors to the word associations. Indeed, the mere fact that as given above the percentage of different words for 100 students is 40.5 ; while that for the groups of 50 stu- dents composing the same 100 it is 55.0 % and 44.9 % respectively, is a sufficiently obvious indication of the phenomenon in question. It is therefore entirely to be expected that the number of different words in the 15 Wellesley lists will be relatively larger than in either of the 25 Wisconsin lists. The law above referred to demands this. A fair com- parison must be between two sets of 15 lists each from Wellesley and Wisconsin, or sets of 25 each from the two colleges. But, further, I do not hesitate to predict that even on the basis of such a comparison the Wellesley words will be found to show a smaller degree of commu- nity than the Wisconsin lists, and that because, as I shall attempt to show presently, the words written at Wellesley seem to be less natural and unreflective than those written at Wisconsin ; and, as indicated in the note to my first article, the ratio of repetition depends, too, upon the character of the task. I had shown, for instance, that the repetition of words is greatest amongst the first words of each list, where the as- sociations are most spontaneous and natural. The second point at issue relates to the manner of distribution of the words written by the students, into twenty-five different classes as indicative of the relative prominence of these categories in the mascu- line and in the feminine mind. The strong preference of the femi- nine mind for certain concrete and familiar classes of words, in par- ticular for articles of dress, interior furnishings, foods, etc., anoT the absence of abstract words, which appeared in the Wisconsin lists, entirely fail to appear in the Wellesley lists. The clue to this differ- ence is to be found in the manner in which the lists were prepared. The lists which I used were written as rapidly as possible, and by each student at his or her own home, under as natural surroundings as possible. The Wellesley process is thus described : "That the thought process might be as free as possible, no restriction was made. The 70 COMMUNITY OF IDEAS OF MEN AND WOMEN. students were not even asked, as in the case of Dr. Jastrow's class, to write as rapidly as possible, but this difference in the method cannot possibly be supposed to account for the wide difference in results." Here I must beg to differ; I am of the opinion that it does very largely account for the difference in the results and I am glad to be able to strengthen my opinion by that of Mr. Havelock Ellis, who in his work on ''Man and Woman" (pp. 166—170), extensively cites my results. In a card to the Editor of this REVIEW he wrote as follows : " In the July Psychological Review I noticed a record of experi- ments supposed to invalidate Jastrow's on community of ideas. I am sorry it has not been pointed out that they do nothing of the kind. It is essential that the words should be written as rapidly as possible (the italics are Mr. Ellis's) . In this case ample time was given for conscious or unconscious selection. The results showed a difference which might largely have been foretold." The large number of ab- stract words is one of many indications of the unconscious selection going on in the Wellesley lists, and one list alone contained fifty ab- stract terms. I lay especial stress in the comparison of masculine and feminine mental traits upon securing as natural a material as possible, and the writing as rapidly as possible is a help toward this result. I remember that in writing my first paper I hesitated between using only the first fifty or the entire one hundred words of each list, feel- ing that the first half, when the words were natural and spontaneous, was in many respects the more typical. In brief, then, I regard the Wellesley lists as more reflective, less spontaneous than my own and the differences between us as in large measure due to this difference in method. It remains to add (i) that as above indicated the proportion of different words will be larger when the words are unduly of the re- mote and abstract kind, so that the difference in method in the two results also goes to account for the higher percentage of different words in the Wellesley lists, and (2) that as I have indicated elsewhere (Educational Review, December 1891), it is only in the unrestricted spontaneous kinds of association that I found community of ideas greater in women than in men, and further that in dealing with such small groups as fifteen or twenty-five persons large room must be allowed for accidental variation. (See PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. I., No. 2, pp. 152-158). I, therefore, see in the Wellesley attempt to corroborate my results nothing that markedly conflicts with the conclusions I drew from my own experiments, and furthermore I find in them a positive contribu- DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 71 tion in that they show that a difference in methods of experimentation and in the treatment of material will bring about definite and predictable differences in the results reached ; and that they thus emphasize the value and reliability of the statistical method, when efficiently ap- plied, in the study of mental phenomena. JOSEPH JASTROW. MADISON, Wis., October 14, 1895. l THE FUNCTIONS OF THE RODS OF THE RETINA. v. Kries has written a long article (Zeitschr. f. Psych., IX., 81- 1 23) in which he sets forth the reasons for considering that the rods are the seat of the faint-light sensation (which is the name by which I have designated the sensation of gray which remains after colors are no longer distinguishable), of the peripheral sensation, and of the sensation of the totally color-blind. His argument is extremely effec- tive, and ought to carry conviction to every one who studies it thor- oughly. I confess that I am somewhat surprised at his constantly referring to this idea as his hypothesis, and as the ' just developed ' hypothesis. I had supposed that it was a fundamental part of my theory of light-sensation ; and I am the more surprised at this because v. Kries expressly says in one place : "It may here be mentioned that the assumption according to which the rods are capable only of the production of the colorless sensation is found in the theory which has been developed by Chr. Ladd-Franklin." Apparently it is because he is unable to adopt my theory (nor even to understand it, he says) that he considers it proper to ignore the fact that the hypothesis in re- gard to the function of the rods is not now put forward, with any strong evidence in its favor, for the first time. (Max Schultze already in 1866 suggested this as the function of the rods, on the ground that many night-seeing animals have rods only, or chiefly, in the ret- ina.) As regards v. Kries' criticism of my theory, I have two remarks to make. In the first place, the assumption which he considers so objectionable a feature, and which he finds it impossible to form any conception of — the assumption, namely, uthat the atoms of the outer layer have become separated into three groups at right angles to each other," is not an essential part of the theory — is, in fact, merely a mode of expression adopted for the purpose of giving the molecules 1 1 must explain that the delay in the appearance of the above rejoinder is due to a long illness and resulting accumulations of duties. 72 FUNCTIONS OF THE RODS OF THE RETINA. conceived of a certain degree of symmetry. All that is essential in the idea is that a photochemical substance which in the rods goes to pieces all at once under the influence of light of any kind has been so modified in the cones that it can go to pieces in three different stages, under the influence respectively of three different groups of wave- length. Merely to give a resting-place to the imagination, I make a diagrammatic representation of two molecules, of a just sufficient de- gree of complexity to answer this purpose, in this way, for instance : G. At . The real molecules (if such exist) are, of course, of very different appearance from this, and of immensely greater complexity. My hypothesis that the vibrations which are going on in the outer por- tions of the molecule are so timed as to cause the molecule to be dis- integrated by ether vibrations of the velocity of the visible portion of the spectrum, but not by those which are either more rapid or less rapid, is at the same time an hypothesis to account for selective chemical dissociation in organic substances in general. It is far from being re- mote from current physiological or chemical speculation. Jensen, in a late number of PJiuger's Archiv (LXII., 172-201) makes use of it to account for the extraordinary fact that, in animals so low down as the foraminifera, a state of contractory excitation is caused by the cut off pseudopodia of a different individual, while the pseudopodia of the same individual, though cut off in exactly the same way, produce no effect whatever; he makes the suggestion, since no morphological ground can be assigned for this difference, that an explanation must be sought in the idea, first made use of by Pfliiger in his memorable paper of 1875, that every portion of living matter is a system of countless little differently tuned harps, and that non-synchronous ly vibrating portions of protoplasm act destructively upon one another when brought into contiguity. The origin of the idea in my own mind dates from the reading of a paper by Ebbinghaus. My second remark is this : The very difficulty which my theory was gotten up to meet (given a separate grey process and complemen- tary, not antagonistic, colors) has not apparently occurred to v. Kries as being a difficulty at all, and hence it is not surprising that he does not feel the necessity for my assumption. He says that in lay- DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 73 ing down a definite relation between the monochromatic and the trichromatic elements, I give up the advantage which should be gained by separating them. But is there not a tremendously definite relation between the sensations in question ? The grey sensation due to the decomposition in the rods is absolutely indistinguishable in quality from the grey sensation due to the decomposition in the cones. What could be more natural then — more indispensable in fact — than to give this remarkable resemblance a physical basis in the theory ? Nor can I see that anything whatever is lost by so doing. Far from my not having ' remarked ' the connection between my assumptions and the Purkinje phenomenon, I had already suggested an explanation of that phenomenon in my paper in Mind, Vol. III., N. S., p. 103 (which v. Kries seems to have overlooked) and have since pointed out the in- evitableness of this explanation in the light of the more recently added facts. Prof. v. Kries attributes importance to the observation of Ebbing- haus and myself that a grey made of red and green is a very different thing from a grey made of blue and yellow, and considers that Hering himself must admit that it is thoroughly destructive of his theory, so soon as Hering shall have convinced himself of the correctness of the observation, v. Kries himself finds it extremely easy of confirmation. C. LADD FRANKLIN. SOMETHING MORE ABOUT THE 'PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE' OF MIND. In the last number of this REVIEW (November, 1895), Prof. Baldwin handled the problem of the completeness and satisfactoriness of the purely scientific answer as to the nature of the functions of knowledge. After showing the impossibility inherent in the very nature of the scientific historical categories of their saying the last word about any organized developing real, he applies the argument, a fortiori, to those developing reals which we call the functions of consciousness. Any thing of organization is only known by its activities, and my present conception of it is of the sum of its known activities up to the present moment. This is the scientific or his- torical view of a thing, or to use Prof. Baldwin's term, the 'retro- spective reference ' of mind. Under this view we can determine the 'how,' the manner of the development of a given thing; but does this give us the right to consider its past history the whole reality, the 'what' of the object of our study? Assuredly not, for we are 74 THE ^PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE* OF MIND. immediately confronted with a new series of activities, which could not be predicted and which may change our entire conception of the thing. Thus was reached, by an elaboration of this idea, a theory which makes an element of teleology necessary to the worth of the historical fragments themselves. It is seen that the mind works equally under the category of description or retrospective reference, and teleology or prospective reference, if it wishes to conceive the 4 what,' the reality, of a thing. One must remain a positivist, con- cern himself alone with the ' how ' and give up the problem of the 4 what/ if he denies the validity of the prospective way of looking at things ; at least so should he do, if he would be consistent. And this is especially true of the functions of mind, which to know aright im- plies not only an understanding of their historical evolution, or of their present epistemological meaning, but likewise of the ideal end toward which they point. But says the Naturalist : All this is true enough psychologically ; yet this very prospective way of looking at things, on account of the possession of which you are dissatisfied with the historical categories, can be shown to have been naturally evolved, and, proud as it is, must owe its existence to the very past which it claims to transcend. 44 If the mind has developed under constant stimulus from the exter- nal world, and if its progress consists essentially in a more and more adequate representation in consciousness of relations already ex- isting in the external world, then it follows that these internal repre- sentations can never do more than reflect the historical events of ex- perience." How then can there be any phase of reality not subject to plain statement in terms of natural law ? This is, however, but a new attempt to state the whole nature of a still active developing real in terms of its past, in this case the category of teleology itself. But the error rises likewise from a second and more subtle cause, namely, the failure to recognize the real relation between the historical categories and teleology, as it is deeply rooted in the psychology of knowledge. This relation we may state, at least tentatively, in the following way : What we call the category of teleology is simply an induction from, or a statement in historical terms of, just those elements in each of the historical categories that escape our description. Or, better, it is an attempt so to describe these prospective indescribable elements. This may seem to be so many words, or, if to be understood, to be a direct violation of our principle which says that the prospective reference must not be put into historical terms. But let us explain. In our study of the 4wliat' of mind, its 4 behavior generalized,' we find one DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 75 peculiarity about its activity, that is not open to observation as in the case of other organized developing things. It is true that every grow- ing, moving organism will have much more to tell us of its nature years hence ; but while, as we have seen, this may then throw our past reckoning out of count, at present it tells us nothing of the future. It is nothing more than a * vague pressure toward the infinite.' But in the activities of mind we think there is something more. They have, as it were, taken us into confidence and revealed to us their hopes for the perfect, the highest, the absolute. Each historical cate- gory, as expressed in the judgments of time, space, causality, etc., contains, we shall attempt to show, a 4 strain of prospective refer- ence,' which is the very life-blood of its function. Spencer recog- nizes this infinite reference of the categories, but fails to make use of its implications for his theory of knowledge, seeing in it only an ar- gument for his metaphysical assumption of an unknowable but ab- solute ground. We may very properly ask why do these categories look toward an absolute, of which we know nothing ; why, if they have nothing but the phenomenal in themselves, do they look for that with which they have no kinship ? Extend these modes of thought to in- finity, and unless there be something of the absolute in their consti- tution, the journey will have failed to bring them there. As a matter of fact this infinite prospective reference has not only a meaning for meta- physics, but for the very psychology of knowledge itself ; it is the mov- ing principle of the categories, the constitutive element in their activity. To discover this we must analyze a little more minutely the psy- chological character of the 'infinite prospective reference.' The Old Psychology1 placed among the fundamental intuitions of mind, as fulfilling in inductive search the criteria of universality and necessity, the two categories of teleology and the infinite. In a general way, this seems to be true to the facts of psychology ; but their close relation to each other and to the other categories of mind is not indi- cated. From a psychological point of view the intuitions of the infin- ite and of teleology are really one and the same, or rather have their roots in the same psychological principle. The intuition of the infin- ite possible future is simply the prospective reference in its 'first intention' devoid of reflection or application to the explanation of particular phenomena. The idea of telos or end is understood, how- ever, when the vague, infinite reference of mind is reflected upon in connection with the application of the retrospective categories to the explanation of the particular phenomena of the world series. 1James McCosh, for instance. 76 THE '-PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE' OF MIND. This makes clearer the conception already brought forward that the teleological principle in mind is simply the prospective reference of all the historical categories, brought under one descriptive term. For when we apply any one of the descriptive categories like time or causation to particular phenomena, this vague infinite reference com- pels us to look forward as well as backward, and as we are then deal- ing with particular phenomena or representations, the end or telos of this infinite reference must likewise be of the nature of a representa- tion, if it is to explain the representations, and thus is the element of ideality or teleology introduced. Against the objection, already sug- gested, to thus characterizing the general prospective reference, or teleology, as the prospective reference of all the historical categories, put under one general term, the answer can be made that such a de- scription is only symbolic ; for we are simply describing it negatively, as that part of the retrospective categories that forever escapes descrip- tion in their own terms, in terms of natural law. It now remains for us to make good, by psychological analysis of the retrospective categories, the claim that each contains this strain of 4 prospective reference.' For then we shall have shown that teleology is a constitutive element in each, and, in the second place, secured a new point of view from which to consider the problem of knowledge. That we may not take our categories at random — and also for an- other reason which will appear later — in prosecuting this research, let us make use of the schematism of Schopenhauer's ' Vierfache Wurzel.' Following the static analysis of Kant, he proceeds to analyze the laws of Vorstellen — that narrow knife-edge of representations that lies be- tween the two halves of the universe, subject and object — into four distinct classes, each of which has its own category and is ruled by a particular application of the 'Law of Ground.' Beginning, then, with the most mechanical of the categories, those of the second class, Space and Time (and for the reason that they are so mechanical, we shall find them the least propitious for our search) , let us see if they do not contain also a strain of prospective reference. The space of our study, it must be remembered, is not the space of geometry, of the so-called pure intuition, from whatever source that may come, but of the empirical intuition involved in our intu- ition of the external world as it may be shown to be historically evolved — in short, psychological space. For it is only this space which is a category of description, of history. Here, it is true, as well as in the sphere of geometry, the law of ground is simply the law of place, which says that any point determines as ground the po- DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 77 sition of every other point. But when this law of ground is applied geometrically it is essentially a retrospective, reflective, point of view, and is discernible only by reflectively impressing upon the empirical vision the laws of an abstract geometrical space. It is a necessity, which, just like logical necessity, is of the second intention ; the law of the simple space intuition, as of all intuition of reality, is simply, as Paulsen has shown, an aesthetic ' Zusammenhang' or harmony.1 Now what is the nature of this primary empirical space intuition, which we hold in common with lower forms of the animal world? Its chief characteristic is that it is subjective and psychological. It is an intuition, an outreaching from a particular 4here.' It becomes such by the very fact that it has the 4here.' Space without the 1 here' is objective and geometrical. As empirical intuition it may be studied from two points of view, that of natural history, and, sec- ondly, that of its meaning for the intuiting consciousness. As his- torically evolved, as seen under the aspect of natural causation, there is no reason for doubting that the empirical space consciousness is, as Spencer claims, but a more complex expression of the primitive adjustments of rudimentary organisms to environment. The only thing to be avoided is the tendency to become metaphysical, to leave the outer world of adjustments and find a metaphysical explanation for space in time or still lower in sensation. But the historical side is not the whole of the category. This gives its past. It has also, as we have seen, its epistemological present with its sharply defined ' law of ground ' for dealing reflectively with the details of the intuition. It has also, finally, a future reference, a teleological meaning for the ' here,' from which the spatialization goes out. If genetically, we must construe the space intuition as a growing complex of adjustments to environment, we surely cannot say, a priori, that its development is complete. As a matter of fact, the synthesis is constantly growing and including new elements in its grasp. To be sure, the geometrical law of ground always does remain ruling, as a matter of history. But the reason we can say that things are necessarily in certain rela- tions of place is simply because our historical experience of space has been such as to make this law of ground always applicable. But space as a function is nothing more than a growing grasp of the manifold of experience, and its only principle from the point of view of its prospective reference is a certain esthetic harmony of place. 1 ' Einleitung in die Philosophic,' p. 229. Man kann es nicht stark genug betonen : Notwendigkeit ist im logiken Denken, aber nicht in der Natur; alle Naturgemassigkeit ist spontane Zusammenhang aller Teile. 7 THE '•PROSPECTIVE REFERENCED OF MIND. This teleological harmony — the ruling motive of the activity of space intuition — has come about on the following wise. Or, rather, one should not say come about, but made its appearance to conscious- ness. In the primitive animal the motive to the rudimentary adjust- ment to environment was an external one, the pressing of sensational environment upon him and thus the necessity of getting into harmony with it. In the spiritual human consciousness, however, the motive to spatialization with the extension of the category is the harmoniza- tion of all representations of a spatial nature, no matter by what means they have entered consciousness, in one all-inclusive ken. To this end it works not alone through sight and touch, which are the his- torical media of the intuition, but by the imaginative use of the mathematical symbols. Can it be said that the planets are not in my space because I have not measured their distances with the naked eye, and can only express their relations in the borrowed symbols of num- bers ? If so, then the house across the river, which I see from my window, is not in my space. For it is quite sure that geometrically its relation to the river is quite different from that which it holds in my perspective. It becomes, then, mere foolishness to attempt to take all of the teleology out of the dynamic space intuition, to separate it from its empirical content, and subject it as a dead, statical res completa, to analysis ; for contradictions immediately develop themselves, such as all keen critical thinkers from Zeno to Bradley have had no difficulty in bringing against its reality. The reality of space exists, however, for the intuiting subject, before whom lies the spacial ideal, uncon- scious, perhaps, of finding in the composition of all the representations that have entered his spacial consciousness, a place for each in har- mony with the great whole. Its ideal, its striving, is ever to overcome the limitations of the individual 'here,' and bring all reality that is external, the limitless world of a limitless space, into the ken of the knowing subject. In the category of time the prospective reference is still more clearly shown. Here again we must distinguish between the time of mathematics and that of the empirical intuition with its 'now;' for only as it is related to this empirical ' now' is time the form of inner experience. This gives it the psychological character of an intuition, just as did the 'here' in the case of space. Succession is its law, to be sure, but as pure succession, independent of the ' now' of the in- tuition, it offers to reflection the same sort of difficulties as did space. Its nature refuses to be completely stated in retrospective terms; DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 79 Bradley's criticism shows here likewise that, taken as a res completa, abstracted from its content and from the dynamic synthesis which is its nature, succession immediately develops intellectual contradictions. If the ' now ' is but a point in the succession, and through its media- tion one attempts to understand the connection of the past with the future, the 'now' will itself break up into atomistic and mutually repelling moments, so that the series will fall into contradiction. The reality of time consists, however, in the fact that it goes out as a dynamic synthesis from a 'now;' and the latter, instead of being a point of connection between the past and future of a series, is in real- ity the measure of our grasp upon the changing content of conscious- ness. The reason that the present can be a bridge between the past and the future is simply that in a vague indefinite sense it already feels the future. Historically, time, like space, was evolved through the reaction of primitive sensibility upon a manifold of sensations and was simply the successful attempt to hold them in its grasp. But the mo- tive of time is now no longer one of sensation ; it has to do with the harmonious grouping of all the contents of consciousness, no matter by what means they have entered. Not all are equally definitely placed, for the law here is not one of simple succession, but rather an aesthetic princi- ple of temporal subordination according as they have meaning for the ' now.' This now is continually prospective and is ever looking for- ward to the wider complex which it will grasp in the hand of the future ' now.' And as the category of time develops genetically, the ' specious present,' by its growing richness of meaning, marks what of the flowing stream the individual has been able to synthesize, and again points to an intuition of things which shall grasp all in a time- less 'now.'1 We now seek to discover the prospective reference in the two important retrospective categories of science; namely, Causa- tion and Identity, or (lest Identity have a too metaphysical sound) the ' Same and the Different,' according to Mr. Spencer's terminology. Causation, the typical category of the Understand- ing, is, as an intuition, dependent upon time and space relations; but, when considered intellectually, it is an attempt to account ration- ally for change in space and time. But if we take the temporal re- lations existing between A and B, and try analytically to discover a real bond between them, we find, as Bradley points out, the same difficulties that appeared in the case of space and time, in fact, in rela- tions of any kind. The A and B will persist in falling apart, for 1 Prof. A. T. Ormond ' Basal Concepts in Philosophy.' Chapter on Time. 8o THE ^PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE' OF MIND. every attempt to introduce a mediating term ends in further disremp- tion. But that this is so, follows from a static and analytical view of what is a dynamic intuition of the subject — from a strange oblivion to the prospective element in this, as in all intuitions. Lotze, equally well, saw the difficulties that gather around the causal relation when it is analyzed statically into its merely spatial and temporal condi- tions. For once analyzed, the space and time as well as the causal idea itself are then seen only under the retrospective point of view. For consider, that the judgment of causation is primarily not due to a definite knowledge of the space and time relations. These are only analyzed after the intuition has taken place, in order to give analy- tical grounds for the intuitive judgment. In order to explain the causal judgment itself and, indeed, in order to make it consistent and rational when analyzed into its grounds, the element of teleology or organization must be recognized in it. Says Lotze in his Metaphysic : "The natures of things that act on each other, the inner states in which, for the moment, they happen to be, and the exact relations which ex- ist between them, all constitute the complete ground or reason from which the resulting effect issues. Thus the consequence is contained in the reason." This is, of course, only discoverable, however, analy- tically in retrospective thinking. But, he continues, there is resident in the notion of causation, "the idea of some one plan, which is the complex of reality, which only once completes itself and nowhere hovers as a universal law over an indefinite number of instances, and which assigns to each state of facts that consequence which be- longs to it as a further step in the realization of the one history." l This is the essential prospective reference of the. category. It is this persuasion that in the harmony of the whole there is a necessary place for every experience of nature in relation to the others, that compels us to order the particulars under this rubric of causal relations. As an intuition this category presents to us a union of the prospective ele- ments of both time and space, so that it seeks a harmony which in- cludes in its plan both relations of place and of succession. As a mat- ter of fact we do tacitly assume such a state of affairs, for every time we make an hypothesis, under the guidance of which we seek to dis- cover causal relations, we rest upon the teleological element in our causal notion, which says to us that the particular facts must mean something like this hypothesis. In regard to the typical category of the Reason, Identity, or, in its empirical expression, the ' same and the different,' only a few words 1 Metaphjsic, p. 107. DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 8 1 are necessary. Natural science has very properly followed Hume in saying that in the sphere of perception, 4 first intention,' there is no such thing as identity, but only close resemblance ; and he is likewise perfectly justified in saying that these empirical judgments, historically considered, may be all reduced to habit and custom. But that ideal identity, which lies at the root of our judgments, the ideal which is so strong that we are always compelled to say that particulars are the same, although our experience afterwards (when we historically and analytically investigate the grounds for the judgment) invariably shows us that we were mistaken and had to do only with close resem- blances— this side of the judgment requires other explanation than that of history, of custom or habit. It is really none other than the prospective reference to be found in this category; absolute iden- tity is the distant ideal to which in its empirical expression the judg- ment never attains. Like a will-o'-the-wisp, it always escapes us, and, when we come up to our actual judgments and historically exam- ine them they are seen to be concerned alone with close resem- blances. But the genetic development of this category in an indi- vidual consciousness shows a closer and closer approximation to the 'norm' or ideal, showing that it does function as a regulation ele- ment in experience. To attempt to show this prospective element in the sphere of ethics or in the will would be gratuitous, for motive, end, is the peculiar law of activity in this sphere. All empirical expressions of the will can be understood only under the law of motivation. Whatever be its historical origin, the existence of a prospective ' must ' in this sphere is never denied ; it is in the historical categories that the problem of the prospec- tive reference lies, for here, so it is thought, ' is,' actuality, expresses all. So much for the psychological analysis of the categories them- selves, by means of which we were to discover in their very constitu- tion a strain of prospective reference — not only an infinite reference which points vaguely to an absolute ground, but their very life- blood, the withdrawal of which causes them to fall into pieces, giv- ing us only appearance and illusion. This is not so very different from the Platonic doctrine that all knowledge is only a remembrance, long since held for philosophical poesy. That doctrine is, however, but a symbolic way of expressing a fact that cannot fail to impress the mind that ponders the problem of knowledge. Is the present, individual knowing consciousness sim- ply a spider at the end of a thread of its own spinning ; or is there an instinct which determines the point to which that thread shall reach, a 82 THE '-PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE* OF MIND. vital living connection with the consciousness that lies in the future time as well as with that of the historic past ? How else shall I ex- press those prospective judgments that do not seem to implicate will but only memory ? The past alone does not explain them, ' nervous habit ' and ' social custom ' express only one side of the truth. Para- doxical and vague as the terms may seem, the prospective element in our knowledge functions can best be described as a future forward memory which, equally with the past, governs the activity of the present. This becomes still more clear if these categories be united under some more ultimate one. It is in the basal category of sufficient reason, which has its peculiar law in each of these retrospec- tive categories, that the prospective reference is most clearly marked. On its historical side, as an evolved psychological principle, it is ex- plainable in terms of 'nervous habit' and 'accommodation;' it is the simple psychological principle of interest, with reactions made defi- nite by habit. As an epistemological principle it is also seen under historic categories, for the law of ground in these different spheres of space and time, causality or the understanding, identity as typical of the reason, and motivation in the case of the will, is only discoverable when these judgments have taken their place as states in the historical, psychological series. For the descriptive terms of universality and necessity by which we test them are only discoverable in an inductive study of the static consciousness as instanced in the case of both Kant and the Natural Realists. In the case both of history and analysis we look upon them as definite formulas or laws and by that very fact are compelled to put them under retrospective categories. But the principle of sufficient reason, as well as the particular cate- gories in which it finds application, has a third and more ultimate side. As such it is simply the dynamic impulse to knowledge which presses on to further and more complete synthesis of mental content, using the categories as its instruments ; it is prospective always ; its grounds only coming into conscious recognition when the judgments are viewed historically. But now arises a most important question. If historically Sufficient Reason is nothing more than nervous habit, if its epistemological grounds are likewise purely retrospective, what can be said of its prospective reference, except that it is a blind forward impulse ? Of what value is it to have shown the individual categories to be prospective in their nature, if the active principle which gets them in motion cannot be defined more definitely than that it is an impulse to know ? Have we not gotten back again to the ' vague in- finite' reference, into which we attempted to infuse an element of DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 83 teleology? The strength of this criticism cannot be well overrated, and at first it may seem that, in having escaped the relativity that arises out of the natural history view of Spencer, we have fallen into the pes- simistic fatalism of Schopenhauer. For this is none other than the position of this famous Kantian. Epistemologically the categories are absolutely valid in their own spheres, for phenomena, but they are simply necessary unchangeable mirrors through which the otherwise blind Will looks upon itself. But all movement is in Will ; therefore no teleology to knowledge, for Will is blind. What difference for knowledge whether the principle that has brought its categories into being is one of blind force, operating under the law of natural selec- tion, or a blind irrational evil, with no meaning in its movements? Now, it cannot be denied that from one point of view there is an element of blind fatalism in the psychological principle of Sufficient Reason. The act of judgment itself, which is the expression of the subjective impulse called Sufficient Reason, is really a leap into the dark, in its first movement.1 Its synthesis of elements is always pro- spective, and it is only in the light of this synthesis, largely aesthetic, that the grounds arise upon which we develop our reasons for the same. But by this time the judgment has already become an event of history. So that the synthetic act itself is always without con- scious grounds, always remains mysterious and illusive, making its necessity something almost fatalistic. This is, undoubtedly, a true picture of the simple psychological im- pulse to knowledge, objectively considered. There is, however, a subjective concomitant, a reflex, so to speak, in the case of every judg- ment, which is so uniform in its meaning that it cannot fail to suggest a teleology to the forward movement of the psychological impulse itself. I refer to the element of necessity or belief with which we are compelled to pronounce a positive or negative judgment on any complex of form and content. In the sphere of ' first intention,' of sensation and perception, this is pure psychological necessity, or, in Prof. Baldwin's terms, ' reality feeling.' In the sphere of reflective judgment it becomes grounded or logical necessity, and its correspond- ing descriptive expression is belief. Now, it is important for our purpose that we see that there really exists no essential distinction be- tween the absoluteness of these two necessities. Whatever may be 1 Kant has the same idea of the Judgment (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Ed. 1781, p. 78) :" Die Synthesis uberhaupt ist die blosse Wirkung der Einbildungs- kraft, einer blinden, obgleich unentbehrlichen Funcktion der Seele, ohne die wir uberall gar keine Erkentniss haben wiirden, der wir uns aber selten nur einmal bewusst sind." 04 THE ' PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE' OF MIND. the difference in their knowledge-content, as functions they are one and the same. In one the grounds are in the elements of the percept ; in the other they lie in the conceptual relations of the elements in the judgment ; but in each case it is a necessary response to a complex of form and content, and the response itself, as long as it remains undis- turbed by any new elements of content, is absolute. Sigwart recog- nizes this in his doctrine of the necessity of all judgments ; although the grounds in one may be psychological, while in another logical. Likewise Newman, in his ' Grammar of Assent,' argues keenly for the essential likeness of both kinds of assent, although ' inferences * may afterward enhance the value of the belief for the logical under- standing. This is belief in all its aspects, when viewed as a psycho- logical function. But is not this also as fatal and irrational as Suffi- cient Reason as a psychological impulse? Yes, viewed alone as a function it is. Yet forces in the psychological sphere are as dark and in- explicable as in the physical. It is only as a bond connecting the concept of the movements of the earth and its surrounding planets that Gravitation has any meaning. As a pure force it is absolutely without any content for thought — must be relegated to the limbo of fantastic powers of enchantment and wilful activity. In the same way the pure reflex function of belief has no meaning in our study of con- sciousness, unless it be a bond between two elements of content that are ideal. Thus to say that belief is the reflex movement of con- sciousness upon any complex of form and content describes it psycho- logically ; but it is only when we conceive it as a bond between the knowing self and its complexes of content that it has any but a de- scriptive meaning for us. As a matter of fact, belief is essentially an act of appropriation to the subject, of that which Sufficient Reason, as an impulse to knowl- edge, has brought before the bar of consciousness. Belief is, above all, self-reference. This self-reference of belief is always manifest to one who is not prejudiced in favor of a sensational phil- osophy, and it is not without meaning that both Hume and Spencer find difficulty in giving even a satisfactory psychological explanation of belief. Now my final aim is simply this : to show that the continual self -reference of belief is the bond which unites the movement of Sufficient Reason, otherwise irrational, to a developing self, whose ideal is the end toward which the impulse to knowledge, in Suffi- cient Reason, is blindly moving, and that this teleology is what gives meaning 10 the prospective reference of the categories, which DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 85 this teleology has generated. The psychological forces of Suf- cient Reason and Belief are blind only as forces abstracted from the ideal self-content to which they relate. But to make good this claim, this self-reference must be analytic- ally shown to be psychologically true — from the lowest form of judg- ment to the highest. First in the reality-feeling that accompanies sen- sation and perception ; here we must not fall into the error of the in- tellectual Idealist, who commits the ' psychologist's fallacy ' of mak- ing every feeling explicitly for a knowing self. Yet we must believe that the self-reference is at least implicit, else how (on the side of knowledge) could sensations ever be held together long enough for comparison and for the emergence of relations. The sensation is not first of all for a self, consciously, but it points vaguely to a self for whom it will become explicit later on in perception. As a matter of fact, recent studies in genetic psychology1 point out that, in the development of the category of personality in the child, there are at first certain personality suggestions, very vague, to be sure, but nevertheless pres- ent, in the touch sensations that the infant receives in its earliest days. Already, in mere feeling, he learns to distinguish the personal in his external surroundings, and this reacts upon this budding no- tion of the self. As we pass from one higher synthesis to another, the self-reference becomes more marked. Time connects in a series the vanishing experiences, and by the mechanism of memory affords the possibility of an empirical self, which in turn by that constant in- crease of its grasp, points to a self which shall see all things sub spe- cie ceternitatis. Space brings with it the external world, both per- sonal and impersonal ; and by setting this over against the subject he fur- ther intensifies the self notion. With the advent of the category of causation comes a fuller notion of the self, for here energy is inter- preted in terms of the activity of the self as revealed in the acts of will. The growth from the perception of close resemblances to the judgment of identity again brings the identical self into view as the norm and source of the judgment. The self in these last categories always reacts in the form of belief, and all these relations thus believed in are taken up and unified by the knowledge of a self as the source from which they depend and the end for which they have meaning. So much Kant saw, from a purely statical and analytical point of view. Whatever may be the metaphysical worth of the category of the self, it is at least the conceptual source of unity for all the other categor- ies of consciousness. 1 Professor Baldwin's ' Mental Development in the Child and the Race.' 86 THE ^PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE* OF MIND. There are thus discoverable two important lines of 'prospective reference :' a main line in the development of the self-notion, and a number of independent forward references in the particular categories themselves — a constitutive element in their growth. Each of these lower categories is in turn connected by the self-reference of belief to the category of the self as the developing motif of the whole move- ment of Sufficient Reason. The following diagram will show this more clearly: ^ 1 1 ' 3 1 \ / X n\ /B t > / \ ,*& B\ ' \ 'X Xv The x's are the four principal retrospective categories, each with its prospective reference. The o is the category of the self, with its forward reference always in advance of the others. And by the bonds of Belief, the B's, each category is involved, in each of its activities or judgments, in the movement of the self, which is the richest cate- gory of consciousness and can then be used to interpret the others. But suppose we seek for this unifying and explaining self as some- thing among the complexes of content of which it is the ground and end. We shall then be looking for that which is the prospective reference of all the categories — all the syntheses of consciousness — among states of mind that have already taken their place in the his- torical empirical series. Our self, which seemed so much en evi- dence as it functioned ideally, has now withdrawn its support from the mechanical or retrospective categories, or, to employ a better fig- ure, has fallen into- lifeless dust among their atomic and disintegrated materials. But the self is just that point which can never be past, and for that reason can never be treated historically or found phe- nomenally. Just because it is the prospective reference of the em- perical self, by which the latter is to be explained, does it refuse to be DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 87 contained within those empirical limits. As Bradley argues, en- deavoring to reduce the self like the other categories to illusion, psy- chologically (or under historic categories) the identity of the self or ego cannot be determined ; for it must then be put somewhere within the temporal series and suffer the fate of time in his critical hands. But for that reason shall we call it illusion ! If so we are reducing to illusion that which a study of the development of consciousness has shown to be the one element which has saved the whole movement from irrationality and confusion. What then is the self ? How is it to be construed in this connec- tion ? It is the empirical states, but more. As far as the retrospective categories can take hold of it is this the self. Nor is alone the un- mediated intuition of the will the essential self, as Schopenhauer claims,^ for this cannot explain the teleological function of the self in consciousness. Such an intuition has no ideal element whatever. It is pure present or past and can only be stated in terms of experi- enced acts of that will. This intuition, however, is a part of my self-consciousness, in that it gives me my notion of self as active and forceful. There is yet a third element of prospective or ideal significance which, just because it is prospective, will almost escape all statement in descriptive terms. It is that aesthetic harmony of our conscious states which we project as an ideal, that confidence (which is such a ground-motif of self-conscious life) that every element of consciousness has a meaning for the general harmony. This may, perhaps, be better suggested by a figure. The detail of the landscape before me is made up of rocks, trees, etc. As such, when I come up to them and subject them to study under the categories of description, they lose all the meaning that lay in the grouping of the perspective. The very value of the perspective is the aesthetic unity in which it reduces mere detail to its place in the whole. The same way of looking at things may be applied to consciousness. There is an ele- ment in the self whose very value lies in the aesthetic reduction of the indefiniteness which pervades the detail. This real psychological char- acteristic of consciousness can never be stated in descriptive terms, for as soon as we approach the scene with the instruments of science we have nothing but gross, crass details bound by nothing but mechanical laws. The prospective side of the self always escapes description, although for that reason it is no less an important psychological char- acteristic. Though rejoicing in the freedom from the thraldom of a metaphysical conception of the self as substance, he who fails to see 1Vierfache Wurzel, end of paragraph 42. 88 THE 'PROSPECTIVE REFERENCE' OF MIND. nothing more in self-consciousness than an aggregate of empirical states, or an unmediated intuition of a feeling called will, is not yet entirely free from the chains of the ' stuff' idea. With the preceding discussion before our eyes, there seems now some hope, if not of correcting the faults, at least of understanding the •weakness of some current epistemological ideas. At the present day the static analysis of Kant has been extended in three important direc- tions, each of these movements being animated by the important mo- dern conceptions of the flux of things. To view knowledge as an activity, and, above all, as a development, to infuse into the rigidity of the intellectual categories the life and movement which appears in the volitional sphere — this has been the motif since the Kantian disremption of the Pure from the Practical Reason. Historically the idealistic movement came first with a thought-evolution, in which the categories are the steps of a development, with the ' Idea ' as its goal. The Evolution Theory in the hands of science, which knows no permanent or static forms in any of its spheres, makes of the absolute functions of Kant evolved products of the interaction of a primary sensibility with its environment. Like the fauna and flora of the biological world, they have taken their place historically according to natural law, and therefore get their whole meaning from the nature out of which they spring. Any forward movement is vague, and in- finite in its possibilities. The Schopenhauerian conception which puts the whole movement of knowledge in the hands of a blind Will, and conceives the categories as complete existences, is but a purely metaphysical restoration of the breach between the Reason and the Will. This is, however, the fault with all these theories : the movement is externally and metaphysically explained. It is not grounded in a psychological analysis of the knowledge factors themselves and of the self in its relation to knowledge. In the case of the Idealists the actual empirical development of knowledge is reduced to a mere con- ceptual relation of ideas, and, to the extent that the psychological roots of the concept are not known, is unpsychological. The Natural Sci- ence view, in so far as it finds the origin of the knowledge processes in the interaction of subject and object, of sensibility and environment, and by this seeks to explain them, is also metaphysical, either naively dualistic or somewhat materialistic in its monism. The third union of Will and Knowledge by Schopenhauer, is, of course, purely meta- physical. If then the ontological teleology of Hegel is untenable, there is left DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 89 either the pure relativity of Spencer, or the absolutely blind unteleo- logical movement of the Schopenhauerian Will. There is every motive then to look for a teleological, prospective reference of mind, as a constitutive element in the retrospective cate- gories themselves which the Kantian critique had looked upon as static and unchangeable : above all to give it a psychological basis, for the metaphysical application will not be far in the rear. Though the preceding study may not have been in any way of the nature of a supply to this demand, it yet affords grounds, we are con- vinced, for a somewhat more emphatic repetition of the poetical but keenly intuitive protest of Emerson against the Kantian description of Intellect and Will : ' ' Our intellections are mainly prospective. The immortality of man is as legitimately preached from the intellect as from the moral volitions. Every intellection is mainly prospective ; its present value is its least."1 JENA. WILBUR M. URBAN. OUR LOCALIZATION IN SPACE. The title to these notes may appear misleading, but I know of no •other to describe the phenomena which I wish to illustrate by an inter- esting experience that occured to me about a year ago and that I have narrated to my classes for suitable purposes. Perhaps it will be inter- esting to others. Only twice in my life have I awakened in dream and at the same time had the dream images continue for a short period so as to watch them as apparently real objects. The first one was a dream of a mountain scene in a valley with a lake and summer hotels on its shore. I watched the view for perhaps a full minute with my eyes still closed, but conscious of being awake and lying in bed. The disappearance of the scene was marked by the visible occurrence of small clefts or openings in the rocks nearest where I appeared to be standing. The scene was perfectly vivid and real, an exact representation of what such a scene would be, if I were actually looking at a landscape, pro- jected outside of me. The eject of reality and actual space relations, perspective, color and all were as distinct as when walking in the fields or the streets. But this is not the characteristic which I wish to describe or illustrate. I have probably only narrated what is a com- mon experience with others who have awakened in a dream and watched it, though it may, nevertheless, be interesting to note the fact 1 Essay on ' Intellect.' 90 OUR LOCALIZATION IN SPACE. that sensory action without its appropriate stimulus is as definite and complete as either in reality or in halucinations. The fact, however, to which I call special attention in it is that I cannot recall or did not have the peculiar feature of the second dream to be narrated, which resembled the first in its main characteristics ; that is, the visual reality and projection of the apparent object. I dreamed that I was in my old bed-room where I slept when I was a child. It was oblong in shape and I recognized it, my view of it appearing as it would if I were lying on the bed. I awakened in the midst of the dream and keeping my eyes shut (there being no reason to open them as no darkness appeared, though where I was actually sleeping it was quite dark) , I noticed paper on the walls, a kind I had never seen in my recollection. Now there never had been any paper on the room represented in the bed-room of my childhood, and observing it in the dream image I felt some surprise, because I knew that my bed-room had never had paper of any kind. This discrepancy at once convinced me that I must be wrong about the room, the moment I compared what I saw with what I remembered, a compari- son which did not suggest itself during sleep. The discrepancy had no effect. But, strangest of all, the moment that I saw the discre- pancy and saw that I was not in the room as I had known it, I be- came confused as to where I was. I noted the resemblance in shape to my old bed-room, and tried to recognize where I was and though wide awake I could not think of myself as in my apartment in New York. I had not the slightest conception where I was. I could only see the walls and wall paper of my old bed-room. After the lapse of about a minute the paper and walls vanished quite suddenly, though a general mass of Eigenlicht remained, and I at once recognized that I was in bed in my apartment. I then opened my eyes. It is remark- able that the tactual sensations did not avail to localize me, but they did not. I felt myself lying down, but I could not obtain the least concep- tion of where I was until the vision of the wall paper and walls dis- appeared, when I could recall to the visual imagination and memory the shape of the room and position in it in which I was actually sleeping. Had it not been for the discrepancy between what I saw and my memory of my old room at home, I might have still imagined that I was there. But I knew from the wall paper that this could not be, and I was puzzled to know where I was until the visual image began to break up and vanish, when I at once pictured to my mind where I was in reality. Now, the question is, was my localization conditioned upon a DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 91 memory image in the visual center which could not be found until the real image vanished ? Of course the identification, when it did come, represented my past experience with my bed-room in the apartment, and the assumption that I was where I had gone to sleep the evening before, but this had no effect until the visual image of my old room at home vanished. Nor did the tactual sensations to which I consciously deferred help me in the slightest degree to determine where I was. It all seemed to hinge on the representation in the visual memory of the room in the apartment after the real image of the old room at home had disappeared. Unfortunately I am not able to corroborate the sup- position involved in the above question by any recollection of actually localizing myself in bed in the first dream which I have narrated. I only recall the fact that I was awake looking apparently at a beautiful landscape of mountain scenery, and that I was much interested in the nature of the phenomenon. But I am not certain that I knew I was lying in bed. This may have been after the image began to disap- pear. I do remember that I was lying on my stomach, but I do not recall that I was conscious of this fact before the picture vanished. Hence I can get in it no confirmation of the possibility that the locali- zation depended upon a visual representation of my room as it was in the memory continuum of experience. Moreover, objection might be made to such a supposition from the fact that the possibility of mem- ory representation conditioned the consciousness of the discrepancy between what I saw and what I recalled of my old room at home. Hence it seems all the more puzzling to note the fact that tactual sen- sations did not tell me where I was and that the localization did not occur until the visual memory became active. But I had a waking experience which at least seems to confirm the supposition, though it may not be conclusive. I was riding in the cars of the New York Elevated Railway and had reached the Thirty-third street station. Just as the train left it I noticed across on the south side of Broadway the sign of a store for the Microbe Killer. I said to myself, "Well, this store has moved; it used to be around the corner of the next street north" (Thirty-fourth street) . I fully expected to see it where it had been as the train moved. I looked up and saw a church (Dr. Taylor's) on the north corner of Thirty-fourth and Broad- way, and I said to myself, "No, this cannot be; there was no church near where I had seen the Microbe Killer store." But I was not pos- itively convinced of the error until I could see up the street as we crossed it. I felt puzzled for a few moments to know where I had seen the store. All at once there emerged in my memory a visual rep- 92 THREE CASES OF SYN^ESTHESIA. resentation of Broad and Arch streets, in Philadelphia, where I had seen a store at which the Microbe Killer was sold, the store being on that side of the street where it would have been in New York on Thirty-fourth street, if I had been correct in my first impression. Now the interest of the case lies, not merely in its being an ordinary case of redintegration (was there any association between the words Broad street and Broadway ?) , but in the fact that the space relations in the false and the true recollections were the same and that my illusion about the store was not discoverable until I formed a visual representa- tion in memory of what I had seen in Philadelphia and could compare it with the knowledge or consciousness of any actual place in New York. But I will not urge the case as proving anything. I narrate it here with the dreams only to encourage observations of others in the same direction. I do not know that such a phenomenon as is narrated in my second dream and the waking state following it is at all common. I should like to know whether others have had a like experience. It is of special interest as suggesting how little tactual sensations have to do with space perception and localization in it except as tactual experi- ence is conceived in terms of visual space. Not that I mean to imply that we cannot obtain any notion of space whatever by tactual and muscular sensations, but that in this case at least they seemed to have no power whatever to determine it. I certainly find in my own case no reason to accept the Berkeleian doctrine of space and our localization in it, and this wholly apart from the dream experience just narrated. In this case, however, the localization was definitely related to the visual representation of my place of living. The only question that remains is to know whether such a phenomenon occurs often enough in the experience of others to give it anything more than individual significance and interest. JAMES H. HYSLOP. COLUMBIA COLLEGE. THREE CASES OF S The subjects of this report are three sisters, D, C and K, aged re- spectively 9, 10 and 12. Their father and mother are good visualizers, the father having definite number forms. There are also two younger brothers one of whom, aged about 5, visualises his alphabet so vividly as to be able to read it off backwards with unexpected rapidity. His alphabet form is traced to the perpendicular series from which he DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 93 learned his letters. No such early association can be discovered in the case of the three sisters, though they too have elaborate forms for numbers, months, days of the week and the alphabet. They are not musical. D sees the letters black on a background of indefinite color, but as if they were behind the patches of the color to which the letters cor- respond. The color is seen only when she thinks the words separately, not when she reads them or hears them spoken connectedly in a sen- tence. The position of the word and color is close to the eyes or in the head. C sees the words from a foot to a yard away. Sounds and smells are yellow to her except thunder, which is black ; but the color is very dim and she herself is somewhat uncertain about it. To K the colors are ' far away,' but seem to come nearer when closely attended to. Her brightest words are the yellow ones. All three have had these pseudo-sensations as long as they can re- member, but their peculiarity was not noticed until about a year ago. They have not influenced one another in the coloring of letters or words, as they have been observed always to disagree about the same letters in the same way. Subjoined is a table giving in the children's own language the colors, if any, of all the letters of the alphabet, days, months, certain proper names, certain common nouns selected for their phonetic or orthographical peculiarities and certain numbers. Roman numerals are colored after the letters (I, V, L, C, etc.) composing them. D K L M N O* P s- s T* U white reddish brown white blackish blue white bluish white white white blue and white white green white blue greenish yellow brown brownish black reddish green brown grey brown or green brown or black red black black yellow red brown dull red crimson black white yellow white yellow blackish red red bluish black red brown light brown white white white black white black yellow white yellowish pink blue or as initial red red white yellow very light yellow black black black yellow greenish white yellow 94 THREE CASES OF SYN^STHESIA. V w blue brownish white green grey blue black X no color yellow brown Y yellowish black black yellow Z black yellow or white brown & yellow black no color i black black white 2 white brown blue 3 red white brown 4 blackish or no color black red yellow green bluish white 6 black red and white red 7 black black light yellow 8 brown green and white bright yellow 9 black brown crimson 10 white i black, o white black ii yellow black dark 12 white black and brown darker than n 13 red black and white brown *4 no color and so on to 20 red 15 yellow white 16 white red, duller than 14 17 black yellow 18 yellow yellow 19 black crimson 20 white brown and white /"dull white, like \ steel" 3° red white brown 4° no color black and white red £ yellow black and so on to 90 like 20 duller red than 40 70 red yellow 80 white yellow 90 no color dark red 99 red 100* white white white 200 white brown and white white like 20 300 red white 3 brown oo no color 400 no color black and white red + no color 500 yellow green and white white IOOO blackish white greenish or white no color 2OOO white brown and white no color 347 red 3 white 47 black f 3 brown 4 red 7 1 yellow 896 red f 8 green 9 brown 6 t white i 8 yellow 9 crimson 6 red Dorothy * white white white Quincy yellow white yellow Grinnell green -4- red brownish green greenish brown Charlotte white -f bluish red bluish black Katharine red black white Laurence vellow white reddish brown Robert * " red red red Morgan blackish white red blue and black Maria yellow red f M light I red rest \ indistinct Isabel / Is brown ; a white ; bel \ yellow yellowish I yellow, rest yellow- ish brown John reddish brown black Sally* white yellowish white white Stephen brownish yellow brown Spencer no color / Spen vellow; cer \ white brown DISCUSSION AND RE FOR TS. 95 Hilda Madeleine Louise Mary Edith hurt pert smell spell stop break try house * Caesar fairy how few straight trait rate ate at hat that handy hand and an yellowish whitish yellow yellow white yellow brown black always yellow all colors st black op white brown black brown white white white black black sometimes white black red yellowish black written, A white, T black black and white black and white eight ate bow (—bough) bow (—bo) Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday Jan. Feb. Mar. April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. black and green white black and white white white and green white blackish yellow blue and white white white red black dark orange black and white light red white light yellow red black green yellowish white white dark red darker red hay color black and white black and white red white and brown dark red black and white red, sometimes white white brownish red green [red] yellow yellow yellow black and white black brown white f white with black \ spots brown red yellow black RA red TE black doesn't know black or no color brown black brown brown green brown red sometimes brown greenish white doesn't know white white pink f red with yellow \ stripes green black and brown black green and white color of the sun green and black darker red and white red and white pink yellow yellow yellow and black yellow and black white and black red and white white and red red not distinct red like Hilda like Maria white dull brown purplish black R red brown brown lighter brown no color blue dull red C and A white yellow, R red red yellow brownish red doesn't know; yellow no color R red no color no color H red, rest no color f T's have black \ back ground red (dull) red (dull) no color no color no color yellow no color no color no color blackish blue yellowish black blackish blue dark brownish black greenish brown very light yellow reddish brown brown red red white red red yellow brownish yellow grey no color white WILFRID LAY. COLUMBIA COLLEGE. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. GENERAL. Elements de psychologic humaine, cours professe" a I'universite" de Gand. T. T. VAN BIERVLIET Gand, Lepper. 1895. 8°. Pp. 317 and 34 fig. This is an elementary treatise on psychology intended especially for students studying for the B. A. degree, who as a rule lack physiological and anatomical knowledge. A large part of the book, almost half of it, is taken up with descriptions of the nervous system and of the organs of sense and movement, descriptions which are to be found in every physiology. The entire work is imbued with the physiologi- cal spirit, as may be gathered by observing the clear and precise lan- guage of the author, whose metaphors and similies are almost always borrowed from the natural sciences. It is evident that the author is not in the unhappy position of some of his contemporaries who hav- ing received a special literary education forget this when they begin to write. It is worthy of note that the physiological tendencies of the author do not lead him to materialism. He urges, on the contrary, that mental processes are entirely distinct from cerebral and do not correspond to anything material, that judgment and reason are not functions of the brain but faculties of an immaterial soul, and that the immateriality of the soul does not require proof, as it is practically doubted by no one. A third characteristic of this book is the complete absence of ex- perimental psychology. Researches on reaction-times are only noted in the appendix. This omission, which is apparently intentional, is surprising, as the author is the director of a psychological laboratory ; and for this reason M. Biervliet's book cannot be considered as repre- sentative of the actual state of psychology. The general plan of the work may now be indicated. After an introduction on the human body in which the author studies cells, tis- sues, and more especially the circulatory, respiratory, muscular and 96 PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 97 nervous systems, including the latest views of Cajal and of Golgi, we have the first part covering the physiology of conscious phenomena. It includes sensations and movements, but scarcely anything else, being merely a repetition of what may be found in general treatises on physi- ology. The second part on the psychology of conscious phenomena contains definitions of ideas, judgment, reason and will, including a defense of the doctrine of the immateriality of the mind and of free will. The third part on the psychophysiology of conscious phe- nomena includes imagination, memory, motor expression, character, personality and measurement of reaction-time. In speaking of mem- ory the author develops interesting though somewhat theoretical ideas on the mechanism of recognition and on localization. In spite of some drawbacks the book is certainly the best elemen- tary treatise on psychology in the French language. Psychologic des Foules. G. Le. BON. Paris, Alcan. 1895. Pp. 200. We have here a book that treats a subject with which the psycholo- gical laboratories scarcely concern themselves. The reading of such a work cannot but be salutary for the professional psychologist, if only to teach him that there is more in mental life than reaction-times. The author studies the 4 crowd,' understanding by this word, which he uses in a wide sense, a number of individuals who think and feel in the same way, but who are not necessarily collected together in one place. Thus he introduces into his book a study of the curious popular movement produced in France by General Boulanger a few years ago. Two principal conclusions are drawn: ist. That the importance of ' crowds' is growing daily and will continue to be a factor of increasing importance in the future. 2d. That the * crowd ' is of low intelligence, without reflection, reasoning or mod- eration, a prey to all extreme emotions, good or bad, incapable of self- guidance and without the power to construct or to originate. How in the face of these results an optimistic conclusion and a faith auguring well for the political future can be drawn we do not understand. A. B. 9§ TELEPATHY, ETC. TELEPATHY, ETC. Ueber umjoillkiirliches Fliistern, eine kritische und experimentelle Untersuchung der sogenannten Gedankenubertragung. F. C. C. HANSEN UND ALFRED LEHMAN. Philosophische Studien, XI. 4. pp. 471-530, In the S. P. R. Proceedings, VI., 128, is a series of experiments by Prof, and Mrs. Sidgwick on the transference of numbers from the mind of Mr. Smith to two young men hypnotized by him. The num- bers were bi-digital, running from 10 to 90, drawn from a bag and silently looked at by Mr. S. The subjects named whatever numbers they saw appear in their mental field of vision. There were 1,356 trials, with the result that any digit 'seen' or 'named' by the subject invariably corresponded much more often to the digit * drawn ' than to any other digit. In table I., for example, in a series of 354 trials, both digits were named rightly 79 times instead of the ' probable ' number of four or five times. Some cause was evidently at work inclining the subjects to guess right. The Sidgwicks think that this cause cannot have been vocal indications given by Smith and hyperassthe- tically heard by the subjects, because if the latter had been guided by sound their mistakes would have shown the effect of sound as well as their successes ; that is, the numbers named wrongly by them would have also tended to resemble in sound the numbers actually drawn from the bag, which the Sidgwicks try to show by a comparative table was not the case. The Danish writers subject this opinion to a careful criticism. Repeating the experiment with two hemispherical mirrors, 90 cm. wide, opposite each other, the head of the agent being in the focus of one, and that of the percipient in the focus of the other, they found that the numbers could be heard by the percipient, and consequently named rightly ; when the agent inwardly articulated them, even the bystanders could hear nothing and the agent's lips were tightly closed. They also found certain parts of the room within which the sound of a grain of shot dropping on a plate could be heard, whereas it could not be heard from other places. The percipient, if in such a favored place, might of course catch a vocal indication to which bystanders would be deaf. Subjecting the whole number of ' guesses,' right and wrong, to a labori- ous phonic analysis, they prove moreover that the mistakes made by the English subjects, mistakes whose nature, according to the Sidg- wicks, was such as to exclude their being due to imperfect hearing, showed a striking analogy to those made by themselves, which posi- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 99 lively 'were due to imperfect hearing. In the English observations, namely, the numbers oftenest substituted for each other were those whose common phonetic elements were the same that caused the most frequent confusions of hearing in Messrs. H. and L. The Sidgwicks' opinion is, therefore, Messrs. H. and L. conclude, superficial and hasty, and hyperaesthesia of hearing remains 4,000 times more probable than any other assignable cause, of the amount of ' thought-transference ' recorded in their experiments. The authors point also to the facility with which, in diagram-guessing, figures may be considered ' right ' which really represent quite different objects from those meant by the agent, if only the two objects have analogous elements. The paper is a genuinely scientific contribution to the elucidation of so-called thought-transference phenomena, and contrasts most agreeably with the random abuse to which their recorders are accustomed. Telepathic Dreams Experimentally Induced. G. B. ERMACORA. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research. Vol. xi. Pp- 235-3o8- This is a startling experimental record of a new genus of thought transference. The personages are : Dr. Ermacora ; the Signora Maria, a young woman with trances and automatic writing in which she mani- fests a secondary personality alleging itself to be a spirit named Elvira; Angelina, Maria's cousin, a child in her fifth year; and, finally, the Signora Annetta, Maria's mother. The two ladies and the child live together at Padua, and Dr. Ermacora is a familiar visi- tor at the house. A certain spontaneous dream of Angelina's, in which she seemed to see the so-called Elvira, led Dr. E. to try systematically whether he could determine Angelina's dreams by ordering 'Elvira' to appear to her in sleep and make her dream according to his prescription. The experiments made were seventy in number and almost every one succeeded. Dr. Ermacora, for rea- sons that he does not give, was unable to isolate Angelina from the two ladies, so the physical possibility was not precluded of Siga. Maria tell- ing the child every night, after the details of the dream had been dicta- ted in the evening, what she must report next morning. He considers it morally impossible, however, that the ladies should wilfully play a trick on him ; and believing that Signora Maria, if she coached Ange- lina at all, could only do so whilst herself asleep, he habitually locked and sealed Angelina into a separate room, and got Signora Annetta to sleep with Signora Maria, so as to detect any possible somnambu- lism. This nevertheless was not reported. He moreover prescribed 100 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. dreams, the nature of whose details was incommunicable verbally, such as dreams of persons shown in photograph to Maria-Elvira, and afterwards identified in photograph by the child as having been seen in dreams ; or dreams of instruments pictured in manufacturers' catalogues, and similarly discriminated in Maria's absence by the child from amongst other figures of instruments that contained the same mechanical elements and would have had to be described in the same words. The child's accounts also made it clear that the suggestion, whatever it was, must have been in optical, and not in verbal terms ; for she often gave circumstances of the dream in words of her own limited experience that differed from the names used in prescribing the dream — 'dog' for lamb, e. g. (she had never seen a lamb); chail' for snow; 4 dark place down stairs' for cellar (she had never been in a cellar); 'tramway' for ship (the steamboats at Venice which was the child's home are known as tramways) etc. Dr. E's conclusion is that there was communication between the subliminal selves of Angelina and Maria. It is clear, in spite of the precautions taken, that much of the evidence hinges on the honesty of Siga. Maria and her mother, which Dr. Ermacora says it is impossi- ble for him to doubt. I, knowing Dr. E. personally, and having been present at one of his experiments, do not doubt his honesty. He is a trained physicist, author of a thick book on electricity, and pos- sesses an unusual experience of ' psychic ' phenomena, and a shrewd mind in comparing hypotheses. The editors do not doubt my honesty, or they will not print this report. But the facts are so unprecedented that the whole chain of honesties will seem a weak one, and the 4 rig- orously scientific ' mind will exercise its natural privilege, and doubt- less promptly and authoritatively dismiss the narrative as ' rot.' W. J. The Present Condition of Experimental Psychology, its Methods and its Problems. VICTOR HENRI. Woprosi Philosophic. The author reviews the rapid development of the science, closing the paragraph with the assertion that psychology is passing through a transition stage at present, in which the school of Fechner and Wundt is disappearing and new school takes its place. The first experi- mental psychologists arose in opposition to the old metaphysical psy- chology, sought to place the science on a similar basis with the natural sciences, and therefore abandoned the use of self-observation, applied physical and mathematical laws to psychic facts, and empha- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. IOI sized the external conditions of psychic life. The result was auto- matic methods and results which include much hypothesis, illustrated in Weber's experiments in skin-sensations where * one point ' or * two points ' were the only answers requested or allowed to the experimen- ter's subject. The Psycho-Physic of Fechner made the matter worse, and experiments similar to Weber's in automatic character were car- ried out in the laboratories of Wundt and others. In 1868 Bonder's reaction-time experiments opened up a new field for the application of these methods destitute of self-observation — a field which was rap- idly investigated in a manner prolific of results. The difference be- tween sensory and motor reactions, discovered by Ludwig Lange, can never be explained, says the author, until the method of self-observa- tion is again resorted to. Following these experiments came others concerning the time-sense, the general sense, contrast, after-images, abnormalities, etc., all carried out without self-observation. These experiments were chiefly conducted in Germany and America, where the first laboratory was founded in 1883, by pupils of Fechner and Wundt. In France and England the writings of Comte, Hume, Mill, Spencer, Bain and Darwin laid the foundation for psychology which in these lands did not come to such sharp opposition to the old meta- physical conceptions and never neglected self-observation nor ceased to employ it. The aim in these countries was, through experiments, to establish constancy in outer conditions and so to secure a control for self -observation. Attention was chiefly directed, not to theories of sensation and psychometry as in Germany, but to the higher psychic functions ; for example, the works of Spencer, Bain, Galton, Sully, Charcot, Ribot, Binet and James. In France attention was mostly given to pathological states, and in America to the practical applica- tion of psychological results in the field of pedagogics. Thus we see, writes the author, how a German school whose chief representatives are Fechner and Wundt has developed side by side with a French- English school whose chief representatives are Galton, James, Binet and Ribot. The former seeks exactness in the measurement of the simplest processes, investigates small details and neglects self-observa- tion ; the latter investigates the complex processes, gives attention to self-observation, and studies psychic phenomena as they appear in reality. The author seems to have confused experimental psychology with psychology as a general discipline, forgetting that the writings of Prof. Wundt, and his pupils are by no means confined to the experimental branch of the subject. The fact that he is the representative of a con- 102 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. ception of the will which some have designated metaphysical is enough to establish for him a relation to general psychology. It is not true that his work has been confined to the 4 measurement of the simplest processes to little things and details.' On the other hand, how can the author classify such writers as Spencer, Comte and Mill as experimental psychologists, or even founders of experimental psy- chology ? The two volumes of Spencer's Principles of Psychology do not contain a single psychological experiment, properly so called. The same is, in general, true of Comte, Bain and Sully. The author finds that in this French-English school alone, self-observance has been used and given its due importance. But looking at the works of the authors cited, what is the fact? The relative importance of self- observance and experiment in psychology is seldom, if ever, discussed. The System of Logic of J. S. Mill emphasizes the importance of ex- periment in all empirical sciences, but aside from this, what is there ? Experimental psychology has been comparatively little pursued in England. Comte denied the possibility of direct self-observation and with it the possibility of such a science as psychology. Locke and Hume can be classed as experimental psychologists as well as Mill, Comte, Bain, Sully or Spencer. Furthermore, the author somewhat misrepresents the psychological work done in America, in speaking of it as a practical application of psychological results to pedagogics. He seems to forget that Prof. James, whom he classes with the French-English school is an Ameri- can, that the latest and most adequate discussion of the philogenesis and ontogenesis of mind is from the pen of Prof. Baldwin, and that Ladd has probably done more work in physiological and experimental psychology than any other English writer. The author's representation of the German 4 school of Fechner and Wundt,' as omitting all self-observation in their methods, is surely inaccurate, to say the least. Space cannot be taken to quote from the many utterances of Wundt in the Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung, in the Grundziige, in the Menschen und Thierseele, and in the Philo- sophische Studien, all mentioning experiment as a help, a means of regulating and controling self-observation. Looking alone at the experiments which are conducted in Prof. Wundt's Institute, as well as at those proposed but rejected, it is clear that the primal requisite to successful experimentation is, to his mind, that all the conditions of the state or process to be investigated be subject to the control of the observer, so that the experimenter is not left to choose any one of a number of unknown processes in forming his judgment, thus introduc- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 103 ing an equal number of unknown variable factors into the results. Just in this requisite, that the method of self observation be known, lies the limitation of experimental psychology. In Prof. Wundt's words, 4 only those psychic phenomena can be influenced through experiment which are open to direct physical influence.' * * * * Every psycho- logical is therefore at the same time a physiological experiment, just as there are physical processes corresponding to the psychic processes of sensation, representation and will."1 The object of Prof. Wundt has never been, as is here represented, merely to minimize the impor- tance and the actual use of self observation ; but rather to control and systematize it. A psychology totally devoid of self-observation is im- possible. The author has exaggerated some features of experiments in Wundt's Institute and made it appear that the value of self-observa- tion is here unrecognized and its necessity denied. Probably no method other than Wundt's, or one in all essentials similar to his, could have been adopted in investigating the phenomena which he has investigated. At best the author's division of psychologists on the basis of the principle of self-observation is not a happy one. Would not some such division as the following be better : I. Psychology of the nature and relations of the functions of adult consciousness, including (i) general psychology of individuals, psychometry, psycho-physic, physi- ological psychology, etc., and (2) psychology of races and crowds; and II. Psychology of the development of consciousness, (i) in the race and (2) in the child? The author divides methods on the basis of the steps involved, and not on the basis of the nature of the objects investigated, into eight classes. ( i ) Experiments where one stimulus is given and the experi- menter simply reports what he experiences. Such are all threshold determinations, experiments concerning the clearness of perception, the analysis of musical cords into single tones, elementary experiments in aesthetic pleasures, the localization of tones and localization in gen- eral, etc. (2) Two stimuli are given, either simultaneously or suc- cessively, for comparison, as in experiments concerning the sensibility to difference (Unterschiedsemfindlichkeit) , etc. (3) Several stimuli are given and the experimenter is asked to choose one possessing a cer- tain characteristic. (4) The experimenter has a certain movement to make, either as he chooses or as directed, to a given stimulus — psycho- metry and muscular-contraction experiments. (5) A copy is given and the experimenter repeats or imitates it, or seeks another which 1Menschen und Thierseele (1892), pp. u, 12. 104 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. stands in a given relation to it, as in memory drawings, and the locali- zation of a stimulated spot of skin. (6) A series of objects given to be arranged in a certain order. These six classes embrace all the psychological experiments which are possible. Two others which are properly physiological are con" ducted by means of psychological observations. (7) Reflex and voluntary movements which follow certain stimuli. (8) Pure self- observation, where, e. g., one requests an author to describe his methods of work The author next discusses the method of gathering together an- swers and working out the results. The experiment is always influ- enced by factors dependent upon the observer, upon the experimenter, or upon accidents. Each such factor is to be investigated together with their relations of mutual interdependence, and they thus furnish principles for the gathering together of results. In skin experiment, e. g., the strength of the stimulus, the strength of the sensation, the character of the sensation, the concentration of attention, the knowl- edge and previous experience of the observer, etc., are all to be con- sidered. Each factor in turn is to be altered while the others remain constant. As a matter of fact, the others do not remain unchanged from one experiment to another. Habit, adaptation, weariness, vari- ations of attention, etc., make it impossible to retain them all un- changed ; and this makes it necessary that the observer alter his plan and method somewhat with each new experiment, and exercise the utmost possible care and foresight. After each experiment any unusual experiences or side-factors should be described ; but questions must not be asked in a fixed order or number, as this leads the experi- menter to devote his attention to these side phenomena and thus pre- vent the normal progress of the experiments. In the choice of experimenters it should be remembered that some have prejudices either as to the experiments or the method ; some soon form a theory as to the problem investigated and answer according to their theory ; and very many are curious to know results and accord- ingly ask questions in regard to them. Among the general conditions are to be mentioned variations of the attention, adaptation through exercise and practice, knowledge of the object and of the method, the mood of the experimenter, sleep, hypnotism and many others. The problems of experimental psychology are represented as (i) to describe psychic phenomena as accurately and completely as pos- sible under different conditions, (2) their relations of interdependence, (3) their influence on each other, and (4) their relation to outer pro- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 105 cesses. One may investigate these problems (i) in respect to those processes which are common to all men; (2) among processes which are shared only by particular classes of human beings, children, the abnormal, the extremely aged, etc. ; (3) with regard to the individual differences of men in their psychic processes. The first group of the last classification embraces the whole of general psychology ; the last two, individual psychology. G. TAWNKY. LEIPZIG. Der Hypnotismus. Seine psycho-physiologische, medicinische, strafrechtliche Bedeutung und seine Behandlung. AUGUST FOREL. 3. verbesserte Auflage mit Annotationen von Dr. O. Vogt. Stuttgart, Verl. v. Ferdinand Enke. 1895. In the new and enlarged edition of the work of this well-known author special reference must be made to the annotations written by Dr. Oscar Vogt, of Leipzig, a pupil of Forel's, in which he — an ad- herent like Forel of the so-called association psychology — endeavors to explain the effects of suggestion as arising from the brain mechan- ism. It is, doubtless, well known that to Prof. Forel are due in a great measure the scientific diffusion and increased recognition of the suggestion theory in Germany, as well as the destruction of the Charcot theory. Since he first became interested in the subject through Bern- heim, he has fought with indefatigable zeal on the side of the school of Nancy. This work, written in the same spirit, forces the convic- tion upon the reader that the author is sure of himself and that entire recognition of his point of view is no longer far distant. The great value of the book lies in its practical usefulness. The author understands how to initiate the beginner in the clearest and most intelligible way in the practical management of all branches of the theory of suggestion with reference at the same time to all related literature. There can be no doubt but that this new edition of his work will win new friends for both author and subject far beyond the bounds of his native country. Besides the practical introduction to the subject itself, the author presents a theory of consciousness on which he lays great stress, rightly holding a psychological comprehen- sion of hypnotism indispensable to the successful execution of hypnotic experiments. Forel holds monistic views. Conciousness is to him only ' the subjective form of appearance of the activity of the nerves,' or ' the inner reflection of a part of the activity of our cerebrum.' "Living nerve-substance, nerve-activity and consciousness are only 106 VISION. three forms of appearance of the same thing in relation to us, analyti- cally abstracted by us and in no way differing from each other. Sub- jectivism, power and matter are in essence the same and appear on earth in their most perfect and complicated form as cerebrum and the soul of man." Without entering fully into these questions, I may remark respecting the theory of consciousness and the psychological deductions of the work that, holding other fundamental views, I can- not agree in all particulars with the explanations and consequences either of Forel or of Vogt, notwithstanding that to the latter I owe personal thanks for some enlightenment as to the nature of hypnotism. In conclusion I refer the reader to Wundt's 'Hypnotismus and Sugges- tion,' a work, I may here add, described by Dr. O. Vogt also in his latest publication (Zeitschrift fur Hypnotismus, etc., Ill, Juli-Sept.- Heft.) as of the highest importance. LEIPZIG. FRIEDR. KIESOW. VISION. Die Arten des Sehpurpurs in der Wirbelthierreihe. ELSE KOTT- GEN und DR. GEORG ABELSDORFF. Sitzungsber. der Akad. d. Wissensch. zu Berlin, 25. Juli, 1895. It is known that there is more than one form of the visual purple, but Kiihne was not able to determine whether the different forms con- sist of two definite types or whether there are intermediate stages. Miss Kottgen and Dr. Abelsdorff now show that the former is the case. They examined specimens of all the classes of vertebrates — sixteen species in all — and they find very close coincidence in the ab- sorption curve of the fishes, on the one hand (of which eight different kinds were examined), and of all the other vertebrates, including man, on the other hand ; for the other vertebrates the maximum absorption is at 500 ftp, and for the fishes at 540 ^/, more in the yellow green, corresponding to the fact that is more bluish in appearance. The fact that there is no visual purple in the rodless retinas of most rep- tiles they confirmed in the case of the turtle — even a concentrated solution of sixteen retinas, extracted with the greatest care in red light, gave no trace of it. The reptiles which have rods, the chame- leon, the crocodile and the boa, they did not examine on account of the costliness of the material. [The reviewer does not find that the absorption spectrum of sea water has been determined. It would be interesting if it should turn out that the agent for absorption in the eye of fishes is adapted to the light to be absorbed in deep water, which is the fish's darkness.] PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 107 Sur la theorie de la vision des couleurs. DUFOUR. Congres intern. de m^decine. Rome. 1894. This paper deserves mention as one more instance of the apparent impossibility of bringing about a widespread knowledge of facts of color-vision which ought by this time to be the property of everyone, at least, who writes upon the subject. Dufour had several cases of total color-blindness, and by experiments in the sorting of colored wools in accordance with their brightness, and by unquantitative esti- mations of the brightness of the different parts of the spectrum, he conies to the conclusion that the brightness' maximum for the totally color-blind lies in the green. But it has already been shown by Her- ing and Hillebrand, and by Konig and Dieterici, by means of the most accurate measurements, not only that the maximum is in the green, but that it is at a definite wave-length in the green. The author then maintains that upon the theory of Hering, according to which only the sensations of black and white and their mixtures remain in cases of total color-blindness, it is impossible to explain why the maximum should fall in the green ; he does not say, however, why we should find it any more easy to explain its falling in any other part of the spectrum. The fact in question is, according to Dufour, readily ex- plained upon the theory of Helmholtz, with the aid of the assumption that what the individuals in question see is really green and not grey. In saying this the writer merely shows that he is unaware that we all have this same colorless scale of sensation in a faint illumination, and in the periphery of the eye at all illuminations, and that its curve of distribution through the spectrum is coincident with that of the color- blind. It would, therefore, be impossible to suppose that the sen- sation of the totally color-blind is green, even if it were not for the fact that we have cases of monocular total color-blindness, in which it is known to be grey; and Helmholtz himself had, in fact, long ago virtually given up this position. It is far more important that who- ever argues the intricate question of color-vision should argue within the bounds of easily accessible facts, and also of elementary principles of logic, than that the theories of Hering or of Helmholtz, inadequate as they are, should be disproved in the briefest possible time. As this was the only contribution to color theory made by the Con- gress at Rome, and as it was received without discussion, apparently, it would not seem to indicate a very great interest on the part of phy- sicians in color sensations or in their theoretical handling. £tude sur les Cones et les bdtonnets dans la region de la fovea centralis de la retine chez Fhomme W. KOSTER (Utrecht) . Arch. d'Ophtalm. V. 428-437. July, 1895. 108 MEMORY. Koster has considered it to be desirable, before finishing his study of the Purkinje phenomenon, to re-examine the retina carefully with the purpose of determining the exact extent of the coneless region about the fovea; this has been done hitherto only incidentally, as it is only since controversy has arisen as to whether the rods alone are the seat of the Purkinje phenomenon or not, that the subject has been of so much importance. Koster had only a small amount of very good ma- terial, but the material is so difficult to get (it is useless to examine an eye so late as two hours after death) that he publishes his method at once in order that others may be spared the loss of time involved in tentative experimenting. His conclusions, based upon four cases, are as follows : Region in which the cones dominate (diam.) 8 mm. Region in which there are no cones at all 5 mm. Bed of the fovea .2 mm. Dimmer gives 1.4 to 2 mm as the diameter of the fovea, but he counts from the beginning of the declivity. Koster reserves discus- sion of this result until a later occasion. Die Cardinalpunkte des Auges fur Verschiedenfarbiges Licht. W. EINTHOVEN. Pfliiger's Archiv., LXI. 1895. The effect of dispersion upon the cardinal points of the eye has not been calculated except in the case of the focal points, and in that case only for Listing's reduced eye with one refracting surface. In view of recent discussion by Schapringer, Konig and others, Einthoven has found it desirable to carry out the entire calculation for the actual eye. Of chief importance for the phenomena of color diffusion in the eye is the position of the second nodal point and of the second focal point. He finds that the former is for blue rays 3^ in front of its position for yellow rays, a difference so small that it can be neglected in cases where a relative change of position of differently colored ret- inal images is to be investigated. The distance between the focal points for blue light and for red light is .248 mm., as against .193 for the reduced eye. C. LADD FRANKLIN. BALTIMORE, MD. MEMORY. On Memory and the Specific Energies of the Nervous System. PROFESSOR EWALD HERING. Eng. trans. * * * Chicago Open Court Publishing Company. 1895. Pp. 50. This is a good translation of two brief essays, the first being a PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 109 popular address delivered in 1870 before the Imperial Academy at Vienna. Like all of Hering's work, it is vigorous and suggestive, and will prove especially so to lay readers. To those at all closely in touch with contemporary psychology it will possess little interest be- yond that which always attaches to a clear statement of any doctrine, for most of its contents concern matters which are to-day psychologi- cal commonplace. The general thesis is the dependence of repro- ductive mental processes, both sensory and motor, upon the retention in protoplasmic structures, such as the nervous system, of modifica- tions occasioned by previous experiences. The important distinction between the mere reproduction, or representation, of mental states and the reproductions of true memory — in Prof. James' sense, for instance, involving the conscious recognition that the reproduced fact has been a part of one's own past experience at a definite time — is never al- luded to. The point, so often misty in other writers, is clearly made, that unconscious memory ( ?) and unconscious mental ( ?) processes are simply tantamount to neural activities of such character and inten- sity as do not awaken their counterparts in consciousness. In the broad sense all organic structures manifest a kind of memory, in so far as they retain the modifications of past experience. The more per- manent among these modifications occurring in the nervous system are transmitted from generation to generation, emerging in the new-born individual as instinctive acts — a statement which may require to be edited anew in the light of Weismann's work. In the second essay, which is much less clearly written, the prob- lem of the specific energies of the nerves is discussed more or less in the light of the foregoing doctrine. The author apparently posits ultimate and specific differences of function as properties of proto- plasm, which differences are called out, developed, and at length firmly embedded in the growing nervous system through the agency of repeated stimulations of similar character. The manifold views of other writers upon this topic gain no notice, and some of the state- ments made are flatly contradictory of the widely-credited work of other scientists — for instance, Goldscheider's work on temperature sensations. Still, it is all very entertaining, and we venture to hope the translator will see fit to render accessible to English readers Her- ing's much more important work upon the color sense. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. JAMES R. ANGELL. HO EXPERIMENTAL. EXPERIMENTAL. Observations comparatives sur la reconnaissance, la discrimina- tion et I 'association. B. BOURDON. Revue philosophique, XX. 154-185. August, 1895. As the title indicates M. Bourdon proposed to investigate the inter- relations of recognition, discrimination and association, but the result is rather three minor studies. (1) Recognition. Series of words, or letters, were read aloud in which one of the words occurring near the beginning of the series was repeated later on, and the number of times its occurrence was recognized was determined. Thus, for example, in a series in which the word restaurant was the fifth of the series and again the twenty- second it was recognized 60 times in 65 trials. The word was of course more likely to be recognized if first in the series or if the inter- vening words were few. Words were more likely to be recognized than letters, and dissyllables than monosyllables. A word is more likely to be recognized if interesting, and thus the method may be used to determine what ideas are of most interest. It would seem that those concerned with eating and drinking attract the attention most forcibly. (2) Discrimination. Three series of printed letters were used — one a passage from a book, one of letters 1.75 mm. high not mak- ing words and one of letters 1.25 mm. high not making words, and the observer was required to mark as many letters of a given sort as he could in four minutes. Thus for example in four minutes 1,693 letters were read, and 216 of the 223 a's were marked. When it was necessary to mark six different letters 503 letters were read and 255 of those 273 occurring were marked. The size of the letters did not make any evident difference. M. Bourdon concludes that the letters not marked take up about one-tenth as much time as those marked. He notes the interesting fact that most observers can mark all the a's in a list more quickly than they can discriminate all the letters, and attrib- utes this to the circumstance that in discriminating the letters there is with most observers a tendency to articulate them. This, however, is probably not the correct explanation. The present writer has found that observers can discriminate and articulate about six letters per sec. when the letters make words, and about three letters per sec. when they do not make words. The rate is limited by the time of discrimi- nation, not by the time of articulation, which is reflex and overlaps the discrimination of the following letters. Observers can mark 100 A's PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. Ill on a list of 500 letters at the rate of about one per sec., in which case they must cursorily discriminate about four letters per sec. in addition to the A's. This cursory discrimination consists in seeing that a letter is not A, which is easier than seeing what letter it is. In making the experiment the A's seem to stand out from an undiscriminated complex. In reading proof one can often see an inaccurately printed word by glancing at a page, and one can see that the word is incorrect before one recognizes the nature of the error. (3) Association. M. Bourdon collected verbal associations on the familiar lines of exhibiting words and letting the observer write down the suggested words. He classifies the results according to the per- centages of nouns, verbs and adjectives suggested, which would scarcely seem to be as satisfactory as the classifications used in similar experiments by others. M. Bourdon concludes that students of letters show greater versatility, and students of science greater stability, in their associations. It will be seen that M. Bourdon's experiments are of interest, but they were not conducted nor are they described in accordance with what the present writer regards as the best scientific method. Basing new work on work already accomplished, and giving such statement of results as may be the basis of further work, is the method that advances science. J. McK. C. De ly influence de la perception visuelle des corps sur leur poids apparent. TH. FLOURNOY. L'Anne"e psychologique, 1894. L, 198-208. Although psychologists generally agree in discarding innervation sensations, says M. Flournoy, yet the immediate knowledge of the outgo of energy in voluntary effort seems so directly evident to con- sciousness, that there is a call for some thorough and crucial demon- stration of its fallacy, apart from pathological cases. For this pur- pose the writer selected ten objects of different sizes, but exactly the same weight (112 grams); the largest was a wooden box of 2,100 cu. cm. content, the smallest a metal case of 10 cu. cm. filled with lead. The subjects (50 in number, in the first set of experiments) were asked to arrange the objects in order of weight. The wooden box was judged lightest by 84% ; the next largest article was given second place by 50% ; and throughout the series the average judgment made the object heavier as it decreased in size, the metal case being placed last by 90%. The individual variations show, however, that habitual associations also affect the judgment of certain objects. 112 EXPERIMENTAL. To eliminate any possible effect from the area of skin touched, M. Flournoy devised a second set of tests, in which the weights were lifted only by means of a string and ring. Out of 31 persons, 29 placed the box first (i. ' ' **"\ \»« mus.) (wealthy classes).. II un.30 13-6 12.4 4.6 4.4 2.9 2.4 (hand.) III Young Men (wealthy classes) IO 4 i <9Q 12 4. 12.7 4.4. 3.7 4..7 4.2 " IV Boston, Army of ?... 35 av.28 *? / 15-6 T j i T / 9-5 9-5 " V Washington School VI Children (boys)... Washington School 526 6-18 16.3 15-5 3-9 3-8 Children (girls)... 55 1 6-18 14.8 13-8 4-5 3-9 VII Boys (parents well- to-do) 205 6-18 16.2 15.2 4.0 3-9 VIII Boys (parents poor).. 119 6-18 16.6 15-9 4.0 3-7 IX Girls (parents well- to-do) 183 6-18 T A t T i r i r\ •3 C X XI Girls (parents poor).. i and the infinitesimal succession which enters into the tissue of each. Dr. Ward, in his Britannica article, aptly expresses the view here defended, the view that a succession of ideas is not an idea of succession, by comparing the actual stream of consciousness to a horizontal line, and the consciousness of time to a vertical line erected upon it. We are aware of time, he says, not through the feelings A and B in the horizontal line, but through the images a and b in the vertical. Our knowledge of time thus involves a perspective effect, similar to that by which we perceive the third dimension of space. "We are aware of time," he insists, " only through the time-perspective."1 The lapse of time is, therefore, not directly experienced, but constructed after the event. The time we are directly conscious of is not the real time that elapsed. The succession of our feelings is a fact external to the feelings themselves. If it were not for memory, we should never have any conscious- ness of succession at all, any more than of past time. And this is true, because succession is essentially a relation between past and present, or between an earlier and a later past. We never lift ourselves up out of the stream of time and view it as a stream except representatively, except through memory. To wish to apprehend succession, or change, or the lapse of time directly, and not through memory, is as foolish as to wish to apprehend the past directly, and not through memory. But now, if this account of the case is correct, it seems to me that the fiction of an intuitive knowledge of the immediate past and future falls to the ground of itself. Later states can have no direct and intuitive dealings with earlier states, for the sim- ple reason that the two do not exist at once. When the earlier state is present the later state is non-existent, and when the later state appears the earlier one is non-existent. Our appar- ently direct consciousness of the immediate past is an illusion, 1Encycl. Brit., gth ed., art. « Psychology,' pp. 64-5. 156 C. A. STRONG. of the same character as that which leads us to attribute extra- mental reality to material objects. To take this illusion seri- ously is to be guilty of a sort of naive realism in the field of time. The impossibility of such a direct consciousness of past time appears, further, from the consequences to which it should lead if true. If we can be directly conscious of a feeling that occurred half a second ago, in spite of the fact that the feeling is now past and gone, why not also of a feeling that occurred a whole second ago, or a minute ago, or an hour, or a day, or a week? The consciousness would be in no wise more miraculous. Why cannot we be directly conscious of any past experience, no matter how remote ? But, if such consciousness is not to be thought of, then for the same reason the direct consciousness of half a second ago is not to be thought of. Our consciousness of even the nearest past must be ideal, not actual ; representative, not intuitive. But again, if this is true, the successive unity of conscious- ness falls to the ground likewise. " In reality," says Dr. Ward, " pasts present and future are differences of time, but in presen- tation all that corresponds to these differences is in conscious- ness simultaneously." But, if so, there is no need of a succes- sive unity of consciousness to account for the consciousness of succession. Earlier and later states cannot be bound up into a successive unity, because they do not exist together, and because they are past and gone when the perception of succession arises. When this perception arises, the relation is perceived between images existing in consciousness simultaneously. It there- fore implies only a simultaneous unity of consciousness, the same unity that is implied in the perception of likeness or dif- ference ; not a successive unity, which, to tell the truth, is a monstrosity, a contradiction in terms. Successive states of con- sciousness are not one with each other, but continuous with each other ; we may speak of a continuity, but not of a unity. The only unity is the unity of that which is in consciousness at once. A word, in closing, in regard to the broader issues involved in this discussion. The legitimate and necessary reaction from the psychological atomism of Hume and his school has led to the recognition of relational states, of the unity of consciousness, of CONSCIOUSNESS AND TIME. 157 * mental synthesis.' This reaction was a necessary and legiti- mate one ; these were features of consciousness which the Eng- lish school overlooked : but it would ill become us, in interpret- ing them, to fail to imitate that sobriety and economy of thought which has always been characteristic of the English school. No psychologist has done more to illustrate and commend these qualities than Professor James. There is no one to whom we are so accustomed to look for plain, honest, intelligible psychology, and no one to whom we so seldom look for it in vain. We have not looked for it altogether in vain in this very matter. There is one mystification, the most insidious and fatal in this subject, from which Professor James's account is signally free. I mean the conception of * mental synthesis ' as involving an agent, who finds feelings apart and puts them together into a unity. When we turn from this mystification to the facts of consciousness, all that we find really given is the essential unity of the relational state itself. We enjoy these states when they arise ; they constitute an increment to our intellectual being ; we may even put ourselves in the way of getting them. But may Heaven preserve us from the arrogance of supposing that it is we who create them. We no more create them than we create the sensations which form their terms. We do not create them, but are them. And may Heaven preserve us, not less, from supposing that, being them, we may nevertheless transcend them and hold direct converse with feelings that are past and gone. Our knowledge of the past involves self-transcendence, but the self-transcendence is representative, it is ideal. A self- transcendence that is other than ideal is neither plain, honest, intelligible psychology, nor plain, honest, intelligible meta- physics. STUDIES FROM THE HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. (IV.) COMMUNICATED BY HUGO MUNSTERBERG. THE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ATTENTION. BY R. MACDOUGALL. The researches here to be reported upon were concerned with the phenomena of functional disturbance which accompany various forms and degrees of perceptual and reflective attention. The subject was seated in a comfortable position with body relaxed and eyes closed, beside a table upon which the instru- ments were placed. The conductor of the experiments, who gave the signals and applied the stimuli, stood at his back, by which arrangement undesired knowledge of the nature of the stimulus or other matter of technique was avoided. Records were taken of the character of the breathing, of the changes in pulse form and blood supply in the left forearm and of the alterations in muscle tension in the fingers of the right hand. Upon the subject's breast was fastened a Marey tambour pneumograph, held in position by tapes passing over the shoulders and around the body under the arms. To the stem of its bulb was attached a rubber tube connecting with the chamber of a pneumatic registering pen, whose point traced the curve of respiration upon the surface of a horizontally revolving drum covered with smoked paper. During the later experi- ments a second pneumograph was added which recorded the character of the diaphragmatic respiration. The features of the pulse and of blood distribution were re- corded in one composite tracing given by an air plethysmo- graph. This consisted of a glass cylinder fifty centimeters long and ten in diameter, open at one end and at the other drawn to a neck, in which a cork, having a glass tube passing through 158 HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 159 it, was tightly fitted. Around the open end of the cylinder was stretched a rubber band twelve centimeters wide, which was cemented to the glass and formed an air-tight bandage upon the subject's arm when inserted in the cylinder. This cylinder was suspended by cords from the ceiling at such a height that the subject's arm, when inserted in it, might be in an easy position as he sat in the chair. This long radius from the point of sup- port gave great flexibility in yielding to slight motor reactions on the part of the subject, those which normally occurred in the course of the experiment — as observation proved — having no appreciable effect upon the character of the pulse and vol- ume curve. When the arm, as far as the elbow, had been placed in the glass chamber, the plethysmograph was con- nected by means of a rubber tube attached to that passing through the cork in its neck, with a registering pen similar to that used in recording the respiration. The muscles selected for observation were those of the index finger of the right hand, which, during the early experi- ments, was placed in the holder of a Delabarre muscle recorder, and afterwards in an adaptation of this instrument, by which the direct extensile and contractile changes without the lateral movements were recorded. The right forearm rested upon a stand drawn up beside the subject, the wrist being supported by a cushion, the hand turned laterally, and the index finger, slightly flexed and free from interference or support by the others, inserted as far as the first joint in the muscle recorder. The giving of the signals and the application of and relief from the various stimuli were recorded by the momentary de- flections of a registering pen operated by pressure upon a rub- ber bulb held in the hand of the conductor of the experiment. There were thus traced upon the one drum at the same time five curves, two registering the respiration, a third the pulse and blood distribution, the fourth the muscle changes, and the fifth the giving of signals and application of the stimuli. The five points of the registering pens were aligned upon the face of the cylinder with each other and with the time recorder, so that being under the control of the operator, there was possible an exact knowledge of the correspondence between the phases of l6o /?. MacDOUGALL. application, relief, etc., and the changes of the function re- corders. The smoked paper records were subsequently fixed by dipping in an alcoholic solution of gum sandarac. The trac- ings were read with the aid of triangles and millimeter scales by reference to base lines parallel to the direction of rotation of the drum. Full notes were taken of each experiment, its condi- tions and the experience of the subject during its course. FUNCTIONAL CHANGES DURING PERCEPTUAL ATTENTION. The subject sat in an easy position, with eyes closed and in- struments adjusted. A period of thirty seconds was allowed to elapse during which he remained quiet, avoiding all movement and mental effort. At the close of this period a watch was opened and brought forwards to the subject's ear, until it was just possible for him, with considerable effort, to follow its tick- ing. To this faint, rhythmical sound his close voluntary atten- tion was given during a second period of thirty seconds ; and a third of similar length, in which the effects of relief and the re- turn of functioning towards the normal type could be observed, closed the experiment. Silence was maintained through the three periods. At the close of each experiment the subject de- scribed his mental experiences, the degree, constancy, and me- chanism of his attention, disturbances, and the like, so that the quality of the subjective condition represented by the record was known in each case. The following figures exhibit the char- acter of the respiration during perceptual attention. AVERAGE LENGTH OF THE RESPIRATORY PHASES. i. Normal. Inspiration. Insp. Pause. Expiration. Exp. Pause. A .68 sees. .33 sees. i.oS sees. 1.51 sees. B .75 " .47 " 1.41 " 1.16 " C 1.35 " 1.08 " 2.59 " 2.55 " D i. 21 " .11 " 1.08 " 1.93 " E .77 " .24 " 1.03 " 1.34 " F 1.31 " .27 " 2.07 " 1.71 " G .95 " .32 " 1.31 " 1.14 HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 161 Total Respiration Depth. Total Resp. Depth. A 3.59 sees. 14 mm. E 3.38 sees. 17 mm. B 3.81 » ii " F 5-35 " 24 « C 7-45 " 36 " G 3.62 " 27 « D 4-34 " 40 " 2. During" Attention. Inspiration. Insp. Pause. Expiration. Exp. Pause. A .83 sees. .87 sees. 1.45 sees. 1.25 sees. B •73 " •39 " 1.38 » •93 " C 1. 12 " •45 " 2.70 " i. 08 <4 D •74 " .11 " i .08 " 1.38 " E .69 " .36 « 1.42 " 1.76 u F i-34 " .22 " 2.02 4t 2.09 " G .69 " •57 " •94 " 1.05 " Total Resp. Depth. Total Resp. Depth. A 4.41 sees. .19 mm. E 4.27 sees. .24 mm. B 3-43 " .15 « F 5-58 " .22 «* C 5.81 " .13 " G 3.28 •< .15 <4 D W " .28 " The characteristic changes accompanying attention to per- ceptual objects, as shown by these figures, are : (1) A tendency to reduce the length of the inspiration. The respiration of sleep and of low mental activity in general has been found to be characterized by its long inspiration and short expiration. As the mental excitement rises the latter component increases, the former decreases. The same ten- dency appears here as attention succeeds inattention. In five subjects the decrease is an absolute one, sometimes of marked extent — e. g-., 1.21 to .74 sees.; in the remaining cases, (A) and (F), though the figures show an absolute increase, a com- parison of the durations for the full respiration [3.59 — 4.41 sees.; 5.35 — 5.58 sees.] reveals the fact that there has been at the same time a relative decrease. (2) There is a general increase in the relative length of the expiration. In four subjects this increase is also positive ; in the fifth, in which an absolute decrease appears, there is at the same time a relative increase in length (1.41-3.81 sees. ; 1.38- I 62 /?. MacDOUGALL. 3.43 sees). The sixth and seventh do not conform to this type. The time-relation of inspiration and expiration is characteristic of the state of mental activity. Respiration during sleep is marked by relatively slow inspiration and rapid expiration. In drowsiness and after a full meal the same predominance of the inspiration is noticeable. With the increase of cerebral excite- ment the inspiration grows rapid, direct and strong, the expira- tion slow and interrupted. The extreme forms are seen in the sudden inspiratory sob of weeping, followed by the prolonged expiration, broken by repeated suspensions of the breath ; or in the similarly swift influx of air in laughter with its subsequent series of alternate suspensions and expulsions. Both the strong inspiration and the retardation of contraction during expiration point to an increased expenditure of energy as compared with the phenomena of sleep, where the innervation is sufficient only to inflate the lungs slowly, and where the contraction of the chest at its close is not interfered with by the contraction of the voluntary muscles. (3) There is a general increase in the rapidity of the res- piration. This is also a characteristic of heightened mental activity. The exceptions to it are noted under section (4) . (4) When the respiration decreases in rapidity the retarda- tion is due not to a proportional increase in time of all the com- ponent phases, preserving the normal type, but to an abnormal suspension of the breath with the lungs inflated [A. .33 — .87 sees. ; E. .24 — .36 sees.], to a prolongation of the expiration [A. 1.06 — 1.45 sees. ; E. 1.03 — 1.42 sees.], or to an exaggeration of the respiratory pause [F 1.71 — 2.00 sees.], all of these indicating an inference with the regular periodic innervation of the organic muscles. (5) There is a moderate tendency to superficiality of respi- ration. This is extremely marked in the case of three subjects. In three others it altogether fails to appear. Two of these are characterized also by slow respiration and retardation of the respiration. (6) In general, the attitude of attention is characterized by disturbance of function. Every departure from the normal type is significant as indicative of an interference with the automatic HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 163 character of the respiration. The breathing during attention is marked by just such wide and frequent but irregular fluctua- tions. This will be made more apparent by the following table of the comparative variations in time and depth during the normal and experimental periods. Normal. Attention. Time. Depth. Time. Depth. A i.Oi sees. 13 min. 3.15 sees. 17 min B .67 « 35 " I.OI " 45 " C •45 " 6 " •56 " 7 " D 1.05 " 5 " 2.80 " 36 " E .82 " 9 " 2.68 " 25 «« F •73 " 8 " 1.16 u 5 4t G i.o«; " 10 " '•75 4t 18 '4 The changes in variability are more readily appreciable than those in average character. The variation in the length of in- dividual respirations has increased to more than double the nor- mal. This increase in variability is uniform ; each individual record of every subject shows it. There is a similar increase in the extent of the variation in depth, amounting in extreme cases to seven times the normal, and failing to appear only in a single case, where the variations in normal and attention phases are as six to five. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PULSE AND VOLUME CURVES. As throughout the whole series of experiments the plethys- mographic and sphygmographic records unite in one volumet- ric curve, an exact analysis of their separate character is fre- quently impossible, the change in strength of heart contraction and the secondary features of the pulse wave being obscured by simultaneous changes in the volume curve. A number of significant features, are, however, definitely determinable. There is, without exception, an immediate increase in the rapidity of the rhythm at the beginning of the attention period, succeeded by a more gradual and enduring decline. This slow- ing usually continues until a point below that of the preliminary period is reached, when there is again a gradual increase 164 R. MacDOUGALL. towards the normal. The following table shows the extent and duration of the changes for the various subjects concerned. The figures give the averages for successive periods of twelve seconds each. Normal. Attention. A 72.5 per minute. 72.5 per minute. 70.0 per minute. A 87.0 " " 90.5 " " 80.0 " " A 72.5 " " 77.5 " " 75.0 « A 80.0 " " 82.5 " " 80.0 " " B 75.0 " " 82.5 " " 77.5 " " C 62.5 " " 67.5 " " 65.0 " " C 62.5 " " 65.0 " " 55.0 " " D 95.0 " " 102.5 " " 92.5 " " The maximum increase is reached within the first ten seconds in the case of all subjects ; and the whole acceleration is usually confined to a period of twenty-five seconds. In some cases the decline is more gradual and reaches the normal only towards the close of the experiment. With the greater number the re- tardation is more rapid and passes beyond the normal, in some cases to a greater extent than the primary acceleration rose above it. There is, in the case of most subjects, an increase in the in- terference of the respiratory period with the volume curve, which tends to obscure the character of the pulse-beats. So far as has been observed, the effect of attention upon the strength of heart contraction is variable. With three of the subjects there is a reduction in the extent of the stroke, independently of the variations in the volume curve or the respiratory changes. In subject D there is an increase, together with a marked irregu- larity, in extent, and in a similar inconstancy in the rhythm of successive beats. This perhaps marks, in one of D's tempera- ment, the presence of a rather strong emotional element due to nervous excitement. Simultaneously with the primary acceleration of the pulse occurs a rapid and extensive fall in volume, reaching a mini- mum at the end of a period varying from six to ten seconds, followed either by a gradual and more continuous rise towards HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 165 the normal line, or by a series of subsidiary waves, finally ap- proximating to that which characterized the preliminary period. These wave-like and frequently rhythmical changes of volume find an apt interpretation in the hypothesis of fluctuation, each pulse of close and accentuated attention being followed by a period of distraction and relaxation ; and the prevalent subsi- dence of the waves in the latter part of the experiment may in- dicate the gradual failing of attention through fatigue. The effect of attention upon the interference of the respira- tory period is variable and obscure. In some cases the rhyth- mical increase and diminution of volume is reinforced, even when the respiration grows more superficial ; in others there is a reduction in the interference, especially if the breathing be- comes more shallow. In others again no definable alteration in character appears. MUSCLE CHANGES IN PERCEPTUAL ATTENTION. These are typical and uniform. The changes consist, in general, of an exhibition of movement and tendency to relaxa- tion of the muscles, indicating a lowering in the static tonicity of the muscular system. In the preliminary period the finger record is usually effected by the respiration, a slight extension of the arm accompanying each inspiratory elevation of the chest, and being followed by a corresponding contraction dur- ing expiration. These changes are uniformly reduced and fre- quently obliterated during the period of attention, though the respiration suffer no diminution in depth. The preliminary period is usually marked by a constant subsultus tendinorum as well as by more massive spasmodic contractions and expansions of the muscles. These are reduced and frequently disappear during the attention period. The tendency to relaxation does not always appear as a positive extension of the finger. In some experiments the finger will be found to remain stationary during attention ; in some others a continued or intermittent contraction is manifested. But in every such case there is a relative relaxation. Where the preliminary period shows a tendency to contract — if strong, it continues, but in reduced 1 66 /?. MacDOUGALL. degree, — if slight, it disappears or is replaced by moderate ex- tension. Where the preliminary period shows no change, the passage to attention is marked by extension, slight in some cases, great in others ; and where the first period is character- ized by continuous extension it is immediately and strongly re- inforced at the beginning of the experimental stage. These expansions and contractions during the earlier period are prob- ably due to the fact of insufficient time having been allowed for the muscles to reach a state of equilibrium. But the effect of the passage to attention is seen as clearly in the altered di- rection of the curve as it is when the preliminary period is marked by rest. A negative illustration of the muscular changes accompany- ing attention appears at the close of the period when the tremors, irregularity in contraction and expansion, respiratory influence, and general tendency to contraction again set in. FUNCTIONAL CHANGES DURING ATTENTION WITH A STRONG SENSORY ELEMENT. In the preceding series the object of attention was a neutral one ; there was nothing in the ticking of the watch which was per se interesting. The attention was wholly secondary and voluntary ; the subject deliberately abstracted from all other ob- jects and focused his attention upon this dull, monotonously-re- peated sound. There will evidently be a new element introduced into the mental complex if a stimulus be selected which besides the de- rived interest of voluntary attention, comes to the subject with a distinct of its own, one which by its unusual or pronounced sensory character arouses a certain emotional element and fixes the attention by its own power. Such a combination of volun- tary and involuntary attention elements was sought by trac- ing upon the subject's cheek with the tip of a pencil a series of geometrical figures which the subject endeavored to discrimi- nate and recognize by the sense of touch alone. The stimulus was novel ; it involved a continuous sense stimulation apart from the volition of the subject ; and with all the persons concerned HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 167 in the experiments it seized and held the passive attention as simple touch sensation, apart from the character of the lines drawn. There was required in addition a close and constant ef- fort to recognize the various forms which were one after an- other inscribed upon the skin. These experiments were con- ducted with five subjects with the following results : AVERAGE DURATION OF THE PHASES OF RESPIRATION. /. Normal. Inspiration. Insp. Pause. Expiration. Exp. Pause. A .76 sees. .22 sees. .58 sees. i. 2 2 sees. B 1.27 " .31 " 1.40 " 1.46 " C .56 " .17 » 1.03 « 1.17 " D 1.08 " .27 " .72 « .72 " E .63 " .22 " .58 " .58 " Total Resp. Depth. Total Resp. Depth. A 2.78 sees. 25 mm. D. — 2.79 sees. 25 mm. B 4-45 " 37 « E.— 2.01 " 20 " C 2.93 " 25 u 2. During Attention. Inspiration. Insp. Pause. Expiration. Exp. Pause. A .49 sees. .36 sees. .85 sees. 1. 1 1 sees. B 1.14 " .36 " 1.48 « 1.90 " C •47 " .56 " i-34 " .83 " D •94 " .18 " •94 " .85 « E •49 " •54 " 1.39 « 1. 12 " Total Resp. Depth. Total Resp. Depth. A 2.81 sees. 13 mm. D. — 3.91 sees. 20 mm. B 4.91 " 30 " E. — 2.50 " 20 " C 3.16 " '3 »> The comparative changes here are of the same type as those which were found to characterize the passage from rest to purely voluntary attention ; but they are more constant and of greater extent. There is first a reduction in the relative length of the inspi- ration, and an increase in that of the expiration. But in both 1 68 R. MacDOUGALL* these components the change is more invariable than in the preceding series and of greater extent. In the present form of attention it is throughout positive as well as relative ; the extent of the reduction, also, is greater in the present series than in the earlier one. In the case of the expiration, again, there is a more constant increase in duration, every subject showing both a relative and a positive increase, and this increase is of greater extent than in voluntary attention. There is in every case a decrease in the rapidity of the rhythm. In all cases but one — E. 2.01—3.50 — this increase is relatively slight. Voluntary attention, on the other hand, was characterized by an increase in the rapidity of the respiration. The changes in the respiratory pauses are variable ; in some objects the averages show an increase, in others a decrease ap- pears. These figures are among the least significant of the record. What characterizes the curves of this composite atten- tion is essentially departure from type, disturbance of function, which a system of averages may as readily tend to obliterate as to preserve. This feature of the breathing during attention ap- pears more plainly by a comparison of the extent of the varia- tions in respiration during the contrasted periods. Normal. Attention. Time. Depth. Time. Depth. A i.io sees. 10 mm. 3.40 sees. 22 mm. B .62 " 4 « 2.92 " 20 " C •45 " 2 " •57 " 6 " D .22 " 3 " •45 " 4 " E •45 " 4 u 2.90 " 9 " The increase of variation both in the rapidity of the rhythm and in the extent of inflation of the period of attention over that of the preliminary period is evident. These fluctuations will also be found greater than those which accompanied vol- untary attention. There is at the same time a uniform reduc- tion of considerable extent in the depth of the breathing. The same general tendency is present also in the previous form of attention, but is found lacking with three of the subjects. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 169 PULSE AND VOLUME CHANGES. Few changes in the character of the pulse are to be ob- served in these records. The apparent strength of stroke re- mains unaltered during the two periods. Slight irregularities in the interval between successive strokes appear in one or two instances, and with one subject there is a slight reduction in the strength of the stroke. In the rate of the pulse beats, before and after the beginning of the experiment, and at successive periods during its continuance, a new set of changes is met with varying from the normal of the preliminary period in a di- rection opposite to those which appeared in the previous series. With all the subjects who took part, the tracing of the figures upon the cheek is accompanied by a retardation in the rate of the pulse, usually immediate, but in some instances delayed for several seconds, followed by an increase again towards the nor- mal. In some cases the diminishing retardation continued throughout the period of stimulation ; in others an acceleration beyond the rate of the preliminary stage was reached ; in one record a secondary wave of retardation appears. These changes are independent of the fluctuations which occur in the volume curve. They are altogether unexpected ; the addition of the sensory stimulus, bringing with it a certain emotional tinge, might lead one to expect an increase of the acceleration which was found in the previous series instead of the retardation which actually obtains. MUSCLE CHANGES. The same muscle changes appear here which characterize the earlier form of attention. In all six subjects there is an al- teration in the direction of the curve at the beginning of the at- tention period. These changes do not always present a posi- tive relaxation of the hand. In those instances in which a gradual contraction continues throughout the previous period, the new direction appears as a diminution in the rate of contrac- tion. When the contraction is slight the subsequent curve shows either a state of equilibrium, or a faint expansion. When a previous tendency to expansion exists it is appreciably rein- forced from the beginning of the new attitude onward. 1 70 R. MacDOUGALL. There is, also, in the preceding experiments a tendency to inhibition of movements manifested in the absence of slight irreg- ularities in the curve, and the dampening of the subsultus tendinorum. The respiratory period is less marked during at- tention than in the preliminary period, occasionally disappear- ing. These muscle changes are not invariably present, and different records fail to show any change of condition in the passage from inattention to stimulated attention. FUNCTIONAL CHANGES DURING RECALL OF PAST EVENTS. The preceding experiments were concerned with objects of perceptual attention; the present and succeeding sections ab- stract from objects of sense, and have to do with reflection and more purely intellectual processes. The method of conducting the experiments was simple. The subject sat as before with closed eyes, the instruments ad- justed upon his body. After a preliminary period of inactivity, he was required to recall various groups of objects, such as the instruments which he had seen in a certain case, the substance of a late lecture, the experiences of a particular day in the past, and the like. At the close a final period of rest was given ; and at the end of each experiment the observer made full notes of his subjective experiences. In recall the changes in the character of the respiration are of the same general type as those found present in perceptual attention, but are more variable in direction, of slightly less ex- tent, and present more individual variations. The quantitative relation of the phases is shown in the following tables : i. Normal. Inspiration. Insp. Pause. Expiration. Ex. Pause. A .76 sees. .22 sees. i. 37 sees. 1.35 sees. B .72 " .67 " 1-57 " 1.30 " C .76 " .36 " 1.37 « .90 " D 1. 12 " .36 « 1.17 " .40 " E 1.26 " .76 " 2.92 " .63 « Total Resp. Depth. Total Resp. Depth. A 3.70 sees. 29 mm. D. — 3.05 sees. 52 mm. B 4.26 " 23 " E.— 5-57 " 37 " C 3-39 " 30 " HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 2. Recall. Inspiration. Insp. Pause. Expiration. Exp. Pause. A .49 sees. .27 sees. 1. 08 sees. 1.03 sec. B •54 " .18 " i. 80 " .81 " C .30 " •54 " 1.03 " i-35 " D .63 « .40 « 1.26 " •54 " E .94 « .63 « 1.71 " .63 « Total Resp. Depth. Total Resp. Depth. A 2.87 sees. 22 mm. D 2.83 sees. 37 mm. B 3-33 " 32 « E 3.91 « 24 « C 3-23 " 13 " Variations in Respiration. Normal. Recall. Time. Depth. Time. Depth. A •45 secs- 6 mm. .90 sees. 19 mm B !-35 " 4 « •45 " 9 " C •45 " 4 " .70 4t 9 " D .90 " 10 " .22 " 6 " E i ^ ^ k* 4 " .70 " 9 " The general increase in irregularity of depth is evident here. The extent of this increase is magnified when it is remembered that there is at the same time a reduction in the average depth of respiration. It is probable that this irregularity is chiefly a physiologically originated phenomenon. The rapid superficial breathing which accompanies continued effort to recall, affords insufficient aeration of the blood ; the series is broken in up- on here and there by one or two fuller respirations stimulated by incipient asphyxiation. In some cases, however, an irreg- ularity appears which is more closely related to the con- sciousness aspect of the experience. The simple effort involved in all recall is expressed in the quickened shallow breathing, which increases in rapidity and superficiality with the difficulty involved in the process. The change here is rather in the direction of increased uniformity than of variation from it. When the objects of recall are not neutral, such as remembering a series of numbers or the in- struments in a certain case, but are colored with a strong emo- 172 JR. MacDOUGALL. tional element ; wide irregularities in the character of the indi- vidual respiration are presented, similar to those which appear under strong sensory stimuli. The subject is, in a less intense degree, living over again the experiences which he is endeavor- ing to recall, and the disturbance of function which accom- panied their original occurrence is partially reestablished here. There are therefore two elements in recall to be kept sepa- rate, as affecting the character of the bodily functions : (i) the effect of attention, the simple intellectual effort requisite to the recall of indifferent objects ; (2) the effect of personal relation to the objects of recall. The character of the functional change varies from indi- vidual to individual. In some cases, instead of the superficial respiration which characterizes most subjects, there is found a rapid, regular but more profound respiration than in the nor- mal. With other subjects there is a great reduction in depth, the breathing at times being almost suspended. While the degree of functional disturbance varies from sub- ject to subject, within the individual record the variation in- creases with the effort requisite for recall. A sense of ease and freedom is accompanied by slight variation from the normal ; with increasing difficulty the deflection of the curves becomes greater and greater. This is seen most clearly in those cases in which the emotional element is got rid of, and the changes are wholly due to the intellectual effort involved. This condi- tion is approximated to in the following series, in which the subject was required to perform certain arithmetical calculations of varying complexity. At present we may say that the effort to recall a series of past events is accompanied by a rapid superficial breathing, marked by a swift short inspiration and an interrupted and pro- longed expiration ; that with the decrease in depth there is a greater irregularity in the duration of successive respirations, in the depth of the breathing, and in the time relations of the com- ponent phases of the individual respirations ; and that as the process of recall becomes more difficult and involves greater effort the extent of the variation from the normal increases. Also, that while simple recall of indifferent objects is ac- HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 173 companied by a quick slight breathing which may be more uni- form than the normal, the recall of things which involve a strong emotional element is characterized by irregularity of rate, depth and form, the nature and extent of the irregularities depending upon the emotional character of the objects recalled. The average rapidity of the respiration is likewise without ex- ception increased ; and there is an absence of the suspensions with full or deflated lungs, or in the midst of expiration, which frequently characterized the former mental attitude. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PULSE AND VOLUME CURVES. The type of change here seems to vary. The pulse-beat is in some cases at first increased, then slowly reduced to the normal towards the close of the experiment. With others there is an immediate slowing of the pulse rate gradually accelera- ting towards the normal again. These two types of change are present in the same individual at different times. In all cases in which an immediate increase in rate appears the process of recall was attended with difficulty. In those marked by a fall it was either easy or no mention was made of effort. The pulse rate frequently presents the form of a series of waves, alter- nately rising above and falling below the normal of the prelimi- nary period. It is possible that these may indicate a series of fluctuations in the intensity of the attention and of the effort to recall. In almost all cases the pulse stroke is shortened during re- call. Frequently this change is immediate and definite, in some cases the reduction amounting to one-third or even one-half of the previous extent of stroke. There is usually with this a simultaneous reduction in the depth of the breathing, which, as a purely physiological phenomenon, is accompanied by such a reduction in the pulse stroke, but the change under these condi- tions is concomitant with a rapid rise in volume, and the re- duction in pulse stroke is proportional to the extent of the vol- ume increase. In the case of recall, however, the reduction is accompanied by a decrease in arterial tension, marked by a fall more or less rapid and extensive in the volume curve. It also 174 /?. MacDOUGALL. occurs when the respiration is increased in depth instead of be- coming more superficial. The form of the pulse wave also undergoes alteration. The preliminary period is characterized by a full strong stroke, fol- lowed by an immediate and sharp fall towards the dicrotic crest, making an acute apex ; in the period of recall the shorter stroke is succeeded by a slow delayed subsidence, the tracer dragging on towards the next stroke before a decided fall takes place giv- ing a blunted form to the arterial wave. The volume curve shows less tendency to typical forms of change than in the previous experiments. There is usually an immediate fall in volume at the beginning of the period, con- tinuing from five to ten seconds, and followed by a more gradual rise, the two phases being repeated several times during the course of the period, usually with a decrease in the width of the variation towards the end. These wide fluctuations in the volume curve during recall are the most constant factors which appear. Since the transi- tion from the previous diffused mental state to the concentration of attention in recall is typically marked by a fall of greater or less extent in the arm volume, the occurrence of these repeated waves suggests a fluctuation in the degree of effort made, the at- tention coming and going in pulses. The interference of the respiratory period increases dur- ing recall. In normal cases its influence increases and diminishes with the depth of the respiration ; suspension of the breath causes it to disappear. Here, on the contrary, it grows more pronounced even when the breathing simultaneously grows more superficial. As relief there is a slowing of the respiratory rhythm, an increase in the depth of the breathing and of the duration of the inspiration with a relative reduction in that of the expiration, an increase in the extent of the pulse stroke, a slowing of the pulse rhythm and a rise in the volume of the arm. MUSCLE CHANGES DURING RECALL. The changes here are similar to those found present in the earlier series on perceptual attention. The transition from the HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. '75 preliminary effortless state to that of strenuous recall is marked by a change in the direction of the muscle curve. This is mani- fested as before in a reduction in the degree of contraction, a disappearance of it, or a substitution of expansion, in cases in which a contraction appears in the preliminary period, and a reinforcement of the tendency of expansion where such already existed. This change in the direction of the curve is very uni- form. There is also a reduction in the greater irregularities which usually characterize the normal curve, and a disappear- ance or dampening of the subsultus tendinorum. The essential features of this curve, then, are a tendency to a relaxed condition of the muscles, and an absence of muscular excitement, marked by a quiet even curve without massive changes or tremors. FUNCTIONAL CHANGES DURING CALCULATION. The method of experimentation here is varied only by the substitution of a new form of stimulation. The subject was required to perform certain arithmetical calculations instead of recalling a series of past events. We may therefore proceed immediately to a consideration of the particular changes in func- tion which present themselves. A B C D E A B C A B C D E Inspiration .72 sees. .76 " .67 " 1.26 " .67 " Total Resp. 3.68 sees. 3-43 " 3-59 " Inspiration. .49 sees. .22 " .67 " .58 " •45 " /. Normal. Insp. Pause. Expiration. .22 sees. i .39 sees. .31 « 1.24 " .40 " 1.17 " (i 1.89 " •49 " .85 « Depth. Total Resp. 29 mm. D. — 5.13 sees. 34 « E.- 3.12 " 20 " 2. Calculation Insp. Pause. Expiration. .22 sees. 1. 1 2 sees. .31 « 1. 12 " .22 " 1.26 u .13 " 1.62 " •45 " .85 4t Exp. Pause. .35 sees. .12 " •35 " .98 " .11 " Depth. 81 mm. Exp. Pause. .90 sees. .36 " •37 " 1.89 " .85 " 176 R. MacDOUGALL. Total Resp. Depth. Total Resp. Depth. + A 2.63 sees. 22 mm. D.— 4.22 sees. 61 mm. B 2.01 " 13 " E.— 2.60 " 12 « C 2.51 " 25 " There appears here, as in the previous experiments, an in- crease in the rapidity of the respiratory rhythm ; but while in both series there is a reduction in the rate of the respiration, in the former the relation of the component phases was signifi- cantly altered, while here there is little variation from the tpye of normal unstimulated respiration. In one component, how- ever, there is a great change, the respiratory pause is invariably shortened, usually to a great extent. In normal breathing it is frequently accentuated, the expiration being followed by a dis- tinct period of quiescence before the succeeding inspiration. During calculation this pause is either lessened or altogether disappears ; inspiration follows expiration with scarcely a break. This feature is significant. Exaggerated pauses are character- istic of one attitude of mind, diminished pauses of a typically different state. In any sudden surprise the breath remains sus- pended, inhibited sometimes for several moments, till the shock passes by. The same suspension appears in more exaggerated forms in fear and terror. In close attention — in the effort to catch a faint sound, for example — it is also a characteristic feature. These states of mind are marked by a general inhi- bition of function which extends to temporary cessation of the respiratory process, until the oppression of the lungs finds re- lief in renewed respiration. In all work — expenditure of ef- fort— on the other hand, there is an increase of functional ac- tivity. The heart beats faster and stronger, the respiration grows deeper and more rapid, and the glandular secretions of the skin become more copious during muscular exertion. And the same change, in greater or less degree, accompanies in- creased intellectual activity. In exciting emotions the respira- tion is deep and rapid with lungs inflated, inspiration and expi- ration succeeding each other without pause. In more purely intellectual activity, the breathing, which is usually more superficial as well as more rapid, is marked by an HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. iff almost complete obliteration of the respiratory pause. This rapid, equable and slightly superficial respiration may be con- ducive to a more constant supply of blood to the brain, the sud- den and great expansion of the lungs in deep respiration caus- ing too great a fluctuation in the quantity supplied to its vascular tissues for continuous cerebral activity. The uniformity of respiration during calculation will further appear from the following table of variations during the two periods : Normal. Calculation. Time. Depth. Time. Depth. A .22 sees. 4 mm. .66 sees. 19 mm. B 1. 10 " 17 " .90 " 20 " C .70 " 7 " .22 " 5 " D 1. 10 " 12 " .70 " 30 " E .90 " 4 " .70 " 6 " The variation in depth is usually greater in the more highly stimulated conditions. This is probably due to two different causes. These are, first, the physiological one of periodically increased innervation from incipient asphyxiation, the more superficial respiration being insufficient for the needs of the sys- tem ; and, second, the psychological one of fluctuation in the intensity of the effort required in calculation periods of close at- tention with rapid, regular, superficial respiration alternating with periods of relaxation indicated by the fuller breathing of relief. In some cases no such rhythmical series appears, the respiration growing continually more superficial as the calcula- tion proceeds. This may indicate a continued attention with increasing effect, as both the shallowness of breathing and diminution of volume are found to bear close relation to the dif- ficulty of reckoning involved in the problems given. PULSE VOLUME CURVES. The beginning of calculation is in all cases accompanied by an acceleration of the pulse rate, sometimes of great extent, and continuing throughout the larger part of the period. The form of this acceleration varies greatly from individual to individual and from record to record. 178 /?. MacDOUGALL, The rise is sometimes immediate and rapid, succeeded either by a similarly sudden fall or by a sustained increase in rate. Some- times the acceleration is slow, maintained during a considerable period, and falling again gradually towards the normal. In some cases the rise is developed for several seconds after calcu- lation begins. The return to the normal is usually reached within a minute's calculation. In some cases the acceleration dies away before one-half the time of calculation has expired. At relief a fall below the normal appears with occasionally a secondary wave of acceleration. The following figures give the average rate before calculation and for successive periods of twelve seconds during calculation : Preliminary Period. During Calculation. A 62.5 seconds. 67.5; 80.0; 85.0 sees. B 72.5 « 72.5; 74.5; 75.0 « C 77.5 « 77.5; 82.5; 85.0 « " 75-o " 82.5; 75.0; " D 57.5 " 65.0; 62.5; 62.5 " " 65.5 " 70.0; 75.0; 75.0 " E 60.0 " 65.0; 67.5; 65.0 " " 75-° " 77-55 80.0; 75.0 " F 50.0 " 55-°; 60.0; 60.0 " An almost constant feature of the pulse during calculation is the reduction in height of stroke. This may be due either to a weaker ventricular contraction or to an increase in the arterial tension. The latter condition accompanies any voluntary re- duction in depth or complete suspension of the respiration. The volumetric curve shows an immediate increase in curve volume, due to congestion of the blood in the smaller veins and arteries, and a reduction in the height of pulse wave — which may finally become obliterated — due to the continued increase in arterial tension. If then the respiration uniformly becomes more super- ficial during calculation, such a reduction of the pulse wave is to be expected ; it becomes a secondary phenomenon, and, ex- cept as depending upon the primary change in respiration, is relatively insignificant. But in these records it appears independently of the respira- HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 179 tory changes, occurring when the respiration is increased in depth as well as when there is no appreciable variation in it. Compare it again with the concomitant changes in the volume curve. This is found to alter as the character of the respiration changes, and as the volume changes the form of the pulse also undergoes alteration. But the changes which appear during calculation seem to be independent of the changes in the vol- ume curve as well. A reduction in the height of the pulse wave is the physiological concomitant of increased arterial distension ; but here it occurs simultaneously with its fall in arm- volume which normally marks the increased mental activity during calculation. It is present when there is no appreciable change in arm- volume, and it persists both in the rising and falling of the curve. The reduction of the pulse wave, there- fore, since it appears even with increased respiration and a fall- ing volume curve, both of which should tend to reinforce it, is a direct effect of the central change obtaining during calcula- tion. The volume changes are analogous to those of the preceding series. Decrease is more or less rapid and extensive, continuing for a variable period, and followed either by a continuous, gradual rise, or by a series of wave-like fluctuations in volume. MUSCLE CURVE. The changes in the muscle curve are usually of slight ex- tent and identical in type with those described in the preceding experiments upon recall. They are not invariable in direction nor so constant as in recall and perceptual attention. Occa- sionally there is an increase in the tremor of the muscles, occa- sionally also a greater irregularity in the form of the curve during calculation than in the preliminary period ; and in one or two instances a slight tendency to contraction appears, or a previously existing contraction is reinforced. In general, however, these changes are the same as in those of recall. Contraction and muscle tension are replaced by relaxation and extension of the fingers. This is shown also in the contraction which frequently appears again at the close of the period, the static muscle tension recovering its normal tone i8o R. MacDOUGALL. as soon as attention is drawn from the process of calculation. With this relaxation goes a diminution of muscular tremor and a reduction in the irregularities of the curve. This relaxed condition during close mental effort indicates a reduction in the degree of reflex stimulation throughout the organism, and inferentially a greater efficiency to the central nervous dis- charges. Tension represents expenditure of energy ; there is a continual drainage of nervous force to the peripheral system when this is in a state of activity, and the lowering of this ex- penditure— which characterizes the types of activity here in- vestigated— leaves free a wider margin of available energy for the central activity. DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. THE METAPHYSICAL METHOD IN ETHICS.1 In his preface Mr. D'Arcy defines his essential point of view and aim. It is to give briefly ' an account as well of the metaphysical basis as of the ethical superstructure ' of conduct. Referring to Mr. Muirhead's Elements, Mr. Mackenzie's Manual, and my own Outlines of Ethics, he says of them that their ethical contents is much the same as that of his own work, 4 but all three build without a foundation.' This foundation he takes to be Green's method and main results as reached in his Prolegomena to Ethics,2 and he proposes to do in small space what Green did in a more extended way. It should also be noted that Mr. D'Arcy declares his inability "to accept in its entirety the Hegelian8 conception of the spiritual prin- ciple as presented " by Green. And as matter of fact, Mr. D'Arcy accepts the doctrine of Green only up to a certain point, and then supplements it by quite other considerations, derived, as a rule, from the real or supposed needs of man's religious consciousness, and some- times from * common sense.' It is this effort, then, of Mr. D'Arcy to give the metaphysical 1A short Study of Ethics. D'Arcy. London and New York, Macmillan & Co., 1895-6. 2 As silence is supposed to give consent, it may not be impertinent for me to say that while I have always recognized my own great indebtedness to Green, yet his metaphysical method seems to me far from affording any adequate basis for ethical doctrine; on the contrary, all the serious weaknesses in Green's specifically ethical discussions seem to me to flow from his metaphysical assumptions. 3 Mr. D'Arcy seems to accept in toto> as does Professor James Seth, Professor Andrew Seth's identification of Green's doctrine with Hegel's. I never have been able to see any basis for this identification. Hegel protests continuously and consistently against the Kanto-Fichtean ethics, and Green's standpoint is essen- tially the latter. The logic of the identification of Hegel and Green seems to be: Each is 'unsound' as to the relation of the human and divine self, and, therefore, both teach the same doctrine. 181 182 THE METAPHYSICAL METHOD IN ETHICS. foundations of ethical theory, which, affording the distinctive feature of his book, calls for especial attention. The primary condition of all experience is the relation of the sub- ject and object. The subject eludes our grasp, when approached by itself. The not-self or object is divided into an inner and an outer region, the former including sensations, emotions, thoughts, etc. ; the latter contains all the things we know in the world around us. The inner experiences, of course, presuppose the thinking subject. The following course of reasoning shows that the outer region is also de- pendent. Every thing is constituted by relations. The world of things in space and time is simply a vast complex of relations. But it is 4of the very nature of a relation to have no existence, no meaning, except for a thinker.' A relation is a "unifying of the manifold, and is, therefore, an impossibility apart from a subject, which can pass from one member of the relation to the other, and combine both in a single apprehension." Hence " things exist only so far as they are due to the synthetic activity of the knowing subject." Morever, since the thing is always constituted by relations to everything else in the uni- verse, it is really a ' cosmic object,' so that the self is the unifying prin- ciple in the whole cosmos of experience. The self is thus a unifying principle, and it is also the ultimate principle of unity. It is not simply the correlative of object, for it can make itself its own object, being self-conscious. It is a real unit, not a logical principle of a unity. So far the language and the method remind us of Green, al- though Green, I think, would hesitate at this extraordinary identifi- cation of the self with subject apart from object, and at the ruling out from the self of all sensations, emotions and thoughts. As the method is nominally derived from the Kantian, it is perhaps worth while to note that Kant urged not only the necessity of the synthetic activity of the subject, but equally urged that the subject could be conscious of itself and of its unity only through its synthetic activ- ity upon the manifold. But Mr. D'Arcy knows a better way than that. This theory might lead to the doctrine of the correlativity of the subject and the cosmos of experience — which appears to be an objectionable doctrine, leading to Pantheism — and consequently having affirmed the synthetic activity of the self in the constitution of the objective world, Mr. D'Arcy affirms that since it is self-con- scious, it can also abstract itself wholly from the world which it constitutes. As Mr. D'Arcy simply affirms this as given in the fact of self-consciousness, wholly apart from any examination of the na- DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 183 ture or method of self-consciousness, I can only affirm from my standpoint that this way of giving 'foundations' for ethics seems to require more foundations for itself than it succeeds in supplying. Were the doctrine of the correlativity of subject and world af- firmed, the self would obviously secure a certain universality ; it would not be a merely particular self, if its essential being were found in the constituting of an objective world. But since Mr. D'Arcy holds that the subject exists in essential distinction from this constitutive work, and engages in it as it were only as by play, or as supererogation, the problem comes up : What sort of existence does the constituted world have? Is the universe a private posses- sion of my own? Are we not committed to the doctrine of subjective idealism ? Mr. D'Arcy implies, this would be the result if it were in- tended "to identify the cosmos of the individual experience with Nature. Nature must be accepted as a great fact, a mighty uni- verse." Having thus secured from the simple 'common sense* af- firmation (see p. 1 8) a world independent of the subject's conscious- ness, Mr. D'Arcy has also obtained a basis for the affirmation of an eternal self, free from all the pantheistic leanings of Green's doctrine. Since our world of natural things depends upon our synthetic ac- tivity, then surely this big world of Nature depends upon its consti- tuting spirit — God. I am forced to stop once more in my exposition to raise the ques- tion : What founds these foundations ? Upon Green's doctrine — no matter what objections may be brought upon other grounds — there is one self and universe. There is no question of subjective idealism, be- cause the subject is defined by reference to the permanent and objec- tive work of constituting a universe ; the particular individual know- ing is a process of reproducing the eternal constitutive action. But this seems to Mr. D'Arcy pantheistic, and for reasons which he has not explained to the reader (save as indicated in deference to the opinions of Professor Seth and Mr. Balfour) pantheistic implications are to be avoided at all hazards, including those of logic. Hence this sudden break into a cosmos of my experience, and another big- ger cosmos, with two spirits, the individual for my cosmos, God for the big one. Two questions can hardly be kept back. If we accept, because we cannot help believing it, the existence of this larger cos- mos, it must also be remarked that common sense equally denies the dependence of our cosmos upon our subjective activity. Common sense is not particularly alarmed about the existence of the sun, moon and stars in the big cosmos, but objects with great vigor to 184 THE METAPHYSICAL METHOD IN ETHICS. making the sun, moon and stars which are individually known de- pendent upon our individual thinking power. I doubt very much if Mr. D'Arcy can satisfy the realist by handing over to him a world, however big, which is unknown, while allowing the subjective idealist complete proprietary rights in the cosmos of individual experience. But it may be said this is quite unfair to Mr. D'Arcy. Does he not say that the u cosmos of experience must be recognized as iden- tical with a part of the great cosmos of Nature ? " This brings me to my second question : Why then is not the individual self -identi- cal with God so far as the identity of worlds goes? How, indeed, do we know there is a bigger unknown world, save as a projection, an extension, out of our present experience? Is it our 'own' self,1 or is it the absolute spirit which really constitutes our cosmos ? If the former, how shall we account for its coincidence with the cosmos of the absolute subject, and for the continuity between the two, as the individual cosmos extends itself ? How shall we account for this remarkable capacity on the part of a uniquely individual self to con- struct a world having its own objectivity and relative permanence? But if the latter, then the whole theory of the ultimate and irreducible distinction of the two selves breaks down. This same method, viz : the following of the Kantian analysis of knowledge up to a certain point and then the contradiction of its logi- cal conclusion in the interests of religion and common sense — appears in the discussion of volition and of the common good. Will is treated as self-determination, and as indeed, only the more explicit recognition of the constitutive process found in all knowledge. * ' Every act of self-determination, every volition, is a determination, not simply of one thing, but of the whole cosmos of experience. Self-determination must be world-determination." This principle of determination recognized from the standpoint of the whole is free- dom ; while necessity is the principle of the articulation of the parts. They are thus correlative and imply each other, instead of being contradictory. That is to say, each fact or event taken as particular is necessitated ; but that it is determined at all and determined in relation to other facts is due to an act of self-determination on the part of the subject. (P. 29; pp. 39 and 49 also.) 1 Nothing could exceed Mr. D'Arcy's conviction of the ' ultimateness ' of the individual self. " Self is for every man unique and ultimate. The identification of the self in every man with God in /olves the identification of all human selves. But since each self is for itself unique and ultimate, this identification amounts to a denial of the essential nature of selfhood." P. 46. DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 185 Why the self and the world should not be correlatives, while self determination and world-determination, freedom and necessity, are correlatives, Mr. D'Arcy does not explain. It is difficult to see why one principle should hold for thought and another for volition ; or why, if one is objected to on the ground of pantheistic tendencies, the other is not equally 'dangerous.' The pressure to make self-determination and world-determination correlatives is obvious. Without this cor relativity, self-determination would occur in a purely transcendental, and, so far as we are concerned, empty region ; will would have no- thing to say or to do with the details of conduct. But the demand for correlativity on the side of knowledge is certainly none the less real altho' not quite as obvious. What the self-consciousness is which is found neither in consciousness of objects, nor yet in sensations, thoughts or emotions, Mr. D'Arcy does not explain, and we have only his word for it that it is not formal and empty. The contradiction is still more glaring when we deal with the question of the End or Good. Mr. D'Arcy having settled that the subject is purely individual — for it must not get too closely implicated with the divine self for fear of pantheism — is quite consistent in hold- ing that the end of self is egoistic. " Will is by nature egoistic No other individual can stand on a level with the self Reason is essentially anti-social Self, unless mastered by some superior principle, must wage unceasing war against all who would pretend to equal authority." (Pp« 58, 59 j the same doctrine also on p. 124 and p. 147.) Hence every moral system independent of religious ideas breaks down. It cannot explain why a man should love his neighbor as himself; it cannot justify the idea of a common good.1 On the same line of thought, Mr. D'Arcy questions whether society is really an organic whole, since the individual is so very individual, and refers to it as an 'amorphous mass of tissue' (p. 73). 2 1 Mr. D'Arcy seems a little hard on the individual self. In the first place, it must be purely individual and unique, since otherwise it will get mixed up in a most pantheistic fashion with God and other selves. On religious grounds, in other words, it is quite shut up in itself. Then the interests of religion being duly secured, the self is gravely rebuked for its self-centred and self-seeking na- ture, and assured to be greatly in need of the assistance of religion to give it an end common with that of others. It is a little hard, I repeat, to refuse and to demand at the same time participation with other selves to the individual self, and both in the name of religion. 2 Mr. D'Arcy nevertheless holds that there is no other idea save that of or- ganic unity, which can be applied to society, and yet that the truth is not fully represented in that idea (p. 74). 186 THE METAPHYSICAL METHOD IN ETHICS. But on the other side, religion is going to help out the egoistic nar- ture of the self. We cannot stop short, after all, with the unity of the self. In this case " God himself would be simply one unit in a multitude and isolated from his creatures. But it is impossible to end in a disconnected multitude." The mind is forced to suppose some principle of unity deeper than the unity of self-consciousness. There is in God a transcendent principle by which he forms the ulti- mate bond of union among the multitude of persons. The fact of the union of spirits must be assumed as' the ultimate basis of all coher- ence, speculative and practical. (Pp. 47-8.) Hence the common good for all persons. "All persons are naturally exclusive (i. e., they limit one another), yet are they one in God. Hence the good for the whole is the good for every separate member. The true good for every man is a common good and an absolute good." (P. 102, see also p. 124.) Man and God have a common end. The end of conduct is identified with the end of the universe (p. 126). We have precisely the contradiction here between the isolated, egoistic end of the self, and the common end of the self through its transcendental union with others in God that we met before as re- gards the constitutive action of self in our cosmos, and of God in the cosmos, except that here it is most explicitly recognized that We must not exclude the working of the divine end from the constitu- tion of the human end. Mr. D'Arcy might, indeed, attempt to bridge the gulf by holding that the natural self is wholly given to evil ; and that only by supernatural grace, initiated wholly from without, does the natural self come to such social ends ; but there are no traces of any such doctrine in him. He seems to hold that in the moral life as such there is the immanence of the common end through the union of all selves in God. Were it not that the contradiction obviously escaped Mr. D'Arcy himself, I should think it wholly unnecessary to point it out. As it is, I must be pardoned for saying that if there is one self, named the divine self, in which all selves are united in a common end which is also the goal of the evolution of the universe, then the doctrine regarding the isolated, exclusive character of each individual self must be radically modified. It certainly is not legiti- mate to insist on the purely individual character of the self from one point of view ; and then, when different considerations are in view, insist upon the community of selves. That the two ends of the con- tradiction are both set up in the name of religion does not make it any the. less a contradiction ; although it may make one suspicious of the particular type of religion represented. DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 187 Thus far the tendency of our examination has been to make us question whether Mr. D'Arcy's metaphysical foundations do not of themselves require more grounding than any ordinary ethical theory is likely to call for. I shall take space for just one application of his metaphysical to his ethical doctrine, seen in the question of the end, with a view to determining whether the ethical superstructure stands any the more firmly for the foundation put under it. The ultimate end is the idea of a social universe in which every person's capabilities shall receive their full realization, and in which every person's realization shall contribute to every other person's realization. It is impossible, however, to give any further definition of the ultimate end, because it is impossible to know what are the possibilities of selfhood (pp. 104-5). Whence it is a fair inference that the end though not formal in itself is purely formal for us. "It must be granted at once that the Ideal End, or Ultimate Good, is relative to a set of circumstances at present non-existent1 (p. 107)." Mr. D'Arcy then goes on to deal with the proximate end, this ultimate end being obviously useless for the immediate guidance of conduct. 4 Every collocation of circumstances has its best.' ' The good is perfectly individualized.' ' It is no rigid standard.' ' Its unit is the concrete act.' (Pp« 108, 112 Passim.} In other words, the real end is always the content of some special act, performed with its own space and time considerations involved in it. This strikes me personally as excellent ethical doctrine; but what de- mand is there then for the ultimate goal furnished by metaphysics ? How does that give foundation in any sense for the concrete ideals with which man is actually concerned ? Mr. D'Arcy gives two an- swers, or two perhaps reducible to one : the thought of the far away goal helps us to read the special instance ; and we judge by the ten- dency of the proximate to realize the ultimate end. As to the first answer, it is of great advantage to the individual to be aware of what he is really about in a special case, and any prin- ciple, however formal and abstract, which aids him in doing this is justified thereby. But it is not the remote goal, but simply a larger view of the present, which thus helps one. It is the reference of an act to the present society which it maintains or furthers that helps one 1To which Mr. D'Arcy adds, " But this is a defect attaching to every ideal" — yes, to every ideal metaphysically established, but to no ideal psychologically, or socially, determined, because in the latter case the ideal always is a certain set of present circumstances viewed in certain new relations and therefore no more requiring reference to some ultimate goal of the universe as a whole than does a scientific discovery or an industrial invention. 1 88 THE METAPHYSICAL METHOD IN ETHICS. see its true content ; not its reference to a society distant an infinite length of time. So far is the conception of a perfectly realized com- munity at the extreme goal of progress from helping us read the pres- ent that, on the contrary, we can only read, or put any meaning into, that conception by reference to the present. As to the other answer, that the present may be conceived as means, it simply removes all value from the present. If the present exists simply as one stage in bringing about an infinitely remote goal, it presents no imperative claims and affords no ends. Such a doctrine simply denies the doctrine that every collocation of circumstances has its own best. It makes rainbow chasing the essence of the doctrine of moral ideas. For my own part, I believe that an ethical doctrine with less ' foundations ' under it is likely to go farther and last longer. In discussing Mr. D'Arcy's book from this one standpoint of the relation of his metaphysical to his ethical theory, great injustice would be done Mr. D'Arcy if I failed to recognize his own acuteness, subtlety and frequent suggestiveness. No one can read the book without stimulation. Mr. D'Arcy's personal attitude and method as distinct from that of his philosophic position, is straightforward and ingenuous. But the use of religious presuppositions to direct philo- sophic doctrine, first this way, then that, seems to me essentially disin- genuous. Let us either explicitly hold that philosophy has no distinct right to be, but is always a form of theological apologetics ; or let us give it the same intellectual freedom that we now yield to mathematics and mechanics. Let us not, even unconsciously, give philosophy the appearance, without the substance, of an independent position. More specifically, the results of Mr. D'Arcy's investigations seem to me to give at least a negative support to the hypothesis that what ethical theory now needs is an adequate psychological and social method, not metaphysical one. JOHN DEWEY. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. INVESTIGATION OF CUTANEOUS SENSIBILITY. In spite of the recent increase of our knowledge of that most gen- eral of our senses — cutaneous sensibility — the experiments hitherto made leave one difficulty only partially solved. This difficulty is, in the first instance, of a technical nature, but it occasions secondary DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 189 disadvantages which in experiment prove greater or lesser sources of error. It consists in the accurate determining of the pressure-value to be produced on the portion of the skin under investigation. The importance of this factor in the investigation of cutaneous sensibility needs no further comment, for it is well known that the increased pres- sure, consequent on the deeper penetration of the instrument used, causes a larger area of skin to be affected. The aesthesiometers hitherto invented for the determination of degrees of pressure have not quite overcome this difficulty, for though serving to determine the pressure- value on portions of the body in a horizontal position, their applica- tion becomes difficult or impossible as soon as parts not adapting themselves to this easy posture are to be investigated ; and in any case the abnormal attitudes exercise a disturbing influence on the results of the experiment. I should like therefore to direct attention to a method of investigating cutaneous sensibility, which, originating in physiolog- ical research, may become of importance in psychology. Prof, von Frey, of Leipzig, has described this method in Berichte der mathe- mathisch-physischen Classe der Konigl. Sachsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig of July 2d, December 3d, 1894, and March 4th, 1895. It was a happy thought of the author to make use of the maximum stimulus-value of a hair of a certain length, this value being determined by the weight which the hair in curving just lifts on a pair of scales. For the different degrees of stimulation von Frey makes use of hairs of various sizes, bristles, horse-hair, beard-hair, women's hair, children's hair, cocoon-threads and glass-threads, also of similar hairs of different lengths. None of the stimulus hairs mentioned ex- ceeds a length of 40 cm. Each single hair is stuck, by means of elastic glue, to a little wooden rod 8 cm. in length and perpendicular to its axis. The little rod serves as a handle during the experiments. Having already written a detailed account of von Frey's interesting experiments for the Zeitschrift fur Psychologic und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, to which I refer the reader, I need here only mention that von Frey designates the maximum value of a stimulus hair measured by the scales as its 'force' (Kraft), that the 'pressure' (Druck) to be determined by the hair is obtained through the division of the primary value by the microscopically-measured transverse sec- tion of the hair and that, according to von Frey's investigations, sense-points differing in quality and in liminal value, are to be found on the surface of the skin. These, designated by von Frey as pressure and pain points, represent a different liminal value on the different parts of the skin. 190 INVESTIGATION OF CUTANEOUS SENSIBILITY. Having frequently worked with von Frey, subsequent developments of the researches are known to me and I may, therefore, add that careful study of the deformation-phenomena produced by pressure has caused him, with respect to the pressure-points, to alter the above men- tioned designation of the value reduced to unity. The pressure is no longer determined by the quotient s^- but by the quotient radiusfo0rfcseurface. The progress made in consequence of these experiments of von Frey is, I think, not only in the proving of difference in quality and inten- sity of the various points of the skin, but also in the possibility of ob- taining exact liminal values, and psychological science in its investi- gations must, I think, take all these factors into account. These thoughts have occupied me since my first acquaintance with von Frey's work, and the subject, it seems to me, is worthy of further discussion. How far we must take into consideration, however, in psychological questions, the relative values given by von Frey or those absolute values designated by him as 'force' will depend on the individual cases with which the investigation has to deal, and according as one is able in each individual case to preserve one or the other component constant. But it is clear that the simplicity of the method permits of the performance of exact quantitative measuring experiments on all parts of the body as soon as a series of stimulus hairs has been determ- ined on the chemical scales. It is also clear that, taking this principle as a basis, it would be easy to construct a simple, satisfactory aesthesi- ometer. This idea, in the interest of my own science in the first place I communicated to Prof, von Frey, who, after having developed it, has had two sorts of aesthesiometers constructed by the mechanician Zimmermann, of Leipzig. These deserve further notice on account of their practical usefulness. One is more adapted for clinical purposes, and will doubtless be of great service in the investigation of patholog- ical cases. It consists of a small tube of about 5 mm. in diameter and about 10 cm. in length, in which a metal rod, graduated in milli- meters, may be moved up and down. The stimulus hair is fixed to the free end of this rod with elastic glue, as already mentioned. According as the rod, with affixed stimulus hair, is moved into the tube, the hair is shortened and its pressure value immediately altered, the latter, of course, increasing with the shortening of the hair. If the hair has been measured on the crater according to its different lengths, the pressure value may be read on the graduated rod, since the transverse section remains constant. The second aesthesiometer by von Frey it, constructed on the principle of earlier instruments. It differs from these only in having yielding stimulus hairs accurately DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 191 gauged instead of hard points. Each hair is fastened into a capsule, which moves easily up and down a metal rod. The distance of the ends of the two stimulus hairs may thus be varied at will according to the experiment to be undertaken. The whole is fastened to a handle. It is needless to say that this instrument may be used with great ease in the investigation of every part of the body without necessitating any abnormal position, and I am not, I think, going too far in repeat- ing that by von Frey's stimulus hair method former difficulties are surmounted. The interest aroused of late in the investigation of skin sensation gives me hope that this short notice may direct attention to this method, the application of which will certainly not be fruitless. The arrangement of the stimulus hairs occasions some difficulty at first, but this is soon overcome by practice and more than compensated for by subsequent success. Von Frey's method has proven of great value in the treatment of diseases of the eye as also is other pathological cases. I may add to the foregoing that when one wishes to mark certain skin-points for continued investigation 10 % nitrate of silver may be applied to the skin by means of a capillary tube the walls of which must not be too thin. Injury to the nervous end-organs can in this way scarcely be apprehended. This is as a rule von Frey's method of marking skin-points under examination. I often make use of a watery solution of methyloiolet which, as I have elsewhere mentioned (Wundt. Philos. Studien, Bd. up. 137), dyes living tissues well and lastingly. In conclusion I may remark that Prof von Frey intends to publish an account of his further investigations in the course of the year. FRIEDRICH KIESOW. LEIPZIG. SUSPENSION OF THE SPATIAL CONSCIOUSNESS. A recent note in this journal by Professor Hyslop on our localiza- tion in space induces me to record a somewhat similar but even more pronounced case of suspension of the power of localization. It is to be noted that the dream which in Dr. Hyslop's cases ' switched out ' the ordinary date of localization was, unlike most dreams, accom- panied by, perhaps caused by, hallucinations of vision, such as I have described in a recent number of the Journal of Comparative Neurology. The theory which seems to have been in the narrator's mind is that the existing mental picture forcibly displaced the memory image of the I93 SUSPENSION? OF THE SPATIAL CONSCIOUSNESS. actual place occupied. The tactile and other sensations were not ade- quate to displace the vivid hallucinatory image. The question in this connection which seems of greatest interest is whether the mind, in its waking state, must (or at least always does) orientate itself, whether correctly or incorrectly. Everyone knows by unpleasant experience that the tendency to extend this orientation to correspond with the limits of our field of space-conception is very strong and, once formed, the orientation is exasperatingly persistent. I had suffered from the inconvenience of being ' turned round ' in unfamiliar places for many years until a simple expedient permanently rid me of the habit. The remedy consisted in charging the mind to suspend judgment of direc- tion until an intelligent one could be formed. After a short struggle this habit was formed and, although mistakes have occurred, they have been due in every case to imperfect or incorrect data and I have never been ' turned round ' since. But the instance which it is desired to record seems to show that the mind may be for a considerable time completely unorientated in both time and space. The experience referred to has occurred to me no more than three times and the period has in two cases been quite short, while in another the time was long enough to provide for a careful study of the state. It was some months after a return from a resi- dence in Berlin lasting several months. Meanwhile the home had been removed from Cincinnati to Granville. Yet there had been a long period of quiet routine at the new home, and the unsettled feeling which an ocean journey always produces had long since worn off. I had been for some time studying dreams and had acquired the habit of collecting my thoughts and attentively observing states following the awakening. Under these circumstances I awoke near midnight from a quiet sleep without any dream content being immanent. The room was absolutely dark and quiet. I lay at ease and it dawned upon me that I had no notion of where I was. I turned over in my mind the vari- ous sleeping apartments in which I had slept. Was this the state room of a steamer? Evidently not, for there was neither noise nor jar. Was it one of the three bed rooms I recalled in Cincinnati, or was it perhaps in Berlin? I could not tell. What had I been doing the day before ? I had not the faintest idea. The events of one pe- riod of the past seemed as vivid and t present ' as those of any other. For some reason the sequence of events seemed gone, though many isolated occurrences were clearly recalled. I lay some time waiting for the appearance of some associated chain, but none emerged. A momentary fear that I had been smitten with blindness was relieved DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 193 by a faint glimmer from the window. I then made several slight movements but could still get no idea of the shape of the room or of the position of objects in it. The necessary link was at last afforded by a movement on the part of my companion and a few tactile coordina- tions without the aid of vision. The state impressed me like that of a disembodied mind, but there seems to have been no special vascular stasis at the periphery, though it is, of course, probable that some cir- culatory changes had occurred in the brain. Tactile sensations were as usual. It thus is evident that the mind may operate in an appar- ently normal way with full consciousness and yet the correlation of vestiges necessary to localization be wholly suppressed, though other spatial reproductions are unimpaired. It is also seen that the orienta- tion does not depend on vision or any one sense, though visual ele- ments predominate when the orientation is at last affected. As I have said, this is not an isolated case, though in the other instances some sense impression has completed the spatial rapport before the state could be calmly observed. DENISON UNIVERSITY. C. L. HERRICK. FOCAL AND MARGINAL CONSCIOUSNESS. There seems to exist among a large number of recent psychological writers a strange confusion of ideas respecting one of the simplest and yet most fundamental distinctions in the science. I mean that be- tween sense content and sensation (not the content of the sensation, which is a very different thing) . The content of sense at any given time is the sum of the affectations of the lower or primary aesthesodic centres. In the visual sphere, for ex- ample, it is the totality of the immediate central reactions correspond- ing to the retinal excitations. We may think of them as distributed in the homologous parts of the tectum, but it is probable that we should add the effects of certain optic reflexes with their sesthesodic reactions, and not improbable that it will be necessary to include modifications or accretions due to changes in the cortical visual area ; however this may be, there is as yet no sensation — only sense content. Besides the contents of the higher senses there is the whole aesthesodic contin- gent from the cord, many of whose elements never are brought into consciousness except under exceptional conditions. Some of them are perhaps incompetent to enter sensation at all, except as a quale of some other sensation, because they have no localizable * tag ' suit- 194 FOCAL AND MARGINAL CONSCIOUSNESS. ing them to independent recognition or isolation. These are, how- ever, just as really part of the sense content as are colors or pains. Now it is evident to ordinary experience that, in many cases at least, the ' sensing' of a sense content is an act, not an occurrence. We fix a certain element; it is immaterial how we were impelled to the fixation of that particular element, the act is an expression of our spontaneity — a reaction of the subject. Many considerations justify us in supposing that an act of consciousness involves, on its neurological side, a reaction between the aBsthesodic and the kinesodic system of the cortex. Only so can the intimate connection between perception and various forms of innervation be explained. Here is an attractive field which it is not possible to enter now. Probably most psychol- ogists will agree that consciousness is an act, not a state, and that it is a pivotal act which takes place in the very focus of our being. The unity of consciousness may be interpreted to mean that con- sciousness is only possible when the aesthesodic and kinesodic currents affect the equilibrium of the entire mechanism of consciousness. It seems possible to conceive of the situation as an instance of most com- plicated equilibrium where each element of the conscious mechanism contributes its tension to the balance of the whole. However this tension is affected, a conscious state may follow. It will be under- stood that on a purely dynamic theory there is no question of spatial unity, only of a common form of action. Letting this crudely-expressed concept serve for present purposes, we are prepared to consider what takes place when any given content of sense is presented to the mechanism of consciousness. If it is a given color, for example, then the balance is disturbed in a certain characteristic way at the moment it is admitted. We perceive a color. If, instead of the color, a retinal picture of great complexity, say a landscape, is presented, the equilibrium is disturbed in a differ- ent way, though one which produces an instantaneous impression of as truly a simple sort as the other. It differs from the former in that this one is followed by the after-shower of innumerable vestigeal im- pressions from the optic and other associated areas which, each in turn, affect the equilibrium of the mechanism of consciousness. We insist that there must be in this ultimate mechanism of consciousness an absolute succession. A wave of consciousness in the sense in which it is postulated by James, and especially by Morgan, is incon- sistent with any conceivable means of bringing sense impressions to consciousness. There are, it is true, in the sense content of vision audition and tactile sense, distinct apparatuses for producing focal and DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 195 marginal impressions. These are associated with localization and are most important in their bearing on the development of ideas of space, but the difference between them is one of degree or kind, not of order or succession, and would afford the same result whether reported cotem- poraneously or successively. Just, then, as the various intensities of sense impressions afford a basis for focal and marginal sense contents, so a perspective of vestiges may be presented to consciousness, but we believe it a false use of analogy to claim that there are in cotem- porary consciousness both focal and marginal elements. We do not conceive that consciousness is bound by the same limi- itations as its intermediary mechanism, nor that it is proper to apply to it the predicates of succession or of time, but, in as much as we are concerned with the intermediary mechanism, the distinctions here in- sisted on seem to us important.1 C. L HERRICK. DKNISON UNIVERSITY. NATURAL HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL. Permit me to remark, with reference to Dr. Hume's review of my Naturgeschichte des Verbrechers (p. 408, Vol. II. of the REVIEW), that its author seems not to possess sufficient knowledge of the Ger- man language to do full justice to a German author. Only on this supposition can I explain his remark that I * have not only a very slight acquaintance with general psychology, ' but that in my book * there are references of contempt for those branches of study. ' This latter judgment is absolutely erroneous ; as to that, I refer only to the great number of books, on general psychology and psychology of ethics, which I have translated from the originals of H. Hoffding, C. Lange, H. Ellis, C. Lombroso, E. Ferri, and others. Before expres- sing his feeling of deep disappointment with my chapter on c Crim- inal Psychology,' Dr. Hume might have made reference to the pref- ace, where I said, that I have been constrained to give only a short sketch of the fundamental problems of ' Criminal Psychology, ' hop- ing to publish later my researches on murderers, vagabonds and cheaters. Dr. Hume's imperfect knowledge reveals itself best in the manner in which he translates the title of the book : Science of the Criminal. 1The view that the higher orders of physical coordination are especially provided for in the cortex of the frontal lobes has received experimental support through the researches of Bainchi. See Brain : IV., 1895. 196 THINKING, FEELING, DOING. I have not the least idea of writing on the ' Science of the Criminal.' At the best it is possible to-day to give only the outlines of a 'Natural History of the Criminal,' and this is the title of my book. BRIEG. DR. KURELLA. THINKING, FEELING, DOING. A review of my book in the last volume of THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW has come to my notice. It contains some statements that are quite misleading. I will pass over the injustice done to a book when its material and its form are criticised according to a standard with which it has absolutely no relation ; it is a cheap and frequent method of exhibiting a young critic's superiority to judge a popular book as if it were intended to be a scientific treatise for the strictest specialists. I am, however, entitled to protest against the attempt to make it appear that my book is merely an adaptation of Wundt without proper credit. Your reviewer, for example, complains that, after stating that I am about to quote a few pages from Wundt, I put quotation marks around a couple paragraphs only. To any careful reader the text shows quite clearly that whereas the material is quoted from Wundt, there are minor changes and condensations in expression such as to render quotation marks not allowable except where used. At any rate, when an author expressly states that he is about to quote a few pages, it is but fair to take him at his word, whether he uses quotation marks or not. The critic again speaks of other quotations from Wundt with- out reference. These reduce to two paragraphs of pure matter of fact which were taken from Wundt, but which were scarcely entitled to a reference, as they consisted of the merest every day matters with no original thought. If the reader will only turn to the book itself he will find that I have given to Wundt and his books about all the credit a man can give. Finally, the worst injustice of this attempt to make it appear that not enough credit is given to the master lies in the disregard of facts like the following : The preface speaks of Wundt as * the greatest of psychologists ; ' the first chapter quotes him repeatedly ; two other chapters contain special quotations ; to the necessary rule of 1 no references ' an exception was made in favor of Wundt's Vorles- ungen; the only footnote reference allowed in the book calls particu- lar attention to a translation of Wundt ; and finally the last chapter contains a biography of Wundt with a bibliography of his works and DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 197 the brightest tribute to his genius that the author could think of. It seems to me that I could hardly have done more to express the obliga- tions of my book and myself to him. In fact, I intended to make the book a popular tribute to his genius and an acknowledgment of my obligations to him. I am happy to say that the tribute has been ac- cepted with the kindest expressions from the master, and I sincerely trust that the large sale of the book has carried the news of his fame into nearly every American household. E. W. SCRIPTURE. This acknowledgment to Wundt is both timely and honorable. The reviewer must have been very stupid, as well as young and supe- rior, for apparently he failed to make intelligible the most important part of his criticism. Messrs. Creighton and Titchener are the gentlemen to whom above all others explanations and apologies are due. But their names do not appear here. Possibly they will feel, however, that Dr. Scripture's explanation is sufficiently luminous and inclusive to be satisfactory without any definite mention of them. And any- way, forbearance will be a necessary virtue. For the book by taking icfuge in 'nearly every American household' has obviously outrun all possbility of successful pursuit. JAMES R. ANGELL. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. The Growth of the Brain : A. Study of the Nervous System in Relation to Educatian. By H. H. DONALDSON, London, Walter Scott. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. 365. This book has been written with such complete appreciation of the requirements of the best scientific method, and the author has shown such untiring patience in collecting and analyzing all the facts which could be made useful, that he deserves to have ascribed to him that besoin de la verite which Louis speaks of as a so much rarer gift than the taste for scientific investigation, with which so many set out on their work. The only real criticism which we have to make is that the range of subjects is so great that the reader, unless well versed in the literature of neurology and anthropology, must find his progress slow and laborious. The style is clear, but the statements are, neces- sarily, concise and condensed. The very richness in data which makes the book so valuable, also makes it one of which it is difficult to give any adequate sketch within the short space of a review. As giving an idea of the wealth of material utilized, it may be noted that no less than sixty-four tables of figures are reproduced and studied. How may we best hope so to modify the nervous systems of indi- viduals and races that the work which they do will be more and more effective? This is the question for which Dr. Donaldson would be glad to find an answer, but he recognizes, more clearly than do the eager parents, teachers and physicians to whom the same problem presents itself, that before we can approach the solution we must learn to know under what laws the development of the nervous system normally goes on and what the conditions are that make the brain a better organ, independently of education. Neither the brilliant achievements of formal education nor the prog- ress that civilized races have made in their pursuit of knowledge are a sufficient warrant that a superior and better type of brain is being created. ''Knowledge comes, for the hindrances to knowledge are in a large measure from without, but wisdom, as heretofore, continues to linger, and still to occupy its place as the rare performance of the balanced brain." 198 PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 199 The first chapter contains a concise statement of the best biological researches in the study of growth. The whole of this is important, especially so is the reminder that, in the human nervous system at least, the production of new cells ceases some time before birth, and that the rate of growth, which, after birth, depends on the increase in size of cells, diminishes rapidly from birth onward (Minot and others). But though no new cells are formed after birth, the capacity for physiological development is not quite so fatally restricted as one might imagine, since there is always a reserve of nerve elements which do not, in the first instance, fully develop, but remain capable, to a certain extent, of subsequent change. The life of any individual is practically a process of adaptation to surroundings, and this is marked at every point by a specialization of function, which leads eventually, when the power or adaptation be- comes less, to impairment of coordinated activity and finally to death. It is not improbable that a law of this sort governs the life not only of individuals, but of species. The special study of the growth of the brain is introduced by a brief but excellent analysis of the observations through which the laws of growth of the body as a whole have been ascertained, and then the relative growth of the different parts of the body is studied, with constant comparison of males and females. The writer's search- ing review of the various researches upon the weight of the brain and spinal cord at different ages, in the different sexes, and as related to size of the body and to intellectual eminence, will long be consulted as an impartial statement of the case, although, as he says, it is plain that the facts * ' contribute mainly to a healthy scepticism concerning the current interpretations of brain weight." It is impossible to judge by the scales alone about the intellectual capacity of a given person, or even whether he was healthy, criminal or insane. Where the weight falls below a certain minimal point, indeed, we are justified in assuming a defective mind, but here questions of structure come in which the author next proceeds to study. It has already been pointed out that growth consists partly of cell multiplication, partly of an increase in the size of the cells. A care- ful estimate shows that at the end of the first twelve weeks of foetal life the volume of the nervous system is about 2.25 cm. cm. By this time the number of nerve elements, or neuroblasts, has pretty much reached its limit, which is somewhere near three thousand million. The volume of the adult nervous system may be estimated as 1005 cm. cm., and, therefore, the average increase of size of each neuroblast is 200 THE GROWTH OF THE BRAIN. nearly five hundred times, though in fact the increase in the case of of many of them is many times as great as this. "The determination of the number of neuroblasts occurs so early in the history of the individual, and under such uniform conditions, -that it is very difficult to regard the environment as possessed of much power to cause variation in this respect, and for this reason, among members of the same race a high degree of constancy in this character is to be anticipated. The influence of the surrounding conditions be- comes much more effective during the later stages of development that accompany the enlargements of the elements already formed, and it is during this period that adaptive modifications may occur." (p. 162.) In the next chapter the following significant questions are asked and provisionally answered : "i. By what means does the brain of the new-born attain the weight found in the adult, and decrease again during old age?" The greatest factor in both the increase and the decrease is the gain and loss affecting the medullary substance which surrounds the processes of the nerve cell. 44 2. Why do tall persons have heavier brains?" This is probably due to increase in the size of the nervous and non- nervous elements arising from the greater cranial space allotted them for growth. 44 3. What significance is to be attatched to the fact that the brain- weight is different in different races ?" The provisional picture to be formed of the brains belonging to those races least capable mentally is that of one in which the number of cell elements is approximately similar to that in the most capable races; but many of these elements being but partially developed, the organization of the brain is less per- fect, though the size is not thereby greatly reduced. 44 4. What significance is to be attached to the difference in brain weight existing between men and women?" (and found, strangely enough, even among the defective classes.) This difference must depend on the fact that the structural ele- ments in the encephalon of the female are smaller than those in the male, and it is probable that, other things being equal, the larger cells have more stored up energy and permit of more complete organiza- tion. The writer then gives a summary of the architecture and structure of the brain and cord which is full of interest. It hardly admits of analysis in a short review. In the course of it he refers to his own careful investigation of the brain of Laura Bridgman. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 2OI The chapters of most interest to the educator are those in which the physiological rhythms which characterize the nervous functions are dwelt upon at some length ; then those which deal with fatigue and old age. The two final chapters are devoted to the study of education and to the statement of the ' wider view.' These deserve to be read in detail, and the reviewer will think his task sufficiently well per- formed if he has indicated on how wide a basis of positive data Dr. Donaldson's moderate but interesting practical conclusions are built up. JAMES J. PUTNAM. HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL. Mental Development in the Child and the Race: Methods and Processes. JAMES MARK BALDWIN. New York, Macmillan & Co. 1895. (2d edition, 1895.) Pp. xvi+496. Professor Baldwin's most recent book has already received much attention, and hardly needs introduction to the readers of this REVIEW. The volume is founded upon essays previously published ; but in its wholeness it is an essentially new piece of work, which constitutes, so far, its author's most mature and original contribution to his sci- ence. It contains an uncommon union of decidedly special, em- pirical observations with comparatively recondite and very far-reach- ing evolutionary speculations. The present reviewer, as himself pro- fessionally disposed to the speculative, may very properly give his at- tention mainly to the latter aspect of the book, although well recog- nizing the high merits of the other aspect. In its literary character this work, always as to all the details of the exposition pleasantly and stimulatingly written, is still in some of its most important features disappointingly obscure. Professor Bald- win's habit of referring to coming chapters for the explanation of the points that his present argument leaves unelucidated is too insistent, and has caused perplexity to more readers than one. Perhaps an au- thor who deals especially with the phenomena of 'accommodation* may be doing well to enable the reader to make numerous subjective observations of the accommodation process while getting used to a novel and complex train of thought ; but has not Professor Baldwin gone in this respect too far ? To be sure he can be, and often is, so clear, especially as to the single sentence, illustration or argumenta- tive point, that we are often most of all baffled in trying to make out why it is that just the connected whole, the unity, the total bearing of his reasoning, long escapes our close attention. Yet the result, when we get it, repays a good deal of trouble. 202 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. How does an organism come to make novel adjustments ? How can new habits of a useful kind get formed? How can mind grow? What is the basis for the organization of experience, viewed as novel experience? In fine, how is 'accommodation' to be psychologically and biologically explained, in the individual* and in the race? Here is the central problem about which Professor Baldwin's evolutionary speculations are grouped. Of old the organization of experience, as studied by the psychologists who followed in Locke's footsteps, and who developed the association psychology, meant primarily the group- ing of the impressions and ideas, or of the Herbartian Vorstellungen, viewed as data received, retained and associated. That the experience of the mind influences conduct was regarded as a matter of relatively sec- ondary import in the study of mental growth. But nowadays the psychologist is dissatisfied with confining his attention to these mental data, in so far as they merely come to the mind. One observes that the experience of a live creature is useful to the possessor only in so far as this experience influences the movements, organizes the conduct, calls forth or adapts the adjustments of the creature itself ; and since Spencer's Psychology the problem of the organization of mental ex- perience has been inseparable from the evolutionary problem regarding the acquisition of serviceable motor habits upon the basis of sensory stimulations. Every evolutionary psychologist attempts more or less elaborately and explicitly to trace the beginnings and the growth of mentally significant adaptations, and to correlate what we know of mental processes with such adaptations. In this field the well-known hypotheses relate, on the one hand, to the influence of natural selection upon the evolution of mentally significant capacities for motor adjust- ment, and, on the other hand, to the variously interpreted relations of pleasurable and painful stimulation to the modification of motor pro- cessses. Professor Baldwin's contribution to this discussion may be briefly indicated, but cannot be quite fairly developed within the present limits. After devoting considerable attention (p. 180 sqq.) to an ar- gument showing that the experience of the pleasurable or painful re- sults of movements once made cannot be relied upon as a factor suffi- cient to explain the way whereby an organism not already provided with useful motor adjustments may acquire such adjustments, Pro- fessor Baldwin proceeds henceforth, in his speculations, upon the postulate that, in order to explain the origin of specific accommoda- tions, i. e., of definitely useful motor adjustments, "a theory of adap- tation must have reference to the repetition of stimulations, funda- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 203 mentally, not of movements" (p. 451). One must suppose, namely, that, in advance of all definite habits of motor adjustment, and in the absence of inherited tendencies to definite acts, a virgin organism (if we may use the phrase) — one standing at the outset of the evolution- ary process — possesses just one, highly generalized, but essentially plastic motor tendency, whose origin (p. 203 et passim) one must refer to natural selection. This is the twofold tendency to expand in the presence of stimulations which exalt, and to contract in the pres- ence of those stimuli which depress vitality. That such simple reac- tions to the presence of light, of food and of injurious objects exist and are universal amongst organisms of even the lowliest type is well known. The present theory supposes that the stimulations which cause expansion are pleasurable, and that those which cause contrac- tion are painful. But now the expansion tendency is the representa- tive of a vital 'excess,' an overflow of energy. From its nature it tends to lead the organism in question nearer to the source of the advantageous stimulation, and hereby it tends to produce a ' repeti- tion' of this stimulation, which again results in further excess, and in more movements of the same sort. This tendency to move so as to secure a repetition of the favorable stimulus involves, however, at every step, by reason of the very excess which is essential to the process, relatively novel movements. If these new movements, in so far as painful accidents do not check their appearance, tend to get fixed, as they do, in the form of habits, the organism, wherever it is exposed, thereafter, to new stimuli, will now be no longer virgin. For, in addition to its original and generalized tendency to expansion and contraction, it will henceforth have definite tendencies to certain movements. The nature of these movements, in view of their origin, and in view of the fact that all pain-giving or even useless accidental accompaniments of the excess process have tended to be excised by the original tendencies to draw back from the painful, and to emphasize the pleasurable stimuli, will be such that the newly acquired move- ments will be apt to repeat stimuli of a certain type. Henceforth the now trained organism will more and more tend to this type of 4 circular reaction,' moving in the presence of certain types of stimuli so as to repeat or to enforce them ; moving in the presence of other stimuli (viz. painful stimuli) so as to avoid repeating them. Upon this ' circular ' type of reaction, as Professor Baldwin ingeniously in- sists, the remainder of the process of mental evolution is founded. This is the type to which, as readers of Professor Baldwin's remark- able paper in Mind and readers of this REVIEW well know, our 204 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. author applies the general name imitation. Every new type of imita- tive or circular reaction once thus acquired becomes a basis for further modification or adaptation through the influence of new stimulations, whose effectiveness, in all pleasurable cases, will be ensured through the very existence of the repetition tendency itself. On high levels the circular reaction appears as the act of attention, whereby the effect of a given stimulation is, through repetition, so heightened as to en- sure its effectiveness in causing accommodations. " In general" (p. 179) "the law of excess may be stated," says Professor Baldwin, "somewhat as follows: The accommodation of an organism to a new situation is secured, apart from happy accidents, by the continued or repeated action of that stimulation, and this repetition is secured, not by the selection beforehand of this stimulation, nor by its fortuitous occurrence alone, but by the proximate reinstatement of it by a dis- charge of the energies of the organism, concentrated as far as may be for the excessive stimulation of the organs most nearly fitted by former habit to get this stimulation again." Granted the repetition, and the accompanying excess, then the organism gets adapted ' by chance ad- justments occurring among excessive diffused movements' (p. 198) ; since the process of repetition tends to favor these movements, so that ere long they become habits. A crucial case for this theory of the acquisition of new fashions of movement is furnished by the phenomena which (p. 373) first at- tracted our author's personal attention to the considerations that now have taken form in his theory. These are the phenomena of the rise of volition in the child. Volition, our author insists, is a phenome- non, at the outset, of 'persistent imitation,' of the 'try-try-again' ten- dency of the child. In so far as an organism inherits tendencies which early, under the influence of pleasure-pain experiences, get welded, without deliberation, into even complex movements, such as are involved in holding the head erect (p. 390), Professor Baldwin does not consider these cases of volition. The acts that thus early get established may, by reason of the generally imitative character which all the organic responses to the environment must possess, appear, in children, as simple imitations. But these simple imitations, acts which, without deliberation, tend to reproduce given stimuli, are not yet voluntary. On the other hand, in the case of the ' persistent imita- tions,' the child has a model before it, and is first stimulated by this model to an act of more or less inaccurate involuntary imitation. Hereupon, however, the child is dissatisfied with the presented con- trast that now appears between its model and this imperfect imitation. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 205 The dissatisfaction gets expressed in an intensely attentive tendency to watch the objective model, and to repeat with variations the imita- tive act. The resulting process of trial and error may be a very ex- tended one, the attention to this process may be long repeated, until at last the imitation comes to resemble the model enough to satisfy the child. This process constitutes, in Professor Baldwin's account, the first appearance of true volition, since here is an ideal, long attentively held before consciousness, and the gradual and persistent adjustment of means to ends. These being, according to our author, the observed facts, it remains still to indicate the theory of the process of persistent imi- tation. Why this strained attention, this long pursuit of the ideal, and why — here is, of course, the more difficult question — why and how does this process of persistent variation of the first response to the model gradually tend to the establishment of acts which actually re- peat the model more closely than the first act did ? Professor Baldwin's theory as to this matter is best stated on page 453 : "In persistent imitation the first reaction is not repeated. Hence we must suppose the development of a function of coordination by which the two regions excited by the original suggestion and the reaction Jirst made coalesce in a common more 'voluminous and in- tense stimulation of the motor centre. A movement is thus pro- duced which, by reason of its greater mass and diffusion, includes more of the elements of the movement seen and copied. This is again reported by eye or ear, giving a new excitement, which is again coordinated with the original stimulation, and with the after-effects of the earlier imitations. The result is yet another motor stimulation or effort of still greater mass and diffusion, which includes yet more ele- ments of the * copy.' And so on, until simply by its increased mass, including the motor excitement of attention itself, by the greater range and variety of the motor elements thus enervated, in short, by the excess discharge the < copy ' is completely reproduced. This, it is evident, is just the principle of ' excess,' and it is very easy to find in it the origin of the attention. The attention is the mental function corresponding to the habitual motor coordination of the processes of heightened or 'excess' discharge." In this conception, it will be noted, the general theory of excess, as stated above, is applied to the special case of volition, by the hypoth- esis that the being who possesses the power to acquire voluntary skill differs from beings lower in the scale by the presence, in his case, of centers of coordination where the continuation of the stimulus that 206 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. produced the primary or simple imitation meets, later, with the result- ing stimulus due to the perception of the imperfect copy. The result of this meeting is a new and more intense motor stimulation, invol- ving at once attention and diffused new motor processes. That some of these new motor processes result in agreement with ' more ele- ments ' of the model is due simply to the fact that they are more numerous and diffuse than were the motor processes of the first imita- tion. And volition is now present, just because volition involves an element of persistent anticipation of a complex act that, when it conies, is to realize an ideal. The natural question arises here, as in Professor Baldwin's other discussions of the results of the excess process, why it is that, when the successful imitation at last results from this process of excessive stim- ulation, the unnecessary or unfitting portions of the motor excess fall away. While the child is learning, in this persistent imitation, the essence of the process, according to the theory, is that the stimulation of the ' coordination-center, ' through the combined sensory effects of the model and of the resulting imperfect efforts to imitate it, leads to excessively diffuse movements, some of which, by virtue of the mere diffusion, tend to produce results agreeing with the model. But since many of these diffuse movements of excess (such as kicking, tongue- movements, and the like incidents of the strain of learning) do not tend to make successful copies of the model, why do they later disap- pear and leave the successful imitative deed to become a settled hab- itual acquisition? Professor Baldwin's response to this question is (p. 445, cf. p. 377) that "When muscular effort thus succeeds, by the simple fact of in- creased mass and diffusion of reaction, the useless elements fall away because they have no emphasis." Or, as p. 377 states the case, 'the useless elements fall away because they are useless.' It seems plain that considerations equally undeveloped govern our author wherever he speaks of that elimination of the useless or unadaptive elements of the excess-discharge which all grades of the process of accommodation, from the lowest up, appear to involve. Surely the very nature of the excess-discharge, in advance of definite adaptation, must be that it gen- erally involves useless reactions quite as probably as useful reactions. The only apparent exception to this would be furnished by the prim- itive expansion movements noticed above. They, it may be said, inevitably involve a tendency to reinforce their stimulation, and to con- tinue its presence, because the expanded organism will, as such, offer more surface to the source of stimulation. But as soon as one passes PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 207 from this primitive state to the case of an organism having activities already complex, adaptation through the chance results of excess will apparently occur only in connection with the initiation of many una daptive movements, which will need to be eliminated whenever the accommodation can become perfect. If one writhes or kicks in learn ing to draw, a positive theory is needed to account for the rapidity with which these unnecessary movements fall away after the occur- rence of the successful imitation ; or, even before that occurrence, since one must take theoretical account of the further fact that such excess- movements generally oppose the attainment of an accurate imitation, and must, therefore, in part, be eliminated before the first accurate imitation can occur. Of course the elimination of painful and of positively unsatisfac- tory movement is used by Professor Baldwin as a coordinate factor in this process of the reduction of the excess to its due form (see p. 143). But this does not of itself explain the inhibition of such useless ele- ments of the excess as are not directly felt to be in themselves unsatis- factory. Yet such elements might be not only present, but actually injurious to the imitation. An awkward man tries fo acquire a new imitative art. He reacts to his model, and then observes the inade- quacy of his first imitation. The perception of the incongruity excites his coordinating centers. The result is a new set of efforts, which may involve numerous excess-movements. Of these some will of themselves tend 'to include more elements' of the model. But some of them, perhaps most of them, will not only be superfluous, but will also actually stand in the way of the accomplishment of the desired aim. For, if the model is at once complex and definite, inhibition of the unnecessary will be an essential part, and, in most cases, a prelim- inary, of the first success. The immediate result will so far be that in- creased effort, in advance of inhibition, will mean failure. The 4 more elements ' of the right sort will be so mixed with ' more elements ' which lead astray, that the total results will perhaps be no gain in ac- curacy. Now, if the awkward man can himself analyze his act and discover that the inhibition of certain superfluous elements would en- sure success, then, but only then, will these superfluous acts become, by association, disagreeable to him, as hindering his ideal, and meaning failure. Thereupon the elimination of these elements will become easy to him. But surely a learner who can analyze the source of his own failure has already come to stand high, through previous suc- cess, in the imitative art. On the other hand, the really awkward man may easily be sensitive enough to be dissatisfied with his failure, and 208 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. yet may be unable to analyze the cause of his failure. He makes, in one act of persistent imitation, superfluous efforts and useful efforts. Who is to tell him which of his efforts are the superfluous ones? What influence is, in advance of success, to overcome, to inhibit, the hindering elements of the excess-process ? Their own disagreeableness as hindering elements. But it is for him, unless he is already skillful enough to analyze, only the total result whose failure is disagreeable. The superfluous parts, by themselves, cannot appear to him, sepa- rately, disagreeable enough to get inhibited, unless some preestab- lished harmony makes them so. The awkward man will try and try again, with excess and failure constantly attendant upon his efforts. The more he strains, the more superfluous efforts will he make, until the whole process ceases in painful exhaustion. Here there will be no necessary tendency of excess to secure ultimate success. Now this is no merely imaginary case. This is the process of failure in many instances of industrious awkwardness. This is what happens when we think vainly over our problems, and yet get no re- sult. This is what happens to the socially awkward, who attempt social enterprises only to get more and more lost in the chaos of their own excessive efforts. This in particular is what happens in our per- sonal relations to the people with whom, despite our best efforts, we * cannot get on.' In trying to conform to their ways we attempt useless acts of conciliation, make ineffective chance remarks, compli- cate our relations through unnecessary explanations, and yet can never quite find out what it is that makes us go wrong. The excess reactions then, as such, need not involve useful plus merely super- fluous reactions that will not positively hinder success. The excess re- actions may, and often do, involve a union, that is for the striving learner unanalyzable, of useful and of positively hindering acts. The question here is what magic in advance of success is to ensure the inhibition of the elements of hindrance thus involved in the excess dis- charged ? But does one reply, with Professor Baldwin, that actual observation of the child's imitative successes shows, first the excess reactions, and then the inhibition of the superfluous elements ? Hereupon one can but retort that the very problem of the acquisition of new habits is : How do these inhibitions of the superfluous elements take place? Does one say : Success is sometimes possible ? The obvious retort is, What particular factor leads to success when the latter does occur? To this problem, so far as the present reviewer can see, Professor Baldwin has given very scant attention. Yet, unless this problem is PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 209 definitely faced and solved, an appeal to the facts of excess, interest- ing as it is, must prove wholely inadequate to show how definite new habits can get formed. For, as a fact, whoever learns a new habit, either by persistent imitation, or by some less intelligent process, learns more numerous inhibitions than he does positive adjustments. This appears to be true low down in the animal scale as well as higher up, and the difficulty developed in the foregoing is one of a very general application. If excess is the beginning of novel adjust- ment, selection amongst the elements of the excessive reactions to in- teresting stimuli involves much more than the merely superior empha- sis given to certain of these reactions by their pleasure-giving charac- ter, or even by their success as imitative reactions. Nor is the princi- ple that the painful elements of the excess get eliminated by reason of their painfulness a sufficient account of how the needed inhibitions oc- cur. For there remain to be accounted for the vast number of super- fluous reactions which are not directly painful, but which are indi- rectly opposed to the definiteness and success of the new habit. The animal acquiring a novel skill in watching for prey must learn to sup- press numerous signs of excitement which will indirectly hinder the success of its quest. How shall the principle of excess and selection work here ? The excitement-phenomena will belong to the excess- wave. Whence will come the selection? From the animal's own intelligent observation of the hindrances that result from these super- fluous acts ? But it is the origin of just such intelligence that we are here tracing. No intelligence of this grade can exist unless definite successes have already given the animal a criterion for judging its own failures. The imitative animal must learn, and does learn, to be silent and hide when the others do so, to stand still and watch when the others do so, and in countless other ways to imitate inhibitory deeds and attitudes. But in the case of the imitation of inhibitions, how is the excess, merely as such, to contain ' more and more ' ele- ments that gradually conform to a model whose very essence is that its outward appearance involves a suppression of elements, the nega- tive fact of the absense of certain groups of deeds. On the other hand, to explain all these inhibitions as due to the experience of the painful results of the acts suppressed is simply to abandon the region where a theory of imitation ought to have most scope, viz : the region of the imitation of inhibitions, or of acts in so far as they involve inhibi- tions. For, as pointed out, every complex positive act involves more inhibitions than it does positive activities. Now, it is indeed true that Professor Baldwin has given some at- 210 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. tention to the conditions of inhibition and of selective self control. But so far as the present reviewer is able to understand the very sum- mary observations upon p. 473, our author appears to regard the prob- lem of inhibition as altogether a secondary one. On p. 456 we do indeed find stated, as in several other passages, the 4 problem of se- lection,' with some indication that the excess-function needs a selec- tive accompaniment over and above the ones upon which our author lays most stress. And, as Professor Baldwin here adds: "Inatten- tion we have, undoubtedly, the one selective function of conscious- ness." One expects to find, accordingly, in the subsequent discussion of attention a genetic explanation of the obviously inhibitory charac- ter which forms so large an aspect of every attentive process. But what one finds is a valuable development of the doctrine of the posi- tive motor elements of attention. At the end comes the passage of p. 473: uThe theory of motor development now worked out throws much light also on the whole vexed question of muscular control — the regulation of movement in amount and direction, and its suppres- sion, etc." There follow two or three sentences regarding the positive aspect of control, and then the words : "And negative control or inhi- bition represents, in general, the limitations which old organic ways of action impose upon our ways ; the new must conform, if possible, to old organic 'copy.'" Surely, this means, if anything, that the presence of inhibition, at least where the latter is not a direct case of the results of painful stimulation, is due to the influence of old imitative functions already set in the organism. The present review- er's difficulty is, however, that some sort of inhibitory process, not wholly due to directly painful stimulation, must be posited in order that the first important selections from any excess reactions should take place; that Professor Baldwin's discussion everywhere silently presupposes the presence of just such an inhibitory aspect of the whole selective process; that the dropping of the superfluous reactions, merely because they are not emphasized by success, is wholly insuffi- cient to explain the actual selection upon which all new adaptation depends ; that, as every teacher knows, some dropping of the superflu- ous is, in general, a necessary preliminary to success in novel adapta- tions ; and that, therefore, in the absence of any teacher to do the in- hibiting, the organism itself must contain the conditions for such inhi- bition of the superfluous ; and that, in fine, without such primary in- hibition, no theory of excess reactions can possibly explain the acquisition of definite new habits. To conclude, then, the theory of the origin of imitation will be, in PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 211 the present reviewer's opinion, whenever it comes, a theory of the origin of inhibition quite as much as a theory of excess functions. The presence and importance of the latter, the excess functions, Pro- fessor Baldwin has, indeed done well to recognize ; but the theory as he leaves it is essentially incomplete, for the lack of any genuine ex- planation of the selective process everywhere presupposed by the whole discussion. Despite this essential gap in this theory, the volume be- fore us is so full of ingenious observation and of courageous specula- tion, as to leave no enlightened reader in doubt of its author's power both to see and to think, and doubtless, ere long, to lead us further into the world where he has already done such admirable work. Agreeing fully, as the present writer does, with the prominence given in this book to the value of imitation for the whole of the higher mental processes, rejoiced as Prof. Baldwin's reviewer is to find in many pages doctrines as to the psychology both of imitation itself, and of the intelligence generally which he would have been glad, in- deed, to have been able to express himself, one can only regret, in closing, that the foregoing comments have often been as negative as they have been. But it is by temporary disagreement that our com- mon interests often find themselves in the end best furthered. HARVARD UNIVERSITY. JOSIAH ROYCE. Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling. HIRAM M. STANLEY. London, Sonnenschein ; New York, Macmillan. 1895. Pp. VIII+392. $2.25 net. Mr. Stanley's book is, in my opinion, an interesting and important contribution to genetic psychology. It takes up the Spencerian for- mulation of the problem of mental development — the interpretation of the functions of the individual consciousness in the light of race-utility — and attempts to throw light on this question by the introspective method. As far as such a problem can be approached by such a method, Mr. Stanley approaches it ; but he cannot, I think, discover in the adult mind a science of mental embryology. With this essen- tial limitation of method — a limitation which is not accidental, but which Mr. Stanley defends — his results are rich in suggestiveness, and mark the author as entitled to a high place among contemporary au- thors in developmental psychology. This the more because his re- sults are peculiarly his own, as his method necessarily makes them. With this general appreciation of the book, which I do not intend the criticisms which follow in any way to impair, I may set out a few 212 EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY OF FEELING. points of the more essential results which the author reaches, and speak to them from my own point of view. Mr. Stanley makes pain-consciousness primitive — what he calls 'pure pain.' It is accommodation agent through the 'will-effort' which it leads the animal to make in order to rid itself of the pain. Pleasure consciousness is a later state arising between want-pain and excess-pain. The derivative character of pleasure is argued at some length, but with arguments of an introspective character ; although here as elsewhere Mr. Stanley deserts his method by appealing to the child consciousness and hints at biological facts. I think that all the points made can be met by facts from biology and child-psychology ; but this is not necessary, since Mr. Stanley says in another place (28) in answer to points made by Mr. Marshall that he is not concerned to maintain this thesis and is quite willing to believe that pleasure and pain are equally primitive. This is generous, certainly, but it shows the essential weakness of the author's method. The point at issue here, I venture to think, is one of the most fundamental in all the theory of development. A number of Mr. Stanley's own later doc- trines rest upon the probable truth of the claim that pain alone is primitive accommodation agent. And the admission made here that it is not, weakens the ground theory of the book all the way through. The second element of Mr. Stanley's conception of the fundamen- tal reaction, i. e., 'will-effort,' finds no analysis or discussion that I can see anywhere in the work. It seems to be assumed along with pain as an ultimate characteristic of mental life. But even then we ought to have some notion of how it works to bring about the adapta- tions of the organism. This great defect is what I referred to above in defining Mr. Stanley's problem as the problem of race development. The parallel question of individual development — the ontogenetic question — seems not to have occurred to him. And yet, is not that just the question for which the introspective method is available? Here it seems to me Mr. Stanley shows a little want of touch with the discussions of current psychology — a sort of personal isolation, as it were. Why does he not bring in some reference to the recent discus- sions of motor phenomena, kinaesthetic doctrines of voluntary action, reduction of will-effort to a sensational basis, etc. Surely these the- ories are the most formidable opposites to the vague postulate of will- effort, which he fails even to define. The resource of child-psychol- ogy? which Mr. Stanley ranks next in importance to simple introspec- tion, should g;.ve him an inkling of the need of settling this great problem. Spencer saw the necessity for a theory of the individual's PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 213 adaptations — the more, perhaps, because of his Lamarckism in the doctrine of heredity; but there, in heredity, is another question the importance of which Mr. Stanley seems not to have appreciated. I do not mean these things as criticisms of a positive kind, in the face of Mr. Stanley's modest assurance that the book is only a series of stud- ies. But yet when he uses phrases equivalent to 4 will-effort' so freely, it can not fail to occur to the reader that it is a bridge of thin ice over these yawning caverns. Again I think Mr. Stanley's free — I almost said indiscriminate — use of the principle of ' variations with natural selection ' leads to little new truth. Cognition is a variation (6173) under which sensation, percep- tion, memory, etc., are all variations. Attention, self-sense, and so on everywhere — all are variations. And then Mr. Stanley seems to think, that his problem is solved when he has pointed out some intro- spective or speculative utility which, in the mind of the psychologist, should justify this or that variation — after the fact. This gives a set of small unimportant problems which each one can settle for himself, as he thinks the facts i most likely' were. But it is as if the biologist should say : The law of variations with utility solves the question of life ; and for this organ or that, its utility assumed, its use was prob- ably this or that. The biologist, on the contrary, goes to pa- leontology and morphology, and those are the fields where the real facts are found to justify the theory of evolution. The psychologist has his paleontology in the animals around him and his morphology in the nursery. And while, of course, we have immeasurable difficul- ties to deal with, yet the real emphasis is thus thrown on the problem of individual or ontogenetic development, where the actual utilities may be seen in operation. It is not a mere question of surmise as to this utility or that. I do not insist on this here because it is a matter of per- sonal conviction which I have recently urged at length in my book on Mental Development. The principle of circular reaction which I became convinced was of the first importance in the development of the individual development seemed applicable then in race develop- ment as well. Whatever may be thought of such a particular sort of formulation, I am yet more than ever convinced, by this able book of Mr. Stanley's, that no mere introspective or descriptive surmises about race-utilities can take the place of some such principle of unity arrived at first by way of the ontogenetic problem. This point of criticism holds, in my view, all the way through the book. The chapter on the 'self-feeling' is full of keen verbal distinc- tions, most of them true to introspection as matters of description, 214 E VOL UTIONA RY PS YCHOL OGY OF FEELING. most of them requiring a general appeal to the law of variations, and many of them important for general psychology. But Mr. Stanley draws inferences for race-development on such grounds ; and whether we agree with him or not depends largely upon whether we follow his distinctions and accept his definitions — and then what is the out- come ? Why this : that so, and so, was probably the utility which the animal found in becoming self-conscious ! But let us once turn to the field of morphology, the nursery, and enquire into the actual condi- tions under which the sense of personality arises, and I think one of the two most compelling and conspicuous factors in the whole group of phenomena, is just a factor which introspection has not revealed to Mr. Stanley at all — though even by that method I think he should have got glimpses of it — the fact, namely, that the sense of self — using the term in Mr. Stanley's sense 'as a reflection of experience upon itself — ' by which the individual becomes aware of its own activities as its own* (254) — comes by way of the progressive social consciousness. And if this be true would not the variation in the race series which the self-sense supposes (254) involve this differentia as well as that deduced from the direct interpretation of the private pleasures and pains of the organism ? And so be a much later thing than his introspec- tion suggests? This I do not mean to argue; but only to say that in the one case we are in the domain of live concrete facts, sufficiently ob- jective to have positive verification ; and moreover we are at a stage of the individual's development at which the elementary facts which we want to observe are likely to be found. To speak again of my per- sonal views, I find with Professor Royce that the sense of self may be treated with some degree of explaining force by the principle of 'circular' or 'imitative' reaction, drawn from ontogenetic observa- tions. The chapter on attention is, from the point of view of the criticism made above, the most inadequate in the book. Mr. Stanley makes attention the great vehicle of ' will-effort ; ' thus throwing it in any case, I suppose, on the active side, the motor side, in the process of develop- ment. But as for ' will-effort,' so a fortiori for attention, we must ask : how does it work ? What apparatus does it use ? How does it effect organic or ideal accommodation ? To these and the almost in- numerable questions besides which come irresistibly up when one thinks of the attention genetically, Mr. Stanley has no answer, be- cause he does not ask them. Certainly the bare .phrase 'will-effort,' with its equivalents, is not at all illuminating. I have left for the last the treatment of the Emotions, in many re- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 215 spects the most interesting and valuable parts of the book. This is so, I think, because in this field there are many introspective distinctions to be made, and also because the expressive characteristics of the grosser emotional qualities are so well differentiated objectively as to suggest interesting race utilities. Fear and anger are treated in detail with subtlety and profit. Fear is primitive emotion, and emotion is fundamentally ' pain at pain.' This formula means that emotional pain is due to revival of painful object with consciousness that it is painful (67) , (98) . This latter element is essential and constitutes the difference between emotion-pain and pure-pain. In this discussion Mr. Stanley lays all the emphasis on pain, none on pleasure, except to point out the contrast of the two qualities of emotion. The duality here, I sup- pose, is possible because emotion as revival-state does not occur until after pure-pain has differentiated itself into pain and pleasure states. And yet the organic evidence, to my mind, points the other way, namely, to the conclusion that the contrast of pleasurable with painful emotions points to the original presence of a distinction between pleasure and pain. Furthermore, I do not think that Mr. Stanley makes out his point that emotion-pain is 'pain at pain.' The consid- eration of the evolution of emotional attitudes in recent discussion has tended to show that less rather than more stress is to be laid upon the representative element in emotion ; and more on the reflex element. The pain of emotion is largely immediate pain due to function of an hereditary kind. And even when the emotion is one learned by the animal in his own experience I think the pain of it is rather pain from the incipient revival of the reflex consequences of the cognition than from the cognition of ' pain-quality ' in the object. So of pleasure, in emotion. As far as there is a new pain or pleasure of revival, it comes from direct accommodation to present experience of object. Of course, in our high reflective lives we have plenty of 'pain at pain.' But Mr. Stanley commits the psychologist's fallacy, I think, in reading the complex formula of ' pain at pain ' down into the genetic origins of emotion states. It seems to me that the postulate of simple revival pain, either of direct stimulation or of a reflex kind, would do greater credit to the principle of natural selection and is altogether ' most likely.' The same considerations also apply to emotion-pleasure ; we would have to have a formula calling for pleasure at pleasure. Why not say that the revival of cognition pleasure is not always necessary when the object is revived, but that the object-revival tends directly to stimulate the same pleasure that the cognition did ? l *Mr. Stanley admits a direct lack-pain (pain of unreality, or non-presence) 2 1 6 E VOL UTIONAR Y PS YCHOL OGY OF FEELING. This requirement is so real, however, that it determines Mr. Stan- ley's account of desire. He argues for the old hedonistic view, coming now to lay all the emphasis on pleasure (i93f). The avoid- ance of pain is, in the realm of desire, always the pursuit ot pleasure. The complexity that this gives may be pointed out. When a man desires to avoid a painful thing, what he does is this : he pictures the thing, the painfulness of the thing, has 4 pain from the pain ' of the thing, pictures pleasure from the removal of the ' pain from the pain' of the thing (or would it be the pleasure of the removal simply of the pain of the thing? The former, I think), and, finally, has 'pleasure from the pleasure' of the pictured removal of the 'pain from the pain.' This, to me, is the outcome, in sober truth, of the hedonistic theory when complicated by Mr. Stanley's theory of « pain from pain' and ' pleasure from pleasure.' 2 And we must add to this the fact, as Mr. Stanley says, that the desire itself is painful. To take a concrete case. Suppose a child crying at the prospect of a cold bath and pleading to be let off. Does he picture the bath in revival, the pain of former baths also in re- vival, get pain from this pain, picture pleasure from the removal of this pain from the presented or revived pain, and then get sense of pleasure from this pleasure, to prompt his desire ? — this last being the end which justifies the hedonistic postulate? Surely all this, or anything like it, is not there. The child has revived symbols of the bath-act, and reflex and associated pain states with them ; these latter revive the associated shunning movement and speech tendencies, etc., and the consciousness of these latter is the desire. The end is the symbolic bath-act, pure and simple; that fills the child's consciousness up so full and its he- donic quality (not recognized mainly but refelt) is so utterly unbear- able that he bursts out in the associated movements — in this case move- ments indicating negative, so to speak, rather than positive, desire. In this difference from Mr. Stanley I have no intention of minimiz- ing the factors involved nor of discounting the real complexity of these higher evolutionary products. It is possible — or, as Mr. Stanley says so often from his introspective points of view, it may be ' most likely ' — that the process of genetic acquisition of desire has been more com- plex than the simple scheme which I have indicated. But we all in lower organisms. Why should there not be a direct lack-pain at the higher representation level — pain of unreality of object without cognition of ' pleasura- bleness' of the lacking object? 2This on the view that desire is emotion (193); and I have not introduced certain other elements included in Mr. Stanley's scheme of eight factors (208). PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 217 recognize the abbreviating processes of evolution and expect the lapsing of links which a chronological order would seem to require ; and, on the whole, it seems much simpler to make the original tendencies of action terminate on objects, clinging to the functional or * index ' view of pleasure-pain, and then to keep this object-consciousness forward all the way up the genetic scale. Then in the interpretation of the higher consciousness one may accept the outcome of the overwhelm- ing current of criticism of hedonism. Certainly it is something to avoid the remarkable shifting of emphasis from pain in the original and lower stages, to pleasure in the higher, to which Mr. Stanley has to resort. There are many interesting topics in the book on which it would be profitable to dwell ; but I may only cite summarily certain special teachings of Mr. Stanley which are confirmatory or corrective of views of others, and important : i . Pain is declared to be ' purely moni- tory (14)' ; this I think contradicts Mr. Stanley's own view that pain is the direct stimulant to 'will-effort;' for if the latter, then the pain must be, as the author seems to teach elsewhere, index of benefit-from- stim- ulus, which is actual, not prospective only. It has a ' monitory ' meaning also, of course. 2. The emphasis of the fact that all mental development is an achievement, 'never a given.' Everything is achieved by struggle, action, effort (23, 29, et al.). 3. Confusion arises from the use of the word 'feeling' in three senses: namely, as equal to ' consciousness,' as 'pure' pleasure and pain, and as qualitative emo- tion. 4. Confusing use of the expression ' quantity of consciousness ' to mean area or Umfang (55). 5. Very interesting theory of the phylogenetic origin and value of ' unreality-feeling' (85) . It is directly confirmed in the life of the infant, as I have argued elsewhere. 6. Unhappy use of the word ' representation ' to include recognition (86) . 7. Mr. Stanley makes the animal's going-out reactions — /. £., for food, etc. — a late accomplishment, dependent on representation with recog- nition of object as pleasure-giving. Why is this necessary when the opposite — i. e., the struggle away from the pain-giving object — is or- ganic and primitive ? The argument for the latter from natural selec- tion will secure as well an immediate reaction for pleasure-giving stimulations. I have used the same argument for the primitive char- acter of both sorts of reaction (Mental Development, p. i73f). 8. Mr. Stanley follows Spencer in making the utility of touch lie largely in the ' circular reaction' function which it exemplifies (193). Why does not natural selection secure this state of things more primitively, so that it is true earlier that 'the edible is no longer fortuitously hit 21 8 THE CELL IN ALCOHOLISM. upon?' 9. The doctrine that all attention is volitional and that all in- tensity quality in sensation is in its origin volitionally achieved, would be much better expressed by maintaining the current distinction be- tween 'reflex' and voluntary attention, and then adopting some gen- eral term like the current ' motor-process ' to express the active process of ' achieving ' all the way through (228) . The confusions into which Wundt has fallen in his doctrines of attention by this same procedure might be a warning against calling the struggle of the amoeba away from pain-conditions 'volitional.' 10. Object and subject-cognition are ' coincident in their origin' (252) ; and since sensation is cognition, all sensation involves self-sense. Mr. Stanley here seems to confuse pleasure and pain values with sense of their value for a self. He is led into it by his doctrine (criticised above) that pleasure-pain is rep- resented as conscious end. 1 1 . The insistance that emotion is geneti- cally stimulant to useful activities and riot result of them is justified (360) ; but only on Mr. Stanley's view that emotion is intrinsically pleasure-pain. I can not see any way to avoid this claim that pleas- ure-pain-feeling is the dynamogenic factor all the way through. 12. Interesting discussion of play (364ff) . I have no space to speak of the author's interesting chapters on ^Es- thetic and Ethical Emotion. J. M. B. ETHICAL. Studies in Character. S. BRYANT. New York, Macmillan, 1894. ($1.50.) Hedonistic Theories from Antippus to Spencer. JOHN WATSON. New York, Macmillan, 1895. ($1.75.) Mrs. Bryant's Essays are grouped under the heads ' Ethical ' and ' Educational.' None the less there is a decided unity of method and point of view running through all of them. The ethical essays earn- educational implications throughout, and it is the ethical side of ed- ucation which commands Mrs. Bryant's attention. It is to be hoped that the book will attain a wide reading in the educational commu- nity. It is a book that does not shock one's intellectual self-respect, which is more than can be said of many professedly pedagogical treatises ; and it utilizes in an unobtrusive, but none the less effective, way very much that is best in current ethical and psychological writings. Mrs. Bryant is at home in what is being said and discov- ered in the vital places of current discussions — another mark of emi- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 219 nent distinction from much of what passes as pedagogical contribu- tions. Systematic in outer form, being a collection of essays, the book is not ; systematic in unity of conception and method the book is, much more so than many more pretentious treatises. In dealing with such topics as 'My Duty to thy Neighbor,' 'Friendship,' 'Soundness of Intellect,' etc., one perhaps could be brilliant only at the expense of sanity, and original only by leaning towards eccentricity, and the originality of sincerity (which, as Mrs. Bryant quotes Carlyle is the real originality) , Mrs. Bryant possesses. However this may be, there is a tendency at times to fall into a certain explicitness of classification and definition that makes long continued reading an impossibility. A few pages are suggestive; two or three chapters of it load one with the feeling of assisting in the laying out of the corpse of the moral universe. As Professor James has remarked about too much descriptive psychology there are many things which it is highly interesting to experience, but a little tedious to be reminded of in too much detail and with too ex- plicit a touch after we have been through them. Perhaps only Aris- totle at his best, and the French moral essayists with their capacity for unexpected epigram and their ability to flash upon the reader the ironi- cal reverse of their own definitions, have ever been at home in this re- gion or moral description. As to the implied ethical doctrine of the book, it is upon the whole, the idealistic interpretation of the conception of self-realiza- tion, vitalized for educational purposes with considerable concrete psychology regarding the motor tendencies of ideas and concrete in- sight into individual temperaments and types. I cannot forbear from pointing out that while in her ethical doctrine Mrs. Bryant conceives the ' ideal ' to be perfection located at a remote goal ; for practical purposes, she, like all other perfectionists, gets down to approximate ideal, which is the right functioning of present powers, or the relating of conditions of a present situation. The same con- tradiction occurs when Mrs. Bryant is getting at ideals from a psycho- logical standpoint. The theory implied in practice is so certain to be more adequate than theory set up as theory of practice. There appears to me also to be a regrettable tendency in Mrs. Bryant to over-emphasize the personal or immediate, direct side of conduct — devotion to persons, whether one's self or somebody else, instead of devotion to work, to action and to persons, whether one's self or others, indirectly through their implications in activity. But so far as there is any concensus of ethical doctrine on this point, I "220 ETHICAL. suppose it is with Mrs. Bryant rather than with the reviewer ; and, as the point is too big for discussion in a review, the matter must go as a personal regret and dissent. All this direct moral devotion to per- sons, I believe can end only in useless complications, weariness of flesh and spirit and contradictions between our aspirations and our ac- complishments, both in theory and in practice. Professor Watson publishes his criticism of hedonism 4 as a need- ful supplement to the ethical part of his [my] Outlines of Philos- ophy.* His method of criticism is, as indicated in his title, historic. It is historical types, rather than actual historic continuity, how- ever, which Mr. Watson deals with; his authors being Aristippus, Epicurus, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Spencer; about one-fourth of the book being devoted to the last named. After discussing the influence of the Sophists, Aristippus is con- sidered as the type of naive and, in one sense, the only consistent hedonism — the seizure of the pleasure of the present moment. Pro- fessor Watson points out a psychological contradiction contained in the idea of seeking momentary pleasure ; seeking for pleasure intro- duces struggle and pain ; pleasure as pleasure comes and is enjoyed without being sought. The doctrine is also shown to involve an es- sential misreading of human nature, ignoring the simple fact of ex- perience that men seek active ends in which undoubtedly they antic- ipate and find pleasure, rather than pleasure as such. Epicurus enlarges and, in an objective sense, rationalizes the momentary, transitive end of Aristippus in introducing the idea of the greatest pleasure on the whole as an end ; but as Professor Watson points out, at the expense of hedonism, virtually substituting a state of content- ment for the ideal of pleasure ; and contentment, in turn, involves its own peculiar self-contradiction, since to make the attainment of indi- vidual contentment the ideal is to throw everything back upon indi- vidual temperament, and thus deify lawlessness. Hobbes generalizes the hedonistic conception still further ; Aristippus simply ignored the state ; Epicurus was for getting along with it with the least possible trouble; Hobbes will turn the whole social organization into a means of bringing pleasure to the individual.1 1 While I hesitate to differ from Prof. Watson on a historical point, this state- ment as regards Hobbes seems doubtful. Perhaps Hobbes ought in logical con- sistency to have taken this view ; but as matter of fact he seems to me to throw all the emphasis on the substitution of the end of the sovereign for that of the individual ; and his whole political reasoning to be a back-handed way of saying PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 221 Locke represents a consistent inconsistency — a philosophy of compromise. His intentions are good; his performance poor. He intends to assert freedom, but he holds that the strongest uneasiness determines the will, and uneasiness is simply the desire for the pleasure that is strongest. He intends to uphold the objectivity of moral distinctions, and defines the good as that which is conform- able to law ; but when he states how law lays hold on the individual he falls back on the pleasures got by obedience and the pains suf- fered through disobedience. Hume is as uncompromising as Locke the reverse. Pleasure is the sole motive, and reason can never be a motive; its sole office is to serve the feelings. With Hume the hedonistic logic may be said to have become explicit and self-con- scious. The self being only a bundle of feelings, there is naught but feeling to seek or avoid, or by which to seek or avoid. With Hume the logical evolution of hedonism ceases ; since him we have only recurrences to earlier types, or else its ennobling through the introduction of ideas non-hedonistic in character. Bent- ham in a way went back to Hobbes, only with great practical interest in social reform which lead him to introduce elements irreconcilable with hedonism, while Stuart Mill can be made consistent only by in- interpreting his practical views from the standpoint of an idealistic theory. The examination of Mr. Spencer takes up his ethical doc- trine both in its hedonistic psychology, its evolutionary aspects and the relation of one of these to the other, with a view to showing that Mr. Spencer's general formula of evolution throws no light on moral conduct ; that his psychology destroys the reality of obligation, and does not justify the transition from egoism to altruism ; while the idea of a completed life and completed society held up as the goal from the side of evolution have no special coherence with the ideal of pleasure set up on the analytic side. Philosophic exposition is at its best as to style in this book of Pro- fessor Watson's. I could with difficulty name another book which might at once command so thoroughly the respect of the specialist and receive comprehension by the layman as does this lucid, direct piece of exposition and criticism. It may be of service to teachers of ethics to point out that the expositions of the various authors, mainly that since men live in society they must regard the social end before the indi- vidual end ; and that */ they lived in a state of nature, while each might then fol- low his own selfish end, yet such a state would be self-contradictory. In other words, Hobbes' psychology and his sociology contradict each other flagrantly, instead of the latter being an instrument as regards the former. 222 LESIONS OF THE CORTICAL NERVE CELL. in the authors' own words, are well proportioned, condensed and ac- curate, and, in some cases, the best available substitutes for a perusal of the original texts, and in all cases a helpful accompaniment of such perusal. The book seems to me to close the case, on the polemic side, as regards hedonism. Undoubtedly we shall go on having arguments both for and against hedonism, but the interest seems about done with. The rise of a new psychological method and of a new sociolo- gical point of view and body of facts have presented new problems and shifted the focus of attention. These indirect influences have probably done quite as much as more direct criticism in making hed- onism a played-out standpoint. Just because Prof. Watson's book has accomplished its task so thoroughly, one lays it down with a feel- ing of what has not been accomplished, and of what constitutes the next task — the discussion of hedonism from the historic standpoint, in the evolutionary sense. We do not need longer to contend with hedonism as a present foe, and consequently we want to comprehend it more thoroughly as a manifestation — comprehend it not in terms of itself, but in terms of the social and intellectual conditions which have given birth to it, to see what it really means when so interpreted. From the historic evolutionary standpoint, there has been the same inner necessity, in the logic of growth, for the appearance of these hedonistic systems as there has been for that of any transcended animal or political form of life. What is that inner necessity ? JOHN DEWEY. LESIONS OF THE CORTICAL NERVE CELL IN ALCOHOLISM. Exper intent elle Untersuchungen uber die Verdnderungen der Ganglienzellen bei der acuten Alcoholvergiftung. HEINRICH DEHIO, Centralbl. fur Nervenheilk. u. Psychiat. V. 113-118. Studies on the Lesions produced by the Action of certain Poisons on the Cortical Nerve Cell. I. Alcohol. HENRY J. BERKLEY. Brain, LXXII. 473-496. The two articles above mentioned have made an attack upon one of the least worked fields of nervous pathology opened up by the ad- vance of the last few years in the methods of preparing and staining PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 223 nerve tissue. The results hardly admit comparison, for while both observers used rabbits for their experiments, and to a certain extent the same method of preparation of sections, Dr. Dehio's subjects were all those of extremely acute alcoholism, the animals having died within 1-36 hours after the first administration of the poison, while Dr. Berkley's had been treated for a much longer time (from five to twelve months), so that the alcoholism had become more or less chronic. What is also to be regretted for comparative purposes is that the German observer confined himself to one method of staining (Nissl's methylene blue), and his observations to Purkinje's cells in the cerebellum, while Dr. Berkley apparently made no observations on these cells with that method, though he employed the Nissl stain on cells of the hemispherical cortex. Dehio's rabbits were treated in most cases with subcutaneous injec- tions of 40 per cent, alcohol, the first injection being from 7-10 ccm. and the resulting intoxication kept up by injections of 5 ccm. when- ever the animal showed signs of recovery. According to the time of intoxication before death resulted the total amount of alcohol admin- istered varied from 20 to 25 ccm. To be brief, there were no changes noted in Purkinje's cells in cases where the ante-mortem intoxication had been very short. When that was longer he found that, instead of the normal finely meshed network of the cell body, the stained sub- stance showed granules irregularly distributed, but of fairly uniform size, while the unstained substance had taken on a light bluish tone. The cell changes in some cases involved the whole cell, in others only a part, while the fine granule rows of the processes appeared always unaffected. The nucleii were unaltered. Even in extensive changes by no means all of the ganglion cells were affected ; there were often whole rows of entirely normal cells, while between them lay singly or in groups the pathologically changed. Dr. Berkley's experiments were much more complete and syste- matic and had what would seem the additional advantage for the in- vestigation of the comparatively long period of alcoholism before death. The methods of staining which he used were both the Nissl and a modified Golgi-Cajal. His results showed, besides certain vascular changes, modifications of nerve cells, as follows : By the Nissl method the nucleoli of many of the cortical cells appeared roughened and uneven, and in many cases enlarged and surrounded by a granular appearance. By the method of silver impregnation the principal lesions were distinct dim- inution in size of a great majority of all the cortical cells, certain 224 SENILE DEMENTIA. swellings in the dendritic processes with roughening of some of the processes and sometimes of the cell bodies. All the layers of cortical cells seemed to partake of the degeneration to some extent. Owing to the small proportion of cells that are stained at any one time by the silver method, it was impossible to determine even approximately the proportion of normal to abnormal cells. In the cerebellum Purkinje's cells showed distinct degenerations, but, as already remarked, the difference of method does not allow comparison between Berkley's preparations and those of Dehio. Dr. Berkley promises a subsequent paper upon the lesions in chronic alcoholism in the human subject which will be awaited with interest. LIVINGSTON FARRAND. COLUMBIA COLLEGE. SENILE DEMENTIA. Ueber Dementia Senilis. Inauguraldissertation, von JEAN NOETZLJ, med. pract. Aus der psychiatrischen Klinik des Herrn Prof. Forel in Zurich. Dr. Noetzli submits 70 cases of senile dementia to a clinical and pathological analysis. Only those patients were selected who died between January i, 1880, and December 31, 1891, and in whom an autopsy was made. The dissection of the brain was made by Prof. Forel himself in most cases, which secures a very welcome uniformity of the material for comparison. The method used is Meynert's. N. makes first a rough classification based on the pathological findings. While the changes in the brain are purely degenerative and always accompanied by arteriosclerosis, in one class the patients die with a uniform degeneration of the brain without focal lesions ; in the other classes there are moreover circumscribed lesions of a thrombotic or haemorrhagic nature. This second group is again subdivided into : A. Cases of Senile Dementia, the focal lesions of which are symp- tomatically completely latent, or in which focal symptoms appear in the course of the disease or towards the end. B. Cases of Senile Dementia which set in with apoplexies or other focal symptoms. Clinically, the cases with focal lesions are marked with rapidly progressing dementia and transitory melancholy or maniacal periods of excitement, while typical senile melancholia and senile 4 mania perse- cutoria' belong almost exclusively to the group without focal lesions. Etiologically, N. states with Forel that the heredity of a disposition to atheroma of the blood vessels may be more important than a her- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 22$ edity of mental diseases (Fiirstner) , but that the quiet forms of Senile Dementia seen in the poorhouses or asylums for old people would be cases without disposition to (positive) insanity, whereas those predis- posed to insanity will show the symptoms of senile mania and senile 4 mania persecutoria.' This is, however, not proven, because no spe- cial attention is given to the question in the records. Changes in the material life of the patients, especially physical infirmity and dis- eases, are very prominent elements, not only where they lead to senile hypochondria ; psychical influences play decidedly a part in many of those predisposed to insanity, contrary to the view of Fiirstner, who states that as a rule the victim of senile dementia is dull towards psy- chical impressions. Further, Forel makes a special group of Dementia alcoholico-senilis, which seems to be very frequent in Switzerland. Symptomatology : i Senile ' psychoses are, as a rule, distinguished by a prodromal stage, with loss of memory, change in character, and slight intellectual and ethical defects. Senile mania lacks the breadth of ideation, the acuteness of judg- ment, the wit and the flight of ideas of typical mania; it is rather loquacity with senseless, impulsive actions and confusion especially as to time and place. Emotions are superficial. Senile melancholia : In his cases, N. finds no delusions of self- belittlement (on account of the weakness of ethical and moral pro- cesses) ; anxiety and fear are apt to cause raptus and unexpected at- tempts at suicide ; hypochondriacal symptoms are prominent. Senile ' mania persecutoria ' or Verf olgungswahnsinn are very of- ten based on hallucinations and most marked at night ; these are, how- ever, primordial deliria of persecution. The alcoholico-senile Dementia shows strong manifestations of chronic alcoholism ; its outset is relatively premature ; at a very early stage the patients commit suddenly impulsive acts on their relations ; hallucinations are frequent and characteristic for alcoholism, but the dementia modifies the whole symptom complex of alcoholism. The 70 cases are classified as follows ; I. Senile psychoses without focal lesions 40 (a) Senile mania 6 (b) Senile melancholia 10 (c) Senile 4 mania persecutoria ' 4 (d) Senile hypochondria I (e) Dementia alcoholico-senilis 6 (f) Typical simple senile dementia 13 II. Senile psychoses with focal lesions 30 226 HYPNOTISM. A. Cases of senile dementia with focal lesions, which were latent or secondary — 15 : (a) Senile mania — (b) Senile melancholia 3 (c) Senile mania persecutoria 2 (d) Dementia alcoholico-senilis I (e) Typical senile dementia 9 B. Cases of senile dementia setting in with apoplexies or with other focal symptoms — 15 : (a) Senile mania I (b) Senile mania persecutoria 2 (c) Dementia alcoholico-senilis 2 (d) Typical senile dementia ...10 The very important study of the brain weights cannot be given in detail here. The chief results are that the decrease of weight aver- ages 200 grammes, the average weight in men being 1,190, in women 1,065 grammes. The brain mantle loses most in weight, but, con- trary to the view of Meynert, the loss is not greater in the frontal lobe than in the occipital or temporal lobe. ADOLF MEYER. WORCESTER, MASS. HYPNOTISM. Ueber Schlaf, Hypnose und Somnambulismus . MAX HIRSCH. Deutsche med. Wochenschrift. 5 Sept. 1895. The above essay offers, according to the author, a partial solution of the question whether hypnotic and normal sleep are identical, or whether these two conditions must be considered as differing from each other. In his manual 'Suggestion und Hypnose' (Leipzig, 1893) the author expresses himself of the latter opinion; hypnosis he here considers merely as a sleep illusion. Influenced by new obser- vations, he now announces a modification of this view. He could ob- serve that 10 per cent, of all persons hypnotized by him fell at the first attempt into the deepest state of hypnosis, which term the author ap- plies to that condition in which all hypnotic phenomena may easily be produced and with which loss of memory is always connected. The author further observed that the same persons likewise show a certain peculiarity with respect to their normal sleep. They can fall asleep when and where they wish. Rapport is also present in these persons during sleep. As the sleep of these persons completely resembles the PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 227 condition of hypnosis, the author designates it as 'somnambulic sleep,' but he leaves it undecided whether this sleep is or is not a patho- logical condition, although in a number of people of neuropathic ten- dency it represents a species of sleep. Those somnambulists, how- ever, in whom the representations during sleep develop into actions are designated as undoubtedly pathological. Although Hirsch still maintains the opinion that hypnosis is in general a sleep illusion, he designates, on the other hand, the hypnosis and sleep of somnambulists as identical. " Hypnosis is in them somnambulic sleep." The author explains these phenomena as arising from the different degrees of attention. In normal sleep the attention is, in his opinion, diffused over all centers of represention ; in this condition it is incapable of concentration ; in somnambulic sleep, on the contrary, the attention retains the power of diverting itself to single representations. Thus the attention of these persons need only be diverted towards the representation of sleep in order to cause them at once to fall asleep. I should like in this place to make mention of the investigations by which Dr. Oscar Vogt has endeavored to decide the present question, and which he will shortly publish in the ' Zeitschrift fur Hypno- tismus, etc,' edited by him. So far as I am acquainted with these interesting researches I am enabled to communicate the following facts. In comparing the graphically fixed attendant phenomena of hypnotic and normal sleep Dr. Vogt comes to the conclusion that there are here many individual differences, but that these attendant phe- nomena are identical in one and the same individual. Vogt further states that in all normal sleep there is a certain stage which admits of rapport as in hypnosis and that, if this moment is not missed during the falling asleep of a person, he may be treated precisely as a hyp- notized subject. Vogt adheres therefore to the school of Nancy and maintains, contrary to the view taken by M. Hirsch, the complete identity of natural and so-called hypnotic sleep. LEIPZIG. FRIEDRICH KIESOW. Criminelle hypnotische Suggestionen. DR. A. A. LIEBAULT. Zeitschrift fur Hypnotismus. Bd. III. Hefte 7, 8, 9. The author advocates the possibility of hypnotic and post- hypnotic criminal suggestions by presenting facts of history, analogies between sleeping and waking states, and incidents of his own experience. Dr. Durand de Gros, who wrote ' Electro-dynamisme vital' (1855), believed himself able to transform moral character and wrote to the Spanish Court for permission to operate on Manuel Blanco, who, 228 HYPNOTISM. under the conviction that he was a wolf, killed six men and actually ate parts of the bodies. The middle ages produced numerous cases of this kind under the name 4 Warwolfe.' They are men who reflect upon and admire one action or type of action till they finally merge their own personalities into a submission to it from which neither re- flection nor volition can free them. A lunatic who believed himself a general and dressed in uniform might just as well have been a War- wolf. A little girl of nine or ten years was freed by hypnotic sittings from the illusion that she was a dog and from habits of lying by the door, barking at visitors, running on all fours. Later the girl's grandmother asked the author to free the girl's father from a low passion for his child. Still later a neighbor's daughter reported to her parents that the man had misconducted himself toward her. He was imprisoned for life. Author believes the father had already sug- gested to his own child that she was a pup. Fixing the attention on the key-note of hypnotism, sleep, the fixed idea of rest, why may not one become subject to personal influences as completely as in cases of fascination where persons are often brought to violate conviction and habitual sentiment? Certain signs of sleep in waking state are physiological and pathological hallucina- tions, impulsive actions, fixed ideas, as that one cannot swallow some- thing bitter, etc. Signs of wakefulness in sleep are writing poems, solving problems, recognition of approaching danger, consciousness of the passing of time, recognizing the stopping of a clock, etc. From 4 per cent, to 5 per cent, of subjects have by the author been brought to perform what would have been terrible crimes had they been real. Automatic sleep-suggestions have led to crimes in waking state in three cases. Author mentions Jacques Clement, who be- lieved an angel commanded him, in sleep, to murder the King of France ; also of Friedrich Staaps, who attempted the murder of Na- poleon I., because convinced of a divine commission to do so. Li6- geois and the author saw a subject choose a suggested watch instead of his real one for his own, proving that suggestion is real. The author asserts that anyone in artificial sleep can be brought to perform any crime in which he is able to participate without waking in dreams. The author holds that only somnambulists — 'and they are but few, as one sees ' — are capable of carrying out these crimes. Those who fail to get criminal suggestions carried out choose subjects without premeditation. The author relates the case of somnambulist N. Dr. X. and the author suggested to N., in artificial sleep, that he would visit Herrn F. at his home on the next morning at 1 1 130, and PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 229 in leaving the house would conceal two statuettes near the door under his mantle ; after two days N. would regret his theft and return the pieces of art. Dr. X. repeated to N. : "and you will steal, do you hear? You will steal!" Later Herr F. related the event as having been caried out in every particular. Later still, N. was imprisoned for stealing an overcoat. On his person was found a note-book recording many small thefts, such as visiting cards. The author felt himself possibly to blame. Much later when N., who was at the time of the theft 17 or 18, had grown (N.'s father forbade it sooner) the author again hypnotized N., and learned that at the same time when the boy committed the theft which ended in imprisonment, Dr. X. had met him on the street, lead him into a cafe\ hypnotized and commanded him to steal 4 little things,' such as watches, gloves, money cases and probably visiting cards. GUY TAWNEY. LEIPZIG. VISION. Note on the Analysis of Contrast- Colors by Viewing, through a reflecting tube, a Series of grey disks or rings, on colored surfaces. A. M. MAYER. Am. Jour, of Science. (4) I., 38- 40. 1895. Article ( Vision) in Johnson's Universal Cyclopedia. W.LECoNTE STEVENS. Untersuchungen zur Lehre vom Farbensinn. W. KOSTER. Arch. f. Ophth. 41 (4) 1-20. Theorie de la Coleur. W. NICATI. Arch. d'Ophtal. XL, 1-44. 1895. From the fact that a dark grey background is most effective when yellow contrast-color is to be produced, and a light grey when the color to be produced is green, Professor Mayer argued that a yel- low-green contrast-color would change its tone with a change in the intensity of the background. He found this to be the case. Bits of violet paper were placed on thirteen different shades of grey ; on the four lightest, the contrast-color was a greenish yellow ; on the fifth, it was equally yellow and green ; and on the darker papers it became greener and greener until at last it was a green almost devoid of yel- low. But Professor Mayer considers that this may be due to the fact, noticed by Professor Rood, that some colors regularly change their tone on being mixed with larger and larger amounts of black. 230 VISION. Professor Stevens has given what must be considered as an admi- rably clear account of the principal phenomena of vision, when regard is had to the small space into which it had to be condensed. He makes short work of the bugbear of the inverted image, and he shows that the contest between the empirical and the nativistic school loses its im- portance in the light of evolution. Attention is given to some of the new facts of color- vision ; but it is an inadvertence to say that the cones are sensitive to variations of color chiefly. The correct state- ment would be that only the cones are sensitive to variations of color ; they must be extremely sensitive to variations of intensity in white light as well, — otherwise the fovea would not be the place with which we make out the minutest variations of line and shade in an intricate drawing. If the cones only give color, they do not give color only. Every new and adequate theory of vision must make provision for this fact ; but, strange to say, it has been overlooked by no mean author- ities. I must protest also against saying that the physicists are satisfied with Helmholtz's theory of vision, with the implication that that is a fact of critical importance. The physicists have nothing to do with a theory as to what goes on in the retina and in the brain — that is be- yond their province. It would be as much to the point if the chem- ists were to announce that they were perfectly satisfied with the cor- puscular theory of light. As matter of fact, the objections to the theory of Helmholtz are exclusively objections from the side of sensation ; as far as the physics of the question is concerned, there is nothing in the theory that anyone could take exception to. And when it is a matter of discussing light as a sensation, we do not so much say that the physicists are not in the habit of thinking about their sensations, pure and simple, as that they are not in the habit of reading up the discus- sion that is going on regarding sensation. Professor Cattell has said he best word that has been said about the Helmholtz theory when he said that it is both pre-evolutionary and pre-psycho logical ; the argu- ments that hold good against it are not only arguments that appeal with especial force to the physiologist and the psychologist, but they are arguments that have been debated in Pfliiger's Archivs and the Zeitschrift fur Psychologie u. Physiologic der Sinnesorgane and other journals of that kind, which the physicists, overwhelmed as they are by their own journals, have no time to read. Even the critical facts, of late discovery, do not always reach them. Captain Abney, in his last book on Color Vision, says of a certain man, who had no vari- ation of sensation throughout the entire spectrum, that it has been PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 231 'proved' that he sees green only. Now if a man has no other light sen- sation with which to compare his one sensation, it is absolutely impos- sible for us ever to find out what that one sensation is, unless by way of deduction from a theory which is taken as proved. But, fortunately for such cases as this, there have been instances of monocular total color-blindness, and from them it is known that the single sensation is a colorless sensation. Moreover, we have ourselves this monotone sensation in the periphery and throughout the retina in a faint light, and one must have a very strong preconceived affection for a theory to regard this sensation as green, though this, too, is a feat that has been accomplished. I have been told that there is one important university in this country in which the theories of Helmholtz and Hering have both been definitely given up, and particularly in the physical depart- ment. Koster explains the fact that the fovea lags behind the periphery in sensitiveness to faint light by the fact that it is generally, on account of its position with respect to pupil and lens, more brightly lighted up, and hence, if I understand him, in a condition of greater exhaus- tion. He forgets that in a faint light also the fovea has the same ad- vantage of position, and that the superiority of the periphery is on this account greater than a simple measurement gives evidence of. For Koster's eyes the difference would seem to be very slight ; if this is so his eyes differ most remarkably from those of other observers who have measured the phenomenon. He uses the term periphery without any indication as to what part of it he is comparing with the fovea. The maximum sensitiveness is about 35° away from the fovea, and it is- true that at distances remote from this the superiority is not extremely great, but at this distance it is, for most eyes, as four to one, which is hardly to be called slight. He seems to have made no measurements. Koster finds the Piirkinje phenomenon to persist, under certain conditions, in the fovea itself ; this does not, however, disprove the belief that the visual purple is the principal factor in the adaptation which the rods undergo. The cones have a means of adaptation of their own in the varying length of their myoids under light and shade (Angelucci, van Genderen Stort), and also in the moving out and in of the pigment grains. This might also account for a supe- riority of the edge of the fovea over its centre, which Koster detects. That the adapted eye sees colors less well than the unadapted, Koster finds not to be the case. This agrees with my own observations ; I found, in fact, that there is a distinct adaptation for color, though nothing like so much as for light, in the middle periphery. 232 EXPERIMENTAL. Nicati uses the term color for the entire sensation produced by light, as painters speak of the color, sometimes, of a picture in black and white. By protochroism he means grey vision ; by metachroism, partial color blindness ; and by pleochroism, normal vision. He gives a theory which, he says, will seem at once to be plausible, and which will be confirmed by all the considerations which he will have men- tioned at the end. In the rods and cones, he says, there is no differ- entiation such as could give rise to three colors, but in the central terminations of the bipolar cells, as described by Ramon Y. Cajal, we have just the separation into three layers, which we are in search of as a basis for a three-color theory. The chemical effect of light on the photopsine (the visual purple) is to disengage electricity ; the dif- ferent threads of the bi-polar cells have different electric resistance, and thus the electricity is conducted, according to its varying degrees of strength, by one or another of the sets of threads to the several layers of their terminal expansions. (But is not this a little like making a big door for a cat and a little door for a kitten ? What prevents the strong current from going also through the path which is fitted to con- duct the weak current ?) The synoptoblasts are the large ganglia be- low the bi-polar cells, and their function is to restore equilibrium, af- ter red has been seen, by sending down a discharge which results in green. C. LADD FRANKLIN. EXPERIMENTAL. Ueber den Einfluss von Gesichts-Associationen auf die Raum- tvahrnehmungen der Haut. Miss M. F. WASHBURN. Phil- osophische Studien. Bd. xi. (1895), pp. 190-225. The development of tactual space is undoubtedly influenced by vision and, though the assertion of this article that the fact has entirely escaped the notice of previous investigators, with the one exception of Weber, who mentions it only in a negative way, called for a correc- tion in a note by the editor, yet a series of experiments such as Miss Washburn has made serves to emphasize an important truth. Results obtained from subjects who visualized but little, from others who are able at will to abstract from their otherwise vivid visual images, and finally from one blind subject are compared with normal results in which the images immediately arising when the skin is touched are allowed to play their usual part. In this way it is shown that Camerer's subjects in his experiments on the method of equivalents PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 233 used visual images as a means of estimating the lengths of the two distances and that his results are to be interpreted in the light of this hypothesis. The well-known observations that the threshold on the extremities is shorter in the transverse than in the longitudinal axis is corroborated only in the case of good visualizers. For poor visual- izers the difference does not appear, and for the blind subject the ordinary relation was completely reversed. These observations are to be explained on the ground that the narrower, transverse axis is more easily and clearly visualized. The rapid lowering of the threshold through training, as reported by Volkmann, does not appear when the influence of vision is eliminated. The author thinks the fact that the earlier investigations were carried out with open eyes accounts for the reduction of the threshold. The judgment of direc- tion of continuous stimuli or of the relative direction of two points from one another is dependent to a large extent on visual images as shown by the fact that this judgment is most accurate in the care of good visualizers. In making these experiments the facts were noted that, in general, two points can be distinguished before their relative direction is correctly perceived and that the direction of continuous stimuli is judged better than that of an equal extent lying between the two points of the aesthaBsiometer. CHAS. H. JUDD. LEIPZIG. On the Development of Visual Perception and Attention. HAROLD GRIPPING, Ph. D. American Journal of Psychology, Vol. VII., 227-236. Jan., 1896. Several series of letters were exposed through an opening in a screen before a group of persons. In the first experiment six letters arranged so as to avoid suggesting words as much as possible were ex- posed at a time for -fa second and for ten successive times. The in- tervals between the several exposures and the warning signals were varied and the observers were without knowledge when they might expect the signal. The observers were examined in groups of ten to thirty, representing all ages from seven to twenty years. The observ- ers fixed their attention upon the opening in the screen until the warning signal was given, and after the exposure they wrote down the letters which they thought they saw. Tables are given showing the results arranged according to age and grade in school. From these u it is evi- dent that the extensive threshold, or ability to receive and retain a num- ber of simultaneous retinal impressions, is a function of individual growth, reaching its maximum only when the observer is fully devel- 234 EXPERIMENTAL. oped." " Practice increases the extensive threshold * * *" "The tendency to guess seems to decrease with maturity." The intellectual capacity as judged by the teachers was compared with these results. The brightest pupils showed the highest averages, with some notable expeptions. Those pupils who marked high in attention generally ex- celled others. The girls showed no superiority over the boys. Better results were obtained when the exposure followed the warning signal by a long interval. Children may experience abnormal fatigue "with- out any marked effect upon the accuracy of perception." In recalling the letters we " see the given stimuli as a unit and then analyze this unit into its components." When only one letter was exposed the older pupils again excelled the younger ; the results were respectively seven errors in 230 observations and twenty-eight errors in 160 obser- vations. When six colors were used in the place of the six letters the results were apparently the same. When the exposure was made for a full second, there was a greater percentage of correct answers, the older pupils showing the higher percentages. "The extensive thresh- old does not measure the number of objects that can be simultane- ously grasped by consciousness;" it u may depend upon the reproduc- tive processes, and the analysis of the memory image," and "to some extent upon the attention." The ' capacity for attention' is to be dis- tinguished from the powers of the attention. The paper has great significance for psychology and for the practi- cal teacher who has to do with the marking and promotion of pupils. The results are conclusive against the absolute value of a system of examinations. It is well to bear in mind in regard to the extensive threshold increasing with age that in our schools a process of selection is going on all the time. Many of the poorer pupils drop out before they reach the higher grades and the dull pupils are frequently cases of slow development ; they show their brightness at a later period. The personal element enters into a teacher's estimation of pupils and this may explain some exceptions. In the last experiment we are not told whether different series of letters were used, or whether other pupils were experimented upon. Unconscious memory in the one case and practice in the other may play some part, as I have found in some of my experiments, to which the author refers in a note. T. L. BOLTON. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 235 CONSCIOUSNESS. Zur Kritik des Seelenbegriffs : einige Bemerkungen beim Stu- dium der Wundt schen Psychologic. ALLEN VANNERUS. Ar- chiv fiir System. Philosophic, Bd. I. Heft 3,360-400. 1895. Wundt rightly maintains, says his critic, that the subject of psychol- ogy, from the psychological point of view, exists in the activity of the psychical process and not as a substance lying back of it. But his op- position to the theory of a substantial soul rests on a restricted concep- tion of substance, which need denote no more than the real ground for determinations not absolutely independent or be more than an ab- stractly conceived factor in a continuously changing whole. And his denial of the applicability of the conception to inner reality on the ground that the latter is reality at first hand, and therefore not constituted by a category which is its own product, rests on a mistake as to the facts. For only an actual content of consciousness is directly intuited, whereas other aspects of psychical reality, the fusion of sensations, for instance, can only be inferred. Wundt's emphasis of the process in mental life seriously threatens its real unity. But change without permanence is impossible. It is psychologically impossible because the relating activities of consciousness presuppose at least a relatively permanent subject, and because, without some constancy in the subject, not only would all mental states eventually pass into nothingness, but, except by a miracle, no mental state could ever arise. Logically, again, all activity implies a constant factor; otherwise reality is 'a hideous mystery of limitless possibilities.' Finally, the theory of parallelism requires an original psychical reality as the subject of the development of consciousness and the basis of its various modes. This original psychic basis of mental life is constant, not as a substance 'lying back' of experience, but in the sense that it is self-identical in its dif- ferent functions. Wundt, however, makes the unity of the mental life consist in the connection of the psychical events themselves. But if these events are not functions of the same subject, how is such con- nection possible ? We must postulate their creation ex nihilo and as- sume as many egos as states of consciousness. The truth about the soul is that it is a living, organic unity. The psychical life is a single undivided whole and itself the real unitary subject. This concrete living self consists in given ideas, feelings and volitions and the activity by which these functions are conditioned ; the whole, however, is uni- fied by a factor which in itself is the abstract ego and from the empiri- 236 CONSCIOUSNESS. cal point of view one side of that psychophysical substance in which Wundt finds the substrate and basis of the soul's unity. Wundt's reply to this argumentation in the current number of the 1 Philosophische Studien* (XII., 37 ff.) is to the effect that his critic has not sufficiently grasped the distinction between physical science and psychology, according to which the latter is science of experience as immediately given, whereas the standpoint of the former requires it to deal with objects constructed by thought. Consequently a physical hypothesis is tested by its utility, a psychological by fact, and the fact is that no other unity is found or required in the psychical life except that which exists in the connection of its processes. This is singularly unsympathetic and avoids the real issue. The real question is, Is there discoverable, whether by direct inspection or by reflection, in the movement of our subjective experience, any constant factor ? Is the psychical life like a stream which simply flows on or is it a pro- cess of self-development? Sameness without change is asserted by nobody ; change with the sense of sameness is a fact. Is the same- ness predicated really there ? That is the real question, as James puts it. Theories of ' actuality ' and 4 substantiality ' are altogether subor- dinate, mere names. And the question is not to be set aside by the arbitrary distinction of hypothesis of fact and hypothesis of utility nor referred for answer to such irrelevant illustrations as Kant's elastic balls, which, if they were conscious, would be obliged to suppose, as we are, that they themselves were the subjects of experiences referred to the past but appropriated by the present self, whose identity with the past self would be, if illusion, then a necessary illusion. H. N. GARDINER. Le Moi des Mourants. V. EGGER. Revue Philosophique, XLL, 26-38. Jan. 1896. Many persons who have survived an accident that seemed to be fatal report that at the time their whole past life came up before them. This experience, which is not, however, to be taken literally, M. Egger is disposed to connect, not with pathological exaltations of memory in epileptics, etc., but with quite normal phenomena. Noticing that children apparently do not have the experience, he refers to the aggre- gation of memories with which the ego is continually being consti- tuted from youth to age, and which is particularly marked in the aged, and the fact that the civilized adult about to die and capable of reflec- tion normally realizes his personality in a form vivid and significant. But with regard to their experiences we want more evidence. The PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 2tf author therefore suggests a systematic enquiry among persons who have faced what seemed to them certain death. Arrested Mentation. G. FERRERO. The Monist, Vol. 6, 60-75. October, 1895. It is a natural law of ' unconscious * reasoning, that is, reasoning not consciously guided by the ideals of strict logic (Aristotle and Mill), that it stops short in its explanation of phenomena with what is revealed directly to the senses and neglects factors which can only be discovered by reflection and comparison. This species of ' arrested mentation' explains various popular errors and suggests the possibility of a new science, positive logic, the study of the laws of human reason according to age, intellectual development and the state of civilization. Another more radical species involves the abolition of all observation. This is a priori reasoning. Mentation is here arrested because the de- ductive method merely draws a conclusion from a premise and conse- quently involves far fewer mental elements and less effort than the in- ductive. In his grasp of the facts and the psychology of the so-called deduc- tive method, historically considered, as well as in his general appre- ciation of logical process, the author seems to furnish a good illustra- tion of his subject. SMITH COLLEGE. H. N. GARDINER. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RHETORIC. Figures of Rhetoric : A Psychological Study. GERTRUDE BUCK. No. I. of Contributions to Rhetorical Theory. Edited by F. N. SCOTT. University of Michigan. 1895. This monograph endeavors to state in psychological terms the pro- cess by which rhetorical figures come into being. While a concept is seen to be the verification of two or more percepts, which verification, when complete, is expressed in language by a name, there are obviously sentences that express implicit rather than explicit relationships. These sentences, representing an incomplete verification, are ' figura- tive.' 'Radical' figures occur when the verifying relation between the two objects has not yet been constructed in the mind of the speaker or writer; 'poetical' figures when the relation is at last partially ex- plicit in his consciousness. The ordinary classifications of rhetorical figures could be simplified by making merely two groups ; those in 238 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RHETORIC. which stress is laid respectively upon the stages of verification and of discrimination. This theory that a figure of speech is an organized complex of mental activities whose implicit verifying prin- ciple comes to be more or less explicit in the mind of the reader or hearer, is then applied to the problem of the nature of the pleasurable effect arising from the use of figurative language, and to the question of humor, the writer contending that the perception of the ludicrous and the recognition of a figure of speech are processes essentially one. A carefully compiled bibliography of figures is appended. The ^Esthetics of Words. L. A. SHERMAN. The Northwestern Journal of Education. Sept., Oct., Nov., Dec., 1895. Professor Sherman's series of articles is thus far devoted to the exposition, largely by graphical methods, of the varying ' values ' of words for artistic purposes. Words are signs of emotion as well as signs of ideas, and their emotional meaning cannot be told by logical definition. As a preparation for the study of poetry, pupils should be taught to distinguish between conceptual words, which occupy the mind more with knowing than with feeling, and experiential words, in which knowing is merged in feeling. These emotional and suggestive words, depending for their power upon reminiscences or sometimes upon anticipated experiences, stand thus in the closest relation to things. The aesthetics of things depends on the types or ideals of ultimate truth or beauty which they evolve or evince. Ideas, and words as the signs of ideas, satisfy us in proportion to their power to fulfil our types. Those words only should be called ' poetic ' which stand for things absolute in their truth or beauty. Professor Sherman's theory of types will not be acceptable to all, but readers of his Ana- lytics of Liter aturevr\\\ welcome the interesting and acute discussion contained in these articles. BLISS PERRY. PRINCETOX. NEW BOOKS. 239 NEW BOOKS. Child and Childhood in Folk Thought. ALEXANDER FRANCIS CHAMBERLAIN. New York and London, Macmillan & Co. 1896. Pp. x+464. $3.00. The Number Concept — Its Origin and Development. LEVI LEO- NARD CONANT. New York and London, Macmillan & Co, 1896. Pp. vi+2i8. $2.00. La theorie platonicienne des sciences. ELIE HALEVY. Paris, Alcan. Pp. xl+378. Die Spiele der Thiere. KARL GROOS. Jena, Gustav Fischer. 1896. Pp. ix+359. M. 6. Manueli di Semijotica delle Malattie mentali. E. MORSELLI. Vol. II. Esame psicologico degli alienati. With 77 illustra- tions and 13 tables. Milan, Vallardi. 1895. Pp. xviii+852. L. 15- / Sogni e il Sonno nelV Isterismo e nella Epilessia. S. DE SANCTIS. Rome, Societa Editrice Dante Alighieri. 1896. Pp. 216. L. 2. The Theory of Social Forces. S. N. PATTEN. Supp. to Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Polit. and Social Science. Philadelphia, Amer. Acad. 1896. Pp. 151. Evolution in Art. A. C. HADDON. London, Walter Scott; New York, Scribners. 1895. Pp. xviii+364. $1.25. Studies in Childhood. JAMES SULLY. New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1896. Pp. viii+527. Die Hauptpunkte der Ifum'schen Erkenntnislehre. ERNST PETZ- HOLTZ. Berlin, Gustav Schade. 1895. Pp. 44. Die Erkenntnisstheorien bei Leibniz und Kant. LOTHAR VOLZ. Rostock, Universitats-Buchdruckerei. J895. Pp. 7°« Movement. E. J. MAREY. New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1895. Pp. xv+322. $1.75. Die Lehre von den spezifischen Sinnesenergien. R. WEINMANN. Hamburg and Leipzig, Voss. 1895. Pp. 96. M. 2.50. NOTES. THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY. The opening of the Congress will take place on the morning of August 4th, 1896, in the great ' Aula' of the Royal University. 240 NOTES. All psychologists and all educated persons who desire to further the progress of psychology and to foster personal relations among the students of psychology in different nations are invited to take part in the meetings of the Congress. Women will have the same rights as men. Those who propose (i) to offer papers or addresses or (2) gener- ally to take part in the Congress are requested to fill up the accompa- nying forms and to send them to the Secretary before the beginning of the Congress. The subscription to be paid by those desiring to take part in the Congress is 15 M. On receipt of this sum a card will be sent to every member entitling him to attend all the meetings and to receive the Journal, Tageblatt, issued daily (with a register of the members) and one copy of the Report of the Congress. The card also admits to all festivities arranged in connection with the Congress and all special privileges granted to its members. The Tageblatt, which will appear in four numbers, will serve to register the guests and contain information as to accommodation, the programme of the papers and addresses and social arrangements, the list of members and a short notice of the places of interest in Munich. The languages used at the Congress may be German, French, Eng- lish and Italian. The Congress will perform its work in general and sectional meet- ings. The division of the sections will be arranged according to the papers and addresses which may be offered. The meetings take place at the Royal University. The length of the papers or addresses of the sectional meetings is limited to 20 minutes. It is hoped that any member who takes part in the discussion will, to insure a correct report of his speech, give the chief points of it (on a form which will be provided) either during or at the close of the meeting. Any psychologist who offers a paper or address is requested to send to the Secretary before the beginning of the Congress a short written abstract of its contents. These abstracts will be printed and distributed amongst the audience, so that the different languages used at the Congress may be better understood. Those members of the local committee who are mentioned in the programme below will all give information as to their respective de- partments of work and also in connection with the inspection of scien tific institutes and demonstrations. The Congress will meet in Sections as follows : NOTES. 241 /. Psychophysiology. — Prof. Riidinger, Prof. Graetz, Privatdo- cent Dr. Cremer will give all information concerning this part of the programme. a. Anatomy and Physiology of the brain and of the sense-organs (somatic basis of psychical life). Development of nerve-centres ; theory of localization and of neu- rons, paths of association and structure of the brain. Psychical functions of the central parts ; reflexes, automatism, in- nervation, specific energies. b. Psychophysics. Connection between physical and psychical processes ; psychophysical methods ; the law of Fechner. Physiology of the senses (muscular and cutaneous sensibility, audition, light-per- ception, audition colored) ; psychical effects of certain agents (medi- cines). Reaction-times. Measurement of vegetative reactions (in- spiration, pulse, muscle-fatigue). 77. Psychology of the Normal Individual. — Prof. Lipps,- Privat- docent Dr. Cornelius, Dr. Weinmann will give all information con- cerning this part of the programme. Scope, methods and resources of Psychology. Observation and experiment. Psychology of sensations. Sensation and idea, memory and reproduction. Laws of association, fusion of ideas. Conscious- ness and unconsciousness, attention, habit, expectation, exercise. Perception of space (by sight, by touch, by the other senses) ; con- sciousness of depth-dimension, optical illusions. Perception of time. Theory of Knowledge. Imagination. Theory of feeling. Feel- ing and sensation. Sensuous, aesthetic, ethical and logical feeling. Emotions. Laws of feeling. — Theory of will. Feeling of willing and voluntary action. Expressive moments. Facts of ethics. — Self- consciousness. Development of personality. Individual differences. Hypnotism, theory of suggestion, normal sleep, dreams. — Psychical automatism. — Suggestion in relation to paedagogics and criminality ; paedagogical psychology. 777. Psychopatholog-y.—Proi. Dr. Grashey, Dr. Frhr. v. Schrenck- Notzing, Edm. Parish will give all information on this part of the programme. Heredity in Psychopathology ; Statistics. — Can acquired qualities be transferred by inheritance? — Psychical relations (somatic and psychic heredity) , phenomena of degeneration, psychopathic inferiority (insane temperament) . — Genius and degeneration ; moral and social importance of heredity. Psychology in relation to criminality and jurisprudence. 242 NOTES. Psychopathology of the sexual sensations. Functional nerve disease (hysteria and epilepsy) . Alternating consciousness; psychical infection; the pathological side of hypnotism ; pathological states of sleep. Psychotherapy and suggestive treatment. Cognate phenomena ; mental suggestion, telepathy, transposition of senses ; international statistics of hallucinations. Hallucinations and illusions ; imperative ideas, aphasia and similar pathological phenomena. IV. Comparative Psychology. — Prof. Dr. Ranke, Dr. G. Hirth, Dr. Fogt will give all information in this department. Moral statistics. The psychical life of the child. The psychical functions of animals. Ethnographical and anthropological psychology. Comparative psychology of languages ; graphology. Prof. Dr. Lipps, Georgenstrasse i8/1? is Committee of Reception, and Dr. Frhr. von Schrenck-Notzing, prakt. Arzt, Max Josephstr. 2/lf is General Secretary. The International Committee of Organization is as follows ; President: Prof. Dr. Stumpf, member of the "Akademie der Wissenschaf ten," Berlin W., Niirnbergerstrasse 14; Vice-President : Prof. Dr. Lipps, Miinchen, Georgenstrasse i8/j. General Secretary: Dr. Frhr. von Schrenck-Notzing, prakt. Arzt, Miinchen, Max-Joseph- strasse 2/r Members of the committee : Prof. Bain, Aberdeen, Scot- land. Prof. Baldwin, Princeton University, New Jersey, U. S. A. Prof. Bernheim, Nancy, h6pital civil, France. Prof. Delboeuf, Brus- sels, Belgium. Prof. H. H. Donaldson, Chicago, 111., U. S. A. Prof. Ebbinghaus, Breslau, Germany. Prof. Ferrier, Cavendish Square, 34, London W., England. Prof. G. S. Fullerton, 116 Spruce street, Philadelphia, Pa., U. S. A. Prof. Stanley Hall, Clark University, Worcester, Mass., U. S. A. Prof. Hitzig, Halle, Ger- many. Prof. James, Cambridge, Mass., 95 Irving street, U. S. A. Prof. Lehmann, Kopenhagen, Hagelsgade 7, Denmark. Prof. Lie"- geois, Nancy, France. Prof. Lightner Witmer, University of Penn- sylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., U. S. A. Prof. Mendelssohn, Peters- burg, Moika 81, Russia. Prof, von Monakow, Zurich, Stadelhoferstr 10, Switzerland. Prof. Morselli, Genova, via Assarotti 46, Italia. Mr. F. W. H. Myers, Deckhampton House, Cambridge, England. Dr. Newbold, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., U. S. A. Prof. Preyer, Villa Panorama, Wiesbaden, Germany. Prof. Richet, NOTES. 243 rue de I'Universite" 15, Paris, France. Prof. Schafer, University Col- lege, Gower street, W. C. London, England. Prof. Sidgwick, Newnham College, Cambridge, England. Prof. Sully, Hampstead, N. W., East Heath Road, London, England. Dr. Ward, Selwyn Gardens, Cambridge, England. THE Annee Psychologique for 1895 will contain, in addition to analyses of psychological literature, and the Bibliography for 1895, prepared by Dr. Farrand and Prof. Warren for this REVIEW, the fol- lowing original articles : i. Ribot, Les caracteres anormaux et morbides. 2. Binet et Courtier, Etude des vasomoteurs dans leur rapport avec Petat intellec- tuel, des emotions, etc. 3. Bourdon, Experiences sur les associations d'ide"es. 4. Flournoy, Temps de lecture et d'oubli. 5. Biervliet, Illusions de poids. 6. Forel, L'instinct des fourmis. 7. Nilliez, La me" moire des chiffres. 8. Henri, La localisation des sensations du toucher. 9. Binet, La peur chez les enfants. 10. Binet et Courtier, Recherches graphiques sur la musique. n. Binet et Courtier, Ap- pareils nouveaux pour la methode graphique. 12. Passy, Revue gene" rale sur les sensations olf actives. 13. Henri, Revue ge"nerale sur 1'erreur probable. 14. Henri, Revue gene" rale sur la mesure de la sensibilite tactile. 15. Binet et Henri, Revue g6n£rale sur la psychol- ogic individuelle. 16. Azoulay, Revue g£nerale sur les conclusions psychologique des derniers travaux sur la structure du systeme nerveux. 17. Binet, Revue ge"nerale sur les experiences de plethysmographie. DR. JAMES WARD, of Cambridge, England, writes a private note to one of the editors (apropos of a reference to him in a book review) , which has a certain historical interest as well as the purely personal one. He says : "In your excellent Review (Nov., 1895, p. 608) I am charged with ' virulence ' and ' acridity ' in criticizing the 4 new psy- chology.' The words seem to me to be unfair and ill-chosen. It is odd that I who did my level best to get a psychophysical laboratory started here before there was a single such laboratory in existence — unless Wundt's then private laboratory is to count — should be counted the enemy of pyschophysics. The very first thing I ever wrote was a monograph on the Relation of Physiology to Psychology, and before 1880 I had spent two years in physiological laboratories. What I ob- ject to is psychophysics by men who are not psychologists." THE psychological department of Cornell University has moved to Morrill Hall, where it is said to have nine rooms and 4,000 square feet of floor space. The Psychological Laboratory of the University 244 NOTES. of Nebraska has been moved into the first floor of the new library building and occupies a series of five rooms with a floor space of 3,000 square feet. In the new biological buildings which the University of Chicago will erect with a part of the $1,000,000 given by Miss Culver, ample provision will be made for the Psychological Laboratory. In the new Schemerhorn Hall of Natural Sciences to be erected for Columbia University at a cost of about $400,000, more than one- tenth of the building is allotted to psychology. DR. C. A. STRONG, associate professor of psychology in the Uni- versity of Chicago, has been elected lecturer on Psychology in Columbia University. H. C. WARREN, M. A., has been appointed assistant professor of Experimental Psychology in Princeton University. LEOPOLD Voss, Hamburg and Leipzig, has begun the publication of a new Archiv called Kantstudien, edited by Dr. Hans Vaihinger, of the University of Halle, with the cooperation of E. Adickes, E. Bou- troux, Edw. Caird, C. Cantoni, J. E. Creighton, W. Dilthey, B. Erd- mann, K. Fischer, M. Heinze, R. Reicke, A. Riehl and W. Windel- band. The journal will treat not only Kant's contributions to philos- ophy, but also the general development of modern philosophy in its relations to Kant. Contributions (which may be in English) are invited by the editor. A NEW Russian journal, a Review of Psychiatry, Neurology and Experimental Psychology, edited by Dr. Bekhteret, will hereafter be published monthly. VOL. III. No. 3. MAY, 1896. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. STUDIES FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORA- TORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. I. REACTION-TIME : A STUDY IN ATTENTION AND HABIT. BY JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL AND ADDISON W. MOORE. ASSISTED BY J. J. JEGI. It is not without grounds that experimentation upon reaction- time has been called the Lieblingsgegenstand of experimental psychology. The facts appear so simple and the interpretation so illusive that ingenuity has seemed piqued anew each time the matter has been opened. The fact has had its interest re- cently augmented by Prof essor James Mark Baldwin's challenge of the results and explanations which have hitherto passed cur- rent stamped with the mark of the justly revered Leipzig school. It must often have occurred to many readers following the Leip- zig explanation of the alleged fact that the time of the so- called * motor form ' of reaction is faster than the * sensory ' to ask, why a brain-reflex should be established in the former case and not in the latter, or why, if established, it should be so much less effective in reducing the time consumed by the re- action ; why occasionally, despite the assertion that such per- sons did not possess the necessary Anlage and so could not be regarded, some persons proved unable to make any distinction whatever in the forms or even showed faster time in the sensory attitude. The fact that these and other questions were left open by the Wundtian explanations appeared to leave room for further investigations. We set out with the general conception that from the evi- 246 JAMES R. ANGELL AND ADDISON W. MOORE. dence already in hand it was to be anticipated that each indi- vidual mind would, from influences already surrounding its growth, show itself possessed of certain coordinations which were customarily employed in the everyday business of life, and that these coordinations would afford pathways peculiarly per- vious to rapid nervous discharges, *'. £., they would form paths of least resistance ; whereas certain other coordinations would be either wholly lacking or much less practiced and much more difficult of employment, yielding when actually pressed into service much slower results. Working under this general con- ception we had reached results in our experimentation very similar to those of Professor Baldwin, and we were just ready to publish when his very notable article upon the subject ap- peared in this REVIEW of May, '95, showing essentially the same results as we had reached. Not only had Professor Baldwin an- ticipated our results up to that time ; he had also anticipated al- most completely our mode of procedure. This full acknowl- edgment of his priority is due him on every score. Although our time results have continued to confirm those of Professor Baldwin, yet as the investigation proceeded a standpoint of inter- pretation emerged, differing in some essential respects as much from Professor Baldwin's as from that of the Wundtian school. On the other hand, the interpretation here given on the basis of the interrelation of habit and attention seems to us to combine and reconcile some of the principal contentions of both sides of the * type ' discussion.1 The explanation we have attempted is * dynamo-genetic ' rather than static as most interpretations appear to us very largely to have been. The experiments were begun in March, 1895, and have con- tinued, with a two months' summer intermission, up to the pres- ent time. While some differentiations have been made, both in the stimulus and the mode of response, the results of these are submitted not so much to establish the characteristics of these differentiations themselves as to furnish cumulative evidence of xThe entire discussion referred to includes an article by Prof. Titchener, of Cornell University, on ' Simple Reactions,' Mind, N. S., IV., 74-81, Prof. Bald- win's report in this REVIEW, May, 1895, a criticism of the report by Prof. Titch- ener in Mind, IV., 506-514, and Prof. Baldwin's rejoinder, Mind, January, 1896. CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 247 the general nature of the reaction, and perhaps point the way for more detailed research in the future. The reagents of this series were the persons whose names appear at the head of the report. J., as indicated by the smaller number of his reactions in some of the series, came into the work recently ; A. had taken part in no reactions for sev- eral years ; M. and J. were entirely unpracticed. The time was taken with the Hipp chronoscope. The clock was tested at each hour's work, and frequently twice dur- ing the hour, by a falling screen whose time was taken from a 1,000 V. Konig fork. The variable error of the machine for the whole series was .0004 sec. We may hope to escape the recriminations generally hurled at all users of the Hipp chronoscope, inasmuch as the signifi- cance of the figures rests but little upon their time values. As will appear, the essential question is whether certain groups of reaction-time approach or recede from each other. As a mat- ter of fact, however, the accuracy of our instrument permits much more stringent conclusions. But this is all we are im- mediately concerned in. The experiments include responses by the hand, foot, and lips, to auditory and visual stimulations in both * sensory ' and * motor' forms. In the auditory series a large number of the hand and foot reactions were further differentiated into those made in the light and those taken in the dark. The auditory stimulation was given in most of the series through a telephone. The visual stimulation was the movement, from a stationary position, of a black screen with a white center. The hand responses were given by pressing downward with the first finger of the right hand. The foot reactions were made by downward pressure of the toe of the right foot, the foot being supported under the instep to prevent fatigue and complicating strain. The lip responses were given with a special key, the reaction being made by parting the lips. Most of the visual series were not begun until after the audi- tory series were completed, and in the latter most of the lip and foot reactions were taken after the hand series had been fin- ished. As the modes of response were the same in both the 248 JAMES R. ANGELL AND ADDISON W. MOORE. auditory and the visual series the reactions in the latter had the benefit of the practice secured in the former. This observation is of importance in considerations where the effects of practice are to be taken into account. It also accounts, in some measure, for the time of the visual series being faster than is usually reported. Indeed, if the mean variation had not in many of these cases remained so small, suspicion must surely have arisen as to whether the conditions desired were really being attained, but with small variations (6 to 15%) and clear distinctions in the sensory and motor forms, the figures ap- pear trustworthy. Since the hand responses to sound were taken first, far outnumber the others, and were distributed over a much longer period of time, they are of most value in show- ing the development under practice. While the reactions were not all taken at the same hour of day, each period of work was divided between the sensory and motor forms. So that, throughout the course as a whole, each sensory reaction is balanced by a motor under parallel condi- tions. The number of reactions taken under each mode of re- sponse, hand, foot and lips, was about equally distributed between the sensory and motor series. Beside the differen- tiations above mentioned, several minor ones, such as alter- ations in the intensity and location of the stimuli, changes in position of body, response with the left instead of the right hand, etc., were made in the course of the work. These vari- ations, to which reference will be made later, simply served to emphasize the importance of habit as a factor in attention. EFFECTS OF LIGHT AND DARKNESS. Most of the reactions in the light were taken with the eyes resting upon the responding organ, save of course in the case of reactions to visual stimulus. In its external aspects this form of reaction corresponds to what Prof. Baldwin calls the * visual motor,' as distinguished from the ' kinaesthetic motor' reaction. In the latter attention is focussed upon the thought of the move- ment, the responding organ not being seen. He further says : 1PSYCHOL. REV. II., pp. 26l ff. CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 249 " In subjects of the motor type the * kinsesthetic motor* is shorter — the * visual motor' time approximating the sensory reaction time." Taking Prof. Baldwin's definition of * kinsesthetic motor' in terms of attention, as that form in which the attention is occupied with 'the thought of the movement,' we found the same results for it, viz. : that in reagents of the * motor type* it was the fastest form. But the external conditions of this loca- tion of attention we found just the reverse of those stated by Prof. Baldwin. Both A. and J. found that the attention could be more completely centered in the reacting organ when the latter was visible. When blindfolded or in a dark room, there was a ten- dency toward the sensory form ; and the time of the reaction was between that of the motor in the light, and the sensory. A.'s and J.'s sensory form was also retarded in the dark. M.'s sensory form was faster in the dark. But the motor was slower and tended very strongly to pass over into the sensory. EFFECTS OF PRACTICE. At the outset of the course, it was found in the hand reac- tions to sound that A. and J. returned the faster time for the mo- tor reactions, and M. for the sensory. The first attempts to react in both ways showed in all the reagents — especially in the cases of M. and J., who were entirely unpracticed, very little difference, save an occasional big jump or total failure to react. This taken with the testimony of introspection showed that most of the reactions still came in the habitual way, the other form of reaction not yet having emerged. Then, as the new form began vaguely to define itself, there arose a large time differ- ence between the two series, and a large mean variation in the series of the new form. At this stage, in the attempts at the new coordination, in spite of the reagent's best effort, attention fre- quently jumped back into the habitual form. With further practice, however, the confusion began to disappear, the new form coming out clear, with its time and mean variation dimin- ishing. Meanwhile the time of the old form also kept diminish- ing, but did not make such rapid progress in reduction as did the new one. This continued until, at the close of some of the 250 JAMES R. ANGELL AND ADD IS ON W. MOORE. series, the difference between the two forms was inside the mean variation for each series with perhaps a slight final balance in favor of the motor as the faster time. Thus both A. and M., who had the longer practice in the auditory-hand series, and who started in the one motor, the other sensory, came out at the same point, relative to the two series, i. e.9 both were a little faster in the motor form. J., who came into the work recently, does not show this outcome so clearly, though in some of his series the approach of the two times is clearly marked. Mean- while the decreasing time and continued approximation of the times of the two series were accompanied in each series by an ever increasing degree of reflexness. At this stage any extra- ordinary effort to concentrate on either form resulted in a con- fused and lengthened reaction. To sum up the steps in the development, we have (i^ differ- ent habitual forms of attention at the outset ; (2) a period of con- fusion and wide time difference in evolving the new form ; (3) a subsequent reduction of absolute time and mean variations in both forms ; (4) an approximation of the time values of the two forms ; with (5) a final possibly shorter time for the motor form. In short, to generalize these steps, the conclusion, to which the whole series points, is that continued practice in the two modes of coordination with a constant stimulus, under constant condi- tions, results in two highly reflexive forms, not of widely differ- ent, but of about equal times values. This result receives further confirmation from Professor Baldwin's report of his own case1 in which he says his reactions " have only changed in that the dis- tinction between the sensory and motor time is less marked than it used to be, and this I explain as probably due to habit and practice, as my theory again seems at least not to contradict." On the whole, the outcome seems to agree with some of the results on both sides of the * type ' discussion. It indicates with Professor Baldwin's results that "the ground of origin of types is to be found in education, which must necessarily apply to single functions ;" that, as so defined, in the sensory 'type' the sensory form of the reaction may be shorter than the motor even after the latter has clearly emerged in consciousness. That 1 Mind, January, '96, pp. 85 ff. CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 251 continued practice does not tend to widen the time difference at first manifest between the two forms, but on the contrary. On the other hand, it finds that when both forms have reached a high degree of reflexness, the motor form is probably somewhat faster, though not to the extent reported in the Leipzig results. The following table shows the effects of practice in the time differences between the first and last thirds of each sensory and motor series. In all, except the hand series of A. and M., the TABLE SHOWING THE RESULTS OF PRACTICE. 1 o 1 Ear. 1 O 1 Focus of Atten. REAGENTS. A M J No. Time in c. No. Time in a. No. Time in o. First Third. Last Third. First Third. Last Third. First Third. Last Third. Hand Sen. Mot. 560 540 195 149 133 127 420 380 163 178 132 134 160 165 185 169 173 159 Foot Sen. Mot. 145 155 182 159 168 150 220 230 138 145 133 134 125 H5 218 204 208 196 Lips Sen. Mot. 130 120 132 125 122 116 125 125 117 112 108 106 160 140 169 157 155 146 Eye. Hand Sen. Mot. IOO IOO 206 193 173 150 IOO IOO 153 I76 125 130 IOO IOO 180 193 173 165 Foot Lips Sen. Mot. IOO IOO 218 170 170 151 no 115 160 153 153 148 125 125 229 199 183 175 Sen. Mot. 130 120 141 133 135 127 125 125 144 136 138 133 IOO IOO m 179 165 number of reactions is very inadequate to show anything like the full effects of practice. But even in the shorter series the drift is clearly indicated. In addition to the general results al- ready pointed out, it further appears from the table, that for all three reagents, the ear-lip coordination is the fastest ; also that there is less difference between the sensory and motor reactions at the outset of this series than at the beginning of the others. For A. and J., the reactions at the beginning of the eye-foot series, are the longest on the record, and show also the widest 252 JAMES R. ANGELL AND ADDISON W. MOORE. difference between the sensory and motor forms. A. shows at the beginning of all the series the faster time in the motor form ; M.'s reactions are quite divided between the two forms showing the faster time in the sensory form in both hand series, and in the auditory-foot series, but is faster in the motor form for both lip series, and for the eye-foot series. J. is motor throughout except in the eye-hand series. A series of auditory and visual memory tests with nonsense syllables showed A. and J. quicker in the visual, and M. slightly faster in the auditory form. INTERPRETATION.1 Taking the simple reaction as the type of voluntary action in general, and voluntary action as action under the direction of attention, it seemed that the key to any explanation adequate to all the facts, the individual peculiarities and the effects of practice, must be found in the functions of attention and habit in their relations to each other. Not to go into too great detail, the process of attention in its essential outlines in, say, the auditory-hand reaction, appears something as follows : As the reagent receives his instruc- tions for the reaction, he formulates in imagination what he is going to do. This formulation, the getting in mind what he is to do, is his attention to the act. Whatever may be the detail of imagery involved in this formulation, it involves pri- marily the coordination of two groups of incoming sensations, one from the ear, the other from the hand, started by the opera- tor's descriptions. From this, two distinctions may be drawn : (i) As related to the act of attention, these two sensation groups are its stimuli ; and each group is as much stimulus as the other — the sensations from the hand as much as those from the ear. The * reaction ' as meaning the whole act to be performed is not the mere response of the hand to the ear, but the act of atten- tion in coordinating the incoming stimuli from both the hand and the ear. Concerning the ' sensory-motor ' distinction it follows that, since the stimulus, *'. £., the material for the act, lies in 1 Under this head we are indebted to Professors Dewey and G. H. Mead, for suggestions without which the following interpretation would not have been reached. CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 253 these incoming currents from both hand and ear, as related to the whole act, both * forms' may be regarded as equally * sensory' or equally * motor.' (2) In relation to each other inside the act of attention, most discussions of the subject appear to make the ear process merely a stimulus to which the hand adjustment is merely a response. But the question arises, What holds the ear to its work ? Why does the reagent maintain his listening attitude ? It may be replied that it is * because he is told to.' But he is not told to listen any more than he is told to move his hand. If the telling suffices in one case it should in the other. More- over, he is not merely to listen, or even to listen just for the click, but to listen for the click as a -pressure signal. It is this char- acter of the click as a signal for pressure that keeps up the in- terest in it and the attention to it. (We are assuming here, of course, a case of sensory attention.) The hand therefore is stimulus as well as response to the ear, and the latter is response as well as stimulus to the hand. Each is both stimulus and re- sponse to the other. The distinction of stimulus and response is therefore not one of content, the stimulus being identified with the ear, the response with the hand, but one of function, and both offices belong equally to each organ. The reason the movement of the hand is so often treated as the mere re- sponse to the ear as its mere stimulus appears to be that the whole act, or * reaction,' is identified with the movement of the hand. But the entire act is the act of attention in coordinating the two groups of stimuli coming from both hand and ear. To be sure, in the act of coordination there is, as we have seen, the interaction of the two elements as stimulus and response each to the other. But it must be kept in mind that this latter is a distinction falling inside the act, not between the hand move- ment considered as the act, and the sound considered as its ex- ternal stimulus or ' cause.' In a word, the reagent reacts as much with his ear as he does with his hand. With the reaction now interpreted as essentially constituted by the act of coordinating ti\z ear-hand activities; with the dis- tinction of * stimulus ' and ' response ' interpreted as wholly func- tional, falling inside the act, the question still remains, — why, in the act of coordination, is attention occupied more imme- 254 JAMES R. ANGELL AND ADDISON W. MOORE. diately with one of these processes than with the other? This question, again, does not ask whether the attention shall be given to the sound or to the movement as such, but where in the total ear-hand process the focus of attention shall fall. This point, wherever it is, must be determined not by the solicitation of the point in itself considered, but by the demands of the -whole act of coordination. Whether the attention be 'in the hand' or * in the ear,' it is ' there ' in order to bring off successfully the ear-hand adjustment. But why is it 'in' one or the other? This leads to the con- sideration of another function or rather another phase of the function of attention, namely, its function as the adjuster, the mediator, of the tension between habitually established coordi- nations and new conditions under which they have to express themselves. An habitual process, such, e. g. , as walking, comes into consciousness as, i. e., under attention, only when some new set of conditions, some obstacle, arises, adjustment to which lies outside the scope of the habit. Then only so much of the process comes into consciousness as needs readjustment to the new conditions. Habit is still left to do all it can, and in every voluntary act there is always something left for it to do. No matter with how minute a portion of a process attention may be occupied, it always will be found giving direction to a group, no matter how small, of already coordinated activities. Any attempt, therefore, to leave habit out of the account in volun- tary action makes such action impossible. It would be affirm- ing a process of adjustment with nothing to adjust. If atten- tion, as such, then, is the process of mediating the tension between habit and new conditions, its focus must be where this tension is strongest, *'. e., where habit is least able to cope with the situation. The position of this point will depend upon the extent to which the different parts of the whole ear-hand process can be left to habit. If the ear element of the process, that is, the sound, be unfamiliar and the movement of the hand be familiar, the point of tension will fall * in the ear ' and vice versa. With the sound and movement both familiar or both un- familiar, the balance between them will be determined by edu- cation, inherited structure, etc. Let it be noted again, that in CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 255 leaving one phase more than the other to habit, the former is not left out of the act, nor out of the process of attention. In attention to the sound, the movement of the hand is present in the character of the sound as a pressure signal ; and in atten- tion to the movement, the sound is present in the very fact of its being a movement in response to the sound. Concerning the process of * shifting ' the attention and the accompanying time variations it follows from the very nature of attention that it is only from an external point of view, the point of view of an observer, that we can speak of « shifting ' the attention in the same act. For the reagent a ' shift ' of atten- tion is a change in his act ; it means a different process of co- ordination. For him, therefore, the sensory and motor forms of attention are not ' two forms ' of attention for the same act ; they are essentially two different acts ; and the time question for him is, which of the two acts is the shorter. Regarding the act, however, in an objective way, we should expect the time of the reaction to be shortest when the attention is upon that part of the process which is least habitual, or in which habit en- counters the most new conditions. When one who reacts spon- taneously to sound in the sensory way attempts to transfer his attention to the hand, two things are involved: (i) leaving the ear adjustment for habit to take care of; (2) a breaking up, in attending to the hand process, of an already efficiently estab- lished coordination. This means that for the performance of the * act,' regarded objectively, unnecessary work is being done. The focus of the attention upon the more habitual phase of the process means its resolution into elements. Now the moment these elements are called out as unit groups, they bring with them their own train of associated groups, all of which have to be inhibited. This increased and, from the objective view of the act, unnecessary complication, means, of course, an increase in time and mean variation, and accounts for the exceedingly * artificial ' feeling that accompanies the effort.1 JHere it may be remarked that if the statement of attention as the act of coordinating activities more or less habitual be correct, Professor Baldwin is entitled to say not only that focusing attention upon the more habitual phase of the act ' may ' but that it must retard the act. 256 JAMES R. ANGELL AND ADD IS ON W. MOORE. Indeed, whether the attempt succeeds at all, depends upon the extent to which the ear adjustment can be left to habit. If the sound be very strange the reagent finds he cannot attend to the hand until, as he says he 'gets used' to the sound, and this * getting used ' to the sound is, of course, the ear adjust- ment becoming habitual. This explains why at the outset of the series M.'s reactions were all made in the sensory form. As the ear phase, however, grows more and more reflex the breaking up of the hand pro- cess becomes possible and the motor form of attention emerges. A precisely parallel process takes place in the development of the sensory form for a reagent spontaneously motor. Under practice the new form continues, of course, to grow more and more reflex, and its time and mean variation steadily decrease. In the case of M., for whom the new form was the motor, its time kept diminishing in the hand series until, at the close, it was a few sigma faster than the sensory. A similar develop- ment occurred in J.'s visual hand series. The sensory was faster at the beginning, the motor at the close. In all the series where the motor was faster at the beginning, it still remained so at the close, though not by nearly so large a margin as re- ported in the Leipzig tables. In saying that continued practice on both these forms rendered them * more reflex,' we mean that when at the close the reactions were made in the fastest time it was with a much less amount of tension, and consequently less attention, than at first. Any extraordinary attempt, at this stage, to concentrate upon either form resulted in great irreg- ularity and increase of time, for the reason, as already stated, that all there is for attention to do is to break up and reestab- lish processes already unified under habit. But why even the small margin in favor of the motor time at the close of a course of practice on the two forms ? The rea- son usually given is that ' attention to the movement is the be- ginning of it.' But if the whole act is not the mere hand move- ment, but the coordination of ear and hand, it is difficult to see why the sensory form is not as much the beginning of the act as is the motor. If attention to the hand is the * beginning of the hand movement ' it is no less true that attention to the ear is CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 257 the beginning of the sound. And this is not mere ' arm chair* psychologizing, for as a matter of fact, at the beginning of the series, nearly all M's premature responses occurred in the sen- sory form, and at the close of the series about as many occurred in one form as in the other. When the premature response came, it was always preceded by a feeling of great tension in the ear, and succeeded by a corresponding feeling of relief in the ear, and when in this case the true signal came it was fre- quently lost entirely by the reagent. Again, it is said, that in attention to the hand a much larger portion of the whole path- way of discharge is ' innervated ' than in attention to the ear. This seems to assume that only that part of the total pathway is * innervated ' which is represented in the focus of attention. But if * innervation ' is necessary to movement, and the focus of attention is necessary to * innervation,' how, e. g., does walking go on when the focus of attention is elsewhere? The answer is, that we must interpret the focus of attention not as a point of innervation merely, but as a -point of conflicting innervations demanding adjustment. It is not the need of innervation as such, but of adjustment of innervations, that determines the focus. But, even supposing that attention means increased innervation, there appears no reason why, assuming the nervous structure homogeneous, and the amount of innervation the same, its ap- plication should be more effective at one point than at another. As to the distribution of the innervation over a larger area, if the amount is the same, it must be correspondingly weakened at each point, and so nothing be gained. It appears, then, that for an explanation of the fact that at the end of the course of practice, when both forms had became highly reflex, the motor form was little the faster, we must ap- peal again to the relation between Habit and Attention, still re- garding, in the objective way, the sensory and motor reactions as * two forms ' of the * same ' act, this fact of the shorter motor time means, (i) in terms of Attention, that the stimulus presented by the ear adjustment affords less material for the continued exer- cise of attention than that presented by the hand ; (2) in terms of Habit it means that the ear process becomes more rapidly and more completely habitual than that of the hand. It takes but a 258 LOUIS GRANT WHITEHEAD. short time to 'get used* to even the strangest sound. After this the character of the sound is comparatively fixed. It cannot be changed through further adjustment. This appears due largely to the more stable character of the inherited ear mechanism. On the other hand, the phase of the stimulus pre- sented by the hand is not nearly so fixed and stable. Here there is much more opportunity for continued variation, hence more ground for the continued exercise of attention. Applying what has already been said, we should, then, expect that act to be faster in which the focus of attention is upon the less stable phase of the hand element of the coordination rather than when it is more * artificially' occupied in breaking up the more completely established ear adjustment. In a word the time question is not a case of a ' sensory ' vs. a * motor ' reaction, but of a sensori- motor less habitual vs. a sensori-motor more habitual. As stated at the outset, this interpretation in terms of Habit and Attention seems to us to combine elements from both sides of the 'type discussion.' On the Princeton side it would say : (i) that the ' type ' of attention and its accompanying time are deter- mined by the relation between the individual's stock of coordi- nations, inherited and acquired, already on hand, and the par- ticular coordination required by the reaction 5(2) that the ' sen- sory form' may still be the faster even after the 'motor form' has clearly emerged in consciousness. On the Leipzig side it would say that under practice, in both forms, upon the same coordination, the sensory phase passes more completely under the control of habit and thus leaves the faster time to the motor form. II. A STUDY OF VISUAL AND AURAL MEMORY PROCESSES. BY LOUIS GRANT WHITEHEAD. PROBLEM. We have been concerned in the experiments here reported to determine the general validity of the Ebbinghaus-Muller- Schumann method of procedure when applied to the following problems, and to obtain as far as possible answers to the same. CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 259 (i) What is the relative quickness of the visual and the aural senses when employed in the memorizing of nonsense syllables constructed like those of the above mentioned authors? (2.) What is the relative power of retention for matter memorized visually compared with that memorized aurally? Or, put other- wise, what is the relative rate of forgetting for material memo- rized in the two ways? (3.) In what manner is the ease of learning anew matter once memorized — but now partially or wholly forgotten — affected by the fact of its being presented on the second occasion to a different sense from that to which it was originally presented? For example, out of six sets of syl- lables learned to-day from visual presentations, three will a week from to-day be presented and learned again in visual terms, the other three in auditory terms. Will the mental co- ordinations constantly occurring between aural and visual pre- sentations of the linguistic type, and generally mediated in these cases by the motor activities incident to enunciation, manifest themselves as complete or not? That is to say, having memo- rized a certain amount of material from visual presentations, will it require less time a week later to memorize this anew from the auditory form of presentation than it did the first time in visual form ; and will it require as little time as does the fresh memo- rizing of the same matter from visual presentation? What are the results when reverse conditions are employed and the origi- nal presentations are made in auditory form? METHOD. Very little need be said of the method. It was essentially that now familiar to every one by the work of the authors al- ready cited. Nonsense syllables constituted by a vowel placed between two consonants were arranged in a series, containing in this case from seven to twelve syllables each. These sepa- rate syllables were presented at regular intervals, the interval being given by a metronome. Five seconds were allowed to elapse between each presentation of a series ; and after the suc- cessful memorizing of the series three minutes intervened before the next series commenced. All the usual precautions were 260 LOUIS GRANT WHITEHEAD. taken to prevent the forming of significant syllables, rhyme, assonance, etc. The test of success in the memorizing was the ability to repeat the lists aloud at the rate in which they were given, a feat which many subjects found exceedingly difficult, owing apparently to inability to make enunciatory movements synchronously with the outside standard. We incline to think that this requirement, which has char- acterized the work of our predecessors, is unwise. We would insist on the subjects adhering to a fixed rate, but it does not appear that it is imperative to have this given from without, much less to have it identical with the rate of presentation. The rate at which the syllables are most easily learned has not proved to be the easiest rate at which to repeat them, and although sep- arate tests are necessary to give an unequivocal answer to the problem, we certainly found many subjects much hampered by the necessity of speaking at an artificially fixed rate. It is not so much that subjects wish to speak slowly and reflect as they go, as that they object to a ready-made rate which they find a distracting and inhibiting element. We may at this point properly say a word about the general subject of rate. Ebbinghaus used a rate so rapid as to seem to us objectionable on several accounts. We hit upon our own rate — 58 beats per minute — after considerable experiment, as being that most suitable in its avoidance of rush and hurry, on the one hand, and drag and tedium, on the other. From a number of ob- servations made during the progress of tests, however, we began to suspect that the rate which permitted the most rapid and sat- isfactory memorizing was essentially that of the pulse. Our evidence is insufficient to warrant us in speaking dogmatically, and the matter must be submitted to yet further test. But the indications have at times been quite striking. The rate 58 it will be observed, on which we decided, from considerations based upon the subjective feelings of confusion and tedium, is very near the pulse rate, though a trifle slow for most of our subjects. The series presented visually were placed on a drum revolv- ing in front of a screen, through a window in which the sylla- bles became successively visible. CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 261 The aural presentations were made by reading aloud, the voice being kept as nearly uniform in intensity as possible. Rhythm in the reading was suppressed. The subject invariably supplied his own rhythmic interpretation of the series, and it seemed wiser to let this be the determinant than to introduce arbitrarily any special form, which with the series of different lengths would certainly produce different results, e. g., with iambic meter the lists with an odd number of syllables would come out with a syllable left over. In any event, it was thought best to let the subject follow his native bent, so far as possible. In this respect our procedure is at variance with that of Ebbing- haus and Schumann-Muller. There is much to be said on their side. Though they found the memorizing to be more rapid under their conditions, yet granting this to be true, our method still seems to us more correct. The total time occupied in memoriz- ing each series, as well as the number of repetitions necessary, was carefully noted. The importance of this last matter will be commented on later. At present, and before proceeding to examine any of the results, let us consider a moment the exact conditions which con- stituted the test, in order the more intelligently to interpret the report which follows. One of two general conditions was always involved ; the subject was either learning or giving at fixed inter- vals successive groups of letters forming unfamiliar syllables. Under both conditions the disposition of almost every person experimented upon was to turn the presentation immediately over into motor terms, through a subdued mental enunciation of the syllables, which often passed over into actual movements of the lips. Nor has this apparently depended in our subjects upon the prevalent type of mental imagery. The predominant imagery was, perhaps, visual ; but nothing very marked showed itself, and in general the mental furniture appeared normal in its mixture of visual, auditory and motor elements. The admix- ture of motor activities was a trifle more noticeable, with visual than with auditory presentations. But this condition of affairs is not abnormal nor peculiar merely to this experiment. On the contrary, it is the common experience in practically all attempts to memorize verbatim. The tendency crops out with perfect 262 LOUIS GRANT WHITEHEAD. naturalness and is exceedingly hard to inhibit. On the last ac- count we have not tried to prevent it. But the result is that, instead of having a presentation material affording ground for direct comparison of visual and aural factors, we have in the majority of cases a material giving us visual motor factors to compare with auditory motor factors. As a test of the practical working peculiarities of the memory for aural as compared with visual elements, this consideration deserves no very great weight after it is once explicitly recognized, because, as noted above, the actual conditions of memorizing linguistic material are exactly the same. It does, however, exhibit a difficulty, which the method does not seem competent to surmount, into making a direct comparison of pure aural and pure visual forms of mem- ory. In calling them forms of pure aural and pure visual memory what is meant is not of course forms which are discon- nected from any motor connections, for that is absurd, but forms which, during the process of memorizing, are disconnected from any enunciatory motor activities, which same activities must of course enter into the test of the successful or unsuccess- ful attempt to memorize, this always being tried by the effort to repeat the syllables. Criticisms have not been wanting upon the asserted homo- geneity of such material as has been used. Indeed, Ebbing- haus himself dwells upon the matter and admits the justice of the criticism. It has been maintained upon various grounds, which we need not canvass, that nonsense syllables do not, as they ought for the purpose of memory tests, possess exactly equivalent tendencies to set up association processes. In this connection we may say that our observations have substantiated those of the authors heretofore mentioned. We found that cer- tain lists of syllables, quite apart from any assignable reason, have shown themselves much harder to memorize, or much easier, as the case might be, than the great majority of lists. This general question takes on a new importance in connection with this special inquiry, where it comes up in a somewhat different form. Granted that nonsense syllables when carefully selected and arranged do furnish an essentially homogeneous subject-matter when presented to a single sense, it does not at CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 263 all necessarily follow that the same material when presented to a different sense is homogeneous. For it will at once appear, in so much as one of the well recognized conditions of ready and successful memorizing is found in clear and moderately in- tense stimulation of the sense organ, that we must show the stimulations to the eye and the ear possess essentially equal in- tensity and clearness, and that the presentations made to each are of essentially equal subjective duration. Now there is only one condition which can be applied to eye and ear that can be admitted as in any measure equivalent in point of intensity and duration of stimulus. This is found in such a combination of the two as shall just furnish each sense with clear and un- equivocal perceptions. But obviously the different character- istics of the eye and the ear render widely divergent the stimuli which, objectively measured, are just competent to render a clear perception. Furthermore, under the conditions of the ex- periment the perception of a clearly enunciated syllable requires less time than is necessary for a clear visual perception. In other words, the ear requires a quicker presentation than the eye to make the conditions equal. But the attempt to reduce very materially the time of the exposure of the visual presentation, in order to make it more nearly equivalent to the auditory pres- entation, results simply in the introduction of disturbing and fatiguing eye movements and after images. Here again, however, as was remarked above, these same conditions are substantially those met with in actual every-day experience, and as a test of the mere practical aspect of the problem the method might possibly stand unimpeached. But where absolutely accurate information is sought the situation is as set forth. Any results gained in this way must stand ready for possible overthrow by some more satisfactory method.1 Our own procedure has given us aural and visual presenta- tions of the character mentioned, *'. £., as nearly just clear and readily perceptible as possible. The auditory presentations were given in a clear, crisp form of enunciation. The visual pres- xWe believe these difficulties might at least be minimized by using an iris photographic diaphragm to make the visual exposures. This would, however, require a somewhat complicated mechanism. 264 LOUIS GRANT WHITEHEAD. entations at the same rate were actually in clear sight about .5 of a second. We believe, therefore, that our results are fairly comparable among themselves, yet we believe also that for ideally accurate material it is necessary, if possible, to decide by preliminary experimentation the conditions which secure most nearly subjective equality of duration and intensity for the visual and aural stimuli. It has been customary in handling the results from memory tests of this general character, to lay the chief emphasis upon the number of repetitions necessary for successful memorizing. There is, over against this, the possibility of employing the time occupied as a criterion. Ebbinghaus has discussed this matter in its purely theoretical and mathematical bearings, and upon the basis of his conclusions retained the number of repetitions as the standard of reference in cases where either the speed of memorizing or the permanency of the impression was considered. The conditions with him, however, as with Miiller and Schumann, were sufficiently different from ours to warrant examination. In our tests the subject had been instructed to make no attempt to repeat the series until he felt he could do so successfully. Now as a matter of fact the actual number of attempts to repeat varies widely from time to time and with different subjects. It will be noticed in the tables subjoined that, other things being equal, the greater the number of repetitions necessary to memo- rize a list, the less is the number required to memorize it anew later on. This agrees with the results of Ebbinghaus. Again, the unsuccessful attempts to repeat a list often results in an ap- parent confusion which requires several extra repetitions to over- come. Furthermore, a half dozen repetitions with three unsuc- cessful attempts to repeat, may occupy as much time as eight repetitions with only one attempt at repeating, and that success- ful. During these attempts to repeat, the subject is of course giving himself both auditory and motor stimulations, which will be helpful or otherwise in somewhat the same degree in which they are accurate. It does not commend itself as wise to place any restrictions upon the subject's attempt to repeat, for this would introduce an artificiality into the method more obnoxious than anything yet touched upon. The subjective certainty of CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 265 the subject is far from being a trustworthy criterion in any re- gard, for it not only happens that one is often quite sure he has repeated a list correctly when such is not the case, but the con- verse also occurs and one finds he can repeat correctly a list about which he felt no certainty at all. In view of this it ap- pears that we must ascribe a certain weight at least to the time involved as well as to the mere number of repetitions. We have kept such time records, and an accurate stop-watch has shown itself very useful. The difficulty of fixing upon a convenient rate table, adequate to express the results in terms having refer- ence at once to the number of repetitions and to the time con- sumed, is that we have no really reliable index as to how much influence should be ascribed to one factor as compared with the other. In fact, our experience leads us to the opinion that this interrelation between the time and the number of repetitions is one of considerable irregularity. The most desirable proce- dure which suggests itself as actually feasible is to eliminate all cases from the results where more than one attempt to repeat has occurred. This involves a much larger body of tests, for, of course, the subject ought not to know that such a method is to be pursued. Yet it would at least free the statistics from the ambiguity now under consideration. We reach then the following conclusion concerning the ade- quacy of our method for answering the questions put at the begin- ning of this paper. The nonsense syllable method is competent for the solution of the problems proposed, but only within certain limits and under certain specific restrictions as to conditions, which we have already canvassed. The main objection which holds against it is the apparent impossibility of excluding enun- ciatory motor activities. We doubt whether any method which submits the eye and the ear to a test upon the peculiarities of the memory processes can hope to avoid the difficulty. It will come up indirectly through association processes, if it does not occur directly as in this case. Even Wolfe's experiments upon tone memory do not escape it entirely. In replying to the last of our three special questions we beg to emphasize that, in ac- cordance with all we have heretofore said, we regard our re- sults gained by this method as provisional. The experiments 266 LOUIS GRANT WHITEHEAD. have extended over about nine months and consist of tests upon thirteen persons, six women and seven men. A considerable number of the experiments we have eliminated as untrustworthy from defects of one kind and another. We give results in terms both of time and repetition. TABLE I. WOMEN. MEN. Visual present'n. Aural present'n. Visual present'n. Aural present'n. 00 C0 } Av. time Av. rep- Av. time Av. rep- Da" Av. time Av. rep- Av. time Av. rep- 3 yet the figure is apperceived with almost absolute certainty as either horizontal or vertical. To explain this we must make a rather detailed examination of the conditions which influence the apperception. Reference to the testimony of the subjects shows that asso- ciations called forth by the position of the body might influence the apperception of the object. If while in the abnormal posi- tion they thought about the fact that they were lying on their side, and that the figure was parallel to the floor, the position in which they preferred the movable line was changed. Most of the subjects found it easier not to make this connection. Hy. however, found much difficulty in not doing this. The explana- tion is simple. In the abnormal position Hy. was not very com- fortable ; this means that sensations from his body were continu- ally being forced on his attention ; hence it was, of course, difficult for him to abstract from the position in which he found himself. The figures show that the effect of the abnormal position was less powerful with him than with the others. Associations, then, form other sources, as well as eye movements and their associations, can influence the apperception. In the normal oblique position the eye movements aroused usually the idea of an oblique figure ; this is probably due to their effect above, as is corroborated by the peculiar figures in HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 279 the results of Hy., where the obliques were much more nearly like the horizontal and vertical than was the case with the other subjects. It will be remembered, however, that Hy., had a strong tendency to hold his head on one side. His eye move- ments, then, were never purely from side to side, or up and down, but were more nearly like those for an oblique position of the figure with the head normal. A change from horizontal to oblique was then, for him, not one of kind but only of degree as is shown by the figures. But in the normal oblique there was also a tendency to approach the horizontal and vertical with the other subjects, his I believe to be due to the fact that we are accustomed to see at times objects which are normally horizontal tipped to one side ; these objects would cause oblique eye movements. It is natural then that these oblique eye movements should at times arouse associations with a horizon- tal or vertical figure. We may now return to the abnormal oblique from which we started. Hy. it will be remembered for the * left up ' and * right down' abnormal positions, upon which all the others showed great agreement, placed the line very excentrically. But we saw that the associations called forth by his body played an im- portant part in his judgments. In the abnormal position then it seemed probable that he was more or less conscious of being in an abnormal position and that the board was really oblique. When such associations were aroused we have seen that a dif- ferent position of the line was chosen by all. Hy. is no excep- tion for the figure for the abnormal oblique position (which the others apperceived as horizontal) were 15.7, while the normal horizontal was 17.6. Moreover, we saw that there was nearly uniformity in the apperception of the oblique abnormal for the other subjects, only nine variations in one being recorded ; of these Hy. had. 5. In the case of the rest of the subjects these associations from the position of the body were largely absent ; they were more- over accustomed to place the line without considering the rela- tion in space. Now in the normal position we saw that the general habits of the eyes determined the apperception, but that when these were ambiguous the apperception was ambiguous. 280 EDGAR PIERCE. In the abnormal position where the line is up and to the left there is first the side movements of the eyes ; this suggests a horizontal figure ; there is also a vertical movement of the eyes which suggests a vertical figure ; we should then expect an am- biguous result in the figure, but this is not the case. There is no doubt, however, that the eye movements most easily made in this case are side ones meaning a horizontal figure. Now the whole situation is very strange, and in order to make the necessary connections and apperceive the figure as oblique a very complicated process, as we have seen, would have to occur. But the subjects are trained to inhibit even much less difficult processes ; it follows then that the eye movements which preponderate will determine the apperception immediately with- out more ado. Such we find to be the case for nearly every subject. When associations are aroused as with Hy. the result is very different. In every case then it is perfectly clear that the eye movements and the intellectual associations determined a general way of ap- perceiving the object, although this tendency of apperception was not present to the individual consciousness unless attention was called to it. The line was in every case placed in accord with this general way of apperceiving, whether this was wholly con- scious or not. This is proved not only by the general agree- ment, but also by the individual variations, and is corroborated by the subjective testimony. There is then no doubt but that in these simple forms one function of the eye movements is to suggest the general way of apperceiving the object; they are not the only elements, as association from other sources may influence the result. But we have seen in our former paper on symmetry that eye move- ments and associations influence the proportions between the dif- ferent parts of the figure, that is to say these elements fix the relations between the parts of the object. It seems then as if the eye movements -with the other elements suggested a given kind of apperception of the object, which tendency need not be fully conscious, and also by laws of their own determined the ob- jective relations necessary to complete this apperception. When the objective conditions fulfill the suggestions aroused by it, then the object satisfies the cesthetic demands. HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 281 We started out in our experiments to explain the aesthetic consciousness derived from simple forms. We found the first condition of these to be unity and variety. We found also that in the horizontal position where variety is given that the sym- metrical arrangement was preferred for this gave unity. The objective condition for this unity varied with the content and involved sensational and intellectual elements. In the vertical position we found other conditions. Stability was here the important unifying element ; the objective condi- tions which produced stability were probably due to the same elements that produced symmetry. The elements that enter in to the unity of these forms are sensational and intellectual. Why do we demand unity was the next question, and it seemed as if a study of the elements that constituted this unity might explain it. An examination of the different forms showed us that certain sensational and other elements determined whether we should regard the forms as horizontal or vertical, and that the specific position of the line always corresponded to the general tendency of apperception. The desire then to make the objective conditions correspond with the subjective ones is what necessitates unity in our forms and is the one essential condition for the emergence of the (Esthetic consciousness. But it will be seen that in our experiments something sug- gested in a general way has been just as necessary as the unity of the forms. This in itself necessitates a variety of elements, for one kind of elements is not rich enough to suggest such a general tendency of apperception. Thus unity and variety re- sult from the fact that the aesthetic consciousness is the feeling resulting from a realization by the object of a tendency sug- gested by it. Any form then that by means of any elements suggests a general tendency which can be satisfied by the ele- ments it contains, apperceived as a whole, may be beautiful. One more limitation is, however, necessary before we reach a true idea of the aesthetic consciousness. We saw in the hori- zontal position that symmetry was preferred, in the vertical usually the stable, but that associations often influenced the re- sult. Thus, if one thinks of a vase, the lines are put so as to carry out the idea. It seemingly then makes no difference 282 JAMES E. LOUGH. what the general tendency is as long as the object carries out this tendency. The essential thing is the fulfillment of a tendency of whatever sort for its own sake without involving any purpose. The aesthetic consciousness is, then, a state aroused by the objective fulfillment of a tendency regarded without reference to any ulterior end, and the function of the elements of the beautiful object is to suggest such tendency and at the same time to fulfill it. A NEW PERIMETER. BY JAMES E. LOUGH. Indirect vision is one of several problems of sight now under investigation in the Harvard Psychological Laboratory. For the purposes of this study the ordinary perimeter and cam- pimeter have proven themselves almost useless. In these instru- ments the eye looks at a stationary point, whilst the stimulating object changes its place on the graduated arc. This change of place alters the objective illumination, etc., of the object, so that the effect of fine changes in its intensity, size, etc., cannot be accurately studied. This difficulty has been overcome in the instrument here described by reversing the usual order of things and making the fixation point movable while the stimulus is the stationary part of the apparatus. By this arrangment the oper- ator is given absolute control over the variations of the stimulus. A description of this instrument is published now before any exact results can be reported, in the hope that it may prove helpful to others engaged in this same line of investigation. I. Figure i shows the ground plan, a semi-cylinder of black- ened brass. A, 30 cm. high, with a radius of 30 cm., is sup- ported by a base board 60 cm. X4O cm. and by back and side boards B and F. In the middle of A and extending through B is a window, W, 10 cm. x 10 cm. This opening may be filled HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 283 FIG. i. by the various contrivances described later. E is the point of fixation which may be moved to any position on A. The angle W C E can be read from a scale on A. The eye piece C re- tains the eye exactly at the center of the cylinder, but as it ro- tates freely upon its axis the eye may always fixate E, throwing W into indirect vision. The chin rest D will give the head a firm support. II. Figure 2 fills the window W during the investigation of the various retinal parts. It consists of a sheet of blackened brass bearing a circle of brass, pivoted at X. The slit O Sis ^4 mm. wide and except for y2 mm. at O is covered by the circle N. This circle contains a series of holes ^ mm. in diameter placed % mm. apart upon the line of an archimedean spiral. When this shutter (shown in Fig. 2) is placed in the win- dow W, and a lamp back of it, the eye at C will always see one point of light at O, while a second point will also be visible 284 JAMES E. LOUGH. whenever one of 'the holes in the circle coincides with the slit O S. The rotation of the circle about X will vary the distance between these two points. This distance can be easily read to £mm. (2') upon the scale P. The intensity of the stimulating light is easily regulated by the distance of the lamp, while the quality of the light may be varied by the use of gelatine sheets. FIG. 2. By this apparatus, therefore, the vertical and horizontal distance at which two points of light stimulating the retina appear as one (the retinal unit) may be obtained for all portions of the retina. And the influence of the intensity and the quality of light upon the retinal units may be determined. Another shutter may be placed in the window W, having an opening at the center, the size of which is controlled by an iris HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 285 diaphragm. By means of a lamp and gelatine sheets a light stimulus of any quality, intensity or size may be made to excite any portion of the retina. Such experiments quickly demon- strate that the * color fields ' depend entirely upon the size and intensity of the stimulating color. This instrument facilitates the study of two points of differ- ent color within one retinal unit ; of the threshold for colors ; of the perception of differences in quality, in intensity and in posi- tion for all portions of the [retina. Reports of these and of other investigations will be published as they are completed. THE ACCURACY OF RECOLLECTION AND OBSER- VATION. BY FREDERICK E. BOLTON. University of Wisconsin. The following observations and discussion are offered as a further contribution to the line of study suggested by Prof. Cattell's article on * Measurement of the Accuracy of Recollec- tion* which appeared in Science, Dec. 6, 1895, and in which the author intimated that a fruitful field of psychological re- search might be opened up by comparison of results obtained from classes of persons differing in certain specified character- istics. A series of questions, similar to those given by Prof. Cat- tell, together with several others, was assigned by Prof. Jastrow to his psychology class in the University of Wisconsin. The class consisted of juniors and seniors, 92 in number, 26 being women. From the results obtained it is possible to make com- parisons of the U. W. students and Columbia students as classes, and also to compare the records of students in different courses, of men and women, and of classes made upon basis of college standings. To ascertain the degree of confidence, in all answers the students were requested to mark their answers *c' if very confident, ' c' if confident, * m' if moderately sure, * D ' if doubt- ful, and 'Z?' if very doubtful. The question given to determine the reliability of recollection was the same as the one proposed at Columbia; viz: "What was the weather a week ago to-day ? " The answers showed great divergence. Out of the 92 that answered, there were 56 that said 'cold,' 32 'warm/ 36 ' clear' or 'fair,' 37 'stormy,' and 21 indicated that rain fell while 21 said it snowed. (Many gave double answers, as ' cold' and ' snowy.') On the day in ques- tion it was very moist in the morning, sprinkling a little, while later in the day it turned to rain and sleet. The temperature 286 RECOLLECTION AND OBSERVATION. 287 varied from a little above freezing in the morning to a little be- low at night. Perhaps little weight could be attached to those answers classed as cold, inasmuch as standards of cold vary so greatly. Also, the most natural assumption would be that it was cold on any December day. While the answers * stormy' only just exceed those of ' clear ' or < fair ' yet it is worthy of note that 16 out of 18 of those who indicated that they were very confi- dent were correct in their answers. The distribution of confi- dence in the 37 correct answers was as follows : 16 c, 4 c, 9 m, 6 D, 2 D. Out of the remaining 55 answers only 2 were c and 14 c, thus indicating that the degree of confidence is of great weight in this case. On comparison of the records of the 26 women of the class with those of an equal number of men (selected by lot) it was found that 14 women gave answers substantially correct, while only 5 of the men's answers were correct. The degree of con- fidence shown is also significant. The women's answers were marked as follows : 13 c, 4 c, 6 m, 3 D. The men's : I c, 10 c, 7 m, 3 D, i D, 4 unexpressed. Assigning the following scale of marking to the answers, £=5, c=4, m=3, D=2, Z>=i, we should have as the women's index of confidence 4.04 and the men's 3.32. The above results, both as to accuracy and confidence seem to suggest (unless the result is accidental) that women are better observers or * recollectors ' of the weather than men. The answers given to the question relating to the direction in which apple seeds point were 42 * toward the stem,' 31 * away,' 10 ' toward the center,' 3 indefinite. Thus the right answers, although not a majority of all the answers, include 4-3 as many as any other class. Of the 42 correct answers, 3 were marked c, 10 c, 17 m, and 12 D. Of the 26 women 12 were correct and of the same number of men 13 were right. The degree of confidence in the correct answers of the women, however, considerably exceeds that of the men. In the former the answers were distributed as follows : 3 c, 3 c, 2 m, 3 D, i D. In the latter : 2 c, 7 m, 4 D. Marking on the same scale as above, the index of confidence for all the women's answers is 3.33, for the men 2.97. Comparing the answers of 288 FREDERICK E. BOLT ON. the entire class with the Columbia records, we find exactly the same proportion of correct answers. There is some variation in the wrong answers. A comparison on the basis of confidence cannot be made, because the results from Columbia were not given on that basis. The question asking the relative date of Luther's and Michael Angelo's birth received an equal number of answers giving each the precedence. But the average of all the answers assigned the earlier date by 6.6 years to Michael Angelo, giv- ing a constant error of — 1.4 years with an average departure of 52 years from the correct date. The Columbia records showed a constant error of+4 years and an average error of 54 years. In this again the records of the women were more nearly cor- rect, they having placed the birth of Michael Angelo n.i years before that of Luther, while the men's average showed that Luther was born the earlier by 9.1 years, or 17 years from the correct date. The next two questions were: "In what year did Victor Hugo die? Chas. Dickens?" The average of the class placed Hugo's death 1851 (true date 1885), and Dicken's 1862 (true date 1870) . In the first the average departure from the true date was 35 years and in the second 17 years. This gives the Co- lumbia students the nearer average estimate by 22 years, and an average error of 22 years less than the Wisconsin students. In these two questions the men came much nearer the correct date than the women, placing Hugo's death in 1860 and Dicken's 1865. The women's averages indicated that Hugo's death oc- curred in 1847, 38 years from the correct date, while Dicken's death was placed in 1860, 10 years from the true date. The average of the entire class came considerably nearer to the cor- rect date of Dicken's death than Hugo's, which is perhaps due to the apparently closer relationship of Dickens to us. Several of the answers showed great deviation, as at Columbia, from the correct ones. Hugo's death was placed as early as 1735 by one and as late as 1890 by several. Of the entire number 3 were right concerning Hugo's death ; one of the 3 was c, one D and the other D; 6 were right concerning Dickens ; of these i was c, 3 D and 2 D. The degree of confidence based upon RECOLLECTION AND OBSERVATION. 289 the scale of marking is about equal in the two cases, 1.84 for Dickens, and 1.82 for Hugo. To determine the average accuracy in estimating weight, distance and time, Prof. Jastrow gave similar questions to those given by Prof. Cattell, as follows : I. (a) Estimate in feet the distance from one college build- ing, "A," to a second one, " B." (b) The distance from build- ing "A" to a third one, " C." (c) The distance from building " B " to building " C," (the three buildings being situated at the vertices of a familiar triangle on the campus) . II. Estimate in seconds the time required in walking from " B " to " C." (All had repeatedly walked the given distance) . III. Estimate in ounces the weight of James' Psychology (Briefer Course) . The results obtained are tabulated for convenient reference in the following form : fr A & £ w A ESTIMATION OF !< P 1* > I-1 || ^ 20.5 -3-5 8 19.6 Entire Class. Ounces. 24 22.8 I9.8 — 4.2 8.8 8.8 20 18 Men. Women. (17) (-7) (8) (16) Columbia. Feet from "A" to «B." 810 580 606 455 — 230 — 204 — 355 306.7 224 462 575 600 350 Entire Class. Men. Women. Feet from "A" to " C." 750 508 546 402 — 242 — 204 -348 229.9 216 416 500.5 300 Entire Class. Men. Women. Feet from "B"to"C." 450 276 296 261 — 174 — 154 -189 216.6 186 333 245 262.5 210 Entire Class. Men. Women. Seconds 182 + 22 48 182 Entire Class. from 160 177 + 17 62 180 Men. "A" to " B." 187 44 180 Women. Seconds. 35 66 + 31 40 60 Columbia. From these tables it will be seen that the average estimates re- lating to weight and time were more nearly accurate than those obtained at Columbia. Instead of a difference of over of the 290 FREDERICK E. BOLTON. weight of the book as at Columbia ours differed only about 1-7 . The number of seconds instead of differing by 90 % was cor- rect within 15%. The actual magnitudes compared in the time estimates not being the same, the comparison must be only a general one ; the numerical constant error at Columbia when 35 seconds was the actual magnitude, was greater than at Wis- consin'with 1 60 seconds as the actual magnitude. The average error in the weight estimate is the same in both records, but the Wisconsin median estimate is considerably closer. There is some difference between the men's and women's records ; in each of the above the men being more nearly correct. Our results relating to distance show a much greater con- stant error than those obtained by Prof. Cattell. Ours show positive constant errors of over 30 % while his show negative errors of only 15 %. The most interesting point, however, is in the direction of the constant errors. In the Columbia results " there was a marked tendency to underestimate weight and to overestimate time. Length was overestimated, but to a less de- gree." At Wisconsin the errors were in the same direction for time and weight estimates as at Columbia, though of considerably smaller degree. The average errors in the distance estimates were smaller than at Columbia, ours being less than 40 % , ex- cept in the 3d case, while theirs is nearly 50 % • The average of the U. W. distance estimates is 71.5 % of the actual, while at Columbia it is 115 % . We find that the greater the distance the nearer correct the actual estimate is. The distance 450 ft., which is nearest to the Columbia distance was estimated with the least degree of accuracy, and diverges most from the Columbia results. Should a few exceptional results be elimi- nated, the average errors would be very small. One person gave the distance from «A' to * B ' 2000 ft., nearly half a mile, and another recorded it 45 ft., less than three rods. These ex- tremes are found in the women's records. An examination of the tables reveals the fact that the men's average estimates are much more nearly correct and their average errors much smaller than the women's. The records of the women on distance show a very small degree of confidence in their answers, the sign 'c' occurring RECOLLECTION AND OBSERVATION. 29I but once. A large majority expressed themselves as doubtful. Among the answers of the men there was a considerable num- ber who were ' c ' and ' m.' From these comparisons we should judge that in quantitative estimations of measurement that men are more accurate than women, and that their index of confi- dence is higher. The following diagrams show the distribution of answers to the weight estimate and a comparison of the actual and estimated distances. to 20 JO t/o FIG. i. — Weight in 02. Triangle ABC represents actual dis- tances. Triangle a b c represents men's esti- mated distances. Triangle a p y represents women's esti- mated distances. The Wisconsin students were asked to draw a ground floor plan of the * Library Hall ' on a scale of •£$ inch to the foot. This would give drawings, if accurate, of extreme length and width of c^-J in. x^J in. A measurement of the drawings re- vealed the fact that all had considerably underestimated the size. The size of the paper on which the drawings were made was 8 in. x 10 in. The drawings averaged 3^ in. x6 in., or indi- cated that the building was about 55 ft. xp5 ft., instead of 78 ft. x 155 ft. In these records we see clearly the same ten- dency to under-estimate distance. Many of the drawings ex- hibited all the characteristic features of the correct plan, and would give a tolerably correct impression of the building. A composite drawing made from the collection would show the plan to quite a degree of exactness. Only five drawings were too large, and these only slightly. Another task to test memory and observation was to draw a 292 FREDERICK E. BOLT ON. print of a dog's foot as it appears in the snow. The drawings present a great variety, and not a very correct impression of what was intended could be gained from most of the drawings, taken separately. It is possible that a composite drawing made from the collection would exhibit the most prominent character- istics. A classification, made on the basis of number of toes, gave the following results: 3, two toes; 16, three toes; 44, four toes; 22, five toes; i, six toes; 6, no toes at all, the foot being one solid piece with slight lobes. Fac-similes of a few drawings are appended. FIG. 3. — Fac-similes of drawings of dog's foot print. The last question was (a) tell the number of steps in a famil- iar stairway ' L ' and (b) the number of steps in another stair- way * S.' The results obtained are given in the following table. 1 k ft W W A. ESTIMATION fc &~' d • a±; | OF. IB P 2% 85 •< P H •4 P I £ Steps in «T »> 6 5-43 5-5 — 57 —•5 i-3 1.27 if Entire Class. Men. 5-2 —.8 1.44 5-4 Women. Step in « C " H 9-8 10.8 —4.2 —3-2 4.4 4.2 9-75 IO. Entire Class. Men. 9.1 —4.9 5- 8-75 Women. RECOLLECTION AND OBSERVATION. 293 Curves are added below which represent the distribution of answers to the last question. FIG. 4. — Steps in ' L.' o r „ if FIG. 5.— Steps in ' S.' A study was made of the entire records on the basis of the course in college and also by classifying according to college standing. No definite results could be secured on the last named basis inasmuch as the standards of marking are so purely conventional with each different instructor that no safe working basis of comparison is available. The results most nearly cor- rect seem to be found in the records of the class with lowest standings, which is probably due to the fact that the women, whose records show greater errors than the men's are found, the great part, in the class with highest standings. The comparison of ' general science ' students with * ancient classical ' students shows that on the whole the former are more nearly correct in their estimates. In these the number of women is about equal in each. In the three distance estimates the * general science ' student's estimate averaged 71.5 % of the ac- tual while the * ancient classical ' student's estimate was only 51.5 % of the actual. The average of the science students placed Dicken's death in 1868, the classical in 1856. Hugo's death was given 1854 by t^ie science students and 1839 ^7 t^ie classical students. The answers relating to the weather were slightly nearer to the correct and the one relating to the apple seeds much more generally correct in the answers of the science students. In two cases the classical students' answers showed a better though only slightly better average, than the science students. 294 FREDERICK E. BOLT ON. A general study of the distribution of confidence in the sev- eral answers is interesting and suggestive. Comparing first the average confidence in the several answers, as expressed in the scale of marking used above, we find a high degree of con- fidence in the answers relating to weather (3.33) ; in the esti- mate of time (3.28) ; and in the question relating to the direc- tion of the apple seeds. A second group, in which the confidence has an intermediate value, consists of the two questions relating to the number of steps (av. confidence, 2.52 and 2.92) ; of the three estimates of distance (2.49, 2.56, 2.54), and the estimate of weight (2.29). The third group, with the low confidence, comprises the historical group, relating to the death of Hugo, M. Angelo and Luther (av. confidence, 1.82, 1.84, 1.79). It thus appears that the smallest degree of confidence attaches to those questions that depend upon memory alone, the highest degree to those depending mainly upon observations (with a slight memory factor) , while an intermediate degree of confi- dence attaches to those questions involving in addition to memory and observation, a process of estimation. It would be interesting to compare the general correctness of the answers with their confidence, but the nature of the answers prevents such comparison, except in a few cases. We can compare the various estimates of number, weight and time. We thus find that the two questions most correctly answered are the estimate of time and the number of steps in a certain flight, and these are also those that have the highest confidence in the group. The estimate of weight is, however, somewhat of an exception to this relation, as the answers are good, but expressed with little confidence, while in the other estimates we have an amount of correctness as well as of confidence. We may finally compare the general distribution of confi- dence in the whole group of answers, as below : Very Doubtful. Doubtful. Moderately Sure. Confident. Confident. Average Confidence. Total . . 15-7 31-9 36.0 12.8 3-6 2.57 Men . . . H.7 34-0 36.7 14.0 3-6 2.77 Women. . 18.4 334 26.1 14.4 7-7 2.56 RECOLLECTION AND OBSERVATION. 295 The numbers in the table express percentages of occurrence. It is observed that there are relatively more doubtful and very doubtful than confident and very confident answers. We ob- serve, also, that, while the men tend to use the moderate confi- dence more than the women, the women use the extremely con- fident and extremely doubtful marks more than the men. This feminine tendency is due to the extreme confidence in the ques- tion regarding the weather, and to their extreme doubt regard- ing the questions of date. I desire to acknowledge many helpful suggestions from Prof. Jastrow in the arrangement and interpretation of these results. DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. CONSCIOUSNESS AND EVOLUTION.1 MR. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN: This conference between those who look upon many of the same phenomena from two points of view, the biological and the psychological, seems to me significant and promising. I think it is one of several indications that in general the devotees of the different particular sciences are coming more clearly to recognize the community of truth and interest which makes them dependent upon each other ; and that this recognition is produ- cing more of the spirit of appreciation and of sympathy among them all. It is to be hoped that the day of the mere specialist is waning. It may reasonably be believed that the day is dawning when a broad culture, a genial attitude and a firm grasp upon the unities of nature and of life will characterize the various departments of human knowl- edge. The peculiarly close relations between biology and psychology are easily made apparent. I think that biologists are destined to make in- creasingly intelligent and emphatic the acknowledgment that they can- not understand or explain the phenomena of living animal forms (and, perhaps, not those of living plant forms) without appealing to the sci- ence of psychical phenomena. And since all science of psychical phe- nomena must forever take its rise from and return, after its attempted excursions into the fields of comparative psychology, again to the sci- ence of human consciousness, biology must always owe much to human psychology. On the other hand, every progressive student of psychology is entirely ready to recognize a constant and growing obli- gation on the part of his science to modern biology. Indeed, just now many psychologists are in danger of becoming too timid and — if I may be pardoned the word — even servile in their attitude towards the physi- cal and natural sciences. It would seem that they often prejudice the facts of their own science, and reject the most convenient and satis- factory theoretical explanations of the facts by being more dogmatic 1 Discussion before the American Psychological Association, Philadelphia, 1895. 296 DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 297 about the validity and universal application of so-called 'natural laws ' than are the physicists and biologists themselves. Witness the hasty and excessive confidence of many psychologists in the principle of causation, as conceived of after the pattern of physics and carried in again upon the sphere of mental life in discussing the phenomena of will ; or the gingerly way in which the facts and laws of conscious- ness in its relation to brain states are discussed, whenever the shadow of the very dubious principle of the conservation and correlation of energy is thrown over this problem. It has been my experience that, on the whole, psychologists are much more inclined to dogmatism over many alleged physical principles than are the most candid and thoughtful students of physics and biology. Without criticising or dissenting from Professor James' threefold division of the problem of consciousness and evolution, it seems to me that we may regard this problem from two points of view. If we take one of these points of view we look backward and ask ourselves as to the origin of consciousness, and as to the possibility of explaining it by considerations which the student of biology is able to present and to verify. If we take the other point of view we look from it in the forward direction ; and then we ask ourselves as to the part which consciousness itself ever plays — has played and will continue to play — in the evolution of animal organisms. Our first question is : How far does the evolution of organisms, histologically and physiologically considered, enable us to give the history and the explanation of the rise and development of consciousness? Our other question is: How far does consciousness, having once got established, so to speak, influence — quicken, accelerate, retard and mark out into definite lines — the development of organisms? The first of these two questions we may consider either in the more purely historical and descriptive way, or in the more profoundly phil- osophical way. And it is difficult, in all thorough discussion of the subject, to separate between the two. But a few words upon each of these ways of consideration, or sets of considerations, may not be out of place here. It must be admitted with gladness and thanksgiving that the modern doctrine of biological evolution has drawn a most interesting and in- structive picture of how the different forms of animal life might have succeeded each other, and of the relations, whether to each other by physical generation or to their total environment, under which they have appeared in succession, been modified, and disappeared, giving place to other forms. But it may well be questioned how far all this 298 CONSCIOUSNESS AND EVOLUTION. puts us in possession of the descriptive history, not to say the scien- tific explanation, of the rise and development of consciousness. For, in the first place, we are still almost wholly in the dark as to precisely where, in the series which evolution presents, consciousness in fact had its rise. Was it with those most elementary living forms which expert biologists hesitate to assign either to the animal kingdom or to the field of plant life? And, if so, shall we go on with Fechner to assume 'souls' as belonging to all the plants; or even with Clifford, to dis- tribute our 'soul stuff' as widely and generously as Nature herself seems to have distributed the ' stuff ' out of which things are made ? It seems to me that the most significant truth which biology is about to establish in such connection is this : The more careful and patient study of the micro-organisms with the higher powers of the microscope shows that an unexpectedly high development and complex exercise of psychic functions needs to be assumed to account for their behavior. Where, then, and how 'low down' shall be placed the rise of consci- ousness in the so-called scale of animal life ? But, even if we could find in biological evolution any answer to the question just raised, and also any answer to the inquiry for a trustworthy descripti ve history of the development of conscious life as connected with organisms, all this would not give us a valid explana- tion of conscious phenomena. For, as is admitted by all when brought face to face with the problem, consciousness is $er se — if I may so speak — a phenomenon of a totally different order from those phenomena with which histology and physiology deal. It appears, indeed, quite as hopeless a task for our imagination, to ask it to conceive how the simplest and lowest form of consciousness can arise out of the uncon- scious as to conceive the denial of the scholastic maxim : Ex nihilo nil -fit. If we had our two parallel sciences complete — comparative an- atomy and physiology in one line and comparative psychology in an- other— we should still exhaust all our wisdom with the sentence : Just at this time, it would appear, the fiat went forth : ' Let there be Con- sciousness, and consciousness was.' I will not attempt to take the question as to the relations between consciousness and the evolution of material forms out into the broader fields of general metaphysical philosophy. It seems to me, however, the history of speculation has sufficiently shown that all theories which make consciousness ultimately dependent upon the evolution o^ unconscious forms of existence succeed only by smuggling into their ex- planations everything which the very essentials of the theories require them to leave out. I will only call attention to one important truth in DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 299 the theory of knowledge. It is impossible to have any science what- ever without basing it upon a system of metaphysical postulates and metaphysical conceptions. But all these conceptions are themselves only products or processes in consciousness ; and all the postulates are only the assumptions, the natural or acquired * faiths' of human con- sciousness. If, then, whatever may be thought of the chronological position which human consciousness occupies in relation to the develop- ment of organisms, you do away with the logical a priority and the ontological value of consciousness, as rational thinking, as willing, as knowing, you remove all science. In the macrocosm it would appear that there is no escape from the position ; being — so far as being can be known, or thought by us — is dependent for its genesis and evolution on some consciousness. As to the other most interesting and important problem, namely, the dependence of the evolution of specific animal organisms upon the conscious psychoses of the animals themselves, it seems to me our trustworthy evidence of an experiential sort is much greater. I was not a little delighted at the main position which Professor Cope took in his address. But I believe that biologists will be compelled to go even further than he appears to, at present, in valuing the influence of consciousness upon the evolution of organisms. To speak in popular and figurative phrase, the psychical characteri sties and psychi- cal activities of every species of animal is an active and authoritative factor in the excitement and direction of organic changes in the indi- vidual. The activities of even the lower forms of animal life are within indefinite but really existing limitations determined by the mental representations, the passions, the conscious wants, desires and volitions of the animal. These forms are not in their individual de- velopment, mere molecular mechanisms. I think that most biologists have quite failed sufficiently to reflect upon the significance of much of the terminology which they employ. How much of it is taken from our own conscious life, our psychical experience ! Strip it of the more obvious meaning which it seems to have as applied to this life and to this experience, and how difficult it becomes to give it any meaning, whatever, which shall make our theory of evolution much more than a ceaseless, unprogressive repeti- tion of the facts. Some years ago, when discussing this subject with a class of graduate students, a member of the class who had taught for years in a large high school expressed his astonishment as he once beheld an amoeba and a fresh- water hydra, after preliminary exhi bitions of rage and cunning, come to a pitched battle with each other 300 CONSCZOt/SNESS AND EVOLUTION. which ended in the hydra taking the entire insides out of the amoeba. Here was indeed ' a struggle for existence ' with a vengeance ! For myself, I do not propose to be deterred by doubtful principles of physics, from the most obvious inference that the animals, including the micro-organisms, have a true psychic existence ; and that this psychic existence is a force, and an important force, for the preservation or de- struction of the species. Only the settlement by biology of the dis- puted question as to the limits of heredity can decide how much psychic forces count for in the modification and direction of the physi- cal evolution of species. Without emotion and what we call instinct to act as verce causce in the evolution of their organisms, the world of animal forms would be a system of pale shadows, moved by toy-like mechanism, compared with the exceedingly interesting and dreadfully earnest thing which it now is. It is here, of course, however, that comparative psychology and biology came so close to each other ; indeed, seem to run together. And comparative psychology — as the very term signifies — cannot be cultivated without knowledge of human psychology. Here, therefore, I am brought around again to the remark with which I started. Such a conference as this is significant of the unity of interest that maintains itself among the sciences ; and it is promising of a more warm sym- pathy and a more helpful intercourse between them. GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. YALE UNIVERSITY. CONSCIOUSNESS AND EVOLUTION.1 The addresses to which we have already listened by Professors James and Cope have raised so many interesting questions, and the various aspects of the general problem have been so clearly formulated, that I shall confine myself to a few remarks upon the positions which these speakers have taken. Professor Cope's position on the place of consciousness in evolution seems in the main the true one, as far as the question of fact is con- cerned. I agree with him that no adequate theory of the development of organic nature can be formulated without taking conscious states into account. The fact of adaptation requires on the part of the indi- vidual organism something equivalent to what we call consciousness discussion (revised) before the Amer. Psychol. Assoc., at Philadelphia, Dec. 28, 1895. DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 301 in ourselves. But I do not think that the need of recognizing con- sciousness in connection with organic functions leads at all necessarily to the view that conciousness is a causa vera whose modes of action do not have physiological parallel processes in the brain and nerves. The alternatives are not really two only, automatism — a theory of mechanical causation of all movement, with the inference that con- sciousness is a by-product of no importance, and this vera causa view which makes consciousness a new force injected into the activities of the brain. There is another way of looking at the question to which I return below. With Professor Cope's view that the recognition of consciousness as a factor in evolution requires a Neo-Lamarckian theory of heredity I am not at all in accord. I have recently discussed the question apropos of Professor Cope's views in Science (Aug. 23, 1895). In- stead of finding with Professor Cope that the emphasis of conscious function in evolution makes it necessary to recognize the Lamarckian factor, I think the facts point just the other way. As soon as there is much development of mind, the gregarious or social life begins ; and in it we have a new way of transmitting the acquisitions of one gen- eration to another, which tends to supersede the action — if it exists — of natural heredity in such transmission. This transmission by ' So- cial Heredity' (as we may call the individual's process of learning from society by imitation, instruction, etc.,) is so universal a fact with vertebrates that we may, it seems to me, say at once that the arguments for Neo-Lamarckism drawn by Mr. Spencer and others from the phenomena of human progress, at least, are completely neutralized by them. And there are facts which should show that the same state of things descend below man. It is very probable, as far as the early life of the child may be taken as indicating the factors of evolution, that the main function of consciousness is to enable him to learn things which natural heredity fails to transmit; and with the child the fact that consciousness is the essential means of all his learning is correlated with the other fact that the child is the very creature for which natural heredity gives few independent functions. It is in this field only that I venture to speak with assurance ; but the recognition of this influence has been reached by Weismann, Morgan and others on the purely biological side. The instinctive equipment of the lower animals is replaced by the plasticity necessary for learning by consciousness. So it seems to me that the evidence points to some inverse ratio between the importance of consciousness as factor in development and the need of the inheri- 303 CONSCIOUSNESS AND EVOLUTION tance of acquired characters as factor in development. This presumptive argument may be supplemented, I think, with positive refutations of the considerations which Professor Cope, Romanes and others present for the view that the transmission of functions secured by conscious- ness requires the Lamarckian factor.1 The examination of the biological evidence just cited by Mr. Cope in support of Neo-Lamarckism I am not competent to make ; but there is present another distinguished biologist, Prof. Minot, from whom I hope we may hear. There is one omission in Professor James' excellent division of our topic into its members — an omission whose importance may justify my bringing up a phase of the general question to which I think too much importance can hardly be attached. It is, in biological phrase, the ontogenetic question, the examination of development of con- sciousness in the individual, with a view to the generalization of results and their application to race-development. Professor Cope's emphasis on consciousness rests here, and it is well placed. In the life history of the organism we have the problem of development actually in a measure solved before us. The biologist recognizes this in his emphasis on embryology and also to a degree in his paleon- tology. But the psychologist has not realized the weapon he has both for biological and for psychological use in the mental develop- ment of the child. Moreover the biologist no less than the psycholo- gist must needs resort to this field of investigation if he would finally settle the function of consciousness in evolution. The fossils tell nothing of any such factor as consciousness. Nor does the embryo. So, as difficult as the ontogenetic question is, it is one of the really hopeful fields on both sides. I may be allowed, therefore, to give a brief summary of certain results reached by this method in my own work ; especially since it will set out more fully, even in its defects and inadequacies, the general bearing of this problem. That there is some general principle running through all the con- scious adaptations of movement which the individual creature makes is indicated by the very unity of the organism itself. The principle of Habit must be recognized in some general way which will allow the organism to do new things without utterly undoing what it has al- ready acquired. This means that old habits must be substantially preserved in the new functions ; that all new functions must be J See my articles on Heredity and Instinct, Science, March 20 and April 10, '96; Prof. Cope's reply and my further note may be found in the Amer. Natur- alist, April and May, '96. DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 303 reached by gradual modifications. And we will all go further and say, I think, that the only way that these modifications can be got at all is through some sort of interaction of the organism with its envi- ronment. Now, as soon as we ask how the stimulations of the envi- ronment can produce new adaptive movements, we have the answer of Spencer and Bain — an answer directly confirmed, I think, without question, by the study both of the child and of the adult — by the selec- tion of fit movements from excessively produced movements, i. e., from movement 'variations. So granting this, we now have the further question : How do these movement variations come to be produced when and where they are needed^ And with it, the question : How does the organism keep those movements going which are thus selected, and suppress those which are not selected ? Now these two questions are the ones which the biologists fail to answer. And the force of the facts leads to the hypotheses of * con- scious force' of Cope, 'self-development' of Henslow, and 'directive tendency' or 'determinate variation' of the American school — all aspects of the new vitalism which just these questions and the facts which they rest upon are now forcing to the front. Have we anything definite, drawn from the study of the individual on the psychological side, to substitute for these confessedly vague biological phrases? Spencer gave an answer in a general way long ago to the second of these questions, by saying that in consciousness the function of pleasure and pain is just to keep some actions or movements going and to sup- press others. The evidence of this seems to me to be coextensive, actually, with the range of conscious experience, however we may be disposed to define the physiological processes which are involved in pleasure and pain. Actions which secure pleasurable conditions to the organism are determined by the pleasure to be repeated, and so to secure the continuance of the pleasurable conditions ; and actions which get the organism into pain are by the very fact of pain sup- pressed. But as soon as we enquire more closely into the actual working of pleasure and pain reactions, we find an answer suggested to the first question also, i. e., the question as to how the organism comes to make the kind and sort of movements which the environment calls for JThis is just the question that Weismann seeks to answer (in respect to the supply of variations in forms which the paleontologists require), with his doctrine of ' Germinal Selection ' (Monist, Jan., 1896). Why are not such appli- cations of the principle of natural selection to variations in the parts and func- tions of the single organism just as reasonable and legitimate as is the applica- tion of it to variations in separate organisms? 304 CONSCIOUSNESS AND EVOLUTION. — the movement-variations when and where they are required. The pleasure or pain produced by a stimulus — and by a movement also, for the utility of movement is always that it secures stimulation of this sort or that — does not lead to diffused, neutral, and characterless movements, as Spencer and Bain suppose : this is disputed no less by the infant's movements than by the actions of unicellular creatures. There are characteristic differences in vital movements wherever we find them. Even if Mr. Spencer's undifferentiated protoplasmic movements had existed, natural selection would very soon have put an end to it. There is a characteristic antithesis between movements always. Healthy, overflowing, favorable, outreaching, expansive, vital effects are associated with pleasure ; and the contrary, the withdraw- ing, depressive, contractive, decreasing, vital effects are associated with pain. This is exactly the state of things which a theory of the se- lection of movements from overproduced movements requires, /. £., that increased vitality, represented by pleasure, should give excess move- ments, from which new adaptations are selected ; and that decreased vitality represented by pain should to the reverse — draw off energy and suppress movement. If, therefore, we say that here is a type of reaction which all vital- ity shows, we may give it a general descriptive name, i. e., the * Circular Reaction,' in that its significance for evolution is that it is not a random response in movement to all stimulations alike, but that it distinguishes in its very form and amount between stimulations which are vitally good and those which are vitally bad, tending to re- tain the good stimulations and to draw away from and so suppress the bad. The term 4 circular ' is used to emphasize the way such a reaction tends to keep itself going, over and over, by reproducing the condi- tions of its own stimulation. It represents habit, since it tends to keep up old movements ; but it secures new adaptations, since it provides for the overproduction of movement-variations for the operation of selection. This kind of selection, since it requires the direct coopera- tion of the organism itself, I have called ' Organic Selection.' It might be called ' motor' or even ' psychic' selection, since the part of consciousness, in the form of pleasure and pain, and later on experi- ence generally, intelligence, etc., is so prominent.1 1 See Chap. VII. on ' The Theory of Development' in my Menial Develop- ment in the Child and the Race (2d ed., 1895). I have prepared a new chapter (XVI.) for the German and French editions of this work, incorporating the po- sitions which this view of ontogenetic development leads to in respect to heredity, as suggested in the article referred to in Science. It will appear as an article in the American Naturalist for June, 1896. It secures determinate variations in phylogeny, without the inheritance of acquired characters. DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 305 This is a psychological attempt to discover the method of the in- dividual's adaptations; it has detailed applications in the field of higher mental process, where imitation, volition, etc., give direct ex- emplifications of the circular type of reaction. But if the truth of it be allowed by the biologist for the individual's development, it follows from the doctrine of recapitulation that this type function shall run through all life. This would mean that something analogous to con- sciousness (as pleasure and pain, etc.,) is coextensive with life, and that the vital process itself shows a fundamental difference in move- ments— analogous to the difference between pleasure-incited and pain- incited movements. The biologist may say that this is too special — this difference of reaction — to be fundamental; so it may be. But then so is life special, very special ! Whatever we may say to such particular conclusions, they illus- trate one of the topics which should be discussed by anyone, biologist or psychologist, who wants to find all the factors of evolution. There are some factors revealed in ontogenesis which do not appear in the current theories of phylogenetic evolution. Indeed, so far beside the mark are the biologists who are discussing heredity to-day that they generally omit — except when they hit at each other — the two factors which the psychologist has to recognize; Social Heredity, for the transmission of socially-acquired characters, and Organic Selection, for the accommodations of the individual organism, and through them of c determinate variations ' in phylogeny. Indeed, I do not see how either theory of heredity can get along without this appeal to ontogenesis. For if we agree in denying the inheritance of acquired characters, thus throwing the emphasis on va- riations, still it is only by the interpretation of ontogenic processes and characters that any general theory of variations can be reached. Either experience causes the variations, as one theory of heredity holds ; or it exemplifies them, as the other theory holds ; in either case, it is the only sphere of fact to which appeal can be made if we would un- derstand them. So why do biologists speculate so long and so loud on the question of the mode of transmission, when the question of the mode of acquisition is so generally neglected by them? The only additional point which I may claim a little time to speak of is that to which Professor James referred in describing the current doctrines of the relation of mind and body. He described the view that consciousness does not in any way interfere with the activities of the brain, as the ' automaton theory,' and spoke as if in his mind a real automatism — a view which considered the brain processes as the 306 CONSCIOUSNESS AND EVOLUTION. sufficient statement of the causes of all voluntary movement — was the outcome of any denial of causal energy in consciousness. In other words that there is no alternative to what is called the epi-phenom- enon theory of consciousness except a theory holding that the law of conservation of physical energy is violated in voluntary movement. Now this reduction of the possible views to two is, in my view, un- necessary and, indeed, impossible. In speaking of the antecedents of a voluntary movement we have to consider the entire group of phe- nomenal events which are always there when voluntary movement takes place ; and among the phenomena really there the conscious state called volition is really there. To say that the same movement could take place without this state of consciousness is to say that a lesser group of phenomenal antecedents occurs in some cases and a larger group in other cases of the same event. Why not go to the other extreme, and say that the brain is not necessary to voluntary movement, since volition could bring about the movement without using the nervous processes to do it with ? In his posthumous book on Matter and Monism, the late Mr. Romanes brings out this inade- quacy of the automaton view, using the figure of an electro-magnet, which attracts iron filings only when it is magnetized by the current of electricity. Whatever the electricity be, the magnet is a magnet only when it attracts iron filings ; to say that it might do as much without the electricity would be to deny that it is a magnet ; and the proof is found in the fact simply that it does not attract iron-filings when the current is not there. So the brain is not a brain when con- sciousness is not there ; it could not produce voluntary movement, simply because, as a matter of fact, it does not. So consciousness does not, on the other hand, produce movement without a brain. The whole difficulty seems to lie, I think, in an illegitimate use of the word 4 causation.' Professor Ladd seems to me to be correct in holding that such a conception as physical causation can not be applied be- yond the sphere of things in which it has become the explaining prin- ciple, i. e., in the objective, external world of things. The moment we ask questions concerning a group of phenomena which include more than these things, that moment we are liable to some new statement of the law of change in the group as a whole. Such a statement is the third alternative in this case ; and it is the problem of the metaphysics of experience to find the category, or the most general principles of experience as a whole, both objective and sub- jective. This I do not care to discuss, but I am far from thinking that the automaton or epi-phenomenon man can argue his case with much force in this higher court of appeal. DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 307 The other extreme is represented by those writers who think that the revision of the law of causation can be made in the sphere of objective phenomenal action represented by the brain ; and so claim that there is a violation of the principle of conservation of energy in a voluntary movement, an actual efficiency of some kind in consciousness itself for producing physical effects. This is as illegitimate as the other view — is it not? It seems to deny the results of all objective empirical science and so to sweep away the statements of law (on one side) on which the higher interpretation of the group of phenomena as a whole must be based. And it does it in favor of an equally empirical statement of law on the other side. I do not see how any result for the more complex system of events can be reached if we deny the only principles which we have in the partial groups. To do so is to attempt to interpret the objective in terms of the subjective factor in the entire group ; and we reach by so doing a result which is just as partial as that which the epi-phenomenon man reaches in his mechanical explanation. Lotze made the same mistake long ago, but his hesitations on the subject showed that he appreciated the difficulty. I agree with these writers in the claim that the mechanical view of causation can not be used as an adequate explaining principle of the whole personality of man ; but for reasons of much the same kind it seems equally true that as long as we are talking of events of the ex- ternal kind, /. £., of brain processes, we can not deny what we know of these events as such. The general state of the problem may be shown by the accompany- ing diagram, which will at any rate serve the modest purpose of indi- cating the alternatives. The line above, of the two parallels, may rep- resent the statements on the psychological side which, on the theory of parallelism, mental science has a right to make ; the lower of the parallels, the corresponding series of statements made by physics and natural science, includes the chemistry and physiology of the brain. Where they stop an upright line may be drawn to indicate the setting of the problem of interpretation in which both the other series of 308 CONSCIOUSNESS AND EVOLUTION. statements claim to be true ; and the further line to the right then gives the phenomena and statements of them which we have to deal with when we come to consider man as a whole. Now my point is that we can neither deny either of the parallel lines in dealing with the phenomena of the single line to the right, nor can we take either of them as a sufficient statement of the farther problem which the line to the right proposes. To take the line representing the mechanical principles of nature and extend it alone beyond the upright is to throw out of nature the whole series of phenomena which belong in the up- per parallel line and are not capable of statement in mechanical terms. And to extend the upper line alone beyond the upright is to allow that mechanical principles break down in their own sphere. As to the interpretation of the single line to the right, it may al- ways remain the problem that it now is. The best we can do is to get points of view regarding it; and the main progress of philosophy seems to me to be in getting an adequate sense of the conditions of the problem itself. From the more humble side of psychology, I think the growth of consciousness itself may teach us how the problem comes to be set in the form of seemingly irreconcilable antinomies. The person grows both in body and mind, and this growth has to have two sides, the side facing toward the direction from which, the 4 retrospective reference,' and the side facing the direction toward which, the ' prospective reference ' of growth and the consciousness of growth. The positive sciences have by their very nature to face back- wards, to look retrospectively, to be ' descriptive, ' as the term is used by Professor Royce — these give the lower of our parallel lines. The moral sciences, so-called, on the other hand, deal with judgments, ap- preciations> organizations, expectations, and so represent the other, the 'prospective' mental attitude and its corresponding aspects of reality. This gives character largely to the upper one of our parallel lines. But to get a construction of the further line, the one to the right, is to ask for both these points of view at once — to stand at both ends of the line — at a point where description takes the place of prophecy and where reality has nothing further to add to thought. I believe for myself that the best evidence looking to the attainment of this double point of view is found just in the fact that we are able to compass both of these functions in a measure at once ; and that in our own self-consciousness we have an inkling of what that ultimate point of view is like.1 I do not mean to bring up points in philosophy ; 1 1 may refer to the extended use made of this general antithesis in my paper in this REVIEW for November, 1895, and to the philosophical consider- ations based on it by Mr. W. M. Urban in the number of January, 1896. DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 309 but it is to me the very essence of such a contention in philosophy that it is a comprehension of both aspects of phenomenal reality and not the violation or denial of either of them. J. MARK BALDWIN. PRINCETON. PAIN NERVES. That specific nerves of pain have at last been established with a certainty fully equal to that for any of the other dermal nerves is an event, for psychology, of the first magnitude. Considering the role that traditional pain-pleasure dogmas have played in fundamental con- ceptions of mind, in ethical theories, and in philosophic deductions, it is perhaps not too much to say that this event is one of the most impor- tant determinations happening within the epoch of Modern Psychology. I refer to the demonstration of pain-nerves through clinical evidence by Dr. Henry Head, of University College Hospital.1 To many the revolution in conceptions which this work must necessitate will cause bewilderment, and perhaps also a lingering skepticism. For it was but a few months ago that Dr. Strong presented to the public his re- ports2— which from their grave judicial tone had quite the appearance of being official — assuring us that according to his summary of the evi- dence the existence of special pain-nerves was 4 more than doubtful ;' which, of course, from this accurate writer could alone mean that they were no longer possible. Yet at the very time of Dr. Strong's writ- ing (1895) the magnificent report , of Dr. Head, which must set this dispute at rest forever, had been nearly two years in print in the official journal of Neurology for the English Language, and had been twice read in public the year previous (1892). The proof which Dr. Head's work offers for separate pain-nerves rests on clinical demonstration that the skin of the body is divided into definite zones of nerve-supply for pain, which zones do not correspond to the zones of nerve-distribution for touch. These zones for pain are coextensive with those for heat, cold and trophic nerves, and all of these four kinds of nerves (pain, heat, cold and trophic) supplying any given zone have common origin in a single corresponding segment of the cord. In other words, each segment of the cord has its own zone of distribution for these four kinds of nerves. These zones are sharply 1 Disturbances of Sensation with especial reference to the Pain of Visceral Disease. By Henry Head, M. A., M. D. Brain, 1893, p. i, and 1894, p. 339. 2PsY, REV., March, 1895, p. 44, July, 1895, and January, 1896. 310 PAIN NERVES. separate, do not overlap, and do not correspond to the zones of distri- bution of the touch-nerves. As is well known, the distribution of the touch-nerves had been previously traced with great accuracy from the posterior roots, where they are gathered from several segments of the cord, to peripheral zones, which markedly overlap or interlace for the respective nerve-roots. As a consequence of these facts: (a) that the zones of distribution for pain, heat, and trophic nerves cover mark- edly different fixed areas of the skin from the zones of distribution of of the touch-nerves; (b) that the former zones do not overlap one another, while the touch-zones do overlap one another ; and (c) that the pain, heat, cold, trophic zones are each supplied by nerves having origin in a single segment of the cord, while the touch-zones are sup- plied by nerves having origin in several segments — from these facts results follow which demonstrate the existence of separate nerves for touch, pain, heat and cold-sensations with something very near to cer- tainty. No less significant, as the title to Dr. Head's papers suggest, is the relation of these peripheral pain-zones to the distribution of nerves in the viscera. In a word, the different viscera are supplied with nerves from definite segments of the cord. As a consequence, disturbances in the different viscera cause excitations to pass along these nerves to their respective segments in the cord ; produce hyperalgesia for all the pain-nerves having origin in the segments so affected ; and their pain- sensations become c referred' or reflected to the dermal pain-zones cor- responding to their segments. A large part of the papers are taken up with demonstration of the zones of 'dermal tenderness,' i. e., painful- ness, which are exhibited in various visceral disorders. It would be inadmissible here to give even enumeration to the long list of visceral, spinal and dermal disorders which Dr. Head marshals into line with his remarkable discovery. Suffice it to say that separate nerves of pain are placed beyond reasonable doubt, and the multitude of heretofore inexplicable cases of the loss or the exhaltation of any one of the functions of touch, heat, cold, touch-pains, heat-pains and cold-pains, or of any sort of partial combination of these independ- ently from the remainder (such as were quoted by Dr. Strong against pain-nerves) , receive explanation upon the basis of separate nerve-fibres for each of the six separate kinds of sensations. This much being determined three lines of investigation remain to be cleared up before the subject of pain-nerves shall be complete. These have reference to the end-organs, and modes of stimulation for the different sources of pain (mechanical, chemical, thermal) . The DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 311 mode by which pain is conducted through the cord. And the corti- cal localization of pain. Regarding the first of these, we are perfectly in the dark as to the ultimate relations of stimulus, end-organ and nerve-impulse for all sensory nerves. It is not surprising, therefore, that the discovery of Dr. Head leaves us as ignorant of the means by which mechanical pressure, heat and cold respectively affect the pain-fibres as we are of how they respectively affect the touch, the heat and the cold-fibres. Since, however, it is now certain that the nerves of pain are separate from those of touch and from those of heat and cold, it is evident that there is identically the same grounds for expecting different end-organs as between touch-pains and temperature-pains as for expecting specific end apparatus for any kind of sensory fibres. It may be that light acts directly on the optic nerves, and temperature directly on all sorts of temperature-nerves. If so we should not re- quire three different ' sets ' of pain-nerves for the three different mode of pain stimulates, i. e., pressure, heat and cold. Right or wrong, however, the prejudice of science at present runs in favor of specific end organs for most if not all of our sensations and so strongly for sensations of heat and of cold; and now, knowing that the distri- bution of pain-nerves coincides with that of the heat and cold-nerves, and does not coincide with that of touch, it seems more necessary than ever to expect different end-organs for heat-pains, and cold-pains (though these may be identical with the end-organs for heat and cold- sensations) in order to explain the cases cited by Dr. Strong of hyper- algesia to temperature in the midst of analgesia to mechanical pres- sure, i. e., to explain the very cases on which, apparently, he rests his entire opinion. Under this head also, in order to clear the field of a confusion, as it seem to me, quite unnecessarily raised by Dr. Strong, I must humbly decline his flattering imputation of superior erudition on this subject, and declare that I know of no literature, certainly none of my own writing, which has ever in the remotest way suggested ' three distinct sets of pain-nerves ' if by ' sets ' is implied any require- ments for additional 'sets' for ' muscular pains, colics, toothaches, etc.* Of course Dr. Strong's suggestion to this effect is graceful from the literary standpoint, and entertaining to ' the galleries,' but was it worth while deliberately to mislead for the sake of being facetious regarding a matter of scientific probability that now turns out to be next door to a certainty ? If it prove true that there be different end- organs for heat-pains and cold-pains, still no sober man would speak of separate 4 kinds ' of pain-nerves for this reason, any more than he 312 PAIN NERVES. would speak of different * kinds ' of touch-nerves for the reason that certain touch-nerves have apparently free endings while others have dif- ferent kinds of touch-corpuscles. The second line of investigation concerns the mode of transmission of pain-impulses in the cord. And here again I must beg Dr. Strong patiently to extend his courtesy toward me, while I make plain wherein Prof. Wundt's theory of this subject does require a more complicated mode of transmission than is necessary or likely. In the first place, Dr. Strong jumps quite unwarrantably to the conclusion that if there be separate pain-fibres from the periphery to the cord, then these must continue through the cord. I, for one, hold it to be probable that such is not the case for the entire cord, though it is likely to hold good for the single segment into which the pain-nerves enter. For the greater portion of the cord it is probably true that the pain-impulses are transmitted from segment to segment rather than by continuous paths throughout, and the reason for this, when fully explained, is likely to prove one of the most instructive evidences of nerve-evolution in the range of anatomy. That there should be separate pain-paths for touch-pains, heat-pains and cold-pains from the periphery to the cord, and a single common path for pain thence onward to the brain, is, however, far and away a simpler requirement than a ' shunt ' ar- rangement in the cord attached to common paths for pain and other sensations between the cord and the periphery, as Prof. Wundt pro- poses and Dr. Strong accepts. It would require a wonderful distribu- tion of ' lesions' indeed, for the various phenomena falling under Dr. Head's list of disorders, to explain them on Dr. Strong's plan. And the simplicity of the conduction without l shunts ' is so obvious above that of conduction with shunts that Dr. Strong, I trust, will now feel relieved from all embarassment against undue prodigality of Nature, without further comment. The third line of investigation, that of cortical localization of pain is of no less importance than the others and is receiving considerable attention among scientists, which is sure to be greatly stimulated by Dr. Head's discovery. Incidentally, I may remark that Dr. Head's papers make it doubt- ful if the viscera are capable of sending any impulses to the cortex save through the common pain-path of the cord, the vagus, and the paths of the sympathetic system; and from the close alliance of these sources, it seems likely that the viscera are capable of no direct sensory re- sponse save one of pain ; all of which is in accord with the summary of experimental and clinical evidence already cited by Foster on DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 313 this point. In face of this it seems more obscure than ever how holders of the James-Lange Theory of Emotions are to explain emotions of joy from visceral reverberations capable alone of direct ^tezVz-responses. And in proportion as the James-Lange theory goes down, by reason of the evidence from Dr. Head's remarkable paper, will the Instinct-Innervation Theory of Emotions, which I presented in the Philosophical Review (September, 1895), become more plainly true. In addition to this major evidence for pain-nerves I must mention as also apparently overlooked by Dr. Strong, the papers of Dr. von Frey, of Leipzig, which may claim independently to have demonstrated the existence of pain-nerves1. They throw much less light on pain- distribution and pain-conduction in the cord, and I have therefore con- fined myself to a report of Dr. Head's work. The existence of specific pain-nerves, however, now stands upon abundant evidence sufficiently independent in source and sure in substantiation to convert the most fastidious from the time-honored superstitions. HERBERT NICHOLS. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY. THE RELATION BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC. The influence of new tendencies in psychology is becoming more and more visible in the field of logic. One need only turn a few pages in the more recent books on logic to mark what a transforma- tion has taken place since the days when Kant could say that the sci- ence had come from Aristotle's hands practically a finished work. Evidently, the Aristotelian Logic is now generally refused recognition as a completed science, for dissatisfaction is shown in various ways ; one and another Aristotelian distinction is neglected, and it is pointed out that the complicated facts of actual judgment and argument can- not be cramped into the narrow mould of the ancients. The widened knowledge we have of the diversity of thought, of individual differ- ences, of new methods of procedure in the modern sciences, of pecu- liarities of thought brought to light by a comparative study of lan- guages, this new material, it is said, requires a recasting of the older logic. The older logic, they tell us, was based on an older psychology, and, as a consequence, no longer fits the known facts. For logic must 1 Two of these papers also appear to have been in print a year previously to Dr. Strong's research. Berichten d. math. phys. Classe d. Konigl. Sach. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig. 1894, pp. 185 and 283 ; 1895, p. 166. 3H PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC. be readjusted to the results of modern psychology ; or better, logic is actually a department of psychology, and must grow with the growth of this. But, as we might expect, psychology itself has been effected by the change it is producing in logic. If logic is the psychology of judgment and reasoning, the consideration of these processes may be omitted from psychology taken in the narrower sense. Only when we seek to state some general theory to cover all mental complexes need we glance over the whole field, and point out that our explanatory principle holds wherever we go ; in such cases judgment and reason- ing get some attention, even in strict psychology. But we find a strong tendency to turn over all the manifold details of these processes to logic. The number of pages given to judgment and reasoning in the books on psychology becomes less and less, though the books them- selves grow ever larger. Of course, the rise of the experimental side in psychology has had much to do with this change of proportion ; the new methods have found readier application in the field of sensa- tion and perception, and consequently have swelled the corresponding chapters with a mass of new material. But, apart from this, there is doubtless a conscious withdrawal from the field of judgment and reasoning, on the ground that the matter is already dealt with in a psy- chological way in logic. Logic has become more and more a psychol- ogy of judgment and reasoning, while psychology in the exact sense is more and more restricted to the less complete processes of mind. To many this will seem a happy division of labor. Psychology, they will say, can become a more exhaustive account of the other functions of the mind if it is relieved of a special treatment of judg- ment and reasoning, while the latter will receive more thorough treat- ment when marked off as the matter of a special science. It would, therefore, seem an advantage to both sciences to adopt such a basis of distinction. If it were merely a question of nomenclature or of division of labor there certainly would be no objection to this. But the apparent ad- vantages of this settlement should not close our eyes to the theoretical error upon which it is based. The proposed division really interferes with the proper work of each of these sciences. In the first place, the rigidly psychological treatment of judgment and reasoning is endangered when turned over to the care of those whose main interest is in the logical aspect of the case. And, on the other hand, the problems of logic suffer violence when once we begin to treat them as purely psychological problems. For the problems DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 315 arising in the two sciences are vitally different, and are to be solved by different methods. The answer to the psychological questions regard- ing judgment and reasoning is not in itself an answer to the logical questions involved; the very kernel of the logical problem will have been left untouched. Nor is the solution of the strictly logical problem any solution of the psychological problem in the case. Logic and psychology deal with the same materials, within certain limits ; but in working up the materials there is in each of these sciences a different end in view, and a different method of procedure. The findings of both are necessary to the body of knowledge ; consequently it is idle, and only brings confusion, when we try to substitute the results of the one for those of the other. But when we see that each, though a work in the same field, is a different and indispensable work, such an at- tempt at substitution will no longer be made. There cannot then be any clash between these two different interests. The divergent aims of the two sciences may be succinctly expressed, perhaps, as follows: Psychology is an effort to state the natural causes of the various mental occurrences. Analysis, classification, and even description, all of which the history of psychology shows to have played such important parts, we must view as but means to the great end, which is explanation. Under what causal circumstances, we ask, does such or such a mental fact arise ? Under what circumstances does the experience undergo change ? What are the conditions that cause its disappearance ? The main question is entirely regarding matters of fact : What is the actual causal order or connection in the mental life ? Logic, on the other hand, is not a search for the causes of mental occurrences, but, rather, an attempt to develop a principle of criti- cism. In logic, we assume the facts of reasoning, and proceed, not to explain, in the scientific sense, but to set forth the abstract marks which distinguish the consistent from the inconsistent. What relations must there be among the premises, and what between the premises and the conclusion — such are the questions asked — if the conclusion is to be justified by the premises ? What sort of procedure is required if the procedure is to justify the outcome? Strictly speaking, in logic we ask not a word as to what the causes are that actually produce con- clusions ; nor as to what the various influences are that give to some mental facts one character, and to others another. The marks of the one character or of the other are set forth in logic, but the marks of a given character are not the causes of that character. It does not fall within the province of logic to ask what the scientific explanation of fallacy is, or what a similar explanation of consistent reasoning is. 316 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC. The moment we ask such questions we turn aside from the proper and vital problem of logic, and for the time become interested in psychol- ogy ; for the questions mentioned are questions of psychology. The problem of logic is to present in full the system of inner relations by which consistent, cogent, ' logical ' thinking is distinguished from the loose, fallacious, ' illogical ' sort. It is possible, however, by a little effort to state the problem of logic so that it will seem to fall within the general limits of pscyhol- °gy* We might say, for instance, that psychology is the search for the conditions of mental occurrences in general, while logic is the search for the conditions of the particular occurrence called reasoning. But if it were meant by this that logic deals with reasoning in exactly the same way that psychology deals with the other mental occurrences, then we should have no science that presents the detailed criteria by which logical reasoning is recognized and distinguished from illogical reasoning ; and yet such a science is necessary, and is historically to be identified with logic. For psychology does not supply the need here. The grounds for the distinction between good reasoning and bad rea- soning, in the logical sense, psychology would have to accept from without, just as it must accept from without the bases for the distinc- tion between a moral state of consciousness and an immoral. Psychol- ogy, after such acceptance, may go on to investigate the psychological differences, if there be any, that accompany these distinctions ; that is to say, we may ask whether an illogical conclusion has any psychologi- cal difference from a logical one, or what are the psychological causes of morality or of immorality. But psychology must always presup- pose the system of criteria by which such distinctions are made, and for the sake of exactness must require that these criteria be pre- sented with scientific elaboration. The statement of the psychological causes of moral action would not be ethics, nor would the statement of the psychological causes of correct reasoning be logic. Instead of logic, we should have under psychology a presentation of the various influences that permit the correct reasoner to thread his way past all the possibilities of fallacy, and to land safe on the right conclusion. But, as I have said, we could only make such an investigation after we knew how to recognize correct reasoning ; and if the recognition is to be anything more than haphazard and naive, there must first have been developed a system of logic. For we should need some test of the various relations which constitute the evidences that the consistent is consistent ; that is to say, we should need a critical decision as to what the requirements of consistency are. What are the postulates, we must always ask, of this ideal that we call logical unity? DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 317 But since, in answering such a question, we do (in a way) give the internal web and woof of the phenomena called consistent reason- ing, we do seem for the time to be working, though not in explana- tory psychology, at least in descriptive ; and thus logic would appear to be a part of an auxiliary subdivision of psychology, grant as much as one may that description is subordinate in importance to explana- tion. Yet a little reflection will bring out a wide difference even here. For, in carrying out a descriptive psychology of judgment and reason- ing, we should inevitably get interested in all phases of these facts — in the possible changes in the distinctness or the intensity of the Vor- stellungen as the processes developed ; in the tone of feeling accom- panying the movement, and changing, say, with different rates or arrangements ; in the time aspects of the mental act and its parts, and in the order of succession of the parts. For the purposes of logic, however, we are indifferent to all these things. And rightly so, be~ cause they have no bearing on the problem in hand. So far as the logical worth of a proposition or of a train of reasoning is concerned, it makes no difference whether the filling of the mental presentations is auditory or visual ; whether the presentations are more intense or less so ; whether the process is accompanied by this feeling or by that, or by no feeling at all ; whether a given part occupies more time or less time than certain others ; or, finally, whether the conclusion comes first, last or in the middle. In logic we can afford to neglect all these as irrelevant to the work in hand, and actually do neglect them with- out loss. But we cannot complete the work of descriptive psychology without attending to them all. In logic we go far enough with psy- chology to get materials for the special criteria desired ; but in our choice of what we will attend to, we bring out clearly how different the aim of the one science is from that of the other. The attempt to state the problem of logic so as to make it fall within the field of psychology would end, then, in missing the very heart of the logical problem. And if we should undertake enlarging the bounds of psychology so as to include the logical problem we should bring into psychology a discordant element and destroy the unity of its aim. To make it perhaps clearer how essentially different the interests of the two sciences are, one need only recall the actual details that each science respectively admits as pertinent to its purpose. It will then be seen that certain combinations perfectly admissible in psychology are not so in logic ; and, on the other hand, what we might judge to be relevant from the standpoint of logic we should condemn from the 3*8 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC. standpoint of psychology. In logic, for instance, it is truly said that every judgment presupposes sufficient premises, and that given prem- ises necessarily lead to a conclusion just such and so. But in psy- chology it is just as truly said that in living experience we make judg- ments without any premises whatever, to say nothing of adequate ones, and that premises which in logic lead to the conclusion c Caius is mortal,' in Q^s process of consciousness lead to no conclusion at all, or possibly to the conclusion that ' Caius isn't mortal.' From the point of view of psychology all such experiences are as interesting and respectable as the logically faultless are, and we assume that they are completely explicable were the constitution of mind once fully understood. On the other hand, according to logic, certain psychic collocations are declared to present an intimate and faultless unity, when, accord- ing to psychology, they utterly lack connection. We may suppose, for example, the case of three judgments in the form of a logically valid syllogism, which occur in a certain person's consciousness in the tem- poral order of (i) major premise; (2) minor premise, and (3) con- clusion. From the standpoint of logic we should see in this an ex- ample of perfect conformity to law should hold that the premises led to the conclusion and that the conclusion was grounded on the prem- ises. But, psychologically, there may have been an utter absence of causal connection between premises and conclusion ; other factors, we may suppose, called up the conclusion at the happy moment ; some- body whispered it in the person's ear or the sight of a book brought back the judgment in isolation from yesterday's reverie. We should then have two causal trains of activity, to be represented, perhaps, by the two columns below, in which each item is caused by the item im- mediately above it, the different levels representing differences of time. c d major premise minor premise t conclusion The two trains are here so timed that the conclusion comes in the second just at the very moment when it would have come if causally DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 319 included in the other series, yet its cause does not lie there. But this fact would be no objection to the syllogism from a logical point of view; the syllogism, as a syllogism, is not concerned with such a fact. To the syllogism the three judgments are simply in the peculiar rela- tion which the logical standards require. But from the point of view of psychology, we should have to declare that in this case neither the temporal sequence nor the conformity to the logical norm is sufficient to meet the special requirements; the absence of causal connections, in the sense meant by natural science, is fatal. Consequently, when examining these items with the interests of a psychologist, we should note a much closer connection between 4 conclusion' and ' t;' while, for logical purposes, the line of combination runs from 4 conclusion ' directly back to 4 minor premise ' and ' major premise,' leaving out the natural cause of ' conclusion ' (namely, ' t ') as of no interest. The two sciences thus present different and distinct standards of worth. For logic those combinations are good, the parts of which are related in accordance 'with what tve call logical norms. For psychology those combinations are good, the parts of which are causally connected. As said above, the whole machinery of psychol- ogy is contrived for the purpose of explanation; while the aim of logic is to present a critical canon. In psychology the question is, What has produced the given facts ? In logic it is, rather, Are the facts a justifiable combination, and why ? There is hardly any need of saying that each of these sciences has a right to its own special aim. The work of psychology does not make useless or superfluous the work of logic, nor can we substitute the results of logic for those of psychology. We need a psychology of judgment and reasoning, and also a logic of these processes, each science existing without prejudice to the other. For when we have decided what causal relation exist among mental occurrences we have settled nothing as to what forms of combination satisfy our logical needs. And, on the other hand, the decision that such and such com- binations are logically necessary (i. e., exist de jure), of course set- tles nothing as to what the combinations are de facto, nor as to the causes of these combinations. Simple as this truth is, it is not always borne in mind by those who write on these sciences. There is frequent evidence of hazy or ill-ob- served boundaries ; as when psychologists incline to leave part of their subject untouched, or when logicians alone are found treating of cer- tain problems that are really psychological. Certainly there is no ab- solute objection to inserting in books on logic much that by nice dis- 320 HEART DISEASE AND THE EMOTIONS. tinction belongs to another science ; this is a matter of expediency, and not to be decided by rigid definition. It would be well, however, al- ways to make clear when we are within the strict domains of the science, and when we are digressing into attractive neighboring fields. Questions, for instance, as to the genetic relation between judgment and concept — whether judgments are developed out of concepts, or the reverse ; as to the temporal order of premises and conclusion ; as to whether we actually quantify the predicate (this is carefully to be dis- tinguished from the question as to the logical importance of such a quantification, which is a question of logic) — such questions are usu- ally discussed exclusively in the logics, and yet they are in fact psy- chological problems, and are to be settled, if at all, by the methods of psychology. It would seem, then, to be in the interest of better logic and of better psychology to have more definite bounds set up between them. For many a psychological problem fails to get proper psychological treatment because, by reason of defective definition, it seems to be merely a logical problem ; and many of the foundation-truths of logic, for a parallel reason, have appeared to lack validity because shown not to be psychological laws. Such errors would, of course, be impos- sible were the real basis of distinction between the two sciences once clearly seen and settled. GEORGE M. STRATTON. LEIPZIG. THE TESTIMONY OF HEART DISEASE TO THE SEN- SORY FACIES OF THE EMOTIONS. What in ordinary parlance, as indeed in most psychological discus- sions, is termed emotion, is in reality a very complex activity. It is perhaps only in pathological states that the elements are analyzed by the falling out or suppression of certain elements. This analysis may be made in the case of fear. As a rule in the normal state, we have in fear a very vivid and attention-compelling concept of the fearful object, together with a more or less distinct representation of the fate of which we are apprehensive. Perhaps in the majority of cases these elements usurp the promi- nent place in the complex, yet it is evident that neither of them is fear or emotion of any kind. We also usually have a more or less definite, if only implicate judgment of the reason for fear, but this is, of course, DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. $21 no more fear than the judgment that if our body is unsupported it will fall. A vivid reproduction or imagination of an event of a disastrous kind is quite sufficient, in my own case, to produce the physical and mental symptoms of fear. These symptoms are, in the one case, sun- dry muscular contractions of a spasmodic nature, which may have a more or less distant relation to the fearful event, or the still more dis- tant associational connection seen in expression of emotion of dis- pleasure, or the wholly unassociated innervation of excited attention. Most writers make too little of this class of effects of emotional impulse, *. £., of the state of general innervation in suspense, which has no as- sociation with any special purposive act, but which is a sort of prelimi- nary tension (Spannung) preparatory to any possible impulse. In the other or mental domain these symptoms are obscure, that is unlocalized (but not therefore weak) sensations of innervations, but more particu- larly of vascular disturbance. Entirely secondary, but often appearing more conspicuous, because localizable, are peripheral sensations. It may be shown that the real core of the fear is in the sensations of vascular change. It is perhaps idle to inquire whether the source of the disturbance is in the vascular change or whether it arises in the medulla, where its nervous center is situated. When an object of apprehension is imaged to conscious- ness it is certain that the vaso-motor center is affected and those circu- latory changes characteristic of fear are produced. If this be not the case I may still view the serried ranks approaching and hear the horrid din of battle and may be fully conscious that any minute may stretch me on the ground mutilated beyond recognition, like a comrade at my feet, but I still have no fear as I calmly serve the gun. On the other hand, as I tread my way through the dense forest and suddenly find myself face to face with a little green snake which I have often handled with impunity — nay with pleasure, every drop of blood seems to stagnate in the heart, and I am a prey to unreasoning and unreason- able fear. It is, however, the pathological states of heart disease that are most conclusive. The irritable heart of neurasthenia affords proof of the connection of the sensation of fear with irregularities of the cir- culation. Thus, after a fatiguing day one falls asleep and rests quietly for several hours, then on awakening feels no pain or inconvenience of any kind, but soon finds his being suffused with what may be called a disassociated sense of fear or anxiety. One seeks for some reason for it in vain. In the earlier instances this disassociated fear soon affects its association with some concept of menacing content, such as 322 HEART DISEASE AND THE EMOTIONS. that of a previous hemorrhage or the like, or perhaps of some external event, and one is easily persuaded that it was this concept which had, unknown to him, produced the fear. Directly the heart begins to throb and palpitate and the paroxism runs its course, after which the fear disappears. After a time, one comes to recognize the meaning of the feeling of apprehension and, knowing its relative insignificance, calmly analyzes the state as he awaits its culmination. 4 c There is noth- ing to fear — I shall be all right in ten minutes — there is no pain," etc., but all the while the fear is there. If one succeeds in preventing the erroneous association he escapes the secondary reflex effects of the fright- ful concept, but the fear remains and only passes away with the paroxism. Anyone who has had this experience can have no doubt of the sensational nature and vasomoter occasion of fears. The reader may recall the experiments of Mosso which showed that even slight irritations of the skin or sense organs produce con- tractions of the peripheral vessels, while in painful emotion the vaso- motor changes were excessive, and were accompanied by changes in the respiration and muscular tension. Laehr1 considers that the vas- cular center controls painful emotion as the cortex serves for the intel- lect. If the cerebrum has an excitation adapted to produce painful emotion, part of the reaction passes to the vascular center and part to the appropriate muscle centers. If the cerebral action is shunted out in any way, the reaction on the vascular center may be the more in- tense. He considers that the painful emotions have a transitory value only in the phylogeny and will disappear in the progress of a normal evolution. C. L. HERRICK. DENISON UNIVERSITY. *Die Angst., Berliner Klinik, 58. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. Outlines of Psychology. OSWALD KULPE. Translated by E. B. Titchener. London, Sonnenschein ; New York, Macmillan. 1895. Pp. 462. The translation of Kiilpe's Grundriss der Psychologic into English calls for some further notice of this already much-reviewed book. Several circumstances have combined to give unusual prominence to this work, of which its real merit and originality are certainly the first. But any writer so well known as Kiilpe, who, in these days of monographs and special researches, has the courage and the scholar- ship to venture a general text-book in psychology based upon experi- mental data, may be sure that his book will receive attention. This work is characterized by thorough and logical treatment of every sub- ject which it undertakes. It is free from any evidence of hasty or superficial work. It summarizes a large amount of experimental research (chiefly German however), and thus becomes an indispen- sable handbook for psychologists. It is marked also by decided originality both in the division of the subject and in the treatment of special topics. The latter, however, is hardly a merit in a book of this kind. It seems to have been thought by many that this work would serve as a general text-book for classes in psychology, a hope encouraged no doubt by the title, Outlines of Psychology, Based upon the Results of Experimental Investigation. The author's wide departures from beaten tracks are interesting as contributions to psy- chological literature, but are somewhat too radical to permit the book to be generally used in the above capacity. The same result must follow from the relatively too-exhaustive treatment of some subjects, such as the psychophysical methods and the fusion of tones, to the omission or partial treatment of others, such as habit, instinct, judg- ment and reasoning. The author appears to have labored so long over fundamental elements and processes that he forgets to make men- tion of those finished mental products that the average student de- mands some account of. One of the best features of the work is the author's clear and simple analysis and classification of the elements of consciousness. There 323 324 KULPES PSYCHOLOGY. are but three classes, peripherally excited sensations, centrally excited sensations and feelings, or, as we should say, sensations, images and feelings. The prominence given to memory, under the head of cen- trally excited sensations, and the clear and exhaustive treatment of the problems of reproduction, recognition and association, are most satis- factory. Equally commendable to my mind is his practical suppres- sion of the will as representing any kind of simple conscious content. May one hope that this is the beginning of the end of this common source of confusion and mystery ? So called elementary will is re- solved by the author partly into certain feelings of effort and partly into certain tendinous and articular sensations. The section on the feelings seems rather barren in contrast with that on memory. Feelings are not attributes of sensations, nor functions of sensations, but independent conscious processes. They are not classifiable except as pleasant and unpleasant. They have, like sen- sations, the attributes of quality, intensity and duration. But their qualities are only two, pleasant and unpleasant. They are investigated by two methods, the serial (Reihenmethode) and the method of ex- pression. The former consists in observing what changes of feeling follow systematic changes of stimulus ; the latter consists in observing the effects of feeling in producing changes of pulse, respiration, vol- untary movements and changes in the volume of a limb, recorded by the sphygmograph, pneumatograph, dynamometer and plethysmo- graph respectively. A few results of experiments with these in- struments are given, and they furnish, as the author says, about all the experimental material we have for the treatment of the feelings. But these researches suggest to the author the hypothesis that pleasantness is the accompaniment of increased excitability of the cerebral cortex, and unpleasantness the accompaniment of a diminution of the same, but whether this is to be finally reduced, with Meynert, to increased and decreased blood supply and metabolism in the nervous elements, or, with Wundt, to the form of reaction of a special apperception center upon sensory excitations, the author is unable to decide. At any rate, pleasantness and unpleasantness are to be explained by central nervous processes, and not in the common way as mere accompaniments of healthful and harmful stimuli, nor as due to the state of nutrition in the nerves. The important subject of pain is practically omitted. Two short paragraphs in different places are devoted to it, which do not agree with each other, and one of which, at the author's suggestion, has been, rewritten by the translator. In neither text is the author's theory PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 325 of pain clear. He does not, however, accept special pain nerves and distinguishes pain from its accompanying ' feeling ' quality, which leads him in discussing cutaneous sensations to the statement that 4 pain is decidedly unpleasant.* Fifty pages are devoted to the feel- ings, occupied principally with classification, analysis, discussion, criticism and hypothesis, while of these not more than four or five pages are devoted to the actual results of experimental investigation, the latter in fact being almost limited to some experiments with the sphygmograph, etc., and to a few experiments upon the aesthetic re- sults of the division of lines. The author's position on a few special points may be noticed. On the relation of mind and body he maintains as psychologist the psy- chophysical i parallelism' of Wundt. The relations of mind and body are not temporally determined, t. e., causal. But the author's paral- lelism turns out to be only a half-hearted one, for mind and body are so related that any change in the one ' expresses itself by a change in the other. In his more recent Einleitung iu die Philosophic, where fuller treatment of this subject is permitted, the author bravely takes the dualistic position. Concerning the question of space perception, the author affirms that the origin of the space idea does not belong to psychology. Extension is an attribute of sensation and space is thus an original datum. Any theory which would derive the space idea from experience is impracticable. There is clear and detailed discus- sion of all the problems of sensations of sight and visual perception. The author criticises the color-sensation theory both of Helmholtz and Hering and regards the theory of Wundt as the most satisfactory. In discussing the intensity of sensations he rules out visual sensations entirely. In sight mere increase of stimulus produces qualitatively different sensations of brightness. The author discusses the psycho- physical, physiological and psychological interpretations of Weber's law, rejecting the first and not deciding between the other two. Kiilpe's work is throughout analytical and critical and is not at all an outline of psychology based upon experimental research. But the analysis is careful and the criticism keen. To be sure the criticism is rather of the crushing kind, but the reader soon learns that it is not so annihilating as it first appears, for instance, where he majestically sweeps aside the common dictum that there is nothing in the memory which was not first given in sensation, only to arrive in the end at the not-original conclusion that memory images differ from sensations mainly in intensity and that they contain no qualities not found among the latter. 3 26 CONANT'S NUMBER CONCEPT. As regards the translation, Professor Titchener deserves the thanks of English readers for giving them a good idiomatic version of this valuable book. A translation is always easy to criticise, and this one is not free from faults. The rendering is very free, so that in some cases the author's meaning is changed somewhat, and occasionally what is clear in the original is confused in the translation. The translator has made a special study of the English equivalents of Ger- man psychological terms and his choices are for the most part good. But his preference for Latin forms produces a somewhat dry and scholastic effect, which makes the English less attractive than it would be with more Saxon forms. ' Colligation* for 'Verkniipfung,' ' limen,' for ' Schwelle,' ' replica' for ' Wiedergabe,' 'limits of stimulability ' for ' Reizgrenzen,' 'multeity* for ' Vielheit,' c modal sensitivity' for ' Sinnesempfindlichkeit ' and ' memorial image ' for ' Erinnerungs- bild ' are examples. ' Local signature ' for what the translator calls the ' collective ' use of ' Localzeichen ' is perhaps the worst, although it seems a pity to translate the expression ' Schwelle ' by the word ' limen,' when we have a perfect English equivalent. In its mechanical aspect this book is a sad commentary on English and American book-making as compared with German. The Ger- man book is compact, well bound, clearly printed on cream paper, and lies open at any page upon your table. The English book is spongy, loose jointed, printed upon glaring white paper with typo- graphical errors, and yet refuses to be read unless held open by brute force. UNIVERSITY OF IOWA. G. T. W. PATRICK. The Number Concept : Its Origin and Development. New York and London. Macmillan & Co., 1896. ($2.00.) By LEVI L. CON ANT, PH. D. Only one exception can be taken to this book — as to its title. The book is not upon the origin of the number concept nor yet upon its development. The book deals with primitive methods of counting and with modes of expressing or registering the results of such count- ing. The true title would be: 'Numeral Systems (or Number Words), Their Origins and Various Forms.' Since the work actu- ally undertaken is thoroughly and accurately carried out, this matter of title is, perhaps, of little account ; yet one who approaches the book expecting to have light thrown upon the psychology of the numerical idea will be struck by the discrepancy between the title and the contents. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 327 This discrepancy is worth insisting upon, because there is possible a psychological inquiry upon an anthropological basis which would agree with the title. The author insists (on pages 2-4) that the ques- tion of the origin of number is outside the limits of inquiry, with his title page still staring him in the face ! u Philosophers have endeav- ored to establish certain propositions concerning this subject, but, as might have been expected, have failed to reach any common ground." The context shows that Dr. Conant understands by this subject the old controversy as to whether numerical judgments are a priori or the result of experience. He is quite right in ruling out this topic from an anthropological investigation, and confining himself to the simple statement that all primitive societies reveal that they have some, how- ever crude, sense of number. But this is not the point from which the psychologist is interested in the problem. The sense of number is a historical, an evolutionary development. It arises in the race and in the individual. The psychological (and the pedagogical) problem is : Under what circumstances, in response to what stimuli or needs, in what psychical context, does this sense arise? It would be impossible to say, in advance, just how much light anthropological investigation would throw upon this problem ; but it may safely be said that it will throw some light ; and it is a pity that Dr. Conant, through confusing the metaphysical and the psychological problems of origin, should not have contributed what his learning and thorough research fit him to contribute. The book would then have been as useful to the psychologist as it now is to the philologist. The following points of psychological interest may be gleaned from the philological data : i . The numerical systems are rythmical. The count proceeds up to a certain point (sometimes only 2 ; sometimes 3, joints of a finger; sometimes 5, fingers of one hand; sometimes 10, both hands ; sometimes 20, fingers and toes ; then a knot is tied, a notch cut, etc., and the count repeated. With further developments, com- pound words are formed, making it possible to dispense, more or less, with the notch or knot, a definite base of reference being formed. 2. While the origin of many number names is from the fingers, many denote activities performed upon the fingers. For example, I may mean ' used to start with,' or ' the end is bent.' 3. The rhythms of the system show reference ahead and also backwards. For example, 9 may mean 'almost done,' 'that which has not its 10,' 'there is still one more,' ' hand next to complete,' ' keep back one finger,' etc. The reference to the starting point, however, is much more common. 9 will more often mean '4 of the other hand,' or 'hand with 4* 328 CONANT'S NUMBER CONCEPT. or ' end and 4.' It is undoubtedly true, as Dr. Conant remarks (p. 72,) that the savage does not discriminate the numerical idea from the concrete image of fingers or whatever with which it is bound up, i. £., does not consciously abstract. But it is equally true that this continual thought of reference forwards or backwards in the larger number, is, psychologically considered, an abstracting movement. When, for instance, in the Zuni scale, 3 means ' the equally dividing finger,' instead of simply the biggest finger, it must be acknowledged that abstraction is pretty well along. While it is not true to the same extent of the verbal form in which 6 means ' I on the other,' still the element of relation is obviously prominent in the latter. While a care- ful study of the actual circumstances under which savages use number would be necessary to justify the statement that the ratio element in number early comes to consciousness, the philological material col- lected by Dr. Conant points in that direction. 4. The fact that the "student is struck with the prevalence of the dual number" in the grammatical structure of the earlier languages is an important fact. Mind first dichotomizes the universe; the world is 'this and that,' 'this' and 'the other one.' Observations which I have made on such small children as have come within my scope bear out this principle for the individual. There was not, at first (with these children at least), a plural number, but conscious selection or preference. 2 denoted not a couple, but a contrast, something left out or ruled out. 2 was not used in an aggregative or enumerative sense until an effort was made also to recognize aggregates larger than 2, which at first (agreeing here also with the philological record) took the form of ' a lot ' — many. I cannot, however, agree with Dr. Conant that the difficulty which the savage met in attempting ' to pass beyond 2, and to count 3, 4, 5, is, of course, but slight.' On the contrary, it seems to me the essential difficulty, marking a distinct advance in consciousness. It is one thing to mark off the mental universe into this and not this ; it is quite another to assume the attitude of ordering things within the universe, and this is what occurs when numbers develop into a row or sequence. At all events, in the observation of children just re- ferred to, I found that the attaching of any meaning to 3 was a much later accomplishment (often a year intervening) than in the case of 2 ; and that when the idea of 3 was grasped there was no difficulty in getting the child to count intelligently to 10; thus indicating that the idea of 3 is not simply cumulative, but marks a different psychical attitude. Till ? child can grasp the idea of 3, numbers like 3, 4, 5» etc., are taken by him to be the absolute names of certain individuals PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 329 An incidental psychological contribution, which will not fail of catching the attention of those psychologists and sociologists who are dwelling upon the importance of imitation, is found on p. 1 1 . Ex- periments were made upon five different primary rooms in Worcester, Mass., to determine the 4 natural' place of beginning in counting off on the finger. In two cases the teacher allowed one child to count while the other children watched. In both cases every other child followed exactly the example of the leader. It is to be hoped that Dr. Conant, or some other equally com- petent student, will supplement this book with another, in which the anthropological data concerning the circumstances and motives with relation to which savages count will be collected so as to extend and to justify the philological data and conclusions ; and will also take up the matter of systems of measurement, upon both a philological and anthropological basis. In this case the contributions to psychology will be direct and not simply incidental. JOHN DEWEY. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. Die Spiele der Thiere. KARL GROOS. Jena, Gustav Fischer. 1896. Pp. xvi-f 359. When it is learned that the above is a volume of 340 pages, exclu- sive of an excellent index, it will at once be plain that the treatmen1 of the subject is of the most thorough kind. The book is well printed on good paper and with a type that en- courages one to keep on when once he has begun the reading — a very important matter in a work which is, after all, of special rather than general interest. In the introduction a succinct statement of the author's entire position is given. The work is rendered valuable for reference by reason of a very full bibliography. The subjects of the different chapters are as follows : I. Consideration of the theory that play is an expression of excess or overflow of energy. II. Play and Instinct. III. Forms oi Play among Animals, which is continued in a fourth chapter as ' Die Liebesspiele,' the two together making over 200 pages of matter. V. The Psychology of Animal Play. The author gives the most ample evidence of familiarity with the literature that bears on his subject, whether directly or indirectly, and well-known American writers on psychology are quoted again and again, some of the citations indicating that the writer appreciates not 33° DIE SPIELE DER THIERE. only their matter but their style, as when he says: "James hat voll- kommen Recht, wenn er z. B. bei der briitenden Henne keine weit- eren Erfahrungen und psychischen Vorgange annimmt als das gefiihl, das eben ein solches Ei, * the never-to-be-too-much-sat-upon object' ist." No doubt Professor Baldwin's work on mental development would have proved to the author a mine to be well worked had it appeared in time. However, it will serve a still better purpose in connection with that second treatise Dr. Groos promises, ' Die Spiele der Men- schen.* Briefly as to the author's views : Animal psychology has been wrongly regarded as a sort of mere amusement in consequence of which the subject has suffered. It has also been lacking in aims and methods. It would be well to consider what in men is animal (thierisch) if we go no further, and this implies a close study of animals. The author then sets forth his views as to the qualifications of the man who would make a thoroughly successful study of animals, and they so perfectly agree with my own that I will quote the passage in the hope that the editor may not throw it out for being too lengthy. "Der Verfasser einer Psychologic der thierischen Spiele miisste eigentlich nicht nur zwei, sondern mehrere Seelen in seiner Brust be- herbergen. Er miisste mit einer allgemeinen psycho logischen, phy- siologischen und biologischen Vorbildung die Erfahrungen eines Weltreisenden, die Kenntnisse eines Thiergarten-Directors und die Erinnerungen eines wahrheitsliebenden Oberforsters vereinigen. Und auch dann wiirde er schwerlich sein Werk zu einem befriedigenden Abschluss fiihren konnen, wenn er nicht zugleich mit den Bestrebungen der modernen Aesthetik vertraut ware. Ja gerade diesen letzten Punkt halte ich fur so wesentlich, dass ich behaupten mochte : nur ein Aesthetiker kann die Psychologic des Spiels schrei- ben." Dr. Groos does not reject the l overflow of energy ' theory origina- ting with Schiller and expanded by Spencer, but considers it inade- quate. Play is a development and preparation for the use or expression of certain instincts. Without this preparation the 'blind might' of in- stinct would often be unavailing. The author's work is saturated with the doctrines of evolution, of which he makes abundant use and with critical discrimination. Bearing in mind the all pervading nature of the sexual instinct, he endeavors to prove that play is essential for the successful attainment of the the objects of this instinct, especially on account of the instinc- tive shyness of the females. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 331 Dr. Groos thinks he has discovered a new i principle ' as described above, necessary to complete and correct those of Wallace, Weismann, Galton, Spencer and Darwin. He does not believe that the females select the males, but that the peculiar forms and colors of the males tend to diminish the shyness of the female, so that with the addition of his own principle that great end of nature, the propagation of species, is accomplished. Through these two principles, attraction of females by the forms, colors, etc., of males, and that behavior for which play is a preparation, suitable matings result. The principle of special interest in psychology in this connection, and especially for ^Esthetics, is l der Scheinthatigkeit oder der bewuss- ten Selbstauschung.' Whether one agrees wholly with the writer of this book or not, he will get many tidbits by the way and is likely to feel more than ever the force of the well-known saying of Bacon, * Reading maketh a full man.' WESLEY MILLS. MONTREAL. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ART. Ueber den psychologischen Ursprung der Poesie und Kunst. M. J. MONRAD. Archiv f. system. Philosophic, Bd. I. 347-362. 1895. In the fourth chapter of the ' Poetics ' Aristotle refers the psy- chological origin of Poetry to two sources, the impulse to and de- light in imitation and the impulse to and delight in rhythm and harmony. Connecting the first with the theoretic impulse — we first learn by imitation — he finds an essential element in aesthetic enjoyment to be the pleasure of recognition. Certain persons in whom the imita- tive impulse was stronger than the rest began with imitations which expressed the temporary interest of the occasion, and these, perfected by practice, gradually became a developed art. The essay of Herr Monrad is an elaboration and application to art generally of the above Aristotelian theses respecting the origin and development of poetry. Aristotle's remark about learning beginning with imitation receives a deeper significance than its author probably intended in the observation that in learning there is an inwardizing, a spiritual reproduction, of the object. Such idealization is a character- istic factor in human imitation, and enables it to rise above the brute stage at which it begins and where it approaches the reflex type, 33 2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ART. and to become an imitation, not merely of movements, but of objects. Connected with this ideal reproduction, this imitation in the sub- ject, is the impulse to objectification, for which the twofold reason is assigned that it is necessary both to define the image and to commu- nicate it. The psychological motifs which are the vehicles of these reasons are not stated, unless the remark referring to the latter of them be regarded as such, namely, that the person, as of essentially a social nature, wills to express himself and to see himself mirrored in his work and in the recognition of others. The result of this ex- pression is to bring out the essential and universal import of the image by placing it where it can be modified by the similar expressions of other persons. Thus every man is a born artist. Only the exception- ally gifted, however, succeed in giving an adequately universal ex- pression to their idea. Besides the pleasure of recognition, mentioned by Aristotle, delight in the work of art is connected with its freedom from all practical interests as being only image, form, and not reality, and with the fact that it is a form produced freely from the spirit and bearing its stamp. It is also connected with the formal elements of technical superiority, and, intrinsically, of rhythm and harmony, these terms being used in a more comprehensive sense than Aristotle's. The essay closes with a strong characterization of that ' Af terkunst ' which passes under the name of Realism, the function of true art being, in the author's view, to give such expression to the things of the spirit that the spirit may recognize and rejoice in its own ideality. SMITH COLLEGE. H. N. GARDINER. Sex and Art. COLIN A. SCOTT, Fellow in Psychology, Clark Uni- versity. The American Journal of Psychology, VII. 153-226. Jan. 1896. Mr. Scott undertakes to bring a vast mass of heterogeneous phe- nomena under a few relatively simple concepts. Erethism, he holds, is the foundation of all sexual phenomena. At first general, it is soon found chiefly in organs specialized for the performance of the sexual function, to which the balance of the organism is brought into relation by the law of radiation: "Starting from the act of copulation, the sexual instinct tends to widen and become more complicated, until the whole of the organism is involved in its activity." With progress- ing sexual differentiation sexual selection comes to view. It is effected chiefly by means of combat and courting, out of which have sprung the emotions of fear and anger, shame, coyness, probably the pa- rental instincts, and the aesthetic sense. Out of the last named sprang PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 333 in turn the instinct for ornamentation, and this, conjoined with the sense of shame, has given rise to clothing. From the symbolism and fetichism so characteristic of savage races, which is at bottom a tendency to attach the complex and subjective to things concrete and objective and which lies at the foundation of all our conceptual and symbolic thought, there springs phallicism, in which the vague emo- tions grouped as above described about the sexual function become attached to a definite symbol, associated with cosmological notions and give rise to religion. The relation of the primitive sex instinct to the more complex instincts and emotions its derivatives may be ex- pressed in physiological terms by the relation of a simple reflex arc and its ganglion cell to complex systems of similar arcs and cells, which may stimulate or inhibit the functioning of the primitive and may even become dissociated from the primitive and function inde- pendently. Such are the main outlines of Mr. Scott's inductions. The balance of his paper illustrates these conceptions in sundry connec- tions. He sketches the general features and laws of courting, bringing to view the katabolic tendencies of the male as opposed to the anabolic tendencies of the female, analyses the phenomena of degeneration and perversion, describes the state of ecstasy, which u as involving an emotional condition accompanying the operation of the phantasy, is a connecting link between art and sex, " and,finally, aesthetics. He con- cludes that the higher derivatives of the sexual instinct are not only excitants of their primitive, but also inhabitants of and substitutes for it, and urges that " what we need at present is a modern phallicism, a religious and artistic spirit that goes out to meet the sexual instinct and is able to find in it the center of evolution, the heart and soul of the world, the holy of holies to all right feeling men." In education we should seize upon the artistic sense at the outset and seek to de- velop it to the utmost. " Love, in its best development in a continued married life, gives us the pulse of this (the artistic) movement, (and) the ennobling ecstasies of poetry, music, painting and the enthusiasms generally, are at the same time an outcome of and a substitution for this happiness." This is a most interesting and suggestive paper, showing on every page the author's acute psychological insight and mastery of his ma- terial. Yet, as is perhaps inevitable in so wide and new a field, its defects are many. In reading it the suspicion constantly arises that generaliza- tions so comprehensive may include or perhaps be based upon mere superficial resemblances, and the fear is increased by the lack of any 334 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ART. attempt on the part of the author to criticise or define such concepts as those of erethism, art, religion, etc. The psychological scheme which Mr. Scott propounds raises a similar doubt. If it be regarded as an attempt to express the facts of observation in symbolic form — a series of physiological fetiches — no one will object to it, although the same end would be as well or better attained by a notation similar to that of algebra or chemistry. But if we are to conceive it as representative of what goes on in the nervous system, it must be regarded as purely mythical. That the primitive sexual passion has been a leading factor in the evolution of the artistic sense, and has been concerned in that of the religious spirit, scarcely admits of question, and the positive side of Mr. Scott's paper is a permanent and valuable contribution to our knowledge of the subject. But his treatment seems to the present writer essentially defective from the theoretical point of view, and from the practical entirely misleading. Fear has been evolved in the presence of dangers of all kinds, and not merely of those arising from rival aspirants for the favor of the female. The primary factor in the evolution of religion is to be found, not in the sex instinct, but in the use of a belief in the continued existence of deceased parents and chief- tains as a fetich for the repressive influence of the community. In its later forms religion has entirely cut loose, and, as I believe, finally and forever cut loose from its early association with the sex passion, and Mr. Scott's plea for a 'Modern Phallicism,' even in the refined sense in which he uses the expression, is little short of grotesque. In the evolution of the aesthetic emotions the sexual feelings have probably played the leading part, yet non-sexual utilities have had much to do with their fashioning. And while one cannot but support Mr. Scott's plea for the wider recognition of the aesthetic emotions in education, the facts which he alleges do not afford a sufficient warrant for it. The aesthetic sense can, and sometimes does, act as an inhibitant of or substitute for the grosser sex passion, but we have no reason for be- lieving that with increase in aesthetic sensibility we should see a dim- inution of sexual excesses. The history of Greece and Rome, of modern France, Italy and Spain, and of the cultured and leisured classes in every community, shows conclusively that there is at least no inconsistency between high artistic development and gross sexual laxity. Mr. Scott duly recognizes the fact that the aesthetic sense serves to awaken as well as control the sex passion, but he fails in his practical deductions to give due weight to that recognition. Further, he makes no mention of the regulative function — the so-called moral PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 335 sense — which has been evolved expressly for the control of the animal passions in the interests of individuals as well as of society. However, it may well be that such sins of omission and exagger- ation are inseparable from any attempt to deal in narrow limits with such raw material, and as an earnest attempt at original construction Mr. Scott's paper will meet with a cordial welcome. UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA. W. ROMAINE NEWBOLD. Temperament et caractere, selon les individus, les sexes et les races. ALF. FOUILLEE. Paris, Alcan. Pp. xx+278. u General Psychology," says Ribot, ''studies exclusively abstract laws, whereas the psychology of character studies types produced by a particular combination of general laws and classifying individuals." The character of an individual is his average mode of feeling, thinking and acting. It is the result of a series of causes, the first of which is race, the second the fundamental difference between the sexes (the signifi- cance of which is not only biological but also psychological) , and the last a product of -the individual constitution and temperament. Thus is formed the innate character, the present manifestation of a long series of evolutionary changes. But the innate character is only a starting point for new developments ; it is passive under exterior influences, but active through the reaction of the intelligence and of the will. It is indeed these personal reactions that constitute par excellence the character properly so-called by assimilation with the innate temperament and constitution. Hence the influence of education and culture. Making these principles his starting point and drawing some of his observations and theories from those who had previously contributed to the new science of character, M. Fouille"e studies : I. Physical and moral temperaments, which result from the uature of changes in the body. There are two types, the reflective and the active, with their subdivisions. So much may be said from the standpoint of the body (which may be modified as age advances) , liut it must not be forgotten that character is affected by the will as well as by the organism, and that the physical constitution, according as it is well or ill directed, affects the moral order for good or evil. Following Descartes, Pascal, Rousseau and Biron, M. Fouille"e con- siders it essential that a place should be given to ethics in the reflective and emotional life, which act not by virtue of abstract precepts, but by a concrete influence on the being. II. Character and intelligence. The type of character is a re- 336 TEMPERAMENT ET CARACTERE. suit of the mutual relations of the three important psychic functions inseparable from the will, sensation, emotion and desire. A character is well balanced when no one of these factors predominates, otherwise according to the element that predominates it becomes sensuous, intel- lectual or volitional. III. Temperament and character according to sex. Following M. A. Sabatier the fundamental features of the female character are said to be concentration, unification, cohesion. The elements of the masculine character are on the contrary separation and production ; the one collects, the other gives out ; the one is dependent on and the other independent of surroundings. From these fundamental differences result the dissimilarity of the male and female character. IV. Character of the human races. The general character of a race is the result of selection under given conditions. Those races which have degenerated from a moral or physical point of view may be regenerated in two ways, the one psychological and the other physiological — education and intermarriage. In conclusion, M. Fouill^e remarks that the period in which the physical and moral differences between races were large, while the differences between individuals were small, belongs to the past. This state of things is reversed to- day, but we are approaching a third period, in which differences be- tween individuals will again decrease without lessening the similarity of races, and thus will arise the true type of man. In the course of the work the writer discusses different classifica- tions of character, especially those of Ribot and Paulhan, and empha- sizes the value of these researches. "From a practical point of view," says M. Fouillee, "the science of character would be of un- doubted usefulness to the moralist and teacher. As it is indispen- sable to the student of hygiene to recognize different physical tempera- ments that he may adapt general prescriptions to individual constitu- tions, so must the moralist adapt his precepts to different moral temperaments. It would be absurd to conclude that what is successful in one case would produce like effects in another, as Kingsley did in preaching that all should find happiness in the study of marine ani- mals. The educator cannot apply the same rules in dealing with dif- ferent children ; severity will influence some, affection will influence others. To fear is necessary for some, to love is best for others. We do not indeed go so far as to say with M. Stewart that classes in a school should be divided into four parts in order to group together children of the same character and apply to them special methods. But it is certain that educators ignore too much the physiology of PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 337 character, as they ignore the hygiene of intellectual work. If the first educators, the parents, understood the intimate relations of physical and moral temperaments they would begin to decipher the nature of their children from the very first and would learn better and better to appreciate their aptitudes." Let us hope that the appeal will receive the attention of educators. JEAN PHILIPPE. PARIS. Die moderne Physiologische Psychologic in Deutschland. DR. W. HEINRICH. Zurich, E. Speidel, 1895. Pp. iv+235. The scope of this book will be best indicated by referring to the author's explanation of how he came to write it. His first and final aim is to attempt the construction of a new theory of attention. On the way to the accomplishment of this end he had to review preceding psychological theories which bore special relation to this problem. This volume contains the result of these studies, the presentation of the author's own theory being postponed. The book has, on the whole, an unsatisfactory character. It con- tains criticisms and discussions which, however acute and however im- portant in themselves and in the development of the author's studies, have no close bearing on the problem of attention, or, at any rate, lack the unification and justification which might have been given to them if we had been presented with positive constructive conceptions. On the other hand, the book is too brief and the selection of topics for discussion is too one-sided to allow us to take it as a history of physiological psychology. Dr. Heinrich states in the preface that the only objective criterion for theories of attention is to be found in the law of psycho-physical parallelism; ''Desist nun zu entscheiden in ivie fern die Psycho- logen, die ja alle den psychophysischen Parallelismus theoretisch anerkennen ihm auch praktisch treu geblieben sind" Our author, at least, is true to his principle ; there are, however, hardly any psy- chologists who are not found to be unfaithful. In truth, if a psycholo- gist sets himself faithfully to interpret facts, he will hardly fail to come into conflict with a dogmatically assumed Gesetz. Dr. Heinrich finds that Kiilpe's recent work on psychology " while it may perhaps be of some use as a text book," ... u is of no scientific value." The mere statement of this judgment serves as well as anything could do for a criticism of Heinrich's treatment. That Kiilpe should profess to investigate only Beiuusstseins-Erscheinungen and should 33^ DIE GESICHTSEMPFINDUNGEN. yet study attention along with other factors as a Zustand des Bewusst- seins is found to be inexplicable and at least to involve a contradic- tion. One may admit that Prof. Kiilpe might have made more clear what he means by Zustand, but that there is a contradiction involved seems by no means to follow. Evidently it is Avenarius whose philosophy is to give an adequate solution of the problem of attention, and we are presented with an account of certain general conceptions which, according to Avenarius and our author, should dominate psychological investigation. I can- not see that Dr. Heinrich's approval of Avenarius in this respect is more justifiable than his condemnation of Kiilpe. It may be noted that Dr. Heinrich refers only to German psycholo- gists. This would be more natural if he were studying attention only in its psycho-physical aspect ; it must be considered as a defect when we remember that his aim is far wider and that his professed object is to construct a general theory of attention. W. G. SMITH. SMITH COLLEGE. Zur Psychophysik der Gesichtsempjindungen. G. E. MOLLER. Ztsch. f. Psychologic und Physiologic der Sinnesorgane X., 1-83. Besides the axioms which it has in common with physics and chemistry, psychophysics assumes five which are peculiar to itself. They are : (1) Some material process (a so-called psychophysical process) is at the basis of every state of consciousness. (2) To the equality, similarity, difference of a sensation (we shall not here discuss other states of consciousness, though the same axioms hold for all), correspond respectively an equality, similarity, differ- ence of the underlying psychophysical process and conversely. (3) If the changes which a sensation runs through have the same direction, or if the differences between a series of sensations have the same direction, the like will be the case in regard to the corresponding psychophysical process; if a sensation is variable in n directions, so also is its psychophysical process. (4) The directions in which a sensation can be varied are of dif- ferent kinds. If a given direction is towards zero (that is, if the sen- sation, by continuous change in the same direction, finally vanishes) , we say that the sensation is suffering a diminution of intensity (and if the change is the exact reverse of this, we speak of an increase of intensity) . Among the different directions which lead to zero, that PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 339 one is of peculiar importance which leads to zero by the shortest route (that is, by passing through the smallest number of perceptible inter- vals) . In this direction, or in its opposite, the change is said to be a change of pure intensity. In any other course towards zero the change is said to be one of mixed intensity and quality. A change is purely qualitative when it leads neither towards nor from the zero point of sensation. The fifth axiom will be stated later. From the fourth axiom it follows that to every qualitative change of sensation there corresponds a qualitative change in the psycho- physical process, and conversely ; and that to an increase or a dimi- nution of the one corresponds an increase or a diminution of the other. These axioms may be summed up in the general doctrine of a psychophysical parallelism. But the history of the doctrine shows too conclusively the necessity of setting out in detail the elements of which it is composed. The definition of psychophysical process is such a material process in the brain as is accompanied by sensation (or other condition of consciousness). This is the converse of axiom i . The above axioms have been stated with more or less clearness by Lotze, Fechner, Mach and Hering. But when Hering says that a given sensation of gray may be caused by psychophysical processes very different in amount, provided the proportion of the white process to the black process remains the same, he misinterprets the principle of parallelism. If this were so, the white process and the black pro- cess might become excessively small in amount without producing any change in the sensation, and upon their finally vanishing, the sensation would cease suddenly without having previously suffered any diminu- tion of intensity. This is in complete contradiction with the prin- ciple of continuity ; it also is in disaccord with our fourth axiom, and with experience in the corresponding region of sound. A principle object of this paper is to modify Hering's theory of antagonistic colors in such a way that it can dispense with this assumption. Since all sensations vary in intensity, the psychophysical process which underlies them must in every instance have a corresponding variation. Shall we suppose that this variation is a variation in strength (to be measured by the energy, the velocity, the acceleration or some other function of moving particles) , or a variation in exten- sion (that is, in the number of particles which take part in the mo- tion) ? A full discussion of this question leads to the conclusion that Fechner's view is best, that subjective intensity must depend upon both of these factors, and that it is not at present possible to distin- 34° DIE GESICHTSEMPFINDUNGEN. guish between them in consciousness. The naif view which regards the feeling of the extension of a colored surface as dependent upon the extension of its image upon the retina, and then the connection of the retinal elements with a definitely extended portion of the cortex, could only be supported if it had been shown that in all the senses (whose cortical connections have also, of course, a definite extent) the same relation holds between extent in space of cortical elements, and an attributed extension of the sensation. And what sensation element should we attribute to the extension of the cortical process in the third dimension ? As regards Lotze's theory of the local sign, it is to be remarked that no difference in sensation is necessary as its basis ; it is sufficient to point out that different retinal elements must, on discharging in the brain, form part of different association tracts, and hence be the basis of different ideas of locality, whether they produce different sensations or not. For Lotze the association was a purely spiritual process ; we take now a more material view of it. The psychophysical processes may be either simple or mixed ; a simple process is either really such, or is never separated in our ex- perience into parts, and is never composed of its parts mixed in different proportions. The sensation corresponding to this is a pure sensation, but a mixed sensation is not such in the sense that it can be looked upon as a complex of several distinct sensations. If fj. is a mixed sensation, and a and b are the intensities of the two partial psy- chophysical processes which call it forth, and if a and /? are the sen- sations which these processes would call forth if acting by themselves, then for the degree of resemblance of the mixed sensation to a we have (as the simplest and most plausible expression) a , and for its degree of resemblance to /?, _1_. But if a a fi resemble each other to a degree represented by R(a$), then these two expressions must be modified, and they become respectively a + b a + b This gives an expression for the quality of a mixture in terms of the intensity of its two (or more) partial processes, and it constitutes the fifth axiom. By differentiating these expressions we are able to prove (among other things) that the degree of whiteness of a mixture of white with a color increases, for a given increment of the white-ex- citation, more when the color is yellow than when it is blue (since yellow is, to begin with, more like white than blue is) . This formula (which gives -^-, for instance, for the degree of whiteness of a given PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 341 gray) resembles that given by Hering, but with him w stands for the intensity of the partial sensation, here it is the intensity of the partial psychophysical process. Hering has, as is well known, given up the idea that the brightness of a pure color is yz , but, since introducing his idea of the specific brightness of colors, he has not said what it is. Miiller here fills up this lacuna. [He uses brightness — Helligkeit — therefore, as synonymous with ' degree of resemblance to white'] . It is proved, in passing, that the addition of blue to a given gray does not always darken it, as Hering affirms, but only when the gray had a certain (not great) brightness at first, and, also, that yellow does not brighten a given gray, unless the gray had a certain (not small) bright- ness at first. From all this it does not follow that the Purkinje phe- nomenon can be wholly explained by the specific brightness of the colors. According to Hering, the series of grays is a quality series, and not an intensity series. This is true, as matter of fact ; we do not see a dif- ferent grey in different intensities (or hardly different) . But this is merely due to the accidental fact that, starting from a given grey, that of the self-light of the retina, for instance, any external cause which increases the white constituent does not also increase the black constit- uent, but, on the contrary, diminishes it. We are not in the position of ever being able to vary the black and the white constituents in the same direction at the same time. It is this, and not any theoretical difficulty, which prevents us from seeing a given quality of grey in dif- ferent intensities. When a sensation changes in quality we are able, to a certain ex- tent, to form a judgment as to whether the change is in a constant di- rection or not (and even though there should be a change of intensity at the same time). A series of sensations in which the quality changes continuously and in a constant direction, we shall call a psychic quality series. Such a series is the series of grays. A psychic quality series may be intrinsically limited or not. The black-white series (unlike the series of tones) is intrinsically limited, because it is a series which consists in becoming more like white or more like black, and we cannot conceive of it as passing beyond a pure white or a pure black. Corresponding to a given psychic quality-series there must be a psychophysical series, which must also be continuous and in a con- stant direction. But a series of processes of this description can be of either one of two kinds : (i) it may consist in a series of changes of a qualitative nature (for instance, of a vibration period) ; or (2) it may consist in a change of the relative intensity of the two constituents of 342 DIE SPECIFISCHE SINNESENERGIEN. a mixture. It is shown, by a very complicated argument, stretching" over sixteen pages, that, in the case of the black-white series, we may assume that the underlying psychophysical process is of the second kind. This argument depends upon the axioms already stated, the assump- tion that the retinal process is of a chemical nature (and therefore not capable of a large number of different qualities), and that to every excitation in the visual nerve, which varies continuously and in a con- stant direction, there corresponds an excitation in the retina of a sim- ilar description, and finally that we are able to recognize a psychic quality-series (that is, can tell whether a series is varying in a con- stant direction or not). All this forces upon us the assumption of the six retinal processes of Hering. The further development of these considerations is reserved for another occasion. It has been known for some time that Prof. Mil Her was engaged upon a profound modification of Hering's theory, and his conclusion of this subject will be awaited with great interest. CHR. LADD FRANKLIN. Die Lehre von den Spezifischen Sinnesenergien. DR. RUDOLF WEINMANN. Verlag v. L. Voss, Hamburg und Leipzig. 1895. Pp. 96. The first part of this book is mainly historical. In the first section of this part the author gives Miiller's well-known theory of 4 specific energies.' He then goes on in several sections to give the forerunners of the theory, naming among others Newton, Eichel, Elliot and Autenrieth. He then gives an account of the so-called new form of the theory in its applications, citing the application of the theory by Natonson to the different qualities in the various ' modes ' of sensation. He cites the work of Helmholtz in the sense of hearing, and in the sense of sight the Young-Helmholtz theory of color and also Hering's color theory. The author then continues the historical account through the various senses. Finally he concludes the first part with a critical summing-up in which he gives the criticism of the theory by Lotze, Weber and Dessoir, concluding first, that in the cases of admitted phe- nomena with a doubtful interpretation no sure decision between the theory and its afore-mentioned critics can be had, and that nothing prevents the assumption that, where the different senses give their own reaction in spite of apparently inadequate stimuli, nevertheless ade- quate stimuli may be present. Second, that there is another class of cases where the phenomena themselves are doubtful. Third, that still another class remain unaccounted for, where, for example, light PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 343 waves are without effect for hearing, taste, smell ; and sound waves are without effect for sight, etc. Finally, granted the newer form of the theory, it yet stands in opposition to the main point of the theory as given by Miiller, which presupposes the indifference of stimulus, while the newer theory only shows that the nervous organization shows a greater complexity and ' division of labor ' than was formerly sup- posed. In the second part the author seeks to reach certain theoretic re- sults. Miiller's theory, he says, takes a group of facts and puts them together under a name. Suppose now we grant the facts, the theory intends to explain these and seeks to do so by ascribing a ' specific energy' to the sense nerves. This 'energy' is after all only a word, and we must seek the concrete explanation of the phenomena. In the first section of this part the author seeks to show that the question of the theory is purely a physiological matter. A sense reaction means two things, a physiological occurrence and a conscious reaction. Now it is admitted that with a nerve process x is always the determined sensation x' ; not every similar stimulus, but every similar nerve process, must have the corresponding sensation. From this it follows that the physiological reaction must be specific, and the theory must explain this. Lotze, says the author, was the first to realize this. Miiller failed to do so, and hence confusion resulted. What, then, asks the author in the next two sections, is specific energy ? He agrees with Lotze's view, which he cites as the correct one. The phrase has a meaning, when applied to sensation, viz. : "the sensation of tone is the peculiar reaction of the auditory nerves." But to lay such a prin- ciple at the basis of nerve processes means to violate all scientific method in the admission of wantonly assumed forces. It means to give up explanation and rest in a word. We must, he claims, seek the explanation with Lotze in the universal mechanical laws which hold when one object impinges on another. After an analysis of Lotze's position Dr. Weinmann concludes that, instead of the doctrine of spe- cific energies, we should speak of the doctrine of the ' diverse nature of the physiological bearer of the sensation.' In the next section he con- siders the question as to the seat of the ' specific energy ' in this sense, and in the following section he takes up the question as to whether it is innate or acquired. Both of these sections we must pass by for want of space. In the third and last part of the book the author con- siders the epistemological aspect of the theory in its new form. He con- cludes that it cannot be used in support of Miiller's subjective sense physiology, nor as an empirical proof of the doctrine of the subjec- 344 RECOGNITION. tivity of the secondary qualities. Though in general it favors sub- jective epistemology, its interest is mainly physiological. PRINCETON. C. W. HODGE. The Recognition- Theory of Perception. Recognition. ARTHUR ALLIN. American Journal of Psychology, Vol. VII. 237-273, January, 1896. Dr. Allin's articles are primarily an attack upon a common theory of immediate recognition, the supposition that it occurs through the fusion of images of an object with the percept of the same. Hoff- ding is rightly named as the chief upholder of the theory, but it is traced in the writings of Herbart and of Spencer, of Mill and of Bain, of Wundt and of Ward, associationists and apperceptionists as well. Incidentally, the author finds opportunity for a vigorous and success- ful criticism of many traditional definitions and formulations of psy- chology. His main positions are the following : I. a. Perception is not a case of immediate recognition. This is proved on the testimony of ordinary introspection. "Perception is. not * * * * an act of memory * * * * If I burn myself, I know it is hot without any reference to former experiences (p* 240)." b. In particular, perception is not a fusion of percept with similar images. The virtual abandonment of the position by the admission of its supporters that the fusion is ' theoretical/ ' metaphorical ' or 'ideal' (p. 241) is clearly indicated. Above all, Dr. Allin combats 'the unconscious' as explanation of the association. "If unconscious," he says, "then obviously it does not exist as a conscious or mental fact (p. 242)." "Statements of an unconscious, conscious act," he concludes, " are too obviously im- possible to demand refutation (p. 242)." c. Finally the theory that perception involves immediate recogni- tion leaves no room for the explanation of sense-illusions, since it re- quires recognition, as well as perception, of all objects (p. 247). II. This fusion of percept with similar images, even granting its existence, can not possibly be all that it is claimed. a. Such fusion (so-called 4 association by similarity ') is not a case of the revival of former impressions, for such a resurrection of the past simply does not occur. b. Such fusion is not association at all, for if it were, "then the two presentations associated must be separately cognized in order to be associated (p. 257)." PS YCHOLOGICAL LITER A TURE. 345 c. Such fusion certainly is not recognition. " Objectively con- sidered, it may be a second cognition * * * but subjectively, it would be for the percipient's consciousness simply (Object and Object) becoming eventually fused into (Object) (p. 257)." III. Recognition, however, both of the obviously associative type and in the form ' immediate recognition ' unquestionably does occur and is to be explained. a. The term ' recognition ' refers to the consciousness that an ob- ject is again presented, not to a second nor to a thousandth presenta- tion of an object without the accompanying consciousness of the repetition. Therefore, b. The mere fact of reproduction does not convert an image into a memory image. "The stages of * * * imagination are not re- cognition proper (p. 255)." And, c. Neither the bare presence of associated elements, nor the occur- rence of a feeling of ease is in itself immediate recognition. "The added or differing associates in themselves are no memory." IV. Positively, therefore, recognition is 'classification as known again' on the ground of certain observed characteristics. These include the lack 'of vividness,' 'of spatial localization,' 'of per- sistency,' 'of muscle and joint sensation ;' the presence of associated objects ; the rapidity, the ease and the pleasure of the recognition-con- sciousness. No one of these characteristics is identical with recogni- tion or even necessary to it ; but one or more of them form the accom- paniment or psychological explanation of the recognition, its ' charac- terization causes.' a. Immediate recognition is marked by an absence of accompany- ing definite associations, and by the presence of the pleasure feeling, or of a consciousness of ease and rapidity in the perception. This 4 surprising immediacy and celerity ' appears to Dr. Allin to consti- tute the prominent feature of paramnesia ; but he also explains it by actual association with dream experiences and with waking images, and by general bodily conditions. b. The classification, however, in which recognition consists, is of objects not of percepts (p. 267). "Perceptions when they once pass out of consciousness are never known again, for they no longer exist;" but a distinction gradually arises between ' certain presentations, faint, dim,' etc., to which 'there are no corresponding external qualities,' and other perceptual presentation ' fresh, full, vivid, steady in their spatial localization ;' the latter are called ' objects present,' while the former are objects known again. " This" says Dr. Allin, " as far as 346 RE CO GNITION. I can see is a simple classification like that of certain sensations into color * * * and sound sensations." Finally c. "There is in recognition no ' identification of the past * * with the present* * * (p. 269)." Dr. Allin's quotations amply verify the need for his protest against the 'recognition theory of perception' and for his insistence upon the obscured distinction between image and memory-image. The writer of this notice subscribes cordially to the critical conclusions of the author, but questions the adequacy of his analysis of recognition. The express identification (p. 267) of 'external reality' with 'the present' obscures many features of the consciousness of external reality, and ignores the most significant of them — the assumption of the parallel consciousness of other selves. The treatment of the past as the known- again-with-its-associates betrays an equally unsatisfactory analysis of the time-consciousness, but this follows logically from the central error of the theory : the assertion that recognition does not imply identifi- cation or comparison. This is argued by a reference to the cases of immediate recognition, which are admitted to 'take place without a second presentation of the same object.' But immediate recognition does, nevertheless, include comparison with the past experience of the subject, only the comparison is wavering and restless, and the identi- fication is incomplete. When a face 'seems familiar' I am eagerly comparing it with faces I have already seen, trying to identify the present with the past. If this sort of comparison were entirely absent, then the 'feeling of familiarity' would not have risen to the plane of recognition at all. Dr. Allin's definition of the ' recognized ' as the ' known again, ' though it recalls Hoffding's Bekanntheitsqualitat which he rejects, is psychologically quite satisfactory, for psychology avowedly adopts the matter-of-fact standpoint, and properly declines to enter upon a metaphysical search for ultimates. But to deny the identity of the 'known again' and the 'compared, ' and to suggest the parallel of the 'known again' with sensation (p. 267), is to confuse contents of con- sciousness which are metaphysically as well as psychologically irre- ducible, with contents which lead by philosophical necessity to the in- ference of a self underlying phenomena. The entire discussion would have gained in force and in arrange- ment if it had been presented as one essay, rather than two. There is a tendency also to over-quotation, which sometimes obscures the au- thor's meaning and overloads his page, especially when he pauses to comment on some irrelevant error, or repeats a quotation already PATHOLOGICAL. 347 made. The occurrence in the body of the text of citation references to title, volume and page is also a serious annoyance to the reader. WELLESLEY COLLEGE. MARY WHITON CALKINS. PATHOLOGICAL. Die Physiologic des Trigeminus nach Untersuchungen am Men- schen, bei denen das Ganglion Gasseri entfernt ivorden ist. PROF. DR. FEDOR KRAUSE. Miinchener Medicinwochenschrift 1895, No. 27-27. Intracranial resection of the different branches of the trigeminus not having proved a complete safeguard against relapse, the author de- termined to perform a more radical operation, that of removing the ganglion Gasseri together with the trigeminal root situated centrally from it. The author promises a special monograph on the histological changes in the ganglion Gasseri in cases of neuralgia. The phenom- ena of abrogation appearing in patients thus operated on are inter- esting. There must be a much greater possibility of accurately de- termining the functions of this nerve-root in this way than in experi- ments on animals. The observations contained in the above treatise refer to cases in which these phenomena were investigated in patients at intervals of from 18 days to two years after the performance of the operation. During the operation no usual investigation of the phenom- ena of abrogation was attempted, although the author, so far as it was possible and the condition of the patients permitted, commenced his examination before the extirpation of the ganglion. The circum- stance must be noted that in all investigated cases resections of the peripheral trigeminal branches had been performed several years be- fore. The general result of these interesting researches is the demon- stration of complete anaesthesia in the entire region of the three branches of the trigeminus. Ober periodische Schwankungen der Hirnrindenfunctionen. RICHARD STERN, aus der med. Klinik in Breslau. Archiv fur Psychiatric Bd. 27, Heft 3, p. 850-917. 1895. The author describes two remarkable, morbid phenomena, hith- erto unnoticed, which appeared in two men as subsequent phenomena after serious injuries on the head. They consist principally in a complex of symptoms which the author attributes to a periodically recurring relaxation of the functions of the cerebral revolutions. This periodical relaxation, designated by the author as ' fluctuations,' ap- 348 PA THOL O GICAL. pears at the same time in sensory, intellectual and motor regions, and influenced, in the first case, all sense-activities, in the second even the breathing. The reaction-times measured during this condition were about three times the normal length. Speech and writing were both injured by these peculiar fluctuations, the activity of the memory was greatly lessened and mental work (Kraepelin's method being applied) much more slowly performed. The work is of great interest and is worthy of further notice. Beitrag zur Pathologic des Gedachtnisses. P. OTTO BARTHEL. Inaug. Diss. Miinchen. 1894. P. 1-48. After a few introductory remarks, the author gives an account of the disease of two individuals, presenting the symptom of a peculiar loss of memory, in consequence of which the patients appeared to have remained stationary at a certain period of their lives. The first of these, a day laborer of 55 years of age, had been injured in his growth by a blow on the head, and although hereditary predisposition was not traceable, his mania, of a religious and sexual nature, gradually devel- oped into a condition of secondary imbecility. This man, in answer to any questions addressed to him, replied that he was 23 years old, at which age his mania broke out. He was able to recall correctly all events fixed in his memory up till this time, whereas all later incidents were for him nonexistent. The second account relates to a pupil of the gymnasium, who be- came ill in his twentieth year, being at present 47 years old. An attack of typhus prepared the way for the disease, as also mental over-exer- tion by which the patient had tried to supply intellectual deficiencies. He lived entirely in his 2ist and 22d year. The author then communicates a number of similar cases drawn from earlier literature and comes to the conclusion that however varied the psycho-pathological conditions may be in the individual, mental weakness forms the link which binds them together. With the ap- pearance of this weakness the patient becomes unable to assimilate fresh material for the memory. "This symptom is the expression of true agennesia of the memory, and it forms the boundary-line between health and disease in primary psychopathy ; in secondary conditions between primary and secondary alteration." FRIEDRICH KIESOW. LEIPZIG. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 349 EXPERIMENTAL. On the Apparent Size of Objects. W. H. R. RIVERS. Mind, N. S. V., 71-80. Jan., 1896. When the ciliary muscle is paralyzed by atropin, there occurs a micropsia of the affected eye ; objects appear to it smaller. Bonders and others explained this phenomenon as due to the greater effort of accommodation, causing a judgment that the object was nearer, hence smaller. Rivers distinguishes two kinds of micropsia — affecting ob- jects at the fixation point, and objects beyond it — and claims that they are due to entirely different causes. Micropsia at the fixation point is a phenomenon or irradiation. It affects black objects on white ground, not white on black. A small artificial pupil before the affected eye corrects it. Hence it is due to dilatation of the pupil increasing irradiation, and not to an affection of accommodation. Micropsia beyond the fixation point is observable by the normal eye, but more easily under atropin. Rivers shows that this form is not due to irradiation, and adopts an explanation which is a modifica- tion of that of Hering. What determines the apparent size and dis- tance of an object not fixated, is its relation to the fixation point, and not to the eye. The retinal image has remained constant, but it is multiplied by a smaller factor with greater distance from the fixation point. So far then as localization relative to the fixation point is con- cerned, there is no evidence that the alteration of spatial relations is in any way dependent on accommodation. As to the localization of the fixation point itself, the atropin experiments show that this takes place in the absence of any peripheral accommodation, and with ex- clusion of peripheral influences from the unused eye by treating that with atropin also. Rivers therefore regards these experiments as go- ing far towards proving that the localization of the fixation point de- pends on central factors. Objects nearer than the fixation point appear larger to the normal eye, and especially so to an eye in which spasm of the ciliary muscle is produced by eserin. This macropsia can be interpreted in harmony with the explanation given for micropsia. BROWN UNIVERSITY. E. B. DELABARRE. 35° EXPERIMENTAL. Die Wirkung akustischer Sinnesreize auf Puls und Athmung. P. MENTZ. Philosophische Studien, Bd. xi. pp. 61-124, 37I- 393, 562-602. The attempts to judge indirectly the quality and intensity of psy- chical states by means of the accompanying vasomotor and respira- tory change have, unfortunately, produced meager results and the present investigation emphasizes the fact that such attempts meet many difficulties which with our present limited knowledge are in- surmountable. The complicated nature of the purely physiological phenomena concerned is by no means fully understood and the results depend upon so many and varied conditions that exact measurement is out of the question. The author found that the changes which ap- peared to furnish the most reliable basis for judgment were the in- crease and decrease of in the rapidity of the pulse, in other words the shortening or lengthening of the abscissa of a single pulse curve. The respiration curves are less constant and for the most part ne- glected. This may be regarded as a deficiency in the investigation, since it is true beyond a doubt the circulation is very much influenced by the breathing and the question is at least open whether the changes in the action of the heart and arteries may not in reality be largely secondary phenomena depending on respiration. The first series of experiments was made with single noises and tones of moderate intensity as stimuli, with the result that the pulse and often the breathing showed a decrease in rate. These well-known accompaniments of agreeable sensations are attributed in this case to the pleasure arising from the mere exercise of the function. When the stimulus was repeated the decrease was less marked. If the in- tensity of the sound was increased, a limit was reached where the indi- cations of pleasure disappeared arid after a period of indifference the pulse rate increased. The pleasure produced by musical notes was most intense at middle e and gradually diminished as the ends of the scale were approached until, after passing through a point of indiffer- ence, signs of unpleasant sensation became apparent. When the sensation was received passively, that is without any strain of atten- tion, the pulse rate, as above noted, decreases; when, on the other hand, the subject voluntarily concentrates the pulse increases in rapidity. In regard to tempo it was found that a certain rate, which varied with the individual, gave pleasure, and from this rate in both direc- tions— when the tempo was made faster or slower — the pleasure passed through an indifferent stage into its opposite. When series of sounds are used the rhythm of inspiration and expiration tends to coin- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 351 cide with that of the sounds. The same results appear when the sub- ject represents to himself a certain rhythm without hearing it. At- tempts to deal with the higher emotions, such as surprise, etc., produced nothing definite. When musical compositions were pas- sively heard, the effects were those above pointed out as the result of involuntary attention to agreeable sensations; when, on the other hand, the subject made an effort to analyze, in other words voluntarily strained the attention, the result was a quickening of the pulse. LEIPZIG. C. H. JUDD. Untersuchungen iiber Temperaturempjindungen. FRIEDRICH KIESOW. Philosophische Studien, Vol. XI. 135-145. 1895. The author used, for searching out temperature points on the arms of seven persons, the brass cylinder (9 cm. x 3 cm. with conical ends tapering i cm.) of Goldschieder. Cylinder was passed through a piece of cork or rubber tubing ; warmed by a gas-flame, for qualitative experi- ments, and in warm water the temperature of which was read from a Celsius thermometer for quantitative determinations ; cooled in a solu- tion of salt and chlorcalcium. For marking the points three colors were used. A square was marked on the arm and the points within it searched out and marked. The doctrine of separate temperature- points was thoroughly confirmed ; they remained constant for I */& months. There is a marked difference in intensity of different points. A figure in the text shows the square of one subject. Intervals be- tween points are at first indifferent, but after 3 seconds diffusely and superficially cold. The importance given to hair-cells by Gold- scheider as points of temperature sensation is at least questionable. For testing the ' specific energy ' of temperature-points four kinds of stimuli were used — mechanical, electrical, needle-point stimulus, and the reversed or opposite stimulus. All the experiments demanded exercise in both the experimenter and subject, the mechanical succeed- ing first. For these a wrooden suitably-pointed cylinder was used. Following Goldscheider, the skin was somewhat stretched. The cold points 'blaze' out when touched, while the warm rather glow; the latter are the more difficult to locate. As to cold points, the author is convinced of their existence. After two weeks, out of 46 possible cold points 21 proved to be positively cold. In another case, 9 out of 30 possible ones proved positive. The warm points took a longer time and were less clear. Finally 10 out of 30 on the author proved posi- tively warm; on another subject, 5 in 15 ; another had only cold sen- sations; another, for two days, had 10 cold and 10 warm points. 35 2 ETHICAL. For electrical stimulus Faradic current was used. Here the skin might react to the touch of the electrodes with its own sensation in- stead of to the current, to prevent which the electrodes were warmed. Cold points show a direct increase of intensity of sensation with the increase of current up to a certain point. In the case of warm points the sensation was due to current — shown by using a cold cylinder as a test. Where the current gave a weakly warm sensation the cold cyl- inder, on the same point, gave cold. All the subjects gave a large per cent, of both points. With the needle warmed in a flame, warm points were always painful ; by far the most sensations were cold ; many points gave only pain. In the experiments with opposite stimuli, cold stimulus for warm points and warm for cold points, the temperatures were 15°— 20° C. for cold stimulus and 38°-4O° C. for warm. A cold sensation was never produced on a warm point with cold cylinder; but scarcely any cold point did not give warm sensation to stimulus beyond 47° or 50°. The article states that beyond this point painful temperature- sensations always came, but the author informs us personally that the statement should be modified. "The great majority of cold points &n the skin are at the same time sensitive to warmth." The experiments are being continued, and the author hopes for clearer results with better apparatus. GUY TAWNEY. LEIPZIG. ETHICAL. Ueber Werthaltung und Wert. A. MEINONG. Archiv. fur syst. Philos. I., pp. 327-346. In his recently published Psychologisch-ethische Untersuch- ungen zur Werttheorie the author sought to determine the relations between the value or worth of an object and the feeling attaching it- self to the knowledge of the existence or non-existence of the object. The value of an object was defined as its capacity to evoke a feeling of pleasure (for this is what is meant ultimately by Werthaltungsge- fuhl}. This feeling was distinguished from the value, but at the same time the greatness of the value was held to depend on the in- tensity of the feeling in a normally constituted individual. But the objection was near at hand that this ratio is not true to fact. A highly valued friendship may be attended by little feeling, while a trifle may call out an altogether disproportionate feeling. The present article seeks to supplement the theory by a conception taken from economics, where it is customary to make value depend upon the urgency of the PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 353 want to be satisfied and upon the other available means for supplying it. This leads to the revised formula that the effective value of an ob- ject is determined not only by the value which its existence brings with it, but also by the discomfort or pain ( Umvert) which would be occasioned by its absence. This latter is evidently the chief factor in estimating the value of such common objects as air and water, for here the lack of any particular portion can ordinarily be fully compen- sated for, although under certain conditions the value may become priceless. Further, in these cases, as in the case of long-standing friendship, the feelings obey the law of fatigue and the accustomed ceases to excite positive feeling. This second element, however, involves the consideration of de- sire ; for the degree of discomfort referred to above will depend on how much I desire the object. Hence value might also be defined as 4 the capacity of an object to maintain itself in the struggle of mo- tives, or, if the expression be preferred, in the struggle for existence,' or again, u the value of an object represents the force as motive which belongs to an object either intrinsically or by virtue of the nature of its environment or of that of the appreciating subject." From the fact that the value of an object is related to feelings de- pendent respectively on the existence and non-existence of the object it follows that as these factors are mutually exclusive the value can never be ' felt ' in its totality. We are forced to resort to an intellec- tual apprehension. We pronounce a ' judgment of value ' ( Wertur- theil). This is not to be confused with another use of the term Wert- urtheil, in which it has been defined as signifying 4 judgments which arise through simultaneous action of ideation and feeling ' — a technical theological usage. An adequate theory of value would require a more thorough study of the part played by choice, and volition in measuring value. The time and labor expended, or to be expended, form a very common standard, and one that we regard as more reliable than the attendant feeling. Further, the reaction of a choice which identifies a given object with the self is also a very important factor in our estimate of value. J. H. TUFTS. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. Skizze einer Willenstheorie. G. SIMMEL. Zeitschrift fur Psychol- ogic und Physiologic der Sinnesorgane. IX. 206-220. Oct., 1895. The author's discussion is based on a theory of instinct as the first step in volition and as a series of purely physical changes beginning 354 NEW BOOKS. with stimulus and ending with movement, the Spencerian conception of instinct. It is a < closed ' physical ' unity which does not transcend itself so as to contain within itself a teleological moment.' Instinct is the conscious side of the innervation which we finally regard as an act. Fear, e. g., is nothing other than the feeling of the beginning of the flight movement. The theory reduces will to a mere psychic accompaniment (Mit- klingen) of a closed physical series which issues ultimately in move- ment or actions. In consciousness, the act seems to follow the will, but in reality, the feeling of having willed follows and results from the act. An apparent contradiction arises in cases of volitions which do not result in immediate action, as in willing to be rich. The author answers that as a child cannot desire anything without immediately acting out the desire, therefore this apparent case of will without ac- companying action is ' a secondary and complex psychological pro- duct ' which represents no elementary function, but must be explained by a synthesis of simpler deeper lying processes. Complicated psychic states bring with them a large number of sympathetic innervation-sen- sations to which the volition-tones of such reflections as the will to be rich is probably due. But the author does not seem to see that every act of accommoda- tion contradicts this theory, the only principle of which is habit. Adaptations, if they ever occurred on such a basis would be purely accidental. The small beginnings of assimilative processes seen in the child's recognition of the meaning of objects resembling those with which it is more familiar — processes going on at the same time that the child must act out every desire — would be impossible on this theory except as happy accidents. The theory has the defects of a materialistic and mechanical conception of the will. LEIPZIG. GUY TAWNEY. NEW BOOKS. The Primary Factors of Organic Evolution. E. D. COPE. Chi- cago and London, The Open Court Pub. Co., 1896. Pp. xvi-f 547. Outlines of Logic and Metaphysics. JOHANN EDUARD ERDMANN. Translated by B. C. Burt. London, Swan, Sonnenschein & Co. ; New York, Macmillan & Co. 1896. Pp. xviii + 253. The Philosophy of T. H. Green. W. H. FAIRBROTHER. London, Methuen & Co. ; New York, Macmillan & Co. 1896. Pp. vi+ 187. NOTES. 355 Pear. ANGELO Mosso. Translated by E. Lough and F. Kiesow. London and New York, Longmans, Green & Co. 1896. Pp. 278. The Theory of Knowledge. L. T. HOBHOUSE. London, Meth- uen & Co. ; New York, Macmillan & Co. 1896. xx-f 622. Grundriss der Psychologic. W. WUNDT. Leipzig, Engelmann. Pp. 392. NOTES. WE have received the first number of the first volume of a new psychological Archiv, to be entitled Beitrdge zur Psychologie und Philosophic, and edited by Prof. Gotz Martius, of the University of Bonn. Numbers will appear at irregular intervals, and can be ob- tained separately. In an introduction the editor explains the philo- sophical standpoint to be represented by this publication ; it is, in brief, that the connection between mind and matter is neither that of com- plete independence in connection with a preestablished harmony, nor that of simple dependence of either upon the other, but something far more complicated than this — something upon which there is always hope that light may be thrown by the results of experimental psy- chology. The four papers which compose this number are all on brightness (Helligkeit) . We shall notice them in a future number of this REVIEW. THE fourth International Congress of Criminal Anthropology will be held at Geneva, August 25-29, 1896. Applications for member- ship should be sent to M. Maurice Bedot, Muse"e d'histoire naturelle, Geneva, Switzerland. The time and place are convenient for those who attend the Psychological Congress at Munich, August 4-7, and the published program is of great interest to psychologists. A MARBLE bust in memory of the philosopher Luigi Ferri was placed on March i6th, the first anniversary of his death, in the hall of the University of Rome, where Ferri taught for twenty-four years. For this memorial about $200 had been collected by subscription. PROFESSOR W. WUNDT has been elected a foreign associate and M. J. Lachelier a member of the Paris Institut (Academy of Moral and Political Sciences). THE provisional program of the International Congress of Pyschol- ogy, to be held at Munich from the 4th to the 7th of August, announces 102 papers, and others will be announced later. 35 6 NOTES. A SECTION of the new New York Academy of Sciences has been formed devoted to psychology, anthropology and philology. The first meeting was held on April 27th, and meetings will be held on the fourth Monday in the month during the Academic year. An Anthro- pological Club for informal discussion was formed in New York on March 4th. At this meeting the recent works on children and child psychology by Sully, Baldwin and Chamberlain were discussed. PROF. WUNDT'S Grundriss der Psychologie is being translated into English by Mr. C. H. Judd, and Prof. Baldwin's Mental De- velopment of the Child and the Race is being translated into Ger- man by Dr. Kiesow and into French by Prof. E. Nourry. FELIX ALCAN announces as in press La psychologie des sentiments by Prof. Ribot and Les type intellectuels by Prof. Paulhan. THE number of the Z,eitschrift fur Psychologie, etc. , issued on Jan. n, contains an index of psychological literature for 1894. The list contains 1,504 titles and is very complete, especially with regard to publications on the senses. PROF. E. B. DELABARRE, of Brown University, has been ap- pointed director of the psychological laboratory of Harvard Uni- versity for next year during the absence of Prof. Miinsterberg. In the same University James Edwin Lough, A. M., has been appointed in- structor in experimental psychology and C. M. Bakewell, A. M., instructor in psychology. DR. MARK WENLEY, recently examiner in philosophy in the Uni- versity of Glasgow and lecturer at the Queen Margaret College, has been appointed professor of philosophy in the University of Michigan. PROF. JAMES SETH, of Brown University, has been elected profes- sor of ethics in Cornell University. EDGAR A. SINGER, JR., has been appointed to a senior fellow- ship in the University of Pennsylvania, under the George L. Harrison Foundation. MR. S. I. FRANZ AND MR. L. B. McWnooD have been ap- pointed fellows in psychology in Columbia University. A COURSE in experimental psychology will be given at Bryn Mawr College by Prof. Lightner Witmer, of the University of Pennsylvania. IT is announced that Prof. Ladd, of Yale University, and Prof. Earl Barnes, of Stanford University, will lecture at the University of Chicago during the summer term. VOL. III. No. 4. JULY, 1896. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. THE REFLEX ARC CONCEPT IN PSYCHOLOGY. BY PROFESSOR JOHN DEWEY, University of Chicago. That the greater demand for a unifying principle and con- trolling working hypothesis in psychology should come at just the time when all generalizations and classifications are most questioned and questionable is natural enough. It is the very cumulation of discrete facts creating the demand for unification that also breaks down previous lines of classification. The ma- terial is too great in mass and too varied in style to fit into existing pigeon-holes, and the cabinets of science break of their own dead weight. The idea of the reflex arc has upon the whole come nearer to meeting this demand for a general working hypothesis than any other single concept. It being admitted that the sensori-motor apparatus represents both the unit of nerve structure and the type of nerve function, the image of this relationship passed over into psychology, and became an or- ganizing principle to hold together the multiplicity of fact. In criticising this conception it is not intended to make a plea for the principles of explanation and classification which the re- flex arc idea has replaced ; but, on the contrary, to urge that they are not sufficiently displaced, and that in the idea of the sensori-motor circuit, conceptions of the nature of sensation and of action derived from the nominally displaced psychology are still in control. The older dualism between sensation and idea is repeated in the current dualism of peripheral and central structures and functions ; the older dualism of body and soul finds a distinct 35§ JOHN DEWEY. echo in the current dualism of stimulus and response. Instead of interpreting the character of sensation, idea and action from their place and function in the sensori-motor circuit, we still in- cline to interpret the latter from our preconceived and preform- ulated ideas of rigid distinctions between sensations, thoughts and acts. The sensory stimulus is one thing, the central ac- tivity, standing for the idea, is another thing, and the motor dis- charge, standing for the act proper, is a third. As a result, the reflex arc is not a comprehensive, or organic unity, but a patch- work of disjointed parts, a mechanical conjunction of unallied processes. What is needed is that the principle underlying the idea of the reflex arc as the fundamental psychical unity shall react into and determine the values of its constitutive factors. More specifically, what is wanted is that sensory stimulus, central connections and motor responses shall be viewed, not as separate and complete entities in themselves, but as divisions of labor, functioning factors, within the single concrete whole, now designated the reflex arc. -__ What is the reality so designated? What shall we term that which is not sensation-followed-by-idea-followed-by-movement, but which is primary ; which is, as it were, the psychical organ- ism of which sensation, idea and movement are the chief or- gans? Stated on the physiological side, this reality may most conveniently be termed coordination. This is the essence of the facts hold together by and subsumed under the reflex arc con- cept. /Let us take, for our example, the familiar child-candle instance. (James, Psychology, Vol. I, p. 25.) The ordinary in- terpretation would say the sensation of light is a stimulus to the grasping as a response, the burn resulting is a stimulus to with- drawing the hand as response and so on. There is, of course, no doubt that is a rough practical way of representing the process. But when we ask for its psychological adequacy, the case is quite different. Upon analysis, we find that we begin not with a sensory stimulus, but with a sensori-motor coordination, the optical-ocular, and that in a certain sense it is the movement which is primary, and the sensation which is secondary, the movement of body, head and eye muscles determining the quality of what is experienced. / In other words, the real beginning is THE REFLEX ARC CONCEPT. 359 with the act of seeing; it is looking, and not a sensation of light. The sensory quale gives the value of the act, just as the movement furnishes its mechanism and control, but both sensa- tion and movement lie inside, not outside the act. Now if /this act, the seeing/ stimulates another act, the reaching, it is because both of mese acts fall within a larger coordination ; because seeing and grasping have been so often bound together to reinforce each other, to help each other out, that each may be considered practically a subordinate member of a bigger coordination. More specifically, the ability of the hand to do its work will depend, either directly or indirectly, upon its control, as well as its stimulation, by the act of vision. If the sight did not inhibit as well as excite the reaching, the latter would be purely indeterminate, it would be for anything or nothing, not for the particular object seen. The reaching, in turn, must both stimulate and control the seeing. The eye must be kept upon the candle if the arm is to do its work ; let it wander and the arm takes up another task. In other words, we now have an enlarged and transformed coordination ; the act is seeing no less than before, but it is now seeing-for- reaching purposes. There is still a sensori-motor circuit, one with more content or value, not a substitution of a motor response for a sensory stimulus.1 Now take the affairs at its next stage, that in which the child gets burned. It is hardly necessary to point out again that this is also a sensori-motor coordination and not a mere sen- sation. It is worth while, however, to note especially the fact that it is simply the completion, or fulfillment, of the previous eye-arm-hand coordination and not an entirely new occurrence. Only because the heat-pain quale enters into the same circuit of experience with the optical-ocular and muscular quales, does the child learn from the experience and get the ability to avoid the experience in the future. More technically stated, the so-called response is not merely to the stimulus ; it is into it. The burn is the original seeing, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW for May, 1896, p. 253, for an excellent statement and illustration, by Messrs. Angell and Moore, of this mutuality of stimulation. 360 JOHN DEWEY. the original optical-ocular experience enlarged and transformed in its value. It is no longer mere seeing ; it is seeing-of-a light-that-means-pain-when-contact-occurs. The ordinary re- flex arc theory proceeds upon the more or less tacit assumption that the outcome of the response is a totally new experience ; that it is, say, the substitution of a burn sensation for a light sensation through the intervention of motion. The fact is that the sole meaning of the intervening movement is to maintain, reinforce or transform (as the case may be) the original quale ; that we do not have the replacing of one sort of experience by another, but the development (or as it seems convenient to term it) the mediation of an experience. The seeing, in a word, remains to control the reaching, and is, in turn, inter- preted by the burning.1 The discusssion up to this point may be summarized by__say^ jng that the reflex arc idea, as commonly employed, is defec- tive in that it assumes sensory stimulus and motor response as_ distinct psychical existences, while in realiiy they are always inside a coordination and have their significance purely from, the part played in maintaining nr rer.nnptii-nti.npr the coordination ; and (secondly) in assuming that the quale of experience which precedes the * motor ' phase and that which succeeds it are two different states, instead of the last being always the first reconstituted, the motor phase coming in only for the sake of such mediation. The result is that the reflex arc idea leaves us with a disjointed psychology, whether viewed from the standpoint of development in the individual or in the race, or from that of the analysis of the mature consciousness. As to the former, in its failure to see that the arc of which it talks is virtually a circuit, a continual reconstitution, it breaks continuity and leaves us nothing but a series of jerks, the origin of each jerk to be sought outside the process of experience itself, in either an external pressure of * environment,' or else in an unaccount- able spontaneous variation from within the * soul ' or the ' or- ganism.'2 As to the latter, failing to see the -tmity-o-f activity, 1See, for a further statement of mediation, my Syllabus of Ethics, p. 15. 2 It is not too much to say that the whole controversy in biology regarding the source of variation, represented by Weismann and Spencer respectively THE REFLEX ARC CONCEPT. 361 no matter how much it may prate of unity, it still leaves us with sensation or peripheral stimulus ; idea, or central process (the equivalent of attention) ; and motor response, or act, as three disconnected existences, having to be somehow adjusted to each other, whether through the intervention of an extra- experimental soul, or by mechanical push and pull. Before proceeding to a consideration of the general meaning for psychology of the summary, it may be well to give another descriptive analysis, as the value of the statement depends en- tirely upon the universality of its range of application. For such an instance we may conveniently take Baldwin's analysis of the reactive consciousness. In this there are, he says (Feel- ing and Will, p. 60), "three elements corresponding to the three elements of the nervous arc. First, the receiving con- sciousness, the stimulus — say a loud, unexpected sound ; second, the attention involuntarily drawn, the registering element ; and, third, the muscular reaction following upon the sound — say flight from fancied danger." Now, in the first place, such an analysis is incomplete ; it ignores the status prior to hearing the sound. Of course, if this status is irrelevant to what happens afterwards, such ignoring is quite legitimate. But is it irrele- vant either to the quantity or the quality of the stimulus? / If one is reading a book, if one is hunting, if one is watch- ing in a dark place on a lonely night, if one is performing a chemical experiment, in each case, the noise has a very different psychical value ; it is a different experience. In any case, what proceeds/ the * stimulus ' is a whole act, a sensori-motor coordi- nation. /What is more to the point, the * stimulus' emerges out of mis coordination ; it is born from it as its matrix ; it rep- resents as it were an escape from it. I might here fall back upon authority, and refer to the widely accepted sensation con- tinuum theory, according to which the sound cannot be abso- lutely ex abru-pto from the outside, but is simply a shifting arises from beginning with stimulus or response instead of with the coSrdina- tion with reference to which stimulus and response are functional divisions of labor. The same may be said, on the psychological side, of the controversy between the Wundtian ' apperceptionists ' and their opponents. Each has a disjectum membrum of the same organic whole, whichever is selected being an arbitrary matter of personal taste. 362 JOHN DEWEY. of focus of emphasis, a redistribution of tensions within the former act; and declare that unless the sound activity had been present to some extent in the prior coordination, it would be impossible for it now to come to prominence in conscious- ness. And such a reference would be only an amplification of what has already been said concerning the way in which the prior activity influences the value of the sound sensation. Or, we might point to cases of hypnotism, mono-ideaism and ab- sent-mindedness, like that of Archimedes, as evidences that if the previous coordination is such as rigidly to lock the door, the auditory disturbance will knock in vain for admission to con- sciousness. Or, to speak more truly in the metaphor, the audi- tory activity must already have one foot over the threshold, if it is ever to gain admittance. But it will be more satisfactory, probably, to refer to the biological side of the case, and point out that as the ear activity has been evolved on account of the advantage gained by the whole organism, it must stand in the strictest histological and physiological connection with the eye, or hand, or leg, or what- ever other organ has been the overt center of action. It is ab- solutely impossible to think of the eye center as monopolizing consciousness and the ear apparatus as wholly quiescent. What happens is a certain relative prominence and subsidence as between the various organs which maintain the organic equilibrium. Furthermore, the sound is not a mere stimulus, or mere sensation ; it again is an act, that of hearing. The muscular response is involved in this as well as sensory stimulus ; that is, there is a certain definite set of the motor apparatus in- volved in hearing just as much as there is in subsequent run- ning away. The movement and posture of the head, the ten- sion of the ear muscles, are required for the * reception ' of the sound. It is just as true to say that the sensation of sound arises from a motor response as that the running away is a re- sponse to the sound. This may be brought out by reference to the fact that Professor Baldwin, in the passage quoted, has inverted the real order as between his first and second elements. We do not have first a sound and then activity THE REFLEX ARC CONCEPT. 363 of attention, unless sound is taken as mere nervous shock or physical event, not as conscious value. The conscious sen- sation of sound depends upon the motor response having already taken place ; or, in terms of the previous statement (if stimulus is used as a conscious fact, and not as a mere physical event) it is the motor response or attention which constitutes that, which finally becomes the stimulus to another act. Once more, the final ' element,' the running away, is not merely motor, but is sensori-motor, having its sensory value and its muscular mechanism. It is also a coordination. And, finally, this sensori-motor coordination is not a new act, supervening upon what preceded. Just as the * response ' is necessary to constitute the stimulus, to determine it as sound and as this kind of sound, of wild beast or robber, so the sound experience must persist as a value in the running, to keep it up, to control it. The motor reaction involved in the running is, once more, into, not merely to, the sound. It occurs to change the sound, to get rid of it. The resulting quale, whatever it may be, has its meaning wholly determined by reference to the hearing of the sound. It is that experience mediated.1 What we have is a circuit, not an arc or broken segment of a circle. This circuit is more truly termed organic than reflex, because the motor response determines the stimulus, just as truly as sensory stimulus determines movement. Indeed, the movement is only for the sake of determining the stimulus, of fixing what kind of a stimulus it is, of interpreting it. I hope it will not appear that I am introducing needless re finements and distinctions into what, it may be urged, is after all an undoubted fact, that movement as response follows sensa- tion as stimulus. It is not a question of making the account of the process more complicated, though it is always wise to be- 1In other words, every reaction is of the same type as that which Professor Baldwin ascribes to imitation alone, viz., circular. Imitation is simply that particular form of the circuit in which the 'response' lends itself to compara- tively unchanged maintainance of the prior experience. I say comparatively unchanged, for as far as this maintainance means additional control over the experience, it is being psychically changed, becoming more distinct. It is safe to suppose, moreover, that the ' repetition ' is kept up only so long as this growth or mediation goes on. There is the new-in-the-old, if it is only the new sense of power. 364 JOHN DEWEY. ware of that false simplicity which is reached by leaving out of account a large part of the problem. It is a question of finding out what stimulus or sensation, what movement and response mean ; a question of seeing that they mean distinc- tions of flexible function only, not of fixed existence ; that one and the same occurrence plays either or both parts, according to the shift of interest ; and that because of this functional distinc- tion and relationship, the supposed problem of the adjustment of one to the other, whether by superior force in the stimulus or an agency ad hoc in the center or the soul, is a purely self- created problem. We may see the disjointed character of the present theory, by calling to mind that it is impossible to apply the phrase * sensori-motor ' to the occurrence as a simple phrase of descrip- tion ; it has validity only as a term of interpretation, only, that is, as defining various functions exercised. In terms of descrip- tion, the whole process may be sensory or it may be motor, but it cannot be sensori-motor. / The * stimulus,' the excitation of the nerve ending and of the sensory nerve, the central change, are just as much, or just as little, motion as the events taking place in the motor nerve and the muscles. It is one uninter- rupted, continuous redistribution of mass in motion. /And there is nothing in the process, from the standpoint of description, which entitles us to call this reflex. It is redistribution pure and simple ; as much so as the burning of a log, or the falling of a house or the movement of the wind. In the physical process, as physical, there is nothing which can be set off as stimulus, nothing which reacts, nothing which is response. There is just a change in the system of tensions. The same sort of thing is true when we describe the process purely from the psychical side. It is now all sensation, all sen- sory quale ; the motion, as psychically described, is just as much sensation as is sound or light or burn. Take the withdrawing of the hand from the candle flame as example. What we have is a certain visual-heat-pain-muscular-quale, transformed into another visual-touch-muscular-quale — the flame now being vis- ible only at a distance, or not at all, the touch sensation being altered, etc. If we symbolize the original visual quale by v, THE REFLEX ARC CONCEPT. 365 the temperature by h, the accompanying muscular sensation by m, the whole experience may be stated as \\im-v\un-vhm' ; m being the quale of withdrawing, m1 the sense of the status after the withdrawal. The motion is not a certain kind of existence ; it is a sort of sensory experience interpreted, just as is candle flame, or burn from candle flame. All are on a par. But, in spite of all this, it will be urged, there is a distinction between stimulus and response, between sensation and motion. Precisely ; but we ought now to be in a condition to ask of what nature is the distinction, instead of taking it for granted as a dis- tinction somehow lying in the existence of the facts themselves. We ought to be able to see that the ordinary conception of the reflex arc theory, instead of being a case of plain science, is a survival of the metaphysical dualism, first formulated by Plato, according to which the sensation is an ambiguous dweller on the border land of soul and body, the idea (or central process) is purely psychical, and the act (or movement) purely physical. Thus the reflex arc formulation is neither physical (or physi- ological) nor psychological ; it is a mixed materialistic-spiritu- alistic assumption. If the previous descriptive analysis has made obvious the need of a reconsideration of the reflex arc idea, of the nest of difficulties and assumptions in the apparently simple statement, it is now time to undertake an explanatory analysis. The fact is that stimulus and reponse are not distinctions of existence, but teleological distinctions, that is, distinctions of function, or part played, with reference to reaching or maintaining an end. With respect to this teleological process, two stages should be discriminated, as their confusion is one cause of the confusion attending the whole matter. In one case, the relation repre- sents an organization of means with reference to a comprehen- sive end. It represents an accomplished adaptation. Such is the case in all well developed instincts, as when we say that the contact of eggs is a stimulus to the hen to set ; or the sight of corn a stimulus to pick ; such also is the case with all thor- oughly formed habits, as when the contact with the floor stimu- lates walking. In these instances there is no question of con- sciousness of stimulus as stimulus, of response as response. 366 JOHN DEWEY. There is simply a continuously ordered sequence of acts, all adapted in themselves and in the order of their sequence, to reach a certain objective end, the reproduction of the species, the preservation of life, locomotion to a certain place. The end has got thoroughly organized into the means. In calling one stimulus, another response we mean nothing more than that such an orderly sequence of acts is taking place. The same sort of statement might be made equally well with reference to the succession of changes in a plant, so far as these are con- sidered with reference to their adaptation to, say, producing seed. It is equally applicable to the series of events in the cir- culation of the blood, or the sequence of acts occurring in a self-binding reaper.1 Regarding such cases of organization viewed as already at- tained, we may say, positively, that it is only the assumed com- mon reference to an inclusive end which marks each member off as stimulus and response, that apart from such reference we have only antecedent and consequent ;2 in other words, the dis- tinction is one of interpretation. Negatively, it must be pointed out that it is not legitimate to carry over, without change, exactly the same order of considerations to cases where it is a question of conscious stimulation and response. We may, in the above case, regard, if we please, stimulus and response each as an entire act, having an individuality of its own, subject even here to the qualification that individuality means not an entirely in- dependent whole, but a division of labor as regards maintaining or reaching an end. But in any case, it is an act, a sensori- motor coordination, which stimulates the response, itself in turn sensori-motor, not a sensation which stimulates a movement. Hence the illegitimacy of identifying, as is so often done, such cases of organized instincts or habits with the so-called reflex arc, or of transferring, without modification, considerations JTo avoid misapprehension, I would say that I am not raising the question as to how far this teleology is real in any one of these cases ; real or unreal, my point holds equally well. It is only when we regard the sequence of acts as tfthey were adapted to reach some end that it occurs to us to speak of one as stimulus and the other as response. Otherwise, we look at them as a mere series. 2Whether, even in such a determination, there is still not a reference of a more latent kind to an end is, of course, left open. THE REFLEX ARC CONCEPT. 367 valid of this serial coordination of acts to the sensation-move- ment case. The fallacy that arises when this is done is virtually the psychological or historical fallacy. A set of considerations which hold good only because of a completed process, is read into the content of the process which conditions this completed result. A state of things characterizing an outcome is re- garded as a true description of the events which led up to this outcome ; when, as a matter of fact, if this outcome had already been in existence, there would have been no necessity for the process. Or, to make the application to the case in hand, con- siderations valid of an attained organization or coordination, the orderly sequence of minor acts in a comprehensive coordination, are used to describe a process, viz., the distinction of mere sensa- tion as stimulus and of mere movement as response, which takes place only because such an attained organization is no longer at hand, but is in process of constitution. Neither mere sensation, nor mere movement, can ever be either stimulus or response ; only an act can be that ; the sensation as stimulus means the lack of and search for such an objective stimulus, or orderly plac- ing of an act ; just as mere movement as response means the lack of and search for the right act to complete a given coordination. A recurrence to our example will make these formulas clearer, As long as the seeing is an unbroken act, which is as experienced no more mere sensation than it is mere motion (though the on- looker or psychological observer can interpret it into sensation and movement) , it is in no sense the sensation which stimulates the reaching ; we have, as already sufficiently indicated, only the serial steps in a coordination of acts. But now take a child who, upon reaching for bright light (that is, exercising the see- ing-reaching coordination) has sometimes had a delightful exer- cise, sometimes found something good to eat and sometimes burned himself. Now the response is not only uncertain, but the stimulus is equally uncertain ; one is uncertain only in so far as the other is. The real problem may be equally well stated as either to discover the right stimulus, to constitute the stimulus, or to discover, to constitute, the response. The question of whether to reach or to abstain from reaching is the question what 368 JOHN DEWEY. sort of a bright light have we here ? Is it the one which means playing with one's hands, eating milk, or burning one's fingers? The stimulus must be constituted for the response to occur. Now it is at precisely this juncture and because of it that the dis- tinction of sensation as stimulus and motion as response arises. The sensation or conscious stimulus is not a thing or exist- I ence by itself ; it is that phase of a coordination requiring atten- tion because, by reason of the conflict within the coordination, it is uncertain how to complete it. It is to doubt as to the next act, whether to reach or no, which gives the motive to exami- ning the act. The end to follow is, in this sense, the stimulus. It furnishes the motivation to attend to what has just taken place ; to define it more carefully. From this point of view the dis- covery of the stimulus is the ' response ' to possible movement as « stimulus.' We must have an anticipatory sensation, an image, of the movements that may occur, together with their respective values, before attention will go to the seeing to break it up as a sensation of light, and of light of this particular kind. It is the initiated activities of reaching, which, inhibited by the conflict in the coordination, turn round, as it were, upon the seeing, and hold it from passing over into further act until its quality is de- termined. Just here the act as objective stimulus becomes trans- formed into sensation as possible, as conscious, stimulus. Just here also, motion as conscious response emerges. In other words, sensation as stimulus does not mean any par- ticular psychical existence. It means simply a function, and will have its value shift according to the special work requiring to be done. At one moment the various activities of reaching and withdrawing will be the sensation, because they are that phase of activity which sets the problem, or creates the demand for, the next act. At the next moment the previous act of seeing will furnish the sensation, being, in turn, that phase of activity which sets the pace upon which depends further action. /Generalized, sensation as stimulus, is always that phase of . j activity requiring to be defined in order that a coordination may \ be completed. What the sensation will be in particular at a given time, therefore, will depend entirely upon the way in which an activity is being used. It has no fixed quality of its THE REFLEX ARC CONCEPT. 369 own. The search for the stimulus is the search for exact con- ditions of action ; that is, for the state of things which decides how a beginning coordination should be completed. Similarly, motion, as response, has only a functional value. It is whatever will serve to complete the disintegrating coordi- nation. Just as the discovery of the sensation marks the estab- lishing of the problem, so the constitution of the response marks the solution of this problem. At one time, fixing attention, holding the eye fixed, upon the seeing and thus bringing out a certain quale of light is the response, because that is the par- ticular act called for just then ; at another time, the movement of the arm away from the light is the response. There is noth- ing in itself which may be labelled response. That one certain set of sensory quales should be marked off by themselves as * motion ' and put in antithesis to such sensory quales as those of color, sound and contact, as legitimate claimants to the title of sensation, is wholly inexplicable unless we keep the differ- ence of function in view. It is the eye and ear sensations which fix for us the problem ; which report to us the conditions which have to be met if the coordination is to be successfully completed ; and just the moment we need to know about our movements to get an adequate report, just that moment, motion miraculously (from the ordinary standpoint) ceases to be mo- tion and become * muscular sensation. ' On the other hand, take the change in values of experience, the transformation of sensory quales. Whether this change will or will not be inter- preted as movement, whether or not any consciousness of move- ment will arise, will depend upon whether this change is satis- factory, whether or not it is regarded as a harmonious develop- ment of a coordination, or whether the change is regarded as simply a means in solving a problem, an instrument in reaching a more satisfactory coordination. So long as our experience runs smoothly we are no more conscious of motion as motion than we are of this or that color or sound by itself. To sum up : the distinction of sensation and movement as stimulus and response respectively is not a distinction which can be regarded as descriptive of anything which holds of psychical events or existences as such. The only events to which the terms stimulus and response can be descriptively applied are to 37° JOHN DEWEY. minor acts serving by their respective positions to the main- tenance of some organized coordination. The conscious stim- ulus or sensation, and the conscious response or motion, have a special genesis or motivation, and a special end or function. The reflex arc theory, by neglecting, by abstracting from, this genesis and this function gives us one disjointed part of a pro- cess as if it were the whole. It gives us literally an arc, in- stead of the circuit ; and not giving us the circuit of which it is an arc, does not enable us to place, to center, the arc. This arc, again, falls apart into two separate existences having to be either mechanically or externally adjusted to each other. The circle is a coordination, some of whose members have come into conflict with each other. It is the temporary disin- tegration and need of reconstitution which occasions, which af- fords the genesis of, the conscious distinction into sensory stim- ulus on one side and motor response on the other. The stim- ulus is that phase of the forming coordination which represents the conditions which have to be met in bringing it to a successful issue ; the response is that phase of one and the same forming coordination which gives the key to meeting these conditions, which serves as instrument in effecting the successful coordina- tion. T^ey are therefore strictly correlative and contempora- neous./The stimulus is something to be discovered ; to be made out/ if the activity affords its own adequate stimulation, there is no 'stimulus save in the objective sense already referred to. As soon as it is adequately determined, then and then only is the response also complete. To attain either, means that the coor- dination has completed itself. Moreover, it is the motor re- sponse which assists in discovering and constituting the stim- ulus. It is the holding of the movement at a certain stage which creates the sensation, which throws it into relief. It is the coordination which unifies that which the reflex arc concept gives us only in disjointed fragments. It is the circuit within which fall distinctions of stimulus and response as func- tional phases of its own mediation or completion. The point of this story is in its application ; but the application of it to the question of the nature of psychical evolution, to the distinction between sensational and rational consciousness, and the nature of judgment must be deferred to a more favorable opportunity. STUDIES FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORA- TORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. III. THE ORGANIC EFFECTS OF AGREEABLE AND DISAGREE- ABLE STIMULI. BY JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL AND SIMON F. McLENNAN. Amid all the recent discussion upon the significance of the activities of the physical organism under conditions of emo- tional excitement, and in other affective states, there has been an apparent consensus of opinion, that states of consciousness belonging to the two general classes agreeable and disagreeable, are accompanied on the one hand, by conditions of expanded vascularity and heightened muscle tone of the voluntary sys- tem, and on the other hand, by vascular constrictions and de- pressed muscle tone of the voluntary system. The greater emphasis is ordinarily laid upon the vascular alterations and ac- companying disturbances in the involuntary system. The con- fidence in this doctrine rests upon a fairly wide basis of experi- ment, and yet certain restricting corollaries need to be pointed out. The present piece of work, forming part of a broader inquiry into the nature of affective states, can only hope to add a mite to the general store of information upon the topic in hand.1 Nor does it pretend to deal with the more fundamental physiological aspects of the problem still left unsolved. For example, we have no theory to offer, and no conclusive evi- dence to show, whether the fluctuating vascular conditions to be commented upon are due entirely to alterations in the action of the heart, or in part to the vascular system ; nor yet whether the dilators or constrictors of the latter system or both are con- cerned in producing the changes. 1 Many of the points we shall touch upon have already been more or less fully reported, but seldom with any proper emphasis on their connection with one another, which is what we shall dwell on. 371 372 JAMES R. ANGELL AND SIMON F. McLENNAN. Incidentally we may say that the frequency with which alterations of breathing, pulse beat and blood supply occur in conjunction, would point to the probability that the effects are due to no one set of organic processes, but rather to diffused disturbances in several of the higher centers. This diffusion might, of course, be a secondary phenomenon of the nature of a reflex, discharged from a center primarily affected, but the results give no evidence specially suggestive of such a state of things. This general class of considerations, however, appears to us to possess less immediate importance than those which we pro- pose to urge. We desire to emphasize, on the basis of a large number of experiments (we retain as trustworthy over 1,100 of all we have made), conducted under conditions of great care, certain fundamental difficulties connected with this method of investigating affective states. While offering very little that is distinctly new, we purpose to bring into strong relief the dis- crepancies of the method, and to call in question again the exact significance and worth of results attained through its use. Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of our subject, a few words are in order concerning our apparatus, method of work, etc. A modification of Mosso's plethysmograph, hung in a swing, served to give us both the vasomotor disturbances and the pulse beat. The plethysmograph was connected with Marey tam- bours writing on the drum of a Stocking kymograph — a machine which is practically noiseless and exceedingly constant in its running. The hand and arm up to the elbow were immersed in the water of the plethysmograph. The changes in the breathing were registered by means of tambours arranged as a pneumograph. A wooden spur attached to the breast and pres- sing against a tambour permitted us to get the slightest fluctua- tions. We abandoned the use of a cardiograph and sphygmo- graph, upon finding that our other arrangements were going to give us the essential points in which we were interested, at a great saving of labor. The senses of smell, taste, hearing and sight were experimented upon, such stimuli being used as would, supposedly, produce affective states readily distinguish- CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 373 able as agreeable, or disagreeable. For sight stimulations rotating disks were employed; for smell, cologne, bayrum, assafoetida, iodoform and turpentine were used ; for taste, sugar, salt, capsicum and quassia; for sound, (i) noises of various kinds, e. g., rasping, snapping, grinding, (2) tones from mounted tuning forks. The external conditions, atmospheric and otherwise, were kept as constant and favorable as possible. The subjects, with whom most of the work was done, were selected from a considerable number of students, as being those who gave the most unequivocal results. Stated again and a little more narrowly, we were concerned with the interpretation of certain organic disturbances due merely to processes, initiated in the centers, as compared with those due to -peripherally excited affective conditions. We no- ticed very early in the experimentation that the alterations in organic conditions under examination depended, as has been recognized,1 in very large measure upon the thorough processes at that time in progress. It is, of course, impossible to control these entirely, and the difficulty is increased when, as in the present instance, it becomes highly desirable to have the mind as nearly quiescent as possible in order to obtain unmistakable evidence of the alterations due to the various stimuli employed to produce the agreeable and disagreeable states. That is to say, before drowsiness comes on, as it generally does, if the mind is kept quiet for a little, it is often necessary to make con- siderable effort of attention to keep the thought processes from running off into all sorts of vagaries of revery, any portion of which may call up affective disturbances. The mind, if kept * empty,' as we say, is frequently kept so only with strain, and this strain then diverts attention from the incoming stimuli and so complicates the affective conditions, which they are intended to set up. Thus, one gets the not affective state brought on by stimulus, but the affective state modified by and blended with the prevailing mental state, which may itself be already affective, or in any event unfavorable to the unambiguous effectiveness of the stimulus. In this connection we found that by artificially 1 In this general connection may be mentioned Mosso's observations upon attention and cortical circulation. 374 JAMES R. AN G ELL AND SIMON F. McLENNAN. altering the thought processes, regardless of the external stim- uli, organic disturbances could be produced essentially similar, in kind if not degree, to those which occurred under the affective conditions induced by peripheral stimulation. Indeed, were there not experimental evidence for it, one might fairly antici- pate, from the general interconnection of mental and bodily states, that the change in mental processes would, regardless of its affective tones, manifest itself in some change of bodily con- dition. To be still more specific on this head, we find, for instance, that disagreeable stimulations of taste and smell produce inco- ordinated and spasmodic breathing, depressions and irregular- ities of pulse and decrease of blood supply to the periphery — meaning by the periphery not simply the skin, but the total member concerned, in this case the hand and forearm. These conditions become increasingly violent and spasmodic, as the intensity of the stimulation and the lack of expectation in the subject increases. The degree of uniformity in this in- crease we have not attempted to measure accurately. The general fact, has, however, been shown clearly. Moreover, the after effect as revealed in these ways continues for a very considerable time. A reverse condition in the organic pro- cesses manifests itself when agreeable stimuli of moderate in- tensity are employed, with a somewhat important exception to be mentioned later. But now we find these identical motor dis- turbances repeated in the same form, though generally in less degree, when the subject is left to his own meditations, or when he is required to indulge in mental gymnastics, such, for exam- ple, as performing mathematical calculations and this too, quite regardless of any peripheral stimulation. Similar results show themselves when the subject is allowed to read. Often marked changes in the breathing and blood supply — less marked in the pulse — occur when the thought process reveals little or nothing adequate, subjectively considered, to produce the dis- turbance. These fluctuations could, of course be accounted for on purely physiological grounds, as due to changes in the chemical conditions in the blood, brought on by any one of a dozen physical causes directly affecting the centers. But when CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 375 the mind is kept perfectly passive, and especially when the first stages of sleep are coming on, we find, almost without ex- ception, that all these organic processes are quiet and undis- turbed. This fact tends to render it probable that the changes are often, if not always, caused by cortical conditions regarded independently of the mere physical environment. We have already stated that the atmospheric conditions, etc., were kept as constant as possible. It is possible that some of these results are due to what one may call the general mood, which prevails at the time, but this does not militate against our contention. From the standpoint of method then, we must maintain that any attempt to use these particular organic activities as avenues of approach, in the study of delicate affective conditions, appears essentially impossible, at least with any appliances now at hand. And this not because affective conditions are not represented here, but because so many other factors, in no fair sense to be recognized as affective, enter in. In the case of coarser affective states the results of previous investigations are substantially cor- roborated by our own.1 But it is not invariably true that the de- liverances of consciousness and the performance of the organism coincide, e. g. , it does not always occur that a stimulus pronounced agreeable is followed by observable increase of blood supply to the periphery. Indeed, there is considerable difficulty in obtain- ing stimulations of short durations, whose effects, therefore, are at 1 Without furnishing a complete tabulation of our results, which could not, unless accompanied by cuts of the curves, be made very intelligible, we may say, that with stimulations felt as clearly disagreeable, about 90% of all the cases show a fall in the various curves. The percentage of cases of rise in the curves, corresponding to agreeable stimuli, has been considerably smaller. But this is in large measure, no doubt, to be accounted for by the relative weakness of the pleasure tone arising from the stimuli. The difficulty encountered in obtaining stimuli to produce agreeable affective states is mentioned elsewhere in the paper. In cases where the subject reports the stimulus as indifferent, we get both kinds of result, with consequent ambiguity in the significance. It is interesting to note, that in cases where the attention was strongly focused on intellectual activities, such as reading or mental arithmetic, about 25 % of the results show alliance with the agreeable affective states by a slight but continued rise in the curves, while 75 % show a more or less sudden and marked decrease. The disturbances in these processes, due to mere shifting of the attention, have already been somewhat studied abroad. It remains for some- one to work up the significance of these facts for a psycho-physical theory of aesthetics. 376 JAMES R. ANGELL AND SIMON F. McLENNAN. all readily comparable, which possess any considerable strength of pleasure tone. Nor is there any obvious and exact corre- spondence in the degree of the subjectively expressed feeling tone with the amount of the disturbance in the organism. Stimuli to the various senses naturally show the widest differ- ences in the degree which they affect particular ones of these processes, and the subjective effect keeps pace only in a general and often remote way. For example, agreeable and disagree- able odors influence the breathing process in a very pronounced manner. A very faint whiff of ammonia will in a merely reflex way produce considerable disturbance of this character, and yet, it may not be judged so disagreeable as a flickering light, which brings about much less change in these organic processes. So we feel justified in reiterating that the very complex conditions, under which affective states may be and are induced, renders it essentially impossible to employ this means of investigation, when delicate results are sought. In any event the general statement that agreeable states and disagreeable states are ac- companied respectively by increase and decrease in the func- tional activities of the organic processes here considered, requires to be offset with the statement that other mental conditions, be- sides those subjectively recognized as affective, produce similar results, and that the amount of the bodily manifestation does not seem to run exactly parallel with the subjective estimation of the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the conscious state. We mentioned above a minor point of divergence from most observations upon which we should comment. It is this, not infrequently it happens that a stimulus felt to be pleasurable, pro- duces for a few seconds a decrease in the blood supply to the periphery and then a subsequent increase. So far as we could determine, this was in no sense due to the intensity of the stimu- lation, for then we should with relatively intense stimuli obtain subjective conditions, in which the agreeableness was question- able, but rather to a condition psychologically equivalent to shock or surprise, and springing in the case of our experiments from even the slightest maladjustment of expectation. This was by no means of sufficient intensity always to excite notice on the part of the subject, but it tends to lend new and striking testi- CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 377 mony to the intimate connection of attraction with affective conditions. For, stated again and more concisely, we have here a case of an agreeable stimulus producing the character- istic external manifestations of a disagreeable stimulus, not because the existing mood, or affective state, is unpropitious, for both these may be neutral, but simply because the adjust- ment of the attention is not perfect. This peculiarity was especially marked in the case of the tuning-fork stimulations. We had supposed these would in most cases be felt as agree- able. But this was far from being always the case when at all loud, or long continued, or unexpected, they became distinctly disagreeable. In conclusion, we may be permitted, perhaps, to insist that out of the purely negative considerations, which we have been urging, certain equally positive inferences are to be drawn. We believe that the results traversed in what we have said lend striking confirmation to the essential solidarity of consciousness, and to the utter futility of attempting to attack the problem of the peculiarities of any one aspect, without due regard to all the others involved. Affective states as such do manifest certain fairly constant and experimentally demonstrable motor expres- sions, but the same motor expressions are also characteristic of other conscious states, not recognizable as predominantly affec- tive ; nor do the bodily manifestations of these affective states run absolutely parallel with the latter. Observable changes in the one do not always betoken observable changes in the other. The impossibility of asserting in any particular case the relative significance of the bodily modifications for the affective state on the one hand, and the merely intellective, or cognitive, state on the other, renders it exceedingly problematic how one is to in- terpret results gained from this method. It is greatly to be hoped, however, that we may have a really careful test made on the intensive side of the exact relation obtaining between the amount of the bodily manifestation, and the subjective estimate of the degree of the agreeableness or disagreeableness felt. 37§ AMY TANNER AND KATE ANDERSON. IV. SIMULTANEOUS SENSE STIMULATIONS. PRACTICE STUDY.1 BY AMY TANNER AND KATE ANDERSON. The published work of Urbantschitsch,2 who has apparently made the most extended examination of the phenomena under consideration, contains no account of apparatus and but little of his method of procedure. The present study has been carried on with special reference to the peculiar effects produced upon attention and the interpretation of the same. In general, we find confirmation of Urbantschitsch's reported observations, but the wide divergences shown by his different subjects, and by the same subjects under different conditions, together with his apparent disregard of the effects of attention, render it probable that much of his report is untrustworthy and that more careful experimentation would give less equivocal results. We have confined ourselves to the partial interaction of auditory, visual and electrically stimulated tactual-muscular sensations, whereas Urbantschitsch examined the effects of the stimulation of each sense upon all the others. Stated in terms of attention, the problem is this : When at- tention is focused upon a barely perceptible sensation, does the addition of another sensation render the first more or less per- ceptible? Or, in another form — is the threshold for any sensa- tion raised or lowered by the presence of another sensation ? The same question can, of course, be put from the purely physiological side. Is the functional activity of any sense or- gan conditioned by the activity of any other? Is the inertia of the central nervous tracts connected with any sense organ affected by excitation in other sensory regions ? The question is, however, essentially psycho-physical, and no solution which neglects this truth can really do justice to all the facts. 1 In accordance with the usage of the laboratory in which their work has been done, the authors, in connection with an introductory course, began this study in a field already worked, in part for merely disciplinary purposes, in part to determine how adequately and carefully the previous investigations had been conducted. 2 Pflugers Archiv., 1888. CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 379 We find that in a large majority of cases, visual sensations just below or just at the threshold are, upon the introduction of a second sensation from either the same or another sense organ, brought clearly above the threshold. We find that in some considerable number of cases the mere enlargement of the field of attention results in a brightening of the center of the field. Upon this point Ladd1 states : " Distraction of attention, if the aggregate of psychic energy be not increased, necessarily fol- lows upon the introduction of any such new factor or object." If this statement be true, we must, on the basis of such results as are here offered, assert that the sum total of psychic energy is increased, ordinarily, if not invariably, when a new stimulus is given. Such a conception is certainly not current in our text-book treatments of sensation. If we make sharply the distinction between the content of attention and the attentive activity itself, and also the distinc- tion between attending to a clear sensation, and clearly or in- tensely attending to a sensation, then our results compel us to revise the old statement that the more things we attend to simultaneously the less clearly do we perceive any one, and to say that, when attention is directed to a content presented to any one sense, the simultaneous stimulation of other senses may enlarge and render more clear the field of the first sense, though we cannot speak with entire confidence as to whether or not the activity of the attention in this direction is or is not increased. In merely neural terms the results seem to mean that the nervous system represents at any moment a certain amount of inertia ; that this is attacked by every sense stimulation, and that the inertia of any region, such as that represented by the visual tracts, may be in part so overcome by disturbance from other regions, that nervous impulses otherwise ineffective may successfully penetrate to their appropriate cortical centers and there set up the processes which parallel consciousness. This result probably extends in some cases to the sense organs themselves. A portion of our experiments comes under this lat- ter head. Such are the answers to our original inquiries when expressed in both psychical and physiological terms. 1 Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, p. 72- 380 AMY TANNER AND KATE ANDERSON. The tests here reported were made during the spring and fall of 1895. Three months were occupied in perfecting appa- ratus and making preliminary experiments. The present re- port refers to six weeks of work done under the improved con- ditions. Our apparatus consisted of three tubes — light-tight, black- ened inside, and sliding into each other. At one end was a perforated pasteboard slide arranged so that the light from col- ored glasses could be seen through the perforations. The light was daylight, reflected from a white pasteboard in front of the slide, and the glasses used were red, yellow, green and blue. The auditory stimuli were given by tuning-forks of 256 v. and 2048 v., and also by the whirring noise of the vibrator on a DuBois Reymond coil. The intensity of the tones of the forks was controlled by a ball pendulum which was employed to strike them. Electrical stimuli from the coil were used to stimulate the skin of the palms. The added visual stimuli were colors of the same size as those first exposed. This case, of course, introduces the question of merely retinal peculiarities as distinguished from central effects. In the cases here reported the intensities of the stimuli were kept constant. In passing we may say that from other tests we incline to think, in opposition to Urbantschitsch, that the observable changes due to altera- tions of intensity are, except near the upper and lower limits, of relatively small significance. The experiments were carried on in a quiet room in which experimenter and subject were alone. The subject sat at the open end of the tube with his face supported by a head-rest, and his head and shoulders covered by a camera cloth so that he was in total darkness and could see none of the operator's movements. We used only the right eye in our experiments, and in order to cover the left, and yet not strain it, the subject wore spectacles in which the right glass was removed and the left covered with black felt. In order to obtain good conditions each subject was used only twenty minutes a day, and in case of unusual fatigue, cold, etc., was not used at all. Every precaution was observed CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 381 to prevent the subjects from knowing either the purpose or results of the tests. In working for such purposes, with sen- sations near the thresholds this is indispensable to accuracy. The method of procedure was as follows : At the outset of the experimentation the color thresholds for the various sub- jects were determined by means of the sliding tubes. After a brief pause, some one of the colors was shown, either at or just below the threshold. Then the second stimulus was given and the effect on the color reported. The length of time con- sumed by the various parts of the test was kept fairly constant, save that occasionally a little longer time than usual was allowed for the giving of the second stimulus, in order to be sure the changes were not due to pulses of attention, which so certainly figure in the report of Urb ants chits ch. The greater constancy of our own results also argue in favor of this con- clusion. TABLE I.* ADDED STIMULUS. — 2048 v. fork. ADDED STIMULUS. 256 v. fork. CONTINUED STIMULI. j CONTINUED STIMULI . 05 1 3 reen. -6 t ,0 3 G . * > M O tf >< w 0 rt Faintly perceived Unperceived. H 5 32 28 H 38 17 112 55 H i 30 II 18 8 45 107 •n Wrongly perceived. Color brought out or intensified Unchanged. 41 49 ii 9 56 4 18 56 4 5 57 4 73 218 22 45 5l 19 53 7 34 9 2 56 4 IOO 212 28 * In all these tables the number of subjects is three ; and twenty tests were made with each of the subjects with each of the continued stimuli. 382 AMY TANNER AND KATE ANDERSON. TABLE II. ADDED STIMULUS — RED. ADDED STIMULUS — YELLOW. CONTINUED STIMULI. . CONTINUED STIMULI. to ^ 3 £ Er d O d o *« i 8 H | 1 -d H > m O M 0 ti Faintly perceived. Unperceived. Ts 29 30 45 12 "5 60 15 45 39 21 28 22 88 Wrongly perceived. Color brought out or intensified Unchanged. i 546 51 9 3 5 150 21 o 0 59 i 10 49 ii 10 150 30 ADDED STIMULUS — BLUE. ADDED STIMULUS — GREEN. CONTINUED STIMULI. to CONTINUED STIMULI. to . 3 13 C |? o p Q i CD ^ H & o !* * m ^ Faintly perceived. i3 «s 41 69 17 9 47 73 Unperceived. 33 44 18 W 42 9 1 02 Wrongly perceived. Color brought out or intensified Unchanged. i i 47 13 i 36 24 16 125 55 12 o 48 12 4 47 13 5 H3 37 TABLE III. ADDED STIMULUS. — ELECTRICITY. CONTINUED STIMULI. to CONTINUED STIMULI. to 1 U M 0 M Faintly perceived. Unperceived. 27 9 20 2 34 18 30 56 92 58 i 21 6 17 24 30 J4 108 4^ Wrongly perceived. Color brought out or intensified Unchanged. 25 27 33 3i 23 37 24 a 12 26 34 92 JIO 130 20 25 35 32 21 39 19 27 33 16 22 38 87 95 H5 ADDED STIMULUS. — NOISE. CHICAGO PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 383 TABLE IV. — RESULTS. Color Number of tests. Faintly per- ceived. Unper- ceived. Wrongly perceived. brought out or Color unaffected. intensified. 1680 722 570 388 1212 468 From the above experiments we see that 72+ per cent, of the whole number gave positive results ; with the 2048 fork, 90 per cent. ; with the 256, 88 per cent. ; with red, 88 per cent. ; with yellow, 83 per cent. ; with green, 80 per cent. ; with blue, 70 per cent. ; with electricity, 46 per cent. ; with noise, 40 per cent. The fact that only 40 per cent, of the experiments with noise are positive, contradicts the assumption that the results vary with the sense. Otherwise we might say that the associ- ations of eye with ear are closer than those of one part of the retina with other parts, or than those of hand with eye. Further experiments may show that pleasure and pain have some con- stant relation to the effects ; but here, so far as inquiries were made, the added stimuli were indifferent, except the electricity, which was disagreeable to A. A. F. With colors, the red and yellow, which gave the largest per cent, of positive results, are visible at greater distances than the green and blue. But where red and yellow are the continued stimuli the results are no more positive than where green and blue are. That red and yellow should have this peculiarity ap- parently furnishes another presumption in favor of Heiny's theory. Although the conditions were not all that could be desired, we failed, in connection with a considerable number of tests con- ducted by Miss Faith Clark, to find any constant positive effect upon the accommodating apparatus of the eye, either from the stimuli here mentioned, or from gustatory or olfactory stimula- tions. The elimination of the disturbances due to fluctuating attention on this form of the experiment are much more difficult and require much more delicate appliances. SOME REMARKS UPON APPERCEPTION. BY J. KODIS, Chicago. The great significance which the conception of apperception has obtained in modern psychology necessitates a thorough un- derstanding of the content of this conception. An historical investigation of the meanings that have been ascribed to the conception of apperception gives no positive and satisfactory result ; not only has apperception been differently conceived by different philosophers, but many philosophers have used one of these conceptions for another, and even in the construction of a * theory of apperception' have blended together a number of different psychical phenomena. Nevertheless, in order to analyze this notion, it will be necessary to arrange the separate types of these different conceptions into their different classes.1 In all we are able to gather from the history of psychology three types of the notion of apperception. 1. Apperception as an event which imparts clearness to rep- resentations. 2. Apperception as reflective knowledge. 3. Apperception as an act of knowledge produced by the impact of two groups of representations. (i) Apperception as an event which imparts clearness to representations. The historical development of this conception begins with Descartes in his definition of a clear perception, his * clear perception ' being namely, one which manifests itself im- mediately and explicitly in an attentive intellect (Principes de la phil., trad, par Aime Martin, p. 2pf), just as when an object sufficiently affects the eye and the latter is disposed to see it. This conception was also used by Leibnitz in the * Nouv. Ess.'2 1 In regard to the proof for this affirmation see my ' Zur Analyse des Apper- ceptionsbegriffs.' Calvary & Companie, Berlin. 2 Nouv. Ess., p. 23, Opera philosophica. 384 APPERCEPTION. 385 According to the definition found there, apperception is to be distinguished only quantitatively from perception; from the summation or the strengthening of perceptions arises appercep- tion. Lately the word apperception has been much used by Wundt in the sense of the clear perception of Descartes. This is particularly marked in his use of the Cartesian illustration in which perception is compared with a visible object. Perception, according to Wundt, corresponds to vision in the field of vision, apperception to vision in the fovea centralist (2) Apperception as reflective knowledge > * connaissance reflexive.'' This reflective knowledge consists in the act of thought, concerning the relation of the object of recognition and the thinking ego. The first to ascribe this meaning to apperception was Leibnitz,2 but this conception was left by him relatively undeveloped. He defines reflective knowledge as an act of thought about some- thing that is taking place in our ego. This theory was taken up and extended by Wolf. According to Wolf, when we be- come conscious of the perceived object, we perceive a certain act of the soul, namely, apperception. We distinguish our- selves at once as perceiving subject from the perceived object. We recognize that the subject is different from this object.3 The fullest development of this theory is attained in the con- ception of Kant in his concept of transcendental apperception, which is namely the representation of the ego in relation to all other representations.4 ' This original and necessary conscious- ness of the identity of self,' being at the same time the consci- ousness of an equally necessary synthesis of all phenomena through representations. In many respects Wundt's theory is similar. Indeed, ac- cording to Wundt, apperception is at bottom the same func- tion as will. But the essence of will is the feeling of individual doing and suffering.5 This feeling, considered by Wundt as the single permanent state of the soul is what Kant designated lPhys. Psyck. cf. p. 236 f II, 4 Auflage. 2 Monad, p. 15 f. 3 Psych. Ration, p. 19. *Krit d. r. Vern. p. 121, 2 Aufl. ausg. v. Kehrbach. 5 System p. 384. 3 86 j. KODIS. the transcendental ego. Thus apperception is the first mani- festation of the will, which forms at the same time a basis for the continuity of consciousness and the identity of the individual. (3) Apperception as the production of knowledge through the impact of two groups of representations. This conception of apperception was originated and developed by Herbart and his school. According to this conception, apperception is the process by which the incoming representation sets in motion already existing representations and at last, according to the laws of psychical mechanics, produces an end result, which must be considered as dependent on all active forces. This theory is based upon the assumption of an eternal existence of the repre- sentations and an artificial psychical mechanics, whose laws, carried out speculatively, are assumed to be analogous to phys- ical laws.1 These are the three types of the definition of apperception, disclosed by an historical sunvey. Has one of these definitions a stronger claim to existence than another? Are all three definitions a delineation of three different phases of the same event, or are all three definitions a delineation of three separate and distinct events, which are classed as one and the same? And is apperception in all or any of these theories conceived as an especial and important function of the soul : as an especial form of activity? We can hope to answer these ques- tions only by an analysis of the psychical acts, which have given rise to these psychological theories. Such an analysis necessitates the rejection of all speculative elements, and the setting forth of the psychical facts of experience, which are the kernel of these theories. This is the method, which will be attempted in the following pages. APPERCEPTION AS AN EVENT WHICH IMPARTS CONSCIOUS- NESS OR CLEARNESS TO REPRESENTATIONS. It is known that Kant used the conceptions apperception and consciousness interchangeably and this interchange is often ob- *It may be noticed here, that the meaning which Steinthal, a disciple of Herbart, attributes co attention, is nearly the same as the meaning of appercep- tion in the sense of ' Connaissaflce reflexive.' See Einleitung in d. Psych, p. 231. 2 Aufl. APPERCEPTION. 387 served in all philosophers, who have occupied themselves with the theory of apperception, most of them having used as synonyms clearness and consciousness. But when it is a question of defining ' Clearness ' more particularly the two de- finitions of apperception and clearness usually differ. Accord- ing to Kant, * empirical apperception ' is the consciousness of self, as determined by our condition (Krit d. r. Vern. p. 673, 2 Aufl. Kehrbach), and 'clearness' the state, where the con- sciousness of a conception rises to a consciousness of its differ- ence from other conceptions (p. 692). Thus notwithstanding that apperception, as an event, which imparts clearness to con- ception, may be easily identified with consciousness, this identi- fication has been avoided, whenever the question of exactness arose. The reason for this lies probably in the fact that most psy- chologists (with the exception of Steinthal) who have elabo- rated the apperception theory have used not the conception of consciousness as a state, but the conception of consciousness as a substance. On the other hand, the conception of apperception as a function of consciousness could not pertain to a substance. Consequently the relation of apperception and consciousness was as follows : Consciousness was believed to have the power of giving greater clearness to representations, this power being nothing else than apperception. In this way when we possess a representation, its clearness is not an inherent element, but something added to it by some extra power of consciousness. Apperception does not create clearness or consciousness, but serves to divide and to heighten it. In addition to consciousness, considered as a substance, a ground for the assumption of an especial power of the soul for the regulation of clearness lies in the fact that the most inten- sive representations are not always the clearest. This problem of the separation of intensity and clearness is familiar to all who follow the history of modern psychology. In reference to this problem it has happened as with many other problems, that it was not solved, but postponed, i. e., since no fixed relation could be determined between intensity and clearness, the regulation of intensity 'was attributed to an es- /. KODIS. pecial power of the soul. This power of the soul, i. £., apper- ception, was enabled to perform its function spontaneously. In this way it was believed possible to overcome the difficulty of distinguishing the phenomena of clearness and intensity in representations. Recently this theory has been modified by Wundt. The regulation of consciousness is ascribed not to the metaphysical spontaneity of the soul, but to the empirical faculty of the will. The state of affairs is in consequence not greatly changed, since the metaphysical spontaneity of the soul is hereby simply relegated to the will, to which is given the creative power in evoking representations. In order to enter clearly into the foregoing questions, it is necessary to consider more closely the relationship between intensity and consciousness, and the theory of the spontaneity of the soul. THE SEPARATION OF INTENSITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN PSYCHICAL PHENOMENA. The natural presumption is, that the most intensive in the psychical life is at the same time the clearest. This presumption is perhaps based upon an unauthorized generalization from a fact often observed. But wider experience shows us that often rep- resentations so weak as to be almost unable to awaken any con- siderable feeling suddenly rise into complete clearness. To explain this phenomenon Herbart enunciated his law of * Hiilfen,' according to which representations rise into consciousness, not met by reason of their own force, but in consequence of a favor- able combination with other representations they are enabled to awaken consciousness and to thrust into the background other representations. In recent times two opposed theories are held in relation to this problem : the theory of association and the theory of will, but neither of these theories is sufficient to ex- plain the problem and the adverse criticism of the adherents of both these theories is justified. In fact, if we ascribe to the will the bringing into consciousness of representations, it is neces- sary to consider will in a certain measure anthropomorphic. Since we know that we choose among conceptions, we now attri- bute thisiaculty to the will, It is no longer the man who executes APPERCEPTION. 389 the choice, but his will acts in this manner. The matter is thereby rendered not in the least clearer. What we have hitherto ascribed to our entire human nature is merely relegated without warrant to a province of our nature. This theory is furthermore unwarranted since it excludes the possibility of a consistent carrying out of the principle of the dependence of the psychical phenomena upon the physiological condition of the organism. The physiological phenomena are determined by the law of causality and subject to the law of the conservation of energy. A free activity of the will could in nowise be attached to such a strictly determined condition.1 Although the association theory does not contain this funda- mental mistake, it is nevertheless insufficient, since it has not succeeded in giving the characteristics of the psychical phe- nomena which are conditions of a higher grade of conscious- ness. So it remains unknown, why in the whole mass of knowledge of the individual only especial representations and conceptions are able to undergo such associations that they reach the highest grade of consciousness. The fault of these theories lies in the fact that they proceed to explanations before all the facts are discovered and their re- lations to one another described. In addition, in spite of the wish of many psychologists, that the objective, i. e.9 the physi- ological condition of consciousness should be determined, most authors make no effort to do so. And yet this is the only way to obtain a general solution of the problem. Only on the basis of the relationship between psychical phenomena and central nervous processes, can we pretend to reach a satisfactory explanation. Such an attempt we find in the theory of R. Avenarius (Kritik d. reinen Erfahrung, p. 51, B. I and p. 18, B. II), which considers intensity and consciousness as dependent on the centro-nervous processes from which they derive their especial character. In this way the difference between in- tensity and consciousness (in the sense of state of consciousness) is kept distinct. We know from experience, that the intensity among physical phenomena is dependent upon the size of the 1 Zur Analyse des Apperceptionsbegrijfs, p. 135. 39° /• KODIS. waves. Hence we approach the supposition, that the intensity of our representations depends immediately upon the size of the centro-nervous vibrations of a thinking individual. Concerning consciousness (consciousness considered as a state) , we see that through the variations in the environment of an individual the consciousness of the individual may be trans- ferred from one object to another. This fact leads us to the affirmation that consciousness depends upon some deviation from the customary arrangement of the vibrations in the centro- nervous system (Krit. d. r. Erf. See Abhebung, p. 57, B. II). Thus, since it often happens, that the increase in intensity of one part of the general impression is sufficient to change the customary arrangement of the centro-nervous vibrations it comes about that intensity and consciousness coincide. The scientific value of this theory is apparent, since it is possible through variations in the environment of the individual or in his customary mass of knowledge to bring about a con- scious state and to conduct the consciousness from one repre- sentation to another. We can proceed experimentally to aug- ment or to decrease the intensity, we are able also to augment or to decrease consciousness in proportion to the time, which passes during the variation of some customary mass of knowl- edge. SPONTANEITY IN THE PRODUCTION OF REPRESENTATIONS. The theory of spontaneity was formed by Leibnitz upon the ground of * inner experience.' He declared in a letter to de Bayle : " L'experience interne refute la doctrine Epicurienne." According to him the spontaneity of the soul is necessary in order to explain that which we have observed in the * inner ex- perience.' Thus we see from an historical investigation that the ground which we mentioned above for the assumption of the spontaneity of the soul, namely, the separation of the phenomena of consciousness and intensity, is not the only one. An element presumably still more important lies in the fact that -we are able, -without any known external cause to originate independent chains of thought. A third ground for this affirmation lies in the fact, that we APPERCEPTION. 391 are able to experience directly the feeling of the spontaneity of our acts. With the first of these three reasons, we are at pres- ent not occupied, but when we investigate the two latter more closely, we see that the explanation of these facts by means of the help of the theory of spontaneity arises from the old ten- dency to consider psychical phenomena of a central character as independent of physiological processes. But if we enter the ground of the dependence of psychical phenomena upon physiological states of the nervous system, there disappears the inconceivability of both the independent production of chains of thought and the sensation of spontaneity. Indeed, it is well known to the physiologist, that the activity of the nerves arises not only in consequence of peripheral stim- ulation, but also as a result of the nutrition of the centers. The functions of the organism, which originate by means of the latter method, are the so-called * automatic functions.' This automaticity of the central nervous system originates nervous processes, which have as correlates chains of thought, the causes of which can not be traced to other psychical phenomena. This fact has long been known and ased in psychiatry, in the treatment of disturbances arising from an under or an over sup- ply of blood to the brain. We see, therefore, that the spontaneity of the soul is req- uisite to explain facts of this kind, but under the condition that we derive the psychical states unreservedly one from another as we do in dealing with physiological states. But so long as we retain the conception that psychical states are the corollaries of physiological states, which follow among themselves the law of causation, the theory of spontaneity remains useless. The third ground for the assumption of spontaneity, the direct sensation of impulse in thought, has been so much dis- cussed that this feeling no longer plays a role as something of mysterious importance. Although psychological analysis has not yet definitely determined, whether this feeling rests upon sen- sations coming from the organs and from muscular contractions, or whether it is a sensation of motion, produced in the central nervous system, it is nevertheless classed among the feelings under the name of a feeling of innervation. Consequently it is 392 /• KODIS. subject to the same laws as other feelings. Thus we see, that all three reasons for the acceptation of the spontaneity of the soul prove worthless. Consequently, apperception, as an event, which imparts clearness to representations is a useless concep- tion, which really means no more than clearness, and has grown out of a conception of consciousness as a substance and rests upon a false idea of the spontaneity of the soul. APPERCEPTION AS REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE. Apperception, in the sense of reflective knowledge was first taken into consideration as a fact of observation, but afterwards this fact received explanations, which came to be substituted for the fact itself. Naturally, through this circumstance, the whole theory, instead of being elucidated, was considerably obscured. We shall now endeavor to determine the results of observation. When we recognize with full consciousness something that belongs to the world of thoughts or of affairs, this act of recog- nition is bound up with a feeling of appropriation. We know and feel at the same time, that we appropriate it, i. e., the ego appropriates the thought or the object which confronts it. Along with this act we experience feelings from the organs, corre- sponding to the way, in which the knowledge originates. Thus we feel that an object is perceived or a thought is conceived. Knowledge through reflection is, therefore, nothing else than a becoming conscious of this especial content of knowledge. In fact, according to the authors of the theory of reflective knowledge, the latter is merely the bringing into relation of the ego to an object thought of or perceived. That is to say, it is the act of becoming conscious of the fact, that a certain determined value is thought of or perceived by the ego. Reflective knowledge, as this especial content of knowledge deserves indeed the important place that has been assigned to it in psychology, as will be seen from the following statements : Only a part of this content of knowledge is varied during the course of the individual life, namely, things or thoughts which form objects of recognition, for the ego with the organic feel- ings, which accompany perception or ideation, remains ever the same. It is, so to say, a constant in the psychical life. APPERCEPTION. 393 Kant expressed this fact in the well-known proposition that the conception of self accompanies or may accompany every repre- sentation. In modern philosophy it has been especially pointed out by W. Schuppe1 and R. Avenarius2 that the ego and its experiences form a single system. Both the self and its experi- ences belong always and inseparably together. But since notwithstanding that the representations of the ego may accompany every state of consciousness, this accompani- ment does not always take place, we must determine more accurately what are the facts. Although the self and its experi- ences form a system in which the self represents a relatively unchanging member, nevertheless, the self is also an object of experience like all other experiences. Thus it is possible that the self with its experiences forms a content of knowledge, but on the other hand, it is possible that this content is formed only by the experiences of the self, i. e., by things or by thoughts. In this case not the whole system of the self with its affairs and its thoughts is known, but only a part of the same. Not the whole relation is recognized but only one of its members is abso- lutely apprehended.1 So for example, when a man recognizes a table and reflects only upon this object, he perceives the table absolutely. If, however, he recognizes the table as an object perceived by him, it is a case of relative knowledge. So it may be seen, that every absolute act of knowing may pass over into a relative act of knowing. Is REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE AN ESPECIAL FUNCTION OF MIND? We have stated above that reflective knowledge is a content of knowledge, which is deserving of especial attention. The question now arises whether reflective knowledge is not an especial function of mind? Apperception in the sense of re- flective knowledge has generally been considered an especial function of the soul, even the highest function. We have seen 1 Erkentnisstheoretisclie Logik. 2 Weltbegrif. 1 1 use the expressions ' absolute ' and ' relative ' knowledge according to the terminology of Avenarius in Weltbegriff, p. 15. 394 /. KODIS. already that knowledge through reflection is knowledge that is directed to the relation between the ego and its affairs and thoughts. But among our thoughts there are countless cases of knowledge directed to relations. Therefore, we can believe that reflective knowledge is a special function of mind only when the relation between the self and its thoughts and affairs includes elements of an especial nature. The relation between the ego and its experiences was indeed conceived as something especial and different from all else. The reason for this lay in the conception of the ego, as a terri- tory sharply bounded off from its whole environment. In this enclosed province the « inner experience ' was believed to reign. On the contrary the events of which the ego took cognizance were conceived as lying in the province of the * outer experi- ence/ As the two sorts of experiences were believed to be fundamentally different, apperception was assigned the im- portant role of bringing the ' outer experiences ' into the * inner experiences' of the ego. The outside world was to be brought by apperception into the ego. The ' outer experiences ' must come into contact with the ' inner experiences.' So long as we remain in the province of the philosophy, which assumes the * outer ' and the ' inner ' experiences as fundamentally different, we must accept * apperception ' as a special function of mind. But in case we do not accept the two kinds of experiences, as things fundamentally different, we cannot accept the act of bringing these experiences into relation as an event, which is peculiar among examples of relative thinking. Given the content of reflective knowledge, it is not possible by psychological analysis to prove the bringing of the * outer experiences' into the 'inner experiences.' We have been able to prove only the feeling of appropriation, a state which depends upon certain modifications in our sensation of motion. Therefore, so long as we remain upon empirical ground we cannot receive as an element of apperception the act of bringing the * outer ' into the 'inner' experience. This is merely a theory based upon the assumption of a fundamental difference between the inner and the outer world — only a method of elucidation of the way in which it comes about that the ego APPERCEPTION. 395 sharply bounded off from the outside world appropriates some- thing of the latter to itself. But since we demand not a specu- lative but an empirical psychology, we may not treat as facts the results of speculation. We must become clear upon the fact, that we cannot prove empirically the bringing of the * outer' into the 'inner' world. If any one for the sake of some metaphysical theory wishes to assume that such a trans- formation may take place, he is naturally free to do so, but so far as we are concerned, we shall not make use of this assump- tion. The more so, as in the light of recent criticism the philo- sophical justification for such a course seems more than doubtful.1 Reflective knowledge must, therefore, be considered as a content of knowledge, which is produced through the relation between the ego and its affairs or thoughts, and which is ac- companied by the specific organic feeling of thought or per- ception, together with the feeling of appropriation, which is a modification of the feeling of motion. APPERCEPTION AS THE PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE THROUGH THE IMPACT OF Two GROUPS OF REPRESENTATIONS. Apperception, as understood by the Herbartian school, may, in contrast to knowledge, through reflection, be defined as fol- lows : Reflective knowledge is an event, where any conscious content of knowledge comes into contact with the consciousness of self, whereas apperception in its third signification is only the first part of this act. Only the act of the production of knowl- edge was investigated by Herbart. Every knowledge may, in the moment of its formation be divided into two parts : a new content of knowledge, and the determination of the same through previously acquired knowledge.2 This fact Herbart interprets from his speculative standpoint as the motion and impact of two different groups of representa- tions of which the newer group awakes and is modified by the older group. To-day, when the belief in the eternal existence 1 Reference may here be made to Schuppe's Erkentnisstheoretische Logik, R. Avenarius, Weltbegrijf. E. Mach's Zur Analyse der Empfindtingen. 2 Wundt expressed nearly the same idea, when he declared that every cogni- tion is at the same time a recognition. 396 /. KODIS. of representations is no longer seriously maintained, such an hypothesis is no longer permissible. But the fact, which forms the basis of Herbart's theory remains. It is possible to prove both experimentally and by the aid of comparative philology, that with every act of knowledge there takes place either a com- bination of new with already existing values (namely a recogni- tion in a certain limited sense of this word), or a grouping of new values within a class whose value has been previously known. Generally speaking, it may be said that an entirely new value cannot possibly form an object of knowledge until by means of frequent repetition of this value a new habit has been formed. Every act of consciousness be it single or com- posed of a chain of thought is always a process of reducing the unknown to the known. If, therefore, recognition does not take place immediately, the chain of thought will not be fin- ished l until there is found a value which is equal or similar to or contained in the new value. If now this possibility is absent two others are at hand.2 In the normal development of a chain of thought the in- dividual, after sufficient time, will form a new habit of thought. The chain of thought is in this case closed through a repetition of the originally given value but with a totally different quality of feeling. The * unknown,' with its negative characteristics, dis- appears in presence of the feeling of the < known.' A new habit of thought has been formed. The other possibility is where the development of the chain of thought does not occur in a regular way. The interest of the thinking individual becomes transported from the original value to some other value and the former is characterized as ' without importance.' The determination of every act of knowledge through knowledge previously acquired is effected not only for the gen- eral character of the representations but for every element and quality of feeling of such representations. Every new experi- ence must be considered only as a variation of previously ac- 1 It may of course happen that the chain of thought will be uninterrupted, but this will take place usually only in cases that have no great importance for the thinking individual. 2 1 follow here Avenarius : Kritik der reinen Erfahrung p. 292, II. APPERCEPTION. 397 quired knowledge. It need not be mentioned that these rela- tions in the psychical world have their basis in the formation of the central nervous system of the thinking individual. The nervous system, constructed in a certain definite way, permits the existence of only certain definite physiological functions and these have as their correlates only definite psychological values. SUMMARY. If now we sum up the results of our analysis of apperception in the three different significations of this conception, we find that these different significations are not false conceptions of the notion, but a use of the same nomenclature for three different phenomena. In addition, apperception in the first meaning of this word and also in the meaning of the Her- bartian school are partial phenomena which can be excluded from no act of knowledge. Apperception as reflective knowl- edge may arise, but does not of necessity arise with every act of knowledge. If now the question arises to which of these three different phenomena the name apperception most properly belongs, it seems to us that the phenomena of reflective knowledge may most rightfully lay claim to this title. Clearness is covered, or at least should be covered by the word consciousness. To ap- perception, considered as an act of knowledge, produced by the impact of two groups of representations must be given a meaning entirely different from the meaning used by the Her- bartian school, since the movement of representation is entirely non-existent, there being only a determination of every new act of knowledge through the mass of previously acquired knowl- edge. Thus reflective knowledge remains a special content of knowledge, which is of particular importance for the formation of the psychical personality. The historical sanction for this use of the word apperception was given by Kant, who often describes it as 'the representation of the self.' But if we are to meet the demands of modern psychology, we must avoid all excursions into the domain of transcendentalism, and endeavor to deal with the notion of apperception as an empirical one, which must be treated according to empirical methods. TYPES OF IMAGINATION. BY RAY H. STETSON. Oberltn College. In order to make any accurate determination of one's imagi- native thought material, it is essential to define what is meant by * forms of imagination,' « mind-stuff,' * symbols in conscious- ness,' etc. That the memory actually possesses a vast store of images corresponding to every sense, and representations of all the varied movements possible to the organism, there can be no doubt ; otherwise it would be impossible to recognize any im- pression, or execute any movement. In terms of physiological psychology, this simply means tha^t certain permanent modifica- tions of the central nervous organs have taken place, and does not involve the implication that all these images be present to consciousness, or become genuine mental factors. Images of every sort, in this general sense, are possessed by every indi- vidual, but each mind chooses out of this varied stock of pre- sentations those of one or more senses, which serve it exclusively as symbols for the embodiment of a large part of its thought. It is in this last sense that a person is called a * visualist,' or a ' tactualist.' The images with which we are concerned are a part of the conscious life of the mind, and can be called up vol- untarily. Memory images here treated of as forms of imagina- tion may be defined : « the appearance in consciousness, under voluntary control, of images without any sensory stimulus.' For example, A may be an exclusive visualist. A certain idea may come to him through hearing ; as the sounds strike his ear they are recognized by the memory, and their meaning attaches to them, but they are at once translated in consciousness into vis- ual images, the exclusive form of his representative thought. Although auditory images were awakened, the idea is not stored in the accessible memory as auditory. Now the idea present to A in visual imagery may act as a cue to call up motor images of 398 TYPES OF IMAGINATION. 399 the vocal organs ; not necessarily however — as Baldwin has pointed out — through kinsesthetic images present to conscious- ness. Thus, while this idea has called up successively with A, auditory, visual and motor images, and while the auditory im- ages, on direct sense stimulation, and the motor images, on a visual cue, may have been momentarily present to conscious- ness, it is not necessary that they be so present, and their mo- mentary presence so conditioned does not affect the fact that A's imagination is exclusively visual. No doubt but few images of the normal individual are strictly of any one type. Though the predominant factor in any one image called into consciousness can usually be determined, the image is nearly always tinged or enlarged by other elements. Sometimes the subordinate image factor, for example motor — visual predominating — is called up by the predominant image factor as a cue, sometimes the subordinate element is an essen- tial of the whole image and appears as a part of it. In order to determine the important point of the imaginative type of the individual, Professor Jastrow suggests in the Pop- ular Science Monthly of September, 1888, an objective method for determining the ' internal language' of the person. His rules follow : (1) Determine the limit of the capacity of both hearing and sight for receiving impressions. (2) Determine the amount of error, and the nature of error of each sense. (3) Determine which of the two processes of perception car- ried on simultaneously makes the greater impression. From these united tests he would determine the type of im- agination as to whether it be visual or auditory. For motor and tactile he has no complete method, and seems to think that they are nearly always combined with visual or auditory images, since motions are nearly always under the guidance of the eye or ear. But because the motion is always under a guidance it does not follow that the image need be inseparable from the vis- ual images; indeed many of our movements always conducted with the aid of the eye are possible without it, e. g:, piano play- ing and writing. And it may be just as important to treat mo- 400 RA Y H. STETSON. tor images apart, though they are usually associated with other sorts, as it is to treat auditory images apart, which with the most of us always occur with visual. While such a method of determination would no doubt be valuable to the individual, as determining his best method of perceiving, t. e., receiving things, it does not at all follow that this may be a basis for a psychological determination of his type of imagination. There is no doubt some general correspon- dence between the large part which some of our senses play in experience and the predominance of their images in imagina- tion, but it is also certain that the connection is not invariable — witness the anomalous ' tactualists,' * motiles,' and even * olfac- taires.' It must be true in any case, whatever the predominant type of imagination, that the individual gains most of his ideas through sight and hearing, and it is certain that he will have facility in receiving impressions through those senses, but the relative ease with which he uses hearing or sight may be as well the result of an original idiosyncrasy as of his type of imagina- tion. In determining a person's type of imagination, it is rather the sense images which he uses in expressing his ideas, and the sense-images to which he appeals in another person, which are to be looked to as an objective clue to his mind stuff than the images used in receiving ideas. Professor Jastrow himself mentions the possibility of image translation, and Wilbrand has determined in a case of aphasia that the brain area concerned in visual reception is not identical with the area concerned in mem- ories of visual images. E. A. Kirkpatrick, in an article in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, notes how prone school children, upon whom he was making memory experiments, were to trans- late presentation forms into other forms. With children the process often shows to the observer by their murmuring words to themselves which are presented written, counting out num- bers given orally on their fingers, etc. In adults, it is not often that the images substituted in the mind are allowed to picture themselves forth in movements. In the studies from the Harvard Psych. Lab. given in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, a report is given of an investigation on TYPES OF IMAGINATION. 401 memory, in which a similar method was used, but for a some- what different purpose. The object seems to have been to arrive at general conclusions concerning the memory, and not to investigate the type of the individual, but some of the conclu- sions reached bear upon the subject in hand. The method con- sisted in the presentation of simple visible and audible contents under varying conditions. The things chosen were numbers and colors. Extended experiments were made with five sub- jects. Two of the conclusions drawn are : (1) When two senses act together in recollection they hinder each other. (2) When isolated, visual memory surpasses by far aural ; when combined, the aural excels the visual, with one excep- tion. If these five men were average types, these results are of some importance as determining the sort of presentation best used, but in each case the statement of the conclusion reached is false. The statements should read : (1) When two senses act together in presentation, recollec- tion is hindered. (2) The memory of isolated visual presentations surpasses by far the memory of isolated aural presentations. When vis- ual and aural presentations are combined, the aural are best remembered. (One exception.) There may be a great difference between ' visual memory ' and memory of visual presentations. Moreover, the presence of one exception in the second conclusion quoted is not very reassuring. An exception of 20 per cent, is rather large, especially when only five cases, however accurately deter- mined, are under consideration. The material used in presen- tation is peculiarly liable to mental translation. Many of us remember a series of numbers presented through the ear by images of the vocal organs (motor). About 45 out of a 100 people examined in a given case reported a visual scheme for numbers. Judging from that, two of the five subjects may have remembered their numbers by the aid of such schemes. If it were not open to objection, such an experimental method of investigating an individual's type of imagination would be the 402 RA Y H. STETSON. best. It gives definite results and has the charm of being a laboratory method, but it seems obvious that no presentation method can avail for the determination of the predominant memory images. The only objective method capable of giving exact results would seem to be the examination and classifica- tion of cases of aphasia. These are comparatively rare, and the evidence is so fragmentary in each single case, that only the most general conclusions can be drawn. Introspection has as many disadvantages in this field, as elsewhere, but coupled with such objective determinations as seem to give legitimate clues, perhaps its results may be worth examination. A list of test questions was submitted to a class of 100 col- lege juniors who had enough knowledge of the subject to under- stand what was wanted but who were not biased by any precon- ceptions. (1) Observe dreams for some time and report as to the rela- tive prevalence of the sorts of images. (While many dreams, perhaps even all, are suggested by sense-stimuli always present to sight, hearing, and touch, in sleep, it is still true that the paths of association awakened by such sensations will probably be those most frequently used, whether the occasioning dis- turbance be extra-cranial or not). (2) Give general method of recall in recitation, conversation, etc., as well as possible. A special report was secured as to method of recalling the forgotten name of a person. (This gives some clue as to visual images of person or name, or auditory images of person's voice or sound of name, or vocal-motor images of pronunciation of name.) (3) a As to memory of breakfast table ; were objects colored ? (referred to Galton's experiment mentioned in James' Briefer Course.) b As to schemes, visual or otherwise, for numbers, colors, days of week, months, or any other series schema- tized in imagination. With any clues as to the origin of these schemes. (4) a As to method of recalling a piece of music (audi- tory, visual or motor) . TYPES OF IMAGINATION. 403 b As to which is best remembered in music first heard ; rhythm (motor) or melody (auditory with perhaps vocal motor). c As to whether a melody remembered is recalled with a tone color, or merely as abstract melody. d As to whether images are called up in listening to music, and of what sort. ^5) a As to the possibility of conceiving bubble and toddle with open lips and passive tongue. b As to presence of suppressed articulation in reading. c As to how concept riding-a-wheel is conceived. (At least three-fourths of class had ridden wheels.) These will give some clue as to the presence of mo- tor images. (6) As to presence of images for concepts : Relation, cause- and-effect, classification. (This may show tendency to image abstracts and also the presence of visual and motor images.) (7) As to any change in the type of imagination which may have occurred. (8) State conclusion as to which type the individual thinks predominates. What sorts were second and third, and if all the sorts of imagery were present. Where unusual types were reported, (auditory, motor, tac- tile,) as predominating this list was supplemented by a second, bearing on that especial sort. Of 100 cases reported, 82 were from their own conclusions and other data judged to be predominantly visual, 6 auditory, 4 motor, i tactual; 5 from their own conclusions, corroborated by their reports were equally visualists and * audiles ' ; 2 were equally visualists and * motiles.' The auditory constituted a large element in 20, the motor in 10, the tactual in 4. None lacked visual or auditory images, though one consid- ered the auditory doubtful. One lacked motor images, 3 lacked tactual images, some 4 of the class, age 19-24, were without much imagery. Serial schemes for numbers, etc., were usually confined to the visualists, though with some exceptions. 41 reported H. STETSON. schemes for numbers, letters of alphabet, days of week, etc. As a rule, where one common series was schematized, others were. In 12 cases the origin of the scheme was reported. Appear- ance of a page where first learned is usually the orgin of alpha- bet schemes, also often of number schemes. Many number schemes, whose form in detail cannot be accounted for, have breaks or sharp turns at six, eight, twelve and twenty, probably marking the successive stages at which numbers up to that point exclusively were dealt with in their early school work. Days- of-week schemes often show traces of calendars. The very common circular arrangement of the months is probably due to vague associations with the zodiac and the earth's revolution ; several reported this definitely. Of course, the circle is a very convenient symbol for a series returning upon itself, but there is no reason why the days of the week be not so arranged as well as the months. The majority of number schemes reported rise from right to left ; there is nearly always a break at twenty, and the scheme usually does not extend beyond one hundred. Usually days of the week rise from Sunday to some point in the middle of the week and then slope down to a second Sunday. One of the most interesting schemes reported shows a re- markable power of visualizing. Numbers, days of week, years in century, and even days of month are represented by regular rows of five squares placed beneath each other. If the number does not fill out a row, a corresponding blank is left. Thus nine is represented by : D D D D D D D D D Days of the week and month run on in same order, Sunday being a dark square : • D D D D D D • D D This scheme is thought to have been derived from a calen- dar: TYPES OF IMAGINATION. 405 Auditory images are usually of words or music where the images play a large part in thinking. In either case, as James points out, it is easy to mistake a motor image of the vocal or- gans for a recall of the sound. Often unnoticed vocal-motor images serve as the necessary cue to the recall of a strain of music or of the sound of a passage read. The motor element is so easily overlooked that probably not a few who think that the auditory plays a large element in theii imagination would find the real element motor. Even in memory of music where it would be expected that auditory images would greatly pre- dominate, the reports seem to bear this out. Of 83 reporting as to how they recalled a memorized piece of music, 25 reported, by auditory, 23 by tactile and motor, and 35 by visual images. The true ' audile ' in reading often hears the words as though in the head or even in the eyes, but not in the throat. Motor images seem from the reports to be a mfcch more im- portant element in imagination than is usually assumed. Of the abstract concepts, cause-and-effect and classification, which at least one-half of the class image, the first was nearly always reported as containing a motor element, usually coupled with a visual, and the second, ' classification,' was also motor in color- ing in a majority of the images reported. It seems but natural that the transitive states should be pictured in memory by motor images, as the very name * transitive' indicates. The difficulty of distinguishing auditory and motor images has already been noted. In an equal number of cases, rhythm was better re- membered than melody. It would seem as though any recall of rhythm must necessarily be motor. The number of cases in which a piece of music is recalled by auditory images, 25, is but little larger than the number of cases in which the recall was by motor and tactile, 23. The deaf Beethoven, writing grand compositions, has been cited as a remarkable instance of auditory imagination ; but the same deaf Beethoven, working out those compositions at the piano he could not hear, and extemporizing on stringed instruments he could not tune, shows the importance even to him, master of tones, of motor and tactual experiences in the expression of ideas. Not a few of our concepts of motions are symbolized in 406 RA Y H. STETSON. motor images. In a large number of cases, * riding-a-wheel' was represented by a distinct feeling of motion in the legs, or of the whole body in mounting. About 60 of 100 reported suppressed articulation in all reading. No doubt many of our gestures are the results of motor forms of imagination. To be sure, many gestures, especially expressions of emotion, are spontaneous and preceded in consciousness by no motor image which they real- ize ; but it is not difficult to distinguish such gestures from those which do delineate motor images. The latter are con- scious, under control of the will, and are often felt as giving expression to motor impulses. Witness the man who shapes his thought in his hands as he speaks, who has a definite feel- ing, located in his hands, that in a logical train of thought one thought draws another after it. Probably motor and tactile images are of great importance in imagining emotional states. In some cases the thought of the cause of the emotion will call up a faint repetition of the bodily state, but often this does not or cannot happen, and if the emotion is recalled at all it must be by the aid of motor and tactile images of those states. To a person whose imagination is largely motor, many con- ceptions cannot be grasped without this motor element. It seems the very life of the notion. Power, sublimity, life, are such con- cepts. None of the persons reporting as * motiles ' could con- ceive of a personification without involving a motor element. To many a person in his ordinary thought, it is this motor ele- ment which distinguishes the beautiful from the sublime ; it is his way of representing power and might. One person in the class, who cannot conceive what a motor image would be like, never appreciates any personification, or has the slightest tendency to personify ; although interested in oratory, he has no tendency to gesture. A motor element is involved in many of the schemes reported for months and days of week. Climbing up hill during winter months or early part of week, and going down during summer months, or last of week. In the case of the days of the week, the scheme with the hill in the middle, rarely toward end, was formed during the college course, when the press of work is greatest at mid-week. TYPES OF IMAGINATION. 407 Aesthetic enjoyment is largely conditioned by motor and tactile imagery. One of the chief demands in modern painting and sculpture is action, i.e., the capability of immobile things to rouse motor imagery. Fromentin's Arab Falconer would be sorry sight if it only roused visual associations ; but the distorted drawing and the grand swing of the uplifted arm suggest motor images of mad, dashing energy and fierce, free muscular life. We participate in the mad galop of the steed and sympathize with the rider because * we picture to ourselves how it feels,' t. e.9 we call up motor and tactual images. It is delightful to poise in imagination with a sculptured Mercury, or to share for a few moments the brawny firmness of some bronze hero. Even in poetry and music we feel the wild galop suggested by the rhythm of Browning's ' How They Brought the Good News from Ghent,' or of Schubert's * Erlkonig.' Lotze makes our enjoyment in watching many forms of animal life, and in view- ing many pictures, to consist in an ability to imagine how we should feel in their places ; we get a joy out of the swift flight of the swallow or the petty industry of the ant, because we live over again to ourselves what we imagine their life to be. No doubt our representations are far enough from the reality, but they must consist in more or less vivid motor and tactile images with the possible accompaniment of other sorts. Architecture, at first glance, is thought of as appealing only to the eye ; but if this were the case, we should not have a sense of unreality and disappointment in finding what seemed an imposing marble temple at a little distance to be but framework and stucco. A part of the interest in architecture comes in imagining the vast load borne up by the aspiring under-structure. If architecture be « frozen music,' this inter-play and combination of opposing forces respresents the rhythm. To most of us it is essentially a matter of motor representation. We get a vivid example of this when at the foot of a perpendicular cliff or towering edifice, we have the sense of its pressing down upon us, overhanging and about to crush us. Tactual images are agreed by all to play the slightest role in imagination. They are oftenest entirely lacking. A single case of tactual images predominating was reported among the 408 RAY H. STETSON. hundred examined. In this case, general concepts are not imaged in any way. Dreams are almost exclusively tactual. It would be hard to imagine a tactual scheme for numbers, yet this man's imagination solves the problem easily enough. His number scheme consists of the representation of the series of sensations produced by tapping the tips of the fingers of the right hand successively upon a surface. Thus sensation at tip of little finger corresponds to « 5' and its tens, sensation at tip of thumb — second round — for ' 6' and its tens, etc. Scheme was formed while learning the multiplication table by counting on his fingers. Little was reported as to any remembered change in types of imagination. Two people of unusual types, tactile and mo- tile, report that the visual is increasing. Four report a recent increase of auditory images ; the increase was referred to at- tention to music, if any reason was given. In no case was there a tendency to increase of imagery. Five report a decrease. The members of class, of course, were not old enough to fur- nish any examples of the decided decrease toward middle age of the image-tendency noted by James and others. It is hard to obtain data as to the imagination of children and illiterate persons, so that the effect of education on the imagination is largely a matter of speculation. It seems quite probable that in the early childhood of the individual and the race all sorts of impressions are stored in the memory and recalled. Voluntary attention does not then determine the trend of the imagination, and to the child, auditory, motor, tactile and even gustatory images would seem to have as good a right to be remembered as the visual. Inherited tendencies in the neural tracts may have something to do with the re- sult, but aside from that, it is very probable that early life is characterized by a much larger variety of images and a more exclusive use of them than later life. There is little doubt that motor images have a full share in the imagination of the child and the savage. Vocabularies of infant speech, as usually given with a large percentage of substantives and a small per- centage of verbs, would not seem to bear this out, but Professor Dewey, in an article in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW (v. I., p. 63), calls attention to a common error in compiling such vo- TYPES OF IMAGINATION. 409 cabularies. He shows that the young child uses words with little or no feeling for a fixed part-of-speech significance, and that the same word may be noun, verb and adjective. He em- phasizes the large percentage of verbs actually to be found in a child's speech. Among savages, the universal tendency to descriptive gesture and sign language attests the motor element in the primitive imagination. From a utilitarian standpoint, motor images are quite as important as visual to either the sav- age or the child. Movement constitutes a large part of the life of either. Baldwin states that in the growth of language-mem- ory, the auditory and visual memories must get the start of the motor memory, though later the adult becomes vocal-motor. No doubt, a large part of the imagery of the adult — especially if * audile ' or « motile ' — consists of images of words, but there is no reason why the mind-stuff of a child should not be largely motor before the development of motor speech. With the adult, much of image-thought is not by word-symbols of any sort ; words at best can usually mark only the distinct, substantive parts. The transitive and the vague upon which James lays so much stress can seldom be expressed in words, and may very well, in both child and adult, be symboled in consciousness by motor-tinged imagery. Even distinct concepts are not always represented by words ; we are constantly making new concepts, unnamed, which we represent in thought by some convenient sign and use for the time being. The child who knows but a few words, visual, auditory, or motor, but who thinks a multi- tude of actions and things, must be dependent in much of his thought on wordless representative imagery. Perhaps in early child life, all sense presentations are re- membered equally well, but later the superior expressiveness of sight, and the fact that it is so largely used in all our processes of education, leads the mind to devote its chief attention to that form of memory. Gradually voluntary control of the auditory, motor, tactual, gustatory, and olfactory memories becomes less and less — degree varying with the individual — or is entirely lost. Some original structural peculiarity of the central organs may account for unusual types. There is no doubt that atten- tion to a single sense tends to develop memory images of that 410 RAY H. STETSON. sort. Among the few changes in type of imagination noted in the reports mentioned above, several had increased their audi- tory memory by the study of music, and a tactualist reported himself as constantly becoming more visual. It almost goes without saying that the mental life of lower orders is limited by the definiteness and variety of images pos- sible to them. The senses limit their thought. The world to the earth-worm must be a matter of tactual and motor images. The image-tendency seems to reach its culmination in the early life of the adult, along with the aesthetic and emotional im- pulses. In middle life, the use of symbols, even visual, grows less and less, and often fades out altogether. That Galton's older, scientific men visualized less than younger, more insig- nificant men need not be due to any incompatability between scientific generalization and imagery ; it is probably due to their being older men. Descriptive science is greatly aided by visualization. The reason that old men dwell so much on their earlier life, and disregard their middle age may be that those early memories are still connected with image associations. The work of middle-life has no such corresponding series of pictures. They live over their early childhood and youth because they can live it over again in imagination. Perhaps the difference between men and women, which Lotze characterizes as a tendency of men to regard the mechani- cal and of women to regard the ideal, may be due to education. The life and education of the girl emphasizes the visual and auditory in their more delicate forms. The boy, on the other hand, has a far greater opportunity for the acquisition of motor images and impulses. He has a contempt for a girl who may know how a thing looks or sounds but who doesn't know how it works. Imaging has many disadvantages. It is often a positive hindrance, e. g. , motor images in reading, visual number-schemes in calculation. It often leads to a narrow view, if the type is exclusive, and the symbol is taken for the reality. Some one has pointed out the vice of visualization as the basis of the phi- losophies of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Much of the feel- ing and expression of other men must be lost to the person with TYPES OF IMAGINATION. 411 a pure type of imagination. Most men possess enough of the common types, though subordinated to the ever-present visual, to enable them to call up on suggestion the image present to another. But there are also advantages. Facility in image-thinking must enhance aesthetic appreciation, if it is not essential to it. For the development of details in dynamic science, gestures in oratory, figures in writing, and for the appreciation of all forms of art, an imagination richly stocked is of great value. True enough, as James remarks, bare concepts do just as well as colored images in running the ordinary affairs of life. But bare concepts are meager material with which to enjoy in mem- ory a favorite picture, bring back a bit of music or a dear face, live over again a deep emotion. ON INDIVIDUAL SENSIBILITY TO PAIN.1 BY DR. HAROLD GRIFFING. The relative sensibility of individuals to pain is a problem of practical as well as theoretical interest. A more definite knowledge of the subject might be utilized not only in medicine but also in education. The data obtained are, however, quite limited ; and most of the observations published have been made by anthropologists with but little consideration of the sources of error involved. The experiments here reported were undertaken with a view to throwing light on these sources of error rather than for statistical purposes. The tests were made with Professor Cattell's pressure al- gometer and with the induction coil. The algometer registered the pressure exerted up to 15 kilo. It was applied by me on the palm of the hand and the forehead in most of the experi- ments ; but in some, the latter ones, the observer applied the pressure himself, and the fleshy part of the thumb was used instead of the palm of the hand. The pressure was increased slowly at a rate as constant as practicable until the sensation became uncomfortable. In the electrical tests the two forefingers of each hand were placed in separate cups of water and the alternating current was sent through the body from hand to hand. Four gravity cells were used with an induction coil. The distance of the primary coil from the secondary served as a rough indicator of the electromotive force of the current, which may be taken to represent the intensity of the stimulus. The purpose of the first group of experiments was principally to find whether the sensibility of a sense organ might not be determined, in whole or in part, by the degree of protection given by other tissues. If decreased sensibility to pain may be due to the thickness of the skin, the determination of the dermal thresh- old for pain tells us nothing of a person's general sensibility to 1 From the Psychological Laboratory of Columbia University. 412 SENSIBILITY TO PAIN. pain. In order to investigate this source of error, before mak- ing the test with the algometer, I recorded my judgment of the probable result from the appearance of the hand. This was done on fifty-three students, four tests being made on each per- son, two on each hand. The men were marked #, b, c or d, according to their estimated sensibility. I give below the re- sulting average values of the pain threshold in kilograms, with the maxima and minima. The results are given in two groups, I. and II., since in group II., the observer applied the stimulus to the thumb, whereas in I., I applied it myself to the palm. Some of the tests in II. were kindly made for me by advanced students in the Columbia Psychological Laboratory in connec- tion with other independent tests. TABLE I. NUMBER. EST. SENS'Y. AVGE. T. MAX. T. MIN. T. I. 11. o I. II. I. II. I. II. I. 6 A 5-i 8.2 2.1 19 10 B IO.O 6.9 13-8 15+ 4.0 4.0 ii 3 C 12.4 13-7 15+ i5+ 7-i 9.4 4 D 14.4 15+ 13-7 First vertical column gives number of observers ; the second gives the esti- mated sensibility, the others the average and maximum and minimum values of the pain threshold (T). From the results above given it is evident that, as might be expected, the thickness of the skin and subcutaneous tissues is an important element in determining the threshold for dermal pain. It is not, however, the only element involved. Some observers were much more sensitive and others less sensitive than one might expect from the appearance of the hand. If the protection given by the tissues varies with individuals, then the relative sensibility of different parts of the body will presumably also be subject to individual variations. This I found to be true. Those having a high pain threshold for the hand were not always correspondingly sensitive to pressure ap- plied to the forehead and top of the head. Nevertheless, as will be seen by the following table, those who were sensitive on the hand were on the average more sen- 4H HAROLD GRIPPING. sitive on the head. I give now the average values, with maxi- mum and minima, of the pain threshold for the head, for the different sets rated according to the value of their hand thresh- old. The first half of the table is for the men classed group I. in the previous table, and the second is for those classed in group II. The top of the head was used with group II., the forehead for group I. TABLE II. NUMBER. T. FOR HAND. T. FOR HEAD. MAX. MIN. 12 Over 13 6-5 13-4 3-2 15 10 to 13 5-0 5-7 3-4 12 Under 10 3-5 4.6 3 Over 10 7.0 "•5 4.8 6 6 to 10 2-3 3-5 i.i H Under 6 1.9 5-i I.O The first vertical column gives number of observers. The second vertical column gives threshhold values for three groups in or- der of sensibility. The third, fourth, and fifth columns give average threshhold and maximum and minimum values for observers mentioned in second column. It has generally been assumed that the sensibility to one form of painful stimulation may serve as an index to pain sensi- bility in general. But there is no evidence for such an as- sumption. In order to obtain data on the subject, I tested 27 observers with the induction coil as well as with the pressure algometer. In this way I found that the sensibility to electrical stimulation to be quite independent of pressure sensibility. Three observers, among the most sensitive to pressure on the hand and head declare, that they felt no discomfort at all when the maximum strength of current was given. One of these did not « feel ' the current when six cells were used instead of four, although the muscles of his fingers contracted from the stimula- tion of the current. On the other hand one student to whom a pressure of 15 + kilo, on the hand and n kilo, on the head, gave no discomfort, considered the electrical effect unpleasant when the current was of the average strength. The above experiments do not, however, prove that the pain sensibility of the nervous system to different forms of stimu- SENSIBILITY TO PAIN. 415 lation is not the same. We can only conclude that the pain sensibility to sensory stimulation varies with the conditions of stimulation. Not knowing the path of the current in the body, we have no right to assume any special physiological or psycho- logical basis for the data obtained from introspection. The probable fact that in the pressure experiments, the vari- ations cannot all be explained by the thickness of the skin and similar conditions, goes to show that there is such a thing as general sensibility to pain ; and the general correspondence of the results for different places of stimulation may be interpreted in the same way. But even these results may be due to pe- ripheral causes, and not to any property of the central nervous system, or of the consciousness by which it is accompanied. THE THIRD YEAR AT THE YALE LABORATORY. BY E. W. SCRIPTURE, Yale University. The report is taken up from the point at which it was left in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, 1895, II., 379. The investigation of hallucination and suggestion by C. E. Seashore was continued throughout the third year and was brought to a close in May, 1895. The first section of this in- vestigation concerned the suggestive influence of size on judg- ments of weight. Two sets of blocks were used. Set A varied in size, but had a uniform weight, while set B varied in weight, but had a uniform size. The problem was to pick out that block of set B which appeared of the same weight as a given block from set A. The difference thus made between the esti- mated weight of an A block and its true weight, gave the effect of the suggestive influence due to the difference in size. The experiments, carried out with the greatest care, gave a definite suggestive influence for each difference in size. The law gov- erning the results is shown in Fig. i. The investigation was extended to the various forms under which size shows its influ- +y INFLUENCE or SIZE ON JUDGMENTS OF WEIGHT DIFFERENCE IN sizE,x*A-B IN MM. DIFFERENCE IN wEiGHT,v=B-A m c. ACTUAL RESULTS IDEAL RESULTS 416 FIG. i, THE YALE LABORATORY. ence, e. g., with the blocks indirectly seen, or seen and then hidden, or estimated by muscle-sense, or by touch, etc. The results are shown in figures 2 and 3. Illusion OF WEIGHT FROM SENSES SiZE ESTIMATED BY H. MUSCLE SENSE I . TOUCH J. SIGHT 0. MUSCLE SENSE TOUCH ft SIGHT FlG. 2. ) I INFLUENCE OF stze Of OF WEIGHT D. DIRECT VrSIOtf E INDIRECT ViSIOtf F. VISUAL MEMORf G NO KNOWLEDGE, FIG. 3. The next section investigated hallucinations of warmth. ^'I was found that with an appropriate suggestion, a pure^halluci nation of heat could be regularly produced. 41 8 E. W SCRIPTURE. A third section investigated the effect of expectation and suggestion on the least perceptible differences in lights. It was found that the repetition of a number of experiments was suffi- cient to regularly create a perceptible difference when abso- lutely no difference existed. A fourth section showed that expectation was sufficient to cre- ate a perceptible continuous change in the intensity of an illumi- nated disc. In a fifth section hallucinations of a non-existing object were produced ; in a sixth, of a non-existing tone ; and, in a seventh, of non-existing sensations of touch, taste, smell and electrical stimulation. In every case the experiments were quantitative ; the scale was more or less an arbitrary one, but always admitted reduc- tion to some standard unit of energy. Thus, on the principle that the intensity of an hallucination is the same as that of a sen- sation from which it cannot be distinguished, the intensity of the hallucination was measured in terms of the physical stimulus. It is to be added that all these experiments were made on normal, healthy, unsuspecting individuals. The second extended investigation was by John M. Moore on the subject of fatigue. In the first place the two eyes were fatigued by being required to estimate depths. The subject looking through a slit at G (fig. 4), had to adjust the bead B FIG. 4. midway between the beads A and C, while seeing only one at a time. This middle bead B was placed always beyond the true middle, the error increasing with fatigue. The experiment was repeated forty times in succession. The average amount by which the successive experiments in- THE YALE LABORATORY. 419 creased the error of the first one is shown for one observer in Fig. 5- no f stria. I n urn &tr of txfitrtffitn t ^ft error In mm. JT.Junt X 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 FIG. 5. The investigation then proceeded to test one eye instead of *two. Similar but less steep curves of fatigue were found. Thereafter the curve of fatigue was determined for steadily 420 E. W. SCRIPTURE. repeated accommodations of the' eye with results as shown in Fig. 6. Finally the effect of fatigue on rapidly repeated taps .X , serial Hamper of experiment Y, atcojnnoefation-ttau ia of ji second M ' M* » V>V 01 IU /*•/ IH in FIG. 6. was determined. The general course of fatigue in this case is shown in Fig. 7. /oo /r« /•oo *r« X , t»f*t *a*tf? »f ttfrnmtnt Y. tint of t*f i> tlio»i. l! I1 « g . 1! i1 I Animal Kingdom, 2C4. 178 146 227 2. Wearing Apparel and Fabrics, .... 129 I Q4 224 l«53 g 0 141 4. Verbs, . . 197 174 279 114 5. Implements and Utensils, . 2 169 121 139 132 6. Interior Furnishings, 89 I9O 212 84 y. Adjectives, 177 I O2 7OO 2^4 8. Foods, .... ri I7Q 88 56 9. Vegetable Kingdom, . . 121 no IOI 91 10 Abstract Terms, 131 Q7 IOI 280 ]j. Buildings and Building Materials, . . . . 105 IOI 117 IO5 86 66 106 34 13. Miscellaneous, 91 97 123 & 14. Geographical and Landscape Features, . 15. Mineral Kingdom, . . . . 97 74 So 96 70 ^o 142 54 16. Meteorological and Astronomical, . . . \ 109 69 26 26 18. Occupations and Callings, <7I 47 24 77 67, C2 19 79 74 76 IO2 167 21. Other Parts of Speech, 96 5 164 41 33 61 17 44 3O M 17 1 02 24. Mercantile Terms, . 3O 29 i* 15 17 32 42 18 Total, 2,5OO 2, COO 2,500 2,500 The figures of the two Wellesley experiments certainly differ at several points and thus bear out the view of Dr. Jastrow and of Mr. Havelock Ellis, that the lack of extreme rapidity in writing brought about the divergence of the earlier Wellesley results. This difference is very marked in the case of abstract terms which fall far below the figure of the first Wellesley results, though it is proper to add that in the fear of overcrowding the class and in the effort to follow exactly Dr. Jastrow's principle of division, many words which seemed to me genuine abstracts were omitted. The prominence of the class of interior furnishings is the case of most marked agreement with the Wisconsin results. Foods also appear two-fifths more often than in the men's lists, yet only half as often as in the Wisconsin women's lists. On the other hand c wearing apparel and fabrics,' supposedly objects of ardent feminine interest are named one-fourth less often than in the 43° COMMUNITY OF IDEAS. men's lists; and 'arts' and 'amusements' fall below any previous level. The results thus confirm some, yet not all, the conclusions con- cerning differences in predominant objects of interest. They certainly need to be supplemented by other figures since, as Dr. Jastrow re- marks, " in dealing with such small groups . . . large room must be allowed for accidental variation." It still seems to me, however, that such investigation is likely to lead to the confusion of two distinct problems and that one of these is practically insoluble. A statistical study may truly, if sufficiently ex- tended, establish characteristic differences in the interests of men and women, and all Dr. Jastrow's conclusions may in fact be interpreted in this way. Mr. Have lock Ellis, however, and Dr. Jastrow, perhaps, by the expression ' masculine and feminine mental traits,' attempt a distinction between masculine and feminine intellect per se, and this seems to me futile and impossible, because of our entire inability to eliminate the effect of environment. Now the differences in the train- ing and tradition of men and women begin with the earliest months of infancy and continue through life. Most of the preferences which have been substantiated by both experimenters, for instance that of women for the surroundings of a home, are obviously cultivated interests. On the other hand, the only characteristics discussed on which the sup- posed fundamental distinction of masculine and feminine intellect could be based, are the prevalence of abstract terms and the tendency to repetition. On the former score, the figures certainly show more ab- stract terms on the men's lists, yet the whole number of words con- sidered seems to me too small to warrant fixed conclusions. The number of ' repeated words' is however large enough to form a fair basis for preliminary conclusions, yet just at this point the Wellesley figures definitely oppose those of the Wisconsin experiment. The question of the essential difference between masculine and feminine mind seems to me, therefore, untouched by such an investigation. MARY WHITON CALKINS. WELLESLEY COLLEGE. Miss Calkins has submitted the above notes to me before publica- tion ; it may, therefore, be appropriate for me to record my conviction that the main points at issue, the relative variability of men and wo- men and the differences in their interests, still seem to me to suggest the solution originally outlined in my paper. On re-reading that pa- per, I can find no suggestion of a claim for a wider application of the generalizations reached than that of the special results presented. The DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 431 repetition of the Wellesley results have shown that similarity of method is necessary to comparable conclusions, and they show this so strik- ingly as to form, in my view, a valuable illustration of the applica- bility of the statistical method to such problems. On the other hand it is equally clear that the results still differ considerably ; this means to me that the data are dissimilar and must be considerably added to by repetition of the experiments in other institutions, before any more definite conclusions can be reached. Inasmuch as the second Welles- ley test has brought the results more nearly in accord with the Wis- consin results ; and inasmuch as the Wisconsin men and Wiscon- sin women form fairly comparable groups ; and inasmuch as there is other evidence of greater uniformity amongst women than amongst men ; and inasmuch as the exceptions to this can in some measure be accounted for, I must still claim that as yet the indications, imperfect as they are, still tend toward the conclusions first suggested. JOSEPH JASTROW. UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. Studies of Childhood. JAMES SULLY. D. Appleton & Co., New York. 1896. The name of this veteran psychologist assures a courteous recep- tion among us, for all his work. Nevertheless, one may fear that this contribution to the psychology of childhood is likely to be under- valued. If the author had proposed a perfect interlocking system of anthropogenesis, or new and daring suggestions toward such a system, if he had covered his pages with comprehensive or with suggestive tables of statistics, or if finally he had written just the book that lies before us twenty years ago — in any of these cases, his work would have been received as an event of first-rate importance. In twenty years, however, a great deal has happened. One thing at any rate has hap- pened and that is differentiation in points of view and in the methods which go along with them. If Mr. Sully belonged more distinctly to some altogether modern group, his book, strong as it undoubtedly is, would be met with the kind of applause and of attack which mean so much more than mere courtesy to a professional colleague. But Mr. Sully's book does none of the things indicated above. It has no closed philosophy of anthropogenesis. It has no startling new theory. It has no statistics. So far as the spirit and method of the book are concerned (much of the material is entirely modern) it might have been written twenty years ago. And, therefore, instead of applause or attack, the book is likely in many libraries to be placed respectfully upon the shelf with the books of its era. The reviewer sincerely hopes that this melancholy prediction will prove false. Mr. Sully's book deserves no such fate. On the con- trary, it deserves not only from the laity, for whom it was primarily written, but also from professional psychologists, attentive considera- tion. Mr. Sully has not written the sort of book upon child study which many of us would like to see, but perhaps many of us fail to recognize the independent and permanent value of the kind of book which he has written. The intimate personal, natural history study of children of which the work is composed, was indeed possible as long ago as there were children and thoughtful men to study them, but in all probability, such study of children will never cease to be 432 PS YCHOL O GICAL LITER A TURE. 433 necessary. The reviewer believes in the future of a more systematic child study, but the discriminating observations of one who sees with a trained mind, and indeed of a mind trained to be more faithful to fact than to any theory, are invaluable at every date. Mr. Sully tells what he proposes to do in the following words : "The following studies are not a complete treatise on child psychol- ogy, but merely deal with certain aspects of children's minds which happen to have come under my notice and to have had a special in- terest for me. In preparing them I have tried to combine with the needed measure of exactness a manner of presentation which should attract other readers than students of psychology, more particularly parents and young teachers." In the introduction, the author discusses critically though moder- ately, the various methods of child study now current, concluding with the opinion that i what is wanted is careful studies of individual chil- dren as they may be approached in the nursery.' The author has made a large collection, or perhaps he would pre- fer to say, selection of observations upon children. A primary rule of selection has been to take observations in which the child with its surrounding circumstances were well known to the observer. Many of the observations were made by the author himself. Others were contributed by his friends and correspondents. Still others were taken from scientific and general literature. The author has grouped this material about certain main chapters in Psychology (Imagination, Reason, Language, Fear, Morals, Art, &c.) . He has written under each head the conclusions or impressions arrived at, supporting these by quotations from the ' observations.* As an example of the characters of the book I shall give a resume" of the section entitled, 'Germs of Altruism,' (pp. 242-251). The various forms of primitive egoism having been considered in the pre- ceding section, it is now pointed out that children are instinctively at- tachable and sociable, craving human and animal companionship and miserable when left alone (one case) . This primitive form of feeling is not sympathy in the higher sense but a kind of imitation. Thus a dog answers the howl of another dog and a child cries when its parents pretend to cry (case at nine months) . Out of such imitation springs the germ of a higher sympathy (two cases in proof of this transition) . Later comes a distinct sympathetic apprehension of the other's trouble (case at fourteen months) . Early exhibitions of sympathy (case at three years) . Consolation (case at two and a half years : case show- ing more thoughtful sympathy at five years) . Helpfulness (case at 434 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NUMBER. twenty-five months) . Attempts to give pleasure (case at forty months) . Love for animals supplanting fear of them (two cases, one at fifteen months). Sympathy for inanimate objects, dolls, &c. Dread of ar- tistic representations of cruelty (case under four years). Dislike of sad stories. "It appears to me incontestable that in this spontaneous out- going of fellow feeling toward other creatures, human and animal, the child manifests something of true moral quality." This brief example which is characteristic of the book will show why it is necessary to cut short this review. There is no way to sum- marize these refined commentaries shading each into the next from page to page. Just for this reason, however, the book will be valu- able to intelligent amateurs who wish help in the observations of their own children. WM. L. BRYAN. UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA. The Psychology of Number and its Applications to Methods of Teaching Arithmetic. By JAMES A. McLELLAN and JOHN DEWEY. New York, Appleton. 1895. izmo., 1 6 and 310 pp. (International education series, Vol. 33.) No more useful work could be imagined than the application of the results of modern psychology to the improvement of the methods of teaching arithmetic. On the whole, this task is admirably accom- plished by the authors of this work. Every intelligent teacher of arithmetic will read the book with profit. The first half is devoted to a careful psychological analysis of the origin of the idea of number as it appears in the fundamental operations of arithmetic. The latter half constitutes a kind of teacher's guide in which the successive stages in the ordinary grammar school course are separately discussed, and specific directions are given about the methods to be followed in teach- ing. The main fault of the book would seem to be diffuseness and some- what wearisome repetition ; the essential principles and their applica- tion might be set forth in a book of less than half the size. But per- haps the authors know their public better than does the reviewer. The leading thought of the whole work is the demand that, in teaching elementary arithmetic, the idea of measurement should be introduced from the beginning and insisted upon throughout, that con- tinuous quantity, in preference to discrete objects, should be used for illustration, that number should be regarded as a means of valuation, and counting as a particular kind' of measuring. It is doubtless true that, to the mathematician, such a view of num- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 435 ber and arithmetic has something startling, to say the least. Ever since the dawn of scientific mathematical thought, from the times of Pythag- oras to the very latest researches of Weierstrass, Kronecker, G. Can- tor, and so many others, has a fundamental distinction been recognized between pure number and continuous extension, between counting discrete objects and measuring quantity ; and arithmetic, or the science of number, being regarded as the natural starting point of the whole science of mathematics, the efforts to bridge over the apparently insu- perable gulf that separates number from continuous quantity have taxed the keenest minds. Indeed, the tendency to ' arithmetize * the whole of mathematics, to base it exclusively on the idea of the whole number as the only sufficiently simple and clear notion of the human mind is a distinct characteristic of, at least, one phase of the most advanced development of modern mathematics. And now we are ap- parently told in this book that all this is wrong, that the psychologist does not recognize this radical distinction between pure number and continuous quantity, between counting and measuring, that the primary notion is not the absolute integer but continuous quantity, and that, therefore, the idea of pure number should be discarded as far as possi- ble from the first teaching of elementary arithmetic. How can such directly opposite views be reconciled ? First of all, by the fact that elementary arithmetic as taught in the schools is not mathematical science ; it is far more a practical art than a science. It is the \ofiGTuri of the Greeks which must have existed long before the foundation was laid for a science of mathematics by a clear and defi- nite recognition of the difference between pure number and continuous quantity. Our authors ascribe the psychological origin of number to the desire, or rather to the necessity in which man finds himself, of evaluating and measuring as accurately as possible, 'to the pro- gressively accurate adjustment of means to end.' Counting thus ap- pears as a means of valuation, number as an expression of value. The reasoning used in proving this position is plausible, if not quite convincing; it is certainly far from accounting fully for the peculiar nature of number. There are numerous cases of counting into wliich the idea of valuation or measurement does not enter except through a strained interpretation. On the other hand, measuring is often per- formed, even with considerable accuracy, without any use of number. What is essential in measuring is the actual ' application' of a unit or scale to the quantity to be measured. Similarly, what is essential in counting is the establishment of a one-to-one correspondence between 43 6 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NUMBER. the things to be counted and the known series of natural numbers. Now while our authors insist very much, and very appropriately, on this analogy between counting and measuring, they do not insist suffi- ciently, it would seem, on the essential distinction between the two operations, on the distinction between number and continuous exten- sion. It must be conceded, however, that this distinction can only be fully appreciated at a higher stage of mental development, that it be- longs properly to apidfj^nxij and not to Ao^orwc??, and that the teacher of elementary arithmetic is mainly interested, as Professor Dewey says in his letter to Science (Vol. III., No. 60, p. 288), in the " task of finding out what sort of a mental condition creates a demand for num- ber and how it is that number operates to satisfy that demand." We cannot refrain from quoting another passage from the same very interesting letter: "The trained mathematician as such is, of necessity, interested in the further use of certain finished psychical products. As a mathematician any reference to the preliminary de- velopment of these products can only disturb and divert him. But the problem for the pupil is how to get the standpoint of the mathe- matician; not how to use certain tools, but how to make them ; not how to carry further the manipulation of certain data, but how to get meaning into the data." The justness of these remarks will be felt by those who have had experience in teaching mathematics ; the be- ginner's main difficulty lies in 4 getting meaning into the data.' And from this point of view the psychological method of our authors is of interest not only for that applied art, elementary arithmetic, but for mathematical teaching generally, even though one may not feel ready to subscribe to Professor Dewey's severe arraignment of 'our text- books of algebra, geometry and high analysis.' It is exceedingly desirable that the attempt be made by mathema- ticians 4 to rethink the psychical conditions and steps through which their present magnificent apparatus has grown out of primitive, non- mathematical or crudely mathematical forms up to its present high es- tate.' But there is some danger that, by insisting too much on this psychological analysis, the pupil, instead of being actually lifted up to the pure mathematical idea, may be left behind with the l primitive, non- mathematical or crudely mathematical forms' in his mind. To come back to our starting point, it might happen, that,- owing to exces- sive attention to the metrical function of number and to its application to measurement, the pupil might never attain to a clear notion of pure number. Even though the logical number concept and the symbolical aspect of arithmetical operations may be considered as lying beyond PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 437 the limits of elementary arithmetic, the teacher of this subject should keep them clearly in his mind. And we should have wished to see more attention paid to this mathematical side of arithmetic in a work primarily addressed to the teacher. ALEXANDER ZIWET. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, May 3, 1896. Darwin, and after Darwin. II. Post- Darwinian Questions; Heredity and Utility. By the late GEORGE JOHN ROMANES, M. A., LL. D., F. R. S. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1895. Pp. X + 344. The Primary Factors of Organic Evolution. By E. D. COPE, Ph. D. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1896. Pp. XVI+547- We are often told that with the advance of knowledge specializa - tion has become extreme. Yet between the zoology and the psychology of fifty years ago, there was but little connection, whereas to-day the more impprtant works in zoology, such as these by Romanes and Pro- fessor Cope, could only have been written by serious students of psy- chology, and in turn every psychologist must read these books. It is perhaps one of the prerogatives of psychology to demonstrate that there are not only sciences, but that there is also science. Both of the books before us offer special pleading rather than judi- cial examination. Cope acknowledges and justifies this. He writes : 4 ' the factors of evolution which were first clearly formulated by La- marck are really such * * * and the book is a plea on their behalf." Romanes, on the other hand writes: "I have endeavored to be, be- fore all things impartial." Cope writes with unusual Derbheit, with directness and condensation based on intimate knowledge of facts at first hand, whereas Romanes is more diffuse and gives the impression of being an able amateur. Romanes' Darwin, and after Darwin is, it is true, a posthumous work, and did not receive its author's final revision. It has, however, been edited with much care and skill by Prof. C. Lloyd Morgan. The present part is concerned with * questions of heredity and utility.' In the introduction of 36 pp., the views of Darwin and of the post- Darwinian schools are reviewed. It is so well known that Darwin admitted the hereditary effects of use and disuse, and with increasing emphasis as time passed, that it seems scarcely likely that confusion has been caused, as Romanes claims, by applying the term * Darwinism' to the factors in evolution made leading by Darwin's works. Wallace 43$ DARWIN, AND AFTER DARWIN. doubtless called his book ' Darwinism ' as a tribute to the greater man, not in order to identify Darwin's views with his own. Neither does it seem necessary to argue at length against the claim of Wallace that man has not descended by natural changes from other species. It has been said that as each has a blind spot in his eye, so each has an idiotic spot in his brain, but such spots may be properly left to atro- phy. In enumerating the American Neo-Lamarckians Romanes confuses the definite views of Cope, Hyatt and Ryder with the some- what agnostic attitude of Osborn and of Brooks. Five chapters of Romanes' book are devoted to 'characters as hereditary and acquired.' The phenomena of reflex action are brought forward as probably the most cogent in favor of the Lamarckian fac- tors, the argument being similar to that from co-adaptation urged by Spencer and others. Romanes argues that reflex actions cannot take place unless all parts of the machinery concerned are already present and already coordinated in the same organism. As the stages of its development cannot have presented any degree of utility, they cannot have been preserved by natural selection. The arguments from co-adaptation (including reflexes) seem to the present writer valid but not conclusive. Romanes states that he perceives that Spencer's arguments based on co-adaptation are equivocal ; his own from reflex actions are equally so. If congenital variations can be or- ganized by use into useful reflex actions the variations are already use- ful, and when further congenital variations occur which tend to relieve consciousness from the burden of interference, they are also useful and will be preserved by natural selection. Here as everywhere the sur- vival of useful variations is accounted for by natural selection, but not their origin. The Lamarckian factors, when they refer to environ- ment, do attempt to account for variations, but when they refer to the guidance of consciousness they invoke a deus ex machina and argue ad ignorantiam. Probably the most valuable part of Romanes' book is the account of his repetition of Brown-Sequard's experiments on the hereditary effects of local injuries. The occurrence of epilepsy in guinea pigs born of parents which had been made epileptic by injury to the spinal cord or section of the sciatic nerve was not tested by Romanes, but has been corroborated by others. Romanes states that he has not been able to furnish any approach to a full corroboration of Brown-Se- quard's experiments, but he has found gangrene of the ears in the offspring of animals in which this condition had been brought about by injury to the restiform body. Brown-Sequard's results are among PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 439 the most curious in the history of science. It is the essence of a valid experiment that it can be verified by any competent experi- menter, yet many of Brown-Sequard's experiments remain, in spite of their importance, isolated observations. Brown-Sequard's positive statements in regard to the * elixir of life,' have, perhaps, made some men of science sceptical in regard to these experiments. The second section of Romanes' book is on ' Utility ' and the four chapters are all entitled 'Characters as Co-adaptive and Specific.' There is an extended discussion claiming that the student of evolution should regard adaptations rather than species, and pointing out the difficulties in the way of defining species. Much of the argument seems superfluous; when Darwin named his work The Origin of Species, he did not mean to exclude varieties, genera and families, and the briefest statement of the doctrine of evolution makes it clear that species represent mere degrees of gradation. Romanes holds that many characters are useless and have developed independently of natural selection. He gives as the causes of these, climate, food, sexual selection, isolation and laws of growth. That variations are conditioned upon climate and food is sufficiently evident, but it does not follow in the cases given by Romanes that the persistent adaptations are not useful under the changed conditions. Sexual selection (the taste of the female) and isolation might preserve variations when no longer useful, but do not seem to be efficient causes of their origin. * Laws of growth ' is a phrase apparently used to cover ignorance. There is no one who claims that every character is useful per se. The single organism and its relations to the physical and organic en- vironment are endlessly complex, and while it is impossible to prove that every trait is useful, it is equally impossible to prove that any given trait is not or has never been correlated with some useful trait. Further it should be remembered that an organism cannot be perma- nently adapted to a changing environment, and that ' natural selection' can only build with the materials offered it. The most zealous ad- vocate of natural selection can only claim that it tends to establish useful traits and obliterate such as are useless and harmful. Romanes' book closes with two appendices and two notes. One appendix deals with panmixia and the other with adaptive characters, discussing further the views of Darwin, Wallace and Huxley. As Romanes' book is itself polemical throughout, the reviewer is apt to follow unconsciously similar methods. But no one can read this book, with its wide and deep interest in fundamental problems, with its sincere and eager search for truth, without a keen apprecia- 44° THE FACTORS OF ORGANIC EVOLUTION. tion of the irreparable loss science has suffered in the death of Ro- manes. Professor Cope's Primary Factors of Organic Evolution is less polemical than Romanes' book and undertakes to offer fewer argu- ments and more facts. But Cope is even more dogmatic than Ro- manes and writes as though problems were settled that have as yet scarcely been adequately stated. Still the work is one of great value and importance. The strong impulse that leads men to adopt a defi- nite theory and search far and near for arguments and facts in its sup- port is wholesome for science, for thus stepping stones are laid on which we pass to wider knowledge. If those who make no hypoth- esis make but few mistakes, they also make but little progress. The book before us opens with an introduction giving Lamarck's statement of the causes of evolution and tracing the subsequent history of the theory of evolution ; and the final chapter of the book reviews the opinions of American Neo-Lamarckians. The three parts of the book are entitled, respectively, 'The Nature of Variation,' 'The Causes of Variation* and 'The Inheritance of Variation.' A large part of the details is outside the province of this REVIEW and the com- petence of the present reviewer. As far as the paleontological evi- dence for a given phylogeny is concerned we can but learn from the author, who probably has no rival in intimate acquaintance with extinct species. In the first part Cope brings forward cases of variation in colora- tion and structure, quoting at length from others as he does throughout the book.1 He concludes that variations are not promiscuous but take place in certain definite directions. Just 100 pages are then given to tracing certain phylogenies or genealogies based largely on the author's paleontological research. The third chapter is on the parallelism between phylogenetic and embryonic development, Cope regarding the parallelism as closer and more important than do most recent writers. The fourth chapter entitled 'Catagenesis,' is on re- gression or degeneracy. ' Sports ' are held to be of no importance in evolution. The whole argument of this part is directed to showing that evolution has been due to determinate variation, giving pro- gressive advance along certain main lines. Under the second part, entitled ' The Causes of Variation,' we xThe long quotations from the author's previous publications and from other writers are in many cases superfluous, but in others they are useful, so long as writers will contribute original work to journals such as ' Agricultural Science,' ' The Radical Review ' and ' New Occasions.' PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 441 find a chapter on ' Natural Selection,' which the author correctly sees to be no cause of variations, whereas the ' Energy of Evolution ' and the ' Function of Consciousness,' which he holds to be efficient causes of variation are not placed in this part but under the part on ' The In- heritance of Variation.' The subjects here discussed are environment and the movements of the organism as causes of variations, these fac- tors being called ' physiogenesis ' and ' kinetogenesis.' The chapter on physiogenesis is short and inadequate. Every little boy knows that the organism is affected by the environment and adapts itself to it, even though he may not know what these words mean. The first time he goes swimming in the spring the sunburns his skin, after that it becomes brown and is no longer burned. But what the little boy does not know, and what Cope does not attempt to explain, is how there comes to be an organism that reacts in this way on the environment. Yet this is surely the central problem of La- marckism. Is the environment the efficient cause or merely the occa- sion of development and evolution ? Later in the book Cope argues that the energy of evolution is not that which characterizes inorganic matter, and thus seems to me to give up the more important aspect of Lamarckism altogether, for I think that the movements of animals and consciousness cannot be regarded as efficient causes of evolution, unless their origin and hereditary transmission can be accounted for without returning in a circle to the nature of the structure and func- tions of the organism. Kinetogenesis is discussed at length, 139 pages being given to the subject. The details, largely drawn from Cope's own researches on the vertebrate skeleton, are interesting and show how the structure of an animal is fitted for the movements that it makes. Changes in struc- ture in the individual follow on the movements that it habitually makes, but then why does the creature make these movements ? Because they are useful under the circumstances perhaps, but then why does the animal do what is useful ? What after all is the efficient cause of an organism that can make these movements and then become still better adapted to making them ? If we are referred to ' laws of growth' and * anagenetic energies,' we have only words no more adequate as a sci- entific explanation than the logos in the first chapter of St. John. Part III. is on the inheritance of variation. It is amply clear that variations are inherited or there could be no organic evolution. Whether the variations that have resulted in evolution are congenital or acquired by the individual in its life-time, is, as we all know, a vexed question. Cope, however, is very sure that all characters now 442 THE FACTORS OF ORGANIC EVOLUTION. congenital have been at some period or another acquired by the indi- vidual. The evidence offered in support of this point of view is not extensive, consisting chiefly of Hyatt's observations on the impressed zone of the nautiloids, and cases from breeding collected by Brewer. The paleonto logical evidence seems to be ambiguous. If we admit that adaptations in individuals due to mechanical causes have preceded the establishment of these adaptations as hereditary characters, this in itself does not prove that the effects of use are inherited. As Osborn has recently pointed out (Science, N. S., Vol. Ill, p. 530) congenital variations that facilitate a useful action would be preserved by natural selection, and it would appear as though the variations were caused by the action. The cases quoted from Brewer are direct evidence, and if admitted would prove conclusive, but miscellaneous observations that cannot be repeated or confirmed by experiment, have never been important factors in the advancement of science. What we need is an extended series of quantitative experiments on variation and heredity.1 If these were properly conducted we could learn whether or not a given change in environ- ment or habit would, in a given number of generations, produce any congenital alterations in a species. So long as such experiments are not made it would seem that we are talking too much and working too little. The chapters on « The Energy of Evolution' and on ' The Func- tion of Consciousness,' would perhaps be regarded by the author as the most important in the book. In the former he argues that the forms of energy of the inorganic world are also exhibited by organisms, but that to account for assimilation, reproduction and growth, ' anagenetic ' energies, ' antichemism ' and l bathism ' must be assumed. It may be necessary to go back to vitalism, but if one can do no more than say that life is an exhibition of ' bathism, ' the preceding arguments of the book have indeed ended in bathos. It is, I fear, true that Cope is more successful in showing that we cannot account for life by physical and chemical energies than in proving that organic evolution has resulted from l physiogenesis ' and ' kinetogenesis.' Cope holds that progressive organic evolution is due to the move- ments of the organism and that the movements are due to conscious- irThe nearest approach to these is in observations made incidentally in prac- tical horticulture. Cope does not discuss this evidence, to my mind much the strongest hitherto adduced in favor of the inheritance of characters produced in the individual by the action of the environment. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 443 ness — an effort to attain " some position which is favorable for the pro curement of relief from some unpleasant sensation or the acquisition of some agreeable one." Consciousness is thus the vera causa of or- ganic evolution. The earth is supported by the elephants and the elephants stand on the tortoises, but then what do the tortoises stand on? Presumably on the earth, for Cope probably holds, though I be- lieve he does not explicitly state, that consciousness is a function of the nervous system. Consciousness and the nervous system take turns in lifting each other to higher places and so we rise in defiance of the laws of gravitation and logic. I do not forget that we are sup- posed to have the help of antichemism and bathism, so we thus have in addition two words to push us along. When Cope takes the part of metaphysics versus common sense, and writes "it is more probable that death is a consequence of life, rather [sic] than that the living is a product of the non-living" and "conscious states have preceded organisms in time and evolution," we can but admire the courage of one who writes these things in a paleontological book published in the days of the triumph of material science. Cope promises a special volume on the evolution of mind and its relation to the organic world, and it is but just to wait for this rather than to enter into an extended criticism of a single chapter of the present book. In conclusion it may be acknowledged that we owe chiefly to Cope and the other American Neo-Lamarckians the clear formulation and partial proof of the proposition that variations are not promiscuous nor multifarious, but are of certain definite kinds and in certain definite directions. This represents an important advance beyond Darwin's position. But we must wait for a second Darwin and a greater Dar- win to teach us the efficient causes of variations and of heredity. J. McKEEN. CATTELL. The Whence and the Whither of Man. By JOHN M. TYLER, Pro- fessor of Biology, Amherst College. New York, Charles Scrib- ner's Sons, 1896. The above title is given to a series of ten lectures delivered at the Union Theological Seminary, being the Morse sections of 1895. The fund was left by Professor Samuel Morse, for lectures on the relation of the Bible to the various sciences. To the question of the whence and the whither of man the Bible gives a clear and definite answer. The object of these lectures is to show that science gives an answer in the main in accord with that of the Bible. The first few lectures were devoted to tracing ' the great line of development through a few of its 444 THE WHENCE AND THE WHITHER OF MAN. characteristic stages from the simplest living beings up to man.' The different stages are marked by predominant sets of functions which succeed one another in an orderly sequence. The lowest forms are characterized almost exclusively by nutrition and reproduction. To supply the needs of digestion muscles are developed. Development of the muscular system brings about the nervous system and finally, as connection between stimulus and reaction becomes less and less di- rect, the growth of the brain. The lower functions, the digestive and muscular systems, have already completed their development; the higher functions, the intellectual and spiritual, are capable of further and apparently infinite development. Professor Tyler looks upon the lower functions as the means for the development of the higher. The end of evolution is the development of mind. If comfort and security, plenty of food and favorable conditions for reproduction, were the goal of development, the clam should be considered the highest product of evolution. The development of mind is parallel to that of body. Already in the hydra we see signs of sentience. In the higher animals we see undoubted signs not only of reasoning, aesthetic emotions and voluntary action, but of moral sentiments, of unselfish love. Evolution is the conformity to environment. The lower animals come into vital relation with but a small part of it. Environment includes all the forces in existence, material and spiritual. Conformity to en- vironment produces therefore in the first place digestion and reproduc- tion, then muscular power, then shrewdness, but finally unselfishness and righteousness. Environment therefore is ultimately God — a personality making for righteousness. I pass over the chapters showing that this answer of science to the question of the ' whither' of man is substantially that of the Bible — also the very interesting chapter on the present aspects of the theory of evo- lution, which is a kind of appendix to the rest of the book. The lec- tures are for the most part fresh and interesting and the argument is clear. But they fail, as most such attempts fail, to give a perfectly definite answer to the main question. We are told that man's future is spiritual ; but we already suspect as much. Does * spiritual ' mean the biblical doctrine of a future life for the individual or does it refer to the future existence of the race as such ? And, if the latter, of what will that existence consist? These are questions which one inquiring about the ' whither 'of man would certainly ask and I cannot see that Professor Tyler has answered them. WARNER FITE. WILLIAMS COLLEGE. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 445 Fear. ANGELO Mosso. Translated from the fifth edition of the Italian, by E. Lough and F. Kiesow. Longmans, Green & Co. London, New York, and Bombay. 1896. Pp. 278. This book comes from one of the best known living physiologists. To Prof. Mosso the world owes some of the choicest methods and ap- paratus ever invented ; his peculiar domain being the study of blood circulation, respiration and fatigue, with special reference to mental activity. In attacking Fear, Prof. Mosso again shows his keen scent for cru- cial problems. Yet we must confess that the results, this time, re- vive our impression of how wonderful the inventor was within his old sphere, rather than excite us with valuable contributions for his new subject. The first eight chapters deal with ' How the Brain Acts,' ' Circu- lation of the Blood in the Brain during Emotion,' ' Pallor and Blush- ing,' ' Respiration,' ' Trembling,' and kindred topics. In them the author has collated the principal facts now known regarding these mat- ters, and has done so in language as simple as a child's fairy tale — and often as extravagant. The trouble, however, with this part of the book, from a scientific stand-point is, that late experiments of highest repute1 explain the mysteries of blood distribution on simple princi- ples which rob the Mosso school of investigation of their chief charm; namely their seeming promise to lead to a solution of the problems of emotion. These eight chapters, therefore, are now behind the times, and misleading if significance be given to them in the last mentioned sense. Next follow chapters on 'Expression,' 'Phenomena Character- istic of Fear,' « Fright and Terror,' ' Maladies Produced by Fear,' ' Hereditary Transmission,' and ' Education.' These are disappoint- ing ; they contain little that was new even at the date of appearance of the first edition, and by getting no further than did Darwin, Spencer, and Mantegazza, they emphasize how inadequate the conjectures of these great men were in this peculiar field. It is true that to-day very little is definitely known about fear ; and this author has perhaps made as good a collection of the fragmentary suggestions currently supposed to have bearing on the subject as is to be found anywhere. But we had a right to expect more from a man of Professor Mosso's origi- nality and rank. The truth is, the book is full of careless statements and cheap hand- Shields, John Hopkins. First number of American Journal of Experimental Medicine. 1896. 446 FEAR. ling of traditional themes. An example of this may be found in the author's so-called ' confirmation ' of Mr. Spencer's theory of the origin of emotional expression ; which theory is that, in emotional excite- ment, general waves spread through all the motor nerves, and effect the muscles proportionally to their bulk, and the inertia of the parts they move. In support of this Professor Mosso offers the fact that he stimulated the facial nerve of a dog electrically, and a weak current caused an attentive pricking of the ears ; a stronger one gave a move- ment of the nose and eyes ; then the lips and mouth opened ; and finally, with a powerful current, the dog assumed the fierce expression of one about to attack — the conclusion being reached that, ' the me- chanical part of expression is therefore much simpler than one thinks.' But can any careful man seriously suggest that our various emotional expressions may be arranged in a serial order dependent on the intensity of general nervous discharge ! If so, at what point in a child do those for violent laughter pass over into the contortions of crying, or the reverse ? And why not explain the movements of Paderewski's fingers by the same ' simple ' plan, since they must be the most easily moved members of his body ? As another example of this sort of looseness, Professor Mosso attrib- utes i frowning ' to sympathetic coordination with the eye muscles for purposes of scrutiny and attention. But why then, at the theatre, do per- sons in rapt attention and scrutiny of the comedian's antics raise the brows in the most open and expansive manner ? And do we not scru- tinize the marvellous as closely as the disgusting, yet with the brows set quite oppositely ? We are not likely to arrive at any profound in- sight into emotion, until scientists are willing to guess at its problems a bit more searchingly than they would at a newspaper riddle. Again, in the chapter on Heredity the doctrine of Acquired Char- acteristics is asserted as unquestioningly as if the great Weismann con- troversy never existed. Yet regarding its scientific aspect it remains to be said that the fundamental error of this book is the author's entire neglect of the psychologic side of his subject. Never once does he even try to approach it ; and one should know, from the first, that a treatise on fear, with the psychology of fear left out, must be as unsat- isfactory as an attempt at mint julip, which gets no further than the glassware. In summary : The translators tells us that this is a ' splendid little work.' Rather it is a splendid little Vaudeville ; a potpourri of all sorts of things, from Professor Mosso's Physiological Scrap Book, thrown to- gether for the popular stage. The book is valuable, as any work from PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 447 this distinguished scientist must be ; but we feel that he stepped down to write it. It is good to bring science to the people, but in doing so one should never descend to tawdry, and much of the rhetoric of the present book comes near this. Scarcely does a cock-sparrow perform more preposterous antics at courting-time than does this author, in places, to drive his subject home upon the attention of 4 popular readers.' (Pp. 36, 74, 200, for example.) The work of the translators, Mr. and Mrs. Kiesow (formerly Miss Lough), is extremely commendable, and the type excellent. HERBERT NICHOLS. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY. Evolution in Art : as illustrated by the Life-history of Designs, By ALFRED C. HADDON, Professor of Zoology, Royal College of Science, Dublin. London. Walter Scott, 1895. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. XVIII, 364. $1.25. There is a great deal in the title given to a book ; and psychologists, interested as they are in all that relates to evolutionary doctrine, will I fear suffer some disappointment when they find that Professor Haddon's excellent treatise deals with little more than the indications that some art forms are developed by slow processes determined by the inheri- tance and the character of men as affected by their environment. But this disappointment is likely to be displaced by a sense of satisfaction, that they have been induced to read a work that might have been passed over had the title been more accurately descriptive of the con- tents. Professor Haddon undertakes to study certain designs used in art, treating them as products of biological evolution ; and he succeeds in showing, rather by accumulation of indirect evidence than by formal argument, that the processes discoverable in the psychicjlife of man are adequate to account for the original use of the principal decorative de- signs, found amongst the savage tribes to which he turns his attention ; and that the persistence of certain of these forms, modified to a greater or less degree, is on the whole exactly what we should expect to find in consideration of our knowledge of the psychic life of man as, influ- enced by imitation, he passes through the normal processes of mental evolution. Of the higher forms of decorative art the author, perhaps not un- naturally, has little to say ; for to him, as to all biological evolutionists, the genesis of man's capacities seems most clearly exemplified in the lives of uncultured barbarians. 448 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. Where Professor Haddon touches upon matters of distinctly psycho- logical significance (e. g. p. 308) he shows himself to be a somewhat crude materialist ; but as he is not often led away from purely biolog- ical discussion, this crudity does not take from the worth of the book which will surely be of value to all who interest themselves in artistic development. In these days when we are beginning to realize that art must be treated scientifically, that it is no mystic gift from the gods which we must worship but which we may not defile by ordinary investigations, all books are welcome which, like the one before us, tend to lead the man who devotes his life to artistic production to take a common sense view of the nature of his endowments. The book is fully and satisfactorily illustrated. The classification, thrown in somewhat at haphazard on p. 8, appears to the writer of this review to require full explanation; as it stands it does not seem logical, and it is clearly not necessary to the argument of the book. H. R. MARSHALL. Inductive Logic. By JOHN GRIER HIBBEN, PH.D. New York, Charles Scribners' Sons. 1896. 8vo. Pp 345. The preface of this work states a very good reason for its existence, and this reason is the impression often obtained that deductive logic constitutes the whole body of logical doctrine, while as a matter of fact the largest amount of our actual reasoning is inductive and should receive corresponding emphasis and consideration in methodology. This is quite true, but the value of deduction method is liable to de- preciation by contrast, unless we give equal respect and attention to the natural demand for a certitude which induction does not give, and which governs many attempts to apply deduction for that purpose. Besides this, the training in deductive methods with all its laborious- ness and elaboration, is the best corrective of dogmatism in the induc- tive field, by exposing the difference between methods which give as- surance, and those which keep within the limits of probabilities until verification has done its work. It is assurance in conviction that most inquirers seek, and if they are taught by indirection that it can be ob- tained by inductive reasoning alone, there will be little to discriminate between conjecture and certitude, and much to encourage an unhealthy dogmatism. Not that I am charging this tendency to the present work, but only that there is equal danger in discussing induction with- out deduction. The method of treatment is somewhat open to criticism. The first PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 449 chapter properly treats of the nature of the process, but unfortunately implies by both its title and the discussion that ' induction ' stands al- ways for an inference or process of ratiocination, though the fact is that it often is synonymous with scientific method, which may be more than reasoning, and in one of its historical meanings is only a process of generalization by observation, the inductio per enumerationem simplicem. In the fourth chapter this simple enumeration is directly classified as one form of the inductive inference in the face of the fact that logicians generally repudiate it as a process of inference. Even Bacon excluded it from the ' induction ' which he was discussing, and which he intended to treat as going far beyond mere observation. The second type of inference seems equally faulty in that it identifies analogy and comparison. A man may define analogy to suit this purpose, but many logicians consider analogy as treating only of a re- semblance in relations and not a resemblance of essential qualities. This view ought at least to be mentioned and discriminated from the conception here maintained. In the chapter on Analogy there is no trace of the method employed by Bishop Butler and similar writers and discussed by Ueberweg and Jevons. Much confusion must follow such a loose identification between analogy and comparison. Less objection can be presented to the several chapters following the fourth and including the topics Causation, Causal Analysis, Inductive Methods and Verification and Prediction. But it is quite singular that the subject of Hypothesis should be postponed to the thirteenth chap- ter ; for if anything is of the nature of an inductive inference hypothe- sis is such. But it is here treated as if it were something else alto- gether and yet is not defined as more than a preliminary to experi- ment. This would make scientific method begin with hypothesis to be followed and ended by verification, and exclude the necessity of in- ductive reasoning altogether, unless we at last decided to identify hypothesis and inductive inference, which is not consciously done in this instance. According to the author's definition of inductive reason- ing, as taking us beyond the premises, he ought to make hypothesis the very essence of inductive inference, as the very step which takes us beyond the premises, and such a course ought to place the dis- cussion of it before that of verification, and at least in the chapter pre- tending to define induction. But the author evidently intends to treat it as wholly distinct from the ratiocinative process known as inductive, and yet he would not regard it as deductive, nor as a form of observa- tion. He must then regard it as a third kind of reasoning new to logicians, or has not discovered its identity with induction as defined 45° VISION AND GALVANOTROPISM. by himself. The oversight probably comes from the tendencies to use the term 4 induction ' as a name for scientific method and forget- ting its distinct meaning as a ratiocinative process. Only one other criticism requires to be made here and it is that in the present critic's opinion many of the illustrations in the body of the work might better be used for practical examples and exercises, at the end where there is a very good collection of them. Illustrations are very important, but only a few require to be carefully analyzed in order to explain the matter of method. For this reason more atten- tion might have been given to an abstract-explanation of the method, and then left the teacher to require its application in the same way to a large number of promiscuous examples. Taking the book as a whole and considering its merits, it is cer- tainly very clearly written and free from technicalities of style or undue philosophic speculation. It will serve very well the purpose for which it was written, and is hardly inferior on the whole to Fowler's work on the same subject. JAMES H. HYSLOP. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY. VISION AND GALVANOTROPISM. Spectrobolometrische Untersuchungen iiber die Durchlassigkeit der Augenmedien fur rote und ultrarote Strahlen. E. ASCH- KINASS. Ztsch. f. Psych, u Phys. d. Sinnesorgane. XL, 44-53. The fact that the eye communicates to the brain a sensation of light over only a small portion of the spectrum, may be due to either of two facts — the nervous apparatus, or, if a chemical process intervenes, the chemical apparatus may react only to waves of a limited range of lengths, or the invisible rays may be so absorbed by the media of the eye as not to penetrate to the retina. It has been conclusively shown that for the ultra-violet rays the latter is not the case, and that the ground of their invisibility is in the insensitiveness of the retina. With regard to the ultra red rays the evidence has been conflicting. Aschki- nass has therefore applied the spectro-bolometric method, which has now been brought to great perfection, to the determination of the ques- tion, with the result of showing that the media of the eye have an ab- sorption-spectrum very nearly the same as that of water, and that our blindness to uHra red is due to the same cause as our blindness to ultra violet, namely, the insensitiveness of the retina. PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 451 Color Saturation and its Quantitative Relations. By A. KIRSCH- MANN. Am. Jour, of Psych., VII, 386-404. 1896. The principle contribution of this paper is the description of a color disc constructed so as to exhibit from center to periphery a constantly changing saturation with an invariable color-tone and intensity. This is accomplished in the following manner : A number of concentric rings are drawn on a circle, and from the center are drawn, at equal distances apart, twice as many radii as there are concentric rings, if there are fifteen rings, two adjacent .radii would be twelve degrees apart. If the points where the radii meet the corresponding circles (the nth radius the nth circle on each half of the diagram) are con- nected by a curved line, a symmetrical heart-shaped figure or leaf will result, such that the fractions of the successive rings inside the leaf decrease in an arithmetical ratio from the center to the periphery. If now a leaf of this shape is cut out of colored paper and pasted on to a gray disk, a color will be obtained, upon rotation, of constantly dimin- ishing saturation from the center to the periphery. But in order that the intensity may at the same time be invariable, it is necessary that the gray chosen should be of exactly the same brightness as the colored paper of which the leaf is made. To avoid the vain search for such a gray for all papers, it can be made for each ring by another applica- tion of the method already used. The brightness of the colored paper is first determined by the method of Rood, or of the author, to be equal to that of a gray composed on the rotating disc of a given pro- portion of white to black, and the portions of the rings outside the leaf must then be made up of black and white in this same proportion. When the number of rings is very large, the boundary of the leaf be- comes an Archimedic spiral, for which the author gives the equation, and also for the boundary of the black and white surfaces. The discs so constructed actually exhibited a constantly changing saturation with an invariable color, tone and brightness. They have been used for testing the validity of Weber's law for degrees of saturation ; the results of this investigation are not yet published. If these discs are made in black and white, since the change of brightness proceeds in an arithmetical ratio, the disc does not seem to grow brighter or darker towards the edge by regular degrees ; that would be effected by a separation of the black and white by a curve giving equal multiplicative increments instead of equal additive incre- ments. Such a curve would be, in polar coordinates, a transcendental .curve analogous to the logarithmic curve in rectangular coordinates. The equation of this curve is given. The corresponding discs have 452 VISION AND GALVANOTROPISM. been made, the construction being for each third of a circle, to obviate the necessity for very rapid rotation, and the increase of intensity be- ing either from center to periphery or from periphery to center. In both cases the discs, when in rotation, present to the eye a surface with apparently uniform transition from black to white, that is, they make the impression of an arithmetical increase of intensity, and hence form a beautiful means of demonstration of the psycho-physical law. There is also a modification of the double cone representing the entire gamut, or rather volume, of light sensation, by which ex- pression is given to the fact that yellow is the brightest color of the spectrum, and violet blue the faintest, and that the whole spectrum grows more yellowish as it grows intense, and more bluish as it grows faint. Zur Theorie des Galvanotropismus. JACQUES LOEB und S. S. MAXWELL. Pfliiger's Archiv. LXIIL, 121-144. Every advance made in the investigation of those phenomena of nature which are of a positive and negative character, whether it be the effect of the two opposite directions of the electric current, the re- sults of katabolic and anabolic changes in nutrition, or the action of opposite groups of muscles, is of wider than immediate interest ; one never knows when general principles may be made out which will enable us to disburden the world of anachronistic theories of light-sen- sation which ought long since to have received their final quietus. There is therefore a special interest attaching to this paper on galvano- tropism, by writers one of whom has for some time made the sub- ject peculiarly his own. The phenomenon of animal galvanotropism was discovered by Her- mann. He found that the larvae of frogs and other animals have the remarkable property, when in a long trough through which an electric current is passed, of placing themselves with the head towards the anode (the antidrome position) , and that those which remained in the opposite (homodrome) position exhibited a constant restlessness. His explanation of the phenomenon was that the current acted upon the central nervous system, and that the latter was permanently excited by the ascending current, and more or less paralyzed by the descending current, and that the larvae sought instinctively the position of least excitation. The experiments here described, which were performed on crabs, ha^e convinced the authors that the assumption of a quieting effect by the descending current, and of an exciting and painful effect by the ascending current, is incorrect. They find that the imnredi- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 453 ate effect of the constant current consists, in crabs, in a change of tension of like sense in associated muscle groups, and of such a nature that on the anode side of the animal the tension of the flexors is greater, on the cathode side that of the extensors. This difference of tension of antagonistic muscles causes these animals, on account of the peculiar mechanism of the organs of locomotion, to swim towards the anode ; if the current is strong, they become completely stiff when in the antidrome position ; in the homodrome position they are not completely stiff, and can still swim backwards toward the anode. The same assumption of changes of tension of associated groups of muscles the authors believe to be sufficient to account for all the corresponding phenomena exhibited by vertebrates. Interesting photographs are reproduced of the crabs with their legs stretched out and bent in accordance with this rule. The real state of things was not discovered before, because animals without legs were largely experimented upon. Galvanotropism will, without doubt, prove an efficient means for the determination of the position of motor centers. The effect of the electric current upon the retina is to cause com- plimentary color sensations according as it is ascending or descending. It is odd that Hering has not dwelt upon this circumstance more than he has done as support for his conception, that complementary colors are connected respectively with assimilation and dissimilation. But it is perhaps fortunate for his theory, for it now appears that the polar quality of the current translates itself in the animal organism, in this well-marked instance, into a quality-change of some sort in the muscle-regulating nerves and not in a simple variation in assimilatory or dissimilatory activity. For it will hardly be assumed that an in- creased tension of a flexor muscle is brought about by increased nu- trition and an increased tension of an extensor muscle by increased degeneration in the muscle, or in the nerve which regulates it. C. LADD FRANKLIN. BALTIMORE, MD. The Colour-Sense in Literature. HAVELOCK ELLIS. Contempo- rary Review, May, 1896. Mr. Have lock Ellis gives the results of his investigations as to the color words most used by representative writers from Homer down to the present day, including Olive Schreiner and D'Annunzio. His only Latin poet is. Catullus, thus omitting Vergil and Ovid both of whom had a very keen sense of color. From a partial survey of 454 PA THOL O GICAL. twenty-five authors, Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, Italian, English, etc., he sees that the color analysis of a writer's style will fur- nish a very delicate means of telling "at a glance something about his views of the world which pages of description could only tell us with uncertainty." What this something is the writer of this article does not tell us. But he concludes that the use of color in the writers of to-day, as it much more nearly resem- bles that of the time of Chaucer and of Shakespeare, than does the usage of subsequent writers, shows that in our color sense at least we are not degenerate. We are told that in literature red symbolizes man ; blue and green, nature ; white, yellow and black, imagination ; and the results of Mr. Ellis' investigation as shown in his tables seem to corroborate this gen- eralization, as red is the most predominant color, black, white and yel- low come next, and blue and green occur least often. But when he says that a poet, in using black, white and yellow, i the color of golden impossibilities ' is marked thereby as a poet of the imagination, his statement is an example of what may, if not supported by exten- sive statistics, turn out to be false analogy. WILFRID LAY. PATHOLOGICAL. IS Etat Mental des Mourants. P. SOLLIER, A. MOULIN, ALEX. KELLER. Revue Philosophique, XLL, 303-313. March, 1896. Continuing the discussion begun by M. Egger (see above p. 236) , MM. Moulin and Keller record in detail youthful experiences of their own in drowning, the latter also a more recent experience of syncope, while Dr. Sollier reports observations, notably of several grave cases of morphinomania, in which the sudden suppression of the habit seemed to the patient to threaten fatal consequences. The most constant phenomenon in all these cases is the feeling of blissful repose preced- ing the loss of consciousness. In only two of the ten instances here cited is there any vivid revival of the past life. M. Keller says that among twenty cases known to him, not one presented this phenomenon with any precision. The most distinct idea in the minds of both the drowning youths was that they would never again see their relatives. Both also experienced hallucinations. As to the feeling of fear, Moulin felt none till after the rescue and then it seems to have been due to chill ; Keller, however, speaks of the self as full of fear till the recognition of the impotency of the struggle brought repose — an evident, and pos PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 455 sibly false, interpretation. Sollier is careful to distinguish the cases; the question raised by M. Egger, he says, relates to the reaction of the self, not to death, but to the idea of death, and this varies within a wide range of possible combinations of circumstances. Confining himself to death from sudden accident, on the one hand, and to death from rapid exhaustion of the organism on the other, he proposes the following theory to account for the feeling of beatitude, the analgesia and anesthesia noted by M. Egger, and the vivid resurgence of memory-images. The more negative than positive feeling of bliss- ful repose he regards as the direct result of the bodily insensibility. The latter, in the case of accident, is due to distraction of the attention, its concentration on the object. The feeling of self is here, in the strug- gle for self-preservation, at its maximum, and hence, possibly, the spontaneous, panoramic vision of the total past self. In the patholog- ical cases, the bodily insensibility is due to physical exhaustion. Here, too, the self is thrown back upon its past organization. Thus in the first case, the revival of memory-images is connected with exaltation of the former, in the second, with the suppression of the actual self. This is probably a little schematic and Dr. Sollier has himself the good sense to say that it is only a theory and to suggest further inquiry along the lines indicated. H. N. GARDINER. SMITH COLLEGE. Ueber die Delirien der Alkoholiken und iiber kiinstUch lei ihnen hervorgerufene Visionen. H. LIEPMANN. Aus den psychia- trischen und Nervenklinik der Konigl. Charite" (Prof. Jolly), Berlin. Archiv fur Psychiatric, Heft I. 171-232. 1895. In the above treatise the author communicates observations made in the summer of 1894 on 125 alcoholists at the Charite in Berlin. His first method of procedure was to make himself acquainted with the previous history of the patient's illness. On account of unavoidable incompleteness in this method, however, the author next endeavored to produce artificial visions in the delirious. The above work* is therefore divided into two parts : I. Spontaneous delirium, II. Sense deceptions artificially produced : pressure visions. I. The author considers the affective side of spontaneous delirium and the fancies of the delirious, dwelling more particularly on the anomalies of their sense-activity, their illusions and hallucinations. Taken as a whole the conclusion arrived at is, that the primary effect dominating the inner life in delirium tremens is fear, which then 456 EXPERIMENTAL. leads to actions for self-preservation. Elementary sense-anomalies appeared in many cases even before the outbreak of the actual disease. II. In common with Nacke the author propounds: "If all or some of the hallucinations of the delirious drunkards arise from stimuli, then conversely, artificial production of such must call forth hallucinations." The simplest and least harmful irritant appears to be a continued pressure on the eyeball. The author suggests that Purkinje's figures produced in healthy subjects by pressure on the eye, which belongs to the domain of normal sensations, is trans- formed in the delirious into complicated visions, in which they see and even fluently read printed and written characters. The author then seeks to prove that visions so produced are caused by the pres- sure as such and are not a continuation of spontaneous visions. He further shows that this method is not only applicable in the case of delirious alcoholists, but could also be extended to the investigation of hallucinations in general, although he only wishes his own plan to be considered as a beginning in the investigation of sense deceptions. It may be added that the author holds delirium tremens to be an acute exacerbation of chronic alcoholism and that in the ' Abortivfor- men ' described by Nacke, he only recognizes a lower degree of the same disease. FRIEDRICH KIESOW. LEIPZIG. EXPERIMENTAL. Experiment elle Studien iiber Associationen. By GUSTAV ASCHAF FENBURG. Psychol. Arbeiten, 1895, I, 209-299. The present investigation deals with normal cases entirely, and is preliminary to a study of the effects of fatigue and stimulants upon association. For the kind of stimulus used in these experiments — a word spoken by the operator — the author adopts the following classification : I. Immediate Association : a. Internal, (embracing) • i. Co-ordination and subordination: 2. Relation of predication: 3. Causal relation, b. External: i. Space and time ; 2. Identities (synonyms, etc.) ; 3. Revival of former verbal succession, c. Stimu lus acting merely as sound : i. Completion of word; 2. Association through sound or rhyme, d. Stimulus producing merely reaction • i. Repetition of stimulus- word ; 2. Repetition of former reaction without meaning ; 3. Association with former stimulus ; 4. Reaction with no traceable connection. II. Mediate Association. Three distinct methods of research were^employed. In the first PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 457 only the initial stimulus was given by the operator ; the subject was required to write down in order his successive associations until a list of 100 had been made ; these were then examined and classed accord- ing to the above scheme. In the second series the subject responded to the given word by a single association, and a number of such asso- ciations (usually 100) were included in the series. Finally, experi- ments similar to these latter were made, in which, however, the reac- tion-time was also measured, by means of a pair of lip keys. Seven- teen different persons in all acted as reagents, and the entire investiga- tion consisted of 44 series of about 100 experiments each. The com- paratively small number of series recorded may be attributed to the amount of time necessarily spent in preliminary practice. Certain series are open to admitted objections, on account of the variability in physical and mental conditions which it was impossible always to avoid. The external associations were in general more numerous than the internal, and show on the average a shorter duration. The reaction- time varied greatly among the reagents, the average lying between nocxr and 1400(7; one reagent gave a much lower average, and one a considerably higher (20000-) ; hence a long association time cannot be considered prima facie evidence of pathological conditions. Lack of complete attention is indicated by a tendency to associations of the types c and d, as well as by a break in the series under the first method ; while repetition of the same associations in the same series may indicate the presence of unfavorable physiological conditions. An interesting fact brought out is the frequency with which the same stimulus led to the same word-association in different individuals. The same stimulus-series was given to five different persons ; all five had 2 responses in common, four had 4, three 16, and two 39, out of 100. Another series given to four different persons shows similar results. These percentages may be regarded as the measure of their common ' intellectual atmosphere.' Apart from such general conclusions as these the results are rather negative. They serve to emphasize especially the fact of individual differences under substantially the same conditions — the fact that important differences exist among normal individuals in respect to both the kind of association and the length of reaction-time. PRINCETON. H. C. WARREN. Die Aufmerksamkeit und die Funktion der Sinnesorgane. By W. HEINRICH. Zeitschrift fur Psychologic und Physiologic der Sinnesorgane. Vol. IX., Nos. 5 and 6, pp. 343-388. 45 8 EXPERIMENTAL. The present theories of attention, says Dr. Heinrich, are unscien- tific since they are arrived at by explaining the known by the unknown (Wundt, Kiilpe) ; or else by reducing attention to association (Ziehen) or to muscle sensations (Miinsterberg) which do not explain all the -phenomena of attention. Experimentation must be introduced to -control conditions, and do away with introspection. It is generally belived that attention is independent of the sense organs. This is thought to be supported by the experiment of Helmholtz in which he found he could change the direction of visual attention without the aid of visual objects. Helmholtz, therefore, concluded that the attention is wholly independent of the accommodation of the eye. Dr. Heinrich considers this verdict unscientific, and devised a method to test it by physical measurements. A perimeter was used .with an ophthalmometer having cross threads on its front end for a fixation point. The latter was placed close behind the perimeter so •that the axes of the two instruments coincided. With the left eye fixated on the threads and the right eye covered, the subject was re- quired to direct his attention to white squares, 2^ cm. to 4 cm. on a side, placed at an angle of 50°, 60° or 70° to the left along a meridian, and to tell what letter was printed on the square. In one form of the experiment the light came from a gas lamp placed near the perimeter on the nasal side of the left eye. In another form the light came from one northeast window, the other windows being darkened. In both cases the image of the light was reflected in the middle of the pupil. The head was steadied by a prop held in the teeth. Following are the diameters of the pupil in millimeters taken from the ophthalmometer when the white squares were at different positions, and also when the subject performed a difficult problem in multipli- cation. With gas lamp. With daylight. 3-6899 4.1245 3-3247 4.3943 3.0091 4.9094 3-95H 6.(x6< " laterally 50° . . " " " 70° . With reckoning . . Dr. Heinrich concludes that : i st. The pupil enlarges when the attention is turned to an object seen laterally. This is dependent upon the angle of the laterally seen object. 2nd. When the subject turns his attention wholly from the object PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 459 as in reckoning, the pupil is enlarged most of all. Since the light was constant these changes were not due to changes in light, but to changes in attention. Later modifications of the experiment in which black squares were used, and when the light came from behind, show that the adaptation is inconstant when the attention is not on a visual im- pression in the axis of vision. The curvature of the lens was found to undergo similar changes. J. P. HYLAN. CLARK UNIVERSITY. EPISTEMOLOGY. Zur Kritik des Seelenbegriffs. A Vannerus. Archiv f . System. Philos. Bd. I. Heft. 3, 1895. The author investigates Prof. Wundt's conception of the soul, as neither an ensemble of associatively bound together elements, nor a material or spiritual substance which underlies the empirical flow of changing states, but as on the contrary a real activity which is actual in that it is immediately known in psychic experience — an activity which is a known Ding an sick. The author admits that from a psy- chological standpoint the Wundtian conception is the true one ; but contends that from an objective point of view the conception exagger- ates the fact of activity. Activity presupposes an actor. Yes, replies Wundt, in the objective world of material things; but "the unity of volition (Willenseinheiten) to which the ontological regression leads is not an acting substance but rather a substance-producing activity." To the author, who substitutes a unified whole and its contained elements for the changing appearance and underlying reality which Wundt names the ' substance-concept,' ' an absolute change is a logi- cal and psychological impossibility.' Activity, event and change are all causal conceptions ; and thought must embrace their ground just as much as the effect. The comparing, relating functions (e. ^.,) de- mand a permanent subject. We may conceive this common factor in all mental states as an activity, indeed as a $ure activity if we hold fast the thought that it includes a constant factor which consists in this that it is always one and the same activity, viz. : the relational func- tion. If the author means an activity which in form is always one and the same, his conception as here expressed is probably identical with that of Prof. Wundt ; but if he means one and the same actor, the discussion becomes a defence of the ' substance-concept ' of which, as the author writes, Prof. Wundt is ' the sworn enemy.' But the relation of the author's own position to that of Wundt is not perfectly EPIS TEMOL OGY. clear in some parts of the discussion. The author's many references to Wundt's works make the discussion very helpful, as well as sugges- tive, to those who wish to study the Wundtian conception in the original. The author seems finally to make a separation of the changing con- tent of consciousness from its underlying ground, conceived as perma- nent ; but this is of course just the effort to reduce the soul to mechani- cal conceptions which Prof. Wundt regards as both unnecessary and seductive. It may still be true that the soul cannot be logically, i. e., mediately conceived, and must be immediately realized in the unity of its own activities ; and this possibility the author does not seem to dis- cuss. Grundlinien einer Theorie der Willensbildung. PAUL NATORP : Archiv f. system. Philos. Bd. I. Hefte 2 and 3. 1895. The author's problem is pedagogical, ' the content of that which should be developed out of man,' the theory of knowledge and aesthetics being as important as ethics in determining the answer. 4 Will is direction of consciousness ' determined by the unconditional demand for ' unity in the manifold,' to which consciousness stands related not only as a legislator to his law but also as subject. The author's Unconditioned is this object of demand not merely as something exist- ing but as something which ought to exist. Will is thus something fundamentally different from the determination of action by the posi- tion in which one finds himself or by an estimate of positions in which he is able to place himself. From a formal point of view it is the necessary reference, imposed by consciousness upon itself, to the un- conditioned as law. Its material content is determined by experience, the bond between them being expressed as direction, striving or ten- dency (Trieb). What, in concrete, is the object of will ? Three considerations de- termine the author's answer. Tendency in some direction is presup- posed— this is Bain's spontaneity and Baldwin's ' Law of Excess.' Will, formally considered, gives to tendency its form — the unity of direction which consciousness unconditionally demands, at the same time rendering tendency objective in its reference. Tendency is a priori and must be centrally grounded and not peripherally. The ob- jective reference of Will is ignored by all who (as Hume) see in it merely a sum of given simultaneously operating forces. The firm be- lief in a thing, that it means unity, explains both fanaticism and heroism. Rational will, the third consideration, adds to unity of tend- PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 461 ency the insight that this is the Unconditioned. Whence then, rational will ? The author's answer is social Technique, the influence of so- ciety with her opinions, institutions and customs on the individual — 4 moral consciousness is social consciousness/ The individual depends on society for self-consciousness, for perception or his view of his not- me, for his opinions and ideals. The pupil must not see with the teacher's eyes, but imitate the teacher in the use of his own. The pri- mary influence of society is on the will ; one learns to will by putting himself in the point of view of others. The law for the individual is ; to give to the will the direction which society is disposed to demand, i. £., the law of humanity. The good is a problem for the individual only in so far as he participates in the life of the whole. What morality is for each depends upon what it is for persons in general. The author develops a system of cardinal virtues embracing Truth, Moral Strength, Purity, the moral ordering of the emotional life; and Justice, 'the love of the wise man.' This part of the discussion is very interesting and throughout suggestive. On a Kantian basis^the author goes to the bottom of the question of will. In the account of the social nature of the objective conscious- ness, the author's view resembles that of Prof. Royce. The principle of imitation as the law of individual appropriation of that which so- ciety offers its members, the principle which Prof. Baldwin in his last work has shown to be of tremendous importance in this connection, is also hinted at by the author. Rather than the theory of self-de- pendence and self- legislation of the transcendental idealists, the dis- cussion leans toward the opposite extreme of making the individual entirely dependent on society, just as Prof. Royce seems to in compar- ing the relation of the individual to society to that of a hypnotic sub- ject to an operator. That instinctive sense of unity which conscious- ness contributes to Will, especially in individuals possessed of a high degree of what the author names Tendency, i. e., Geniuses, often as- serts itself against society in favor of an ideal so superior to society, it may be, that the latter cannot appreciate it. Moreover, the author emphasizes the legal, formal side of the Unconditioned as aim. This has two difficulties — moral development becomes the problem of fol- lowing a rule, life is * sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought ; ' and then there are no ideal formal laws capable of obvious applica- tion to conduct. This conception really makes unnecessary the prin- ciple of imitation at which the author hints. Finally it remains un- clear to us what the author's Unconditioned, as a matter of concrete content, is, although he has given it a clear formal determination. 462 EPIS TEMOL OGY. Neither Spinoza's absence of determination, nor Kant's sum of all conditions, nor Spencer's sum of all force would answer. All that the author says points to self-consciousness in the form of self-activity as that which alone transcends the empirical manifold and becomes the aim of Will. But if we ask for a closer definition of self-activity, we simply come back to the question to answer which the interesting dis- cussion was written. The individual depends on society, but society is a sum of individuals, and streams do not rise higher than their source. According to this it seems as though our moral emotion ought to be what it is, not merely an aspiration after something better than we are ; whereas it has in fact a positive demand that we be that which we ought. It seems as though this difficulty is not solved by the discussion. GUY TAWNEY. LEIPZIG. Ueber Glaube und Gewissheit. JULIUS BERGMANN. Ztsch. f. Philos., 1896, CVIL, 176-202. Following the tendency established by earlier theological writers, many philosophers down to the present time have inclined to regard the belief based upon our ordinary avenues of knowledge as implying some degree of uncertainty. This is the reason for the many attempts that have been made to discover other avenues of knowledge capable of yielding more certain results. Herr Bergmann, on the other hand, claims that certainty is the essence of belief of every sort. ' ' The belief in the content of a judgment ... is never some- thing added to the judgment, but the judgment itself is this belief." Every judgment carries with it a belief not only in its own truth, but also in its own certainty. In order to this certainty, one must have an assurance of truth. Such assurance is found, either (i) in the identical character of the proposition; or (2) in its agreement with experience; or (3) in the fact that the judgment follows as a conse- quence, from recognized truths. The only real assurance of the truth of an opinion, then, is the perception of its truth; i. e., the perception (which may be but dimly present in consciousness) that one of these criteria holds with respect to it. Belief and the feeling of certainty thus become functions of the understanding 7 and the understanding is the sole judge as to whether a thing which has been considered true and certain is so in reality. Truth is not an attribute of the notion as such, but merely of the notion as predicated, and hence belief is al- ways belief in objective certainty, or truth. The present paper is a defense of the writer's views as elaborated in his work : ' Die Grundprobleme der Logik,' and to this he refers in PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 463 several places for amplification — e. g., in his discussion of Kant's syn- thetic judgments a priori; Herr Bergmann holds these to be merely special forms of the analytic judgment, as of course his scheme would require of all necessary judgments. H. C. WARREN. PRINCETON. L? Hegemonic de la Science et de la Philosophic. A. FOUILLEE. Revue Philosophique. Philadelphia. January, 1896. The Hegemony of Science and Philosophy. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ETHICS. January, 1896. The problem which the author would consider under this title is stated at the outset in the form of a question. Are there, as the Kan- tians hold, limits beyond which scientific methods do not apply, regions in which speculation must be controlled by entirely different prin- ciples? Or is there, as Aug. Comte would hold, a 'cerebral unity* of mankind capable of being constructed on the data of science alone ? To which of the two must we grant the true intellectual hegemony (P- 137)- The author distinguishes between two senses in which the term science is used. In its broader sense it means 'a rationally estab- lished system of facts and ideas which, over a given range of objects, confers certainty, assurance, probability, or even a doubt that knows why it doubts' (p. 143). Thus understood science includes any be- lief founded on reason; universal philosophy as well as so-called special sciences. It excludes belief ' founded on the authority of oth- ers, not regulated, and incapable of demonstration, or on the imagina- tion or feelings to which a supernatural bearing is given. ' In its narrower, its ' true ' sense, however, science ' hinges on the relations of objects to each other, independently of their relation to the sentient and thinking subject.' It is 'the perception of the constant relation between things such as these appear to us, independently of what they may be in themselves' (p. 144). Is it to science, in this latter sense, to philosophy, or to religion that the hegemony belongs ? In favor of science it may be said that it is the strongest bond of agreement in society. Scientific ideas are the only ones identical among individuals. Science must, then, ' take an ever-increasing part in the utilitarian and even moral direction of humanity' (p. 144). ' Science is nothing else than that social knowledge which is one of the essential elements of social consciousness' (p. 145). But, though the idea of an 'organization by science' can merit only universal assent, the question remains whether the individual sci- 464 EPIS TEMOL OGY. ences are sufficient to found the true ' cerebral unity ' of the human race. Three hypotheses are possible. Either (i) religion and phi- losophy will be absorbed in the particular sciences, or (2) they will con- tinue to coexist with science, but within more and more circumscribed spheres, or (3) they will grow with the growth of science itself. Taking up arms for philosophy, Fouille"e holds that, while it is mani- fest that the metaphysics which would explain the * facts of experience by means of entities and of causes which cannot be verified by experi- ence or established in a definite relation with it' ought to disappear (p. 147), yet the history of true metaphysics, from Plato to Hegel, shows no tendency to grow poorer. Not only so ; but science is, and must be, theoretically and practically incomplete. Theoretically it abstracts (i) from a sentient and thinking subject, (2) from the whole of existence. Practically it abstracts from the moral aspect of the universe. Philosophy rests assured of a 'perennial function' in cor- recting the abstraction that has thus been made of the thinking subject, and in reestablishing the unity of nature and of thought (p. 148). And, further, to it 'the intellectual hegemony in the practical order of things belongs,' ' because the rational basis of morality depends neither on the positive sciences nor on religious faith, but on philosophy itself (p. 150). Science treats the world of organisms as machines; philosophy regards them as conscious, as animate. Science treats inanimate objects as phenomena, philosophy in animating them treats them as real (p. 151). Only for philosophy is a moral attitude pos- sible (p. 152). To the science, then, ' that is at once objective and subjective, with philosophy as its indispensable crown,' not to purely objective science, belongs the moral hegemony of humanity. There remains, however, a certain validity to sentiment, especially to religious sentiment. Not, indeed, to sentiment supposed to be a faith that increases our assur- ance without increasing our knowledge, but to sentiment that is the re- sultant of tendencies, for the most part inherited, unanalyzed and com- plex; but not for that reason unanalyzable (pp. 153-155). A 'good sentiment' is a collective reason instead of being reason in detail ; but it is none the less reasonable for not having been reasoned out' (p. 155). Religion, while it may lose its mythology as metaphysics must lose its entities, may pass over into philosophy ; but cannot be merged into the pure sciences with their objective methods. "Religion is a philos- ophy of sentiment and of imagination which is chiefly social, although it addresses itself to the individual ; it is a poetry of consciousness, seek- ing after the loftiest universal ideal." (p. 160). PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 465 But while we grant a moral and intellectual hegemony to philoso- phy and science, it is not to these as contemplating dead facts and their relations, but to them as actions and productions. The question being put to nature is essential to its being answered. The result is a 'philosophy of action, in which thought is no longer merely a reflec- tion and a copy of the model subjectively presented ; but a creation of new effects in harmony with those already existing' (p. 104). Fouil- l£e concludes, therefore, that 'the true hegemony belongs to the intelligent volition of universal ends, a volition which exists as ob- scure consciousness in religion, but reaches in philosophy and in sci- ence the clear consciousness of its goal and of its means' (p. 164). Enough of the substance of FouilleVs article has been here given to convince the reader of its healthy tone and comprehensive view. Nothing could be freer from that paltry spirit of reconciliation that cannot rest until it has left the ghosts of philosophy, science and relig- ion locked in an empty embrace in a vacuum that was once filled by the fruitful struggles of their substantial selves. And on the whole, despite some vaguenesses that naturally springs from the difficulty of putting a system of philosophy in a few words, one feels the justice of the author's conclusion. It is, for example, true that 4 pure ' science is content to rest upon certain abstractions, that religion misleads insofar as it separates certain emotions, as different in kind, from the rest of experience. But one may be inclined to question whether Fouiltee has not mistaken an illegitimate abstraction of the sci- entist for the necessary, or at least convenient, abstraction of science. Must science abstract from the sentient and thinking subject? Must it abstract from the rest of the universe ? Must it omit moral aspects ? Are, in short, its ' phenomena ' to be opposed to the * realities' of phil- osophy? Science may, indeed, speak of an azoic age, may define sound as air vibrations, may employ the concept of ' 1'homme ma- chine.' But science may also ask what is the relation of the azoic age to the rest of experience, may also define sound as sensation, may also regard certain, or all, actions as meaningful. The azoic age, the sen- sation, the meaning, however, must be such as can be ' verified by ex- perience or established in a definite relation with it.' To abstract from them, thus understood, is to set a limitation from considerations of economy, of division of labor. To include them is to bring in no new principles. That from which science does seek to abstract, is not the 'thinking' subject ;' but the individual point of view — in short, illu- sion. Since to perform this abstraction is to consider only that which can find confirmation, the object of science is, in a true sense, the object of 466 NEW BOOKS. a ' social consciousness.' The more accurate, the more complete the confirmation ; the more perfect, the more i objective ' the science. It is true that the scientist may seek to establish for his object a false independence from the rest of experience. He may rob it of all characteristics that make it an experience at all. But in so doing he sins against the intelligibility of his science itself. The philosopher, however, is in danger of committing the same sin if he would make the 'reality 'of his object depend upon a ' meaning' which is not itself a phenomenon to be verified by and related to experience. Such an eject, based upon a false interpretation of analogy and of experience falls most naturally under the head of those very 'entities' and * causes ' for employing which Fouille" e so justly condemns false metaphysics. The 'meaning' of actions, however, is a conception that has proved so difficult in the past, that one must rest in doubt as to whether one should accuse Fouille"e of a fallacy, or oneself of a mis- understanding. Properly understanding them, however, science need not abstract from ' meanings.' If it does not, its separation from phil- osophy is merely a practical result of the economy of thought. Science rests, in its historical position, a less reflective philosophy, philosophy a more reflective science. Is philosophy destined to dis- appear in the growing reflectiveness of science ? Perhaps, when there are no more reflections to be made. But then we shall be neither scientists nor philosophers ; but in the happier sense of the word — sophists. EDGAR A. SINGER, JR. UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA. NEW BOOKS. La psychologic des sentiments. TH. RIBOT. Paris, Alcan. 1896. Pp. xi+443. L'annee psychologique. Publiee par. H. BEAUNIS and A. BINET. Paris, Alcan. 1896. Pp. 1010. The School of Plato. F. W. BUSSELL. London, Methuen & Co, New York, Macmillan & Co. 1896. Pp. xvi + 346. $2.75. Outlines of Logic and Metaphysics. JOHANN EDWARD ERDMANN. Translated by B. C. Burt. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York, Macmillan & Co. 1896. Pp. xviii+253. $1.60. Primer of Philosophy. DR. PAUL CARUS. Revised edition. Chi cago, Open Court Publishing Co. 1896. Pp. xiv-f 232. NOTES. 467 Studien zu Methodenlehre und Erkenntnisskritik. FRIEDRICH DREYER. Leipzig, Engelmann. 1895. Pp. xiii-f 223. M 4. Hegel as Educator. FREDERIC LUDLOW LUQUEER. Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Columbia University. New York. 1896. Pp. 185. Agnosticism and Religion. J. G. SCHURMAN. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. 1896. Pp. 181. NOTES. A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. Macmillan & Co. have made arrangements for the issue in New York and London of a ' Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology ' under the editorial supervision of Professor Baldwin of Princeton Uni- versity. The work is to have the following general features : 1 . It will contain concise definitions of all the terms in use in the whole range of philosophical study (philosophy, metaphysics, psy- chology, ethics,. logic, &c). 2. It will contain such historical matter under each term as may be necessary to justify the definition given and to show that the usage suggested is the outcome of the progress of philosophy, together with special historical articles. 3. It will have very full bibliographies both of philosophy gener- ally and of the special topics which are connected with it. With these features to give it character, and with the contributions of the leading men in this department of thought, chosen from Eng- land, America, and for the German and French usage, also from Germany and France, to give it authority, it is hoped that it may come to be a standard work, and serve two main purposes as follows : First, It should, if successfully carried out, render to philosophy, in a measure, the service of 4 setting' the terminology, in the differ- ent philosophical disciplines ; and thus remove what is by common consent the greatest hindrance to their advance, i. e., the varying and conflicting usages of terms which now prevail. Such a book should serve both the teacher and the student in a most essential way. Teachers would have a consistent and, as far as the influence of the book might extend, uniform system of meanings with which to introduce these topics in the class room ; and students would have the corresponding advantage of learning once for all an accepted terminology. 468 NOTES. Second, It should serve as a general introduction to all the philo- sophical disciplines for all those who take interest in them. Further, it is expected that men who are most competent in the several departments will contribute, and that in the result their work may present a fairly adequate statement of the present state of these studies in the world. All the matter in the Dictionary will be original and signed. The following assignments of topics with the names of the au- thorities who will contribute original matter may be already an- nounced : General Philosophy and Metaphysics, Prof. Andrew Seth, Edinburgh University ; Prof. John Dewey, Chicago University ; His- tory of Philosophy, Prof. Josiah Royce, Harvard University ; Logic, Prof. R. Adamson, Glasgow University; Ethics, Prof. W. R. Sor- ley, Aberdeen University ; Psychology, Prof. J. McK. Cattell, Colum- bia University; G. F. Stout, W. E. Johnson, Cambridge University; Prof. E. B. Titchener, Cornell University; The Editor, Princeton University; Mental Pathology and Anthropology, Prof. Joseph Jastrow, Wisconsin University ; Biology, Prof. Lloyd Morgan, Uni- versity College, Bristol ; Bibliography, Dr. Benjamin Rand, Har- vard University. THE first number of Kant Studien, the new philosophical journal, edited by Dr. Hans Vaihinger, of the University of Halle, was pub- lished by Leopold Voss on April 25th. The number contains, in addition to an introduction by the editor, articles by Professors E. Adickes, K. Forlander, A. Sadtler and A. Pinloche, the last in French. Forty-three pages are devoted to reviews and ' Kantiana.' THE American Association for the Advancement of Science meets this year at Buffalo, from August 23d to 29th. The anthropological section offers an opportunity for the reading of psychological papers, and the meeting is a favorable occasion to meet men of science work- ing in allied departments. DR. FRANZ BOAS has been appointed lecturer on physical anthro- pology in Columbia University. DR. ARTHUR ALLIN, honorary fellow in psychology in Clark University, has been appointed to the professorship of psychology and pedagogy in the Ohio University at Athens. DR. CHARLES H. JUDD has been appointed instructor in psycho- logy at Wesleyan University. VOL. III., PLATE i. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Illustrations to article by PROFESSOR G. T. W. PATRICK AND DR. J. ALLEN GILHERT. VOL. III. No. 5. SEPTEMBER, 1896. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. STUDIES FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORA- TORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA. ON THE EFFECTS OF Loss OF SLEEP.1 BY PROFESSOR G. T. W. PATRICK AND DR. J. ALLEN GILBERT. The object of the following experiments was to determine some of the physiological and mental effects of enforced absti- nence from sleep. In an address before the International Medi- cal Congress at Rome in 1894, M. de Manaceine reported some experiments upon young dogs on the effects of absolute insom- nia. The animals were kept from sleeping, and died at the end of the fourth or fifth day. (Arch. Ital. Biol. XXI, 2. PSYCHO- LOGICAL REVIEW II, i, p. 81.) So far as is known to the present writers, no experiments upon human subjects have hitherto been made on enforced insomnia for psychological purposes. The plan of our experiments was as follows : It was proposed to keep the subjects awake continuously for about 90 hours, to make a series of physiological and psychological tests upon them at intervals of 6 hours in respect to reaction- time, discrimination-time, motor ability, memory, attention, etc. ; to observe secondly, the general effects of insomnia, and finally to observe the depth, character and amount of sleep fol- lowing the period of waking. This plan was successfully car- ried out with three subjects, the depth of sleep being ascer- tained, however, in the case of only one. The subjects were in each case constantly attended by either one or two watchers. 1 One of the three experiments described in this article was reported in a paper by Professor Patrick at the December meeting of the American Psycho- logical Association at Philadelphia. 47° G. T. W. PATRICK AND J. ALLEN GILBERT. They took their regular meals at 7 a. m., 12.30 p. m., and 6 p. m., the food being normal in character and amount. In addition they ate a very light lunch at 12.30 a. m. The days were spent in occupations conforming as nearly as possible to the usual daily work of the subject. The nights were spent at first in reading or playing light games, and toward the end of the experiments in any way best adapted to keep the subjects awake, such as walking, working upon apparatus, or playing active games. Each set of experiments, however, took nearly two hours, so that this occupation consumed almost one-third of the time both day and night. We give first a general account of the subjects and experi- ments. The first subject, J. A. G., is a young man of 28 years, assistant professor in the University. He is unmarried, of per- fect health, of nervous temperament, of very great vitality and activity. He is accustomed to about 8 hours of sound sleep from 10 p. m. to 6 a. m. He awoke at his usual time Wed- nesday morning, November 27, and remained awake until 12 o'clock Saturday night. The second night he did not feel well and suffered severely from sleepiness. The third night he suf- fered less. The fourth day and the evening following he felt well and was able to pass his time in his usual occupations. During the last 50 hours, however, he had to be watched closely, and could not be allowed to sit down unoccupied, as he showed a tendency to fall asleep immediately, his own will to keep awake being of no avail. The daily rhythm was well marked. During the afternoon and evening the subject was less troubled with sleepiness. The sleepy period was from midnight until noon, of which the worst part was about dawn. The most marked effect of the abstinence from sleep with this subject was the presence of hallucinations of sight. These were persistent after the second night. .The subject complained that the floor was covered with a greasy-looking, molecular layer of rapidly moving or oscillating particles. Often this layer was a foot above the floor and parallel with it and caused the subject trouble in walking, as he would try to step up on it. Later the air was full of these dancing particles which devel- oped into swarms of little bodies like gnats, but colored red, IOWA PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 471 purple, or black. The subject would climb upon a chair to brush them from about the gas jet or stealthily try to touch an imaginary fly on the table with his finger. These phenom- ena did not move with movements of the eye and appeared to be true hallucinations, centrally caused, but due no doubt to the long and unusual strain put upon the eyes. Meanwhile the subject's sharpness of vision was not impaired. At no other time has he had hallucinations of sight and they entirely disap- peared after sleep. The period of 90 hours being completed at 12 o'clock Satur- day night, the subject was allowed to go to sleep, which he did immediately. He was awakened at intervals of one hour to as- certain the depth of sleep, but fell asleep again at once after each awakening, and slept until half past ten Sunday morning. He awoke then spontaneously, wholly refreshed, felt quite as well as ever, and did not feel sleepy the following evening. He slept, however, two hours later than usual Monday morning. The special tests made upon this subject, 14 in number, are shown with the results in Table I. They were all repeated every 6 hours throughout the whole period, and repeated again finally after the subject had slept. The results of the latter tests are shown in the last column. In reaction-time and discrimina- tion-time, the effects of practice were eliminated as far as pos- sible by preparatory training preliminary to the experiment. A few words of explanation of methods and apparatus are neces- sary. The pulse was taken at the beginning of each set of tests and then again at the end immediately after the subject was fatigued by tapping with the forefinger as rapidly as possi- ble for 60 seconds. The subject was weighed the same time after each meal and in the same clothing. Grip was taken with an ordinary hand dynamometer. Pull was taken with the same instrument, the subject using the second finger of each hand. For reaction-time the stimulus was a telephone click, with signal, the reaction being the release of a key, the subject be- ing in the dark room, away from the recording drum. Each reaction-time given represents the mean value of from 10 to 15 reactions. For discrimination a modification of the same appa- ratus was used, the subject reacting only to the loud stimulus. If £ CO a ' o «O . OVOONcON t^McOMVO C-l VOcO^cO . O»OOXt^.CS -3-OcOMVO OOcooo'cocO IOOWCOMIO VOONt>.VOcO M K M . M *«. ; • M N MVOCOt^vd O COt^OWQCOOCO OOcOVO'!d-«S M rOMrJ-TtONfO'd-M V? rOlOTt M M CS ON N t*»O-^-«N r}- MCOONMM « vdoo^co *co M cOVOiOW « lO « 04 O CO d M >O t>. t>. 0 W M W vdt^cotAoN O cOVOTtW 10 CJ H «rfo\ rJ-WCO o < .&• = ll 1| o ? •s « s t; D >-> C b I i o « < S 2r O D •*-• K I 5 « 13 ?, £ a § I* g f T3 "3 "S *3 IOWA PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 473 Sensibility to pain was tested by a specially prepared algometer, arranged to bring any desired pressure upon the middle of the fingernail of the first finger, the finger being inserted between two horizontal bars, the one pressing upon the fingernail being a very dull wooden knife edge. The figures record the pres- sure in grams, the lower threshold representing the first feeling of pain, the upper threshold the point at which the pain could no longer be endured. Acuteness of vision was tested in the dark room by finding the greatest distance at which the subject could read a section of a page from Wundt's Studien by the light of one standard candle at a distance of 25 cm. The memory test consisted in committing to memory 10 of the Ebbinghaus non- sense syllables. These were used in the ordinary way, but we consider this test of very slight value, for it is impossible not to learn these lists by association, and impossible to get different lists which offer equal ease or difficulty in association. The ef- fects of loss of sleep upon attention and association we at- tempted also to ascertain by determining the greatest number of figures in prepared columns that could be added in three minutes. Voluntary motor ability was tested by having the subject tap with the forefinger as rapidly as possible upon a key for 5 seconds, using the recording drum and graphic chronom- eter. He then continued tapping for 60 seconds to fatigue the muscles. The number of taps during the last 5 seconds was then recorded. In the table is given first the number of taps in the first 5 seconds, then the percentage of loss in the last 5 seconds due to fatigue. The results of the special tests may best be studied from the table. Attention is called, however, especially to the following. The steady in- crease in the subject's weight during the experiment and the sudden decrease in weight after sleep are noteworthy, and appar- ently not to be accounted for by accidental circumstances. His average weight during the last 24 hours was 18 ounces greater than the average during the first 24 hours, and at 9 o'clock Saturday night the subject weighed 27 ounces more than at 9 o'clock Wednesday morning. During the 10^ hours' sleep, however, which followed the experiment, the subject lost 38 ounces, being n ounces more than he had gained during the 474 G. T. W. PATRICK AND J. ALLEN GILBERT. experiment. In the tests with the dynamometer the subject lost slightly and gradually in strength of both grip and pull, re- gaining all after sleep. On Saturday afternoon, however, the subject made what appeared to be a spurt, in view, perhaps, of the approaching end, and gripped and pulled nearly as much as at the beginning. The reaction-time beginning with 122*7 increased somewhat regularly, reaching its maximum, 165^7 Saturday afternoon, after 81 hours without sleep, and dropped back to the normal immediately after sleep. The discrimina- tion-time appears to decrease, but as it does not increase after sleep the result cannot in this case be attributed to loss of sleep. The acuteness of vision uniformly increased throughout the ex- periment, falling below the normal after sleep. The slight re- tardation in the increase in the second night corresponds with the period of slight sickness at that time. There is a significant decrease in voluntary motor ability. The decrease in this sub- ject's pulse-beat after fatigue by tapping is abnormal and ap- parently a result of loss of sleep. The above experiment upon J. A. G. was regarded as some- what preliminary. It was, therefore, decided to repeat the ex- periment upon two other subjects, making such modifications in the special tests and apparatus as seemed to be desirable. The second subject, A. G. S., was a young man of 27 years, in- structor in the University, unmarried, quiet and of excellent health. The third subject, G. N. B., was a young man of 24 years, instructor in the University, unmarried, of German parentage, stout and perfectly healthy. At the time of the ex- periment, A. G. S. was accustomed to 9 hours of sound and regular sleep ; G. N. B. to 8 hours. These two subjects en- tered upon their sleep fast at 7 o'clock, Tuesday morning, March 17, 1896. 90 hours was again the period determined upon. On Friday night, March 20, .at 11.15, the last set of experiments being completed, they were allowed to retire, so that their waking period was actually 88 ^ hours. In the case of these two subjects there was no illness, no hallucinations of sight, and no serious suffering or discomfort. A. G. S. became very sleepy during the last 24 hours and had to be watched constantly. On Friday, at 9 p. m., after a brisk walk in IOWA PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 475 the cool air, his temperature sank to 35.3° Cent. (95.6° F.), but in 15 minutes rose to 36.3° Cent. (97.3° F.). Of the three subjects he was the only one who apparently could not have prolonged the experiment beyond the period of 90 hours with- out danger. G. N. B. had less trouble in keeping awake and showed outwardly but slight effects of the abstinence from sleep. Both subjects slept immediately upon retiring at 11.15 P- m-> Friday. They both slept uninterruptedly until 10.30 a. m., Saturday. They both awoke then for a few moments and slept again, A. G. S. until 11.15 a< m-> G. N. B. until 2.40 p. m. They both felt wholly refreshed upon awaking, required no further extra sleep, and felt no ill effects from the experiment. The special tests made upon these two subjects are shown with the results in Table II. and Table III., and exhibited, in part, in graphic form in the subjoined curves. They were as before, repeated every 6 hours. To eliminate, as far as possible, the effects of practice, the tests were begun two or three days before the beginning of the sleep fast. The first three sets of results in the tables, being taken the first day before any loss of sleep, should represent the normal reaction of the subject. These, taken together with the results of the tests made after awaking shown in the last column of the tables, make a fairly adequate standard for comparison with the results obtained during the sleep fast. The tests in respect to pulse, temperature, weight, grip, re- action-time, discrimination-time, sharpness of vision, voluntary motor ability, and fatigue, were the same as described above for the first subject. The strength of pull was taken with an ordinary lift dynamometer, the subject, standing upon a small platform with bent knees and straightened back, lifting his utmost by means of two handles connected by ropes with a large spring balance. In the memory test, the nonsense sylla- bles were discarded and 18 figures substituted. 18 small squares of cardboard were provided upon which were printed the 9 figures, each figure thus appearing twice. For each ex- periment a random order of these figures was made, and then modified, if necessary, to prevent adjacence of same figure and suggestive combinations. The subject, timed with a stop 476 G. T. W. PATRICK AND J. ALLEN GILBERT. watch, committed to memory the list, the watch being stopped when the subject announced his readiness to recite the list. Each experiment consisted in committing to memory three such lists. The tables show in seconds the average of these three trials in each case. No. u was a test in adding numbers. The sheets of figures used by Miss Holmes in studying fatigue in school children and described in the Pedagogical Seminary, Vol. III., No. 2, were used. The subject was required to add each set of 40 figures by twos, setting down the results. He then added the results and then added the original figures in a different order. Any variation recorded in the two results in- dicated errors. The tables give the time required for the whole process. Test No. 12 was designed to determine the subject's facility in seeing and naming letters. A page from THE PSYCHO- LOGICAL REVIEW was used ; the subject reading the lines back- ward merely named the letters as fast as possible. The tables record the number of letters, average of two trials, named in one minute. Test No. 9 was designed to show the acuteness of hear- ing by discrimination of the intensity of two sounds. The sounds were vibrations of a tuning fork heard in a telephone in the silent room, the intensity being varied by a resistance board, only one telephone being used. The results in the tables have only rela- tive value, indicating the number of divisions upon the resist- ance board by which the resistance had to be increased to en- able the subject to detect the difference in the intensity of the sounds. We may call special attention to a few of the results. In both subjects we again observe an increase in weight through- out the experiment with decrease after sleep. But with these subjects the decrease is less than the increase. In strength of lift both subjects lose quite regularly and seriously, but regain nearly all after sleep. In the memory tests, the results are very marked, especially with G. N. B. His average time in normal condition for committing the 18 figures was 134 seconds. No remarkable increase in this time was observed until the expira- tion of 72 hours. At 9 a. m. Friday the subject required 960 seconds to commit the first set of figures and failed entirely to commit the third set, working at it for 20 minutes. At 9 d g vo IO Tl-M CO M co* co* o o »o co co^- •-• >H 0 ON CO co 04 VO VO O IO ON co ON CO t»» M O r^. VO' ON VO co VO CS ^t M cs O "-i CO O N cOOi-iONCS VO vo r^» iO-^- ON co vo' r-^. ON o% M od vo cs cs vo covoc» Tf vo »o 10 . cs »o Tf »-lO"-l VO'^M VOCSCO OcOiOONM up Tfvo"iO cOCSVO § M *§ t^. . CO t>« O CO t^ ON CS CO M t^-^-cOVOMCOcO vot^oo* 6 cOvOcOTt OMMHIO coiooN COMVO ON l^« M O co O 00 VO t^» ON co M VO co vO co vO cocs' O lOOvO COON O M MOOVO fOMVO M CN VO 00 CS IO MO^OIOMVOM t*» $* <6 *Q O IOOOO\O VOcOCSCC 3 ( 3.S J , . .> ;= j fli-i 'n-5 || 2=0 S.£S?g-3-s3 O £ M M ^Qg<^>fe£ I? O CO ^ N vO r^ONMVDMOVO»O M ri M Tf-3-MVQONOOO -^-M rON OCQ^ pJvo WON TJ- t^ MNM COONO cO co Wt.cO ONCO VOM O >O>O so & v^ i- S? o M oq P»VOO°Nt^.CO M M VOcOVDcOM VO CO CO iO ON O co r^ CO 00 M Cl M Cs. M 00 VO 10 M co CO * £ £ 3 5- COONCO ON VO VO IO IO N Tf vo" co v^T 00^ M VO OS VO O\ ON »O cO VD CO M t^ t^ M If) CO Tf MMMCOMOOM TtOCO l>.cf\cOCO O MM COVOCOCO Tl- O i-O 10 wMMTtfN rf vdoN MVO covoco'cNcd co M|>, ags - -S S S r II II II a. - . 0 IOWA PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 479 p. m. he could not commit the figures, and having made no progress after 15 minutes he desisted. The attention could not be held upon the work. A kind of mental lapse would constantly undo the work done. With both subjects an ener- getic * waking up ' by means of brisk walking and fresh air was often necessary during the latter time in order to address them- selves to these mental tasks. After sleep, A. G. S. easily com- mitted the figures in 88 seconds, and G. N. B. in 106 seconds, this being in both cases the shortest time in which the work was done. In respect to the number of letters named in one minute, there is with both subjects a steady decrease with the progress of the insomnia, with immediate return to the normal after sleep. In adding numbers similar results appear in a marked form in the case of A. G. S., but with G. N. B. adding time was affected but slightly. Reaction-time increases with A. G. S., as with J. A. G., but the reaction-time of G. N. B. is not lengthened. In respect to reaction with discrimination and choice the results are irregular and unsatisfactory. There is an irregular increase with A. G. S., but an actual shortening of time with the other two subjects. Attention should be called to the length of sleep following the sleep fast and its relation to the whole amount of sleep lost. A. G. S. found it necessary to make up but 16 % of the lost sleep, as measured by time ; J. A. G. 25 % ; G. N. B. 35.3 % ; As restoration was in each case apparently complete, explana- tion must be sought in one of two hypotheses or in both. The first is that, owing to the greater * depth ' of sleep after the sleep fast, the anabolism accompanying restoration was more rapid. The second is that the partial restoration which normally ac- companies the waking period was, in the case of this long wak- ing, greater than usual ; that the subjects, in other words, al- though apparently awake and, indeed, as wide awake as they could be kept, were nevertheless at times partially asleep. There are reasons to believe that the results depend upon both of these causes. Our subjects well illustrated the fact that sleep is a matter of degree. All that could be done both by objective diligence and subjective effort to keep the subjects wide awake was done. If the subject, contrary to his own intention, closed 480 G. T. W. PATRICK AND J. ALLEN GILBERT. his eyes, although he immediately opened them in response to his watcher's command, still there was time for a short and, per- haps, refreshing ' nap.' Again, one of our subjects, who was kept jogging about the streets during a sleepy period at 5 a. m., afterwards could remember little about the walk. Another sub- ject, standing with eyes open, reflectively gazing at a piece of ap- paratus upon which there were some pieces of rope, suddenly re- ported that he had had a dream about a man being hung. With our first subject we undertook to test the delicacy of the muscle sense by means of lifting weights. These weights were small tin pails loaded with graded weights and lifted by a detachable handle. Lifting these pails was found to be very monotonous and sleepy work. The subject was not permitted to let his at- tention wander, and yet he reported at least four dreams. For instance, he lifted two pails, carefully judged their relative weight, and as he set the second one down, instead of saying that No. i or No. 2 was the heavier, he said * trimmings,' evi- dently having fallen asleep as he was lifting or setting down the pails and dreamed that they contained trimmings. It must be understood that these dreams were instantaneous and the subject as wide awake as he could be kept, but these facts reveal a cerebral condition related to sleep. This hypothesis alone, however, would not seem to account fully for the small propor- tion of sleep made up. And, indeed, a study of our special tests shows that restoration took place chiefly during the pro- found sleep following the sleep fast, and took place rapidly. That this sleep was actually more profound and that the pro- found part of it was longer than usual was shown by our ex- periments in depth of sleep in the case of J. A. G. reported be- low. The depth of normal sleep for the consecutive hours of the night has been studied by Michelsen and by Kohlschiitter, and the results presented in the so-called sleep curves. The depth of sleep was determined by these observers by the intensity of sound necessary to awaken the sleeper. Their results show the greatest depth of sleep at the end of the first hour. After the first hour the curve drops abruptly and rapidly. Already at the end of the second hour sleep is light and continues slowly IOWA PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 481 to become lighter until morning. In the case of our first sub- ject, J. A. G., we attempted to ascertain the relative depth of sleep for the consecutive hours of the profound sleep following the sleep fast, for the sake of comparing our results with the normal sleep curve. As a sound stimulus would not be practi- cable, for the reason that, the experiments all being made in the same period of sleep the sleeper would soon become accus- tomed to it, we substituted a pain stimulus. An electric garter, to which the subject had become accustomed by wearing it for some nights preceding the sleep fast, was attached to the sleeper's ankle and connected with an induction coil in an ad- joining room, and so arranged that the current could be closed for a constant time, viz., .334 sec., by means of a pendulum, and that the strength of the current could be varied by means of a resistance tube. It was agreed that the sleeper should an- nounce his awaking by means of an electric button at his bed- side. The current was turned on at intervals of one hour. Unfortunately the least resistance that could be arranged with the resistance tube failed to awaken the sleeper at the first three periods, so that it was necessary to cut out the tube and the pen- dulum and apply the direct current and measure it roughly by the time the circuit had to be closed. Our results, therefore, lack the exactness necessary for the construction of a curve or table, but still show plainly the relative depth of sleep for the consecutive hours. The deepest sleep was found at the end of the second hour, when the subject could not be aroused suffi- ciently to ring the bell, but responded by a cry of pain. The next deepest sleep was found at the end of the first hour and the next at the third hour. The current used at these three times was one which it was altogether out of the question for the subject to endure when awake. At the end of the second hour, just after the experiment, we entered the sleeper's room and attempted to awaken him by speaking to him in a loud voice without avail. At the fourth hour the sleep was less deep, and continued to become lighter regularly until awaking, but the decrease in depth was very much less rapid than in the normal sleep curves reported above. At 10 a. m. a very slight current awakened the sleeper, and at 10 130 he awoke spontaneously as stated. 482 G. T. W. PATRICK AND J. ALLEN GILBERT. The tendency of our subjects to have short semi-waking dreams suggested to us that in enforced insomnia there would be offered a good opportunity for a study of dreams. This, of course, was incompatible with our purpose, but in the cases of A. G. S. and G. N. B., at the end of the sleep fast and before allowing the subjects to retire, we undertook a few experi- ments in dreams. We allowed the subjects to sit with head supported behind, and to sleep for periods of 30 seconds, one TABLE IV. J. A. G. 2d day be fore experiment. ist day before experiment. &i •sS £jj •ofc 2ft M Sj 11 p L n ji x \* °s frl ^fc ft* 4th day of ex- periment. (Sleep.) ist day after experiment. ad day after experiment. 24 1475 24 1370 24 1270 H 805 "# 400 24 950 Total amount urine(ccm.) Grams N. per hour . . . 0.901 0.929 0.667 0.723 0.490 0.723 Grams P2 O5 per hour . . 0.1327 0.1438 0.1105 0.1304 0.0564 0.0888 Relation P2 O5 to N. . . . 1:6.8 1:6.5 i: 6.0 i:5.5 1:8.7 1:8.1 A. G. S. Hours . . 38 1308 24 1510 24 1700 24 1420 i3# 750 12* 525 24 1000 24 1240 Total amount urine (ccm.) Grams N. per hour . . . 0.655 0.661 0.628 o.745 0.661 0.414 0.6175 0.761 Grams P2 O5 per hour . . Relation P2 O- to N. . . . 0.07 i: 8 65 .6 0.0708 1:9.3 0.0791 1:7.9 O.IOII i: 7-4 O.IOOO 1:6.6 0.0674 1:6.1 0.0907 1:6.8 0.1023 i:7.5 G. N. B. Hours 24X 24 24 23 I3# i6# 24^ 24 Total amount urine (ccm.) 920 1240 1205 1730 650 365 705 705 Grams N. per hour . . . 0.4853 0.7094 0.6270 0.6123 0.5195 0.3390 0.5020 0.4765 Grams P2 O5 per hour . . 0.0574 0.0802 0.0931 0.0826 0.0815 0.0435 0.0616 0.0613 Relation P2 O6 to N. . . . 1:8.5 1:8.8 1:6.7 1:7.4 i: 6.4 1:7-8 1:8.1 1:7-8 IOWA PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 483 minute, three minutes, etc., then awakening them and asking for their dreams. No dreams were obtained in any case. If the period was less than one minute the subject sometimes had a hazy memory of something like a dream which could not be put into words. If the sleep was longer it was apparently pro- found and dreamless. These rough experiments confirm, of course, the generally accepted opinion that dreams are the prod- uct of light sleep, representing indeed the reinstatement of consciousness after the early and profound sleep. Through the kindness of Dr. E. W. Rockwood, of the Uni- versity, a chemical analysis of the urine was made throughout the experiments in the case of each of the subjects. The object of the analysis was to determine the influence of continued waking upon the relative amounts of nitrogen and phosphoric acid respectively excreted. The results are fully exhibited in Table IV. as compiled by Dr. Rockwood. Considered in rela- tion to the fact that each subject increased in weight during the insomnia, the results are significant. They show not merely that there was an increase in the excretion of both nitrogen and phosphoric acid during the period of insomnia, but that relatively more phosphoric acid was excreted than nitrogen. A certain amount of support is thus given to the theory of a special connection between mental activity and the katabolism of the phosphorized bodies of the nervous system. STUDIES FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORA- TORY OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY. I. THE RELATIONS OF INTENSITY TO DURATION OF STIMU- LATION IN OUR SENSATIONS OF LIGHT. BY JAMES E. LOUGH. Instructor in Psychology, Harvard University. These experiments were made for the purpose of ascertain- ing the exact relation existing between the duration of a stimu- lus and the intensity of the resulting sensation. They were suggested by the phenomena of color-mixing by means of Maxwell's discs. This method of color-mixing shows that the influence of a given color upon the final mixture varies with the size of the sector of that color. In these rotations the color does not vary in intensity, but the time during which it stimu- lates a given portion of the retina changes. The relative time, however, is the only effective element, for after the colors once fuse, any increase in the speed of a rotation produces no change in the intensity of the colors. My first experiments repeated the conditions given by Max- well's discs, but with apparatus so arranged that the experi- menter could determine the exact amount of variation in the in- tensity of the sensation, resulting from a given difference in the duration of the stimulating light. Vx* t c FIG. i. The apparatus used may be understood from the ground plan shown in Fig. i. 484 HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 485 A B and B C are two wooden arms along which slide lamps a b of one standard candle power each. The lamp a stands a little higher than b ; and the dead white reflector #', standing at its level, reflects its light through the upper half of the slit E. The reflector b1 reflects the light from b through the lower half of the same slit. G is a large black screen to protect the subject's eyes from lateral lights. In it is the slit E I cm. wide by 4 cm. high. F is a black tube to fix the eye and still far- ther cut off side light. D is a dead black disc rotated by a color wheel. A window, d1 d", is cut out of this disc, as is shown in Fig. 2. FIG. 2. The lines m h, Ik and/ /are radial and m /, kj and h i arcs of concentric circles. D is placed so that when the window covers the reflectors a' and b1 the line j k is level with the hori- zontal line dividing them. Consequently a' stimulates the eye while d' is passing between it and the slit, and b' while d" is passing. The absolute duration of this stimulation will depend upon the rotation-rate of the disc, but we have seen that it is only the relative time we need to consider in comparing the ef- fects of stimuli of different duration. The relative times of ex- posure to the eye of the lamps a and b will be proportional to in and k n severally. The room was darkened and the lamps placed 20 cm. from the reflectors (correction being made in this and every other experiment reported for any over-estimation of intensity due to position, etc.). The disk, with jn and kn in the ratio of 2 :i, was rotated 100 times per second, under which conditions the 486 JAMES E. LOUGH. after-images from a1 and b1 fused completely, so that each reflec- tor gave a continuous impression. But the lower one now ap- peared much darker than the upper one. In order to determine how much darker, the lamp b was moved toward 3', thus increas- ing its objective intensity until the two reflectors again appeared equally illuminated. In other words, until the intensity of sen- sation lost through the shorter time of stimulation was compen- sated by the greater intensity of the stimulus. The relative in- tensity of the reflected lights may now be calculated from the distances of the lamps, and the ratio between the original inten- sity of b and the final one will express the loss of intensity due to its shorter time of stimulation. The results of this experiment are given in Table L, each ratio given being the average of ten determinations. The sub- jects were Dr. Singer and the writer. TABLE I. Ratio of Ratio of d< : d" Intensity. Subject. ' i-35 S. : 1.39 L. : 2.05 L. 2.05 : I 2.93: i 3.00: i 2.97 S. 3.02 L. It is clear from this table that when the difference of time between d' and d" is not greater than that here employed, the intensity of the resultant sensation is proportional to the time of stimulation. A second series of experiments followed these, differing from them only in this, that the light from a' was not inter- rupted at all, and hence always produced its maximum effect. The light from b1 was interrupted by sectors of the disc D. If S represents the width, in degrees, of the sector, then 360 : 360-8 will represent the relative duration of the stimuli from a1 and b'. The rapid rotation of the disc caused b' im- mediately to appear much darker, a1 ', of course, remaining un- changed. The intensity of b' was then made to equal a' by moving the lamp b nearer its reflector. From these data it is HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 487 possible to determine the loss of intensity due to the shortened time. The experiment was made with light of different intensi- ties. That reported in Table II. was produced by one candle- power at 100 cm. The experiments using other intensities gave the same results. Each number in the table represents the average of a large number of determinations. In this and all the following experiments the writer was the only subject, other persons being used only to confirm the results given. TABLE II. Ratio of duration. •0055 .0083 .Oil .014 .0166 .0194 .O222 .025 .0277 •0555 .083 .1111 •139 .166 .194 atio of Ratio of tensity. duration. .006 I .222 .0078 I .Oil I .OI2 I .0164 I .0177 I .0225 I •25 .306 .361 •5 .611 .666 .0249 I .702 .0273 I .059 I .091 I •7°5 .803 .888 .121 I .156 .176 I .902 .904 •97 .209 Ratio of intensity. •239 .272 .385 •463 .538 .645 .662 •7 .702 .813 .909 •943 •97 .98 This table shows that throughout the entire series a decrease in the time of stimulation results in a proportional decrease in the intensity of the resultant sensation. All of these experiments were then repeated with colored lights, produced by interposing gelatine sheets ; red, green, blue and yellow were used. These gave the same results as those given in Table II. It would appear from these experiments that the chemical processes in the retina take place only after a certain inertia has been overcome, and that this requires a certain duration of stimulation. When under ordinary conditions a stimulus of a given intensity excites the retina it produces a chemical dis- JAMES E. LOUGH. integration, which is a growing process up to a fixed limit, which depends upon the intensity of the stimulus. When this limit is reached, the light produces its maximum effect. Beyond the point of maximum effect, time produces no difference of inten- sity ; looking at a lamp for two minutes does not make it seem brighter than when it is seen for only one minute. But below this point of maximum effect, the duration of the stimulus is one of the factors determining the amount of disintegration in the retina and so the intensity of the resulting sensation. It was the object of a third series of experiments to find the point of maximum effect. The apparatus was the same as that already described, except that a large dead black screen swinging upon a pendulum apparatus took the place of the disc D. The screen contained a window similar to that in the disc. Let us call 'the upper and narrower half of this opening s', and this lower and wider half s", and the reflectors back of the screen a' and b' as before. The opening was so arranged that at the lowest point of the swing, both reflectors came simulta- neously into view, a1 being seen through 5', and b1 through s". The relative time during which a' and b7 will stimulate the eye will depend upon the relative width of s? and j", while the ab- solute time of both stimulations will depend upon the arc through which the pendulum swings. The absolute time of exposure was determined for each degree of swing by the ordinary means. The pendulum apparatus was made especially for this laboratory by Elbs Freiburg, after Miinsterberg. The length of pendulum is 2 meters, but adjustable weights and counter- weights give every rate of swing desired. The screen and opening were made in Cambridge, Mass. In order to obtain the time for maximum effect, the lamps were placed so that a1 and b' gave sensations of equal in- tensity and s' and s" were then adjusted to the relation of 1:2. When now the pendulum was allowed to swing through a small arc the two reflectors seemed equal, but as the amplitude of the swing increased, a point was soon reached where a' ap- peared just perceptibly darker than b'. This marks the point where a' fails to produce a maximum effect. With the openings and lamps adjusted as before, the pendulum was now given a HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 489 much larger swing. This caused a' to appear much less in- tense, while b' retained its former intensity. The amplitude of the swing was gradually decreased ; with this a' becomes gradu- ally more intense until it finally becomes equal to b' ; after this no farther change will take place. This also makes the point of maximum effect for a'. These points were ascertained by a large number of experiments and their mean taken as the real time necessary to produce a maximum effect. This point of maximum effect was found for light of several intensities, as given in Table III. The light of a single candle-power lamp at 320 cm. — the limit of the apparatus — was taken as the unit. TABLE III. Intensity of Light. Time of Maximum Effect. I. 148 ff 4 no ff 16 100 ff 64 85 ff 256 90 ff It will be seen from this table that while the time becomes a little longer for the weaker stimili it remains very nearly the same for all but the very lowest. Other subjects gave similar results, but the absolute times varied somewhat. It should be remarked here that the point of maximum effect — where duration influences intensity — is in no way connected with the threshold for time judgments. The judgment of a difference of duration does not go over into a judgment of dif- ference of intensity. A third series of experiments were made to determine the amount of intensity lost in a single stimulation by any given reduc- tion of time below that required for the maximum effect. Two methods were employed to reduce the time, giving rise to two sets of experiments. One method used a difference of swing, while the window remained constant ; the other varied the size of s', while the swing was the same throughout. The first series employed the method of right and wrong cases to determine the position of the lamps ; the second used the method of just per- ceptible differences. 490 JAMBS E. LOUGH. The first of these experiments was as follows : The pen- dulum apparatus above described was used, s' and s" were ad- justed in the relation 1:2, and the lamp b placed 20 cm. from the reflectors. The pendulum was allowed to swing through a given arc, and a moved until a' appeared similar to b' '. Table IV. gives the results of this experiment. The two series were separated by several months, both are given here to show the constancy of the results. Each number is determined by the method of right and wrong cases. Duration of stimuli. Arc. S'a S"a 60° 30 60 50 40 So 40 60 120 30 85 170 24 no 22O 20 150 300 18 i So 360 16 250 5OO 310 620 TABLE IV. Ratio of time. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Ratio of t series. intensity. 2d series. 1.99 1.94 2.03 .69 I I 2.03 1.85 •23 .08 I I 1.23 1. 06 .10 I 1. 00 .10 I 1. 02 We see from this table that until 40° is reached the lights keep the same ratio as the openings. Both reflectors did, how- ever, become lighter as the duration of the stimulation became longer. Below 40° b' remains constant and a' approaches it ; in other words, b' produces its maximum effect, at between 1200- and 1 70*7. After 18° the two reflectors are of equal intensity; a' is also producing its maximum effect. This point is somewhere between 1500- and 1800. These numbers differ from those given in Table III. But the determinations for Table III. were made with a more perfect reflector, giving a much more intense light. Figure 3 gives the curve of intensities as obtained from Table IV. Between the two points of maximum effect the intensity of the sensation is seen to be exactly proportional to the duration of the stimulus. The other set of experiments under this head gave a wider HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 491 so Jut w jj» i/o ipo i to tro FIG. 3. range of time for investigation. By the first method the time was limited by the maximum point for b'. With the second method the pendulum swung through a constant arc, and s" also remained constant, always producing a maximum effect, while the duration of a' was regulated by the size of s'. The inten- sity of light chosen was one candle-power at 80 cm. The time of maximum effect was first found for s' when s' and s" were in the rated i : 2 in the manner already described. It was found to be 100 a, and this was taken as the unit of time. The time of a' was now made one-half of the standard, ioo