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UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

by the

ONTARIO LEGISLATIVE LIBRARY

1980

PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT AFTER THE WAR

ROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT AFTER THE WAR

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D. APPLETON AND COMPANY

NEW YORK :: :: LONDON

1915

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COPYRIGHT, 1915, BT D. APPLETON AND COMPANY

Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS

I. THE WAR AND DEMOCRACY . .

Albert Bushnell Hart, Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D. Professor of the Science of Gov- ernment, Harvard University.

II. AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE WAR . 37

Edwin R A. Seligman, LL.B., Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Political Economy, Columbia University.

III. THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION ... 73

Franklin H. Giddings, Ph.D., LL.D., Pro- fessor of Sociology and the History of Civilization, Columbia University.

IV. THE RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE

STATE 98

Westel W. Willoughby, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins Uni- versity.

Y. THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW . . . 129

George Grafton Wilson, Ph.D., LL.D., Pro- fessor of International Law, Harvard Uni- versity.

CONTENTS

PAGE

VI. THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE AND

FINANCE 150

Emory K. Johnson, Ph.D., Sc.D., Pro- fessor of Transportation and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania.

YII. THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY AND NAVAL WAR- FARE 179

Caspar F. Goodrich, Rear- Admiral United States Navy, Retired.

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PROBLEMS OF READJUST- MENT AFTER THE WAR

THE WAR AND DEMOCEACY ALBEBT BTJSHNELL HAET

"The proof of democracy, ' ' says an Ameri- can sage, "is, does it democf" Just now that question comes home to all civilized mankind. Up to the twenty-third of July, 1914, every sig- nificant nation in the world from Montenegro to British Columbia had at least the appearance of the admission of the people to a share in their own government. Democracy was consid- ered the ripest flower of the highest civilization. Out of the nine great powers of the world, three — the United States, France, and China — were republics in form; and in each of the other six < — Great Britain, Germany, Austro-Hungary,

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Russia, Italy, and Japan — the representatives of the people had established their right to share the government with the personal sover- eign.

Today seven of those nine powers are plunged into the heat of the fray; and in every one democracy seems, for the time being, sub- merged. In not one of those countries are the people or their representatives now legislat- ing for the crisis or keeping the ministerial ex- ecutives in control by questions and criticisms upon military affairs. Nor does it appear that the people at large or the voters in any country resent this exclusion from a part in the great decisions that are being made. "We hear vaguely of bread riots; but the only constitu- tional crisis that has come about in the eight months of the war has been the change of for- eign minister in Austro-Hungary from an Aus- trian to an Hungarian. In England a few criti- cisms of the government are made in the public press ; most of which are received by the public as disloyal utterances ; none appears in Ger- many except a rare complaint by Socialist mem- bers of the Eeichstag. There is no public opin- ion— or rather public opinion compels every one not only to support the war but to support it

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with vehemence. Unhappy subjects of hostile countries are treated all over Europe as though they were escaped convicts.

In the strongly monarchical countries of Rus- sia, Germany and Austro-Hungary the author- ity was naturally retained by the emperor and his immediate group of councilors and officers. In all three countries the army and navy are closely centralized, and parliaments have never had much to do with them except to vote upon the terms of service and the money credits. It is only about a year and a half since the Ger- man Reichstag by a vote of 293 to 54, expressed its discontent at the ill-treatment of the civil- ians of Zabern by military officers ; nevertheless, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg refused to re- sign and allowed the officers to be acquitted by court-martial. In France and England the leg- islative bodies have for many years been accus- tomed to take a lively part in government while war was going on. Not even in the Boer War of 1899-1900, nor in the serious likelihood of wars involving France in 1905 and 1911, did tho^e bodies abdicate their functions. They have done so now. For when the representatives of the people are silent, the necessary decisions are not postponed, they are simply made by

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the executive. In this war the civil authori- ties have either given carte blanche to the mili- tary or have accepted and carried out their will.

Is this the end of European democracy? Will example and military pressure cause the end of American democracy? Are the people of the world giving over their destinies to the judgment of a handful of statesmen and war- riors, practically designated by themselves? Have the peoples as a whole no wisdom left? Is there a difference in the makeup of the hu- man mind between times of war and times of peace? Or when the cyclone is past, will the owners of the various ships of state again claim their right to their own property? These crit- ical questions come home with peculiar force to the people of the United States ; for popular government in America depends upon the power of democracy to repel the shock of mili- tarism.

One reason for the atrophy of parliaments is that in every belligerent country the people accepted the war when it broke out, took it up, made it their own, and are carrying it on as a national duty. In every country the thinking people as well as the unthinking were convinced

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that their country had been unjustly and mali- ciously attacked and would be destroyed unless the population rallied to the support of the government. The way for this conviction was prepared by a long propaganda in newspapers, periodicals, and books, especially in Germany, Great Britain, and France. For more than ten years, writers in all three countries have tried to arouse their countrymen to a belief that they were in imminent danger of invasion by im- placable enemies.

For example, in 1897 an English admiral in the Fortnightly Review declared that "if Ger- many were extinguished tomorrow, there is not an Englishman in the world who would not be richer." In 1912 Bernhardi's book stated more clearly than previous writers the aspirations and dangers of Germany and demanded for her " world-power or downfall." Cartoons, pam- phlets, and elaborate books have set forth the grievances of various countries and have sug- gested methods of carrying on "the next war." In Eastern Europe a campaign of hate has been going on ever since the Turkish Eevolution of 1908. The Austrians and the Hungarians had been gradually accumulating a reservoir of wrath against the Servians, because of their

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manifest hope to split off the Serb provinces from Austro-Hungary. The Russians have been nursing resentment ever since 1908, when they had not the military strength to resist the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria.

In the French school geographies, Alsace- Lorraine has for years been shown in a differ- ent color from the rest of Germany. Treitschke long ago taught his countrymen that ' ' England is today the shameless representative of bar- barism in international law." Before the war broke out thousands of respectable people who could not bring themselves to believe unproved evil of their own friends and neighbors, the people whom they knew best, were convinced that unknown Englishmen and Englishwomen, Russians, Germans or Servians, were sodden with crime and thirsting for other people's blood.

All this in spite of decades of efforts to bring people into a better understanding with each other, and a conscious effort to found a kind of world democracy of men of science, letters, and business. Students have traveled from country to- country; fellowships have been founded for foreigners; professors have been

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exchanged; addresses delivered by men from other countries. There has been an era of world- congresses of physicians, of historians, of elec- tricians, of engineers. Considerable groups of business men have traveled about to make them- selves acquainted with the spirit of foreign countries. When the crisis came, of course every man adhered to his own country: one cannot serve two masters. Was it also neces- sary for every man to deny his own experience of the character, courtesy, and high-minded- ness of his foreign friends I Philosophic Eucken rolls under his tongue as a sweet morsel a de- nunciation of "Servian accessories to murder, Eussian lust for conquest, English perfidious- ness, and at last, Japanese scoundrelism, all united." On the other side the Catholic Arch- bishop of Glasgow declares the war to be, "Christianity against paganism, the Cross and its civilization against the crescent and its bar- barism ; against the even worse — because delib- erate and calculated — barbarism of the War Lord."

It is a fair question whether most of these good people who enjoy bad language would not have been just as sttre of the greatness of their respective nations and the wisdom of

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their leaders if they had been told that all the monarch s and all the ministers were convinced that there was no sufficient cause for war. The trouble in such crises is that it is impossible for the people to form a judgment as to the danger, because they have not the facts. They must rely on somebody to judge of the crisis as a whole. In the United States we should expect the Senators and Eepresentatives of the na- tional Congress in such a crisis to be the peo- ple's eyes and lips. Congress might be more belligerent than the President, as it was at the beginning of the Spanish War in 1898 ; but Con- gress then believed that its constituents ex- pected the action they took, and that was why only one member of the House ventured to suggest even a brief delay. Let the name of Boutelle of Maine be remembered as that of a brave and honest man who wished at least to give public opinion an opportunity to form.

When the pinch came in Europe not a single one of the national legislatures, based on popu- lar representation, did its duty. The facts are obvious and dangerous. At the time the war broke out four of these bodies were actually in session or could be immediately summoned.

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THE WAR AND DEMOCRACY

The Parliament of Great Britain, the Reich- stag of Germany, the Senate and Chambre of France, and the Russian Duma were in exist- ence, filled with national concern, ready to give their wisdom toward the great decisions that had to be made. Not one of them was consulted till after war had actually broken out. Sir Ed- ward Grey's first definite statement to Parlia- ment was on the third of August, a day after he had committed his nation to the protection of the French coast. The Reichstag was con- sulted on August 4 when Germany was already at war both with Russia and with France. Pre- mier Viviani made an imperfect statement to the Chambre on August 3 and not till August 5 did he fully explain the situation. The Rus- sian Duma was called in special session August 8, seven days after war had broken out with Germany. The Japanese Diet was in session and acquiesced in the war ; but when later it would not vote the military measures which the Prime Minister thought necessary it was dis- solved and a new election ordered. In Austro- Hungary there is no federal parliament; but neither the Austrian nor Hungarian parliament was consulted either as to the ultimatum sent to Servia July 23, or on the attitude of the Im-

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perial Government toward the various proposi- tions for mediation or toward a direct under- standing with Russia.

When summoned, every parliament practi- cally abdicated; and probably would not have been allowed to remain in session if it had not been expected to abdicate. Representative de- mocracy in Europe seems almost to have dis- appeared for the time being. In not one of those countries are the people through their representatives now legislating for their ex- traordinary needs, or keeping track of the man- ner in which their affairs are carried out by ministerial executives. Only in London are questions put which might imply a lack of con- fidence in any military man or action. All the parliaments vote prodigious measures without assuming the right to alter a hair's breadth. The British Parliament strove for nearly two centuries to acquire control over the purse ; and is now ready to vote a thousand million dollars in a paragraph without so much as a suggestion as to the destination and use of the money. Enough that it is to be spent by the military men in carrying on the war. The German Diet voted the supply asked for by the government with only one negative vote. Numerous stat-

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utes solemnly enacted after long and careful discussion by the legislative authority are now superseded or ignored by votes of the Bundes- rath in Germany, or by Orders in Council is- sued by the British Ministry under a general authority from Parliament. That conquered provinces should be governed by military com- manders who levy contributions, assess fines on the cities, and exercise the power of life and death, is not remarkable. So much was done in the Philippines by the American military au- thorities. It is, however, an amazing spectacle to see the interior of lands which have hardly as yet seen an enemy — England, Scotland, Ireland, Brandenburg, Bavaria, and South- ern France — practically governed by martial law.

One of the triumphs and protections of demo- cratic government is the liberty of the press. It has been won by sheer determination in the teeth of the fundamental belief of despotic and dull governments that it is hurtful to them to have people discuss what is going on. In Rus- sia there is still a pig-headed censor system in times of peace, with its blacking-brush obliter- ation of what the censor does not like. Yet even there, since the establishment of the Duma,

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there has been an approach to common-sense. In Austria and Germany the journalists have been more or less tied up by official deposits of money which can be drawn upon in case of fines or verdicts against them. They have even had the droll institution of the " jail editor" ! Every journal has been required to file the name of its responsible editor; in many cases he is a man whose sole "responsibility" is to take his sentence and go to jail whenever his paper has been too bold. In France there was a reckless freedom of the press, restrained by occasional shootings. Germany has for years had, along- side many free and fearless newspapers, the institution of the reptile press, which crawls at the feet of the government functionaries who feed it with official information and subsidies. Nevertheless editors and journalists like Maxi- milian Harden of Berlin and Emile Zola have rendered a magnificent service to civilization by focusing the attention of the voters upon a case of oppression or corruption. As recently as 1911, almost the whole press of Germany de- nounced the slashing of the lame schoolmaster of Zabern by the undaunted Lieutenant von Forstner. In England every newspaper has been free to say anything it chose about any

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public official, though liable to be cast in heavy damages if it assailed a private reputation.

How is it today? Even in England there is no such thing as a free press. Among the bel- ligerent powers no criticisms are allowed on military movements or commanders, and the of- fense of printing the truth about things already known and published in other countries may lead to severe punishment. The government was so childish as to conceal the loss of the Audacious, which was known to hundreds of people. People expect censors in Austria, but it seems ridiculous for the London newspapers to be deprived of dispatches which go freely to America. Bernard Shaw and Vernon Lee tell John Bull that he is vain, stupid, and no better than his neighbors, and that is allowed to pass. Otherwise the military censors every- where employ the blue pencil and scissors. Partly because of this lack of common-sense news, in all countries there is a rage and fury against the unhappy citizens of enemy coun- tries who have been stranded away from home. The fear of spies is very like the fear of witches in colonial times, not founded on reason or af- fected by the lack of evidence. The possession of a German name, doing business behind a

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German sign, speaking a German sentence, may draw a mob upon an innocent person in a non- German-speaking country. Free thought, pub- lic discussion, the will of the people, seem to have lost their meaning.

One of the main arguments for universal mili- tary service is that, since every able-bodied military man is a soldier and in most coun- tries also a voter, the representatives of the people will never sanction a war that is not absolutely unavoidable. In the present great struggle not one country was held back for five minutes by the pressure of its citizen soldiery. In fact, the breaking out of the war is a con- clusive proof that universal service brings about a habit of mind which is very unfavorable to democracy. The citizen may oppose war, speak against it, write against it, ask his rep- resentative to vote against it. The same man as a soldier is taught that to oppose war is cowardly, a breach of discipline, contrary to the spirit of the service. On one side a man is an independent unit in a great aggregation and he may join with other units in peaceable remon- strance. On the other side, he is an undivided part of a military community in which argu- ment, hesitation, and discussion are traitorous.

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An army made up of democrats is not a demo- cratic army, least of all in services like those of Germany and Austria ; there, the officers are of a different social class from the men, and have no conception of accepting the decision of men in the ranks as a restraint upon their own action.

Here is the evidence that even a mild mili- tarism has very unfavorable effects upon democracy, even where it consists only in giv- ing a favored position to military men, exalt- ing military courage and preaching the gospel of obedience to one's superior officer. The goal of Americans is freedom. The joy of American living is the right to have one 's own way. The child looks forward to the day when he will be- come a man and can play a man's independent part. The sculptor searches for inspiration in the picturesque life of his own country and molds the frontiersman, the Indian, the cow- boy. The triumph of American education is the right of the professor to speak his mind. As a nation we go to an excess in freedom. The tramp follows his instinct to wander and to be fed by strangers. The yellow journal pushes the right of a free press to the point of scur- rilousness. Children select their schools and

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colleges, their friends and amusements. The trade in poisonous drugs is just now coming under regulation. Yet there is no genuine and wholesome American who does not feel that these extravagances are to be endured, if neces- sary, to keep the two pearls of great price — freedom of body from the control of another person, and the freedom of the soul to see and to describe things as they are.

War is the negative and denial of freedom. All modern wars rest upon the universal legal principle that it is the right of the state to command the service of any or all of its sons. The free American may be, indeed 'ought to be, compelled to undergo some military training. If he formally enrolls himself in the militia, he must obey orders to turn out for drill, camp, maneuvers, or riot service. The recruited man, the militiaman, and the drafted man may all be forced into the army in case of actual war. Once a man puts on the knapsack and takes hold of the rifle, he becomes the servant of his officers and the bondman of the state. "Obey orders, " is the first and last letter of the sol- dier's alphabet. That means to march for ap- parently unending days, to carry heavy bur- dens, to perform repulsive tasks, to live on

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scanty food, to drink noxious water, to sleep in the mud and wake to a miserable meal. The better organized the army, the more thoroughly does the once free man become a machine, or rather a cog in a machine. If his orders are to fire at the enemy, he sends his bullet in the air and it descends to kill a man whom he has never seen and who, if he could have known it, might have been a heart friend. He must obey orders if they bid him throw his living body into the cracking, hissing zone of death. He must obey orders if he is directed to fire on non-com- batants, or to drop bombs on nursemaids and babies in perambulators, or to sink a ship full of helpless women and children. Disobedience, even under such circumstances, is the heaviest of sins, to be atoned for by a disgraceful court- martial and a shameful traitor's death.

This is the contrast between freedom and war, the one aiming to make men rational, think- ing, considering beings; the other depending on the expectation that men will abdicate their own souls and do just what they are told. Hence, war has been the enemy of republics in all ages. The Greek, the Eoman, and the medi- eval democracies all went down in blood at last. What is the hope for mankind, the safety

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of civilization, if Mars is to lay his mailed hand upon the shoulder of every able-bodied man and say, " Think no more; only shoot "f On one side, democracy, on the other, militarism, con- tend for the dominion of the world.

In the last quarter-century the organized Socialists have been a power in the affairs of government ; in some countries they express the purposes of the working classes. In Germany the so-called Social Democratic party is the only party of protest, and its candidates receive the votes of hundreds of thousands of those who are discontented with what they think the arbi- trariness of the government. In 'the United States the avowed Socialists polled 900,000 votes in the presidential election of 1912. They are in most countries well organized and are strong advocates of an international under- standing between the working classes. Previ- ous to the war they were expected to defend ultra-democratic principles. What have they done in the present crisis f As an organization they have in all countries simply abdicated for the time being.

When the pinch came it was natural that the English Socialist should be an Englishman first, and a Socialist after the war shall be over. But

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in the militaristic countries there is a stronger reason for joining in the war with heart and soul. In Germany, for example, the aim of the Socialists is to show that they are not the dan- gerous and destructive class that has been pic- tured by high authority. They expect eventu- ally to lead the majority of their countrymen to their way of thinking, and their influence would be absolutely destroyed for decades to come, if after the war they should be held up as the sole body of Germans who would not defend the Fatherland. The Socialists at the front are earning the right to say, " We have not only lived with you ; we have died with you. And you can no longer hold that our doctrines are con- trary to patriotism and to self-defense." John Burns, the labor leader, resigned from the min- istry in England, but that was not because he was a Socialist, but because he felt with justice that he and his friends had not been consulted like other members of the Cabinet; that the aristocracy had made a capital decision with- out them.

Yet though Socialism as a principle is para- lyzed in the great war, Socialism as a principle has never in the history of mankind won such a victory. The method of the war has given

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the Socialists ammunition for half a century to come ; it proves their contention that the com- munity can work more efficiently through col- lective effort than through individual effort. Never has state Socialism been practiced on such a scale and over such an area. For the transportation and supply of armies, all the governments have taken whatever they wanted. They have for the time being nationalized the railroads, the food supply, the manufacture of arms, and will apply the same principles to the putting in and harvesting of crops, the produc- tion of mines, and the output of factories. What an uplift of the world would 'come about, if the nations could apply to such matters as education and social welfare the same terrific energy, the same abnegation of individual profit and interest and direction! Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, this tremendous single- minded national devotion is possible only be- cause it is unusual. A horse can be urged to put forth for a few minutes four or five times the muscular strength which he usually employs for drawing a load, but nothing will compel him to keep up that effort for a day or an hour. The screws of a monster ship will work steadily when they are submerged, but when the ship

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pitches, and the screws come out of the water, they may rack the machinery to pieces.

Nevertheless the state Socialism thus em- ployed is not of a kind that commends itself to the Socialist. It accords with the maxim, "from everybody according to his ability," but does not accept i l to everybody according to his needs. " The army comes first, second, third and fourth in the scale of thought and expendi- ture. To keep the army going, men must work ; and a strike in the arms factory is looked upon as hardly less than treason. All the great coun- tries involved, except England, have the un- questioned right to call out every man physic- ally able to take part in a campaign, and proba- bly millions who are not physically able. Eng- land will eventually come to conscription if the war lasts long enough; because the "thin red line of 'eroes ' ' will not be numerous enough for the crisis of attack or defense.

It is going beyond orthodox Socialism to compel men to work under military guard, and that is what every European country will do if it cannot otherwise keep up the supply of food and munitions. The commandeering of metals and food already practiced by Germany and Austria will be adopted by other nations if that

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is the only way to keep the populations alive and to supply the armies.

That is indeed the statecraft of our In- ternational Workers of the World; but the I. W. W. expect to control supply and trans- portation through their own chosen leaders, and not through any sort of hereditary or military officials. Socialists may enter the army to fight a foreign enemy ; yet when it comes to the point of shooting down fellow Socialists because they question the authority of the government, state Socialism runs on a rock. It is hard to see how this new Socialistic state differs from the old- fashioned despotisms which assumed the right to seize any or all of the property in their coun- try in order to use it for what they assumed to be national purposes. What is the difference in theory of government between a state in which Lord Kitchener calls out men and directs the distribution of food, and one in which Louis XIV did the same thing?

For many years the advocates of peace have been banking upon the self-interests of the busi- ness men, both large and small. Have they not a strong influence upon government in every country? The great money-lenders were sup- posed to form anti-war syndicates, looking after

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their interest and their coupons, and their ex- pirations and the drawings of their bonds for payment. The world had almost come to be- lieve that the power of commercial and finan- cial syndicates was the greatest in the ptate. Inasmuch as they have financed the wars of the past half -century, they thought they were in a steel fortress ; they believed apparently that no- body could make war without their lead. Was it not the money-lenders or rather the no-money- lenders, who made necessary the Peace of Ports- mouth in 1905 between Japan and Russia? Was it not the bankers who by withdrawing the French funds in 1911 nearly brought about a panic on the Berlin Bourse, and proved to the Germans that they could not afford to go to war on the Agadir incident? On the contrary, so far as the great capitalists work through their ramifying influences on the electorate or by direct contact with the executives, they have absolutely failed to delay the war by a single twenty-four hours. During the last twelve months they have acted as reservoirs of capital, and have remarkably supported the operations of their governments. The popular subscrip- tions to the German and English loans are un- deniable proofs of the strength and flexibility of

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the modern financial system. Nevertheless the capitalists accept the doctrine that it is their business to lend and not to consult. The power, weight, and authority of the men of business have for the time being ceased to control their governments.

Another class of business men is that of the small dealers, manufacturers and traders who up to this time in all countries have kept up profitable business, notwithstanding the ten- dency to bring industries together into large units. Whatever the limitations on the suf- frage, this class everywhere possesses it ; and it is as much interested as any class in politics, elections and popular government. Here, if anywhere, ought to be found a solid wall of re- sistance against an unnecessary war, and an un- breakable determination to take part by dis- cussion and through representatives in the management of affairs. Yet that class has shown no more resisting power or directing power than the laborers or the capitalists. Ger- many has always been interested in and pro- tective of der kleine Mann. In England the small shopkeeper is still a pillar of the state, and in France the family business and indus- tries are the admiration of all investigators.

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Could not those people rally to defend their obvious interests? They stand to lose more than anybody else. The workman who survives the war will find employment, perhaps on more favorable terms than before. The great cap- italist will come out the creditor of his country, and his children and grandchildren will draw the interest. The small men stand to lose more than their proportion of lives, all their savings, and very likely their business.

With the small business man is closely asso- ciated the farmer, whether land-owning or rent- ing; and that includes a considerable part of the peasants in all the European countries. Those people ought to be depended upon to look after their own interests. All representa- tive democracies consider them the safest class in the state. Yet in not a single country has that class asserted itself ! Higher taxes, expro- priation of crops and stocks of goods by the state, the draining of their savings, the stop- page of their little trade, any one of these things would cause an overturn at the next elec- tions in ordinary times; yet they are all ac- cepted without a quaver. What is the matter? Have men lost their interest in their own af- fairs, their farms, their gardens, their crops,

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their workshops, their offices? Has the desire to make one's children safe and comfortable ceased to be a motive in the human mind? Above all, has the democracy which has been growing steadily for a hundred and fifty years, suddenly lost its vitality?

The picture of the apparent abdication of popular government in Europe has been de- liberately drawn in strong colors, because it is a part of a problem to which the people of the United States are now directing their minds. In not a single European country have the peo- ple any intention of giving up the hard-earned right to share in their own government. There is no reason to doubt that the German Social- ists, for instance, will continue to send to the Eeichstag a large number of their representa- tives. Some of the oppressed classes at the bot- tom of the social and political scale may come to their own. If Jews in Poland and Gypsies in Eoumania can die for their country, have they not earned the right to live in it on equal terms? The confidence of the various peoples, their sacrifices, their heroism, ought to be a liv- ing lesson that they are capable of helping to direct the destinies of their land. The Duma which has stood by the Czar and the aristoc-

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racy of Russia can hardly be treated in this furnace flame as a set of visionary radicals. The war ought to draw the social classes of every country closer together.

The real reason for the present state of de- mocracy is obviously that the people of every nation believe that their only hope of victory is in concentration of their force. What they have actually done is to constitute groups of dictators for the time being. Never was there a greater mistake than to suppose that the Em- peror Francis Joseph and Kaiser Wilhelm II are tyrants who have usurped power. Author- ity has been deposited in their hands because national armies, directed by a single impulse, are doubly as effective as armies acting sepa- rately. We of the United States know that full well, because General Grant in 1864 was the first man to insist that the Eastern and Western armies should move at the same time and with a common purpose ; and that is why Grant and Sherman and Thomas and Farragut finished up the war. Even in our war the legal authority was concentrated in the hands of President Lin- coln. No military critic would admit that the Senate and House at that time contributed much to military efficiency. The main service of Con-

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gress was to keep the government in touch with the people at large, and to maintain enthusiasm through four dragging years. The Germans are right and the English are right in their feeling that the whole country must pool its issues, must concentrate its confidence, must accept great decisions made by a few self-chosen people.

For the national dangers are terrific. Every belligerent except Eussia has thrown into the fray its existence on the scale which it deems respectable. If Great Britain is defeated, she will lose a great part of her colonies and the naval prestige accumulated during three cen- turies. If Austria is defeated, she may be dis- membered. If Servia is defeated, she becomes a province of Austria, which to the Servians is a repulsive Nirvana. The Belgians have been defeated and for the time being have gone off the map of Europe. The midst of such danger is no time to stickle on a vote or a parliamentary inquiry.

All the European countries are much more familiar than we are in the United States with capital decisions made by others than legisla- tors. They have a tradition of royal preroga- tive enhanced by the titles, distinctions, re-

28

THE WAR AND DEMOCRACY

wards, and promotions which are at the dis- posal of the sovereign. In England treaties are made by the ministry and submitted to Parlia- ment for discussion after they have gone into effect. In France, the ministry and the indi- vidual ministers use large authority to bind the individual even in time of peace. Imperial re- scripts, royal orders, and ministerial minutes have the force of law; and, so far forth, Euro- peans do not feel the sense of usurpation that would be roused by similar action in this country.

Hence it is idle to suppose that the war may result in the overthrow of European thrones except perhaps in the Balkans. King George and perhaps Victor Emmanuel of Italy are the only royal sovereigns whose jobs might be en- dangered ; because the difference between their being kings and being simply an Englishman or an Italian is already small. The Russians, the Austrians, and the Germans have no na- tional conception of a government without a crown. The out-and-out Republicans in those countries are few, though those who desire democratic government are many. Whatever the result in any of the European countries, it is likely that either misfortune or victory will bind

29

PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT

closer together the sovereign and the people who have labored and suffered together.

Will the war also enhance the representative part of the various governments? That de- pends in large degree upon the success of re- publican France and essentially democratic England. The world is bound to take notice of the relative efficiency of popular and aristo- cratic governments. The ordinary voter is not a political philosopher, and if England and France win, even by dispensing with the parlia- mentary regime for the time being, the people will feel that democracy has triumphed. They will feel so rightly, because it wilLbe a proof that countries brought up under popular gov- ernment, in which the military and naval sys- tems and preparations are subject to parlia- mentary control, can hold their own against armies officered, trained and directed by a more nearly absolute system. Eome was no less a republic after Cincinnatus returned to his plow. Some republics have perished in similar crises, because the commanders of the army and navy have turned upon their creators; but nobody has the slightest dread of a King Kitchener the First or an .Empereur Joffre Premier, or a Kaiser Hindenburg. It is a fine tribute to de-

30

THE WAR AND DEMOCRACY

mocracy that nobody dreads the Man on Horse- back.

The success of the combination of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey would reaffirm the Oriental type of government in the Turkish Empire, in which the Young Turks, with all their efforts, have not been able to establish an actual parliamentary government, and are ruled by a self -perpetuated cabal. Thereafter Tur- key would stand toward Germany in the rela- tion that Egypt occupied toward Great Britain down to the present war — a nominally inde- pendent nation, while actually in complete de- pendence on its sponsor.

As for Austria-Hungary, it seems impossible that the Slav elements in a reconstituted em- pire should not gain more liberty and right of self-expression than in times past. They de- serve something, for they have inflicted a big scare on the monarchy, yet have not revolted. The present forms of democracy may be ex- pected to continue in Germany ; for the German Eeichstag with its manhood suffrage was or- ganized by Bismarck so as to give to the smaller states substantial representation in the empire. Doubtless success in war would somewhat exalt Prussianism, militarism, distinctions of classes

31

NN.

PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT

and military methods of government, which seem to outsiders so contrary to the genuine spirit of democracy. In any case no European country is likely to change either from democ- racy to monarchy or from monarchy to democ- racy. The future trend from or towards democ- racy will depend on who is the victor.

Although the United States of America seems to be quite outside the danger zone, we have something to learn from the experience of our democratic neighbors abroad. First of all are we wise in putting the immediate control of our armies and navies into the hands of civil- ians ? In our four external wars since 1789 and in our Civil War, the commander-in-chief of the armies and navies was in every case a civilian. We have had several presidents who were chosen because of their military reputation — Jackson, Harrison, Taylor, Grant — but not one of them took the conduct of a war upon his hands. Perhaps the American suspicion of military men as more likely to make themselves despots has no foundation; but civilian presi- dents ought to have military and naval experts upon whom they can throw direct responsibility.

Military experts have their failings, but it is the business of their lives to study the military

32

THE WAR AND DEMOCRACY

needs of their country and to keep abreast of the advance in military science and machinery. The United States might well follow the exam- ple of military countries like France and Eng- land in frequently putting at the head of the departments of war and navy men who are trained in that specialty. In the long list of secretaries of the navy since 1798, the only well- known name of a naval commander is John Eogers, who was ad interim for a few days in 1823. The first secretary of war, General Knox, was appointed because he was a trained mili- tary administrator; and Pickering, McHenry, and Armstrong were military men. Winfield Scott served about three weeks ad interim; but Jefferson Davis was the only experienced sol- dier to be appointed to the office except during the troubled period of reconstruction when Grant, Schofield and Sherman served for a few weeks.

If the country absolutely cannot trust its army to a soldier and its navy to a sailor, it absolutely must put military men in places of recognized responsibility. With great difficulty the army has secured a general staff, the chief of which, however, is supposed not to be in the confidence of the administration. Congress has

33

PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT

refused the similar naval staff which is essen- tial. Congress is not stingy. In the year pre- vious to the present war, the United States government spent more money for military and naval purposes than any European power. We may as well do in advance what Great Britain has been compelled to do by the danger of national ruin — we may as well select a man of brains and intrust him with the task of reor- ganizing the army, which sorely needs it. The United States is protected by three thousand miles of water and besides that, by the naval first line of defense; after that by the use of mines such as are protecting the coasts of Eng- land, France and Germany from a landing of enemies. Still those three countries have more than twenty thousand men available to resist an attack if the first and second lines were broken ! France and Great Britain have far ex- ceeded the United States in preparations, and yet both were caught without a sufficient amount of material and a clear knowledge of where the human units were to come from. It was not creditable to the kingdom of Great Britain and the empire of India that 324,000,000 human be- ings should have had at their disposal in a mo- ment of supreme danger — leaving out of ac-

34

THE WAR AND DEMOCRACY

<jount the garrisons in Africa and Asia — less than 100,000 troops available for immediate service. It is still less creditable to the United States that 100,000,000 human beings should rely upon a net effective force capable of being thrown at any point on our eastern coast of less than 25,000. We have the keenest desire to maintain democracy in the western world, but there can be no democracy of the United States unless there is a United States capable of keep- ing out hostile armies.

Above all American democracy must recog- nize that armies are made up of soldiers. The English territorials and colonial levies have been molded in from four to six months into good troops ; but if the Germans had been able, as seemed not impossible, to land an army in England, the United Kingdom would have col- lapsed. Thereupon Paris would probably have been captured. It is a crime which ought to be punishable by confinement in a state's prison, for the American people to rely upon untrained volunteers for future wars. Their quality is high and once properly drilled and officered they could march, fight, and hold trenches against any soldiers in the world. But the experience of the United States in every

35

PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT

war from the Revolution to the Spanish War has been that the refusal to give military train- ing till the war is actually breaking out means a fearful waste of treasure and of lives. The wars of the future are going to be fought by great masses of trained men. What American democracy needs is simply to apply to its own defense the principles of organization, expert service, and efficiency which have made its rail- roads and mines and factories so productive. This favored country cannot go on indefinitely enjoying the privileges of modern life without taking account of the present changes in war- fare and international relations.

n

AN ECONOMIC INTEEPEETATION OF THE WAR

EDWIN E. A. SELIGMAN

There have been almost as many explanations of the great war as there have been writers. The explanations, moreover, have ranged over a very wide field: personal jealousies, dynastic differences, militarism, wounded pride, the en- deavor to round out political boundaries, racial antagonism, not to speak of such high-sounding phrases as struggle for liberty, or fight for na- tional existence — all these and many more have been advanced for popular consumption. What is lacking in them all, however, is a realiza- tion of the fact that a conflict on this gigantic scale must be explained on broader lines than any of those mentioned. Wherever our sym- pathies may lie in the present struggle, it be- hooves us, as students of the philosophy of his-

37

PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT

tory, to take £ position far removed from the petty interests of any of the contending par- ties. Servia tells us that she is fighting for independence; Austria maintains that she is struggling against political disruption ; Russia asserts that she is contending for the liberties of the smaller Balkan States ; France urges that she is endeavoring to restore freedom to her lost provinces ; England puts in the foreground resistance to the insolent pretensions of mili- tarism and protection of small nationalities; Germany claims a place in the sun; and Japan — well, Japan is fighting to defend, large rather than small nationalities, that is, to free China from German domination. In each country, with scarcely a single exception, there has been a truly national uprising. Each of the contest- ants considers that he is fighting for a holy cause, and is thoroughly convinced not only of the justice of his own claims but of the infamy of his adversary's. Rarely in the world's his- tory has there been presented such a spectacle of genuine and universal enthusiasm penetrat- ing every nook and cranny of the belligerent countries, combined not only with an utter in- ability on the part of each to understand the position of the other, but also with a fierce and

38

AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION

implacable hatred between the more prominent contestants.

But if, amid the actual clash of arms, it is impossible for any of the belligerents to see the situation in its true light, is there any excuse for us, as neutrals and would-be philosophers, to content ourselves with the explanations that are born of mutual prejudice ! Is it not rather incumbent upon us to realize that there are deeper world forces at work which are respon- sible for the present titanic conflict ; and if so, is it not somewhat hasty to endeavor to appor- tion praise or blame for what is the inevitable result of world forces I

The starting-point of our analysis is the ex- istence of nationality. Modern, as distinct from medieval, and in part from ancient, political, life, is erected on national foundations. The city states of classic antiquity or of the Middle Ages, although forming political entities, had no direct relation to the facts of nationality. There were in fact no nations : there were peo- ples and races and states, but no nations. The Greek states warred with each other, and there was an Hellenic people ; but there was no Greek nation. Borne overran the world, and the Eoman Empire included many peoples and

39

PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT

races ; but we cannot properly speak of a Roman nation. In the later Middle Ages, the Italian and the German cities were often at war with their neighbors ; but there was no Italian state or German state, and still less an Italian nation or a German nation. Modern political organi- zation, on the other hand, is framed on national lines ; and it is now universally recognized that the creation in the seventeenth century of the first great national states on the continent, as well as the solidification of the British common- wealth, was due to economic forces. It was now that what the economists call the local or town economy gave way to the national economy; it was now that land as a predominant economic force was replaced or supplemented by com- mercial and industrial capital. Land in its very nature is local; capital, in its essence, trans- cends local bounds. The rise of the national state was an accompaniment of the change in economic conditions.

From that time to this the basis of national life has been economic in character. I do not, of course, desire for a moment to deny that other factors have contributed. National con- sciousness, is a subtle product of many forces, among which geographical situation, common

40

AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION

language, inherited traditions and similar so- cial and political ideals have all contributed to perpetuate the racial characteristics which differentiate one nation from another. That racial and even religious differences have in the past frequently led to sanguinary contests goes without saying; and he would be ven- turesome indeed who would dare to predict that the future has not in store for the world many a conflict referable to these same causes.

If, however, we trace the history of the world during the past few centuries we are struck by the fact that, on the one hand, nations of dif- ferent races have lived together in complete amity, and that, on the other hand, separate nations belonging to the same race and the same religion have often indulged in the most vio- lent conflicts. Examples like the war between England and the United States, between Chile and Peru, between Prussia and Austria, could easily be multiplied. If in these cases the old explanation of racial antagonism obviously does not suffice ; if on the contrary the political con- tests in such cases were due to more fundamen- tal economic causes, is it not fair to assume that as between nations of different races as well,

41

PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT

similar economic causes often lie at the bottom of the controversy?

While economic considerations indeed do not by any means explain all national rivalry, they often illumine the dark recesses of history and afford on the whole the most weighty and satis- factory interpretation of modern national con- tests which are not clearly referable to purely racial antagonisms alone. The present strug- gle is without doubt to be put into the same category. To say, however, that nationalism in its economic aspects is the root of the present trouble is not yet adequate. For we have still to explain why there should have been such a recrudescence of nationalism of recent years. On the contrary, it might be asked, if the mod- ern age is essentially a capitalist age, why should we not, in the face of the international aspects of capitalism, have a growth of inter- nationalism rather than of nationalism? Why should we not be on the brink of that era of universal free trade, of permanent peace and of international brotherhood for which Adam Smith and the Manchester School so valiantly contended? Why is it that after the downfall of the Mercantile System — which was nothing but the economic side of the great national move-

42

AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION

ment of the seventeenth and the eighteenth cen- turies— we should witness, hand in hand with the undoubted growth of international inter- course and mutual understanding, the revival of the so-called Neo-mercantilism, as found a generation ago in almost all the continental nations of Europe as well as in the United States? And why should we at this very mo- ment be in the presence of an almost universal emergence of national consciousness which threatens to destroy well-nigh everything that has been won during the nineteenth century, and which in its deplorable aspects is typified no less by the Oxford pamphlets of the English scientists than by the fulminations of the German professors or the decisions of the French learned societies ? "What are the world forces which compel human beings, almost per- haps against their will, to act as do the foremost representatives of our present-day civiliza- tion?

If I read history aright, the forces that are chiefly responsible for the conflicts of political groups are the economic conditions affecting the group growth. These conditions have of course assumed a different aspect in the course of history. The first and most obvious reason

43

PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT

leading to an expansion of a political group is the desire to insure a food supply for the grow- ing population. It is today a fairly well estab- lished fact that the forces which set in move- ment the migration of the peoples from Asia to Europe and which were responsible for the so-called irruption of the barbarians were pri- marily the inability to maintain the flocks and herds, owing to the gradual desiccation of the original home, and the necessity of seeking fresh pastures abroad. We have recently been taught that the secret of the implacable enmity between Eome and Carthage was the desire to retain Sicily as the granary of the world. The need of an adequate food supply is the first con- cern of every political entity.

The next step in the economic basis of po- litical expansion is the desire to develop the productive capacity of the community. This al- ways assumes one of two forms. Where agri- cultural methods are still primitive and agri- cultural capital insignificant, the system of cul- tivation is necessarily extensive. As a conse- quence, and especially in those countries where slavery has developed, the need of a continual supply of fresh land as a basis for profitable slave cultivation, becomes imperative. It is this

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AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION

fact which explains the Mexican War in the history of the United States, as well as number- less conflicts of former ages in other parts of the world.

On the other hand, where agriculture ha& been supplemented by an active commercial in- tercourse, and especially in the case of coun- tries contiguous to the sea, the desire for the in- crease of wealth based on commercial profits* has in the past everywhere led to a struggle for the control of the trade routes. From the time of Phoenicia down to the domination re- spectively of the Hanse towns and of Venice,, the grandeur and decay of civilization may al- most be written in terms of sea power.

All these changes, however, were anterior to- the growth of modern nationalism. What, then, are the points in which modern struggles differ from their predecessors?

From this point of view it may be said that the first stage of modern nationalism represents an analogy rather than a contrast; and that it is only in the later stages that the real differ- ences are to be sought. In the first stage of modern nationalism we find in fact a combina- tion of the three forces which, as we have seen, played so important a role in former times.

45

PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT

The closing of the land route to India, through the Mohammedan conquest of Con- stantinople, and the discovery of the New World were the two chief factors which led to the development of nationality in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was at this time that the great colonial empires of Spain, Por- tugal, Holland, France and England were formed. The struggle to protect the economic interests involved in the colonial system led necessarily to an organization on a national scale. The real basis of the early colonial sys- tem, however, was the attempt to secure either raw materials for the incipient manufactures of the mother country, or crude articles like the spices from the East Indies, or treasure from America. The early colonial system, which itself marks the transition from medieval feudalism to modern capitalism, thus represents an attempt to increase the area of the supply of certain kinds of food, or the endeavor to expand the basis of productivity by the acquisi- tion of fresh land calculated to yield raw ma- terials or, finally, the effort to secure what was considered the essence of wealth itself in the .shape of the precious metals. In order to ac- complish each of these results, a great navy

46

AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION

was necessary, and such a navy could be pro- vided and maintained only along national lines. Before long, however, the accumulation of capital derived from the profits of the colonial empire found its chief utilization in an appli- cation to industry; and as this capital grad- ually percolated through business enterprise, the whole form of economic organization was changed. In the place of the medieval guild system where the same individual bought the raw material, fashioned the commodity, and sold the product to the consumer, there now grew up what was later on known as the do- mestic system, that is, the system where the first and third stages of the process were in the hands of capitalists who could both buy the raw material and sell the product on a large scale, while the second stage in the process was still carried on by the individual workman in his own home. The emphasis was consequently now put upon the protection of this national industry against its rivals, and the colonies henceforth became important, not so much as sources of raw material as, on the other hand, favorable markets for the commodities manu- factured in the mother country. The so-called Mercantile System was badly named: because

47

PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT

although it is true that the prosperity of both colonies and mother country depended on the interchange of products carried on through overseas commerce, the essence of the system was the development of domestic industry on a national scale. The great wars of the seven- teenth and eighteenth centuries, fought in or- der to control the sea and to expand the colonial empire, all had in view the development of the nascent industry on capitalist lines. Protec- tion of industry was, therefore, the character- istic mark of nationalism during this period.

With the advent of the nineteenth century, however, Great Britain was ready to enter upon the next stage of development. Having built up her industry by the most extreme and ruth- less system of protection that the world has ever known, and having wrested a large part of her world empire from her competitors, Eng- land now found it to her interest to go over from a system of protection to one of free trade. The free-trade movement, as is almost always the case with great economic transitions, was only ostensibly in the interests of the consumer, but actually in the interests of the producer. Thanks to a favorable conjuncture of events fa- miliar to all scholars, the industrial revolution

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AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION

—which means the complete application of cap- italism to every stage of the productive process — took place first in England, and thus consoli- dated her position of industrial primacy. But as free trade and universal peace were obvi- ously the means best calculated to perpetuate this industrial monopoly, we find Great Britain from this time onward desirous of living in amity with all those countries which had for- merly been her rivals, but which were now hope- lessly distanced in the industrial race and which were henceforth to be regarded as the most desirable markets for the output of British fac- tories.

With the gradual spread of the factory sys- tem, however, into the continental countries, a new situation was engendered. In the first place, economic pressure upon Germany and Italy gradually resulted in the creation of a political nationality in order to mobilize the economic forces on a national scale. As a con- sequence, we find emanating from those coun- tries, as soon as nationality was achieved, pre- cisely the same movement of protection to in- dustry which had characterized the Mercantile System several centuries earlier. Just as na- tionalism was the real basis of the early Mer-

49

PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT

cantilism, so this movement now came to be called Neo-mer cantilism. In France, indeed, where, as we know, nationalism had been achieved at an earlier date, the new move- ment assumed a slightly different form, namely, that of competition for the mar- kets of the world. It was this competi- tion for the world market which now, after the period of quiescence and universal good will during the sixties and seventies, led in the eighties to the new movement for the in- crease of the colonial empire on the part of both England and France, and which at one time almost threatened to bring those two great na- tions into collision in Africa. Moreover, the advent of the industrial revolution in Germany and the transition from the domestic to the factory system immensely increased the tempo of the evolution. Whereas in the first decade after the formation of the German Empire the chief emphasis was put by Bismarck upon pro- tection, now towards the close of the century the national industry had been built up to such an extent that Germany soon joined France in competing for the world market against Eng- land.

This transition from a period of protection 50

AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION

to a period of competition for markets would not, however, have sufficed to bring about the present gigantic struggle. The most important phase of modern industrial capitalism still re- mains to be explained. After national industry has been built up through a period of protec- tion, and after the developed industrial coun- tries have replaced the export of raw materials by the export of manufactured commodities, there comes a time when the accumulation of industrial and commercial profits is such that a more lucrative use of the surplus can be made abroad in the less developed countries than at home with the lower rates usually found in an older industrial system. In other words, the emphasis is now transferred from the export of goods to the export of capital.

England reached this stage a generation or two ago. For England, as is well known, has largely financed not only North and South America, but also many other parts of the world as well. In fact, the chief explanation of Eng- land 's immense excess of imports is to be found in the profits from her surplus capital annually invested over the seas. Because of her later transition to the factory system, France fol- lowed at a subsequent period, but even then

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PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT

only to an inconsiderable degree. For in the first place, the virtual cessation in the growth of population prevented any such increase of output as in England, although naturally aug- menting the per capita wealth, and especially the prosperity of the peasant. And in the sec- ond place, since the French are far more con- servative, largely for the reasons just men- tioned, their annual surplus, such as it is, has been invested chiefly in contiguous countries like Spain and Belgium, and later on, for obvi- ous reasons, in Eussia. Thus France did not develop into any serious competitor of Eng- land in the capital market of the .world. On the other hand, the significant aspect of recent development is the entrance of Germany upon this new stage of development. The industrial progress of Germany has been so prodigious and the increase of her population so great, that with the opening years of the present century she also began on a continually larger scale to export capital as well as goods. It was this attempt to enter the preserves hith- erto chiefly in the hands of Great Britain that really precipitated the trouble. For if the growth of national wealth depends upon the tempo of the accumulation of national

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AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION

profits, and if the rate of profits is, as we have seen, far greater in the application of capital to industrially undeveloped coun- tries, it is clear that the struggle for the con- trol of the international industrial market is even more important than was the previous competition for the commercial market.

Other and more familiar phases of the eco- nomic struggle have no doubt played their role in the various countries. It is indubitable, for instance, that Russia, still a predominantly agricultural community, is endeavoring to se- cure Constantinople partly in order to obtain an unrestricted vent for her wheat, partly in order to acquire a port which will not be ice- bound for the greater part of the year, and partly in order further to consolidate the basis of her national wealth. Austria, which is some- what further advanced in industrial develop- ment, is assuredly interested in preventing in- terference with her economic hegemony in the Balkan States. Germany, because of her close union with Austria, is almost equally con- cerned in resisting the Russian pretensions. France, finally, would naturally seek to recover her lost provinces whenever the opportunity for an effective cooperation with Russia pre- 53

PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT

sented itself. So that those who desire to inter- pret the war on the lines of an economic strug- gle between the Teuton and the Eussian civi- lizations would find no little basis for their con- tentions. All these, however, would not suffice to explain the one thing which needs elucida- tion : Why has the present contest attained the dimensions of a veritable world war, and why has it become clear, not only to the dispassion- ate observer, but to the contestants themselves, that the real struggle is between England and Germany!

If, however, Germany and England are the real antagonists, the true interpretation of the war must rest on this antagonism. From this point of view it is significant that England should now for more than three centuries have fought her way up with successive rivals in turn. In the seventeenth century, England's chief fight was against Holland ; in the eighteenth cen- tury her greatest antagonist was France, and now, finally, she has locked horns with Germany. To the student of economic history, the present war, however, was just as inevitable as its pred- ecessors ; in this case, as in the others, it seems unnecessary to advance the minor explanations which are currently found. England's war with

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AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION

Holland was a struggle for the control of the seas as a prelude to the expansion of national industry. England's wars with France were contests for colonial empire resting on a com- petition of markets for goods; England's war with Germany marks the final stage of a com- petition involving not simply the export of goods, but the export of capital.

While Germany was in the first stage of eco- nomic nationalism she took relatively no inter- est in colonial expansion, but was busily en- gaged in developing her industrial power and in utilizing to that end the same weapon of pro- tection which had served Great Britain in such good stead in preceding centuries. With the consolidation and development of industrial enterprise Germany soon entered upon the sec- ond stage of economic nationalism, that of com- peting for the markets of the world. The ex- port of commodities thus led naturally to co- lonial expansion, as a result of which the early Bismarckian policy was reversed. With the be- ginning of the present century, however, Ger- many entered upon the third stage of economic nationalism, supplementing the export of goods by the export of capital. Now it was that there emerged the real rivalry with England. Now

55

PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT

for the first time there came into view the pos- sibility of the financial control of large sections of the world, of which Morocco and Asiatic Tur- key are good examples. These efforts for finan- cial control represented a penetration of back- ward countries by a developed capitalism — a peaceful penetration if possible, but a penetra- tion at all costs. For Germany was learning the lesson from England's experience, and was fully aware of the fact that a financial or cap- italistic domination is the surest avenue which leads toward commercial growth and which renders probable the greatest multiplication of profits.

This consideration seems of slight weight. Is it not true, it might be urged, that capital is invested in foreign countries by people of all nationalities, and that the stock of modern cor- porations pursuing their activities in any coun- try is distributed among investors of all finan- cial countries? This criticism, however, does not touch the core of the matter. For in the first place corporation policy is not influenced by the minority stockholders at all ; and it is de- termined, so far as nationality is concerned, by that of the controlling directorate. The fact that the shares of the South African mines were

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AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION

traded in on the Berlin stock exchange did not affect the close connection of the British min- ing corporations with the Boer War. And in the second place, the political influence which goes with financial authority is itself respon- sible for all manner of economic advantages, di- rect and indirect. It would be tedious as well as unnecessary to recite in detail the countless benefits that England has derived from India, or more recently from Egypt, and the number- less subtle ways in which she has contrived, just as every other nation would have done, to retain most of these benefits for herself. For who will in any way doubt that under modern conditions political preferment is the real open sesame to economic advancement! We have only to point to what is taking place at this very moment between China and Japan.

The German statesmen were simply learning their lesson from the vast book of English ex- perience. The German economists were, almost to a man, united in the belief that, while it may not always be true that trade naturally follows the flag, it is clearly not open to doubt that political influence paves the way for economic superiority and vastly enhances the opportuni- ties for economic preferment. It was primarily

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PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT

to augment this political influence and to clinch these expected financial and commercial advan- tages that a large navy, with coaling places and stations throughout the world, became a neces- sity. This attempt, however, necessarily con- stituted a challenge to England's virtual mo- nopoly of sea power and engendered in both countries the state of mind which has finally re- sulted in the present conflict.

To say, then, that either Great Britain or Germany is responsible for the present war, seems to involve a curiously short-sighted view of the situation. Both countries, nay, all the countries of the world, are subject to the sweep of these mighty forces over which they have but slight control, and by which they are one and all pushed on with an inevitable fatality. Eng- land, no less than Germany, Austria no less than Eussia, cannot escape this nemesis. How idle is it, therefore, to speculate as to what the particular torch may have been which set fire to the conflagration ! How bootless is it to attempt to estimate from the blue book or the white book or the yellow book which states- man or set of statesmen is responsible for the particular action that led to the declaration of war ! If the war could have been averted now,

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it was bound to break out in the more or less immediate future. Germany like England, Austria like Eussia, Italy like Servia, each was simply following the same law which is found in all life from the very beginnings of the indi- vidual cell — the law of expansion or of self- preservation.

It is a curious fact that no one should hitherto have attempted to explain the paradox of in- creasing internationalism combined with the recrudescence of the newer nationalism which we are witnessing today. And yet, in the light of the preceding analysis, the explanation is simple. In the earlier days of civilization the stranger was the enemy because the economic unit was the local unit. With the slow growth of trade, these barriers were gradually broken down and the feelings of enmity attenuated, until, as in the Eoman Empire, natural law de- veloped as the law common to all peoples. In the same way, in the later Middle Ages, the local antagonisms were disappearing before commercial progress, until we even find dream- ers who several centuries ago welcomed the speedy advent of the universal republic and proclaimed the impending reign of a world citizenship. As we have seen, however, the cre-

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ation of industrial capitalism and the birth of nations in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen- turies consolidated the economic interests along national lines. While individuals now consid- ered themselves citizens of a country rather than of a town, national antagonisms became stronger than the older local antagonisms. Yet after the first fierce onset of national power the forces of internationalism began to assert them- selves, and international law was born, although never becoming a very lusty infant. A little later, however, when Great Britain had com- pleted the first stage of nationalism through protection, it was so clearly to her interest to emphasize the ties that bind nations together, that her philosophers and economists found for a time a more or less ready response to their cosmopolitan teachings among those countries which were not yet quite prepared to start on the road of nationalism. Thus it was that by the middle of the nineteenth century the pre- cepts of Adam Smith were now taken up by Cobden and Bright, and were reechoed in Ger- many, in Italy, in Eussia, and in other indus- trially undeveloped parts of the world — with the one significant exception of the United States, which, having entered after the Civil

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War upon her first real stage of nationalism, turned a deaf ear to the preachings of the Man- chester School.

With the progress of the industrial revolu- tion in the United States, however, and with her gradual transition from an exporter of food to an exporter of finished products, the United States was ready to take its place side by side with England in preaching the gospel of cosmo- politanism and good will, and in emphasizing the forces which make for the growth of inter- national trade. Had all the nations of the world been on the same level of economic prog- ress, the very existence of capital as an inter- national force would have lent a mighty sup- port to the spread of good feeling and inter- national fellowship. Unfortunately, it was pre- cisely this equality that was lacking. In the absence of such a situation, the exploitation of the capitalistically undeveloped countries by the few nations which had reached the third stage of economic nationalism, that of the ex- port of capital rather than of goods, became the keynote of a new struggle. Thus it is that modern capital, which on the one hand works* toward real internationalism, peace and public morality and which will ultimately be able to*

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accomplish its beneficent results, is at the same time responsible for the weakening of inter- national law and the revival of a more con- spicuous and determined nationalism because of the greater prize to be achieved and the fiercer struggle necessary to win it.

In the political life of the world today we see the same forces at -work as in all life from the very beginning — the forces which we sum up under the terms of the competitive and the cooperative process, the individualistic and the collective movement. Just as the animal or- ganism was built up by a combination of the struggle between the cells and cooperation among them ; just as human society has devel- oped through the advance of the individual working hand in hand with the growth of the group ; so the world society that is slowly com- ing to pass is evolving in obedience on the one hand to the competitive spirit of national strug- gle, and on the other, to the cooperative forces of internationalism — both of them inherent in the modern factory system, resting upon indus- trial capitalism. At certain stages in the world's history the one set of forces seems to be in the ascendency, at another stage the opposite set ; but in reality they are complementary ancl

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are always working together. It is the indus- trial revolution with the factory system and the growth of capitalism which has set in motion the mighty forces both of world cooperation and of national antagonism.

In the light of what has been said, the pres- ent and the future of the United States form an especially interesting subject for considera- tion. When this nation was born it was for some decades weak and puny. It was the genius of Alexander Hamilton which realized the true economic basis of nationality and which at- tempted to start the country on its real career. The gradual dominance of American politics- by the South, the economic basis of which was agricultural rather than industrial, was, how- ever, responsible for good as well as for evil. The emphasis upon states' rights indeed almost destroyed the Union; but the need of a wider basis of productivity under the extensive sys- tem of slave labor was responsible for the Mex- ican War and the rounding out of our imperial domain. It was only with the completion of the Civil War that this country as a whole entered on the first real stage of economic nationalism. Thus it was that the United States, following the example of Great Britain a century before^

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"built up an enormous industrial power through a system of national protection. We are now just beginning to reach the stage attained by Great Britain three generations ago, the stage, namely, of transition from the export of agri- cultural products to that of the import of agri- cultural produce and the export of manufac- tured products. We have not yet reached, and it may well be at least another generation be- fore we reach, the third stage of economic na- tionalism, that of the export of capital on a large scale as the typical form of profitable enterprise. When we reach that third stage, which, as we have seen, carries 'with it the struggle for the exploitation of the relatively undeveloped parts of the world, our real trial will come, and the true conflict between nation- alism and internationalism will begin. Then, and then for the first time since the develop- ment of our national forces, shall we have an opportunity to test the foundation of our his- toric friendship with Great Britain. Then, and then for the first time, will the situation arise when Great Britain, instead of being bound solidly to us by the bonds of her financial in- terest in us, will face the United States as a rival, a rival on the international market for

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the control of the capitalistically undeveloped countries. "Whether by that time the forces of internationalism will prevail and good will and peace continue, or whether, on the other hand, the United States will be impelled, perhaps against her will, to take the place now occupied by Germany, can be foretold by no one.

Finally it may be asked what is to be the outcome of all this? Are wars to go on for- ever? Is the present struggle, gigantic though it be, simply a forerunner of wars still more gigantic? Or, on the other hand, are the dreams of our pacificists to become true, and is universal peace to be realized?

If there is any truth in the preceding analy- sis, both of these things are coming in the full- ness of time. That is, we are to have more wars, but we are to have ultimate peace. The reason that we are to have more wars is simply because of the fact that what we call the indus- trial revolution is in reality only a gradual change, and that this change is but slowly per- meating the world. That part of the earth's surface which is occupied by countries with a highly developed industrial capitalism is rela- tively small. Although capitalism is spreading throughout the West and South of the United

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States and effecting a lodgment in Canada and Japan and Kussia, it is only beginning in the rest of Asia and Africa as well as in South America and Australia. As long as there are vast stretches of territory still waiting to be developed, so long will they prove to be a lure to the industrially advanced nations of the world. England, and to a much less extent France, have until recently provided this capi- tal. Whatever be the outcome of the present war, however, nothing, if our analysis is cor- rect, can check the ultimate tendency of coun- tries like Germany, and later on Japan and the United States, to be followed still later by other countries, to secure their share of these lucrative opportunities. Whatever may be the immediate results of the present situation, or with whatever great success the attractive and even noble ideal of an imperial British federa- tion may be realized, England can scarcely ex- pect in the long run to retain the monopoly or the domination which it has achieved and which it built up during the nineteenth century as a result of the lucky accident of being the first country to experience the industrial revolution and to exploit her coal supply. England's pri- macy was no doubt deserved, and is assuredly

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welcome to many of us; but from the point of view of world forces, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that it also is destined to disappear. Eome was able to create a world empire and to maintain it for several centuries because there was no economic expansiveness in the outlying constitutent members of the empire. Great Britain will find it far more difficult to create a world empire permanently dominating all other countries, for the simple reason that in- dustrial capitalism is destined to overrun the world. Even today England is able to retain India only by strict commercial control and by sedulously preventing the growth of any na- tional industry in that huge empire.

The above forecast as to the probability of the continuance of war rests indeed on an as- sumption that may be challenged. It might be urged that civilization is progressing so rapidly that the nations of the future will realize the economic waste, the inexpressible horror, and the irreparable ravages of war, and that com- mon decency and ordinary humanity will impel the world into an abandonment of what is essen- tially the mark of savagery. However deeply and even passionately we may desire such a consummation, it must be confessed, in all hu-

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mility, there seems to be slight warrant for its expectation. If indeed the chief nations of the world were to abandon all efforts to secure sel- fish advantage for themselves; if an interna- tional pact could be arranged so that each na- tion would cheerfully divide its opportunities with its neighbors, and would welcome the en- trance of continually new claimants into the agreement ; if, in other words, generosity were to replace selfishness in national arrangements, the outlook might, indeed, be very different. But with the frailty of human nature, as it un- fortunately still exists ; with the undoubted na- tional consciousness which is suffused at pres- ent with the distinctively modern emphasis upon the importance of the material basis of the higher life; and above all with the oppor- tunity afforded to each nation to reach out for its share of almost boundless prosperity by grasping the new opportunities afforded to modern capitalism, it seems hopeless to expect any effective resistance to a temptation which is so compelling, so illimitable, and so promis- ing of success under the conditions of actual economic life. No more striking illustration of the real forces that dominate the foreign policy of modern nations can be found than the vain

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effort recently made by certain Italian states- men to repress the popular feeling and to pre- vent their country from joining a war the hor- rors of which had been for months clearly be- fore the eyes of all. Pacificism seems destined, for the near future at least, to remain an unat- tainable ideal; for it is both blind and deaf to the effect of modern capitalism in accentuating, rather than attenuating, the lure of the eco- nomic life.

But if, then, we are likely to see during the next few generations wars on an even greater scale than the present one, will this endure for- ever ! Not if our analysis is correct. For when once the time comes that industrial capital will have spread to the uttermost parts of the earth ; when China and India and Africa and the rest will all have been as fully supplied with capital as are now Great Britain and Belgium and Ger- many; when, in other words, the industrial revolution will have permeated the world, then the economic basis will have been laid for two supreme events. In the first place, there will no longer be any exploitation of the backward countries, because there will be no industrially undeveloped countries to exploit. Then the whole world will be divided up into a series of

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empires, perhaps a dozen or more, on a level of comparative equality economically, and therefore politically. With such a relative equality of industrial development, and in the absence of any important foreign territory to be exploited, each nation will then find it to its interest to develop what is best within itself in order to carry on a peaceful exchange of com- modities with the other nations. Then, and then only, will Adam Smith's dream be realized, namely, that each nation will be able to utilize its own climatic and other economic advantages in a peaceful struggle with other nations. Then, and then only, will universal free trade become profitable to all, and the rule of inter- national amity become enduring, Then, and then only, shall we have the secure foundation laid for the world republic and for the coopera- tion of all races and of all peoples toward a common ideal.

In the second place is the industrial revo- lution. Just as the industrial revolution changed England from an aristocracy to a democracy, just as the industrial revolution in the United States is re-creating a new South on a democratic basis, so the spread of the indus- trial revolution will bring democracy through-

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out the world and will enable every country to turn its efforts to the ideals of a political and a social democracy. Then we shall not have to spend more money for dreadnoughts than we do for social progress.

To predict how soon this change will come about is idle. All that can be said is that the change is in progress, and that in this change there seems to lie the chief hope of the world 's future. What the particular economic organi- zation of the future is to be, it is not the pur- pose of these pages to discuss. My point will have been attained if we clearly keep in mind the inevitable spread of industrial capitalism, irrespective of the fact by whom the capital is to be controlled. Capitalism on an interna- tional scale may well lead during the next few decades to a strengthening of certain forms of international cooperation and fellowship, so ardently desired by all forward-looking think- ers. But industrial capitalism will not have completed its allotted task until it shall have brought about the reign of national economic equality which alone will serve as the basis of an enduring internationalism. Whatever may be the influence of the other factors, ponderable or imponderable, that contribute to civilization, it

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is scarcely open to doubt that the dominant forces which are actually molding history to- day are primarily economic in character, and are as a consequence intimately associated with the great transition that is at present taking place in the economic organization of the world. Unless the present conflict is studied in the light of these world forces, its lesson will not have been read aright.

Ill

THE CKISIS IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION FBANKLIN H. GIDDINGS

For two or three months after the war began, everybody was asking or telling who was to blame. The primitive human instinct to hold some one personally accountable had asserted itself in full strength. Then, for two or three months more, every one plunged into a discus- sion of the " causes " of the war. Agreement about causes proved to be no more possible than unanimity in fixing responsibility. Doubt- less in his heart every one felt bitterly toward some potentate or people, while in his intel- lectual centers he may have cherished a firm conviction that his own theory of causation was the only true one. Perhaps everybody was right, and only couldn't prove it. You know what the Scriptures say — or was it Don Marquis 1—

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All the wicked cities

In the Vale of Siddim Thought of things they shouldn't do —

Then they went and did 'em!

Like enough this simple hypothesis is as far as we shall ever get in explaining how the trouble began.

Of late, the speculations of the thoughtful have turned toward the future. How will the world henceforth be different because this ca- lamity came upon it? Civilization is set back we all believe — but to what extent and in just what way? The destruction of commerce and the loss of life every one sees and thinks he understands. The waste of capital is realized by some. The irreparable loss to art and to science is appreciated by the few. And beyond this destruction, which is immediate and al- ready is felt, processes of selection and rear- rangement have been set going which will con- tinue to affect the quality and the happiness of mankind throughout future time. May I ask your attention to one or two considerations, rather elementary I fear, touching these trans- forming changes that are likely to continue.

It is commonly held fTiaf. modern V/"" undoes 74

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fhft wnrk of a. hfvnpficent natural selection. The best, we say, are killed ; and the race must be perpetuated by its weaklings.

If this is true, or in so far as it may be true, a war so gigantic as the one now being waged must be regarded as the most appalling calam- ity that has overtaken mankind from the begin- ning. Gains of half a million years have been buried in the trenches, or withered by the fire of artillery. Surely a hypothesis so terrible should be subjected to searching scrutiny before it is accepted.

It is true, of course, that war takes the phys- ically fit, and takes more of the young in the prime and vigor of life than of the old. It is true, also, that death takes a heavy toll of the bravest and most intellectual of these young men, whose courage and abilities have won them commissions as officers; who, whatever orders from above may be, spare their men whenever they can, and recklessly sacrifice themselves. If this were the whole story, we could not escape the pessimistic conclusion. But there is some- thing more to be said.

How many of the men who fall in battle die childless, and how many leave offspring! Who knows I Yet plainly, until this question can be

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answered it is absurd to assume that the course of natural selection is diverted by war. The one fact that can be affirmed with certainty is that a large proportion of the victims of battle do leave children, legitimate or illegitimate. Since this present war began, a large number of hastened marriages have been made in all the belligerent countries; and the certainty of an extraordinary birth-rate in the summer of 1915 has necessitated measures, both governmental and voluntary, for rendering extraordinary as- sistance to destitute young mothers.

Again, the men who are killed in battle even in the present war, which probably is excep- tional in this respect, are not the only Important harvest of death. In all wars of which we have record, disease has claimed more victims than bullets. And in death by disease there is always natural selection. While cholera, typhus, ty- phoid and pneumonia take the strong no less than the weak, no one, I suppose, will deny that when all allowances have been made it is the relatively weak or non-resisting that are carried off in larger numbers.

These considerations surely put a question- mark against the assertion that war gives us an adverse natural selection. And these con-

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siderations are only the more obvious ones. Another, and probably far more important one, although we almost never hear it mentioned, is the intensified struggle for existence among the non-combatants. Hardships are multiplied, food is inadequate, doctors and nurses are at the front, anxiety and sorrow bring tortured nerves to the breaking-point. Under these cir- cumstances, natural selection has its way to a degree approaching the remorseless elimination of the relatively weak which we are accustomed to associate with the jungle, or at least with savagery and barbarism.

In particular, women and children suffer. It is most curious that those who uncritically take for granted the adverse natural selection of war never let their imagination wander beyond the battlefield and the male combatants assembled there. Would it not be well, before accepting any conclusion on this subject, to ask for the death-rates of women and children dur- ing war years and immediately after? Unfor- tunately we lack adequate statistics ; but what scientific man can ignore the plain implication of the facts that are available! The death-rate of women and children in such times is so much higher than in normal times of peace that it i

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impossible for any observer to be unaware of it, although he has no figures — as impossible as it would be to be unaware of an epidemic or of an extraordinary succession of funeral proces- sions in a village street.

With some diffidence I venture to offer as my own conclusion a bit of pure skepticism. I seri- ously doubt whether war greatly affects the normal course of natural selection. In any case, the assertion that it does, is not proven.

Natural selection in the strict biological meaning of the term is closely simulated by a selection always going on in the realm of human habits, ideas, inventions, morals, laws, and po- litical institutions. The wiser students of social evolution do not undertake to say how far these phenomena of behavior and relationship are products of unconscious activities, how far of man's conscious planning and reasoned en- deavor. Either way they are products of the struggle for existence carried on collectively — by human beings living in groups, facing com- mon dangers, making common cause, working together.

As the individual struggle for existence is successful for some and fateful for others,

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thereby eliminating not only the unsuccessful individuals themselves, but also in the course of time whole varieties or kinds ; so the group or collective struggle — successful often for whole aggregations and fateful for others — has from the appearance of mankind on the earth until now been destroying habits, purposes, cus- toms and policies correlated with unsuccess, and preserving and establishing policies, rela- tions and habits correlated with success.

Whether war or peace in the long run plays the larger part in social selection is another question, upon which the wiser students of hu- man progress will not offer too positive an opinion. But it is not rash to say that every "N war has destroyed many things beside human / life and material wealth, beyond possibility of I recovery or reproduction. Often the destruc- ( tion is unobserved for years, or even genera- \ tions^ after hostilities have fipas^. The habit ) or institution so eliminated is not usually as conspicuous as American Negro slavery; but the passing of uncounted social phenomena of lesser magnitude may have cumulative results quite as important as the crushing of any one great institution.

With all its uncertainties, history is less 79

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doubtful than prophecy, and it is easier to see the process of social selection in historical retrospect than to visualize its future conse- quences. Nevertheless, a war has this merit as a datum for intellectual speculation : it is a two- sided conflict — it presents alternatives. It was not easily possible to be muddle-headed about what would happen if the Saracens or the Huns conquered Europe ; about what would happen if Great Britain subdued the American colonies, or the Southern Confederacy made good its secession.

The present war is more than a conflict of nations. It is a struggle between different civi- lizations. It will not result in the destruction of either civilization, or perhaps of any nation, even Belgium. But the outcome will give to one civilization or the other a long lead. It will discourage, handicap, and presently destroy many of the factors or elements that make up the defeated civilization, imparting to it its characteristic qualities.

It is the boast of Germany that her people are homogeneous, a relatively pure stock. The claim may be allowed if we confine attention to the strictly European elements that are blended

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in German blood, properly so called. The boast is altogether untrue if the entire population of the empires in question is taken into account; and this discrimination, as will appear, is the key to any thoroughgoing explanation of the profound difference between German civiliza- tion and the civilizations of France and Eng- land.

By comparison with the German and Aus- trian empires, the allied nations are an old and well-ripened blend of all four of the great Euro- pean stocks. These stocks are: the Mediterra- nean— long-headed, olive-skinned, dark-eyed and dark-haired ; the Baltic — long-headed, fair, yellow-haired and blue-eyed; the Alpine — broad- headed, chestnut-haired and gray-eyed, a prod- uct of the crossing of Mediterraneans with round-heads from the Armenian parts of Asia, who made their way across Europe along the southern foothills of the Alps; and the Danu- bians — broad-headed, florid, red-haired and gray-eyed, a product of the crossing of Baltics with Asian round-heads that pushed across Europe by way of the Danube and Rhine val- leys, the northern foothills of the Alps and so into Belgium and England, where they became historically known as Belgae and Britons. The

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French and English have, of course, in their composition a much higher percentage of Medi- terranean blood than the Germans have. While it is not quite accurate to identify this blood with the so-called Latin race, it is a physical basis of the Latin culture. In the Austrian and German empires, on the other hand, there are large groups of Asian elements far less well blended with European stocks than is any element found in the population of France or of England. The Lapps, Finns, and Slavs with which German blood is crossed in Prussia, the Esthonians, Magyars and Huns which have managed to keep separate from the Germans in Austria, have, all in all, made the population of the German and the Austrian empires much more of a merely mechanical mixture of unas- similable, or at any rate unassimilated, factors than are the populations of France and Eng- land.

No argument is needed to prove that popula- tions composed of elements that neither amal- gamate to any great extent through inter-mar- riage, nor assimilate mentally or morally through imitation of one another's habits, ac- ceptance of one another's beliefs and ideas, and adoption of one another's purposes, can achieve

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political cohesion in one way only: they may be held compact by the strong hand of militar- istic sovereignty. Such sovereignty, in its turn, may be the authority of a conquering state or it may be the authority created by the feder- ation of states, not otherwise too friendly, for defense against a common enemy. Such popu- lations engage in teamwork because they have to, not because they want to. They become ac- customed to command. They learn to expect direction, to have life planned out for them. What Walter Bagehot calls "government by discussion " they regard as both wasteful and ineffective. A smoothly working administra- tive machine they learn to admire as the best of all machines invented by man, and the most important instrumentality that functions for human well-being.

How different is the political cohesion of pop- ulations sufficiently alike or sympathetic enough to amalgamate readily and to assimilate inevi- tably! It is as suggestive of chemical union as the political cohesion of antagonistic popula- tions is suggestive of the mechanical union of molecules under the impact of a steam hammer. At some time far back in their history the blend- ing social elements may have been dissimilar

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and hostile, as were the Pictish, Goidelic, Bry- thonic, Saxon, Danish, and Norman elements which combined at length in the English peo- ple. But if through long dwelling side by side antagonisms have diminished and toleration has prepared the mind for understanding and the heart for friendliness, a true people comes into being. Cooperation is created by the meet- ing of minds, policies are determined and shaped by discussion, sovereignty is the peo- ple's will, government is ministerial only; per- sonal liberty, individual initiative, private re- sponsibility and public accountability are things of course.

It will not do, however, to assume, without some further looking into things, that the civili- zation which is made possible by assimilation and a harmonious blending of elements once different, is on all accounts better than a civili- zation of the more mechanical sort. Civiliza- tion is a certain state, quality, and functioning of human society, and all human society is a great collective enterprise. In the struggle for existence, which began when life began, group effort has played a part as large and far more conspicuous "than individual effort. The col-

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lective struggle for existence has made possible the moral and the intellectual advance of man- kind by establishing relative security, creating economic abundance, and putting a premium upon the restraints, the sympathies, and the mental activities that are essential to social co- hesion and successful cooperation.

To see the social problem so, in its ultimate nature, shorn of complications and stripped of accessories, is to realize that any group, asso- ciation, community, nation or international or- ganization, achieves the supreme ends of ex- istence more or less fully as it is more or less efficient. And the efficiency must comprise both the collective efficiency of the cooperating whole and the personal efficiency of the individual units whose efforts are combined. If individual efficiency only or collective efficiency only were enough, the problem of the quality of civiliza- tion as poorer or better would be simplified.

This twofold aspect of efficiency must be borne in mind when we attempt to appraise the redoubtable efficiency of Germany, and to com- pare it with the efficiency represented by the allied nations.

German efficiency is "made"; French, Eng- lish, American efficiency " grows. " In Ger-

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many under orders from above a few selected kinds of education are planned and organized. No detail is neglected. From infancy the child is dedicated to a specific future. By the time he arrives at years of discretion he discovers that parents and the state have left him small scope for choice. He may, indeed, if of a more than commonly rebellious spirit, break away from the scheme of things into which already he is fitted like a standardized piece in a mech- anism. If he has been prepared for shop or counting-house, in shop or counting-house he probably will abide. His preparation will have been excellent, and the chances are that he will revere and obey the state that so thoughtfully spared him the hard task of shaping his destiny. If for the civil service, the army, or the uni- versity he has been predestined, civil service, military life, or the university career will prob- ably claim him, and hold him to the end.

Or perhaps so much of education as is need- ful for business or professional life has been thought too precious to waste on him, born a proletarian. The state does not therefore over- look him. He is told how much of his wages he must pay into a fund to provide against ac- cident, illness, or other misfortune. If out of

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THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION

work, a state employment agency, well organ- ized and effective, will aid him quickly to find new opportunity. If heredity has been unkind to him, or notwithstanding the best efforts of a watchful paternalistic state his childhood has been spent among evil surroundings, he will be taken in hand, and suitably corrected on a farm colony, should he lapse into vagrant ways.

So in the life of each individual much is foreseen, little is left to chance, and not too much to personal choice.

In the relation of group to group, a like pre- vision and administrative direction dispose and regulate. Domestic and foreign markets are catalogued and described; trade routes, ship- ping facilities, credit facilities and demands are inventoried. Any important information that the manufacturer or exporter might need in his business, if obtainable at all, can be found in governmental guides or card catalogues as readily as one finds the definition of a word in a dictionary.

Natural resources and human life are con- } served; men are drilled for war as prepared ( 'for peace. Nothing is neglected, nothing left to chance and, as in the relation of authority to the individual, little is left to choice.

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If in this pen-and-ink sketch of German effi- ciency there be exaggeration, it is an exaggera- tion that heightens the effect which the Ger- man himself admires. It does not, as he sees it, impair or detract.

But it is a picture that may be compared with one that was painted in vivid colors by a writer whose profound interpretation of social evolution was given to the world a full gen- eration ago. Who can read Herbert Spencer's imperishable description and analysis of mili- tarism and industrialism, viewed respectively as contrasting social types, without perceiving that any account of German social efficiency that could be written within limits of truth would coincide point by point with Spencer's account of the militaristic, regimented state!

It is not to be denied that efficiency of the German model has made and will continue to make a powerful appeal to thoughtful minds in other nations. Militarism devours and de- stroys; but an unbridled individualism also is notorious for appalling wastes and cruelties of its own.

The achievements that we in America credit fo personal- initiative, to untrammeled individ- ual enterprise, put a strain upon imagination.

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The industrial world of today, the accumula- tions of capital, man's power over nature, the substitution of heat energy and electric energy for the toil of human muscles, swift transpor- tation and the network of communication throughout the earth — these are the creations of discoverers, inventors, men of vision and dar- ing, in England, France, America and other countries where the human mind has worked freely, swiftly, with amazing grasp and amaz- ing precision, under liberty.

Yet these achievements have brought with them a new exploitation of the wage-earner, a concentration of wealth, an increasing control of opportunity by a plutocratic minority, a staggering waste of material resources, and a growing menace of discontent. Is it to be won- dered at that not only amateur reformers, but disciplined publicists and seasoned statesmen, too, have more and more turned to the statejor control and coordination!

Plainly the superiority of one or the other group of efficiency factors is not so far demon- strated. Is it demonstrable f Can any one prove to the satisfaction of all interested parties that the German plan of life on the one hand, or

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the French, English and American plan on the other hand, is on the whole and in the long run beyond question more effective for the realiza- tion of economic, moral and intellectual possi- bilities? Or do we discover here a controver- sial question that admits of no decisive answer • — one over which men may endlessly dispute without result, as the long battlelines of Europe have been fighting in their trenches without important advance on either side?

The obvious reply, in part at least, to this question about the possibility of answering an- other question, is found in the reflection that, since each of the plans of life here contrasted has great merits and great shortcomings, the development of each so as to incorporate the good features of the other may hold out a maxi- mum hope to mankind. If, for example, Amer- ica, England and France, maintaining their standards of personal liberty, could yet make use of the administrative organs of govern- ment, subject to a democratic control, to corre- late, coordinate, and regulate the spontaneous activities of citizens, might we not attain the best results which stand to the credit of au- thority without sacrificing those that are at- tainable only under liberty?

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Surely we may believe that such a develop- ment is possible; at least, we may believe it long enough to ask whether the German plan or its opposite is more likely to develop into one more comprehensive, offering a larger sum- total of merits and a smaller inventory of de- fects.

Put in this way, the problem in my judgment is correctly stated, and can no longer be re- garded as insoluble.

One day since the war began, a German uni- versity docent, arguing with an American stu- dent, maintained that Germany is more demo- cratic than the United States. Asked to ex- plain his meaning, he said : ' ' The German gov- ernment does more things for its people than yours does." To his mind, and, I suspect, to the minds of tens of thousands of his compatri- ots, democracy means nothing more than ' ' gov- ernment of the people for the people." Of democracy as defined by Lincoln, namely, "gov- ernment of the people, for the people and by the people," they appear to have little idea. Un- less from the embers and desolation of war that larger conception of democracy shall arise, and transform the Teutonic state, there is seemingly little likelihood that it will be the Prussian plan

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of efficiency organization that will most rapidly approximate the comprehensive scheme ; but in the minds of nations that already have accepted government by the people, for the people, all the factors of idea and appreciation are present, and even now are assembled, for the generous expansion of democratic policy. Without for- getting the priceless value of liberty and of in- dividual achievement, the democratic peoples have rapidly been coming to a truer appraisal than they once made of the legitimate func- tions of law and administration. Can we then doubt that in these peoples centers the hope and the expectation of an efficiency in every way greater than any social efficiency the world has hitherto known?

Not if one final consideration supports the presumption so far established. The larger tasks of civilization are the same in all gen- erations, but the tasks that any one community or group of communities has to perform in pre- serving and developing civilization are not, un- der all circumstances and generation after gen- eration, unchanging. Group Hf e, like individual life, proceeds through adaptation and adjust- ment; and titanic forces, over which man lias TmF little control as yet, are ever creating new

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conditions to which civilizations, no less than the humblest plant and animal organisms, must adapt themselves under penalty of death. Therefore the most crucial of all the questions that can be asked about the relative excellence of the two types of efficiency organization that we are comparing, relates to their modifiability, under slow-changing demand or acute crisis.

So long as the conditions under which an organism lives undergo no change, the reactions of the organism itself are over and over re- peated, without change. Ages ago reactions of this kind became correlated with the mechan- ism of heredity in all the animal species, includ- ing man. They are the original nature of man, as of his humbler animal kindred. "We are born with them, we do not have to learn them, we call them instincts.

Supplementing his instincts every individual, animal or human, has reactions that he has learned but which, over and over repeated, un- der conditions practically unchanging, have be- come nearly as automatic, often as unconscious, as instincts. We have toilsomely learned how to walk and to talk, but usually we are not con- scious of the muscular adjustments so painfully acquired.

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But now and then the unexpected happens. Crisis makes havoc with a complex of condi- tions that had undergone no change, perhaps, for years or for ages. Then habits and in- stincts fail. By accident or by a wild trial and error, well nigh like a beating of the air, new adjustments may be made, and the life of the individual or of the race may continue. But if such new adjustments are not somehow ar- rived at, extermination is the fate of those highly perfected instinct and habit mechanisms that were working quite well enough so long as nothing " happened. "

In the human race, trial and error have cre- ated a wonderful apparatus, supplementing in- stinct and habit, whereby, with a good deal of skill and a large measure of success, we meet the unexpected and adapt ourselves to it. This mechanism we call intellect, or reason. Thanks to it, the human race comes safely through cri- sis after crisis, any one of which would have been, or would be, the end of us all if we had only our instincts and our habits to rely on.

f Groups of individuals, like individuals singly,

) live instinctively, or by instincts supplemented

• by habit, to u great extent. The communities

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of the so-called social insects, the ants and the wasps for example, are only instinctive, or pos- sibly only tropic, forms of cooperation. The villages of beavers are communities maintained and working by means of instinct and habit. Human societies might be creations of instinct and habit only, if they could live on indefinitely under unchanging conditions. Educational systems could by disciplinary methods train every individual to perform certain duties as automatically as a perfect bit of electrical mechanism works. But such a community is static. It would perish at the touch of crisis as surely as the beaver village does when invaded by the hunter with a gun.

Five thousand years of human experience have demonstrated that in crises of the first magnitude, of which wars are the supreme ex- amples, centralized authority, working through a highly coordinated organization, is vital. From the days of Athens until now successful wars have not been conducted through incontinent resort to recall and referendum. But against this indisputable fact stands a vast accumula- tion of evidence that over and over againiiattlfis and campaigns have been lost through a stupid adherence to traolition, through overtraining,

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through, lack of individual discretion, and fail- ure of initiative. Even in militarism, then, it seems, where central direction is essential, the traits that are correlated with liberty are not negligible.

If altering conditions do not take the form of acute crisis, but are rather a fairly rapid transformation of circumstance or environ- ment, centralized authority may be of relatively little value; while plasticity of mind, modifia- bility of habit, the passion to explore and to discover, inventiveness, and individual willing- ness to take responsibility, are commonly the factors of successful readjustment.. The most enlightening example that history affords is the United States. Here a people, inheriting from the Old World a rich legacy of European custom and tradition, has adapted itself, first to the wilderness and the plain, then to state and national political organization under ex- perimental conditions, and now to a stupendous industrial activity, to the most intense and ex- tended urban life that has thus far appeared in the world, and to the responsibility of world in- fluence. There has been no break in continuity, great crises have successfully been met, a re- sponsible, instead of a despotic, centralized con-

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trol has been developed, yet liberty and in- dividual initiative have been preserved.

So once more we arrive at the general conclu- sion that the efficiency plan which offers a maxi- mum of merits with a minimum of demerits, which above all meets the requirements of our modern world of incessant change, is the one that is naturally evolved by democracy, having the energetic, responsible, inventive individual as its force-generating unit, but creating or- ganization and strengthening central control as the need arises.

Such are the elements, such the ideals, such the efficiency, of the contrasting civilizations now arrayed in mortal conflict. In one or the other, every people of the world places its hope and its faith. Each is meeting, as best it can, the supreme test. We are witnessing the most gigantic, the most fateful trial and error ex- periment since human life began.

IV

THE EELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE STATE

WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY

To the political philosopher that which gives extraordinary significance to the great struggle now taking place in Europe is that, critically viewed, it exhibits a contest between divergent and, in the main, contradictory conceptions of the nature of the state, of its ends, and of the relation which exists between it and the individ- uals subject to its authority. Whatever, there- fore, may be the practical outcome of the pres- ent war, its influence upon political theories is certain to be great. The distinctive differ- ences between the political views officially de- clared in Germany and those popularly held in England and her Dominions, in France and the United States will have been made clear, and the results to which they lead demonstrated in deed. It will be noticed that I have spoken

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in the one case of the opinions officially held, and in the other of the doctrines popularly cur- rent. This difference in characterization would seem to be justified, for the German view, al- though accepted by practically the entire peo- ple, is one which in its source and in the means by which it has been spread, justifies the title which has been given it. These ideals which are described as peculiarly German have in fact been the product of Prussian thought and ex- perience. Inasmuch, however, as they have be- come controlling throughout the Empire, they may fairly be spoken of as German rather than Prussian. How far these theories may prop- erly be spoken of as characteristic of Austro- Hungarian thought it is not necessary to con- sider. The Dual Kingdom has had domestic problems and international ambitions which ex- plain her actions independently of a political philosophy such as is needed to give meaning and logical coherence to the actions and utter- ances of Germany; and it would seem that Germany has utilized the ambitions of her ally to obtain her cooperation in the realization of her own WeltpolitiJc.1

1 Austria-Hungary is of course predominantly Roman 'Catholic, and Rohrbach asserts that there is a natural con-

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Finally, it may be said that in this chapter I shall not attempt by quotations from official and professional writings to demonstrate the cor- rectness of the analysis I shall make of the political conceptions that are and for some years have been dominant in Germany. I be- lieve that I shall make an accurate statement of them, but as to this fact the reader will have to satisfy himself by an examination of the source material, of which an abundance now ex- ists in English translation.

It cannot be said that the ante-bellum polit- ical philosophy of England and her allies had been so clearly and definitely worked out as had that of Germany. At any rate, it had not become articulate in the English official and professional mind, and employed as an argu- ment and guide for national and imperial ac- tion. But, though not often explicitly uttered, this philosophy has existed in the thought of the people and has directed constitutional practice and international action and, since the outbreak of the war, the English and those who have sympathized with them have been led to search their own political minds and to state more defi-

flict between Catholicism and the national idea of a State such as Prussia stands for.

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nitely and possibly more emphatically than they have ever done before, their own political ideals. Certain it is that the English have earnestly sought to make evident to all, to themselves as well as to neutrals, that the present war is, at the bottom, a contest between contradic- tory and rival conceptions of the state and of public right, and that it is one in which all peo- ples, aside from their immediate territorial or commercial interests, are vitally interested.

The relation of the individual to the state may be viewed in three main aspects. In the first place, there is the question as to the ex- tent to which the welfare of the one is con- sidered as indissolubly bound up in the welfare of the other. In the second place, there is the question as to the extent to which and the man- ner in which the individual may claim the right or be granted the privilege of determining the form of political government which shall exist, of selecting those who shall operate it, and of controlling what they shall do. In the third place, there is the question as to the sphere of governmental action; that is to say, of the ex- tent to which public control and operation shall be substituted for individual liberty of action. These are distinct topics and need to^fce^sep-

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arately considered; first we shall consider the relation of public and private welfare.

During the distinctly monarchical period in Europe and lasting until the end of the eigh- teenth century, a theory was held and widely practiced according to which the welfare of the subjects was absolutely subordinated not so much to the welfare of the state as to that of their rulers; or, to put it in another way, the welfare of the state was identified with the per- sonal welfare of its rulers, and the interests of the people subordinated to both. The state to- gether with its people and their property were regarded as the personal property of the ruler to be disposed of as he might see fit. In his "Four Georges" Thackeray tells us how the Duke of Hanover sold to the seigniory of Ven- ice sixty-seven hundred of his subjects, of whom only fourteen hundred ever saw their homes again, the proceeds of the sale being devoted to the satisfaction of the royal duke's sensual pleasures. "Bound all that Koyal splendor, " writes Thackeray, "lies a nation enslaved and ruined ; there are people robbed of their rights • — communities laid waste — faith, justice, com- merce trampled upon and well-nigh destroyed — nay, in the very center of Royalty itself, what

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horrible stains of meanness, crime and shame ! It is but to a silly harlot that some of the noblest gentlemen and some of the proudest women in the world are bowing down ; it is the price of a miserable province that the King ties in dia- monds round his mistress' white neck. In the first half of the last [eighteenth] century, I say, this is going on all Europe over."

It might seem that a political practice such as this might have been based upon postulates that denied the possession by the people of moral rights to consideration, or placed the conduct of monarchs outside the realm of or- dinary morality. It is quite clear, however, that, despite the general acceptance of the doc- trines of Machiavelli, the argument in behalf of royal absolutism and selfishness was not stated in terms as bald as these. It is true that the rulers, when they took thought at all, regarded themselves as endowed with overlordship by divine providence, or, at least, by the work- ing out of historical processes beyond direct human control, and that, as thus circumstanced, they regarded themselves as the absolute own- ers of sovereignty as of a piece of property, and that this ownership carried with it full rights of use and disposition of their subjects

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and of all that they might possess. This com- prehensive right the rulers claimed as inhering and original in themselves, and not as obtained by any sort of gift or grant, real or construc- tive, from those whom they ruled. At the same time, however, it would be a mistake, I think, to hold that the rulers in their dealings with their subjects felt themselves free from all the moral restraints which humanity and sympathy impose. But it is clear that the moral obliga- tions which they recognized were those of gen- erosity and charity rather than those of jus- tice which imply the possession of rights by those to be benefited by them.

As rationalizing or at least as explaining the acceptance of this theory which regarded the right of rulership as a piece of property, and as giving to the monarch what amounted to an ownership of his subjects, including their goods, it is to be remembered that it was not until the early part of the nineteenth century that the principle and practice disappeared from Europe of regarding human beings as objects that might be treated as chattels or appurtenances of the soil. And indeed the entire feudal system out of which the monarchical state developed was based upon the idea that political jurisdiction

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arises out of ownership — ownership of the land. It would seem then that the rights claimed and exercised by the eighteenth-century mon- archs were not different in essential nature from those claimed at the present time by hold- ers of private property who regard the institu- tion of private property as devoid of social or political connotations, and, therefore, regard themselves as vested with rights of use and dis- position, the free exercise of which may not be interfered with except under very special cir- cumstances. Thus, as we know, there are at the present time many owners of large fortunes the possession of which has come to them by accident of descent, by the favoring operation of law, or by the happy working of economic forces, who feel themselves free to use their wealth, if they see fit, for their selfish welfare, and, as employers of labor, consider that those who work for them have no moral claim, and certainly no legal claim, beyond such as is founded upon their contracts of employment, that anything beyond this which they may do for the benefit of those subject to their eco- nomic rule is an act of charity or generosity rather than an obligation of distributive jus- tice.

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This proprietary conception of political rulership has now happily disappeared from the thought of modern civilized peoples. No longer do the rulers of these nations regard their lands and their subjects as objects of own- ership which may be used for the advancement of purely dynastic interests or the satisfaction of purely selfish pleasures. Instead they feel that their powers are to be exercised for the benefit of the state over which they rule. Whether or not the welfare of this political en- tity termed the state is regarded as necessarily including the welfare of its citizens, is a ques- tion presently to be considered.

In a second respect, also, the eighteenth-cen- tury conception of monarchy has been pro- foundly modified. No longer is it held that the exercise of political authority should be to any considerable extent subject to the discretionary will of those who possess it. Upon the con- trary, in all its manifestations it is felt that political power should be exercised only in ac- cordance with forms and within the limits which existing laws establish. This is the essential meaning of constitutionalism, and under its regime in the modern state the individual is protected against oppression on the part of his

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rulers as regards at least his ordinary rights of person and property. Whether or not he is pro- tected, and whether or not it is feasible under any workable form of government so to narrow the discretionary powers of those in authority as to protect him against the adoption by his rulers of broad public policies, especially in matters of war and peace, which will be detri- mental to his wishes and welfare, is a problem of administrative politics which cannot be con- sidered in the space assigned to this chapter. It may be pointed out, however, that thus far, not even in the most democratically and consti- tutionally organized states, has it been found feasible to subject the conduct of foreign affairs to a popular control beyond that of censuring a policy to which the state has already been committed by those in authority. And even this right of censureship in practice proves of very slight value in cases where war has been pre- cipitated or rendered imminent, and thus the prestige or honor of the nation apparently in- volved. %

It has been said that the essence of constitu- tionalism consists in the fact that public author- ity has its extent and modes of operation con- trolled by law. When we ask ourselves whence

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came these legal limitations upon the exercise of sovereignty, who control their interpreta- tion, and, in the last resort, determine their continuation, we reach the first point at which an important difference distinguishes the con- stitutional jurisprudence of England, France and the United States, from that of Germany and Austria, and especially from that of the Kingdom of Prussia.

The political philosophy of England since 1688 at least, of France since 1789, and of the United States since its foundation, is squarely committed to the proposition that all political authority comes from the people, and is not vested in the rulers as an original and inher- ent right.1 This is not the assertion of that

1 The constitution of France, if its fundamental laws can be regarded as constituting a complete instrument of gov- ernment, does not contain an explicit statement of popular sovereignty, but the principle certainly finds acceptance in her constitutional jurisprudence. Perhaps the clearest statement of the doctrine in formal terms is to be found in the constitution of Belgium, adopted in 1831, in which the following declarations occur : "Art. 25. All powers ema- nate from the people. They shall be exercised in the man- ner established by the Constitution. . . . Art. 29. The ex' ecutive power is vested in the King, subject to the regula- tions of the Constitution. . . . Art. 129. No law, ordinance, or regulation" of the general, provincial, or communal gov-

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merely moral doctrine that the people have a revolutionary right to resist political oppres- sion, and that thus, in a sense, all just govern- ments may be said to derive their right to be from the consent of the governed. This, indeed, is asserted, but the doctrine is much more than this. It includes the constitutional principle that, as a legal proposition, the rulers possess only delegated authority, and the legal limita- tions which circumscribe their official acts are not self-set, but are imposed by laws which draw their force from the popular will as authoritatively expressed at the polls, in con- ventions, or in representative legislative bodies.

As opposed to this fundamental constitutional doctrine, the monarchical theory of continental Europe is that the right of political rulership comes from above. It inheres in, and is an original right of, the monarch, and, as such, in its exercise is ultimately subject only to the will of him who possesses it. It is true that Austria-Hungary, and the German Empire and

eminent shall be obligatory until after having been pub- lished in the manner prescribed by law. Art. 130. The Constitution shall not be suspended, either in whole or iru part."

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its individual states, including Prussia, oper- ate under formal written constitutions, but these instruments of government are regarded as themselves the creations of the royal or im- perial will.1 It thus results that not only may the constitutions be changed by an exercise of the royal or imperial will, but that the sover- eign is regarded not as the exerciser of enu- merated delegated powers, but as the possessor of sovereign authority free from legal restraint in all matters in regard to which he has not seen fit to fix self-set limitations. This is the constitutional theory, whatever may have been the popular pressure which, historically speak- ing, may have led to the promulgation of the written constitutions.

It further follows from this constitutional conception that the part played by the elected representatives of the people in the enactment of laws and in the adoption of public policies is

*It is not necessary in this discussion to consider the question whether in the German Empire the sovereign power is vested in the Bundesrath rather than in the Em- peror. The fact that the king of Prussia is, ex officio, the German emperor, and that as king he controls the Prussian delegates which in turn control the Bundesrath, renders largely academic, for the purpose of this paper at least, the constitutional status of the emperor in the Empire.

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THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE

one quite different from that which is played in countries whose constitutional systems are founded upon a democratic basis. According to the doctrine held by German jurists the people through their representatives participate not in the creation of law, but in the determination of the contents of a proposition which is to be submitted to the sovereign for the exercise of his supreme legislative will. Essentially speak- ing, then, the situation is this: The ruler, as a matter of grace and expediency, is pleased to learn the wishes of his people regarding a prop- osition of law or the adoption of a public pol- icy, and to obtain such information regarding its wisdom as a representative chamber is able to provide ; and these wishes and this informa- tion he necessarily takes into consideration in determining the exercise of his own sovereign will. But never does he regard these factors as controlling in any affirmative sense. So long as the constitution which he has promulgated ex- ists, he agrees not to act contrary to its provi- sions with regard to the matters which are therein specified. But never for a moment does the German ruler admit himself to be under a legal or even a moral or political obligation to give effect to an expression of the will of the

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representatives of the people of which he dis- approves.

It is this relationship in which the king stands to his popularly elected legislative chambers which interprets many features of German pub- lic life which seem strange to English and American observers. It explains in the first place the fact that it is considered a wholly justifiable practice for the king and his personal advisers — "the Government " as they are called — to control so far as they are able not only the elections of members to the representative body, but by rewards and other forms of po- litical pressure to influence the votes of the rep- resentatives after their election. It explains furthermore the policy of the " Government " in playing off one party or faction against an- other and thus through the bloc system of ob- taining a majority vote in favor of action which the Government desires. It explains also the fact that not even the first steps have been taken in Germany towards the development of respon- sible parliamentary government whether of the English or the French type. It is indeed recog- nized by all of their publicists that such a sys- tem is absolutely incompatible with the Ger- man conception of monarchical power. It is

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true that irritation, at times intense in char- acter, has been felt and expressed against the assumption of the emperor of the right to di- rect and control foreign affairs by his own per- sonal acts and words. But this, however, has not been because of any derogation of the power of the representatives of the people or of a min- istry which they support, but because, under the imperial constitution, he is required to act through his chancellor, who in turn is supposed to exercise his power in and through the Bun- desrath, which body in turn represents the " Governments " of the several states of the Empire. Since the downfall of Bismarck, and especially since the retirement of his successor, Caprivi, the emperor has selected as his chancel- lor and president of the Prussian Ministerium men who have been willing in very large meas- ure to subordinate their own wills and judg- ments to that of their imperial master, and thus the personal influence of the emperor has been very great, especially in foreign affairs. While this has been at times disapproved of, there has never been any movement, seriously pressed, to subject his will to the control of the popularly elected branch of the imperial parlia- ment.

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The monarchical conception in Germany ex- plains still further the right which is freely ex- ercised by the " Government " of dissolving the elected chamber whenever other methods of ob- taining its support for a government measure have failed; and, it may be said that so pow- erful is the official influence that may be exerted in the ensuing election that in almost all cases the result is that the newly chosen chamber is of the desired political complexion. Von Biilow in his "Imperial Germany" complains that the Germans lack political ability by which, as he explains, they show a disposition to form a multitude of minor parties based not on broad public principles but upon narrow, particularis- tic, and personal interests. It would seem, how- ever, that this failure of two or more strong political parties to develop has been due in no small measure to the attitude which the ' l Gov- ernment" assumes toward all political parties. The one strong political party — the Social Democrats — which has been formed in German imperial politics, is strong in numbers rather than in influence, and, moreover, occupies a very peculiar position, for, as von Biilow frankly says, it has, from the standpoint of the "Government," no right to exist. He flatly

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stigmatizes its members as enemies of the Ger- man State — enemies for the overthrow of whom any means, including force when possible, may rightfully be employed. As to the reasons why the Social Democrats are held in such peculiar detestation by the "Government" I shall not have space to speak, but shortly stated it may be said that it is not so much their legislative program which is disapproved of as it is that their fundamental political doctrines are in con- flict with the monarchical conception of the Em- pire and of Prussia. This is made abundantly clear by reading between the lines of von Bil- low's book.

Finally, it may be said that the monarchical conception in Germany explains the open and avowed measures which are taken by the rul- ing authorities to control the formation and expression of a popular opinion with regard to matters of public policy. Not only is there kept a strict control over unofficial expressions in the press, as the numerous prosecutions for lese majeste testify, but, and more espe- cially, governmentally inspired articles are constantly published in the leading news- papers in order that the people shall be led to take a favorable view regarding public

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policies which are approved by the "Gov- ernment."

It had not been my intention to encumber this essay with quotations, but the point with which I am now concerned is of an importance that warrants me, in order to make it clear, in giv- ing the words of Dr. Hasbach, the author of an important work entitled "Die Moderne Demo- cratie," published in 1912. In an article pub- lished during the present year1 in which he states more specifically the function which pub- lic opinion plays in the modern constitutional state, Dr. Hasbach says: "Who forms pub- lic opinion? In democracy and parliamentary monarchy [England] it is created' exclusively by parties; in constitutional monarchy [e. g., Germany], on the other hand, by parties and the Government. For a full understanding of this important difference we first must clearly dis- tinguish between parliamentary and constitu- tional monarchy. In parliamentary monarchy the influence of the monarch is as a matter of fact so far suppressed that here, too, the stronger party opinion determines the destiny of the country, while in the constitutional mon-

1 The American Political Science Review, Feb., 1915. "The Essence of Democracy."

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archy the prince as joint possessor of the legis- lative power, and as the possessor of the ex- ecutive, exercises a considerable influence upon the formation of public opinion. The ministers nominated by him introduce bills into parlia- ment; they defend them against the criticism of representatives whom they are compelled to face; the prince addresses messages to parlia- ment ; he can dissolve it and thereby take a po- sition on definite questions ; official newspapers defend the attitude of the government; party organs which approve the policy of the govern- ment support it or open their columns to it ; the government seeks to influence representatives, etc."

" These are methods, " Dr. Hasbach contin- ues, "some of which are also understood in America; in America the President addresses messages to Congress; presidents and govern- ors attempt to influence the legislative power; there are also newspapers which support the President and governors against the legislative assemblies if they consider the former's poli- cies advantageous." This is true, but the im- portant fact is that in America the president and the governors of the States are themselves the leaders of their parties and are representa-

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tives of the people. The stronger public opin- ion which thus finds expression in State action is therefore a popular opinion and is not one which is largely determined by the judgment of persons who are not responsible to the people and who only in a purely fictitious sense can be said to represent them.

The refusal upon the part of the " Govern- ment " in Germany to permit the popular will as represented in the legislature to exert a con- trolling influence in the determination of public policies is of course not predicated solely or even in major part upon the purely technical and legal premise that sovereignty finds its fons et origo in the monarch. Nor, as We have al- ready seen, is it justified by any claim that po- litical rulership need not necessarily be for the benefit of the state or its people. Eather, it would seem to be founded upon a conviction that the problem of government is, by its very nature, one, the satisfactory solution of which cannot be secured by surrendering a controlling influence to the people. And, in turn, the rea- son why the government of the state is held to be of this essentially unpopular or undemo- cratic character would seem to be compounded of two convictions.

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The first of these beliefs is that, as a practical administrative proposition, the problem of gov- ernment is one which requires the exercise of faculties of judgment and of executive over- sight and control which it is not possible for an electorate, however enlightened and well dis- posed, to possess and exercise. The second be- lief, which would seem to have at least a certain amount of currency even if it cannot be said to be generally held, is that the ultimate end for the realization of which the state exists is something else and higher than the welfare of the citizens as individuals, whether distribu- tively or collectively considered.

Upon the face of it, the proposition that the efficient carrying on of the national govern- ment of a state of any considerable size is an administrative task, in the performance of which it is not practicable to admit any con- siderable amount of democratic participation or control, is not an unreasonable one, and can be met only upon a basis of fact. Certain it is that, in its actual operation, German govern- mental forms and administrative methods have produced results which, from the standpoint of present administrative efficiency, are superior to those which any other government of the

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world has been able to produce. Not only has the social and industrial prosperity of the peo- ple been wonderfully advanced, and the gen- eral level of education raised to a high degree, but a state has been created which is of tre- mendous military strength. This much must be admitted. The only way, therefore, in which this exhibition of the efficiency of an undemo- cratically organized government can be weak- ened is by what lawyers call "confession and avoidance, " namely, by admitting the claims that are made and avoiding the conclusion at- tempted to be drawn from them that this type of political control is thus shown to be, if not the best possible, at least superior "to the more democratic forms which are exhibited in other countries.

The avoidance of this conclusion is based upon the assertion that the state power, the in- dustrial development, the social welfare, and the high level of education, especially upon its scientific side, which Germany has secured, lack certain elements of national greatness which are more important than those which have been obtained, and that, beneath its surface pros- perity, German national life contains potenti- alities of evil which need only time and oppor-

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tunity to be manifested. Thus the critics of deutsche Kultur have claimed that the successes which have been the product of the German con- stitutional and administrative system have been of a materialistic character and have lacked true ethical and spiritual elements — that right has been sacrificed to might, political liberty to state authority, and individual spontaneity and freedom to organized efficiency; with a result, as is claimed, that state action has thrown off the limitations which ordinary morality imposes, and the entire mind of the people has been cor- rupted ; and that with their pride swollen with a contemplation of the material success which they have gained, they have lost respect for, and appreciation of, the value of civilization and po- litical ideals which differ from their own. Mis- led by this distorted perspective, it is charged that the Germans have adopted a Weltpolitik which has brought them into necessary conflict with other nations and made inevitable the ter- rible conflict which is now devastating almost all Europe.

A consideration of the issues which are thus drawn between the Kultur of Germany and that of other nations cannot, of course, be here un- dertaken. An adequate treatment of them

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would involve what would practically be a crit- ical examination of the civilization of today. The statement does, however, seem to be justi- fied that the national ideals of which I have spoken have, so far as they have been held, tended to provoke armed conflict with the other great powers. It is quite explainable and, in very large measure, reasonable that any great people should feel a conviction as to the superi- ority of their own civilization over that of other peoples; but this does not necessarily carry with it a belief that it is desirable, or ethical, or even possible, forcibly to impose one's own cultural ideals upon other nations which are re- luctant to receive them. If, however, we may accept as representative the utterances of cer- tain of their leading men, the Germans have felt a conviction not only that their own Kultur is inherently superior to that of any other race, but that its super-excellence is so great that its benefits must ultimately be recognized even by those upon whom it has been imposed by force operating in its materially most devastat- ing form. Finally, one other characteristic of this German conception of Kultur needs to be mentioned, for it has a direct bearing upon the relation of the individual to the state. This

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characteristic is that Kultur finds its apotheo- sis in the state — in the nation as politically or- ganized. In other words, this Kultur is con- ceived of as something more than a civilization which is the summation of the culture of indi- viduals. It is the nationally organized genius of the people — a genius which finds its highest end and ultimate manifestation in the power and purposes of the state. And thus we are brought to the second conviction which has been earlier spoken of, namely, that the ultimate end for the realization of which the state exists is something else and higher than the welfare of the citizens as individuals, whether distribu- tively or collectively considered.

This theory to which we now turn is one the statement of which in formal terms is not an easy task, for like all mystical conceptions it eludes exact definition. Furthermore, it would seem to be rather an element which pervades and influences German political philosophy than an explicit premise upon which an argument is based. It is, furthermore, an element which un- doubtedly exercises an influence in the feelings of patriotism of all peoples, but would seem to be especially powerful in German national thought.

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The German nation is conceived of as an eth- nic unity distinguished from other ethnic units by a characteristic genius which finds its expres- sion in die deutsche Kultur. This Kultur, how- ever, as we have already pointed out, finds its "best expression in and through the state. If then, it is argued, this Kultur, the super-excel- lence of which is assumed, is to find its fullest realization, two things are necessary. First, as far as possible, all persons who have in their veins a sufficient amount of German blood to en- title them to be regarded as inheritors of the German genius should be brought within the control of the state through which the spir- itual inheritance which they potentially pos- sess may find objective realization. Secondly, the German nation thus politically united must, through the strength of its state organization, exercise throughout the world that influence which is its just due. "Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt" is the title which Eohrbach gives to his well-known book in which he argues for the widest possible extension of German influence. Weltmach oder Niederganz is the alternative which Bernhardi places be- fore the eyes of his countrymen, by the first of which -terms, as he has later explained,

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he means not world dominion but world influ- ence.

It will thus be seen that a mystical or geist- liche significance is given to the conception of both the nation and the state. The state is the German nation viewed in a certain aspect — as organized for the realization of the function, which Providence has assigned to it in the working out of the development of humanity and of world civilization. It has an end of its own which cannot be stated in the terms of the welfare of the individuals who at any time hap- pen to be under its control. Its immediate aim is its own power, for without this power it can- not realize its ultimate ends, and these ultimate ends, it is evident, are so transcendent and su- per-personal in character that the morality of the means that may be employed for their at- tainment cannot be subjected to the criteria which govern the ordinary conduct of individu- als. Furthermore, it is clear that when thus stated the end of the state is one that requires that all individual and community interests should be subordinated to it.

It is not the purpose of this paper to consider the validity of the assumptions made in the theories which have been outlined. Its aim has

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been simply one of orientation. If space had allowed, however, the author would have liked to exhibit the strong infusion of Hegelian- ism which, in his opinion, it contains, and, fur- ther, to show how the political transcendental- ism of Hegel seemed to find objective demon- stration in the history of Germany in the nine- teenth century. If die Weltgeschichte 1st das Weltgericht, it can be appreciated how the Ger- mans were led to think that the Prussian Real- politik had justified itself.

It cannot be denied that the German doctrine which has been outlined is one which possesses elements of lofty idealism. It rests, however, upon assumptions which cannot be proved, and leads to results which must be deplored. The patriotism which it exacts is a false one. It de- mands sacrifices for which no real return is made; it is predicated upon premises which, if adopted by all nations, each asserting their own excellence, would render impossible the peace- ful adjustment of conflicting interests and the advancement of civilization through the peace- ful cooperation of the nations of the world.

We turn now to the third phase of the rela- tion of the individual to the state — a phase which will undoubtedly be greatly influenced by

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the present war, whatever its outcome. I speak now of the extent of governmental control. The exigencies of war have forced all the nations en- gaged in it to extend in many directions, social as well as industrial, the spheres of their gov- ernmental regulation. Where, upon the whole, good results are obtained from this increase in state action, it may be expected that the regime will, in many instances at least, be continued after peace is established. But, more impor- tant than this, Germany, whether she is deci- sively defeated or not, will certainly have given to the world an impressive exhibition of the re- sults that are to be obtained from an adminis- trative system efficiently organized and oper- ated. There can be no question but that at the present time, in England as well as the United States, the laissez faire doctrine, as an a priori principle, has lost its force, and that that which especially operates as a deterrence to an exten- sion of the activities of the state, whether by way of regulation or direct operation, is the fear that honest and efficient public administra- tion cannot be secured. If then, as is very likely to be the case, the nations of the world should take to heart the lesson which Germany, and especially Prussia, has so impressively

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•

' . '

taught them, and be led to improve their admin- istrative systems, we may be sure that this will be followed by an increase in the control in- trusted to those systems. How far this exten- sion of the activities of government will be car- ried only the future can reveal.

THE WAB AND INTEENATIONAL LAW

GEOKGE GKAFTON WILSON

International law is not dead. Those who have made such affirmations have drawn their conclusions too hastily. Far from being dead, the subject is receiving a recognition which is a striking tribute to its vitality. Apparently not one of the warring nations regards inter- national law as even in a weakened condition.

The attempts of the states at war to put them- selves right in the eyes of the world and to cite precedents in international law in support of their acts is a comparatively new phenomenon in the history of conflict among states. The old idea that the state could do no wrong seems now to be open to question, and it is even af- firmed that kings can do wrong and that no ruler can now affirm, "I am the state." The right of a state to work its will regardless of

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other states is not admitted, even though the aggressor may be older, more powerful, or more progressive. Some are questioning the old maxim that "a higher civilization may right- fully supplant a lower." Indeed, there does not at present seem to be any satisfactory cri- terion for measuring what is called civilization unless it be, as some claim, the military power. A careful analysis seems to cast more than a doubt upon this basis of standardization. In the exercise of sovereignty it must be recog- nized that there are principles governing the conduct of states and that these principles can- not be lightly disregarded.

The flood of printed material that has poured from the governmental and other presses in an attempt to justify the action of the several states now engaged in testing by arms some of their ideas of civilization is enormous. There is no escaping from these arguments. They are inclosed in letters from old friends on either side. They are furnished by unsubsidized and subsidized representatives and patriots who plead the causes of their respective states. Why should this be if there exist no standards or principles by which these actions should be judged? The question is answered in these

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documents themselves by the frank acknowledg- ment that the aim of the publication is to show wherein the state publishing the document has observed the law of nations and wherein its op- ponent has set it aside. White books, gray books, orange books, yellow books, and others in the chromatic range have appeared. Patri- otic citizens of almost every walk of life and grade of ability have added to the bulk of ma- terial until the mass is appalling to one who seeks the real facts.

The general testimony of each that its own government "sought only peace/' causes one to wonder by what mysterious power the aims of those in authority were so manifestly perverted. In general, international law favors the main- tenance of peace and apparently each state just now desires to have on its side the utmost possible support for its method in the attempt to maintain the peace of the world. Some of the states which seem not to have found good grounds for going to war before actually en- gaging in hostilities have endeavored to dis- cover them afterward. Whether these will stand the test later, remains to be seen. The important fact is, however, that there is a clear attempt to bring the action within the range

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of those which international law justifies and supports.

It is worthy of notice also that the endeavor to conform to international law as set forth by international conferences and congresses has been universal. The third convention of the Hague Conference of 1907 provides that "the contracting parties recognize that hostilities be- tween them must not commence without a pre- vious and unequivocal warning, which shall take the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with a conditional dec- laration of war. ' ' In spite of the fact that the general practice for two hundred years has been in an overwhelming majority of cases con- trary to this convention, even under greatest strain, in 1914, the convention was followed. The excuse could have been advanced that as Servia had not ratified this convention, other powers might be relieved of some of its obliga- tions, but seemingly each wished to conform to the latest pronouncement upon the law relative to the commencement of hostilities.

How remarkable was this recognition of the Convention of 1907 relative to the opening of hostilities may be seen if the practice of states during the last two centuries be reviewed. Dur-

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ing this period there have been about one hun- dred and forty wars. Of course, there are not included the periodical revolutions of some of the states of Central and South America. In all the wars between 1700 and 1914 only ten seem to have received formal sanction by dec- laration, though a few were informally declared and only six of the declarations might properly be called preliminary. This was a wide depar- ture from the practice of those ages which some have been pleased to call "dark" when it was held that an honorable foe would not strike without previous notice. Even in the more ancient days it was a custom to enter upon hos- tilities with a foreign state only after a cere- monial,' often of the most elaborate nature, though the religious part seems sometimes to have been to justify the war before the gods rather than before men. The United States in 1898 by Act of Congress declared on April 25 that war had existed since April 21. In the present great war where there is a network of declarations of state against state, these have been uniformly prior to the opening of hostili- ties and frequently detailed, sometimes indicat- ing not merely the day upon which war would begin but also the hour and minute. Thus in

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the opening of the war there was in 1914 a re- spect for conventional forms which shows in a marked degree the influence of the work of the Hague conferences and for legal purposes gives a definiteness to the relations consequent upon the state of war which has existed in few of the wars of modern times.

As the third of the Hague conventions of 1907 has been observed as shown in the declara- tions of war in 1914, so the fourth of these conventions has been embodied in the laws of nearly all the belligerents. In cases in which this convention has not been thus embodied, the corresponding convention of 1899 has usually served a like purpose. These conventions re- late to the laws and customs of war on land. These rules were detailed and regarded as showing the advanced ideas of the states of the world as to the proper conduct of war if it should unfortunately arise. Definite and for- mal statement of the rules under which war shall be conducted is in itself comparatively modern, the first great set of such rules issuing from the War Department of the United States scarcely fifty years ago and commonly known as Lieber's Code. Subsequent rules have been frankly based upon Lieber's Code. These rules

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of 1899 and 1907 are tributes to the fairmind- edness of the early codifier. Is it not in itself a marked advance that the old motto that ' ' all is fair in war" is no longer even current? A careful review of these Hague rules and testing of action of the belligerents thereby show a closer observance of these rules than is gen- erally believed. Each belligerent party has accused its opponent of violation or of failure to observe these rules. These accusations have been widely published and have received cre- dence usually according to preconceived predi- lections of the reader. It is reasonable to sup- pose that there have been acts both in the east- ern and in the western theaters of contest wilich would not conform to the accepted laws of war. Certainly the invading armies of both parties have been accused of such acts and of course it would be the invading army which would or- dinarily be the only one generally guilty of, or having much reason for, such acts. The rela- tions between the respective combatant forces seem to have been generally in accord with law. The investigation of the treatment of prisoners by a representative of the United States gov- ernment showed a condition usually com- mended. The advance in this respect since the

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days of the American Civil War is marked.

The instruments of warfare have usually been such as are approved by law. It is true that the guns have been of a larger caliber and of a longer range than those previously used. In the huge siege guns Germany has found a weapon of offense which made advance against strongly fortified positions possible in the early days of the war. The use of such guns made it necessary for the opponents of Germany to use other methods of defense than those originally planned, but the legality of the use of big guns on land and sea is unquestioned. There was a proposition in the Conference at The Hague that limitation of armaments begin by restrict- ing the effectiveness of guns to the standard of the most effective then constructed. There was, however, such reluctance on the part of the states supposed to have the most effective guns, to furnish data upon the subject, that the proposition failed. The effectivity of the gun is not always a matter to be determined by its caliber, but is often dependent upon the "man behind the gun."

While the size and destructiveness of the gun may not be, up to this time, subject to limi- tation, there are restrictions upon the use of

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certain projectiles which cause unnecessary suf- fering. Small explosive bullets, copper bullets, etc., are prohibited and such prohibition seems to have been respected. Accusations in regard to the use of dum-dum bullets have been made by both belligerent parties. It is said that one of the belligerents was about to submit as evi- dence of his opponent's guilt certain dum-dum bullets, when a neutral expert on projectiles called attention to the fact that these bullets about to be submitted were manufactured only in the state bringing the accusation, and that they would not fit any of the opponents' guns. This accusation was allowed to drop. There are in recent times many instances where it is claimed that the uniform of an enemy is used to deceive, but when the aim in modern warfare is to avoid color which will be conspicuous, to eliminate brass buttons and shining helmets, and in many instances even to use no flag, it is easy to understand that cases of mistaken iden- tity in khaki uniforms may easily occur.

Aerial bombardment has also been a matter on which considerable difference of opinion has been expressed. The laws of land upon this subject are brief and state "the attack or bom- bardment, by any means whatever, of towns,

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villages, habitations or buildings which are not defended is forbidden. ' ' The rales also provide that in making an attack the commander should do all he can to warn the authorities. Mani- festly if the attack is to be a surprise this in- junction would not be obligatory and it was so understood by those negotiating the conven- tion. It is also exceedingly difficult for an air- man to determine in every instance whether a town is defended and there is thus far no clear definition of defense. Only sixteen of the forty- four states represented at the second Hague conference have signed the convention prohibit- ing the discharge of projectiles from aircraft and Austria, France, Germany and "Russia are not among these. Indeed aerial warfare is a type so modern that its possibilities and proper regulation can scarcely be predicated.

Here it should be borne in mind that new means of warfare have from earliest times been opposed by the party not possessing them. Gunpowder was at one time the subject of de- nunciation, cannons were condemned, and tor- pedoes were regarded as the creation of devil- ish ingenuity. There has been opposition to the use of shells which diffuse gases and put the enemy hors de combat. The late Admiral

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Mahan pointed out that giving an enemy gas which would not cause unnecessary suffering and then capturing him might be more humane than mangling him with projectiles before mak- ing him a prisoner.

The laws of war of all countries regard non- combatants who take up arms and commit hos- tilities, except as levees en masse, as liable to punishment for illegitimate acts. The nature of the punishment will be determined by the exigencies. It is true that the Hague rules pro- vide against collective punishment for the acts of an individual, but the report of the commis- sion which drew up this article provides that it shall be without "prejudice to the question of reprisals, " Reprisals are usually acts of re- taliation for illegitimate acts of warfare and are therefore usually beyond the range of law. These acts must be judged accordingly and must not be advanced to show that the Hague conventions have been violated. These conven- tions have been observed far more strictly than one could have anticipated in 1907 had the spec- tacle of a general European war been prophe- sied. The observance of the Hague conven- tions has been in the main observance of con- ventions which have been formally ratified.

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More remarkable in some respects is the gen- eral observance of the Declaration of London of 1909 which had not been ratified by any of the belligerents. It is true that Great Britain has added very largely to the list of articles contraband of war under the Declaration and in this France and Eussia have followed. Great Britain has also made extensions in the range of destination which may be regarded as hos- tile, thus making vessels more generally liable to capture. Germany and Austria-Hungary have, however, kept fairly close to the Declara- tion in their published regulations and Japan has almost completely embodied its principles. There seems, however, at this time" (February 20, 1915) a tendency to undue extension of the list of contraband to articles that are of such indirect use in war that the list would hardly have received the sanction of Grotius three hundred years ago.

Recently negotiations have been in progress in regard to the establishing of a war zone about Great Britain and in regard to the use of neutral flags by British merchant vessels. Each belligerent seems to be endeavoring to the utmost to extend the pressure upon his op- ponent and- to save himself as far as possible

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without too great risk of complications with neutrals. In absence of complete information as to whether the British government gave or- ders to use the American or other neutral flags and in absence of information as to the method in which Germany is to apply her proclamation in regard to the war zone, it may be said that there is no law against the use of a neutral flag by a belligerent merchant vessel though the governmental order for such use, if such were given, may be questionable. The United States has generally disapproved of the use of false colors in the time of war and the prohibition would have much support in the mind of those who believe in respect for a national flag.

It may also be said that the proclamation of war areas or war zones is not unknown in in- ternational relations. Such areas were pro- claimed by Japan for defensive purposes dur- ing the Eusso-Japanese War of 1904-5 and the entrance to these areas was regulated or pro- hibited.

The international law embodied in conven- tions, declarations, and other agreements, con- sidering the area of the present hostilities, has, with comparatively few exceptions, been a mat- ter of careful concern on the part of the bel-

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ligerents. International law which is not thus embodied has also received attention and bel- ligerents have endeavored to justify many acts by appeal to its principles, and in some in- stances the belligerents have frankly admitted violations of the law and their responsi- bility for such acts. Of course, many in- stances must await the issue of the conflict for determination of incidence and amount of lia- bility.

Not alone the belligerents, but neutrals also have shown a disposition to observe their in- ternational obligations. In some cases neutrals seem to have leaned over backward in an en- deavor to stand erect. In some states desirous of maintaining neutrality the exportation of ar- ticles, ordinarily regular objects of commerce, has been prohibited. The articles embargoed by neutral European countries for various rea- sons number more than three hundred. This list is varied, from acetic acid to zinc. It in- cludes armor plates, arms, etc., by nature ab- solute contraband, and dogs in Switzerland, herring meal and reindeer in Norway, skees and sticks in Sweden, etc.

Some neutral states endeavored in the early days of the" war to prevent the making of loans

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THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

by private persons to belligerent governments, but the impracticability of such measures was well understood at The Hague in 1907, and such obligations were not imposed on neutral gov- ernments even in form. The obligation of a neutral government itself to refrain from making loans to belligerents was clearly and positively acknowledged. It was plain that while a neutral government might control and be responsible for its own acts, it could not con- trol or be responsible for all the acts of its sub- jects. A banker, particularly if he had branches in other countries, could transfer money in such fashion that its ultimate destination could not be known to the authorities of the state from which the transfer was made.

The United States ' proclamation of neutrality is extremely comprehensive, though it does not as some have asserted forbid the expression of any except neutral opinions within the jurisdic- tion of the United States. On the other hand, it distinctly announces that it does not propose to interfere "with the free expression of opin- ion and sympathy, ' ' provided this does not take certain material forms, as for example, the aug- menting of the force of a belligerent vessel of war. The regulations for securing the mainte-

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nance of the neutrality of the Panama Canal are even more detailed.

There are, moreover, many new factors in this war which did not exist or were not fully developed in earlier wars, such as mines, sub- marine boats, radiotelegraph, aircraft, etc. There was not a satisfactory agreement upon the use of submarine mines at the Hague Con- ference in 1907. The use of such mines in the Eusso-Japanese War in 1904-5 had called the attention of the world to the dangers of the un- restricted laying of mines. In the conflicting claims of belligerents in the present war one fact stands out clearly, each belligerent desires that his action be regarded as within the law, or else justified as a reprisal to meet a viola- tion of law by his opponent.

As to the use of submarine boats, there has been and is no well-defined law. This means of warfare is comparatively new and rules have naturally not yet developed for its regulation. That Great Britain had anticipated that it might be used against merchant vessels is in- dicated in the already developed policy of arm- ing such vessels, "for defense," as she an- nounced. It is often difficult to determine the difference in" fact between offense and defense.

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THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The simple fact that one strikes first is not sufficient evidence. The claim that the subma- rine boat is a secret means of war is not a valid argument against its use. This argument has been advanced against other means of war but never long and seriously entertained. It is true that the submarine may prey in a dangerous manner upon the private property of a bellig- erent, yet at the Hague Conference of 1907 France, Great Britain, Japan and Russia were among the eleven states voting against the im- munity from capture of private property at sea and Austria and Germany supported the American proposition for exemption. The vote stood twenty-one votes for, eleven against and one state not voting.

The use of the radiotelegraph has been put under very strict control in the United States, thus formulating as it were a set of rules which may later become generally accepted. Cer- tainly the rules have been admitted by the bel- ligerents and to this extent have become inter- national.

The rules in regard to the use of aircraft were not formulated at the beginning of the war, but in practice there has been care to avoid passing through the air above neutral territory.

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Neutrals have also seemed inclined to main- tain their rights to jurisdiction in the air above their territory. Aircraft have been placed in the category of contraband and no objection has been raised.

The wide discussion upon the sinking of enemy merchant vessels at sea has shown a gen- eral tendency to look for support for the action in international precedents. These have not been difficult to find. The contention that neu- tral vessels may be sunk if they cannot con- veniently be brought to a prize court is one which it is more difficult to sustain, though there is support for this in the decisions of some courts and in some prize regulations. These are questions upon which the International Na- val Conference in 1908-9 found much difference of opinion. The law upon the subject cannot be' said to be settled.

There have unquestionably been acts upon the part of belligerents, if one can trust the re- ports that each makes in regard to the oppo- nent, which were not merely not sanctioned by international law, or not within the provisions of international law, but were contrary to in- ternational law. The newspapers of one side accuse the invading party of the other of atroci-

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ties. It is natural that this should be the case as the invading party would be obliged to act in a more rigorous manner than the party on the defensive within his own territory. This might lead to, or be accompanied by, acts in excess of, or contrary to, the acts permissible under the rules of international law.

Here again, however, the fact that the injured belligerent hastens to bring these actions to public notice as being in violation of interna- tional usage and meriting general condemnation is an evidence of the force which the law has acquired.

It has not been the purpose of these remarks to justify the action of any one of the belliger- ents nor to hold any belligerent up for condem- nation. There seem to have been some acts upon the part of each of the belligerent parties which are open to question and which must be reserved for a later judgment. Such conduct has been common in all wars. This war, in- volving so many states and fought over an area so great, affords more opportunity for acts not in accord with international law. The change in the means of warfare, the introduction of new instruments, the use of the air above the earth, and the sea, and the water under the sea-

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level, have given rise to new problems, and law has not kept pace with these changes. States have been reluctant to make agreements in re- gard to their probable conduct under conditions which have yet to be tested. Such facts as these should be kept in mind when passing judgment on the acts of the belligerents during the last six months. It should also be kept in mind that in some instances the violation of international law has been frankly admitted and indemnity or reparation has been unhesitatingly promised. In such a case the promise of indemnity does not make the act less a violation of law, but makes the existence of its obligatory force un- questioned even when the so-called "higher state policy" has been followed.

When thinking at the present time of that treaty which was ratified and proclaimed almost exactly one hundred years ago (February 18, 1815) and of the hundred years of peace with Great Britain since that time, it is well to recall that even though the present is a time of a war of unparalleled magnitude, it is at the same time a period when the influence of the principles of law are more potent than a hundred years ago and indeed more potent than ever in modern times. The old maxim, inter ar-

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ma silent leges, no longer applies, and the doc- trines which belonged with the maxim are pass- ing away. It would be absurd to say that in the great struggle of the nations now going on there has not been disregard of international law, it would be equally absurd to attempt to give a complete justification for all the acts of one side as against the other, and it was not the purpose of these remarks to endeavor to ac- complish either of these ends. It is the purpose to show that the work of the Hague conferences and the International Naval Conference was not in vain, that the principles of international law have not lost all their power, that while new conditions may have made old rules inap- plicable, there has been an inclination to ob- serve the fundamental principles, that while vio- lations of law may have taken place, often the liability for such violations has been recognized, and thai international law, far from being im- potent, embodies the principles under which the most powerful nations of the world now seek to find sanction to justify their actions before the opinion of the world.

VI

THE WAE AND INTERNATIONAL COM- MERCE AND FINANCE

EMOBY E. JOHNSON, Ph.D., Sc.D.

The economic interests of all countries are so interrelated that a prolonged war between any two important industrial nations inevitably creates a serious disturbance of international finance and trade. The present war, which in- volves the larger part of Europe and also more or less directly much of Asia, Africa and Aus- tralia, has temporarily stopped a large share of the world's international exchanges, has com- pelled such trade as is carried on to be con- ducted under unprecedented conditions, and has so interfered with commerce generally as seriously to modify, at least temporarily, the commercial and industrial activity of all coun- tries, neutral as well as belligerent. It is cer- tain that the permanent industrial and commer-

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cial effects of the present war will much ex- ceed those that have resulted from any previous international struggle, with the possible excep- tion of the Napoleonic wars.

This result is to be expected, first of all, be- cause of the unprecedented destruction of cap- ital. If the war ends in 1915, it is estimated that the military expenditures will reach twenty billion dollars, and if, as now seems possible, the war should continue through 1916, the ex- penditures may reach forty or fifty billion dol- lars. The Government expenditures, however, represent only a part of the expenses of the war. Capital is destroyed in great quantities over large areas, production is checked, trade is reduced to a fraction of its normal propor- tions, and the total economic waste due to the war may be double or treble the measurable military expenditures. This wholesale destruc- tion of capital must necessarily influence for many years to come the monetary and financial institutions of the leading countries of the world, must compel changes in international finance, must lessen the industrial output of many countries, modify the conditions of in- ternational competition, and, by means of in- creased prices and lessened opportunity, make

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living conditions harder for the people of Europe and for those in many other parts of the world.

To what extent and in what manner the pres- ent misfortunes of Europe will affect the in- ternational trade and domestic commerce of the United States ; to what degree the United States will supplant Europe as the financial and inter- national banking center; and in what particu- lars the economic position of the United States among the industrial and commercial countries of the world will be benefited, are problems to which economists and business men are giving earnest thought, with the hope of being able to read aright the horoscope of the world's eco- nomic future.

Of course no one can at the present time defi- nitely predict how the great European War will affect the financial, commercial and industrial interests of the United States. There are too many unknown factors in the problem. It is not known how long the war will last, nor how many nations will become involved in the titanic struggle. This paper is being written just at the time Italy is joining the war. It is probable that some of the Balkan States, and possibly other countries of Europe, may yet become in-

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volved in the struggle. Indeed, it is within the realm of possibility that the United States it- self may be unable to protect American national and individual rights while maintaining her po- sition of neutrality. Assuming that the United States succeeds in remaining neutral — as every patriotic citizen most earnestly hopes will be possible — also assuming that the war will not include more nations than have already been drawn into the conflict, and assuming further that the struggle will continue for another twelve months and thus last for a period of about two years, what will probably be the ef- fect of the war upon the economic future of the United States? In answering this general question it will be well to consider first how the war will affect the American money market and the position of the United States as a finan- cial and banking center.

The first and most obvious effect of the whole- sale destruction of capital by the European War will be a higher rate of interest. Interest rates were stiff before the beginning of the present war, the relatively high rates of inter- est that have prevailed during recent years be- ing thought by experts to have been the result of the destruction of property by the series of

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wars that occurred from 1898 to 1905. The Spanish- American War is said to have cost a billion of dollars, the Russo-Japanese War an- other billion, and the Boer War two billion dol- lars. The direct expense of these three wars amounted to at least four billion dollars. The effect of the destruction of that amount of capi- tal upon the rate of interest commanded by in- vestment capital had not been overcome when the present war started.

It is certain that the demand for capital for at least two decades following the close of the present war will be abnormal. Had there been no war, there would have been a relatively large demand for capital in 1915-16. In Several coun- tries, particularly in the United States, times have been dull and a period of business expan- sion seems about to begin. To secure capital that must be obtained even at high interest rates, Europe at the close of the war will bor- row from all countries that have surplus capital. American capitalists will unquestionably ad- vance large sums to European borrowers, and American investors will be able to secure high rates of interest not only because of the neces- sities of European borrowers, but also on ac- count of the opportunities for the investment

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of American capital in domestic industrial en- terprises.

If the great nations now at war succeed in making peace with each other before the credit of any one of the nations collapses and thus endangers or overthrows the credit institutions of other countries, we may expect peace to be followed by an entirely abnormal inflation of credit. Indeed, all of the powers at war have made a greater use of credit than would have been deemed possible. About twelve billion dol- lars of war loans have already been floated or authorized. Great Britain has issued between two hundred and three hundred million dollars of paper currency redeemable in gold by the Bank of England; and the bank has agreed to make loans to the Government taking as se- curity the Government's bonds issued in the war loans. The Bank of France has in- creased its note issue more than fifty per cent., and cities and towns in different parts of France have issued large quantities of paper money. Likewise, in Germany, loan banks in different parts of the empire, with the approval and aid of the Government and the Eeichsbank, have put large quantities of paper money in cir- culation and the banks have accepted practi-

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cally all kinds of property as a basis for credit and financial assistance. The termination of the war will not bring an end to the use of gov- ernment credit, provided the financial position of the several governments at the close of the war is such that further use may be made of government credit. Capital will be so greatly needed that the revival of business will de- pend very largely upon government assistance, and, if aid can be given, it is certain that every form of government credit that can be safely de- vised will be employed in aiding the revival of industry and trade.

The demand for gold will continue for some time after the close of the war, and there is much danger that the supply of gold in the United States will be reduced to an unsafe amount. Fortunately, the Federal Reserve Act has established a banking system that will prob- ably enable the United States adequately to pro- tect its supply of gold. It is most fortunate for the country that the banking laws of the United States were revised in 1914. The finan- cial situation of the country would have been even better today had the banking laws been revised a year earlier.

It is the expectation of many persons that 156

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the financial and industrial strength of Europe will be so reduced by the present great war that New York City will be able to supersede London as the primary money center of the world. Un- doubtedly, the United States will, as a result of the war, occupy a much more important posi- tion in international banking than it now holds ; and it is possible that at least a part of the bills of exchange drawn in the transactions of inter- national trade will, in the future, be in terms of the dollar instead of the sovereign, and will be drawn against New York instead of London. At the present moment, a Pan-American Finan- cial Conference is in session in Washington, called together by the United States Secre- tary of the Treasury to consider how the United States may best cooperate with the other countries of the American continent to provide the funds and banking facilities required for the present and future conduct of the trade of Central and South American countries.

It will be well, however, not to expect that New York will suddenly become the world's- leading financial center. As was stated by Mr. T. W. Lamont, of the firm of J. P. Morgan and Company, in a paper read April 30, 1915, before

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the American Academy of Political and Social Science :

"Many people seem to believe that New York is to supersede London as the money center of the world. In order to become the money cen- ter we must of course become the trade center of the world. That is certainly a possibility. Is it a probability? Only time can show. But my guess would be that, although subsequent to the war this country is bound to be more im- portant financially than ever before, it will be many years before America, even with her won- derful resources, energy and success, will be- come the financial center of the world. Such a shifting cannot be brought about quickly, for of course to become the money center of the world we must, as I have said, become the trade cen- ter ; and up to date our exports to regions other than Great Britain and Europe have been com- paratively limited in amount. We must culti- vate and build up new markets for our manu- facturers and merchants, and all that is a mat- ter of time. ' '

Mr. Lament is unquestionably correct when he suggests that no country can become a finan- cial center of the world unless it enters largely and widely into international trade. The fu-

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ture of the United States in international finance will depend upon the success attained by this country during the present war, and sub- sequent thereto, in building up its foreign com- merce. What are the prospects in this regard?

The immediate effects of the war upon Amer- ican commerce have been to stop all direct trade with Germany, to limit greatly the trade to neutral countries, and to render difficult and dangerous all intercourse with the Allies. The foreign trade of the United States in numerous commodities has been greatly limited in quan- tity and trade as a whole is being carried on very expensively on account of the high freight and insurance rates. Certain articles such as foods and military supplies are being exported in greatly increased volume. The effect of the war upon imports has been greater than upon exports.

At the close of every important war that has interrupted trade and interfered with the in- dustrial activities of two or more producing countries, there is a sudden expansion of com- merce, due to the effort of producers to dis- pose of accumulated stocks, and to the desire of buyers to secure materials with which to renew production, and also because of the extraordi-

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nary effort which everybody makes to recoup the losses suffered during and in consequence of the war.

It is certain that European purchases from the United States will be large for the first year or two following the declaration of peace. Nec- essarily, those purchases will be made, for the most part, upon credit; and European buyers will make use of their credit to the full- est extent in order to secure the materials and supplies required to renew industry upon as large a scale as capital and labor conditions will permit. After having made these large pur- chases immediately following the war, all pro- ducers in Europe will necessarily be obliged to l)uy with unusual caution and to limit purchases to the smallest possible proportions. Instead of buying freely, the European producers will endeavor to sell the products which they have manufactured during the first year or two in order to pay off their debts and to secure cap- ital for further industrial activities.

Thus immediately following the war the ex- ports from the United States to Europe will be large, and this period of heavy exports will be followed by large imports into this country ac- companied by a restricted export trade. Ameri-

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can industries, having been stimulated to un- usual activity immediately following the war, will probably experience a severe check two or three years after the war; and, if a panic is avoided, it will be due to the foresight and busi- ness restraint of American manufacturers, par- ticularly the large business organizations that control a relatively large share of the output of staple industries. Every great war of the last century has been followed by a period of feverish business activity which has, within a few years, been succeeded by a business depres- sion of greater or less severity. It remains to be seen whether the lessons of history have been well enough learned by the captains of Ameri- can industry to enable them to prevent the repe- tition of what has happened after previous wars.

South America, Africa and Oriental countries are, at the present time, unable to secure from Europe many of the articles which they have regularly purchased from European exporters. Likewise, the European market for many South American, African and Oriental goods is greatly restricted. The conditions seem ex- traordinarily favorable for the rapid expansion of 'the foreign trade in the United States. If

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the war continues through 1916, American pro- ducers ought to secure a portion of the markets that have previously been supplied from Europe. It was expected when the war broke out that there would immediately be a large in- crease in the trade of the United States with South America. The expectation, however, was not realized, because the purchasing power of South American countries was greatly reduced. The banking and commercial connections of South American countries having been mainly with Europe, the European War almost par- alyzed South American trade and industry. Banking and credit institutions in South Ameri- can countries were unable to be of assistance to producers and traders, and even now, nearly a year after the opening of the war, financial con- ditions in South America are still unsettled. The United States is now beginning to secure part of the South American trade that was for- merly carried on with Europe. Great Britain, however, is holding most of her South Ameri- can commerce, and, without doubt, Germany will be able to resume her South American trade without very great difficulty at the close of the war.

It will be an advantage to the United States 162

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to be in possession of a part of the commercial field formerly occupied by European producers and traders, but it would be a mistake to expect the United States to be able to hold all the new trade that will have been diverted to her from European producers while the war was in prog- ress. While European manufacturers may not be able to regain all the ground they have lost, they will, within a comparatively few years, re- cover most of the trade that has been taken from them. There are several reasons why this is to be expected.

The commerce of the United States with South America or with other parts of the world depends, first of all, upon the amount of capital invested in foreign countries. Up to the pres- ent time, the industries of South America, Af- rica and the Orient have been developed mainly by British and German capital. The people of Belgium, Holland, and some other European countries have also invested largely in various parts of the world. Trade follows capital into foreign lands. As far as can be learned, British and German capitalists are retaining their South American investments, with the confident expectation of engaging actively in the indus- tries and trade of South American countries

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as soon as the war is ended. If American trad- ers compete in the future successfully and largely with European producers and traders in South American countries, it will be in con- sequence of a greater investment of American capital than has thus far been made in South America. What is the prospect that such in- vestments will be made?

There are definite indications that American investors are looking with increased favor upon investments abroad. It is stated that seven hundred millions of American capital have been put into Canadian industries other than agri- culture, that a half a billion dollars have been invested in Mexico, Central America, Cuba, Haiti, Chile and Peru. The amounts that have been invested in other Latin American coun- tries cannot be stated, but they are a consid- erable sum. Since the war began, Argentina has taken an unusual amount of American cap- ital in the form of merchandise, for which pay- ment has been made, in part, by treasury notes of the Argentine Government sold in this country.

It is easier for any country to secure trade abroad when its citizens reside in the foreign country with which the trade is carried on.

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Great Britain and Germany, notably, have built up their trade in South America, Africa, and the Orient very largely because British and Ger- man subjects reside in large numbers in for- eign countries. It has not yet become the prac- tice of American citizens to reside abroad in any considerable numbers. Industrial oppor- tunities at home have, until recently, been more alluring than the possibilities of securing wealth abroad. In all probability, the time has come when increasing numbers of persons born and educated in the United States, will, for busi- ness and other reasons, make their residence in South America, Africa, and the Orient, and this will unquestionably prove to be of assist- ance to the United States in holding and devel- oping the foreign trade obtained during the period of the war.

A former handicap upon the development of the foreign trade of the United States has been remedied by Sections 13, 14 and 25 of the Fed- eral Eeserve Act. Now, for the first time, it is possible for an American bank chartered un- der the National Banking Act, to establish and maintain branches in foreign countries. Sec- tion 25 of the Federal Eeserve Act provides that "any national banking association possess-

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ing a capital and surplus of $1,000,000 or more" may, with the approval of the Federal Eeserve Board, establish "branches in foreign countries or dependencies of the United States for the furtherance of the foreign commerce of the United States." This provision of the act has already been made use of. The National City Bank of New York has established branches at Buenos Aires in the Argentine Eepublic, and in Eio de Janeiro and Santos in Brazil. Permis- sion has been given that institution to establish a West Indian branch with a main office at Ha- vana and with several sub-branches at various points in Cuba, Jamaica and Santo Domingo. The authority to open a branch bank at Eio de Janeiro also included the right to operate sub-branches at several points in Brazil. In all probability, other American banks interested in foreign trade will establish branches in dif- ferent parts of the world.

Section 13 of the Federal Eeserve Act pro- vides that ' ' any member bank may accept drafts or bills of exchange drawn upon it and growing out of transactions involving the importation or exportation of goods having not more than six months sight to run." Banks may accept foreign bills of exchange to an amount equal to

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one-half of their paid-up capital stock and sur- plus. This makes it possible for American banks to rediscount acceptances based upon im- ported and exported goods, and opens a new field in which to conduct business, while enabling banks in this country to be of great assistance in the future development of American for- eign trade. The banking prerequisites of the development of a larger trade between the United States and South America seem now to have been met. As the trade increases it will be possible to afford merchants and manufac- turers the necessary international banking fa- cilities.

The fact that the relatively small volume of commerce that has been carried on between the United States and most South American coun- tries up to the present time has been trans- ported, for the most part, in foreign ships, and that there has been no marked tendency to es- tablish American steamship lines for opera- tion between the ports of the United States and countries of South America, has caused many students of commerce to argue that the future development of the trade of the United States with American countries to the south, will de- pend upon provision being made, either by the

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Government or by private capital, for a large increase in transportation facilities. Undoubt- edly, regular and adequate steamship services from American ports to South American coun- tries would make the development of commerce easier, and tend to diversify as well as to extend the trade between North and South American countries. It should be remembered, however, that steamship lines and other transportation agencies are merely trade facilities which cap- ital will provide whenever it becomes evident that profit can be secured by establishing and maintaining such facilities.

Trade development depends primarily upon the existence or non-existence of favorable in- dustrial, financial and mercantile conditions. Without doubt, production is carried on within the United States so economically that Ameri- can producers of many kinds of articles can compete successfully with manufacturers in other countries ; and, as has been pointed out in this paper, it seems probable that the interna- tional banking facilities needed in carrying on a larger trade between North and South Amer- ica are about to be provided. There remains, however, .for American manufacturers and traders to develop the merchandising meth-

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ods by means of which European mer- chants have secured the major share of the foreign trade of South American coun- tries. For some reason, American producers and merchants are not as successful traders as are the merchants of Great Britain and Ger- many. The normal attitude of the American manufacturer is that the superiority of his goods will guarantee their popularity with for- eign buyers ; he feels it is necessary only to call the foreigner's attention to the character of American goods and to the opportunity the for- eigner has to secure goods in the United States. The British, and particularly the German, mer- chants, on the contrary, have actively solicited the trade of the South American buyers, and have sought to adapt European goods and European merchandising methods to the needs and customs of South American producers. These generalizations apply broadly, and, as in the case of all general rules, there are excep- tions. There are, indeed, evidences of the de- velopment of better merchandising methods on the part of American producers and