ifd'- Is/^
-J
THE
PHILOSOPHICAL
PRINCIPLES
OF
NATURAL AND REVEALED
RELIGION,
UNFOLDED IN
A GEOMETRICAL ORDER
BY
THE CHEVALIER RAMSAY
AUTHOR OF THE TRAVELS OF CYRUS.
GLASGOW:
PRINTED AND SOLD BY ROBERT FOULIE. MDCGXLVHI,
PREFACE.
IN this twilight of human underftanding • we fee things ' darkly as in a glafs.' The moft fublime reafonings, the noblefl: ideas, the moft perfeft fchcmcs we can form of God and Nature are no doubt looked upon by angelical minds, as the childifh difcourfes of little babes, according to the cxpref- Cion of a fine poet ;
* Superior beings when of late they faw
* A mortal man unfold all nature's law,
^ Admir'd fuch wifdom in an earthly fhape,
* And fhew'd a Newton, as we fhew an ape.
It is therefore with the greateft fclf-diffidence that we under- take the refearch and demonftration of the principles contai- ned in the following trcatife. We know their fublimity, we feel our own weaknefs.
There are but two pofFible ways of coming to the know- ledge of truth, by natural evidence, or by fupernatural revela- tion. Both are emanations of that fovereign wifdom which alone has the right to command our afTent, and both are em- ployed in this effay. Tho' natural light is not always fufficient to difcover fupernatural truths, yet revelation never contra- 6iO:s reafon. The former ferves to exalt and ennoble, but ne- ver to degrade and extinguifh the latter. Philofophy therefore as an handinaid may very well be employed to fhow that rcli-
a 2
iv PREFACE.
glon IS perfeftly conformable to reafon. So long as Deifts and Freethinkers fee no fublimity,dignity,nor beauty in the Chrifti- an fcheme,they will ftill cry out that our myfteries are blaiphe- mous, and that feveral do6lrines of faith deftroy all the moral attributes of God. PrepofTelTed with thefe falfe ideas, they muft look upon miracles as tricks of art; prophecy as impofture; infpiration as enthufiafm ; facred hiftory as fabulous ; ecclefia- ftic authority as prieftcraft, and all the reafons of credibility as plaufible falfhoods. We do not here attempt to prove by fuch prophecies and miracles as could have proceeded only from omnifcience and omnipotence, that God has fpoken to his creatures in a fupernatural manner; far lefs that the books of the Old and New Teftament were thus infpired and have been preferved ever fince pure and uncorrupted. What we pretend to fhow is, that fuppofing thefe books divine, the do<flrine contained therein is the only religion which juftifies the ways of eternal providence, renders the Deity amiable to his creatures, reconciles all his moral attributes, far from de- ftroying them ; and in fine that the Holy Scriptures con- tain the mofl: fublime fyftem of theology and philofophy con- cerning God and nature ; the vifible and invifible world, that has ever yet been difcovcred.
In order to this, we endeavour to demonftrate in the firft part of the following eflay, * That the great principles of
* NATURAL RELIGION are foundcd upon the moft invin-
* cible evidence; and that the effential doftrines of REVEA-
* LED RELIGION are perfectly conformable to reason.' In the fecond part we fhall fhow ' That vcftiges of all the
* principal do<5lrines of the Chriftian religion are to be found
PREFACE. V
* in the monuments, writings, or mythologies of all nations, ' ages, and religions ; and that thefe veftlges are emanations of
* the primitive, antlent, imlverfal religion of mankind, tranf- ' mitted from the beginning of the world by the Antidiluvi-
* ans to the Poftdiluvian patriarchs, and by them to their po-
* fterlty that peopled the face of the earth.' In the whole courfeof this work we attempt to fhow, that as the Pagan my- thologifts adulterated by degrees the original traditions of the patriarchal religion ; fo firft the Jewifli rabbins, and then the Chriftlan fchoolmen have disfigured revealed religion, by ma- ny abfurd opinions, popular errors, and wild fictions, which being neither founded in fcrlpture, nor authorized by the con- fentof the univerfal church, ought not to pafs for do^rines of faith. Thus we hope to feparate the pure from the im- pure, and thereby remove many fcandals, ftumbling blocks, and prejudices, that make minute philofophers fcoiFat, and delpife ChrKHanlty,
We have digefted the great principles of thefirfl: part Into a geometrical order,which Is certainly the mofl: exa(5l wayof rea- foning,the mofl proper to convince others, and undeceive our- felves. Each demonftration confifls ofonefyllogiflTi, of which the premifes are either a definition, an axiom, apropofition al- ready demonftrated, or fome corollary drawn from it. Thus it is eafy upon a review to detect the error where it lay s.The lem- mas are incidental propofitions defigned to prove others, and they are demonflrated in this treatife by a combination of felf- evident maxims. In the fcholiums we do not pretend to demon- ftrate, but only to explain the principles already proved, or to anfwer obje6tions made againfl them. Tho' fome of our de-
.vl PREFACE.
monftrations or corollaries fhould fecm lefs evident, or even prove falfe; yet this will not deflroy the truth of the principle advanced, if other demonftrations can be found to fupport it, and therefore our adverfaries muft not triumph, till they can fhow, not only that fome of the proofs we give are lefs cogent and exa61: ; but alfo that no better ones can be given.
The ufual way of demonftrating is by feparate and inde- pendent proofs, which do not flow from, nor re-unite in the fame principle. All the propofitions and corollaries of this effay are derived from the fimple idea ofasELF-ExisTENT BEING ; which all muft allow, whether Atheifts or Theifts; Deifts or Chriftlans. This is the feed which contains the hidden tree, with all its roots, branches, leaves, flowers, and fruits. The harmony, order, and connccllon of truths ; the unity of the principle ; the multiplicity of tlie confe- quences; their mutual dependence upon each other; their tendency to elevate the heart, at the fame time that they en- lighten the underftanding ; to fecure human focicty during this life, while they prepare us for a happy immortality In the next; tore-unite natural and revealed religion; and to recon- cile reafon with revelation, are fo many additional proofs that give a new light to each particular propofition.
We have divided the firft part into fix books, becaufe the objects we treat of may be reduced to fix heads. God con- fidered in himfelf, and then with regard to his creatures makes the fubje^l of the two firft books; the third confiders the properties and diflerenccs of finite beings; the creatures confidered in an elevated, lapfed, and rc-cftabliflied ftatc, make the fubjeft of the three laft. By this diftribution we
PREFACE. vii
embrace the eflentlal parts of philofophy, both phyfical and moral, and of theology both natural and revealed. I fay theef- fential parts ; for fince this efTay is only a book of principles, it is not to be expelled that we fliould defcend into an ample detail and explication of all the confequences deducible from them. We content ourfelves to prefent to thinking minds, the original feeds from whence fpring vaft fields of new the- ories, that may be further cultivated, beautified, and enlarged. Truth however being of a coherent nature, it is impoffible to feparate one branch from another, and fee it in all its beauty. I beg therefore my readers not to judge of the work by par- cels ; but to continue to the end, that fo they may fee the con- ne<flion of every part with the whole. Scattered rays do not always enlighten ; but when re-united they give a mutual iuftre to each other.
VVe forefee that this performance will not equally fuccced with all forts of incredulous minds. Thefewho are blinded by their paflions, will rejedt it with fcorn, and cry out at firft fight of the Title-page, ' What would this babbler fay?' Determi- ned to indulge fenfe, appetite, and pleafure; they are affraid to fee truth in its native colours. The fulleft funfhine cannot enlighten thofe who fiiut their eyes to its luminous influen- ces. Truth is a hidden treafure which none can difcover but thofe who fearch after it with a generous mind, and upright heart, and are refolved to facrifice all to the love of it, when known. Whofoever does not find in himfelf thefe dilpofiti- ons, is not yet prepared for the fearch of truth: and without this preparation of the heart it is needlefs to read this work or any other that pleads the caufe of Chrifiianity. We hope
viii PREFACE.
however, that all ferious Freethinkers, who are become fuch only by the falfe ideas that have been given of religion, or by tlie prejudices of education,will profit by the difcoveries of the great men of all nations and times, which we have endeavou- red to re-unite under one view, and into one regular fyftcm : for we do not pretend to give here a fcheme of new,unheard of theories; but only to concenter in one fyftem the lights and difcoveries of the fages of all countries and ages, whether antient or modern.
In the firft part of this effay, we give only the philofophi- cal principles of natural and revealed religion, in fo far as they are demonftrable by reafon, or can be proved compatible with it, tho' not always difcoverable by it. In the fecond part we prove that the great principles advanced are conformable to the tradition of all nations, both facred and profane. If there be therefore fome principles in this part which at firft fight feem contradi<n:ory to Scripture, we refer to the fecond part to prove that they are not fo.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES
OF
NATURAL AND REVEALED
RELIGION.
BOOK I
OF THE ABSOLUTE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
DEFINITIONS.
IN all demonftrablefciences whether metaphy ileal or mathe- matical, whether they regard Being in general, or Qu a n- T I T Y in general, we fhould begin by defining the things that are to be the fubje(5ts of demonftration. Exa6l and clear de- finitions are far more necefTary in metaphyfics than in ma- thematics. In this later fcience, fenfible figures and images recall to us continually the definitions of things, fo that we cannot miftake : but in the former pure intelledual ideas can- not always be exaftly reprefented by fenfible figns, and fo the terms by which we exprefs thofe ideas may be equivocal.
A
a OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
I. By a Being or a Reality, I underftand in general whatever is, whether it be a fubftance, an attribute, a mode, a Power, or Perfeftion.
2. By Substance, I mean a Being which is the founda- tion of attributes, modes, powers, and perfections.
3. By Attribute or Property, is meant a reality that necefTarily belongs to, flows from, and is contained in the idea of a being, fo that it cannot be taken from it without deftroy- ing its effence.
4. By a Mo D e or Quality, I underftand a reality given to a fubftance that does not necefTarily flow from its effence, nor belong to it, in all times, in all places, and in all circumftan- ces, and that may be communicated to it, or taken from it without deftroying its nature. .
5. By Power, Cau-se, Activity, Force, we mean a reality that does or that can produce fomething in itfelf, or diftind from itfelf, freely or necefTarily ; whether this produc- tion be a fubftance, an attribute, a mode, or a being of any
kind.
6. By Per F ECTioN, we mean an attribute or quality that excludes all bounds in the firft caufe, or that fuppofes power, acflivity, and caufality in fecond caufes. It exprefTes infinite or an image of infinity.
7. By Finite, we mean what contains only fome de grees of reality, power, and perfection.
8. By Absolute Infinite, we mean the moft perfe<ft negation of finite, what is unbounded in all fenfes, and what contains the fulnefs of all perfe<5tion in the higheft degree.
9. By Self-existent substance, we meanaBeing
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 3
that contains in itfelf a reality which makes its exiftence ne- cefTary ; and its non-exiftence impoflible.
10. By Idea, I mean that which the mind conceives or perceives when it thinks.
SCHOLIUM.
From the foregoing definitions, it is clear that the word Being does not fignifythe fame thing asfubftance: but (im- ply a reality or fomething that is and that exifts, whether It be fubftantial or modal ; a<5live or paflive ; necelfary or contingent; finite or infinite ; material or immaterial. All fubftances, attri- butes, modes and powers are equally realities, tho' they be not equal realities ; as great and little fpheres are equally fpheres, tho' they are not equal. The Cartefians feem to confound the idea of Being with that of fubftance. This may occafion great miftakes ; for we fhall fhew afterwards, that there may be in- telle(5tual felf-confcious agents that are diftinft beings, hypo- flafes or perfonalities, tho' not diflind fubflances ; and that there may be a plurality of fuch agents, beings, hypoftafes, or perfonalities in the fame individual and indivifible fubftance.
The fchoolmen define a Subflance, * That which exlflrs
* by itfelf, and which can be conceived by itfelf without ano-
* ther." They define a mode, " That which exifls in ano-
* ther and cannot be conceived, nor fubfift without another.' Thefe two definitions are altogether equivocal, and may have a double fenfe. They may fignify either ' That a fubftancc
* can exift, fubfift and be conceived without any one particu-
* lar mode; and that no mode can exift, fubfift, nor be con-
A2
4 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
* celved feparate from, and independent of fome fubftance:* or they may fignify that * a fubftance is that which exifts
* by itfelf, independent of any other fubftance ;' and that a mode is that which exifts in and by another. Spinofa under- ftood the fchool definitions in the later fenfe; and fo confoun- ded the idea of fubftance with that of felf-exiftence. Hence he maintained that there was but one fubftance in nature, and that all other things were modes of this only fubftance. Now fince thefe definitions of the fchoolmen may be underftood in the latter fenfe as well as in the former, they are not only e- quivocal but dangerous, and therefore ought to be rejected.
We have chofen to define a fubltance, * Something that is
* the foundation of modes,' and a mode, ' Something that
* may be given to or taken from a fubftance.' All Mr. Locke's cavils againft thefe definitions of fubftance and mode come from his confounding clear ideas with adequate ones. The former fufEce to diftinguifti things, the later fuppofe a perfed: knowledge of their intimate eflence. Tho' we do not know the intimate eflence of any one fubftance , nor the manner how modes are produced in it; yet to know that the one fup- ports and the other is fupported fuffices to diftinguifh them. Now all the knowledge we can acquire in our prefent ftate, confifts in comparing the differences and relations of things, and not their intimate effcnces, of which we have no adequate ideas ; as fhall be demonftrated.
We have feldom made ufe of the words properties and qualities ; becaufe thefe terms are equivocal, and fometimes confounded as fynonimous. A property fignifies in its etymolo- gy, fomething that belongs to a thing exclufively of all others.
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 5
It is apply'd fometimes to eflential attributes; as when we fay that thought is a property of fplrit; and extenfion a property of matter; and fometimes to accejGTory modes, as when we fay that language and baldnefs are properties of human nature, becaufe they belong to men only, tho' not always, nor to eve- ry individual. It is to be remarked however that attributes, ge- nerally fpeaking, exprefs whatiseflential to fubftances; where- as properties denote what is eflential to beings of all kinds, whether fubftantial or modal. Thus we fay the properties not the atrributes of a triangle. Moreover we fay indifferent- ly that underftanding and will, as well as fciences and virtues, are qualities of the mind, tho' the one be eflential attributes, and the other acquired modes. It is true indeed that when we call underftanding and will qualities, we mean rather the a<5lual exercife of thefe powers, than the faculties themfelves; and generally fpeaking, qualities denote rather modes than at- tributes ; as foft, hard, dry, humid, and all the other fenfible qualities; they are accidental, not effential to matter. Tofhun all confufion, we advertife that in this elfay, we mean by pro- perties what is effential to a thing, or what flows from its na- ture neceffarily. By qualities on the contrary we mean what is acceffory and communicated tho' durable and permanent. Thus we fay that felicity is a permanent quality of pure un- fallen fpirits, and motion a confhnt quality of ethereal mat- ter; tho' both be communicated, and no ways effential attri- butes, nor properties of either.
The Unitarians and Socinians maintain that all a<5tion is free, in order to deny God's immanent a<n:s: but this is abfo- lutely falfe; for the love of happincfs, of good in general, or
6 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
the tendency of the foul to beatifying objeds, is no doubt an aftion, and yet it is neceflary ; as Ihall be demonftrated. The Spinofifts,Fatalifts, and Predeftinarians affert on the contrary that all adion is necefTary ; but we fhall fliew that this is alfo falfe, and that there may be two forts of a<5tion, one neceflary and another free.
There have been great difj5Utes about the term perfe(n:ion ; fome maintain that it is altogether indeterminate, equivocal, and even unfignificant, unlefs it be underftood in the fame fenfe as the general term reality ; others fay that it may be apply'd to fomething, to nothing , and to every thing ; and therefore that it ought to be banifh'd from philofophy. We grant that the word perfeft confidered in a relative concrete fenfe, may be apply'd to all fort of realities, and even to the ne- gation of thefe realities : but then all the word means, is that the object we fpeak of is poffelTed or deprived of fome reality in a fuperlative degree, when compared with others. Thus we fay a perfect mettal, a perfeft folid, a perfeft circle; yea perfed darknefs, perfe(5l ignorance, and perfe<5t malice. We fay alfo that beauty, order and regularity are perfe<5tions, but they are fuch only in a relative fenfe, with regard to fome ar- chetype or model to which we fuppofe them conformed: per- feftion in an abfolute abftrad fenfe, independent of all relati- on, cannot be faid of every being or reality. To be (imply a fubftance, an attribute or a mode, a ftone or a mettal, divifible or indivilible, a triangle or a circle, is not a perfection. We call nothing a perfection in a ftrift and abfolute fenfe but what fuppofes infinity, or fome image of infinity. All God's at- tributes are perfections, becaufe they are infinite in all fenfes.
Book. I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD 7
All the attributes of the creatures are not called perfedions. Divifibility, mobility, and figurability in matter are not called Perfedions, but attributes or properties. Underftanding, rea- fon, and will, in fpirits are called more or lefs perfe6lionsaccor- -ding to their degree. The reafon is becaufe all thefe proper- dies in intellectual beings exprefs power. Now all power or caufality fuppofes an efFed produced that was not before ; and jJierefore a palfage from nothing to fomething; and fo is an ■image of infinity of power. Thus force, knowledge, and be- neficence are called perfedions, tho' in a finite degree. A •perfeftion then in an abfolute fenfe is not a (imple reality, at- tribute, property, or quality ; but a reality, attribute, proper- ty, or quality that implies power or activity, and excludes all .bounds in the firft caufe. In one word it is a divine attribute, ■or an imitation of fome divine attribute. It is then an egre- gious miftake in philofophy to confound the idea of perfedli- on with that of fimple reality.
Spinofa fays that finite is that which can be limited by a- nother of its kind. This is abfolutely falfe ; for a thing may be limited by its quality, as well as by its quantity; by its pro- perties, as by its magnitude; by its attributes, as by its modes; by a being of a fuperior kind, as well as by a being of its own kind. A being is called finite, not only when fome fubftance of its kind may be added to it, but alfo when it contains only a determinate degree of reality and perfection.
The fame author defines Abfolute Infinite * A fubftance
* compofed of infinite attributes, every one of which expref^
* fes an eternal and infinite effence.' Thus material exten- fion if boundlefs would be an attribute of God. Thus God
•8 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
would contain all beings as modes or attributes of his fub- ftance, if they were fuppofed infinite in number and eternal in duration. This is a falfe fuppofition as we fhall fhew here- after.
All Spinofa's errors, fophifms, and pretended demonftrati- ons are founded upon his falfe and equivocal definitions. He underflands by a Subftance * That which exifls by itfelf, may
* be conceived by itfelf, and fubfifl of itfelf, independent of
* all other beings.' This is true only of the felf-exiflent fub- ftance, of the fupremc infinite, of God himfelf. He de- fines an Attribute,* That which conftitutes or compofes afub- ' fiance' This is falfe, for tho' attributes flow neceffarily from a fubfl:ance,yet they do not compofe it as the parts do the whole. He calls a Mode, ' Something that exifls in another, ' is fupported by another, and cannot fubfift without ano-
* ther.' In this fenfe all finite beings would be modes of God. He defines a Power * That which produces fomething
* in itfelf by neceffity of nature.' If this were fo, then all finite beings would be confubflantial hypoflafes of the di- vine effence, and flow neceffarily from it. He confounds the idea of perfe^ftion with that of fimple reality ; if this were fo, then all attributes, properties, and modes in the lowefl and leafl degree would be perfections, which is abfurd. He calls finite * That which is limited in quantity / not in quality. He calls Abfolute Infinite ' That which is compofed of all
* forts of beings, attributes, modes, and realities.' This is na- ture and not God. Thus he confounds from the beginning of his work all the common received definitions of things, the idea of fubftancc with that of felf-exiftence ; the idea of at-
Book L ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 9
tributes with that of component parts ; the idea of modes, with that of eiFefts ; the idea of necefTary a<5livity, with that of free a(5lion ; the idea of perfection, with that of reahty ; the idea of finite in one fenfe, with that of finite in all fen- fes; and the idea of God, with that of univerfal nature. If his definitions were true, it would have been needlefs for him to have heapt up proportion upon propofition, and employed near a thoufand theorems, corollaries, lemmas, and fcholiums to prove his fyftem; for the demonftration of it is included in and necelTarily refults from the definitions themfelves. To maintain that God is the only fubflance, and that all things are necelTary, eternal emanations, parts, or forms of this felf- exiftent nature; and to found all his demonllrations of this abfurd, impious fyftem, upon falfe definitions, which fuppofe what he is going to prove, is a weaknefs or an impudence in- excufable in a philofopher; and difcovers either a feeble mind that deceives itfelf ; or a falfe heart that intends to deceive o- thers.
After having defined the terms of the propofitions that are to be demonftrated, we come next to explain their different divifions, branches, or kinds, to avoid confufion.
DIVISIONS.
The mathematicians fometimes negled to give clear di- flindions and divifions of things ; and this negligence hinders the perfpicuity and order of their demonftrations. Every thing or reality, that is or can be the objeft of our perception, prefents itfelf to the mind either as a fubftance, an attribute,
B
lo OF THE A:BS O LUTE Book I.
a mode, a power, or a perfection. But as thefe generical term s exprefs objects that are of feveral different kinds, it is necef- fary to difHnguifh them exactly. r,
I. Substances may be diftinguiftied cither by the dif^ fercnt degrees of reality they contain, as finite and infinite; or by the different attributes that belong to them, as material and immaterial; or by the different modes, changes and acci- dents that may befal them ; thus the numberlefs fpecies of bo- dies and fpirits are diilinguiihed; or in fine by their feparate and independent exiftence, as the individuals of each fpecies. 2. Attributes maybe diftinguiihed into adtivc and paf^ five. The active are fuch whofe ideas fuppofe the production of fomething; as conception, reafon, and will in fpirits, and then they are called powers or faculties. The pafTive are fuch whofe ideas include a mere aptitude of receiving fome- thing; as figurabihty, divifibiUty, and mobility in bodies, and they are called capacides.
3. Modes may alfo be diftinguifhed into two forts, per- manent or tranfient. The firit are thefe which remain al- ways the fame, tho' they do not belong effendally to the mo- dified fubffance. Such are the primitive forms of the con- Itituent fmalleft particles of matter. The other are thofe which change or may change continually, as the figures of vifible compound bodies.
4. Powers are alfo of two kinds ; effential and accidental. The former flow from the nature of a thing, as activity and love in fpirits ; and they are called inherent properties. The other arc communicated to it by a fuperior force, as motion
BookL attributes of god. ir
and gravitation in bodies; and they are called imprefTed qua- lities.
5. Perfections are either relative or abfolute. The former fuppofe always fome degree fuperior to them, real or pofTible. The later exprefs an infinite boundlefs degree ; or at leaft the higheft degree pofTible. Thus a being may be per- fect in its kind, and yet imperfe6l with regard to beings of a fuperior degree. What is abfolutely perfed excludes all fu- periority ; and what is abfolutely perfed in all fenfes excludes all equality, as we fhall fhow hereafter.
■ SCHOLIUM.
Since by the foregoing divifions and definitions, all pro- perties, faculties, qualities, capacities, powers, and perfecti- ons, are either attributes or modes ; the whole of nature may therefore be confidered as compofed of three forts of obje(n:s or realities that include and exprefs all that we can conceive ; fubftances, attributes, or modes. Great care muft be taken not to confound them, and efpecially the impreifed qualities with the eflential properties. This as we ihall (how has been a fatal fource of great miilakes in philofophy.
Some Cartefians and efpecially the Malebranchians reduce all the objects of our perception to fubftances and modes, and fay nothing of powers, thereby to deftroy the real activity of fecond caufes. It is true that they diftinguifh betwixt eften- tial and accidental, inherent and impreffed, active and paflive modes: but what flows neceffarily from the effence of a thing, is very improperly called its mode, manner, faihion, or form.
B2
12 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
We therefore believe that the mofl: natural, clear diftindion of what belongs to fubftances, is that into attributes and modes; or, what is eflential to them, and what is only acceiTory.
All the other diftin^lions of objecfls, whether they be the ten Ariftotelian categories, or what the fchoolmen call the five univerfals, are either comprehended in this triple divifion of fubftances, attributes, and modes, or they are ufelefs and dangerous diftin(5lions : becaufe they accuftom the mind to miftake the knowledge of words for that of things.
Spinofa adopts this threefold diftin6lion of objects: but he maintains that fubftances are not diftinguiftied when they have the fame attributes and modes. Thus according to him, two pieces of gold exactly like in all things are not two diftinft fubftances, tho' the one might exift while the other is annihi- lated. They are as he aflerts only different modes of the fame fubftance. He confounds always generical terms and individu- als; and fuppofes that all beings of the fame kind are the fame individual fubftance. But he gives no proof of his affertion, and he can never prove it. He forgets a third diftindion of fubftances which is that of their feparate and independent exiftence. The fchoolmen give alfo occafion to this Spinofian error, by their wild difputes about universale a parte R EI ; or an univerfal objecfl that anfwers in nature to our uni- verfal ideas. Spinofa took occafion from this to maintain that God is this univerfal object, and the only fubftance exi- ftent, of which all other things are mere attributes or modes. The diftin6tion of kinds and individuals is therefore very ne- cefTary, and founded upon the difference there is betwixt our abftracfl general ideas, and the real particular objects exiftent.
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. is
Hence arifcs alfo the diftincfllon betwixt efTence and fub- ftance, which Spinofa always confounds. An EfTence is
* A general idea, which reprefents to the mind all the attri- ' butes, properties and qualities common to beings of the fame
* kind. A Subftance is a particular being really exiftent, which partakes of thefe attributes, properties, qualities and modes. Thus there can be but one ideal eflence of the fame kind ; but there may be many different fubflances of the fame kind. The general idea of human nature is one and indivi- fible: but there may be many different individuals of the hu- man fpecies, that have the fame attributes and modes. Spi- nofa's defign in confounding the ideas of efTence and fub- flance, was to infinuate that all individuals of the fame kind, are the fame individual fubflance ; and that finite beings are not diflin^t feparate fubflances ; but modes of the fame uni- verfal fubftance. Thus he ftill fuppofes what he is going to prove.
Dr. Berkeley denies that there can be any abflraft univer- fal ideas ; becaufe all the objects of our perception are con- crete or particular. We fhall defer this queflion, till we ex- plain the fource, nature and divifion of our ideas. It fufRces here to remark, that all we mean by an Idea, is that which the mind feels, perceives, or conceives when it thinks ; and for this reafon our ideas are divided into Senfations, Perceptions, and Conceptions, which are vaflly different, as fhall be ex- plained hereafter.
14 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
AXIOMS.
After exaft definitions and dividons, the next care in all demonftrable fciences, is to lay down felf-evident maxims or axioms, whofe truth is perceived by one fimple intuitive view, without any fucceflive comparifon of ideas. For this reafon they are called flrft principles and elementary truths, becaufe they are the ftandards, meafures, and rules of reafon and com- parifon. I fhall not examine here whether they be innate ideas imprelTed upon the mind from its origin, or percepti- Ofts which prefent themfelves unto it upon the leaft reflexion. This difcufTion would be premature. All I advance is that thofe axioms are fo felf-evident that no attentive mind who underftands them, can refufe its affent to them. Of this kind are the following truths.
1. Nothing, or the negation of all properties and reali- ties cannot be a caufe, fince nothing can have nothing, and produce nothing.
2. Reality in fome degree or other is the only reafon of in- ferring neceffary exiftence, fince nothing cannot be a caufe.
3. Finite is a negation of all fuperior reality or perfec- tion.
4. There can be nothing greater than abfblute infinite, or infinite in all fenfes,
5. In the fcale of finites, the progrefHon may be conti* nual without end; becaufe no addition of finites can make abfolute infinite.
6. The attributes, powers, qualities, and perfe<5tions of ma-
BooK.I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD 'i^
ny fubftanccs of the fame kind are a greater fum than thofe of one of the fame kind.
7. Infinite activity, or the produ<n:ion of an infinite effect is a fupreme perfedion.
8. Infinite perfeftion known and enjoyed mufl neceffarily produce infinite love.
SCHOLIUM.
All Spinofa's axioms are either falfe, equivocal, or ob- fcure. They cannot be proved, and yet require proof. I fhall give only two examples of this infidious fallacy.
He lays down for an axiom, that ' The knowledge of an ' efFe(5l depends upon the knowledge of its caufe, and includes * it'. This is abfolutely falfe, for we may know that a thing is an efFe6l without knowing the caufe whence it proceeds. Men knew certainly for many ages that water rofe to a cer- tain height in a tube, without knowing the true caufe of this afcent. They knew in general that this phenomenon was an eflfed of fome caufe ; tho' they did not know that the prefTure of the atmofphere was this particular caufe. Moreover it is abfolutely falfe that the knowledge of an effed fuppofes al- ways that we know how it is produced; for we may know certainly that a thing is an efFeft, without knowing the man- ner of its produ6lion. Thus we know that all finite fubflan- ces are effects of the felf-exiftent fubftance, as fhall be demon- ftrated; tho' we do not know, how the effeft produced is connected with the producing caufe. Spinofa's defign in this axiom was to infinuate that creatfion is impofTible, becaufe in-
i6 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
conceivable; and that it is a contradi(5lory idea, becaufe we do not know the manner how God creates, or gives exiftence to beings that had none before the exercife of his creating e-
nergy.
Another axiom of the fame philofopher runs thus : ^ Things ' that have nothing in common cannot be underftood by each ' other, or the idea of the one does not include the idea of
* the other.' If the defign of this trifling maxim was to infi- nuate that ' when things have fomething in common the idea
* of the one includes neceflarily the idea of the other,' then it is abfolutely falfe: for things may have fomething in common, tho' the idea of the one does not include the idea of the other. All finite beings have fomething in common, as having either the fame attributes and modes; or as being effects of the fame common caufe, or as reprefentative of the fame archetype ; tho'the idea of the one does not include neceffarily that of the other. The idea of a man does not include that of his pidure, yet they have fomething in common, which is their refem- blance. The idea of one man does not include that of ano- ther, yet they have fomething in common, which is that of a foul and body. The idea of minerals and plants have fome- thing in common, which is their material and vegetative na- ture, and yet the idea of the one does not include the idea of the other. In general all individuals of the fame kind have the fame attributes, and yet the idea of the one does not include the idea of the other. We fhall fee afterwards why Spinofa advanced this abfurd fallacious maxim.
Thus all the Spinofian fcheme is founded upon falfe de- finitions, that fuppofe what ke is going to prove, or upon falfe
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 17
axioms that are captious and fallacious. No folid edifice can ftand upon fuch tottering foundations. It is ftrange that men of genius fhould be impofed upon by fuch an empty dream, and fuch a pitiful delufion. Nothing deceives them but the geometrical form this fophift gave to his proportions. It muft be granted that his confcquences are juft, but all his funda- mental principles are falfe. This logical dilfertation about elementary truths fuffices to confute him ; but in the courfe of this effay v^^e Ihall unfold and unmafk all his pretended de- monftrations.
POSTULATES.
In all demonllrable fciences, there are befides definitions, divifions, and axioms, certain univerfal maxims or poftulates that all muft grant unlefs they renounce reafon. They are felf-evident when explained, and want only fcholiums to illu- ftrate them, and not demonftrations to fupport them. I fliall only mention fix, becaufe they are frequently employed in the following eflay, and may rather be called proper rules in all ftridl inquiry into truth.
POSTULATE L
We muft affirm neceftarily, when we fee clearly; we may doubt when we do not fee; but we fhould never deny be- caufe we do not conceive.
SCROLIJJM.
I do not fay that * we may .affirm, but that we muft affirm
G
i8 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
• necelfarlly when we fee clearly/ We are forced to afTent to what appears to us evident ; as we are forced to love what ap- pears to us good. This is our nature. We do not yet know what this nature is, or who conftituted it fuch; whether it be felf-exiftent or produced by another; material or immaterial; good or bad; true or deceitful; but whatever it is, our efTence is fo made, that we mufl: afTent to what we fee clearly. There are certain truths that we cannot deny let us make what ef- forts we pleafe. No man can deny that the whole is greater than the part; that a thing cannot be and not be at the fame time ; that nothing cannot be a caufe. The axioms we have laid down, and all others of the fame kind, are reducible to thefe three. Whofoever fays he denies fuch axioms, either does not know what he fays, or does not believe it; he is ei- ther a falfe, or a very capricious man.
The Pyrrhonifb will fay that in dreams and fevers, we imagine very oft, that we fee what we do not fee; that our life is perhaps a continual dream; that we are oft deceived, and therefore may be always fo; that our faculties are perhaps fomade, that error and delufion are inevitable; and in fine, that human underflanding is incapable of demonftrating any thing but geometrical truths ; and furrounded with uncertain- ties as to God and nature; becaufe what it fees clearly on one fide is counterballanced by obfcurities on another. Hence they cry out that all metaphyfical learning is chimerical, and that fyftem-makers of every kind are ignorant of the true bounds of the human mind.
I anfwer in the firft place, that we may be deceived in at- tributing to objcfts without us, fcnfations that are not caufed
Book L ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. ip
by them; as In dreams and fevers: but the dreamer and the frantic cannot doubt that they feel when they feel; for we cannot feel and perceive nothing; for feeling Is perceiving; now it is impoffible to perceive and not perceive at the fame time. Clear evidence is a perception ; a light that modifies and determines the mind irrefiftibly. I do not yet examine if this evidence cheats us. Suppofing It did fo, we muft fubmit to it : it is an Invincible power, that has a fovereign dominion over us, over the American and the European; the Afiatlc and the African; the Hottentot and the Laplander; the Chinefe and the Peruvian. We cannot efcape from Its unlverfal Em- pire. Whoever denies that there are fuch felf-evldent propo- fitions,reje(5ls all the fundamental principles of reafon; all the ftandards by which we deny, doubt, or affirm. He can give no reafon for his denying that any thing is certain; nor for his affirming that every thing Is doubful. His brain is diforde- red, his mind is frantic ; he cannot be cured by reafon. He denies that there Is any fuch thing as reafon, fo there is no rea- foning with him, fince he is unreafonable.
I anfwer in the fecond place, that we may be deceived In comparing, combining and afTociatlng our complex ideas, and that we are very oft fo: but then v/e have the remedy within us, if we be reafonable ; which Is to review our compari- fons ; reduce them to felf-evident principles, which all mufl admit, and examine if the confcquences be juft. Yea I dare fay, that tho' prejudice, imagination, and paflion may blind fo Intircly the Intelleftual eye in fome, that they fancy they fee what they do not fee, yet In all recollecfled and up- right hearts that know how to enter into their fpiritual na-
C2
•20 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
tures, and confult felf-evident maxims, there is always- a central, internal doubt and obfcurity, that hinders the total acqiiiefcence of the mind, when it does not fee clearly the connection and relation of ideas. This all men accuftomed to profound reflexion feel. The mind is fo made, that when it afls without paflion, it cannot alTent to falfhood, without remorfe, inquietude, or hefitation. I do not pretend to give a general criterion or characfleriftic by which we may know truth infallibly. This is impoffible. It is known only by itfclf, as funfhine is dift-inguifhed from twilight. It is fo fimple, fo evi- dent, and fo luminous, that it can have no other token, proof, nor badge but itfelf. This however is one of its unfeparable concomitants, that it leaves all thinking minds in an abfolute impoflibility to doubt ; and in a perfect reft, acquiefcence, and peace when they affirm. We Ihall fee afterwards what this evidence is that thus brings the mind to tranquillity, fixes its inconftancy, diflipates all hefitation, and commands our af- fent. All I advance at prefent, till we inveftigate the nature of man, is that he is fo made, that he cannot refift the evi- dence of what we call truth, when he fees it, as he can- not refift the love of what appears good, when he feels it.
We anfwer in the third place, that there are two forts of metaphyfics. One that confifh in vainfubtleties,ufelefsdiftinc- tions, chimerical refinements, and barbarous terms, borrowed from the AriftoteUan philofophy, fpoiled by the Arabians. This falfe fcience of the fchools is indeed contemptible. There is another fort of metaphyfics which afcends to firfl
■ principles, defcends to confequences ; gives each truth its due place, and rifes from fimple to compound ideas, with order,
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 21
clearnefs,ancl preclfioni This is the fource of all mathematical knowledge. Thofe who believe there can be no other demon- ftrablefcience but geometry, muft naturally fall into afceptlcal indolence, maintain thatPyrrho andBayle have wrote the true hiftory of the human mind; and that all other philofophers have only given the romance of it. A fyftem is nothing but a chain of truths well combined, whatever be their nature, whether mathematical or moral, phyfical or metaphyfical. All weak and effeminate minds that hover about the furface of truth, that have not force enough to try its depths, and that cannot fupport a long continued feries of reafonings, muft necelTari- ly cry out againft fyftems. They extoll and exalt mathemati- cal evidence, notbecaufe they have any true knowledge of geo- metry; but in order to flatter their irregular appetites and incre- dulous prejudices, by rejecting all moral and metaphyfical de- monftrations. They are, generally fpeaking, fuperficial minds, that relifh nothing but poetical fiction, fprightly imagination^ and glaring wit; as well as corrupt hearts drunk with pafHon. We mud abandon them to the wanton fportof wildimagina- tion,andto be undeceived in a future ftate, becaufe of all men they are the moft incorrigible.
I have added in the fame populate, that ' we may doubt, * when we do not fee.* In this cafe doubting is reafonable, free and voluntary; becaufe we ought never to aflent firmly without feeing ; without reducing our confequences to firfb principles ; weighing them in thefe ballances, and meafuring them by thefe flandards. To doubt cautioufly, till we have examined fully ; to retain our affent, till we have feen clearly; Is force of mind, and not the fludluation of a wavering fouL
22 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
that cannot fix a fteady view upon any one objecl. The true, wife hefitation and fufpenfc of the Old Academy has nothing in common with the wild univerfal doubt of felf-evident ma- xims, and the moft demonftrable truths. To doubt thus without any reafon of doubting, is as great a defe^l as to be- lieve without any reafon of believing. Both thefe extremes come from an excefs of imagination which diforders the in- tcllc6lual eye in the credulous, fo that they fee what is not, and blinds the incredulous, fo that they do not fee what is. Thelaft branch of the poftulate is,that ' we ought never to
* deny becaufe we cannot conceive.' If this were not fo, then a man born blind would reafon right when he forms this fyl- logifin. * We know the figure of bodies only by handling
* them: but it is impoflible to handle them at a great diftance; ' therefore it is impofilble to know the figure of far diftant
* bodies.' To undeceive the blind man we cannot give him the fifth fenfe of feeing, of which he can have no idea. We cannot convince him by experience that there is another way of knowing the figure of far diftant bodies than by contaft ; tho' we may endeavour to fhow him by other proofs that this is not only pofiible, and probable, but abfolutely certain. We may prove to him that this is fo from the concurrent teftimo- ny of all who furround him ; but we can never make him per- ceive how this is fo. T his is precifcly our cafe in this mortal ftate as to many intellecftual truths. We fee that many things muft be, but wc cannot conceive how they are. We fee the connexion betwixt fome truths, but not betwixt all: we fee a part, but not the whole: we fee fome attributes and modes of things, but wc do not fee their intimate cfTence. Thus we
BooK.I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD 25
fee that eternity, Immenfity, creating energy, and many other perfc(5Lions muft belong to Abfokite Infinite, and are inclu- ded in his idea; but we do not fee how they flow from his ef- fence. We fee clearly that he is, and a part of what he is ; but not the totality of his nature ; iince Abfolute Infinite muft be incomprchcnfible to Finite. It is therefore a fundamental maxim in all true philofophy, that * many things may be * incomprchcnfible and yet demonftrable, that tho' feeing ' clearly be a fufiicient reafon for affirming; yet not feeing at ' all can never be a reafon of denying. The negation of this principle was the fource of all Spinofa's errors. Perfuaded that whatever is inconceivable is impoflible, he degrades all the divine attributes in order to comprehend them, as we fhall Ihow hereafter.
POSTULATE II.
When of three or more propofitions whereof one muft neceffarily be true, all but one are proved to be falfe, abfurd and impoflible, this one is evidently certain.
SCHOLIUM.
Thus if it can be proved that the curves defcribed by the periodical revolutions of the planets muft be fome of the four conic fedions; circles, hyperbolas, parabolas, or ovals: and if it be moreover demonftrated that they do not defcribe any of the three firft, it is felf-evident that they muft defcribe the laft. There are two forts of demonftrations ; one that comes from a clear perception of the immutable neceffary relations betwixt things, and another tkat arifes from the abfurdities
• 24 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
that would follow upon denying this connection. In this twallsht of human underfl-andingj, the firfl: fort of demonftra- tions are not always pofTible, becaufe we have no adequate ideas of the intimate ciTence of things, we cannot always per- ceive by an intuitive view, the properties that flow from them, and therefore we are obliged to have recourfe to the fecond kind of demonftra tion called in the fchools demonstratio A B A BSUR do, by fhowing the contradictions that would fol- low from denying or attributing to them certain qualities. This latter way of demonftrating is as furc as the other, but not fo fatisfying. By the one we fee how a thing is ; by the other we fee only that it muft be, tho' we do not conceive the manner of it. The firft enlightens and perfuades; the fecond convinces and forces our afTent. The latter fort of de- monftrations are lefs frequently excufable in mathematics, be- caufe the objed of this fcience being only the modes of quan- tity, and not the effence of things, we may generally fee by an intuitive view, or fuccefllve comparifon, the relations of our ideas : but in metaphyfics, where we treat of fubftances both finite and infinite,coporeal and fpiritual, we cannot always fee clearly how the attributes and modes flow from the ef- fence, and therefore we muft have recourfe to the dcmonftra- tions ab abfurdo. Thus we can dcmonftrate again ft the Male- branchians that activity muft be an effential property of fpi- rits; not by fliewing how it flows from their effence; but by the abfurdities that would follow upon denying it. Thus we prove againft the Spinofifts, that God muft have a creating power, not only by the idea of his effence, but by the con- xradiftions that would enfue upon refufnig him this produc-
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 25
tive energy. Thus in fine we confound the Materialifls by fhowing that thought and extenfion are contrary, contradic - tory, and incompatible attributes; and fo cannot belong to the fame fubftance.
POSTULATE III.
In things of a "contingent nature, we fhould not require DEMONSTRATIONS, but Only PROOFS; yea fometimes be content with probabilities.
SCHOLIUM.
A DEMONSTRATION is when its contrary is impofli- ble in all times and in all fenfes. It is an eternal and immu- table truth. It fuppofes a relation that is founded upon the nature of things, and a property that flows neceflarily from their elTence. Such are all mathematical truths. The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones. This pro- perty is contained in the definition, nature, and efTence of a triangle; and in this fenfe demonftration is only an unfolding of what is contained neceffarily in the primitive idea of things.
A p R 00 F is when we have all reafons to believe, none to doubt, and when evident abfurdities would follow from the contrary fuppofition ; tho' abfolutely fpeaking the thing might be otherwife, and its exiftence is only contingent. Thus it is ImpofTible to demonflrate that there is a city called Rome ; becaufe its exiflence being contingent; it might never have been. But to conclude from this metaphyfical principle than
D ' '
26 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
there is not, and never was any fuch city as Rome, would be abfurd and ridiculous. The fchools fay very well that a
POSSE AD ESSE NON VALET CONSEQ.UENTI A ; the fim-
ple poflibility or non-contradiclion of things cannot be a de- monftration of their exiftence. Thus we can demonftrate that God can create myriads of intelligent natures fuperior to human fpirits; but that he has really done fo can only be proved by revelation. Thus we can only prove, not demon- ftrate, that there is in nature a third fubftance befides God and created fpirits, called matter. Thus in fine we can only prove, not demonftrate, that all the men we {peak with and that furround us are not fantoms, mere appearances, and per- ceptions excited in us; but real entities, fubftances, and be- ings fimilar to us.
Befides thefe two forts of evidence, there is a third kind, that ferves only to anfwer obje«5lions; but not to demonflrate principles, and it is probability. We are fometimes obli- ged in our fcholiums to make ufe of probabilities and hypo- thefes, to fliow how a thing may be, when we have proved otherwife that it mufl be r but we never employ thefe hypo- thefes to found fyflems and build confequences upon them. This is an efTential vice in reafoning ; yet the Cartefian, and even the Newtonian philofophy are not quite exempt from this fallacious defect:, as we fhall fhow hereafter.
The greateft force and accuracy of the mind confifls in diflinguilhing and applying thefe three forts of evidence; in not employing the one for the other, and in not confounding them together. To require demonflrations where proofs can only be given ; to content ourfelves with proofs where de-
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 27
monftratlons are not only poflible but neceflary; and in fine, to heap up probable hypothefes to prove principles, are capital defeats in reafoning. This is very oft the method of Bayle. To throw the mind into an univerfal fcepticifm, he fhows that demonftrations cannot be given where only proofs are requiflte ; and to invalidate the force of proofs he infinuates that they are not demonftrations. This is the fource of all his fophifms. He has wit enough to prefent to the mind the dark fides of a queftion, but he feldom or never difcovers the luminous point that can determine our affent. He fhows very prettily and artfully the bounds of the human underftan- ding, but he feldom or never trys its depths, and knows its true extent. He was an excellent fophift, but not always a philofopher; as fliall be proved elfewhere.
POSTULATE IV.
We ought not to require the demonftration of compound truths till we be convinced of fimpleones.
SCHOLIUM.
The moft exafl order in demonftration is to begin with 'fimple truths 'ere we afcend to more complicated ones, not only becaufe the latter are founded upon the former, but alfo becaufe the capacity of the mind extends and dilates by re- peated acts, producing habits of reflexion. This is that lu- minous order which the antients talk fo much of; but few of their philofophers have conftantly obferved it. It is a mar-
D 2
28 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
vellous art in demonftrating to give every truth its due place, to fhcw^ how^ one flows from another,as a corollary or confe- quence ; to demonftrate firft fome great luminous fruitful prln. ciples, that flow from an intuitive view of the fimpleO: axioms ; and then deduce all complex truths, from afucceflive compa- rifon and combination of thofe original ones. Without this order the fublimeft difcoveries appear chimerical. To give demonftrations of the complicated, intricate properties of curves, 'ere we know thofe of ftreight lines is impoilible. To demand demonftrations of the properties of finite 'ere we know the attributes of infinite, which is the moft natural and fimple of all ideas, as we fliall fhow, is yet more abfurd. To pretend to prove the necefHty, excellency, and certainty of fome fublime precepts in the Chriftian morals, to a man v/ho does not believe in God, is madnefs. Very oft truths that are pofterior in the order of demonftration, are fuperior in the degree of excellency. To begin by proving thefe is prepofte- rous. We muft afcend by degrees : for this reafon we drop very oft, in the following effay, the proof of certain truths, till we come to their proper place ; and then the mind fees how they flow naturally a.nd necelTarily from propofitions already demonftrated. Many fubHme doctrines that would at firft fight be matter of fcorn and raillery to incredulous and un- prepared minds, fhine forth in a full light, when the true gra- dation of ideas is obferved. In the refearch of eternal, neceir- fary,and immutable truths, it is therefore of great confequencc to hide fome of them, till others be demonftrated ; for with- out this precaution, we either weary or fear weak and deli- cate minds , that cannot all of a fudden digeft, nor fupport
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 29
a long ferles of reafonings. It is therefore a ralh inconfide- rate eondu(5t in bigots, zealots, and pharifaical do(5lors to talk to Atheifts, Deifts, Freethinkers, and minute philofophers of the lefs neceflary, acceflbry, incidental truths ; of church au- thority, and of the rites of outward worfhip; before they be convinced of the exiftence of God, and of the great principles of natural and revealed religion. Here the gradation is necef- fary. The Atheift mull become Theift,and theTheift Chrl*- ftian, before any thing be faid to them of churches, fcriptures, and facraments.
POSTULATE V.
We ought never to confound myfterlous truths with pal- pable contradicftions.
SCHOLIUM.
There is a great difference betwixt what is Incomprehen- fible by reafon, and what is contradi(5lory to it. The one fup- pofes that we do not fee the connection between two ideas, the other fuppofes that we fee clearly their oppofition. Now as we have faid and explained, not feeing is never a reafon for denying, tho' feeing clearly is always a reafon for affirming. The incredulous Freethinkers pretend that the Chriftian my- fteries are contradictory. This we abfolutely deny. The word myftery in fcripture fignifies very oft a hidden truth, that is not abfolutely incomprehenfible to human underftan- dingjbut only unintelligible to thofe who are not enlightened from on high. Thus our Saviour lays to his difciplesj, * it is
30 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
' given unto you to know the myfteries of the kingdom of * heaven.' ThusSt.Paulcallsgodlinefsamyftery. Thefchool- men change this definition, and advance as myfteries certain {peculations, which are not only incomprehenfible, but con- tradictory to human reafon, and altogether incompatible with the divine perfections. Yea they look upon all efforts to re- concile reafon with religion as bold attempts to fubmit faith to philofophy. The defign of this eflay is to (how, that the Chriftian myfteries, tho' undifcoverable by reafon, yet are never contradidory to it.
POSTULATE VI.
We ought not to attribute to men the abufes made of their principles, nor even the natural and neccftary confequences that flow from them, when they difavow thefe abufes and confequences.
SCHOLIUM,
Such is the corruption of human nature, that there Is no- thing fo wife,fo juft, and fo good, but men may abufeit. Thus nothing is more neceftary than civil government, and yet the moft lawful fuperiors abufe it every day. Nothing is more ufeful to diffufe juft fentiments of the Deity, to excite men to the love and adoration of the common father and univer- fal friend of mankind, than ecclefiaftic polity, and public worfhip: yet men have moft mifcrably abufed thefe inftltuti- ons, whether they be human or divine. They have turned priefthood into prieftcraft, and religious worfhip into idola-
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 3,
try. We ought never to confound principles with the abufes made of them, nor fuppofe that all thofe who maintain and practife the fame principles are guilty of the fame abufes. We fhould always diftingui/h betwixt what is tolerated and what is commanded ; think the moft favourably we can of every body ; not love nor tolerate error and corruption ; but pity and tolerate the perfons who err, in order to gain them. This beneficent, univerfal charity would mitigate the heats of dif- pute, and preferve the mind in that calm equanimity which is neceflary to examine truth ; yea totally extinguifh that fiery zeal, implacable wrath, and devout fury which tranlports bigots of all feds ; drives them at iirft to calumny, then to hatred, and at laft to perfecution ; which makes religion not the cure, but the fewel of all cruel paflions.
Moreover, fuch are the bounds of human underflanding-, that men do not always fee all the different faces and fides of aqueflion, and therefore they maybe verylincere and upright in maintaining a principle, while they reje<n: its natural, inevi- table confequences. We fhould not therefore afcribe perni- cious defigns and intentions where there is only defe<51: of accuracy and attention. Thus we are far from branding Spi- nofa with deliberate Atheifin, tho' we believe that his princi- ples lead to the blackefl Atheifin. Thus we are far from be- lieving that the Predeftinarians are Spinofifts ; tho' we fhali fhow that their fundamental principles lead to Spinofifm.
The ignorance or negled of thefe poftulates is the fourcc of all the errors, fophifms, and uncertainties of the Spino- fin:s,Deifl:s,Pyrrhonifl:s,Socinians, Unitarians, Freethinkers, and minute philofophers of all kinds: they either maintain
32 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
that every thing is uncertain; or they fuppofe that all that is inconceivable is impoflible ; or they require demonftrations where proofs fuffice ; or they demand that complicated truths fhould be demonftrated without a fucceflive comparifon of fimpler ideas ; or they rejed myfterious truths as contradi6to- ry ; or in fine they confound the abufes of religion with its principles. They pretend to excell in reafon, but they are ignorant of its firft principles; of the extent and bounds of hu- man underftanding ; of the different forts of evidence, and of the true order of demonftration.
We have infifted [o much upon thefe elementary princi- ples, becaufe it is of great confequence not to err in definiti- ons, divifions, axioms, and poflulates. We dare fay that the mofl part of errors proceed from not adverting accurately to ibme of thefe four heads. Firft principles, hke elementary threads, are in their origine fo delicate, fo flender, fo imper- ceptible, that they efcape the view of weak and unattentive minds: but when interwoven, knit and joined together, they form flrong chains and cables fufRcient to fix the foul, and hin- der it from being hurried away by that torrent of uncertanty which furrounds us in this twilight of human underflanding* Thefe primitive original feeds of truth appear in themfelvesfo fmall, fo minute, and fo inconfiderable, that men of lively, bright imaginations look upon them as below their notice; but when fown in luminous and fruitful minds, they become -of a wonderful fecundity, and produce vaft fields of truth. This will appear from the following propofitions which arife from a fimplc combination of the foregoing definitions, divi- sions, axiomS; and poftulate?.
33 THE
PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES
OF
NATURAL AND REVEALED
RELIGION,
PROPOSITION I.
T
HERE muft have been from all eternity fome original felf-exiftent being.
DEMONSTRATION.
Nothing or the negation of all properties and realities can- not be a caufe (a). Reality in fome degree or other is the on- ly reafon of necefTary exiftence (b). Therefore there muft have been from all eternity fome original, neceflary, felf-exi- ftent being.
(a) Ax. I. (b) Ax. 2.
E
34 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
S C H O L I U M.
I do not fay that the world and all that It contains was produced by a fuperior Being diftinft from it. This we have not yet difcovered. What I fay Is, that either the world, and all things that now exift, muft have been from everlafting, or have been produced by fomething that was eternal, and fo it is ftill true that there muft have been from all eternity fome felf-exiftcnt being. For fince fomething now is, it is mani- feft that fomething always was, otherwife the things that now are muft have been produced by nothing, that is, not produ- ced at all, fince nothing cannot be a caufe. Now this eter- nal SOMETHING muft be felf-exiftent, that is, it muft con- tain in itfelf a reafon why it does exift rather than not exift, a foundation upon which its exiftence relys ; fome internal caufe of exiftence, that renders its non-exiftence impoflible, and its exiftence neceffary.
The notion of an infinite fucceflion of changeable, con- tingent, and dependent effe<n:s, produced one from another in an endlefs progreflion, without any original, felf-exiftent, ne- ceflary, independent caufe, is altogether abfurd. This is fuppofing an infinite chain fufpended by nothing, and an in- finite weight that has no fupport (a). It is an infinite fe- ries of beings which might not have been, determined to exift without any reafon ; that is, determined and not determined at the fame time, which is a contradicftion in terms, as Spinofa himfelf has very well demonftrated.
(a) See Woolafton's Religion of Nature delineated; page 67.
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 35
I do not here enter into the queftlon, whether the world was an eternal, necelTary emanation of the divine elTence, as Ariftotle maintained ; or an eternal free efFeft of almighty power, as the Platonifts affirmed. We fhall examine both thefe quefHons hereafter. All we now pretend is, that there muft have been in the totality of nature, fome original, inde- pendent, necefTary, felf-exiftent being, whofe non-exiftence is impofTible, whofe idea includes exiftence, and whofe ef- fence could not but be. This Spinofa never called in quefti- on. He afTerts indeed that all finite beings are co-eternal modes and hypoftafes of the only fubftance: but he ftill main- tains that this only fubftance is neceflary, independent, and felf-exiftent. Let us now examine what the internal caufe, ground, and reafon of self-existence muft be.
PROPOSITION, II.
The greater reality a being has, the greater is the reafon for its neceflary exiftence.
DEMONSTRATION.
A felf-exiftent fubftance is that which contains in Itfelf a ground or reafon which makes its exiftence neceflary, and its non-exiftence impofllble (a). Reality in fome degree or o- ther is the only reafon of neceflary exiftence (b). Therefore the greater reality a being has, the greater is the reafon for its neceflary exiftence.
. (a) Def. 9. (b) Ax. a.
36 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
SCHOLIUM.
In the fcale of finites, we may conceive Innumerable be- ings, fuperior to any one determinate finite, fince progreflion here may be infinite. At whatfoever degree of being we ftop, we may ftill conceive innumerable other beings that have more reality and perfection than this determinate one, and confequently that have a greater reafon for exifting neceffa- rily than it. Neceflary exiftence therefore cannot belong to any one of them, unlefs it belong to all of them equally, and then we muft fay that the idea of fimple exiftence, and that of neceflary exiftence are the fame. Now this is abfolutely falfe; for modes or forms may have a real exiftence, and yet may be changed, deftroyed, and re-produced. It may be anfwered, that there is a great difference betwixt substantial and MODAL reaHtles. We grant it ; but both are equally realities, tho' they are not equal realities (c). Now fince the force of this reafoning, depends upon their being realities, its evidence is inconteftible. Spinofa was fo convinced of this truth, that he never maintained that finite of any degree how great foever could be felf-exiftent: he fays indeed, that all fubftancc exifts neceffarily, but then he affirms, that there can be only one fubftance which is infinite, eternal, and felf-exiftent.
COROLLARY I.
Hence no finite of an inferior degree contains In itfelf a reafon of neceffary exiftence, preferable to a finite of a fupe-
rior degree.
(c) Schol, I. of the definitions.
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 37
COR. II.
Hence in the fcale of finites we can flop at no being of any determinate degree, that has an adequate reafon of neceffary exiflence proper to itfelf alone, and excKifive of all others.
COR. III.
Hence the idea of absolute infinite contains an adequate reafon of neceffary exiflence, proper to itfelf alone, and exclufive of all others, fince beyond absolute in- finite there is and can be no progreffion.
PROPOSITION III.
The eternal, neceffary, felf-exiflent being is abfolutely infinite.
DEMONSTRATION.
A felf-exiflent being is that which contains in itfelf a rea- fon of neceffary exiflence (a). Nothing befides absolute INFINITE contains in itfelf a reafon of neceffary exiflence(b). Therefore the eternal, neceffary, felf-exiflent being is abfo- lutely infinite, or infinite in all perfedions.
SCHOLIUM.
Thus we have difcovered that the reafon, the foundation, and the fource of God's felf-exiflence is his abfolute infinity, or infinity in all perfections. The idea of no finite includes that of neceffary exiflence. Its non-exiflence is not impofli- bk; we may fuppofe it annihilated without any contradidion:
(a) Def. 9. (b) Cor. 3. of prop. II.
38 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
whereas k is manifeftly repugnant to fay, that a being that con- tains all perfe<ftions does not include the greateft and firft of thefe perfe61:ions, which is that of neceifary exiftence. For this reafon the Legillator of the Jews defines God the Being that is, or the felf-exiftent being, to infinuate that finite is the being that was made, and that God alone is the being that is. All the definitions of tiiis divine philofopherare exa^l. He did not deduce them from a fuccellive comparifon of ideas; but feems to have feen truth in its fource by an intuitive view. The Being that is, or the feif-exiftent being expreffes all, contains all, and fuppofes all the other perfections of the divine na- ture, and firft of all abfolute infinity. Whatever is felf-exi- ftentmuft be abfolutely infinite, and whatever is abfolutely in- finite mult be felf-exiftent. This is the fimpleft, fhorteft, and moft natural way of demonftrating the exiftence of a God. It is not deducing this great truth from the bare idea and definition of a God, whofe exiftence is not yet demon- ftrated; but from the idea of a felf-exiftent being, whom all muft allow, even the moft incredulous. We do not fay with the Cartcfians that there muft be an abfolutely infinite being, be- caufe its idea includes that of necefTary exiftence: but we prove firft that there muft be a felf-exiftent being, and then that this being muft be abfolutely infinite ; becaufe felf-exiftence cannot belong to any thing finite. Neither do we fay with Dr. Clarke and the Newtonians that immenfity and eternity being ideas which can never be feparated from the mind,which are necefTary and indeftru^iblc, they muft be properties or attributes of fome fubftance,and therefore there muft be fonie immcnfe and eternal fubftance. Spinofa will fay the fame, and
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 39
may reafon in the fame manner. It is God is immenfe and eternal, but he is immenfe by extenfion, and eternal by fuc- cefHon. This is not the true notion of God.
Some men feeing the unfufficiency or falfhood of the moft part of themetaphyficalreafoningsboth of theCartefiansand Newtonians, about the exiflence of a God, pretend that this great truthcanbe demonftratedonlyA POSTERioRi:butwe dare fay that all thefe demonftrations drawn from the perfecti- on of the EFFECTS are far inferior to thofe that are drawn from the perfe^ion of the cause. Tho' wedifcover in the univerfe undoubted marks of eternal power, wifdom, and goodnefs ; yet Spinofa will attempt to invalidate all thefede- monftrations by maintaining that the felf-exiftent caufe a6ts without defign and choice by neceffity of nature; that this only fubftance being eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, an in- finite force a(5ling upon an infinite fubftance during an infi- nite duration muft neceffarily produce infinite forms, and fb muft contain at the fame time every thing pofFible of all kinds; what appears to us regular and irregular; wife and foo- lifh; good and bad; and all that mixture of contrary and con- tradi<5lory qualities we fee in the univerfe. They are not efFe<5ts of hazard, nor defign; but the neceffary produ»5lions of an eternal caufe, whofe perfection confifts in an unboun- ded power, that produces all that is, and all that can be. Thus bethinks all the demonftrations a posteriori fail to the ground, or are at leaft very much weakened.
We abandon therefore all the fubtle modern reafoninss both of the metaphyseal and natural philofophers, and have recourfe with Mofes to the idea of the felf-exiftent effence,
40 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
as the only fource of demonftratlon. We dare venture to fay that all thofe who endeavour to difparage the evidence of this antient Mofaical demonftration, becaufe of its won- drous fimplicity, have no juft notions of the original con- ftitution of the human mind. Since the being of God is the firfl and greateft of all truths, it was worthy of almighty wiA dom to make our faculties fuch that this demonftration ftiould appear to them the moft eafy and obvious; ftrike them u- pon the leaft refle<5tion, and convince them of the exigence of a God from the bare infpeflion of the idea of a felf-exiftent being whom all muft allow.
Thus by the combination of fome few definitions and axi- wns we are at length arrived at the firft and mofl: efTential of all truths, The exiftence of abfolute infinite, from whom Is derived originally all the knowledge we can acquire of finite. It is impofilble to know the creature, but by the Creator; the properties of the former, but by the attributes of the latter, and even the exiftence of the one, but by that of the other. For all finites being contingent, not the being that is, but the beings that were made, we cannot demonftrate their exiftence by our perceptions of them ; but only by comparing thefe per- ceptions with the perfections of i N F i N i t e. We cannot de- monftrate that the earth, the fun, the planets, the ftars, and all the objects of fenfe without us, are really exiftent, purely and only by the fenfations we have of them, as fhall be de- monftratcd hereafter. We have difcovcred that abfolute infi- nite is the only being that is, and that all other beings may not be. We have demonftrated his exiftence, and we feel our own. We are ignorant of all the reft, and unlefs we derive
Book L ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 41
light from the idea of the felf-exiftent being, we can be fure of nothing; but that he is and that we are. Yea unlefs we find in this great idea what he is, as well as that he is, it is needlefs to interrogate the obje<5ts of fenfe. We do not yet know if they exift really, or if they are what they appear. All demonftrations a posteriori are infufficient. All that wc fee, hear or feel from without are perhaps mere fiiftions, and phantoms; ormaybealledgedtobemodes of abfolute infinite, who produced them by neceflity of nature, not byxhoice,de- fign and wifdom, as Spinofa faid. Loft and funk in this im- menfe ocean of absolute infinite; folitary with God alone, let us ihut our eyes, ftop our ears, impofe filence upon fenfe and imagination, fix all our powers upon this one obje6l, retire into our Ipiritual natures, and examine by this great idea of the self-existent absolute infinite, whatare his attributes and perfections. E're we begin this re-fearck however, wemuft draw three very ufeful corollaries from this propofition.
COROLLARY I.
Hence if there be any finite fubftances really exiftent, they mwft be efFe6ls, produ<5lions, or creatures of abfolute infinite; fince nothing is felf-exiftent but he alone.
COR. IL
Hence to whatever degree of reality or perfeClion we e- levate any being, this cannot be abfolute infinite, if we can •conceive another being fuperior to it.
COR. in. Hence how great foever be the perfecHiions we attribute to the felf-exiftent, eternal caufe, they cannot belong to abfolute
F
42 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
Infinite, if we can conceive perfeftions fuperior to them in a-
ny degree.
't>"
PROPOSITION IV.
Abfolute infinite excludes all negation, pri- vation, and defeat.
DEMONSTRATION.
Abfolute infinite is the moft perfe(5l negation of finite (a). Finite is what contains only fome degrees of reality, power, and perfeftion (b), and is a negation of infinitely fuperior rea- lity and perfection (c), wherefore its contrary, or abfolute in- finite, is the negation of all finite, that is, of all negation, and fo excludes all negation, privation and defe<fl.
SCHOLIUM.
Tho' the grammatical term infinite feem negative, yet its true fenfe is affirmative when applied to God. The nega- tion of all bounds is the fullnefs of all perfe<n:ion. It is the a^al pofreflion of being and reality in the higheft degree, without any fhadow of privation, defe(!^or limitation; with- out any poflibility of increafe,decreafe,or variation; and fure- ly this objc<5t has nothing negative in it.
Hitherto Spinofahad agreed with us; but here he begins to dilTer from us. He grants that there muft be fome eternal, original, independent, felf-exiftent caufe; and that this felf- exlilent caufe muft be abfolutely infinite. He abufes however
<a) Def. 8. (b) Def. 7. (c) Ax. 3.
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD- 43
that term and underftands it in a quite different fen{e from what he fhould.
Abfolute infinite may fignify a being that contains all pof- fible perfciftions from the higheft to the loweft degree; yea all fort of realities, whether modal or fubftantial, producing or produced; material, or immaterial, aiflive or paflive; not collectively but as attributes, modes or hypoftafes of the fame eternal, infinite and indivifible fubflance.
Abfolute infinite may alfo fignify a being that contains in itfelf, not all perfections, but all perfections in an infinite de- gree ; yea not only all infinite perfections feparated, but all re- united in an indivifible manner, and that can produce by an all-powerful fecundity, an innumerable variety of fubftances really diftinCt from itfelf.
Spinofa underftands always abfolute infinite in the firll: fenfe, and never in the fecond. He does not affirm, as Poi- ret accufes him, that God is no real being, and that what we mean by the term God, is only the metaphyfical abftraCt idea of entity in general,or the collective fum of all poflible finites. His fcheme is far more intricate. In imitation of the antient Pantheifts, he confounds the efTence of God,withthe effence of the creature, and maintains that there is but one, fole, e- ternal, felf-exiftent, abfolutely infinite fubftance; and that all other beings, whether thefe we call corporeal or intellectu- al, are coeternal, confubftantial forms, inherencies, hypofta- fes, and perfonalities of this only fubftance. He allows that this ABSOLUTE INFINITE produccs all, underftands all, and wills all, and that it gives exiftence, intelligence and activi- ty to all other beings, not by creation, which he endeavours to
F2
44 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
explode, but by immanent aftion,and necefHty of nature. He calls this felf-exiftent, infinitely a<5live, and infinitely intelli- gent fubfta nee NATURE PRODUCING, and its confiibftantial forms, inherencies and perfonalities nature produced. We have already overthrown the original props, and fun- damental propofitions of this monftruous fyftem, by unmas- king the falfhood of Spinofa's definitions. We fhall now fliew the total abfurdity and contradiction of this fcheme. It is impofTible that the abfolutely infinite, felf-exiftent being, which excludes all negation, privation and defefV, can con- tain in itfelf, as efiential attributes, the totality of all finites, that is, the coUedive fum of all negations ; or produce in it- felf by neceflity of nature, confubftantial forms, efFe(^s, inhe- rencies, and perfonalities that are full of contrary, contradic- tory, and incompatible qualities.. This impure mixture, this monftruous alliance, this abfurd confufion of finite and infi- nite, of light and darknefs, of reality and privation, of per- fection and imperfection cannot be the eternal, felf-exiftent, abfolute infinite jfince we have the idea of another far fuperior to this Spinofian Hydra, (a) we have the idea of an abso- lute infinite that is unbounded in all fenfes, and per- fections, without any fhadow of privation, defeCt, or limita- tion; yea without any pofilbility of increafe, decreafe, or va- riation; of an ABSOLUTE infinite, that can by its all- powerful energy produce from without, not by ncccflity of nature, but by free choice, not by immanent but by emanant aCtion,an innumerable variety of fubftances, attributes, powers, and modes rcprcfcntative of himfclf , and yet diftinCt fron>
(a) Cor. 2. and 3d of Prop. III.
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 45
himfelf; of an absolute infinite in one word that is
SUMMUM INFINITUM, not SUMMA INFINITORUM; the
fupream infinite, not the fum of infinites ; all Being, not all Beings; all perfections, not all realities; all perfedions in an infinite degree, and not all forts of perfeiflion in every degree. Now fince this idea is infinitely fuperior to that of the Spi- nofian God, it is evident to demonftration that this muft be the true abfolute infinite.
All Spinofa's errors on this head came originally from ths dangerous definitions of the fchoolmen, whom he had fludi- ed carefully in his youth; and eipecially the fataHft divines^ They call God * the univerfal being, the univerfal reafon,thc
* univerfal goodnefs, that contains in himfelf necelTarily all
* the ideas and efTences of finite.' Tho' Father Harduin was too rafh to accufe of formal, deliberate atheifm, all the great men who make ufe of thefe equivocal expreffions, yet he was in the right to look upon the expreflions themfelves as the fa- tal fources of Spinofifm. God is neither the univerfal being, nor the univerfal reafon, nor the univerfal goodnefs; for thefe expreffions may fignify the colle«5live fum of all particular be- ings, reafons and bounties; he is, as we fhallfhew, one, fole, lingular, individual and indlvilible fubftance, that reunites in; himfelf all perfe<flions, every one of which is infinite in its Icind. Neither does this fupream intelligence contain in him- felf all the ideas and eflences of finite, as the neceffary ob- je<5ts of his underflanding. We fhall fully demonftrate here- after that this is a wild chimera of the fchoolmen, which fa- vours and produces neceffarily Spinofifm. Neither muft we fay that God contains in himfelf eminently all the pcrfedi-
46 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
ons of finite beings. For tho', as we fnall (hew, the perfefti- ons of finite be analogous to and reprefentative of the divine perfections, yet the later do not contain the former in any fenfe whatfoever. This dark and rafh exprefTionof the fchool- men unknown to all antiquity both facred and profane, fa- vours the opinion of thofe, who fancy that caufes contain their effefls as plants contain their feeds, or as the fun con- tains its rays, and then we mufl: look upon creation as an evo- lution, or emanation of the uncreated effence, which modi- fys itfelf differently, without producing any real fubflance di- ftinft from itfelf; which is pure Spinofifin. We fhall fhew hereafter that creation is neither a difcerption, nor an emana- tion from the divine effence ; but a produ<n:ion of fomething that had no exiftence before.
Thefe three expreflions therefore of the fchools, That
* God is the univerfal being ; that the ideas of all finites are
* the necefTary objefts of the divine underflanding, and eter- ' nally coexiflent in it; and in fine that God contains emi-
* nently the perfections and qualities of all finites,' gave rife to atheifjii ; as will fully appear in the courfe of this work. We beg our readers to go on, and all thefe great truths fhall be unfolded by degrees. If we attempted to expofe them all at once, this multiplicity would perplex the mind, dazzle the intellectual eye, and render all its objeCts confufed.
COR. I.
Hence absolute infinite, or that which contains the fullncfs of all perfeftion, can neither increafe nor decreafe in its effential aCts, attributes and perfections; becaufe it pof^ feffes in every moment all the powers, properties and realities
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 47
that are neceflary to compleat its idea; which is that of abfo- lute fullnefs, and perfection in all kinds.
COR. II.
Hence if we difcover in nature, beings that are full of ne- gations, privations, and defects, of different, incompatible, and contradi<ftory qualities ; nature produced, or the univerfe of beings, cannot be an eflential attribute or modification of the divine fubftance.
COR. III.
Hence we mufl deny of abfolute infinite not only all pro- perties that fuppofe negation, privation and limitation: but even all perfections that are not infinite in all fenfes: where- fore if it can be proved, that there is a higher or more per- fect way of exifting every where, than by extenfion as bodies do, then we muft deny that God's omniprcfence is a local difFufion, tho' infinite and indivifible: and confequently that the divine immenfity and infinite fpace are not the fame.
COR. IV.
Hence, tho' abfolute infinite excludes all negation; yet the idea which finite intelligences have of it is altogether ne- gative. All we conceive of abfolute infinite is that it is grea- ter than any idea we can form of it; that it farpaffes all finite comprehenfion, and that it is none of thefe things, that we can imagine. Thus tho' the object of this idea be pofi- tive, yet the idea we form of it is altogether negative, as Locke very well demonflratcs. But it were falfe to conclude from thence, that the objecft of that idea includes any negation; as it would be abfurd to fay that becaufe our idea of God is im- perfect, therefore his elTence is fuch.
48 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
PROPOSITION. V.
Abfolute Infinite excludes all duality and plurality of fubftance.
DEMONSTRATION.
If there were two or more abfolute infinites, their per- fe<flIons, powers, and forces united in one fum, would be grea- ter than thofe of onefingular abfolute infinite (a). Now there can be nothing greater than abfolute infinite (b), therefore there cannot be in nature a duality, nor a plurality of diftinft, felf-exiftent, independent and abfolutely infinite fubftances,
SCHOLIUM.
That which exhaufts the whole plenitude of perfe<5lion In all fenfes, can admit no other of its kind; not becaufe it contains numerically all beings, powers, and perfe<5lions: but becaufe it contains in itfelf in an indivifible manner a perfec- tion equivalent to all pofllble multiplicity. Subftances of any finite degree may be all equal to each other, and yet be mul- tipliable without end; becaufe none of them fingly and fepa- rately, exhaufts the whole plenitude of reality in its kind. Ab- folute infinite can admit of no duality nor plurality of fub- ftance ; becaufe the powers, pcrfe<n:ions and realities of both or of all united in one, would make a being of a fuperior de- gree to abfolute infinite which is a contradiction.
Befidcs, if by an impofilblc fuppofition there could be two
(a) Ax. 6. (b) Ax, 4,
Book L ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 49
or more abfolutely infinite fubftances, each one of them mufl necelTarily know, love and be united with each other, and with all of them at once; and fo they muft by this union ei- ther become an individual and indivifible fubilance; or elfe their united powers, knowledge and happinefs, muft augment and furpafs their fingle, feparate power, knowledge and hap- pinefs. Wherefore every one of them would not be felf-fuf- ficient, and fo could not be abfolutely infinite*
G O R. I.
Hence infinite power can never be exhaufted by the pro- duftion of beings diftinftfrom itfelf ; becaufe flnce it can never produce from without, another abfolute infinite equal to it- felf, there may be in the fcale of finites a progrefllon without end.
COR. 11.
Hence God can never communicate to nature pro- duced, or to created beings, a principle of felf-exiftence, (b as that they could fubfift for ever independent of him ; fince he can never make them abfolutely infinite, which is the on- ly reafon of felf-exiftence or independence.
COR. III.
Hence creation can neither be coeternal, nor confubftan- tial with God, nor neceffary to his perfe(5tion ; becaufe it can- not be abfolutely infinite as fhall be fhewn more fully here- after.
COR. IV.
Hence the abfolutely infinite mind can have no other ab- folutely infinite obje<5t of his thought, but himfelf, or his own idea, image and reprefentation.
G
50 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
COR. V.
Hence all the rophlfms that Baylc makes ufe of, to prove thatManicheifm,or the do6lrine of two co-eternal, felf-exif- tent principles, one good and another bad, is a plaufible opi- nion; are weak, childifh, and unphilofophical. All his wit- ty reafonings on this head, are founded upon this fuppofiti- on, that moral and phyHcal evil will be eternal and indeftruc- tible; and that what is indeftruflible muft be felf-exiftent. This is abfolutely falfe, as we fhall prove hereafter both by fcripture and reafon.
PROPOSITION VI.
Abfolute infinite excludes all divifion and all divifibility of fubftance whether ideal or real.
DEMONSRATION.
If the divine fubftance was divifible into parts, thefe parts would be abfolutely infinite, or abfolutely finite. If abfolute- ly infinite, then there might be many abfolute infinites ; which is impoffible (a); if abfolutely finite, then the addition of fi- nite to finite would make abfolute infinite, which is abfurd: (b) therefore abfolute infinite excludes all divifion and all di- vifibility both real and ideal; fince what is ideally divifible may be really divided.
SCHOLIUM.
Spinofa never denied the indivifibility of the divine effence. He maintains indeed, with Des Cartes, that matter and fpace
(a) Prop. V. (b) Ax. 6.
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 51
are the fame; and having endeavour'd to prove that Ipace is infinite, eternal, indivifible, and indeftruflible, he concludes that infinite Ipace and the divine immenfity are the fame; and that the fupreme abfolute infinite or only fubftance is exten- ded every where by local diffufion, yetfo as to be ideally and really indivifible. Thus tho' he attributes extenfion to God, yet he denies that God is corporeal, figurable, and divifible. He does not even fay that God is the foul of the world inti- mately united to all the mafs of infinite matter; for he afferts that there is no other real matter but infinite Ipace. We Ihall unriddle this intricate queftion very foon.
COR. I.
Hence all God's effential attributes, powers, and perfec- tions fubfift and zS: in, by and with each other according to all the extent of his infinite nature. They cannot contra- dict nor be feparated from one another. There may be in- deed as we fhall fhew real diftin(n:ions in God, but there can be no real divifions.
COR. II.
Hence nature produced, or the univerfe of beings is not a participation of the divine fubflance, for what is indivifible in all fenfes admits of no feparation or divifion. Wherefore when God produces or creates finite beings, it is not by a dif^ cerption, divifion, or communication of his effence.
PROPOSITION VII.
The divine effence does not exift by fuccef- fion of thoughts.
Gz
52 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
DEMONSTRATION.
Abfolute infinite is that which contains the fulnefs of all perfection: (a) that which contains the fulnefs of all perfec- tion can never increafe, decreafe or vary as to its effential afts, attributes and thoughts, (b) Therefore the divine eflence does not exifl: by fucceffion of tlioughts*
SCHOLIUM.
God knows and loves himfelf always equally; and in this permanent, unchangeable knowledge and love, confifts the effential perfection of his infinite underftanding, and the un^ bounded happinefs of his infinite will. Locke pretends that we can have no idea of duration, but what is fucceflive: but all his (pecious reafonings on this head tend to confound the idea of infinite time, with that of God's eternity. It is true that we have no idea of duration in finite but what is fuccef^ five. This however does not prove that we can have no idea of God's duration, without fucceffion, variation and change- He knows and loves himfelf not by fucceffive a<n:s, but by one continued, permanent, and immutable act; otherwrfe we muft fay that he knows and loves himfelf more at one time than- at another. Boethius had far more noble notions, when he faid that eternal duration in God is the full, a<5tual, permanent poffeffion of all reality and perfection: whereas infinite time in the creature is the fucceffive augmentation or variation of its modes, realities or perfections without end.
All Locke's miftakes on this head come from his not ad- verting to this, that eternal duration in God does not regard
(a) Def. 8. (b) Cor. i. of Prop. VI.
Book L ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 53
his abfolute efrence,but his elTential a<5ls. Neceffary exigence •is not the fame idea with that of eternity. Neceffary exif- tence belongs to the eifence of God, as independent of any other caufe: but eternity or unfucceffive duration belongs to his effential a6ls as exempt from all poflibility of increafe, de- creafe, or variation. He knows and loves himfelf always in the fame manner and degree; and this permanency confti- tutes his eternity. We fee that this muft be fo, but we cannot form any adequate ideas of this fimultaneous duration in God ; becaufe being bounded we conceive only by parcells, by fucceflion, and by progrellion. All the attributes of abfo- lute infinite tho' demonftrable, yet muft be incomprehenfiblc to finite minds.
Dr. Clarke by confounding the ideas of fucceflive and un- fucceffive duration advanced a ftrange paradox which he ex- preifes thus; (a) * How any thing can have exifted eternally, ' that is, how an eternal duration can be a6lually paft, is ut-
* terly unconceivable, and yet to deny that an eternal durati-
* on is now acTtually paft is an exprefs contradi(flion.' He fhould have faid quite the contrary, that to maintain an eter- nal duration is now a6lually paft is altogether repugnant and contradi(5lory. It is not only unconceivable, but abfolutely impofilble. Wherever there is a laft, there muft be a firft; now in eternity there can be no firft, and therefore no laft. Whatever is fuccefilve cannot be eternal, as whatever is divi- fible cannot be a6lually infinite; becaufe no addition of fi- nite dimenfions, nor of finite fucceffions can make abfolute infinite. When we fay that creatures may be immortal and e-
(a) Dr. Clarke's Demonftration of the being and attributes of God; page 9.
54 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
ternal; all we mean is, that God may ftill continue their exis- tence without end; and no ways that there can be no laft mo- ment wherein they may ceafe to be. When we fay that mat- ter is infinitely divifible or multipliable, all we mean is that infinite power may diminifh or augment it without end, and no ways that it can be actually and really infinitely great, or infinitely Uttle. I repeat it once more, wherever there is a firft, there may be a laft, and wherever there is a laft, there muft have been a firft.
In the pure and abfolute eflence of God, and in the exer- cife of his eftential, immanent, and neceffary a6ls, there can be neither paft nor future. All is one prefent moment. Be- caufe God always knows and loves himfelf equally, without variation or fhadow of change. All his eftential afts are co- eternal, confubftantial, and fimultaneous with his effence. There is in them neither priority nor pofteriority with regard to duration ; tho' there may be fuch diftinflions conceived in him with regard to caufality, as fhall be explained hereafter. When we di(Hnguifti anterior from pofterior eternity, this does not regard God but us. We do not mean that there can be any real priority or pofteriority, any alteration or fuccef- fion in the divine eftence ; but only that there was a time when finite began, and when God manifefted himfelf from with- out: for he can never interrupt the eternal, permanent, uni- form duration of his eftence, nor of his eftential, immanent, and con-fubftantial a(^s.
Tho' in God, there is no ftiadow of variation with regard to his neceftary a^ls, and their immanent efte(fts, yet with re- gard to his free a(fls and emanant cftedts, there may be fuc-
Book L ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. ^^
ceffion ; that is, they are not co-eternal with his efTence, and cannot be the permanent objects of his underftanding; there was a time when he did not exert thefe acfts; and there may be a time when he will ceafe to exert them. This is the fu- blimeft truth in all theology, and the firft bulwark againft Spi- nofifm; as fhall be evidently demonftrated hereafter.
COR. I.
We may conceive two different forts of duration: one by which a being exifts abfolutely and altogether the fame in all the periods of duration; another by which it exifts diffe- rently, in different times, by the increafe, decreafe, and vari- ation of its modes, qualities and perfe(n:ions. The idea of time arifes from the mutability and fucceffion that happen in ■the modes, qualities and perfections of finite.
G O R. II.
Hence infinite time and the divine eternity are not the fame. Infinite time is the mutable duration of finite continu- ed without end. Eternity is the immutable duration of abfo- lute infinite. Thus duration is the generical term; immutable and fuccefTive duration are the two kinds or ipecies.
COR. III.
Hence it is abfolutely falfe, that duration is an abfolute quality that belongs to all beings in the fame fenfe. Succcf- five duration or mutability is the effentlal property of all fi- nites: unfuccejffive duration belongs to God alone.
LEMMA OF PROP. VIII.
A fubftance that is extended by diffufion of parts may be conceived as ideally and really divifible.
S6 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
SCHOLIUM.
In all fubftance extended by difFufion we may conceive lengths, breadths, heights and depths; parts diftlntfl from each other, parts towards the center, and parts towards the circumference. Now wherever there are real parts diftlnd and diftant from each other, the one is not the other j the whole Is not contained In each part, nor does each part con- tain the reft. One part therefore might exift, tho* all the reft were annihilated, and confequently its parts are feparable. They are Ideally divlfible, and therefore muft be really fo; o- therwlfe their ideal divifibility would be impoflible. For this reafon it is, that matter is not one (imple/indivlfible fubftance, but a compound of many fubftances really feparable, tho' ne- ver fo contiguous and homogeneous.
Some will fay that we may conceive In fpace ideal diftinc- tions, but not real dlvifions; that we may diftlnguifh In it heights, lengths, and breadths, and yet no feparable parts; and therefore tho' It may be partially apprehended, yet it can- not be mentally nor really divided. I anfwer that this is true, becaufe, as we ftiall fhew, Ipace is not a real fubftance; but if it were a real fubftance that exifted by difFufion, then it would be both mentally and really divlfible.
COR. I.
Whatever Is really divlfible Is really compounded ; for it could not be divided into parts if it were not compofed of parts.
COR. II.
Hence if a fubftance be divlfible into parts without end,
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. ^y
(ince the parts are of the fame nature with the whole, this fubftance cannot be one, fingle, individual fubftance, but a compound of innumerable, diftind, and divifible fubftances.
PROPOSITION VIII.
The DIVINE ESSENCE Is not extended by diifufion of parts.
DEMONSTRATION.
A fub fiance that is extended by diffufion of parts, may be conceived as ideally and really divifible (a): the divine efTence admits of no divifion ideal or real : (b) therefore the divine efTence is not extended by diffufion of parts.
SCHOLIUM.
We are now arrived at the mofl: dliHcuIt, the mofl ab- flrufe, and the mofl fubtle part of all theology and metaphy- ficks. The miflakes on this head have had bad eflfedls, and tended to open the fluices to Spinofifm,
There are three opinions concerning the divine immenfity, and there can be but three ; fome fay that God exifls in all places by diiFufion ; others, that his efTence is circumfcribed to one definite place, while he is prefent every where by his almigh- ty power; others again afTert that the infinite, all-comprehen- five mind is prefent without extenfion to all beings, not only by the whole exerclfe of his power, but according to the to- tality of his indlvifible cflence. If It can be demonflrated that the two firfl opinions are falfe,and Incompatible with the per-
(a) By thepreceeding Lemma. (b) By Prop. V.
H
58 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book T.
fe6lion of abfolute infinite, it is evident that the third mull be true (a); fince the divine eflence can exift no otherwife but ia one of thefe three manners.
Some of Sir Isaac Newton's difciples, without per- haps feeing the confequences of their do<5lrine, favour direct- ly the firft opinion, that God exifts in all places by diiFufion, when they maintain that infinite ipace and the divine immen- (ity are the fame. They argue thus.
1. As God's exigence in all times conflitutes infinite du- ration or eternity, fo his prefence in all places conftltutes in- finite fpace or immenfity. The felf-exiftent eflence is the fub- ftratum of fpace, and the ground of its exiftence. God is not in the world, but the world is in him. His immenfity is the common place or receptacle which contains all created be- ings: for this reafon St. Paul fays, that " in God we live, " move and have our being."
2. The idea of fpace is eternal, infinite, independent of and antecedent to the creation of all matter: for fince matter is created, God might have produced from the beginning on- ly two globes of matter which would have touched each o- thcr only in a point; and therefore we might have had the idea of a fpace void of matter betwixt all the other points. Further, fince matter is created, it may be annihilated ; for whatever does not exift neceflarily, may ceafe to be. Where- fore God might annihilate all the matter betwixt four im- moveable walls, without fufFering any other matter to fill its place, and then we would have an idea of fpace where there is no matter. In fine, fince matter is created it mufl be finite.
(a) By Poftulate 3,
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 59
If we were therefore tranfported to the utmofl: boundaries of created matter, we might ftretch out our hand, and thus have the idea of a fpace where God might create another world like ours, yea not only one but numberlefs worlds, flnce his power is unbounded. In all thcfe three cafes we would have an idea of fpace where there is no matter, antecedent to, in- dependent of, and infinitely greater than all matter. Thus the idea of fpace is infinite, eternal, and neceflary.
3. Space and time are abfolute qualities requifite and ne- cefTary to the exigence of all beings; flnce all things mufl ex- ift fomewhere, and in fome time, or every where and in all times. To exifl no where and in no time, is not to be. Space and time therefore are neceffary, indeflru^tible ideas, that no- thing can blot out of the mind, and this is the mofl compen- dious demonftration of the exiflence of a God: for flnce eter- nity and immenfity are necelTary, indeftruflible ideas, they mufl be properties of an immenfe, eternal being; and flnce the properties cannot exift without their fubftance, there mull be an immenfe, eternal fubftance to whom they belong.
4. Space muft either be fbmething or nothing. It cannot be nothing ; flnce we conceive in fpace portions greater or lef^ fer, equal or unequal, nearer and remoter. Now nothing has no properties nor parts. If fpace be fomething, it mufl: either be a fubftance or a property of a fubftance; the fame with matter, or an attribute of matter. It cannot be, as the Carte- flans fay, the fame with matter, becaufe fpace is penetrable, immoveable and indivifible, whereas matter is impenetrable, moveable and diviflble. Moreover, fpace is what contains mat- ter ; now the thing containing muft be dilUnel from the
Hz
6o OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
thing contained. In fine, if fpace and matter were the fame, we could not fay that bodies quit one fpace to go into ano- ther; for this would be faying that they go out of themfelves. Neither can fJ3ace be an attribute of matter, nor of any created being, fince Ipace is eternal, neceflary and infinite. Wherefore it muft be an attribute of the eternal, infinite, felf- exiftent being or the fame with the divine immenfity.
Thefe are the principal arguments of Locke, and the En- gllfh Newtonian philofophers, to prove that infinite fpace and the divine immenfity are the fame. This matter has been handled of late by two great men, Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke. The firft by his profound depth lofl himfelf in ob- fcurity, without being intelligible. The other by his great fubtility fklpped over truth, without going to the bottom. We fhall endeavour to fhew firft that the principles upon which this do6lrine is founded ai*e falfe and fophidical; and then prove that the confequences of it are very harfh and dangerous.
I. It is abfolutely falfe that God's exigence in all times is his eternity; and therefore by the rules of analogy his ex- iftence in all fpaces is not his immenfity. As infinite time is not eternity (a), fo infinite fpace is not immenfity. The va- riability of'the creature gives us the idea of fucccfTion and time (b), and the cxtcnfion of matter by its compofition gives us the idea of fpace or extenfion. If there were no variable beings, if we could remain for ever in one permanent thought, we would have no idea of fuccefllon or time. Jull fo, if there Vvere no compound beings made up of diftant or fcparable
(a) Cor. 2. of Prop. VII. 00 Cor. i. of Trop. VJI.
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 6t
parts, we could have no idea of ipace or extenfion. Time in- dicates a fiicceflion of modes; Ipace, a compofition of parts. We jfhall fhew hereafter that the mind Is capable of forming abftrafl ideas both of fubftances and properties. Now it is certain that the abftra(5l idea may remain In the mind tho' the fubftances were annihilated. Thus we form the ideas of in- finite Ipace, and infinite time. Having obferved that all finite beings exift by fucceflion, we form to ourfelves the abftraft idea of an infinite, flowing, variable duration without end; becaufe God might have created antecedently to all determi- nate time, and continue his produ6lion for ever. In the fame manner having once got the idea of a being compofed of parts, we conceive that God may augment extended fubftan- ces for ever; and fo we form the abftrad idea of imaginary, infinite fpaces, as of imaginary, infinite numbers and moti- ons, which are mere modes of the mind's forming, and no- wife real fubftances ; far lefs properties of the infinite fub- ftance. When the apoftle fays therefore, that " in God we " live, move, and have our being;" wemuft not underftand this in a grofs, material fenfe, as if all bodies and all beings fwimmed in the divine eifence, like fifhes in the fea. If fome Newtonians (or rather the difciples of the pious Dr. Henry More, who firft defended this notion among the moderns) think thus, they feem not to explode the idea of an ethereal fluid that fills all; but they deny the Cartefian, created, finite, paflive, divifiblc, figurable, moveable, unintelligent, fubtilc matter, in order to transform the divine elTence into an un- created, infinite, unfigurable, a^ftive, intelligent, ethereal raat^ £er, which too much refemblcs Spinolirm; as we fhaii fhew
6z OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
hereafter. This then cannot be the meanhig of St. Paul, but that God is prefent every where to all created beings, becaufe they exifl: and fubfifl: only by the continuation of his creating energy. Now as his power cannot a6l where his eflence is not, he niufl: exifl: where he a^ls; and as his effence is indivi* fible, he muft be entirely prefent to all beings, without dif- fufion of parts, as he exifl:s always without fuccellion of thoughts.
2. All the reafonings by which thefe moderns endeavour to prove that fpace is eternal, infinite and neceffary, are pure dclufions of fancy. It is true that God might have created only two globes of matter which touched one another in a point; that he might annihilate all the real matter, there is betwixt four immoveable walls, without fuffering any other matter to fill its place; and in fine, that he might create new worlds beyond our fyfl:em. In thefe three cafes we would have the idea of a void or fpace antecedent to and indepen- dent of all matter: all this we grant. But in all thefe cafes the idea we have of fpace is not that of any real fubftance, or pro- perty, difl:in6l from matter, but an abftraft idea of extenfion which remains after the extended fubfl:ance is fuppofed to be deftroyed, and which we fuppofe e're the extended fubfl:ance be created. We confider this abflraft idea as a capacity, an interval, a diflrance or a void, where there is nothing materi- al; and therefore nothing that hinders the pofition or creati- on of new matter betwixt or beyond the bodies really exif- ting. Now this abfl:ra6t idea of void, difl:ance, interval, or ca- pacity, has no objcaive reality without us; it is a mere ficflion of the mind, an ens rationis, the work of our own
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 63
thought. It is thus that when we have once the idea of an extended fubftance, we may form that of imaginary heights, lengths, depths, and diftances without end, tho' all the real matter in the univerfe were annihilated. When the Cartefi- ans therefore deny the poHibllity of forming the abftrad idea of a void or extenfion where there is no matter, they are dri- ven inevitably to maintain either that matter Is abfolutely in- finite, and confequently eternal and uncreated; or to fay that it is an attribute of the divine fubftance; and fo to materialize the divine nature, in a more abfurd fenfe than the later au- thors. It is a mere Sophifm In the Cartefians to fay that bo- dies are united when there is nothing betwixt them ; this is falfe; bodies are only then united, when there can be nothing betwixt them.
3. Space and time are not abfolute qualities that belong to all beings. God exifts every where without (pace or exten- fion; as he exifts always without time or fucceflion. He ex- ifts In himfelf as his own place, always the fame, without va- riation, In one permanent act of knowledge and love. It Is true that the Ideas of fpace and time are infeparable from our minds, becaufe being variable creatures. Intimately united to matter, we cannot Itrike out of our minds the Ideas of exten- fion and fucceflion: but If we transfer thefe ideas to abfolute infinite, we become anthropomorphltes, and imagine that God is like ourfclves. We fancy with children that all that is not extended, Is nothing; and that all duration which Is not floating, and fuccefllve Is no duration at all. Space and time are not then abfolute qualities that belong equally to all be- ings created and uncreated; material and fpiritual.
64. OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
4. The dilemma's of thefe moderns are not conclufive. All the objects of our perception are not fubftances, or proper* tics of fubftances. There is yet a third object of our percep- tion, and that is, abftra6t ideas. Space is not a pure nothing, but an abftrad idea of extenfion, as that of number, time, and motion, which we may confider as greater or lefTer, di- ftant or nearer; and which we may add or mukiply, divide or combine without end; yea we may reafon upon them, as if they were real fubftances : tho' it is certain that all num- bers without multipliable beings, all times without variable beings, all motions without moveable beings, and all (paces without extended beings; are mere abftraftions of our minds. We fay that bodies exift in fpace, in the fame fenfe that we fay that finite beings exift in time. In both cafes, the vulgar impofed upon by imagination, confider (pace and time, or the abftrafl ideas of extenfion and fucceflion, as fome things di- ftin(ft from the extended and fuccefilve fubftances in which thefe fubftances exift; and fo by a metonymy without precifi- on fay that the fubftances exift in their properties, or ra- ther in the abftrad ideas of their properties. Can Philofo- phers make ufe of the errors in ordinary fpeech to prove phi- lofophical principles? Striflly fpeaking we fhould not fay that bodies exift in fpace, and finite beings in time; but that the one exift with extenfion, and the others by fucccfilon, or with Ipace and time. Moreover, it was a great miftake in fome Car- tefians to maintain that space and matter are the fame; for then it would be nonfenfe to fay that bodies change one fpace to go into another. This would be faying that bodies ^o out of thcmfelves to go into other bodies. What is meant
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 65
when we fay that bodies change fpace or place, Is that they change the relation of diftance to each other; for, as we have already remarked, fpace fignifies fometimes a void where there are no bodies at all, and fometimes an interval or diftance be- twixt bodies. In both thefe cafes, ipace is only a relation or an idea of the manner that bodies exift by extenfion. Now ex- tenfion is not a fubftance, but a property of a fubftance; it is not matter, but an attribute of matter. Each atom of mat- ter carries along with it the idea of local extenfion, and fup- pofes it necelTarily : but as fucceflion without any being that varies is a pure idea, fo extenfion without any extended be- ing is a pure idea.
Thus all the principles upon which thefe moderns found the identity of infinite fpace and the divine immenfity, are uncertain orfalfe: but the natural confequences of this doc- trine are of a dangerous tendency.
1 . If infinite fpace were the fame with the divine immen- fity; if God's omniprefence conflituted infinite fpace, and if infinite fpace were an attribute of God: then the fupreme ef^ fence would exifl by difFufion andlocal extenfion, tho' indivi- fible, unfigurable, and immoveable. Now if the divine ef^ fence exifled thus by difFufion, there would be more of it in a greater fpace, than in a lefTer, in a mountain than in a mole- hill, in a giant than in a pigmy.
2. This is not all. We have already demonflrated, that all fubflance which exifls by difFufion muft be divifible : for in all fuch fubftances we may conceive parts diflant and diftincH:; equal and unequal; greater and lefTcr, and confe- quently thefe fubftances are ideally and really divifible, tho'
I
<$5 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
they may be uncTivided ; now what is really divifible is there- by figurable and moveable. If the divine efTence exifted there- fore in fpace by difFufion, it would be divifible, figurable and moveable; and fo fubjeft to all the accidents and qualities of bodies. We might fay literally and phyfically an inch, a foot, a cubit, and a yard of the divine fubftance. It might be really divided into portions of all forms, triangular, circu- lar, (pherical, and cubical. Yea all thefe portions might be tranfported from one place to another with more or lefs ve- locity. Thus we would corporalize the divine nature.
3. In fine, if the divine elTence were locally extended, tho* indivifible, one would think it mufl be as impenetrable as matter: for a real fubftance that exiftsby difFufion fills its own place; and fo cannot admit in the fame place any other fub- ftance of the fame nature. It is the difFufion or extenflon of a fubftance that makes it impenetrable, and not its divifibili- ty or indivifibility. If the divine elTence conftitutes infinite Ipace, and fills it, then there can be no other fpiritual fub- ftance but itfelf. For this reafon Spinofa maintain'd, that there was one only fubftance in nature, and that all other beings are only confubftantial forms, ideas, hypoftafes, and perfo- nalities of the divine efFence.
Dr. Clarke prefs'd by thefe abfurd confequences, of which he had no doubt a facrcd horror, retra^s his firft cxprefTions, and fays (a) ' That God is not in fpace, nor penetrated by it; < and that to call the felf-exiftent fubftance, the fubftratum of
* fpace, or fpace a property of the fclf-exiftent fubftance, are
* not perhaps proper expreffions : but that all he means is, that
(a) See the anfwers to the 3d and 4th letters at the end of his Pemonftration of the being and attributes of God .
Book L ATTRIBUTES OF GOD, 6y
* the idea of fpaee is the idea of a certain quality or relation,
* which we evidently fee to be necefTarily exifting, and which ' not being a fubftance prefuppofes necelTarily a fubftance
* without which it could not exift.' We abfolutely deny that the idea of fpace is that of a quality neceffarily-exifting: for if there never had been any real matter, or extended fub- ftance, we might have been eternally without the idea of ex- tenfion ; and fo could never have form'd an abftra^l idea of this property or of fpace. For this reafon it is that Dr. Berke- ley maintains ' that we acquire the ideas of grandeur, dif-
* tance and extenfion,only by habitudeyexperience and touch;
* and that we learn to fee as we learn to fpeak. To fay that a neceflarily exifting quality prefuppofes a neceftarily exifting fubftance, is returning to his firft maxim; for fince qualities cannot exift without their fubftance, if fpace be a neceffarily exiftent quality, it muft be that of a neceffarily exiftent fub- ftance, and fo the fame with the divine immenfity; otherwife this phrafe fignifies nothing. Thus the Do<n:or falls into the fame jargon he reproaches others with; rather than quite a- bandon a principle whofe natural and neceffary confequences alarm him. Thus the mathematical philofophers have fallen into all the abfurditles of materlallfm and Spinofifrii, without defigning it. The greateft geometers are very oft incapable of metaphyfical reafonings, becaufe their minds being entirely abforb'd in the contemplations of extenfion and figure, and conftantly accuftom'd to the ideas of quantity, they become by degrees incapable of all pure Ideas that have no relation to fpace, figure, and motion.
The opinion of an immenfe void, of an infinite fpace, of
I 2
6B OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
an uncreated extenfion, in which God exifts by diffurion, is probably an old,antiquated notion of Democritus and the a- tomifts; which was combated and confuted by Socrates, A- naxagoras, and all the philofophers, who believed that the thinking eflfence was diftincl from the material fubftance. This fidlion was renew'd by Epicurus and Lucretius; and con- futed anewbythePlatonifts. Manes and his followers reviv'd the fame chimera in the third and fourth centuries, and St. Auguftin was long infatuated by it, but he rejeded it at laft with horror, and confuted it with force and fubtlety. Cham- peaux, mafter to Abelard, endeavoured to recall the fame er- ror in the twelfth century; but his difciple attack'd him and proved him to be a materialift. Some Scotifts, fuch as Dero- don, revived the fame opinion in the fifteenth century; but they were vigoroufly oppofed by all the fchools. In fine,Spi- nofa in the laft century eftay'd again to introduce this noti- on into the empire of philofophy, to prove that there is bus one fubftance in nature, and that extenfion and thought are properties of this only fubftance; but his dark fcheme was abhorr'd by all the philofophers of Europe. It is ftrange that fuch profound genii, as Dr. Henry More, Clarke, and many of the learned Englifh, ihould have agreed in this point with the Epicureans, Manicheans, Materialifts, and Spiniofifts, in oppofition to the moft able metaphyficians of all ages, coun- tries, and religions.
Some antient and modern philofophers fell into another extream, and pretended that the proper refidence of God is without this fyftem; that his eftencc is circumfcribed to the higheft heavens, and that he is prefcnt to created beings, on-
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. ^^
ly by a power of irradiation, an all-extenfive virtue, and Spi- ritual operation ; and this is the fecond opinion about onmir prefence. Thefe philofophers, to fhun the dodrine of difFu- five, local extenfion, limit the divine nature, and render it re- ally finite by efTence. Nothing is more abfurd and ground- lefs, as will fully appear from the following reflexions.
I . It is abfolutely impoffible that infinite power can be fe- parated from the omnipotent elTcnce; that a property can ex- ift without its fubftance; and that an agent can operate where it is not: wherefore if God a6ts every where, he muft be pre- fent every where: his eflence mufl exift, where his power ex- erts itfelf.
2. We grant, that the holy fcriptures fpcak of the highefl: heavens, as the proper refidence of God : but thefe palTages muft fignify, as we fhall fhew hereafter, that there is one place in the divine immenfity where the infinite effence ma- nifefts itfelf to created beings, in a more eminent manner than in another, and not that he exifts more in one place than in another. Scripture muft be explain'd by fcripture. Now thefe facred books alTure us, that God is prefent in hea- ven, upon earth, and in hell; " that the heaven of heavens " cannot contain him, and that he is not far from every one " of us, fince in him we live, move and have our being."
3. It is true indeed, that the facred oracles fay, that impi- ous minds, and damned fpirits are " far from God; and caft " out of his prefence; that holy fouls are near to him, and " united with him; and that none but the pure in heart can " fee and approach him:" But thefe expreffions cannot be underftood of a local prefence. In fome knk we are pre-
70 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
fent to obje(5ls only in fo far as they ac^ upon us, and mani- feft themfelves to us. If all the avenues of fenfe were Ihut up, and all communication with bodies were fufpended, we might be furrounded with them, and be in the fame place with them, and yet have no perception of them. Thus God is efTentially prefent to the devils and the damned; and yet they do not perceive him : they are faid to be feparated from him, becaufe he does not adt upon them in a beatifying man- ner; thus we live, move and exift in God, tho' he be invi- fible: he is prefent to all beings, tho' they do not feel his pre- fence. They are diftind but not diftant, from him. When he creates, he does not produce beings without himfelf,in this fenfe that he places their fub fiance in a ipace where he is not: but in this fenfe that they are diftinfl from him, or have a being really different from his.
The two opinions mention'd about the divine immenfi- ty, the one of God's diffufive prefence in all places, and the other of his circumfcription to one place, are then incompa- tible with the perfection of the divine nature. Now when of three fuppofitions, whereof one neceffarily mull: be true, two are proved abfurd and impolTible, the third is invincibly demonftrated (a). God muft either be eflentially prefent in all places, or in one definite place: there is no midft. The di- lemma is exaft; the enumeration is perfect. If he be eifen- tially prefent in all places, he muft be fo either by diffufion of parts, or without diffufion of parts. Here again there is no midd. We have already demonftrated that he cannot be pre- fent in all places by diffufion of parts; nor circumfcribed to
<a) By Poftulate 2.
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 71
one definite place ; therefore.he muft beprefent efTentlally, en- tirely, and indivifibly In all places without difFufion. The ab- folutely infinite, necejfTary, felf-exiftent being muft be omni- prefent, not ' becaufe abfolute neceffity' as Dr. Clarke fays, ' is always and every where the fame/ which feems to be no proof; but becaufe the indivifible, all-comprehenfive mind. jnuft be at all times entirely and equally prefent, both by the totality of his abfolute eflence, and by the perfed exercife of his attributes, to all beings whether material or fpiritual. This is incomprehenfible, but not impollible. We fancy it fuch only becaufe we imagine, that there is an infinite Ipace diftin^: from God, which hefiUs by local difFufion; and then it would be abfurd and contradictory to fay, that he is as much inan atom asin the whole of matter. For what Is entire- ly and locally in a part, cannot be at the fame time entirely and locally in the whole. When we think therefore of God's immenfity, we muft abftra<5t from all ideas of extenfion and difFufion, as when we think of his eternity, we muft drop all . ideas of fucceflion and time.
Some imagine they have clearer ideas of God's eternity than of his immenfity, of his unfucceflive duration than of his unextenfive exiftence: and that we may conceive how he knows and loves himfelf always by one permanent aft without fucceflion ; but that we can have no idea how he exifts entire- ly every where without extenfion. The realbn is, becaufe we have no adequate ideas of God's eifence, nor indeed of any o- ther fubftance whatfoever. So foon as we begin to imagine what SPIRIT is, we immediately extend and corporalize it. Immers'd in fenfe and drunk with imagination, we cannot
ji OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
imagine that to be a reality which is not extended; as children believe air to be an empty void or nothing, becaufe they do not feel or fee it: but when we rife above fenfe and bridle i- magination, we foon difcover that God muft exift without diffufion of parts, as without fucceffion of thoughts; and that there can be no phyfical relation between the properties of the eternal mind, power, wifdom, and will ; and the proper- ties of matter, divifibiUty, figurability, and mobility. We cannot fay a fpan of power, an ell of wifdom, and a yard of will. It IS true indeed that we exprefs very oft the attributes of fpiritby thefe of body, an high mind, a profound judg- ment, a foft heart; but then we fpeak only in a metaphorical, figurative way, and not in a phyfical, literal one.
The fchoolmen have miferably obfcured the doMne of eternity and immenfity by their dull, infipid comparifons. They conceive God's immenfity as a point, and his eternity as a moment. Pitiful jargon. So foon as we imagine the in- finite mind under any form relative to finite, whether it be a point or a moment; an infinite extenfion, or infinite fuccefii- on, we corporalize God, or humanize him. To fancy that he is contra<5lcd into a point, or expanded thro' infinite fpace, is degrading his nature. He exifts every where and always with- out extenfion and without fucceffion. This is all we fhould fay; and if we have departed from this fimplicity, it was ra- ther to confute error, than explain truth. The fimplefl ideas and the fimplefl cxprefilons are the beft, when we fpeak of the fimplefl of all beings; and the removing of all imperfec- tions by negative propofitions, is fafer than attempts by affir- mative ones to explain what is incomprehcnfible.
"Book t ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 73
COR. I.
Hence as there is a great difference between infinite time and the divine eternity; fo there is a total difference between infinite fjjace and the divine immenfity. Infinite fpace is an abflracl idea of the manner according to which bodies exift by extenfion. Divine immenfity is the manner by which God exifts without extenfion. To fay therefore that infinite fpace is the fenfory, organ, or medimii in which and by which God fees ail things,is an unintelligible and dangerous way of fpea- king. It is faying that the abftraft idea of a finite mind, is anabfolute attribute of the infinite mind.
COR. II.
Hence we muft neceffarily admit of two forts of fubflan- ces ; one that exifts without extenfion, and another with ex- tenfion : one that is prefent to all beings entirely, indivifibly, and effentially, to the part as to the whole. Another that exifts only by fucceflion and expanfion ; by parcels, additi- ons, and multiplications. Thefe two manners of exifting are quite contrary, and incompatible attributes ; and therefore muft belong to quite different fubftances. For this reafon we fliall call abfblute infinite for the future, mind, intel- lect, or spirit.
COR. III.
Hence if it can be proved that God has a creating power; then it is plain that he may produce two forts of fubftances quite different and diftin6t, one that exifts without extenfion, and the other with extenfion. The one immaterial, and the other material. The one muft be like himfelf, a fimple, un- compounded, indivifible effence; the other a compound of
K
^jf OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
many difFerent fubftances, which tho' contiguous and Cimi- lar yet may be divided and feparated ; yea the one may be an- nihilated, while the other exiils. And this is the firft diftinc- tion betwixt fpirit and body.
COR. IV.
Hence the idea of an extended, material fubftance, that is abfolutely indlvifible, unfigurable and immoveable, is a per- fect contradi(5lion. Matter may be undivided, but it is not in- dlvifible. It may be without any one particular, determinate figure we can imagine, but it is not unfigurable. It may be unmoved, but it is not unmoveable; for by its nature of an extended fubftance that exifts by diffufion of parts, thefe parts mull: neceifarily be fufceptible of figure, divifion and motion by a fuperior force capable to form, divide and move them.
COR. V. Hence the firft myftery of natural religion is that of the divine immenfity, or unextenfive exiftence : we fee that it muft be, but not how it is; this attribute is incomprehenfible but not impofTible. It is unconceivable, but it is demonftrable. Now when we have dcmonflrated that a thing muft be, we ought not to deny it purely and only,becaufe we cannot con- ceive it.
PROPOSITION IX.
The abfolutely infinite mind muft be in- finitely, eternally and eflentially adlve and pro- du^ive of an abfolutely infinite effc<5t.
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 7^
DEMONSTRATION,
Abfolute infinite contains all pofTible perfe<5Vion$ (a) : in- finite activity , or the production of an infinite efFeCl, is a fu- pream perfe(n;ion (b): therefore the abfolutely infinite mind mufl be infinitely, eternally and efTentially a<5live, and confe- quently produ<5tive of an abfolutely infinite efFefl; fince an abfolutely infinite caufe, a<5ling according to all the extent of its nature, muft neceffarily produce an abfolutely infinite ef" fed.
SCHOLIUM.
Men generally imagine that God is infinitely aClive, only becaufe he can produce innumerable beings from without, or difl:in(n: from himfelf; but unlefs this faculty be for ever reduced into a<5l:, it is not infinite a<5tivity, but infinite power. It is a real inaftion, tho' it fuppofes an infinite capacity of ac^ ting. Nowfuch ina(5live powers as ly dormant during a whole eternity in God, are abfolutely incompatible with the perfec- tion of the divine nature which mufl be infinitely, eternally, and efTentially active.
The Deifls, the Sabellians, the Unitarians, and the Soci^ nians, yea the great Sir Ifaac Newton, with his learned dif- ciple Dr. Clarke, maintain that all aftion is free, both in the firfl and fecond caufes. If this were fo, then God would be a<5live only by creation, he would not be aftive by efrence,he would not be neceffarily but freely active. They muft there- fore either fay that creation is eternal, or maintain that God was during a whole eternity, without any action at all. If
(a) D€f. 8. (b) Ax. 7,
K2
7(5 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
they fay that creation was coeternalwith the Godhead, then, as we fhall fhew prefently, it muft be confubftantial; thus they will become Spinofifts,and be obliged to alTert^that na- ture PRODUCED is a coeternal, confubftantial emanation of NATURE PRODUCING. A confequence which mu ft ap- pear very harfh to every fober mind.
Thefe authors will urge, that to ^S: Is to produce freely fomething that was not, and that therefore the idea of caufe fuppofes always priority of time to its effed.Thls is abfolutely falfe. Power, caufe, afbivity, and force Is what can produce fomething in itfelf or without itfelf freely or neceffarily. To defireor tend towards beatifying objects is no doubt an aflion of the mind ; now we defire and love what is beatifying ne- ceflarily, and not freely. Therefore we have the idea of an a<5tion that is neceffary and confubftantial with our efTence. Moreover, it is abfolutely falfe that the idea of caufe infers always priority of time to the effeS: produced. On the contrary, if the effect be neceffary, its coexiftence with its caufe is necef^ fary ; for caufe and efFecH: being relative terms, a necelTary, con- fubftantial efFc(5l muftexift at the fame time with its caufe. We may diftinguifh In fuch a<5ls a priority of nature or of caufali- ty to their cfFed; but not a priority of time or duration.
Since abfolutely infinite muft be infinitely, eternally, and effentially active, and llnce he cannot be eternally a<5tive froin without, or upon any thing external; he muft be eternally ac- tive from within ; and fince his effencc is Indivifible, and can- not ad by parcels, he muft be neceffarily, and Immanently ac- tive, according to the whole extent of his infinite nature. Now an abfolutely infinite agent thatadts according to ail the extent
Book L ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. jy
of its abfolutely infinite nature, muft necelTarlly produce in It* felf an abfolutely Infinite efFe6l; other wife the effed: would not be proportionate to the caufe; and fo the caufe would not 2.^ according to all the extent of its abfolutely infinite nature, which is contrary to the flippofition. Moreover, the produftl- on of an abfolutely infinite effect is a far greater peFfe(n:ion than the creation of any number of finite efFecls how great fo- ever; and therefore this immanent fecundity muft bean effen- tial, coeternal, confubflantial perfe^lion of the divine nature.
COR. I.
Hence abfolute infinite in his pure and folitary eflence, antecedent to all creation muft have produced within himfelf, an eternal, neceffary, abfolutely infinite efFed.
COR. II.
Hencean abfolutely infinite mind or intelligent fubjedfup- pofes an abfolutely infinite obje^ or idea known, otherwife it would be only an infinite capacity of knowledge, and not an in- finite underftanding that knows and poffeffes its objed.
P R O P O S I T I O N. X.
The abfolutely infinite efFe<5t and object of the abfolutely infinite mind can be no other than its own idea, image, or^eprefentation.
DEMONSTRATION.
An abfolutely infinite and infinitely a6live mind fuppofes an abfolutely infinite effed produced, and an abfolutely infi- nite obje(5l or idea known (a). God cannot produce any ab- folutely Infinite efFe6l from without, and confequently can haye no other abfolutely infinite object of his thought but himfelf or his own idea, image, or reprefentation (b): there-
(a) Cor. I. and 2. of Prop. IX. (b) Prop. V. and Cor. 3.
78 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
fore God's own idea, image, or reprefciitation of himfelf muft be the abfolutely infinite cficcl, and obje6t of the abfolutely infinite mind.
SCHOLIUM.
- The Deifts, Unitarians, and Socinians deny this eternal generation of the Wo r d, becaufe they do not fully enter in- to their ownfpiritual natures, to examine what paffes in them- felves. When we think, it is clear that the objecl of our thought is diftin(5]: from our thinking faculty ; otherwife we would think equally at all times, and have always the fame idea; fince we have always the fame powers. Our ideas are changeable and imperfe(5l modes of the mind; whereas God's idea of himfelf is a permanent, neceffary and eifential image, and not a free, accidental mode. All our fimple ideas are pro- duced in us by other obje6ls that a6l upon us, while we are altogether pafFive. Whereas this confubftantial idea of the di- vine mind, is not produced by any other obje6l diftin^l from itfclf. It is conceived from within, not received from with- out; it is produced, not perceived. We may therefore in com- paring abfolute infinite with finite fpirits, (which, as wefhall ftiew, are his living images ) diftinguifh in him the thinking fubjeft or the MIND conceiving; from the objefl of this
THINKING ESSENCE Or the IDEA CONCEIVED.
Some moderns will fay that intelligence is not a6tion, and that to know is not to produce. I anfwer that perception is not an a(51:ion; but conception is the highcft acH: of the under- ftandlng. To receive ideas, fcnfatlons, or modifications from obje(^s that a6t upon us, is purely pafUve. But to form or
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 79
create in the mind new ideas, is a real produ6lion. Wc do not form our fimple ideas ; we receive them from external ob- jecfls that a<5l upon us. God is impaflible and eternal, and Co cannot be aded upon by other objecHis. He does not per- ceive, but he conceives his eirential,confubfl:antial idea, image, or reprefentation ; he does not receive this idea from others, but he produces it in himfelf. We form our complex ideas by a fucceflive combining of our fimple perceptions. God forms his confubftantial idea by one unfucceflive acH:. Now this is the higheft and moft exalted of all activities and perfec- tions.
Spinofa never denied the eternal generation of an eternal, immanent, neceffary, confubftantial efFed in the divine mind; and he calls this effecl nature produced. But he con- founds the ideas of finite with the confubftantial idea of God; and the creature with the creator. Having learned from the fchoolmen, that all the ideas of finite exift eternally, necefta- rily and immutably in the divine Intelled 3 that all that is in God is God, and partakes of the divine attributes, he conclu- ded that all thefe eternal, immutable, neceftary ideas, or ef- fences of finites are living, active beings, and hypoftafcs that fubfift and inhere in the divine nature, from everlafting to e- verlafting; and confequently that the fuppofition of created intellip-ences diftinft from thofe ideas is ufeiefs and chimeri- cal. Thus according to him, the ideas and the objeds are the fame, and finite fpirits are not diftinft fubftances from God ; but coeternal, confubftantial, neceftary ideas or images, forms or expreftions, hypoftafcs or perfonalities, productions or e- nianations of the eternal mind. Thus the fchoolmen have
8o OF THE ABSOLUTE Book t
given occafion to all Spinofa's wild chimeras, and horrible blafphemics. Thcfe blafphemous chimeras can never be fo- lidly confuted, unlefs we overturn the falfe reafonings of the fchoolmen, and (hew that the ideas of finite do not coexift c- ternally, ncceflarily, and immutably in the divine mind; that they do not enter neceffarily into the generation of the Lo- G OS or confubftantial idea; and in fine, that they are free a(5ts of the divine underftanding. We muft however go on by de- grees, left we perplex fuch abftra6t, fublime truths with too much multiphcity. We have already remarked, that to pro-
duceONE ABSOLUTE INFINITE EFFECT or IDEA,isa
far greater perfecftion than to produce a collection of finite efFefts or ideas how great fo ever; and this one idea fuiHces to prove, that God's confubftantial idea is not the fum or col- le<5lion of all finite ideas ; as his fubftance is not the fum or collection of all finite fubftances. We beg our readers once more to go on, and this all fublime (peculation fhall be fully unfolded and demonftrated hereafter.
COR. I.
Hence abfolute infinite, in his pure, and foUtary efTence, antecedent to the produ(ftion of any finite ideas, is infinitely intelligent, felf-knowing, and felf-confcious; as well as infi- nitely active and productive of an eternal, immanent and ab- folutely infinite effect, object, or idea.
COR. II.
Hence this generation of the Logos, or of God's confub* ftantial idea, is fufRcient to compleat the perfection of the di- ■%'inc underftanding ; for an infinite mind can defire nothing
Book L ATTRIBUTES OF GOD, 8r
more to £11, enlighten, and fatiate it, than an Infinitely Infi- nite objed.
COR. iir. Hence all other ideas, thoughts, and conceptions that do not regard immediately the pure and abfolute elTence of God, and that do not enter neceflarily into the generation of the Logos, or the production of this confubftantial image, arc not necefTary to the perfedion of the divine underftanding.
cor. IV. Hence Intelligence or reafon Is acHilon, yea an aftlon of the higheft degree ; becaufe it fuppofes the produ(n:ion of new I- deas, or a new combination of Ideas already perceived. God conceived in himfelf the archetypal ideas, and we can form to ourfelve's abftrad ideas, as Ihall be fhewn hereafter.
PROPOSITION XI.
The eternal, permanent, confubftantlal Idea God has of himfelf, produces neceffarlly in him an infinite, eternal, immutable love.
DEMONSTRATION.
Infinite perfe(5lion known and enjoy'd produces neceila- rily infinite love (a); God knows himfelf infinitely, fince ab- folute infinite mufl be infinitely Intelligent (b): therefore the eternal, permanent, confubftantial idea God has of himfelf, produces necefTarily in him an infinite, eternal, and immu- table love.
(a) Ax. 8. (b) Cor. i. of Prop. X.
L
8i . OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
SCHOLIUM.
It is clear as funfhine, that fince the obje<^ and motive of
love is perfe<flion known, the greater the perfection is, the
greater the love muft be, or at leaft fhould be ; and therefore
infinite perfe<^ion known muft produce infinite love. I do
not fay that the greater a perfection is, the greater the love
for it is, fince a perfection may be great in itfelf, and yet not
known ; and what is unknown cannot be loved. Nor do I
fay that perfection known is the only motive of love, fince
pleafure felt may alfo be a motive of love. We may attach
oufelves to objeCts, either becaufe of the agreeable fenfations
they produce in us; or becaufe of the real perfections we dif
cover in them. It is therefore fure that perfection known
and enjoy'd produces love; whether that be by the fenfation
of pleafure that accompanies the view of perfection, or by the
natural empire that the knowledge of it has over the mind.
This we (hall examine afterwards.
Thus it is certain that antecedent to all communicative goodnefs toward any thing external, God is good in himfelf and juft to himfelf, as he is infinitely, eternally, and eflen- tially aaiveand intelligent; becaufe as he produces within himfelf an abfolutcly infinite efFeCt and Idea, fo he is infinite- ly, eternally, and efientially good and juft. Infinitely good, becaufe from the knowledge and enjoyment of his confub- ftantial idea flows an infinite fenfation of joy, an unbounded love,an unfpeakable pleafure,and an eternal felf-complacency, which conftltute his uninterrupted happincfs. Infinitely juft, becaufe it is this permanent love that conftitutcs his elTential
Book L ATTRIBUTES OF GOD- Bi
juftice; for by this love he renders to himfelf all that is due to his fupream perfeftion. He does not therefore want to create innumerable myriads of finite objects to exert his ef- fential beneficence and equity ; fince he produces within him- felf from all eternity one infinite objeft that exhaufts, fo to Ijjeak, all his capacity of loving, beatifying, and doing juflice. The Deifls, Unitarians, and Socinians, who deny the doc- trine of the Trinity, cannot explain how God is eflentially good and jufl, antecedently to, and independently of the cre- ation of finite; for God cannot be emanently good and juft, where there is no obje<5l of his beneficence and equity. If then he be elFentially, eternally and necelTarily good and jufl, he muft be fo immanently; he muft be fo in himfelf; he muft therefore find an infinite obje<5l within himfelf, to whom he difplays all his efTential love, beneficence and equity.
COR. I.
Hence God does not love himfelf becaufe he is happy, but he is happy becaufe he loves himfelf. He loves himfelf not by a blind infHn<fl, not in order to be happy; but becaufe he is infinitely perfe*^:: and this love makes his elFential hap- pinefs, goodnefs andjuflice.
COR. II.
Hence God would have been eternally, effentially and necefTarily good and juft, tho' he had never created any be- ings diftin<n: from himfelf to beatify and recompenfe them.
COR. III.
Hence God's confubftantial love of himfelf is fufKcIent to compleat the felicity of his infinite will. Here all its mo- tions, tendencies and defires fix, concenter and reunite.
L2
84 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
Wherefore all other afts and produftions, that do not necef- farily flow from and enter into this confubftantial love, are not effential to the perfection of the divine will.
COR. IV.
Hence if God at any time creates or produces any beings diftinft from himfelf, he cannot love them but proportionab- ly as they refemble him. For fince pcrfedion is the only mo- live and rule of his love, and (ince the perfe<5lion of all crca* ted effences, depends upon the refemblance they have to their uncreated original, it is plain that God can love nothing, but in fo far as it reprefents him or refembles him in fome degree or other.
COR. V.
Hence God loves himfelf neceffarily and all that he has made. His elFence is love.
LEMMA OF PROP. XIL
To compleat the idea of perfed felicity, there mufi: be an object loving as well as an objed loved.
SCHOLIUM.
Such is the nature of love, that it muft be communica- tive. Infinite love therefore muft be infinitely and neceffari- ly communicative. It muft have an obje(5t upon which it ex- erts itfelf, and to which it difplays itfelf ; into which it flows, and that flows back to it again. There is a far greater felicity in loving and in being loved than in loving fmiply. It is the mutual harmony and correfpondence of two dilHn<n: beings or perfons, that makes the completion of love and felicity*
BookI. attributes OF GOD. 8s
COROLARY,
Hence God could not have been infinitely and eternal- ly loved, if there had not been from all eternity, fome being diftind from himfelf,and equal to himfelf, that loves him in- finitely; fince, as we have fhewn(a), creation could not be coeternal, confubftantial, and necelTary to the divine nature,
PROPOSITION XII.
The eternal, infinite, and immutable love, which proceeds from the idea God has of him- felf, is not a fimple attribute, mode, or perfec- tion of the divine mind ; but a living, a<5tive, confubftantial, intelligent being or agent. DEMONSTRATION. To compleat the idea of perfe<51: felicity, there mufl be an objefl loving, as well as an objeft loved(b); God could not have been infinitely and eternally loved, if there had not been from all eternity, fome being diftina from himfelf, and equal to himfelf that loved him infinitely (c) : therefore the eter- nal, infinite, and immutable love which proceeds from the idea God has of himfelf, is not a fimple attribute, mode, or perfection of the divine mind; but a living, active, confub- ftantial, intelligent being or agent.
SCHOLIUM.
As it is neceffary to compleat the idea of perfect know-
(a) Cor. 3. of Prop. V. (b) By the preceeding Lemma of Prop. XII.
Cc) By CoroU. of the fame Lemma.
B6 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
ledge, that there be a fubje<5l knowing, and an objea known, £o it is necelTary to compleat the idea of perfeiH: felicity, that there be a fubjeft loving, and an objed loved. As God ex- erts his infinite aftivity, by producing necelTarily, and eter- nally within himfelf, one infinite idea or image, fo he ex- haufts all his communicative goodnefs, and all his capacity of love, by producing neceflarily and eternally within him- felf, a fubjeft that loves him infinitely, according to all the extent of his boundlefs perfeftion.
It may be objedled here, that tho' we fliould fuppofe no third being or hypoftafis in the divine nature, yet the gene- ration of the Logos alone, would furnifh an infinite, eter- nal, confubftantial agent, to be the objeft of the divine know- ledge, and the fubjeft of the divine love; fo that God by the fole exiftence of the Son, would be eternally, necelTarily, and Infinitely loved as he loves. I anfwer, that if fuper natural revelation had not taught us, that there is a triplicity in the divine nature, we would naturally have ftopt at a duality, and could have gone no further. For this reafon it is, that fome ancient hereticks denied the perlbnality of the Holy Ghoft. We do not pretend to prove the do<5lrine of the Trinity by reafon, but to ihew fimply, that if it be truly reveal'd, it is not contradi(ftory to reafon.
It is by this eternal generation of the Logos, that the fource and fountain of the Deity communicates all his per- fedions to his confubftantial image; and it is by this everlaf- ting proceffion of the Holy Ghoft from both, that God, fo to fpcak, returns into himfelf again, by concentering in this living image all his love and affedions. Without thefe two
Book L ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. Sy
immanent zS:s, and emanations in the Godhead, the Eternal Mind, in his folitary and abfokite efTence, would neither be infinitely produ(5live, nor infinitely loved.
The ignorance of thefe great principles make fome per- fons, that have a facred horror againft Deifm and Unitaria- nifiii, fancy, that creation mufi: be eternal, othervi^ife God could not have had an objed: whereupon to difplay his infinite atfti- vity and beneficence. This idea is manifeftlyfalfe for the three following reafons; i. If with out creation God had not an ob- je^ to difplay his effential beneficence and fecundity, then creation was not only eternal but neceffary, fince God could not have been infinitely active and loved withoutit. Itmuftnot be a free produ(5lion of his arbitrary will, but a neceffary ema- nation of his effence; and therefore confubflrantial ; fince no- thing can be eternal and neceffary but what is abfolutely in- finite; and nothing can be abfolutely infinite but the divine fubflance. 2. If God witliout creation had no adequate ob- jeft of his atftivity and love, then he could never have any ;be- caufe he can never create an abfolutc infinite without him- felf ; and fo the obj eds of his fecundity and beneficence would always be infinitely inferior to his creating energy. Thus he could never find from without, an ohjcS: equal to his effenti- al, neceffary activity and beneficence. He could neither love infinitely nor be loved fo. 3. As it is more perfect to produce one infinitely infinite effe^, than any number of finites how great foever; fo it is infinitely more beneficent to beatify one infinitely infinite object, than any number of finites how vafl foever. The effential, immanent, eternal, neceffary activity and beneficence of the fupream mind is thcrcfgre infinitely
88 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
more difplay'd by the generation of the Logos, and procef- fion of the Holy Ghoft, equal to the Father in all things, felf-origination only excepted, than by the creation and bea- tification of numberlefs worlds, which are ftill finite.
It is evident therefore from the four prec ceding propofl- tions, that we may reprefent the divine efTence, under thefe three notions,as an INFINITELY active MiNDthatcon- ceives; or as an INFINITE idea that is the obje<5l of this conception; or as an infinite love that proceeds from chis idea: the Eternal Mind produces neceffarily in itfelf, the idea of itfelf. This idea is not like our free, floating, falfe ideas; but is a neceflary, permanent, true idea. From this idea known, poffeffed and enjoy'd, flow or proceed not in- conftant, bounded, accidental defires like ours ; but an elfen- tial, immutable, infinite love. There are three, there can be but three; and all that we can conceive of the Infinite Mind maybe reduced to thefe three; infinite life, light, and
LOVE.
This is not all ; revelation fuperadds to thefe natural ideas what reafon could never difcover. It is this, that thefe three diftiniftions in the Godhead, mind conceiving, idea conceived, and love proceeding from both, are not three fimple attri- butes, or modalities, or powers, but three diftin<5l principles of adion. The confubftantial image and the coefTential love, are not only eternal a6ls, but diftinft agents, that fubfift and 0.S: in the eternal cfFence, as if they were really three different, hidcpendent minds ;tho' they are not fo.They are hypoftafes, inhercncies, and emanations of the abfolutely infinite mind, whofc metaphyfical nature we cannot define. They are real
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. S9
agents, beings, and living principles of aa:Ion, diftlna from their fource; fo that God is known by the one and loved by the other,asif they were really diftind fubftances. This is the myftery. Idea and love, or which is the fame, wifdom and goodnefs, truth and jnftlce, which in finite beings are fimple modalitys, powers, or virtues, are in the abfolutely infinite mind, felf-confcious agents, intelligent beings, or real perfo- nalities. We do not know enough of the intimate nature of things, and efpecially of the eternal uncreated effence, to deny that this is poflible. And if this is poffible, all our bufi- nefs is to examine if this be reveal'd. Now that this is pof- fible feems evident from the following reflexions that have been already demonftrated, or that are felf-evident truths.
1. God being infinitely, eternally, and eifentially adive, he muft produce eternally and necelfarily within himfelf an infinite efFed, objed, idea or image of himfelf This confub- ftantial idea muft be a living principle of acftion, a permanent, ever-fubfiftent, fubftantial idea; and not a tranfient, variable modality ; otherwife God's effential aftivity would not pro- duce an effed: equal to its infinite caufe; and fo the caufe would not a<5t according to all the extent of its infinite na- ture, and fo would not be eifential; which is contrary to the fuppofitlon.
2. God's happinefs could not be infinitely infinite, if he were not loved by an abfolutely infinite objed. The perfec- tion of happinefs confifh in a mutual, reciprocal union be- twixt the object loved and the fubjeft loving, and therefore there muft be in God, befides his confubftantlal idea, a liv- ing, felf-confcious agent or principle that proceeds from the
M
5J0 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
union of the mind conceiving with the idea conceived. We have proved that God, without being eternally barren and ina<n:ivc, muft produce in himfelf, a living, confubftantial !• mage: juft fo we prove, that if God will be infinitely happy, and loved, he muft produce within himfelf an obje6t that loves him infinitely. He cannot be infinitely known but by the Logos ; he cannot be infinitely loved but by the Holy Ghoft.
3. The efFeds of God's immanent a6ls being coeternal, confubftantial, and coefTcntial, muft partake of all the divine perfection s;becaufe in God there can be no inequality, or dif- (imilitude. Moreover the divine eflence being fimple, uncom- pounded and indivifible, the infinite caufe muft communicate all his perfections, and all his fubftance to his coeftential pro- ductions, effects and emanations. He cannot communicate his fubftance by parcels. The immanent effecls of his imma- nent aCls muft be like himfelf, and equal to himfelf in all things, felf-origination only excepted. His ejuanant, created effects are, and muft be infinitely inferior to himfelf; they are not portions of his fubftance, but fimple productions of his power; more or lefs perfeCt, proportionably as they imitate or rcfcmble his perfections: but the confubftantial image, and the cocifential love, muft be compleat and total participations of all his cftence. This is incomprehcnfible, but this is not impofilble. We do not fee how this is, but we muft not de- ny it purely and only becaufe we cannot conceive it.
4, God's immanent aCls muft have a reality infinitely fu- perior to the aCls of finite. The eflfcCts of fecond caufes are only bounded, tranfient modes. The immanent eifcCts of the firft caufc arc eternal, infinite agents. Our ideas and
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. ^i
loves are only variable perceptions and pafHons; but God's confubftantial idea and love are permanent, active realities, in- dued with all the divine perfedions. Moreover, God's ema- nanta<n:s muftbe infinitely inferior to his immanent ones. The efFeifls of the firil: are real fubftances diftincft from God, but all finite in their kind, tho' of different degrees according as they adumbrate more or lefs his different perfeftions. God's imma- nent effe(5ts muft be abfolutely infinite agents, beings, or reali- ties, tho' not different fubftances ; becaufe, as we have fhown, there can be one only abfolutely infinite mind, that excludes all duality and plurality of fubftance. They are not three di- ftin<5t coeternal minds, becaufe this would infer a triplicity of fubftance; fince three diftinft intelligent fubflances would have three difl:in<n: felf-confcioufneffes ; and fo their actions might be feparated, and their effences be independent of each other. They are not three fimple attributes or modalities, becaufe they are dlftlnd intelligent principles, and felf-confcious agents. They muft therefore be three dlfHn^t beings, realities, fome- things, or perfons ; becaufe the idea of perfonallty includes that of an intelligent felf-confcious agent. The three perfons of the Trinity have the fame felf-confcioufnefs. They all exift:, and aft, in, by, and with each other ; fo that the aftion of the Father, tho' dlftinct, is never feparated from that of the Son or HolyGhoft: and this is what the Schools call circum-in-
CESSIOM.
The Nicene fathers made ufe of the word Hypoftafis, and the Latin church tranflated this word by Perfon, to Indi- cate that the triplicity which is In the divine nature Is not a fimple diftinftion of modes, much lefs of attributes, and far
M2
92 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
lefs yetof fubftances. But a fourth diftin^lion, that is more than the firft and fecond, and lefs than the third, and which therefore fuppofed Intelligence, A6l:ivity, and Self-confciouf- nefs; yet not fo as to conftitute three feparate minds. The words hypoftafis and perfonaUty were invented therefore, ra- ther to indicate what this triplicity is not, than to exprefs what it really is. It is neither of fubftances, nor of attributes, nor of modes. Thereisitfeems, a fourth diftin^lion in the Dei- ty unknown to finite, which we cannot comprehend till we fee God as he is.
The Deifts, Sabellians, Unitarians, Arians, and Socini- ans affert, that difference of perfons fuppofes neceffarily diffe- rence of fubflance. This is true in finites; but this may not be fo in abfolute infinite. Yea it muft be otherwife, fince we have demonftrated, that the two effecfls of God's immanent a6ls mull be like himfelf, infinite, eternal, confubflantial, in- telligent, and felf-confcious agents.
Spinofa had fome idea of the difl:in(5lion of perfonality in the Eternal Mind, tho' he applied it wrong. He main- tain'd, that finite fpirits are not fubftances diftinft from God, but coeternal, confubftantial, immanent ideas, hypoftafes, and inherencies of the felf-exiftent effence. Thus he fuppofed in NATURE PRODUCING an infinite number of bounded per- fonalities, words, and hypoftafes ; confounded God's imma- nent and emanant effefts, and God with nature: but ftill he had a notion of real perfonalities in the divine effence, or of immanent efFe6ls that are intelligent, fclf-confcious, diftind, and feparate agents.
The facred oracles make ufc of feveral different metapho-
Book L ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 93
ricalexprefTions to fignify thefe three perfonal diftln^lions In the Godhead, i. The infinitely active mind is what the original Hebrew text of the Old, and the Greek text of the New Teftament call THE eternal father, as felf-originated ; Infinite force, as producing an infinite efFe (51; EiTential life, as being the fulleft exercife of boundlefs aflivi- ty; Flaming center or Fiery fource, as emitting rays of coe- ternal light. 2. They name the infinite idea God con- ceives in himfelf, his only begotten son and living IMAGE; confubfbntial word or Mouth of God ; becaufe it is the full expreflion of his perfeftions ;eternaltruth or wisdom, becaufe it is the inexhauflible treafure of his knowledge; uncreated light, becaufe it irradiates his underftanding. 3. They call the unbounded love proceed- ing from both, spirit or breath of God's mouth, be- caufe it proceeds from the Father by the Son ; Infinite Juflice, becaufe this love renders to God what is his due; abfolute Goodnefs, becaufe this felf-complacency conftitutes the di- vine happinefs; Holy Ghost, becaufe this love is pure, un- mix'd, and fo conlHtutes God's unfpotted fanftity.
All thefe metaphorical expreflions are refpedively fynoni- mous to one or the other of thefe three perfonal diftin6lions in the Godhead, i. Eternal Father, Infinite Force, EfTen- tial Life, Flaming Center, or Fiery Source, are all fynoni- mous terms to exprefs the paternal property. 2. Only begot- ten Son, Confubflantial Image, Eternal Word, CoefTential Wifdom, Uncreated Light, are alfo all fynonimous to exprefs the properties of the fecond principle. 3. Breath of God's Mouth, Coeternal Love, Infinite Juftice, abfolute Goodnefs,
<;4 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
■ Holy Ghoft or Spirit, are alfo fynonimous to exprefs the per- fonal chara6lers of the thh'd principle. All that we can con- ceive of the abfolutely infinite cfTence maybe reduced to fome one of thefe three diftinfllons, realities, fomethings, beings, or pcrfonalities. There are three, and there can be no more.
The primitive fathers, in imitation of the facred oracles, make ufe of many beautiful comparifons and metaphors to ex- prefs the conceptions they have of this myilery. They con- ceive God the Father as the fource, fountain, and root of the Deity: the Son, as the raySjrivers, and branches that flow from him ; and the Holy Ghoft as an ethereal fluid, fubtilc fpiritor air, immenfe ocean, and everlafHng fruit, that proceeds from both, and flows back again into the firfl: principle. As the fame fubftance that flows from the fun, the fountain, and the root, conftitutes the rays, rivers, and branches; and forms by its reflux an uninterrupted circulation from the center to the circumference, and from the circumference to the center; fb the Father communicates to the Son and Holy Ghofl all his fubftance without divifion, diminution or partition, yea with- out confounding the incommunicable properties of paterni- ty, filiation, and proceflion.
We muft however allow, that all thefe beautiful metaphors both of the fcriptures and the fathers, whether they be taken from material or immaterial agents, are lame, defective and diffimilar ; as all comparifons borrow'd from finite muft be, when applied to infinite. They exprefs only a part of this boundlefs reality and incomprehcnfiblc myftcry. "1 he ideas of fource, ray, and reflexion ; of fountain, river, and ocean ; of root, branch, and fruit; of mouth, word, and breath ; of fire,
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 95
light, and air; as alfo of mind, idea, and love; of power, vvif- dom, andgoodnefs; of aflivity, knowledge, and happinefs ; of intelligence, truth, and juftice; of paternity, filiation, and proceflion; are intelligible in finite agents that exifl and a(fl by diffufion and divifion, by fuccefTion and variation; but thefe diftinftions become abfolutely inconceivable in an eter- nal, infinite effence that exifls and afts without diffufion, divi- fion, or limitation; that is immenfe in all places, and unfuc- ceflive in all times; where there is neither beginning, middle, nor end: Reafon proves that this myflery is poflible; Reve- lation afTures us that it is true; heaven alone can fhew us how it is.
The fchoolmen never fliew wherein the difficulty of con- ceiving this myftery confifls. It docs not ly in this, (i) that God is eternally, infinitely and effentially active within him- felf, antecedent to all creation from without; (2) nor in this, that an infinite age^t ading according to all the extent of its infinite nature, muft necefTarily produce an infinite cfFeft; (3) nor in this, that an abfolutely infinite mind fuppofes an abfolutely infinite obje<5l or idea known; (4) nor in this, that the fovereign happinefs of the divine nature confifls not only in loving itfelf infinitely, but in being loved Infinitely by an abfolutely infinite object diftind from itfelf; (5) nor in this, that thefe three diflindions are neither three feparate fub- flances, nor three independent minds, nor three fimple attri- butes; (6) nor in fine in this, that the immanent, neceffary, and eternal efFe<5ts of God's aftivity, of his underflanding and will, are and can be only two, his confubftantialidca, and co- effential love. All thefe fix proportions arc dcmonftrable,
^6 OF THE ABSOLUTE BookL
and have been demonfkated. Here alone lyes the incompre- henfible myftery, how thefe three diftinftions, in one eternal, indivifible, and uncompounded fubltance, can be three real, diftind, intelligent, felf-confcious agents and perfons. We do not fay that this is comprehenfible; but we deny that it is impoflible. All we pretend to demonftrate is, that this mylte- ry is not contradictory, not that it mufl: be, nor what is the manner of it. We demonftrate that the divine immenfity mull be without diffufion of parts, tho' we do not compre- hend how it is. We demonftrate that the Trinity may be, tho' we do not conceive it adequately. Both are myfteries, the one of natural, the other of revealed religion; but we cannot fhew the dUOMODO of either, otherwife they would be no more myiteries. We ought not however to deny them becaufe we cannot conceive them; for tho' feeing clearly be always a reafon of affirming; yet not feeing at all is never a reafon of denying.
The fchoolmen have mofl: mifcrably obfcured and per- plex'dthis myltery, by their definitions of perfonality. Hiey call it, contrary to the exprefs dodlrine of the Nicene fathers, fometimes, a relation; fometimes, a manner of fubfiftence; fometimes, a fubftantial form; and very often, an unintelli- gible fomewhat, that does not exprefs a diftinft, intelligent, fclf-confcious agent. When the Deifts and Socinians prefs'd them by the contradictions that foUow'd from thefe abfurd de- finitions, they would not recoil, nor change their barbarous, Arabick, and Ariftotelian jargon, that leads by turns to Sabcl- lianifm or Trithcifin; and fo cry'd out that itwasnecdlefs to form any ideas about this myftcry; that reafon could neither
Book L ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 97
prove its exiftence norpolTibility; and that all efforts to recon- cile reafon with faith are audacious attempts to fubmit faith to reafon. Thefe obfcurities, abfurdities, and contradicftions of the fchoolmen have engaged of late the Unitarians, Free- thinkers, and minute philofophers to maintain, that the doc- trine of the Trinity is a modern fidion, quite unknown not only to the Pagan philofophers ; but alfo to the ancient Jews. This is abfolutely falfe, as will fully appear in the fecond Part of this Work,where we fhall endeavour to fhew, that yelliges of this fublime truth are to be found among the Sages of all nations, times, and religions. This affertion will no doubt appear bold to men unacquainted with facred and profane antiquity: but we hope to give fuch clear proofs of it, as will cure all folid, fincere, difinterefted minds of their prejudices.
GENERAL COROLLARIES.
C O R. I.
Hence we may conceive in the divine naiture three real diftin6lions, and we can conceive no more; fince all that we can comprehend of abfolute infinite, is either mind con- ceiving, IDEA GONCEIv'd, or LOVE PROCEEDING
FROM BOTH. God felf-cxiftcnt; God of God; and God the Holy Ghofl:. Thefe three diftindions in the Deity are nei- ther three difHn<5t independent minds, as the Tritheifts al- Jedged ; nor. three attributes of the fame fubftance reprefen- ted as perfons, as the Sabellians affirmed: nor one fupream, and two fubordinate intelle^lual agents, as fome refined Ari- ans maintain : but three coeternal, confubflantial, coordinate perfons coequal in all thiligs, felf-origination only excepted.
N
j^8 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
COR. II.
Hence in talking of the three perfons of the bleffed Tri- nity we may fpeak of them as if they were three diftindl be- ings, agents, and powers, providing we mean neither more nor lefs by thefe expreffions, than three coequal, coeternal, confubflantialperfonalities, whofe operations arefo perfeiflly different, that the a6lion of the one, is not that of the other; tho' they all exift, fubfift and aft in, by, and with each other, in one indivifible fubflance.
COR. III.
Hence what conftitutes the formal herefy of fome great modern divines, is not their calling the three perfons of the Godhead three diftinft beings, intelleftual powers, and felf- confcions agents: but their maintaining that the Son and Ho- ly Ghofi: are fubordinate and free, tho' eternal produdlons of the divine mind, and that honour, adoration and love are due to thefe two only in a relative fenfe. This is a refined fort of Arianifm which reduces the fecond and third perfons of the Trinity to the order of creatures: for all that is free might not have been, andfo is neither neceffary nor confubltantial with the divine effence, and therefore not God but a crea- ture.
PROPOSITION XIII.
The generation of the Logos, and the pro- ccfTion of the Holy Ghoft, or the knowledge and love God has of his pure and abfolute cflence are alone fufficient to compleat his infinite perfecti- on and happincfs.
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 99
D E IM O N S T R A T I O N.
The knowledge of abfolute infinite is fufficient to com- pleat the perfedion of the divine under[i:anding(a); the love of abfolute infinite is fufRcient to compleat the happinefs of the divine will (b) : therefore the knowledge and love of the pure and abfolute effence of God are fufHcient to compleat his infinite perfection and happinefs.
S C H O L I U M,
The reafon why variation, fucceflion, andever-increafing progreflion are neceffary to enlighten, and beatify finite, is not becaufe it loves change as change; but becaufe it cannot grafp infinite by one {ingle a<fl:, and becaufe it foon exhaufts every thing bounded. There is ftill fomething further to be defired and enjoyed; to be difcovered and known; to be ad- mired and loved. Whereas God knows and loves himfelf without fucceflion. His infinite underflanding is commen- furate to its infinite obje^; which offers him flill the fame boundlefs felicity, and all the three are equal to each other. Now it were a contradiction to fuppofe, that an infinite mind could know more than an infinite object, and enjoy more than an infinite happinefs. In this eternal intercourfe, and communication among the perfons of the facred Trinity, God employs a whole eternity without beginning and without end. This is the central abyfs of the pure and abfolute effence of God; his ftill eternity and his eternal folitude; wherein he hears nothing but his confubftantial word, he fees nothing but his coefTential image, and loves nothing but his only be-
(a) Cor. 2. of Prop. X. (b) Cor. 3. of Prop. XI.
N 2
loo OF THE ABSOLUTE Book L
gotten Son. This eternal commerce of the coeternal three is the fecrct fund of the Deity, of which we can form no idea till we be loft and immerfed in our center, * fee light in * his light, and behold him as he is.' Then we fliall fee how the paternal mind conceives within himfelf the confubftantial image, and how from both proceeds the loving fpirit, by two permanent, immanent, coeternal a^ls, wherein no idea of mul- tiplicity, variation or fuccelTion can enter. All the archetypal ideas of finite; of nature material or immaterial; of created beings, and all their poffible combinations are free ads of the divine underftanding, as the produ<flion and beatification of finltes are free acts of his power and goodnefs. This we fhall fully dcmonftrate in the following book.
All thofe who are ignorant of the do(5lrine of the Trinity, of the generation of the Logos, of the proceflion of the E- ternal Spirit, and of the everlafting commerce among the fa- cred THREE, look upon God's ftill eternity, and folitudc, as . a ftate of inaction and indolence. For this rcafon Ariftotle fancy'd that the world was eternal in order to find a theater and object of the divine adivity and beneficence. The Deifts, the Arians, the Unitarians and Socinians, who did not know that God found eternally within himfelf, an infinitely infinite objed of love,andan infinitely loving obje6t, equivalent to and infinitely fuperior to all poffible multiplicity, thought as Arif- totle. The Arabian philofophers, and all the difciplcs of Ma- homet, who borrowed all their metaphyficks from afalfe co- py of Ariftotle, were alfo Unitarians ; and fo had no juft ideas of God in himfelf, nor of his pure and abfolute cfTcnee, with- out any relation to created nature. JHence Avicenna and A~ '
Book L ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. lor
verhoes fancy'd that it was a fufHcient fcene of acflivity, bene- ficence and love, for the Eternal Mind to revolve for ever the ideas of finite and all their pofTible combinations; to produce material and immaterial fubflances without number, and to govern an infinity of worlds and fpheres. The prcdeftinari- an fchoolmen about the thirteenth century, having adopted the Ariftotelian philofophy fpoil'd by the Arabians, dropt in- fenfibly into the fame dangerous idea, and revived this wild opinion, that the contemplation of finite and all its forms or modes enter'd neceffarily into the generation of the Logos. Spinofa, by natural confequence of this do^rinc, concluded j that the production of finite and all its modalities was the immanent proceilion of the Holy Ghoft. The predeflinari- an mythologifls believed that all the coUeftive ideas of finite coexifled eternally with, and were contained neceflarily in the confubftantial idea God has of himfelf. The Spinofifts reafon very confequentially from this falfe principle of the fatalift doctors, when they conclude, that all the colledivc ellences of finite coexift: eternally with and flow neceflarily from the infinite elTence. Thus the monflruous fchemes of predeftination, fatality and Spinofifiii, which have a fl rid con- nexion with each other, were hatch'd and brought forth by degrees, as fhall be fully unfolded in the next book; where we fhall fhow, that the independent felf-fufKciency of the Godhead e're created nature began, and the ineffable com- pletion of the divine perfection and felicity in the commerce of the eternal three, excludes all neceffary thought, vo- lition, and produ(5tion of finite, all eternal conception, and creation of what is bounded; and that this great principle is
102 OF THE ABSOLUTE Book I.
the foundation and corner-ftone of all true theology natural or fupernatural, and the fureft bulwark againfl Fatalifm, Spi- nofifm and Predeftinarianifm; as well as againft Dcifm, Aria- nilln, and Unitarianifm, which are the fix great and dange- rous errors we intend to combate in the following elfay. The nioft part of men, yea of philofophers and divines too, have no notion of God's filent and ftill eternity, antecedent to all ideas and produt^ion of finite. The proofs they give of the exifienceof a God, regard only that of a God creator, and be- atify er of finite; and not that of a felf-fufficient, independent caufe, whofe pure and abfolute effence has no necefiary rela- tion to finite ideas, or finite fubftances; and that might have fubfifled eternally without thinking of the one or creating the other.
COR. I.
Hence we have the effential difl:in(5lion betwixt finite and infinite fpirit. Created intelligences can never find within themfclves, wherewithal to fill their boundlefs capacities of knowledge, and quench their unfatiable thirft of felicity. They muft, fo to fpeak, go out of themfelves, and rife above thcmfelves to unite themfelves to abfolute infinite, therein to find the full completion of knowledge and happinefs.
COR. II.
Hence we have the true difference betwixt neceffary and free action in God; necefiiiry a^lion, as the generation of the Logos, and the procefiionof the HolyGhoft, is what flows efientially and eternally from his nature, and without which he could not be infinitely pcrfe6l or happy. Free action in him as the thought, volition, and production of finite, is what
Book I. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. loj;
he may do, or not do, without uiterefting the elTential per- fe(5lion and happinefs of his nature.
COR. III.
Hence the efFe<5ls of God's free ads cannot be eternal; for It is impoflible that an agent can be free to do or not to do, what he did from all eternity. To be free to a6l or not to a6l, fuppofes a time wherein the efFed was not yet produced. I do not as yet fay, that God's free acls cannot be eternal; this we fhall prove hereafter. All I advance is, that the efFe<5ls of his free ads cannot be coeternal with his effence.
COR. IV.
Hence the creation of finite cannot intereft nor augment the efTential happinefs and perfedion of the divine nature; o- therwife God would not be felf-fufficient. Theprodudion of numberlefs worlds can add nothing to his plenitude ; be- caufe all that he can produce without himfelf, is ftill infinitely inferior to what he pofTelTes within.
COR. V.
The knowledge of the pure and abfolute eflence of God Is alone fufHcient to compleat the perfection of the divine un- derftanding, and all other ideas, thoughts and conceptions are no ways neceffary to this perfection.
c o R. VI.
Hence the procefllon of the Holy Ghoft or the infinite, eternal, confubfbntial love God has for himfelf, is alone fuf- ficient to compleat the perfection of the divine will, and all finite beings, fubftances, efFeCls, and worlds are no ways ne- ceffary to his felicity.
END OF THE FIRST BOOK.
♦ 105
THE
PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES
OF
NATURAL AND REVEALED
RELIGION,
B O O K II.
OF GOD's RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES,
DEFINITIONS.
i.TiY an INFINITE POWER, I ni€an a Caufe that can J-^ produce whatever is poflible, or that includes not a contradi6lion.
2. By NECESSARY A CTION, I undcrftand what flows ef- fentially from the nature of a thing in all times and in all places,
O
jo6 OF THE RELATIVE Book IL
3. By SPONTANEOUS ACTION, I mean what is volunta- ry, whether that volition be free or neceflary.
4. By FREE ACTION, I mean what may be donc or not be done, and to which the agent is not determined by any ex- ternal conftraint, nor internal neceflity. It is purely contin- gent and and polTible.
5. By PROVIDENCE, I mean that infinitepower, wifdom and goodnefs, by which God employs, knows, and wills all the means neceflary to accomplilh his defigns.
AXIOMS.
1. * When a mode is produced, there Is a reality made ex-
* iftent which was not before,* and fo a paiTage from nothing to fomething.
2. What is inconceivable in the idea of creation is thispaf- fage from nothing to fomething.
3. * It is unbecoming the wifdom of an infinitely perfect
* being to change his will when the fame reafon of willing
* always fubfifts.'
4. ' God never forefees things but as they are, otherwlfe
* his knowledge would be falfe/
5. ' The fupream happinefs of all intelligent natures con- ' fifts in the knowledge and love of abfolute infinite.'
SCHOLIUM.
Spinofa defines a free being, ' that which afts by the folc
* ncceffity of its nature, and is determined by itfelf alone/
Book II. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 107
This is fpontaneous and not free a6tion. Spontaneity, as wc havefaid, is finiple volition without any foreign conftraint; but this may alfo be neceffary. Thus we love good in gene- ral, or rather defire pure happinefs and love perfeftion fpon- taneoufly, and yet neceffarily. We will it with pleafure, but we cannot do otherwife. This is an indeftruaible attribute of our elTcnce. Freedom is what we may will or not will. It is not only what we will without any foreign conftraint, but without any inherent necefTity of nature. We chufe it as good, real or apparent, but we might rejea it and chufe ano- ther equal or fuperior to it. NecefTity is what cannot be other- wife than it is, what flows inevitably from the nature of a thing ; what determines abfolutely and invincibly, fo that nothincr can hinder its production but the deftruftion of the agent. Spinofa confounds thefe three ideas of Spontaneity, Freedom, and NecefTity, without giving any reafon why he does fo ; and thus falls back into his general and ufual fallacy ; which is to fuppofe in his definitions what he is going to prove. He may, if he can prove it, deny Liberty, and fhew that it is a chimera: but to lay down this as a principle in a definition without any fhadow of demonftration, is a folly unworthy of a philofopher.
Hitherto we have confiderM God in his eternal folitude, e're he manifefted himfelf from without. We fhall now con- fider him with rcs:ard to finite, and examine thefe three per- feftions in him by which he produces, knows, and beatifies the creatures. The Spinofifts deny his creating power. The fchoolmen convert his foreknowledge into fatality. The Pre- dcftinarians blafpheme his communicative goodnefs. We fhall
O2
io8 OF THE RELATIVE Book IL
endeavour to lay down fuch principles in this Book, as may preferve from thefe three monftrous errors.
PROPOSITION XIV.
The creation of new fubftances is no more inconceivable, than the production of new. modes.
DEMONSTRATION.
In the production of new forms, there is a pafTage froni nothing to fomething (a) ; what is inconceivable in the idea of creation, is only this pafTage from nothing to fomething (b) : therefore the creation of new fubftances is no more incon- ceivable than the production of new modes.
SCHOLIUM.
Tho' we fliould fuppofe with Spinofa that God and nature are the fame; that the felf-exiftcnt being is the only fubftance; and that all things are confubftantial modifications of his e- ternal elTence; yet we can never explain the manner of this caufality, with regard to the continual changes, modes, and forms, that we fee in nature every day. When God a^s thus immanently upon himfelf to modify his fubftance, accord- ing to Spinofa, he produces fomething that was not before. Now this paftagc from nothing to fomething is equally in- conceivable, whether theeifeCts of the divine a6ls be fubftan- ces diftinCl- from God, or new modes of his own fubftance. The fame objection Spinofa makes againft emanant aClion,
(a) Ax. I. of this Book. (b) Ax. 2. of this Book.
Book II. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 109
or the creation of fubftances diftln<5l from God, returns up- on him againft immanent a6lion, or the produ^lion of modes in the divine fubftance. We have no adequate ideas of power. We fee evidently that there muft be fuch a thing in nature; but we cannot conceive how it a6ls, nor what connects the producing caufe with the produc'd effeS:. This pafTage from nothing to fomething, is and will be incomprehenfible, 'till we fee God as he is, and difcern how all things flow from him, necefTariiy or freely. Tho' the creation of new fubftan- ces however,be as conceivable as the produftion of ncwmodes; yet the idea of creating power is not the fame with that of mo- difying power; lincethe ideaof fubftance is not the fame with that of mode.
COR. I.
Hence we ought to allow that it is poffible to produce new fubftances as well as new modes ; becaufe the paiTagc from no- thing to fomething being equally inconceivable in both, if we allow the one, tho' we do not comprehend the manner of it, we ought not to deny the other, purely and only be- caufe we do not underftand the manner of it.
COR. II.
Hence our not comprehending how fecond caufes a(fl, is not a fufficient reafon for denying their a<5live power, as the not comprehending how the firft caufe creates is no reafon for denying his creating energy. Wherefore all the Malebranchi- an philofophy on this head feems falfe and dangerous, as fhall be explained hereafter.
no OF THE RELATIVE Book 11.
PROPOSITION XV.
Infinite power can produce new fubftan- ces as well as new forms.
DEMONSTRATION. It is poflible to produce new fubftances as well as new forms (a); infinite power can produce every thing that is pof- fible (b) : therefore infinite power can produce new fubflan- ces as well as new forms.
SCHOLIUM.
It Is certainly more perfect to be able to create than not; and therefore absolute infinite mufl: have this per- feftion; unlefs it be proved that the idea of creation is con- tradi6tory and impollible. Now fince we have fhown that the produ(5tion of new fubflances Is as poflible as the produc- tion of new modes, we mud afcribe this power to God ; other- wife we might conceive a perfe^llon which Is not included in the idea of abfolute infinite; which is a manifeft contradic- tion.
Here we mufl: fhun equally two fatal and capital errors. Some fancy that finite beings are mere modalities of the di- vine nature: others Imagine that creation is a participation of the uncreated efTcnce. The former confound the fubflancc of the Creator with that of the creature. The latter materia- lize the Deity; and both deny creation.
Spinofa who adopted the former opinion endeavours to
(a) Cot. I. of Prop. XIV. (b) Def. i. of this Book.
BookII. attributes of god. Ill
demonftrate ' that one fubftance cannot produce another ) and m order to prove this great principle, which is the foun- dation of all his fyftem, he lofes himfelf in a wild maze of ab- fl:ra61:,fubtile,fophiftical ideas. He reafons thus, ' There can-
* not be in nature two diftinft fubftances, that have the fame
* attributes. If two fubftances have not the fame attributes,
* they can have nothing in common, and if they have nothing
* in common, the one cannotbe the caufeof the other.' The laft proportion is equivocal, and the two former are abfolute- lyfalfe.
This fophift pretends to demonftrate the firft propofition thus, ' Subftances can be diftinguifhed only by their attri- ' butes or modes. If their attributes be the fame, they are dif- ' tinguiilied only by their modes, and fo they differ modally ' and not fubftantially.' Both thefe proportions areabfurd. It is abfolutely falfe that beings can be diftinguifhed only by their attributes and modes. There may be a third diftinfti- on; and that Is by their feparate and independent exiftence. Generical ideas are diftinguifhed by their different attributes, as fpirits, and bodies. Species are diftinguifhed by their dif- ferent modes. Thus wood differs from gold by the different configuration of its parts, tho' both be equally matter. Indi- viduals are diftingulflied by their feparate exiftence ; for tho' two pieces of mettal have the fame attributes, and may have the fame modes, yet they fubfift feparately and independent- ly of each other. Beings therefore may be dilHnguifhcd by their attributes, modes, and feparate exiftence. Wherefore tho' beings have the fame attributes, and the fime modes, yet they are diftinct fubftances, becaufe the one may cxift tho' the
112 OF THE RELATIVE Book 11.
others were annihilated. They may be the fame kind or [pe- des of fubftances, but not the fame individual fubftance. Be- fore Spinofa can eftablifh his principle, he muft prove that the threefold diftinftion of genus, Ipecies, and individual, is nei- ther founded in nature nor in reafon ; neither real nor poilible ; that all beings of the fame kind are the fame individual fub- ftance, and that to be the fame numerical fubftance, and the fame generical fubftance are fynonimous terms. This he proves no where. Thus the proof of the firlt propofition of his dark fyftem is abfolutely falfe.
His fecond propofition is ' that two fubftances which have ' not the fame attributes can have nothing in common.' He tries to prove it thus. * A fubftance is that which exifts in it- ' felf, and can be conceived by itfelf. Two fubftances that ' have different attributes exift in themfelves, and may be con- ' ceived by themfelves, and therefore the idea of the one does ' not involve the idea of the other, and fo they can have no- ' thing in common.' Here is a combination of abfolutely falfe maxims and definitions. A fubftance is not that which exifts in itfelf, and which may be conceived by itfelf. Neither is a mode always fomething that inheres in a fubftance, and that cannot be conceived without it. By thefe definitions he con- founds the idea of fubftance, with that of felf-exiftencc, and the idea of modes with that of effects. A fubftance is fome- thing that is the foundation of attributes and modes ; and a models a change made in a fubftance. Further, tho' two fub- ftances have different attributes, yet the idea of the one may involve the idea of the other and fuppofe it. Thus finite fub- ftances, and the infmitc fubftance have different attributes,
BookIL attributes of god. 113
yet as the former cannot exift by themfelves, their exigence involves and fuppofes neceflarily that of the lafl.
Spinofa's third proportion, * that when beings have no-
* thing in common the one cannot produce the other,' is alto- gether equivocal. If he means by ' having nothing in com-
* mon' that beings which have no relation to, no refemblance of, and no dependance one upon the other, cannot be confl- dered as caufes and effefts; this we grant. But if he means, that when beings have not the fame common attributes, powers, and perfections, the one cannot be the caufe of the other; this we abfolutely deny, and he never offers to prove it. Thus all his principles are the very matters of queftion, undemonftrated and undemonftrable. He pretends to geo- metrical reafbning, andmetaphyfical precifion; but he knows neither one nor the other. Hiere is a great diflperence betwixt the true art of afcending to firft principles, and defcendincr to their juft confequences, by a flrong, nervous, palpable and exaft chain of clear ideas; and the fubtile refinements of that baftard fophiitry, which pains and fatigues the mind, which fubtilizes to excefs, and which defh'oys at lafl all truth, by fpin- ning it fo fine, that it becomes invifible. Sound, folid, maf^ culine reafoning retains always a confiilence that fupports and nourifhes, while it enlightens the mind and inflames the heart.
Some of Spinofa's difciples, afham'd of his fophifms and falfe reafonings, have recourfe to another argument to prove his great principle: it runs thus. * When God creates there ' flow s either fomcthing or nothing from his effence to produce
* the created effeft. If nothing, how can nothing be a caufc? ' If fomething, then creation is an emanation of the divine
114 OF THE RELATIVE Book II.
' fubftance; which being indivifible, its aftion Is immanent, < produces nothing without itfelf, nor diftinft from itfelf.
* Thus the felf-exiftent being is the only fubllance, and all o-
* ther beings exift by, flow from, and inhere in this only fub-
* ftanceas confubftantial forms, hypoflafes, and perfonalities/
I anfwer in the firft place, that all thefe reafonings are foun- ded upon this principle, that we ought to deny what we can- not conceive. Now this is abfolutely falfe ; for tho' not fee- ing may be fometimes a reafon of doubting, yet it is never a reafon of denying. When God produces fubftances, there happens no change in his immutable eflence; but his almigh- ty will is accompanied with an efficacy which gives a real exif- tence to fomething that had none before. We have no ade- quate ideas of the nature of this caufality ; nor of the manner how it operates; nor of the connexion betwixt the caufe and the effect: yea we can have none till we fee God as he is, the intimate effences of things, and how they flow from him: but as we do not deny the producftion of modes, tho' we cannot conceive how they are produced, fo neither ought we to de- ny the production of fubftances, tho' we cannot comprehend how they are created.
I anfwer in the fecond place, that tho' we fliould fuppofe with Spinofa and the Spinofifts, that the ideas and the objeifts are the fame ; that there is no third fubftance betwixt God and Ipirits, called matter; that the extenfion, figure, divifion, and motion we imagine without us; are like colours, tailcs, fmells and founds; nothing but fenfations produced in us by the di- vine fubffance that a6ts immediately upon us ; yet it would be repugnant and abfurd to maintain that our fouls are fubltan-
Book II. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 115
tial forms of the divine mind. It is abfolutely impoflible that the fame infinite effence, which is, as we have demonftrated, all knowledge and all happinefs; all wifdom and all love; all intelligence and all juftice; all truth and all goodnefs, can produce in itfelfby neceffity of nature, living, a6tive, eternal, felf-confcious, intelligent forms and perfonalities that are full of ignorance and mifery; folly and hatred; error and injuf- tice ; falfhood and malice. It is impofTible that all the contra- dictory reafonings, painful fenfations, and irregular pafHons we difcover in others and feel in ourfelves, can be the modes of abfolute infinite, who is one permanent a6t, one infinite idea, one immutable love; without fuccefHon of thoughts ; without variation of forms; without any contradictory quali- ties, and without any fhadow of privation, negation or de- fect. When we fee therefore in nature finite, variable beings, we muft conclude that they are efFefts of the divine power, and not forms or modes of the divine cfTence.
As we muft deteft with horror the Spinofian blafphemy, which maintains, that nature produced is only an expanfion or modification of the divine fubft a nee; fo we muft alfb re- je<5l the error of thofe who affert that creation is a participa- tion or difcerption of the eternal eifence, which God erects into a fubftance diftincft from his own. This opinion attacks and deftroys the immateriality of the divine nature; for it fup- pofes that the infinite caufe contains and produces its efFe(5ts by evolution, as plants and animals contain and bring to light their feminal moulds. Thus we corporalize the uncreated effence. The fchoolmen feem to favour this opinion, when they fay that God contains the clTences of finite beings eml-
ii6 OF THE RELATIVE Book 11.
nently and virtually. This dark phrafe may be interpreted as if he produced them by emanation, edu6tion, extrapofition, or placing without what he once contained within ; and there- fore we have rejected from the beginning, this rafh, dange- rous, Arabian phrafe of the fchools as equivocal.
It is true that fome pious philofophers, to exalt our notiorr of fpirit, and fhew that it is quite different from, and fuperior to matter, pretend that the intelligent images of the Deity were not produced from nothing as the material pictures, and that when Mofes faid, that " God breathed into man the " breath of life," he meant that the foul was an emanation of the divine fubftance. This do(5trine deftroys the indivifibili- ty of the divine effence, and muft be rejected. The effential property of all created beings is that of non-exiftent: they were made exiftent, and tho' God has communicated to them greater or lelfer realities, powers, and perfecftlons ; yet they once were all equally nothing, before his all-powerful free action. They are neither inhcrencles, difcerptions, emana- tions or participations ; much lefs attributes or modalities of the indivifible elTence: but mere eife^ls of his power, that had neither real, ideal, nor modal exiftence before his arbitrary thought and free produdion; as fhall be demonftrated in the following propofition.
COR. I.
Hence, fince nature produced can neither be an emanati- on, nor a participation, a difcerption or an expanfion, an at- tribute or a modification of the divine effence; it is plain that it muft be compofed of fubftances, attributes, and modes dif- tinct from the producing caufe.
BookIL attributes OF GOD. 117
COR. II.
Hence father Malebranche Ipeaks very uncaiitloufly when he calls the creatures participations of the divine fiibftance. This indire(n:ly favours Spinofifm, contrary to his pious in- tentions. Yea the zealous anti-fpinofifl: Poiret himfelf goes too far when he mantains that fpiritual fubftance is an emanati- on, or participation of the divine nature in a phyfical fenfe.
COR. III.
Hence the divine creating energy is a myftery of natural religion, as incomprehenfible as omniprefence ; for fince cre- ation can neither be an emanation, nor a difcerption of the divine elfence, it mufl: be fome third thing of whofe metaphy- fical nature, and phyfical produ(5tion we have no diftln^l, clear, adequate idea. We fee on the one hand, that nature produced muft be diflin^l from the producing caufe : We fee on the Other, that abfolute infinite mufl: have a creating power: but we have not at prefent a third idea to connect thefe two, to fhew the influence of the creating ad upon the created ef- fed:, and explain the manner of the divine operation by which creatures pafs from nothing to fomething.
c o R. IV.
Hence nature produced, or created beings cannot fubfifl: for ever, but In two ways, either by a continuation of the fame creating energy, which gave them exiftence ; or by God's communicating to them, a ftability of exiftence which makes them fubfift for ever by themfelves: for fince they are not e- manations nor modifications of the divine effence, but fub- ftances dlftlnft from God, their eternal duration and confer^ vation muft either be dependent upon, or independent of the
ii8 OF THE RELATIVE Book II.
firft creating energy. They muft fubfift by the continued in- fluence of the firft caufe, or by a communicated ftability of exiftence.
PROPOSITION XVI.
God was entirely free to create or not to create.
DEMONSTRATION.
Free action in God is what he may do or not do without interefting the eflential happinefs and perfe<n:ion of his na- ture (a); the creation of finite cannot intereft nor augment the efiential happinefs and perfection of the divine nature (b): therefore God was intirely free to create or not to create.
SCHOLIUM.
It may be obje6led, that God in the excrcifeof hisa6livity, is always determined by the better and the beft; that it is better to create than not to create; and therefore God was necefilta- ted to create and even to create the beft. I anfwer in the firft place, that God has always a reafon for a6ling, and a reafon worthy of himfelf; but this reafon tho' fuilicient to determine him to create, yet is not neceflitating ; becaufe creation is not neccfTary to his perfcdion and happinefs. I anfwer in the next place, that God is necelFarily determined in his imma- nent a6ls, or in acting within himfelf, by the beft; but the beft is only the generation of his Word, and the procefli- onof the Holy Ghost : for in the fcale offinitcs there can be no MAXIMUM, nor optimum: no abfolute great, nor
(a) Cor. 2. of Prop. XIII. (b) Cor. 4. of Prop. XIII.
Book 11. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. n^
abfolute good; fince God can never create an abfolute infinite equal to himfelf. I grant indeed, that when God creates, he prefers always among all pofTibles, the plan that is moft pro- per to diiplay his power, wifdom, andgoodnefs: but then this neceflity is only moral, not phyfical; that is, God's free a6ls are always conformed to his attributes, but no ways necelTa- ry to his perfedion. All God's emanant ac^ls are free, becaufe their effefls are not and cannot be abfolutely infinite. They are good, and therefore worthy of his production; but they are not infinitely good, and fo not neceffary to his perfe(5li- on and felicity. On the contrary, his immanent zRs are ne- celTary, becaufe their effeifts are abfolutely the befl:, abfolute- ly infinite, and coequal to him in all things, felf-origination only excepted.
The Leibnitian fcheme, that God is obliged to create the beft, and that the univerfe in its totality is the beft, and moft perfe^ God could create, has been adopted for a decent cloak by fome fatalifls and predeftinarians. The fatal neceflity of the poets and fome old philofophers, to which God himfelf is fubje^ed, differs much from what the German philofopher calls the neceflity of the Sage, and is as dangerous as that of Spinofa. The lafl:, by reducing the Godhead to an infinite power, that zSis by neceflity of naaire without defign, choice, or final caufes, fl:rips God of all his moral attributes. This idea is ihocking, and immediately offends all wife, and up- right minds: as does alfo that notion of fatality which fup- pofes God himfelf fubjeded to it, without choice, or even con- trary to his will. The new Leibnitian fcheme oFfatality has none of thefe inconveniencics and abfurdities; but it makes
120 OF THE RELATIVE Book II.
God aS: as neceflarily as the creatures, as fhall be more fully unfolded hereafter.
COR. I.
Hence we fee the falfhood of one of the maxims of theSpI- nofian fcheme; which fuppofes that God is obliged by necef- fity of nature to produce all beings poffible with all pollible modalities, becaufe an infinite activity during an infinite du- ration muft necelfarily produce infinite effects, and fo extend to all poflible events and eflences. The principle is true, but the conclufion is falfe. An infinite agent, afting according to all the extent of its infinite nature, muft necefTarily pro- duce during an infinite duration, infinite efFe(5ls, but thefe ef- fe<fl:s are immanent not emanant. God's infinite activity is compleat by the generation of the Logos, and the procefli- on of the Holy Ghost. All other adts and effects are free, arbitrary, and no ways intereft the efifential happinefs and per- fection of the divine nature.
COR. ir.
Hence God's efTential, immanent activity, and his crea- ting, emanant power are not the fame. The generation of the Word is necefiary; the creation of the world is free. In the one, the effe<5t is equal to the caufe : in the other, the efFe^ is infinitely inferior to the caufe. Nothing can be added to the one, additions to the other may be continued without end.
COR. III.
Hence God can create nothing but what he loves, for be- ing independent and omnipotent, and perfectly happy origi- nally, we can fuppofc no original fenfe of mifery, nor any o-
Book 11. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD, 121
riginal natural idea of it, nor confequently any natural appe- tite toward what was not an object of any innate perceptive power or fenfe. His notion of mifery muft arife from feeing die ftate of finite beings, or be his voluntary invention of a prefervativeor medicine for them, to avert or cure fuch evils as they muft neceflarily be made liable to. Accordingly we fee in his creatures of the higheft orders; the more perfefl they are, and the lefs indigent through their firmnefs and ftrength of foul, the more they are fufceptible of love, friendfhip, and goodwill to others. But 'tis dread of danorer, fenfe of weak- nefs, fear about our intereft, fenfe of having fufFered through our weaknefs, which are the only fources of hatred, cruelty, or ill will.
COR. IV.. Hence God can create nothing but what he loves, for this aftion being free, he would not have exerted it, if it had dif- pleafed him ; and for the fame reafon it is, that God defires necelFarily the happinefs of all that he creates, becaufe it is impofTible to love a being, and not defire its well-being.
COR. V.
Hence God's communicative goodnefs or defire to beati- fy all intelligent beings was the fource, reafon and motive of God's creating them.
COR. VI.
Hence God cannot produce in the firft inftant of creation a being that hates itfelf, otherwife he would give it a will con- trary to his, and fo contradift himfclf ; yea he would render it miferableby its very exiftence, which would be the higheft cruelty. Wherefore true felf-love or the love of our being and
122 OF THE RELATIVE Book IL
well-being, is an eflential, infeparablc, indeftruftible proper- ty of all created intelligences.
COR. VII.
Since God's communicative goodnefs was the fource of creation, and fnice this communicative goodnefs fubfifls al- ways the fame ; hence it follows, that the fame reafon God had for creating freely from the beginning, fubfifts always to make him continue freely the exiftence of beings already cre- ated.
COR. VIII.
Hence there is no period in eternal duration wherein it can be faid that God could not create ; for fmce this aftion is free, he might have exerted it at all times. We are fure that he once began, but we cannot decide when he began.
PROPOSITION XVII.
God could not create from all eternity.
DEMONSTRATION.
Creation is an effea of God's free aft (a); the efFeasof God's free afls cannot be eternal (b): therefore God could not create from all eternity.
SCHOLIUM,
Dr. Clarke infmuates in his Demonftration of the being
and attributes of God (c) ' that the old Platonick notion a-
* bout the eternity of the world may be true ; that the will of
< God and his power of a6ling, being as eternal as his effencc,
(a) By Prop. XVI. (b) Cor. 3. of Prop. XIII. (c) See p. 28 and 33.
Book II. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 123
* the effeds of that will and power might be fuppofed coeval ' to the will and power themfelves; in the fame manner as
* li^ht would eternally proceed from the fun, if the fun were
* fuppofed eternal.'
I anfwer, in the firfl: place, that this inaccurate comparifon leads dire(5tly toSpinofifm, for fince according to the New- tonian philofophy, the rays of the fun are emanations of its elfence; this fuppofes that creation was confubftantial as well as coeternal with the Godhead, an immanent not an emanant aft, a necelTary effluence of the divine nature, and not a free effeft of his power. We are very far from fufpefting the Doc- tor of fuch an impious defign. We believe rather that he ad- vanced this paradox in philofophy to juftify his Unitarian and Arian notions, which fuppofe that God created freely from all eternity two infinite, fubordinate powers, which the Doctor called the Son and the Holy Ghofl. We have alrea- dy confuted this opinion.
I anfwer in the fecond place, that if creation was eternal, then there would be an eternal fucceflion paft, which is abfo- lutely impofTible and contradictory. For wherever there is a laft, there muft have been a firft ; and wherever there is a firft, there may be a laft. As we can never mount up in an eternal duration to the firft moment, fo neither can we de- fcend in an eternal duration to the laft. Whatever is fuccef- five, divifible, fufceptible of more or lefs, cannot be abfolute- ly infinite. Eternity and infinity fuppofe neceffarily a perma- nent plenitude where there can be no additions, fucceflions, diminutions or variations. An eternal duration paft is then a contradiftion in terms, as an infinite divifion exhaufted.
t24 OF THE RELATIVE Book II.
I anfwcrln the third place, that if God had created from all eternity, then God's creating power would be abfolutely exhaufted; becaufc an eternal exercifc of infinite power muft produce an abfolutely infinite effect: for this is multiplying an infinite duration by an infinite energy, which muft pro- duce an abfolute infinite, to which nothing can be added. Hence arofc the Spinofian error, that nature produced was abfolutely infinite as well as nature producing; that both are equally infinite, confubftantial and coeternal; and that God cannot produce any being but what is already exiflent.
I anfwer in the fourth place, that if creation were coeter- nal with God, then it mufl be confubllantial r for what is eter^ nal could not be free ; fince, as we have already remarked, it is impoffible that an agent can be free to do or not to do, what it did from all eternity. To be free to ad or not to ad fup- pofes a time wherein the efFed was not yet produced: if cre- ation therefore was eternal it could not be free, and if it was not free, it mufl; be neceifary, if neceffary it mufl be imma- nent, for nothing foreign to the divine nature can be neceffa- ry to it ; and what is immanent, muft be confubftantial. Thus we return again to Spinofifm. It may be faid, that as the ads or decrees of God's will concerning finite are free and yet e- ternal ; fo the ads and effeds of his power may be free tho* eternal ; and that the freedom of thefe ads does not depend upon their not being eternal, but upon their not being necef- fary to the perfcdion of the producing caufc. We anfwer, that it is abfolutely falfe that any of God's free ads with re- gard to finite are eternal ; for, as we fhall fhew very foon, God
Book II. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 125
was as free to think of finite ideas as to create finite fubflan- ces. We grant, that if God's ads about finite were eternal, there would be no evidence to prove that the efFe<n:s of thefe zS:s were not fo too: but as we have already faid, freedom and eternity are incompatible.
I anfwer in the fifth place, that to create is to produce fomething that was not before : now the eternal exiftence of fomething that was not before is a contradiflion in terms. I grant that there is no definite moment in eternal duration, wherein God might not have begun to create, but fince he began this aft could not be eternal. All confubftantial and immanent effects, tho' pofterior in nature, muft coexifl with their caufe, fince they flow necelTarily from its eifence: but free and emanant effefts mufl be pofterior to their caufc both in nature and time, becaufe creation fuppofes neceffarily the giving exiftence to fomething that had no exiftence before. If it be faid, that creation is not a production of fomething that was not before, but of fomething that might never have been; of fomething that is purely contingent and dependent; of fomething that is neither neceffary, nor felf-exiftent. We re- ply, that this realbning is what the fchools call petitio p R I N c 1 p 1 1 ; or, fuppofuig what is in queftion. We deny that what is eternal can be contingent, and free; we have fhewn that it muft be neceffary, immanent, and confubftantial with the Deity.
Some will fay, that it is impofTible to conceive how infinite power could remain eternally ina(5tive, infinite wifdom unin- telligent, and infinite goodnefs uncommunicative. We have already Ihewn that God did not remain thus ina(5tive, unintcL--
126 OF THE RELATIVE Book II.
ligcnt, and uncommunicative during his ftill eternity, before the worlds began, e're he had thought of any finite ideas, or created any finite fubftanccs. He produced, he contemplated, he beatify'd for ever and ever two infinite objects, by the generation of the Logos and the proccffion of the Holy Ghoft. It is thus that he was eternally, abfolutely, and neceffarily aftive, wife, and good, antecedent to and independent of all conception or creation of finite.
We muft therefore conceive an eternal duration wherein the only effects of God's immanent action were the generati- on of the Logos, and the proceflion of the Holy Ghoft. This is the ftill eternity, the adorable folitude, and the central a- byfs of the pure divinity, into which enter no afts about finite ideas, effences or fubftances ; no multiplicity, variation or fuc- ceflion ; and, as we fliall very foon fhew, no infallible prefci- ences or predeterminating decrees about finites and their ac- tions.
Tho' creation cannot be eternal, we muft not however think that God never exerted his creating power till about five or fix thoufand years ago; that then he fallied out of his eter- nal folitude for a moment to create a fmall parcel of beings, and that he recentred into it never more to exert his energy without hinifclf. This God has no where declared, and it is audacious in us to affirm it. It is pofilble that God's creating energy never ceafcd from the moment in which it began, and that it may be eternally produiflive and fruitful from without. As there is no definite period in eternal duration wherein he might not have begun to create, fo there is no determinate mo- ment in eternal duration wlierein he may not continue to ere-
Book II. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 127
ate ; and we Ihall Ihew hereafter that revelation fays nothuig to the contrary.
COR. I.
Hence in the creation of finite, tho' we remount never fo high, we muft always flop at fome beginning, antecedent to which there was nothing but the pure andabfolute eiTence of God, exchifive of all finite ideas, effences and fubftances, of all a£ls and efFeds relative to nature and creature.
COR. II.
Hence the Ariftotelian, or Platonick opinions about an c- ternal world real or intelligible may lead the incautious into Atheifm or Spinofifm.
PROPOSITION XVIII.
The duration of all created fuftances will be eternal.
DEMONSTRATION. It is unbecoming the wifdom of an infinitely perfe^l being to change his will, when the fame reafbn of willing always fubfifts (a) ; the fame reafon God had for creating freely from the beginning, fubfifts always to make him continue freely the exiftence of beings already created (b): therefore the du- ration of all beings will be eternal.
SCHOLIUM.
The Wife Man fully perfuaded of this great truth, aflures us that * all the works of God will be eternal,' the material as well as the immaterial world. It is true indeed that the irre-
(a) Ax. 3. of this Book. (b) Cor. 6. of Prop. XVI.
128 OF THE RELATIVE Book II.
oTilar and impcrfc<5l forms of fpirit and matter cannot be e- tcrnal, but their efTences will laft for ever. God does not ad by ftarts and fits; by capricioufnefs and fancy, without rea- fon. He is immutable in all his defigns, and never changes them unlefs the reafon of willing changes. The proofs of im- mortality drawn from the immaterial nature of the foul, are notfufficient; for tho' it cannot die as organical bodies do, by a dilTolution of parts; yet not being felf-exiftent, it may ceafe to be. Neither is it a demonftration of the immortal and eternal exiftence of the foul, that there muft be a future ftate of rewards and punifhments ; for tho' we ihall fhew that the eternal felicity of intelligences, was