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PERSONAL MEMOIRS
U. S. GRANT.
VOL. II.
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PERSONAL MEMOIRS
OF
U. S. GRANT.
IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. II.
NEW YORK: CHARLES L. WEBSTER & COMPANY,
1886
Copyright, 1885, £y ULYSSES S. GRANT.
(All rights reserved.)
MAY* 1967
Press of J. J. Little & Co., Nos. 10 to 20 Astor Place, New York.
70215G6001
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CONTENTS
VO L U M K II.
CHAPTER XL.
First Meeting with Secretary Stanton— General Rose- crans— Commanding Military Division of Missis- sippi— Andrew Johnson's Address — Arrival at Chattanooga 17-30
CHAPTER XLI.
Assuming the Command at Chattanooga — Opening a Line of Supplies — Battle of Wauhatchie — On the Picket Line 31-43
CHAPTER XLII.
Condition of the Army — Rebuilding the Railroad — General Burnside's Situation — Orders for Bat- tle— Plans for the Attack — Hooker's Position — Sherman's Movements...*.* 44-60
CHAPTER XLIII.
Preparations for Battle — Thomas Carries the First Line of the Enemy — Sherman Carries Missionary Ridge — Battle of Lookout Mountain — General Hooker's Fight 61-74
CHAPTER XLIV.
Battle of Chattanooga— A Gallant Charge— Complete Rout of the Enemy — Pursuit of the Confederates —General Bragg— Remarks on Chattanooga 75-88
IO CONTENTS OF VOLUME II
CHAPTER XLV.
PAGE
The Relief of Knoxville— Headquarters moved to Nashville— Visiting Knoxville — Cipher Dispatches — Withholding Orders 89-106
CHAPTER XLVI.
Operations in Mississippi — Longstreet in East Tennes- see— Commissioned Lieutenant-Genera l— Command- ing the Armies of the United States— First In- terview with President Lincoln 107-123
CHAPTER XLVII.
The Military Situation — Plans for the Campaign — Sheridan assigned to Command of the Cavalry — Flank Movements — Forrest at Fort Pillow — Gen- eral Banks's Expedition — Colonel Mosey — An Inci- dent of the Wilderness Campaign 124-145
CHAPTER XLVIII.
Commencement of the Grand Campaign — General But- ler's Position — Sheridan's First Raid 146-157
CHAPTER XLIX.
Sherman's Campaign in Georgia— Siege of Atlanta- Death of General McPherson — Attempt to Cap- ture Andersonville — Capture of Atlanta 158-176
CHAPTER L.
Grand Movement of the Army of the Potomac — Cross- ing the Rapidan— Entering the Wilderness— Bat- tle of the Wilderness 177-203
CHAPTER LI.
After the Battle— Telegraph and Signal Service- Movement by the Left Flank 204-216
CHAPTER LII.
Battle of Spottsylvania— Hancock's Position— Assault of Warren's and Wright's Corps — Upton Promoted on the Field— Good News from Butler and Sheri- dan 217-227
CONTENTS OF VOL UME II I I
CHAPTER LIII.
Hancock's Assault — Losses of the Confederates — Pro- motions Recommended— Discomfiture of the Enemy — Ewell's Attack— Reducing the Artillery 228-242
CHAPTER LIV.
Movement by the Left Flank — Battle of North Anna — An Incident of the March — Moving on Richmond — South of the Pamunkey — Position of the Na- tional Army 243-263
CHAPTER LV.
Advance on Cold Harbor — An Anecdote of the War- Battle of Cold Harbor — Correspondence with Lee — Retrospective 264-278
CHAPTER LVI.
Left Flank Movement across the Chickahominy and James — General Lee — Visit to Butler — The Move- ment on Petersburg — The Investment of Peters- burg 279-299
CHAPTER LVII.
Raid on the Virginia Central Railroad— Raid on the Weldon Railroad — Early's Movement upon Wash- ington— Mining the Works before Petersburg— Ex- plosion of the Mine before Petersburg — Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley— Capture of the Wel- don Railroad 300-325
CHAPTER LVIII.
Sheridan's Advance— Visit to Sheridan— Sheridan's Victory in the Shenandoah — Sheridan's Ride to Winchester — Close of the Campaign for the Win- ter . . 326-343
CHAPTER LIX.
The Campaign in Georgia — Sherman's March to the Sea — War Anecdotes — The March on Savannah — Investment of Savannah— Capture of Savannah 344-376
12 CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.
CHAPTER LX.
PAGE
The Battle of Franklin — The Battle of Nashville 377-386
CHAPTER LXI.
Expedition against Fort Fisher— Attack on the Fort — Failure of the Expedition — Second Expedition against the fort — capture of fort flsher 387-399
CHAPTER LXII.
Sherman's March North— Sheridan Ordered to Lynch- burg—Canby Ordered to Move against Mobile- Movements OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS— CAPTURE OF
Columbia, South Carolina — Sherman in the Caro-
linas 400-419
CHAPTER LXIII.
Arrival of the Peace Commissioners— Lincoln and the Peace Commissioners — An Anecdote of Lincoln — The Winter before Petersburg— Sheridan Destroys the Railroad— Gordon Carries the Picket Line— Parke Recaptures the Line— The Battle of White Oak Road 420-435
CHAPTER LXIV.
Interview with Sheridan — Grand Movement of the Army of the Potomac — Sheridan's Advance on Five Forks— Battle of Five Forks— Parke and Wright Storm the Enemy's Line — Battles before Peters- burg 436-453
CHAPTER LXV.
The Capture of Petersburg- Meeting President Lin- coln in Petersburg— The Capture of Richmond- Pursuing the Enemy — Visit to Sheridan and Meade 454-469
CHAPTER LXVI.
Battle of Sailor's Creek— Engagement at Farmville— Correspondence with General Lee— Sheridan in- tercepts the Enemy 470-482
CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. 1 3
CHAPTER LXVII.
PAGE
Negotiations at Appomattox— Interview with Lee at McLean's House— The Terms of Surrender— Lee's Surrender — Interview with Lee after the Surren- der . . ■ 483-498
CHAPTER LXVIII.
Morale of the two Armies— Relative Conditions of the North and South — President Lincoln visits Richmond — Arrival at Washington — President Lincoln's Assassination— President Johnson's Pol- icy 499-512
CHAPTER LXIX.
Sherman and Johnston — Johnston's Surrender to Sherman — Capture of Mobile — Wilson's Expedition —Capture of Jefferson Davis— General Thomas's Qualities— Estimate of General Canby 513-526
CHAPTER LXX.
The End of the War— The March to Washington- One of Lincoln's Anecdotes— Grand Review at Washington — Characteristics of Lincoln and Stanton— Estimate of the different Corps Com- manders 527-541
CONCLUSION 542-554
APPENDIX 555-632
INDEX 633-647
MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.
VOLUME II.
PAGE
Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, Engraved on Steel, by
Wm. E. Marshall Frontispiece
Map of Knoxville, Nashville and Chattanooga 23
Map of Chattanooga and Vicinity ■$?>
Map of the Battlefield of Chattanooga 65
Map of the Meridian Campaign in
Map of Bermuda Hundred 149
Map of Sherman's Campaign, Chattanooga to Atlanta 161
Map Illustrating Siege of Atlanta 173
Map of Wilderness Campaign 179
Map of the Battle of the Wilderness 1 89
Map of the Country between the Wilderness and Spott-
sylvania Court House 209
Map of the Battle of Spottsylvania 219
Map of the Battle of North Anna 247
Map of the Operations between the Pamunkey and the
James Rivers 257
Map of Central Virginia 261
Map of the Battle of Cold Harbor 267
Map of Richmond 309
Map of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign 330
Map of Sherman's March to the Sea 360
Map of the Nashville Campaign South 381
Map of Fort Fisher 389
Map of Sherman's March North 407
Map of Petersburg and Five Forks 441
Map of the Appomattox Campaign 457
Map of Jetersville and Sailor's Creek 471
Map of High Bridge and Farmville 475
Map of Appomattox Court House 487
Etching of McLean's House at Appomattox where General
Lee's Surrender took Place 488
Fac-simile of the Original Terms of Lee's Surrender as
Written by General Grant 496
Map of the Defences of the City of Mobile 520
Map of the Seat of War — 1861 to 1865 632
PERSONAL MEMOIRS
OF
U. S. GRANT.
VOLUME II.
CHAPTER XL.
FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON — GENERAL ROSECRANS — COMMANDING MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI — ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS — AR- RIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA.
THE reply (to my telegram of October 16, 1863, from Cairo, announcing my arrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to proceed immediately to the Gait House, Louis- ville, where I would meet an officer of the War De- partment with my instructions. I left Cairo within an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via Indianapolis. Just as the train I was on was starting out of the depot at Indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the
Vol. 11. — 2
1 8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
Secretary of War was coming into the station and wanted to see me.
I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent conversations over the wires the year before, when I was in Tennessee. Occasionally at night he would order the wires be- tween the War Department and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a conversation for an hour or two. On this occasion the Secretary was accompanied by Governor Brough of Ohio, whom I had never met, though he and my father had been old acquaintances. Mr. Stanton dismissed the spe- cial train that had brought him to Indianapolis, and accompanied me to Louisville.
Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after I left Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of Halleck's dispatches that I had better go to Nashville and superintend the operation of troops sent to relieve Rosecrans. Soon after we started the Secretary handed me two orders, saying that I might take my choice of them. The two were identical in all but one particular. Both created the " Military Division of the Mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and all the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River north of Banks's command in the south-west. One order left the department commanders as they
FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON,
19
were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and as- signed Thomas to his place. I accepted the latter. We reached Louisville after night and, if I remem- ber rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. The Secretary of War told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that occasion from which he never expected to re- cover. He never did.
A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giv- ing me the military news at the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of some of the campaigns. By the evening of the day after our arrival all matters of discussion seemed ex- hausted, and I left the hotel to spend the evening away, both Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and my- self having relatives living in Louisville. In the course of the evening Mr. Stanton received a dis- patch from Mr. C. A. Dana, then in Chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so.
As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly upon the government the propriety of a movement against Mobile. General Rosecrans had been at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, with a large and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with Bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on the defen- sive. But after the investment of Vicksburg Bragg's
20 PERSOXAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT.
army was largely depleted to strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the siege. I frequently wrote General Halleck suggest- ing that Rosecrans should move against Bragg. By so doing he would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay Chattanooga open to capt- ure. General Halleck strongly approved the sug- gestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war, had re- plied in effect that it was a military maxim " not to fight two decisive battles at the same time." If true, the maxim was not applicable in this case. It would be bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. I, however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn from Rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was over, when these troops could be returned. Rosecrans was ordered to move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege. Fi- nally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days afterwards Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free to return.
It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief the movement against Mobile. I
GENERAL ROSECRAXS. 21
knew the peril the Army of the Cumberland was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as con- stantly being strengthened. Mobile was important to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than artillery. If threatened by land and from the water at the same time the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its defence. Those troops would neces- sarily come from Bragg. My judgment was over- ruled, and the troops under my command were dissi- pated over other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the most service.
Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rose- crans was in trouble and required assistance. The emergency was now too immediate to allow us to give this assistance by making an attack in rear of Bragg upon Mobile. It was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent from every available point.
Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the Tennessee River, and through and be- yond Chattanooga. If he had stopped and in- trenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and the mistake of not moving ear- lier partially compensated. But he pushed on, with
2 2 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT.
his forces very much scattered, until Bragg's troops from Mississippi began to join him. Then Bragg took the initiative. Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army together at Chicka- mauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before the main battle was brought on. The battle was fought on the 19th and 20th of September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured. The corps under Major- General George H. Thomas stood its ground, while Rosecrans, with Crittenden and McCook, returned to Chattanooga. Thomas returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order. Bragg followed and took possession of Missionary Ridge, overlook- ing Chattanooga. He also occupied Lookout Moun- tain, west of the town, which Rosecrans had aban- doned, and with it his control of the river and the river road as far back as Bridgeport. The National troops were now strongly intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the Tennessee River behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and west, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain, and with Chattanooga Creek, for a large part of the way, in front of their line.
On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all the forces that could be
24 PERSOXAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
spared from my department to be sent to Rosecrans. Long before this dispatch was received Sherman was on his way, and McPherson was moving east with most of the garrison of Vicksburg.
A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. It would not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery still left with the Army of the Cumberland and the annihilation of that army itself, either by capture or demoralization.
All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the government up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the south side of the Tennessee River ; but Bragg, holding Lookout and Raccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of the Tennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. The distance between these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail ; but owing to the position of Bragg, all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by a circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country, increas- ing the distance to over sixty miles.
This country afforded but little food for his ani- mals, nearly ten thousand of which had already
COMMANDING MILITARY DI VI SI OX OF MISSISSIPPI. 25
starved, and not enough were left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick. The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across the country. The region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there — " on the lift." Indeed, the beef was so poor that the sol- diers were in the habit of saying, with a faint face- tiousness, that they were living on " half rations of hard bread and beef dried on the hoof."
Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without sufficient shoes or other cloth- ing suitable for the advancing season. What they had was well worn. The fuel within the Federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it was abundant. The only way of supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. It would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps.
If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not prob-
2 6 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
able that any of the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if followed by the enemy.
On the receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stan- ton sent for me. Finding that I was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where I was, and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. About eleven o'clock I re- turned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house, every person met was a messenger from the Secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see me. I hastened to the room of the Secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing- gown. Saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch. I immediately wrote an order assuming command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and telegraphed it to General Rose- crans. I then telegraphed to him the order from Washington assigning Thomas to the command of the Army of the Cumberland ; and to Thomas that he must hold Chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that I would be at the front as soon as possible. A prompt reply was received from Thomas, saying, " We will hold the town till we starve." I appreciated the force of this dispatch later when I witnessed the condition of affairs which prompted it. It looked, indeed, as if
A NDRE IV JOHNSON S A DDRE SS. 2 J
but two courses were open : one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured.
On the morning of the 20th of October I started, with my staff, and proceeded as far as Nashville. At that time it was not prudent to travel beyond that point by night, so I remained in Nashville until the next morning. Here I met for the first time Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee. He de- livered a speech of welcome. His composure showed that it was by no means his maiden effort. It was long, and I was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be expected from me in response. I was relieved, however, the people as- sembled having apparently heard enough. At all events they commenced a general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of it, was a great relief to me in this emergency.
From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville, that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that they could be held with the least number of men ; to Admiral Porter at Cairo, that Sherman's advance had passed Eastport, Mississippi, that rations were probably on their way from St. Louis by boat for supplying his army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to con- voy them; and to Thomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the wagon-road then in use back to Bridgeport.
28 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching Stevenson, Alabama, after dark. Rosecrans was there on his way north. He came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. My only wonder was that he had not carried them out. We then proceeded to Bridge- port, where we stopped for the night. From here we took horses and made our way by Jasper and over Waldron's Ridge to Chattanooga. There had been much rain, and the roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and from wash-outs on the mountain sides. I had been on crutches since the time of my fall in New Orleans, and had to be carried over places where it was not safe to cross on horseback. The roads were strewn with the debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thou- sands of starved mules and horses. At Jasper, some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport, there was a halt. General O. O. Howard had his head- quarters there. From this point I telegraphed Burn- side to make every effort to secure five hundred rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small- arms. We stopped for the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on. The next day we reached Chattanooga a little before dark. I went directly to General Thomas's headquarters, and
ARRIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA. 29
remaining there a few days, until I could establish my own.
During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. They pointed out on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon. If any of them had approved the move they did not say so to me. I found General W. F. Smith occu- pying the position of chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. I had known Smith as a cadet at West Point, but had no recollection of having met him after my graduation, in 1843, UP to this time. He explained the situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly that I could see it without an inspection. I found that he had established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood ; and, by rafting logs from the north side of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoons and road- way plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being there already. He was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing the boats for a third bridge. In addition to this he had far under way a steamer for plying between Chat- tanooga and Bridgeport whenever we might get possession of the river. This boat consisted of a
30 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT.
scow, made of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheel attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or factory.
I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying General Halleck of my arrival, and asking to have General Sherman assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, headquarters in the field. The request was at once complied with.
CHAPTER XLI.
ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA — OPENING
A LINE OF SUPPLIES BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE
ON THE PICKET LINE.
THE next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal inspection, taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the members of my personal staff. We crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the Tennessee at Brown's Ferry, some three miles below Lookout Mountain, unobserved by the enemy. Here we left our horses back from the river and approached the water on foot. There was a picket station of the enemy on the opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within easy range. They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our presence. They must have seen that we were all commissioned officers. But, I suppose, they looked upon the garrison of Chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of them except in self- defence.
32
PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
That night I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport — a cracker line, as the soldiers appro- priately termed it. They had been so long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a line over which food might reach them.
Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Ten- nessee, where that river runs nearly due west. It is at the northern end of a valley five or six miles in width, through which Chattanooga Creek runs. To the east of the valley is Missionary Ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more before reaching the Tennessee. On the west of the valley is Lookout Mountain, twenty-two hun- dred feet above-tide water. Just below the town the Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of Lookout Mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad passes this point, where the mountain stands nearly perpendicular. East of Missionary Ridge flows the South Chick- amauga River ; west of Lookout Mountain is Look- out Creek ; and west of that, Raccoon Mountains. Lookout Mountain, at its northern end, rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the sum- mit, where it ends in a palisade thirty or more feet in height. On the gently sloping ground, between
Vol. ii. — 3
34
PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farm- house, which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east.
The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across Chattanooga valley to Lookout Mountain. Look- out Mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in Lookout valley west, and on Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it useless to us. In ad- dition to this there was an intrenched line in Chat- tanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to Lookout Mountain, to make the investment complete. Besides the fortifications on Mission Ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front. The enemy's pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies could converse. At one point they were separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from which both sides drew water. The Union lines were shorter than those of the enemy.
Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below. Practically, the Army
OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES.
35
of the Cumberland was besieged. The enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the river the pass- ing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical supplies. The Union army was short of both, not having ammunition enough for a day's fighting.
General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered parts of the nth and 12th corps, commanded respectively by Generals How- ard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of the Potomac to reinforce Rose- crans. It would have been folly to send them to Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. They were consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to them. Before my arrival, Thomas ordered their CDncentration at Bridgeport.
General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops.
On the 24th of October, after my return to Chat- tanooga, the following details were made : General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march
36 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
up by Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry. General Palmer, with a division of the 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back road, until op- posite Whitesides, then cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear after he had passed. Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under General Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eigh- teen hundred of them, under General Hazen. were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout, down to Brown's Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that point. Smith was to march with the remainder of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river to Brown's Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge as soon as the crossing was secured.
On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridge- port and commenced his eastward march. At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, Hazen moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eigh- teen hundred brave and well-equipped men. Smith started enough in advance to be near the river when Hazen should arrive. There are a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at Chatta- nooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of
OPENING A LINE OE SUPPLIES. 37
Lookout. It was over this road Smith marched. At five o'clock Hazen landed at Brown's Ferry, sur- prised the picket guard, and captured most of it. By seven o'clock the whole of Smith's force was fer- ried over and in possession of a height commanding the ferry. This was speedily fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. By ten o'clock the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Look- out valley, was fortified and connected with the rest of the army. The two bridges over the Tennessee River — a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one at Brown's Ferry — with the road north of the river, covered from both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. Hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the af- ternoon of the 28th emerged into Lookout valley at Wauhatchie. Howard marched on to Brown's Ferry, while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped three miles south. The pickets of the enemy on the river below were now cut off, and soon came in and surrendered.
The river was now opened to us from Lookout valley to Bridgeport. Between Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry the Tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it. To get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled ; that is,
38 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.
pulled up by ropes from the shore. But there is no difficulty in navigating the stream from Bridge- port to Kelly's Ferry. The latter point is only eight miles from Chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road, which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountains on the south side of the river to Brown's Ferry, thence on the north side to the river opposite Chattanooga. There were several steamers at Bridgeport, and abundance of forage, clothing and provisions.
On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville for a good supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so long deprived of. Hooker had brought with him from the east a full supply of land transportation. His animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. In five days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeport and, with the aid of steam- ers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troops were receiving full rations. It is hard for any one not an eye-witness to realize the relief this brought. The men were soon reclothed and also well fed ; an abun- dance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerful- ness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. Neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. The weak and languid appear- ance of the troops, so -visible before, disappeared at
OPENING A LINE OE SUPPLIES.
39
once. I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspond- ingly depressing. Mr. Davis had visited Bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to be about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report. " These dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage. Possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his de- struction was only a question of time." But the dis- positions were not "faithfully sustained," and I doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to "sus- tain" them now rejoice that they were not. There was no time during the rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the South was more to be benefited by its defeat than the North. The lat- ter had the people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and prosperous nation. The former was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class. With the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have extended their territory. The labor of the country was not skilled, nor allowed to become so. The whites could not toil without becoming de-
40 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
graded, and those who did were denominated " poor white trash." The system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the. people poor. The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor. Soon the slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. The war was expen- sive to the South as well as to the North, both in blood and treasure, but it was worth all it cost.
The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of supplies. He appreci- ated its importance, and hastened to try to recover the line from us. His strength on Lookout Moun- tain was not equal to Hooker's command in the val- ley below. From Missionary Ridge he had to march twice the distance we had from Chattanooga, in order to reach Lookout Valley ; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made on Geary at Wauhatchie by Longstreet's corps. When the battle commenced, Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown's Ferry. He had three miles to march to reach Geary. On his way he was fired upon by rebel troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road was commanded. Howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking
BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE. 41
many prisoners. Leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to reinforce Geary. Be- fore he got up, Geary had been engaged for about three hours against a vastly superior force. The night was so dark that the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of the flashes of their muskets. In the darkness and up- roar, Hooker's teamsters became frightened and de- serted their teams. The mules also became fright- ened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded directly towards the enemy. The latter, no doubt, took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn. By four o'clock in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our " cracker line " was never afterward disturbed.
In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man killed and four or five wounded. The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry, cap- tured. In the night engagement of the 28th~9th Hooker lost 416 killed and wounded. I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a hundred.
After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our supplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see the situation of the pickets of the two armies. As I have stated, Chattanooga Creek comes down the centre of the valley to within
42 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRAXT.
a mile or such a matter of the town of Chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north westerly, and en- ters the Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout Mountain. This creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from the same stream. As I would be under short-range fire and in an open country, I took nobody with me, except, I believe, a bugler, who stayed some distance to the rear. I rode from our right around to our left. When I came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard the call, " Turn out the guard for the commanding general." I replied, " Never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went back to their tents. Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek, were the guards of the Confederate pickets. The sentinel on their post called out in like manner, " Turn out the guard for the commanding general," and, I believe, added, " General Grant." Their line in a moment front- faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which I returned.
The most friendly relations seemed to exist be- tween the pickets of the two armies. At one place there was a tree which had fallen across the stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing water for their camps. General Long- street's corps was stationed there at the time, and
ON THE PICKET LIXE. 43
wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform. Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commenced conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. He was very polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to General Longstreet's corps. I asked him a few questions — but not with a view of gaining any particular information — all of which he answered, and I rode off.
CHAPTER XLII.
condition of the army rebuilding the rail- road— general burnside's situation orders
for battle plans for the attack hook-
er's position — Sherman's movements.
HAVING got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position, I now began to look after the remainder of my new command. Burnside was in about as desperate a condition as the Army of the Cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged. He was a hundred miles from the nearest possible base, Big South Fork of the Cumberland River, and much farther from any railroad we had possession of. The roads back were over mountains, and all sup- plies along the line had long since been exhausted. His animals, too, had been starved, and their car- casses lined the road from Cumberland Gap, and far back towards Lexington, Ky. East Tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice. Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the nth of October. His instructions required
REBUILDING THE RAILROAD. 45
him to repair the road in his rear in order to bring up supplies. The distance was about three hundred and thirty miles through a hostile country. His entire command could not have maintained the road if it had been completed. The bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done. A hostile community lived along the road ; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the West. Often Sherman's work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distance away.
The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee River at Eastport, Mississippi. Knowing the difficulty Sherman would have to supply himself from Memphis, I had previously ordered supplies sent from St. Louis on small steamers, to be con- voyed by the navy, to meet him at Eastport. These he got. I now ordered him to discontinue his work of repairing roads and to move on with his whole force to Stevenson, Alabama, without delay. This order was borne to Sherman by a messenger, who paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe and floated over Muscle Shoals; it was delivered at Iuka on the 27th. In this Sherman was notified that the rebels were moving a force towards Cleveland, East Tennes- see, and might be going to Nashville, in which event his troops were in the best position to beat them there. Sherman, with his characteristic promptness, aban-
46 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
doned the work he was engaged upon and pushed on at once. On the ist of November he crossed the Tennessee at Eastport, and that day was in Florence, Alabama, with the head of column, while his troops were still crossing at Eastport, with Blair bringing up the rear.
Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the single track road from Nashville. All indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying Burnside's command in East Tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the same route. A single track could not do this. I gave, therefore, an order to Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge's command, of about eight thousand men, at Athens, and subse- quently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from Decatur north towards Nashville, and to rebuild that road. The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. All the bridges over these had been de- stroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. All the cars and locomotives not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. All bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur, and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and
REBUILDING THE RAILROAD. 47
Charleston and the Nashville and Chattanooga roads unite. The rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply the army. From Bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river supplements the road.
General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. He had no tools to work with except those of the pio- neers— axes, picks, and spades. With these he was able to intrench his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the enemy. As he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to Nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. He had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be found. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. When these were not near enough to the troops for protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. Black- smith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved up in like manner. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. Axemen were put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives when the road should
48 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
be completed. Car-builders were set to work repair- ing the locomotives and cars. Thus everv branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer except what the command itself furnished. But rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full capacity. There were no rails except those in use. To supply these deficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except ten. I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to points on the river and on the Memphis and Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the railroads except the Memphis and Charleston to Nashville. The military manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material. General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms ; the length of road repaired was one hun- dred and two miles.
The. enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against Burnside or were going to
GENERAL BURN SIDE'S SITUATION. 49
Nashville, went no farther than Cleveland. Their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at Washington, and, on account of our helpless con- dition at Chattanooga, caused me much uneasiness. Dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do something for Burnside's relief ; calling attention to the importance of holding East Tennessee ; saying the President was much concerned for the protec- tion of the loyal people in that section, etc. We had not at Chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a supply train. Rein- forcements could not help Burnside, because he had neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them ; hardly, indeed, bread and meat for the men he had. There was no relief possible for him except by ex- pelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and about Chattanooga.
On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about fifteen thousand troops, besides Wheelers cavalry, five thousand more, to go against Burnside. The situation seemed desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up. The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for the safety of Burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief. On the 7th, before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I
Vol. 11.— 4
50 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
ordered Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley. I directed him to take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them: to move the necessary artillery. But he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order. Nothing was left to be done but to answer Washington dispatches as best I could ; urge Sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and en- courage Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be relieved. All of Burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammuni- tion held out. He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held south and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his base and make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when the battle should begin.
Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon ; but from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. Burnside's suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. On the 14th I tele- graphed him :
" Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force will be ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest. If you can hold Longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing
ORDERS FOR BATTLE. 5 I
and falling back can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I will be able to force the enemy back from here and place a force between Longstreet and Bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to his supplies. Sherman would have been here before this but for high water in Elk River driving him some thirty miles up that river to cross."
And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as follows :
"Your dispatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With your showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment and save the most productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry Lookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. This favors us. To further con- firm this, Sherman's advance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton. The remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from Whiteside to Kelly's Ferry, thus be- ing concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley. Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only reach there on the 1 6th. This will bring it to the 19th as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until this time. I can hardly con- ceive of the enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing
52 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT,
for Kentucky. If they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will ascertain if they have started, and inform you. It will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from here ? "
Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th. That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. He was in a position threatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon, Sherman reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day.
My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival,* except the dates, which could
* Chattanooga, November 18, 1863. Major-General W. T. Sherman :
Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to Major- General Thomas. You having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with the South ; but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the result of our first effort is known.
I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to
PLANS FOR THE ATTACH.
S3
not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no special advantage to us now. Hooker was in- structed to send Howard's corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chatta- nooga; with the remainder of the command, Hooker
Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or thereabouts. U. S. GRANT,
Maj.-Gen'l.
Chattanooga, November 18, 1863. Major-General Geo. H. Thomas,
Chattanooga : All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not be- ing provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of Chicka- mauga ; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division in
54 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OR U. S. GRANT.
was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower pali- sades, and so get into Chattanooga valley.
The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so as to
readiness to move wherever ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simul- taneously with him as possible. The junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become neces- sary. All these troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or un- necessarily fired away. You will call on the engineer department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek.
U. S. GRANT,
Major- General.
PLANS FOR THE ATTACK. 55
threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like service on our right. His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley in the most expedi- tious way possible ; cross the latter valley rapidly to Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks.
To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at Brown's Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of Mission Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on- the ridge. There are two streams called Chickamauga emptying into the Tennessee River east of Chatta- nooga— North Chickamauga, taking its rise in Ten- nessee, flowing south, and emptying into the river some seven or eight miles east ; while the South Chickamauga, which takes its rise in Georgia, flows northward, and empties into the Tennessee some
56 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
three or four miles above the town. There were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the North Chickamauga River, their presence there being un- known to the enemy.
At night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each boat. A few were to land east of the mouth of the South Chicka- mauga, capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two banks of the river. The rest were to land on the south side of the Tennes- see, where Missionary Ridge would strike it if pro- longed, and a sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side to ferry over the main body of Sherman's command while those left on the south side intrenched themselves. Thomas was to move out from his lines facing the ridge, leaving enough of Palmer's corps to guard against an attack down the valley. Lookout Valley being of no present value to us, and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure Missionary Ridge, Hooker's orders were changed. His revised orders brought him to Chattanooga by the established route north of the Tennessee. He was then to move out to the right to Rossville.
Hooker's position in Lookout Valley was abso- lutely essential to us so long as Chattanooga was besieged. It was the key to our line for supplying
HOOKER'S POSITION. 57
the army. But it was not essential after the enemy was dispersed from our front, or even after the bat- tle for this purpose was begun. Hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past Look- out Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, and up to Missionary Ridge. By crossing the north face of Lookout the troops would come into Chattanooga Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the valley, and would necessarily force its evacua- tion. Orders were accordingly given to march by this route. But days before the battle began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action were all considered. The passage over the mountain was a difficult one to make in the face of an enemy. It might consume so much time as to lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they were more wanted. After reaching Chattanooga Valley, the creek of the same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be crossed. I was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep Lookout Moun- tain until we got through with the troops on Mis- sionary Ridge. By marching Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream, and re- crossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named time ; when in this new position, he would have Chattanooga Creek behind him, and the attack on Missionary Ridge would unquestion-
58 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT.
ably cause the evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on Lookout Mountain. Hooker's order was changed accordingly. As ex- plained elsewhere, the original order had to be re- verted to, because of a flood in the river rendering the bridge at Brown's Ferry unsafe for the passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all the troops together against Missionary Ridge.
The next day after Sherman's arrival I took him, with Generals Thomas and Smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed them the ground over which Sherman had to march, and pointed out generally what he was expected to do. I, as well as the authorities in Washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for Burnside's safety. Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one who did not share in this anxiety. Nothing could be done for him, however, until Sherman's troops were up. As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, Sherman started for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, I believe, from Kelly's Ferry. Sherman had left Bridgeport the night of the 14th, reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the above-described inspection on the morning of the 1 6th, and started back the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the impor- tance of time.
SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS. 59
His march was conducted with as much expedi- tion as the roads and season would admit of. By the 20th he was himself at Brown's Ferry with the head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division (Ewing's) was at Trenton, sent that way to create the impression that Lookout was to be taken from the south. Sherman received his orders at the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the following morning. News had been received that the battle had been commenced at Knoxville. Burnside had been cut off from telegraphic communications. The Presi- dent, the Secretary of War, and General Halleck, were in an agony of suspense. My suspense was also great, but more endurable, because I was where I could soon do something to relieve the situation. It was impossible to get Sherman's troops up for the next day. I then asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the morning of the 2 2d, and ordered Thomas to move on that date. But the elements were against us. It rained all the 20th and 21st. The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the pontoons in place.
General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander under Burnside, was at this time occupying a posi- tion farther up the valley than Knoxville — about Maynardville — and was still in telegraphic communi- cation with the North. A dispatch was received
60 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP V. S. GRANT.
from him saying that he was threatened from the east. The following was sent in reply :
" If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that our attack on Bragg will commence in the morning. If suc- cessful, such a move will be made as I think will relieve East Tennessee, if he can hold out. Longstreet passing through our lines to Kentucky need not cause alarm. He would find the country so bare that he would lose his transportation and artillery before reaching Kentucky, and would meet such a force before he got through, that he could not return."
Meantime, Sherman continued his crossing with- out intermission as fast as his troops could be got up. The crossing had to be effected in full view of the enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain. Once over, however, the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hills on the north side, and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountain or Missionary Ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the bank of the river. But when Sherman's advance reached a point oppo- site the town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, it will be remembered, had been concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march to join the troops on the south sideD His crossing was in full view both from Missionary Ridge and the top of Lookout, and the enemy of course supposed these troops to be Sherman's. This enabled Sherman to get to his assigned position without discovery.
CHAPTER XLIII.
PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE THOMAS CARRIES THE
FIRST LINE OF THE ENEMY — SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUN- TAIN GENERAL HOOKER^ FIGHT.
ON the 20th, when so much was occurring to dis- courage— rains falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown's Ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge ; news coming of a battle raging at Knoxville ; of Willcox being threatened by a force from the east — a letter was received from Bragg which contained these words : "As there may still be some non-com- batants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early with- drawal." Of course, I understood that this was a device intended to deceive ; but I did not know what the intended deception was. On the 2 2d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg was leaving our front, and on that day Buckner's division was sent to reinforce Longstreet at Knoxville, and another division started to follow but was recalled. The object of Bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some
62 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
way to detain me until Knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be returned to Chattanooga.
During the night of the 21st the rest of the pon- toon boats, completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in North Chick- amauga. The material for the roadway over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the Tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest.
Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress in Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations for his relief. I determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the Army of the Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th.
The position occupied by the Army of the Cum- berland had been made very strong for defence dur- ing the months it had been besieged. The line was about a mile from the town, and extended from Citico Creek, a small stream running near the base of Missionary Ridge and emptying into the Tennes- see about two miles below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, on the left, to Chattanooga Creek on the right. All commanding points on the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. The important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified and supplied with a proper arma- ment. Among the elevations so fortified was one to
THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE ENEMY. 63
the east of the town, named Fort Wood. It owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and Missionary Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. Fort Wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the enemy's line. On the morning of the 23d Thomas, according to instructions, moved Granger's corps of two divisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood commanding, to the foot of Fort Wood, and formed them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan on the right, Wood to the left, extending to or near Citico Creek. Palmer, com- manding the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and south-west. He supported Sheri- dan with one division (Baird's), while his other divis- ion under Johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved to any point. Howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre. The picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. At two o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. By this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position all that was going on. The signal for advance was given by a booming of cannon from Fort Wood and other points on the line. The rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occu- pied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. These too were carried before
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halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance guards. But it was not without loss on both sides. This movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to this time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. During the following night they were made strong. We lost in this preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were capt- ured. With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first day
The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only have been assured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I should have rested more easily. But we were doing the best we could for him and the cause.
By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a position to move, though one division (Oster- haus's) had not yet crossed the river at Brown's Ferry. The continuous rise in the Tennessee had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to cross ; but I was determined to move that night even without this division. Orders were sent to Osterhaus accord-
MAP
OF THK
BATTLEFIELD CHATTANOOGA.
Scale of Miles..
UNITED STATES FORCES CONFEDERATE "
Vol. ii.— 5
66 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
ingly to report to Hooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th. Because of the break in the bridge, Hooker's orders were again changed, but this time only back to those first ofiven to him.
General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as Chief Engineer of the Military Division. To him were given the general direction of moving troops by the boats from North Chickamauga, laying the bridge after they reached their position, and gen- erally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief engineer. During the night General Morgan L. Smith's division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the brigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the river. During this night also General J. M. Brannan, chief of artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the Army of the Cumber- land, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end of the bridge was to rest. He had to use Sher- man's artillery horses for this purpose, Thomas hav- ing none.
At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed out from the North Chicka- mauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each
SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE. 6 J
loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. The boats with their precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the at- tention of any one who could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of South Chickamauga. Here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket guard known to be at that point. The guard were surprised, and twenty of their number captured. The remainder of the troops effected a landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good results. The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from the north side of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the pur- pose. A steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. The rest of M. L. Smith's division came first, then the division of John E. Smith. The troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their position. By daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well covered by the works they had built.
The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was now begun. The ferrying over the infantry was continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, how- ever, as fast as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. By a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South Chick-
68 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT.
amauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades below, and all the infantry and artil- lery were on the south bank of the Tennessee.
Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. By one o'clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the course of Chickamauga River ; J. E. Smith next to the right and a little to the rear ; and Ewing still farther to the right and also a little to the rear of J. E. Smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come from that direction. A good skirmish line preceded each of these col- umns. Soon the foot of the hill was reached ; the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports. By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height without having sustained much loss. A brigade from each division was now brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand. The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that Lookout Moun- tain and the top of Missionary Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. But now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. Later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this,
SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE. 69
too, failed, and Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained.
Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at Chickamauga Station. All of Sherman's command was now south of the Tennessee. During the after- noon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded and carried from the field.
Thomas having 'done on the 23d what was ex- pected of him on the 24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his position. Howard, however, effected a crossing of Citico Creek and a junction with Sherman, and was directed to report to him. With two or three regi- ments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks of the Tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid. He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway put upon it. Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed.
While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker was engaged on the west.
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He had three divisions: Osterhaus's, of the 15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary's, 12th corps, Army of the Potomac ; and Cruft's, 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland. Geary was on the right at Wauhatchie, Cruft at the centre, and Osterhaus near Brown's Ferry. These troops were all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. These brigades occupied the summit of the mountain. General Carter L. Ste- venson was in command of the whole. Why any troops, except artillery with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, I do not see. A hundred men could have held the summit — which is a palisade for more than thirty feet down — against the assault of any number of men from the position Hooker occupied.
The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. Farther up, the ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. On the east side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging up it, connects the town of Chat- tanooga with the summit.
Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved
BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. J I
Geary's division, supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a crossing. The re- mainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. Osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross it. The bridge was seized by Gross's brigade after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. This attracted the enemy so that Geary's movement farther up was not observed. A heavy mist ob- scured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain. He crossed the creek almost un- observed, and captured the picket of over forty men on guard near by. He then commenced ascending the mountain directly in his front. By this time the enemy was seen coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing into their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. By eleven o'clock the bridge was complete. Osterhaus was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed and captured.
While the operations at the bridge were pro- gressing, Geary was pushing up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his front, and in face of the guns on top of the moun- tain. The enemy, seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by Cruft and Osterhaus. Soon these were up abreast of
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Geary, and the whole command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. By noon Geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper pali- sade to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek.
Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now made our line a continu- ous one. It was in full view, extending from the Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the base of Mission Ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to Chattanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper pali- sade. The day was hazy, so that Hooker's oper- ations were not visible to us except at moments when the clouds would rise. But the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. During the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Look- out all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for
GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT. 73
the time. At four o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable. By a little after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him. These troops had to cross Chattanooga Creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it, and by night the commander, General Carlin, reported to Hooker and was assigned to his left. I now tele- graphed to Washington: "The fight to-day pro- gressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of Mis- sionary Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at Chickamauga Creek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. Hooker reports two thousand prisoners taken, be- sides which a small number have fallen into our hands from Missionary Ridge." The next day the President replied : " Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here. Well done. Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside." And Halleck also telegraphed : " I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. I fear that Burn- side is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove fatal. I know you will do all in your power to relieve him."
The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had been sent to the North Chicka- mauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited
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in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of citizens. On the night of the 24th his division, hav- ing crossed with Sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain to the north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued to a late hour in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point.
CHAPTER XLIV.
BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA A GALLANT CHARGE
COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY PURSUIT OF
THE CONFEDERATES GENERAL BRAGG REMARKS
ON CHATTANOOGA.
AT twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give orders for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to encourage Burn- side. Sherman was directed to attack at daylight. Hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he still remained ; if he had gone, then to move di- rectly to Rossville and operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge. Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Mission- ary Ridge. As I was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further orders from me. The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day. Bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers — pre- sumably staff officers — could be seen coming and going constantly.
76 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, over which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. The problem now was to get to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on the point ; and back farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the first. Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held the hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of Mis- sionary Ridge ; Loomis along the west base, sup- ported by two brigades of John E. Smith's division ; and Corse with his brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. The ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith's troops were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west side. The troops advanced rapidly and car- ried the extreme end of the rebel works. Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located. The enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the position we had gained, but
BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA. yj
without success. The contest lasted for two hours. Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in this assault. Sherman now threat- ened both Bragg's flank and his stores, and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to strengthen his right. From the posi- tion I occupied I could see column after column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman. Every Confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was concentrated upon him. J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged up the west side of the ridge to the support of Corse's com- mand, over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the enemy. He lay here for a time, but the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. A few hundred yards brought Smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily re- formed, when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his intrenchments.
Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith from the position I occupied, I di- rected Thomas to send a division to reinforce him. Baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of Orchard Knob. It had to march a considerable distance directly under the eyes of the enemy to reach its position. Bragg at once commenced mass-
78 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT.
ing in the same direction. This was what I wanted. But it had now got to be late in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compel- ling Bragg to mass in that direction also.
The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain dur- ing the night, as I expected he would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hooker was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the de- struction above named. He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected from his forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it was to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge. But Sherman's condition was getting so criti- cal that the assault for his relief could not be de- layed any longer.
Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed Thomas to order the charge at once.* I watched eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made. The centre of the line which was
* In this order authority was given for the troops to reform after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying the ridge.
A GALLANT CHARGE.
79
to make the charge was near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by an interven- ing forest. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to General Wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. He replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. I told him to make the charge at once He was off in a moment, and in an incred- ibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before them towards Missionary Ridge. The Confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. Our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and Union troops went over the first line of works almost at the same time. Many rebels were capt- ured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher up the hill. Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued. The retreating hordes being between friends and pur- suers caused the enemy to fire high to avoid kill- ing their own men. In fact, on that occasion the
So PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position. Without awaiting further orders or stop- ping to reform, on our troops went to the second line of works ; over that and on for the crest — thus effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th * for this charge.
I watched their progress with intense interest. The fire along the rebel line was terrific. Cannon and musket balls filled the air : but the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition ex- pended. The pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the Confederate barriers at different points in front
* Chattanooga, November 24, 1863. Major-General Geo. H. Thomas,
Chattanooga : General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek. I have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in co-operation. Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road.
U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.
COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY. 8 1
of both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. The re- treat of the enemy along most of his line was pre- cipitate and the panic so great that Bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their flight.
Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a point above where the enemy crossed. He met some resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of Mis- sionary Ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. It was now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right and left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the movement before these dis- positions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. To Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished.
While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General Thomas with staff, General Gordon
Vol. il— 6
82 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
Granger, commander of the corps making the as- sault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which the entire field could be observed. The moment the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defences, I ordered Granger to join his command, and mounting my horse I rode to the front. General Thomas left about the same time. Sheridan on the extreme right was already in pur- suit of the enemy east of the ridge. Wood, who commanded the division to the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in the charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit. To the left, in Baird's front where Bragg's troops had massed against Sherman, the resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. I ordered Granger to follow the enemy with Wood's division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy had taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way. The enemy con- fronting Sherman, now seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also. Sherman, however, was not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received orders to pursue at day- light in the morning.
As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he directed his reserves, Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland, to push
PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES. 8$
over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chicka- mauga, and to move forward to Chickamauga Sta- tion. He ordered Howard to move up the stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow Davis at four o'clock in the morning. Morgan L. Smith was or- dered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still held. Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies. The rest of Sherman's com- mand was directed to follow Howard at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad towards Grays- ville.
Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the destruction of the bridge at that point. He got his troops over, with the exception of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock. Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the remainder of his command. At Rossville he came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were captured. Hooker's position during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, ex- tending east of the ridge. Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville.
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During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could hold out ; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside.
Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for the relief of Burnside the mo- ment the way should be clear. Thomas was directed to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. Grangers corps was to move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston, and up that to Knoxville, accompanied by the boat. In addition to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds of am- munition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in haversacks.
In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the Potomac, from the Army of the Ten- nessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland par- ticipated. In fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the Tennessee River so mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept together, under their respective com- manders, during the battle. Hooker, on the right, had Geary's division of the 12th corps, Army of the Potomac ; Osterhaus's division of the 15th corps,
PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES. 85
Army of the Tennessee ; and Cruft's division of the Army of the Cumberland. Sherman had three divis- ions of his own army, Howard's corps from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis's divi- sion of the Army of the Cumberland. There was no jealousy — hardly rivalry. Indeed, I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of this intermingling of commands. All saw a de- fiant foe surrounding them, and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was accomplished.
The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily than was expected by reason of Bragg's making several grave mistakes : first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops ; sec- ond, in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle ; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his impregnable position.
It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on Missionary Ridge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious differ- ence between Bragg and Longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the campaign against Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general.
86 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
I had known both Bragg and Longstreet before the war, the latter very well. We had been three years at West Point together, and, after my graduation, for a time in the same regiment. Then we served together in the Mexican War. I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionally subsequently. I could well understand how there might be an irreconcilable difference between them.
Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-in- formed man, professionally and otherwise. He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. A man of the highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army he was in fre- quent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his commanding officer infring- ing his prerogatives ; as a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect, even of the most trivial order.
I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg. On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. He was first lieu- tenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other duty. As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the quartermaster — himself
GENERAL BRAGG. 87
— for something he wanted. As quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his reasons for so doing. As company commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition called for nothing but what he was en- titled to, and that it was the duty of the quarter- master to fill it. As quartermaster he still persisted that he was right. In this condition of affairs Braoror referred the whole matter to the command- ing officer of the post. The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed : " My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with yourself ! "
Longstreet was an entirely different man. He was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he had the courage to maintain. He was never on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given.
It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knox- ville for the reason stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own military genius, and thought he saw a chance of ' killing two birds with one stone." On several occasions during the war he came to the relief of the Union army by means of his superior military genius.
$& PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF V. S. GRANT.
I speak advisedly when I say Mr. Davis prided himself on his military capacity. He says so him- self, virtually, in his answer to the notice of his nomination to the Confederate presidency. Some of his generals have said so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy.
My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanooga were as fought. Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did ; Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweep across Chattanooga Valley and get across the south end of the ridge near Rossville. When Hooker had secured that position the Army of the Cumberland was to assault in the centre. Be- fore Sherman arrived, however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River. The waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing troops upon it. For this reason Hooker's orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were originally.
Note. — From this point on this volume was written (with the exception of the campaign in the Wilderness, which had been previously written) by General Grant, after his great illness in April, and the present arrange- ment of the subject-matter was made by him between the loth and 18th of July, 1S85.
CHAPTER XLV.
THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE HEADQUARTERS MOVED
TO NASHVILLE VISITING KNOXVILLE CIPHER
DISPATCHES WITHHOLDING ORDERS.
CHATTANOOGA now being secure to the Na- tional troops beyond any doubt, I immediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, about the situation of which the President, in particular, was very anxious. Prior to the battles, I had made prep- arations for sending troops to the relief of Burnside at the very earliest moment after securing Chatta- nooga. We had there two little steamers which had been built and fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run. General Thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with rations and ammunition and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops. General Granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand men, was to start the moment Missionary Ridge was carried, and under no cir- cumstances were the troops to return to their old
§6 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. S. GRANT.
camps. With the provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, it was supposed he could hold out until Longstreet was driven away, after which event East Tennessee would furnish abundance of food for Burnside's army and his own also.
While following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the 27th, part of the time by the road to Ringgold, I directed Thomas, verbally, not to start Granger until he received further orders from me ; advising him that I was going to the front to more fully see the situation. I was not right sure but that Bragg s troops might be over their stam- pede by the time they reached Dalton. In that case Bragg might think it well to take the road back to Cleveland, move thence towards Knoxville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash upon Burnside.
When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the 27th, I saw that the retreat was most earnest. The enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with the exception of Cleburne's division, which was act- ing as rear-guard to cover the retreat.
When Hooker moved from Rossville toward Ringgold Palmer's division took the road to Grays- ville, and Sherman moved by the way of Chicka-
THE RELIEF OF KMOXVILLE. §1
mauga Station toward the same point. As soon as I saw the situation at Ringgold I sent a staff offi- cer back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas of the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start Granger at once. Feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the relief of Burn- side I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at Ringgold through the day to prepare for the return of our troops.
Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between East Chickamauga Creek and Taylor's Ridge, and about twenty miles south-east from Chat- tanooga. I arrived just as the artillery that Hooker had left behind at Chattanooga Creek got up. His men were attacking Cleburne's division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as to cover the retreat of the Confederate army through a narrow gorge which presents itself at that point. Just beyond the gorge the valley is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great many times in the course of the first mile. This attack was unfortunate, and cost us some men un- necessarily. Hooker captured, however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were left upon the field.
I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the mills and all
9 2 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT,
other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not to make any wanton destruction.
At this point Sherman came up, having reached Graysville with his troops, where he found Palmer had preceded him. Palmer had picked up many pris- oners and much abandoned property on the route. I went back in the evening to Graysville with Sher- man, remained there over night and did not return to Chattanooga until the following night, the 29th. I then found that Thomas had not yet started Granger, thus having lost a full day which I deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of Knoxville. Thomas and Granger were aware that on the 23d of the month Burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve days and during that time he could hold out against Longstreet, but if not relieved within the time in- dicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt to retreat. To effect a retreat would have been an impossibility. He was already very low in ammu- nition, and with an army pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies.
Finding that Granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, I sent word to General Sherman of the situation and di- rected him to march to the relief of Knoxville. I also gave him the problem that we had to solve — ■
THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. 93
that Burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, and that he must be relieved within that time.
Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his re- turn from Graysville, having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from Dalton to Cleve- land and Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these troops had not yet returned to camp. I was very loath to send Sherman, because his men needed rest after their long march from Memphis and hard fighting at Chattanooga. But I had be- come satisfied that Burnside would not be rescued if his relief depended upon General Grangers move- ments.
Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked ra- tions in their haversacks. Expecting to be back in their tents by that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them neither overcoats nor blankets. The weather was already cold, and at night they must have suffered more or less. The two days' rations had already lasted them five days ; and they were now to go through a country which had been run over so much by Confederate troops that there was but little probability of finding much food. They did, however, succeed in capturing some flour. They also found a good deal of bran in some of the mills, which the men made up into bread;
94 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
and in this and other ways they eked out an exist- ence until they could reach Knoxville.
I was so very anxious that Burnside should get news of the steps being taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if it became necessary, that I determined to send a message to him. I therefore sent a member of my staff, Col- onel J. H. Wilson, to get into Knoxville if he could, report to Burnside the situation fully, and give him all the encouragement possible. Mr. Charles A. Dana was at Chattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before I assumed command. Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson, and did accompany him. I put the information of what was being done for the relief of Knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or other it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the hands of General Longstreet. They made the trip safely ; General Longstreet did learn of Sherman's coming in advance of his reaching there, and Burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it had been necessary.
Burnside had stretched a boom across the Hol- ston River to catch scows and flats as they floated down. On these, by previous arrangements with the loyal people of East Tennessee, were placed flour and corn, with forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of the Union troops.
THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. 95
They also drove cattle into Knoxville by the east side, which was not covered by the enemy ; so that when relief arrived Burnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported.
Our total loss (not including Burnside's) in all these engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing. We captured 6,142 prisoners — about 50 per cent, more than the enemy reported for their total loss — 40 pieces of artil- lery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms. The enemy's loss in arms was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a great many that were found abandoned.
I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men. Bragg had about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable. It was his own fault that he did not have more men present. He had sent Longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command. He did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communi- cation by way of Brown's and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing full rations and supplies of every kind ; and also when he knew reinforce- ments were coming to me. Knoxville was of no
96 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
earthly use to him while Chattanooga was in our hands. If he should capture Chattanooga, Knox- ville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a struggle. I have never been able to see the wisdom of this move.
Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that he was on the north side of the Tennessee River, he sent Buckner's division to re- inforce Longstreet. He also started another di- vision a day later, but our attack having commenced before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered it back. It had got so far, however, that it could not return to Chattanooga in time to be of service there. It is possible this latter blunder may have been made by Bragg having become confused as to what was going on on our side. Sherman had, as already stated, crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River at Brown's Ferry, in full view of Bragg's troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before the attack. They then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of the troops on Missionary Ridge until they met their assault. Bragg knew it was Sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the Ten- nessee River to the relief of Knoxville and that Longstreet was therefore in danger. But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet, cannot be ac-
THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. 9 J
counted for in any way I know of. If he had capt- ured Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. It would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from Chattanooga safely. It was a manifold greater victory to drive away the besieging army ; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly annihilate it.
The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we were the attacking party. The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361 : but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. There was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they could. Then, too, Chattanooga, following in the same half year with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was much the same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in the North the fall and winter before. If the same license had been allowed the people and press in the South that was allowed in the North, Chattanooga would prob- ably have been the last battle fought for the pres- ervation of the Union.
General William F. Smith's services in these bat-
Vol. 11. — 7
98 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
ties had been such that I thought him eminently entitled to promotion. I was aware that he had previously been named by the President for promo- tion to the grade of major-general, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination. I was not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a major-generalcy. My recommendation was heeded and the appoint- ment made.
Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course, informed the authorities at Washington — the President and Secretary of War — of the fact, which caused great rejoicing there. The President especially was rejoiced that Knoxville had been re- lieved * without further bloodshed. The safety of Burnside's army and the loyal people of East Ten- nessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the President for several months, during which time
* Washington, D. C, December 8, 1863, 10.2 a.m. Maj. -General U. S. Grant:
Understanding that your lodgment at Knoxville and at Chatta- nooga is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command, my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless you all.
A. LINCOLN,
President U. S.
HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE. 99
he was doing all he could to relieve the situation ; sending a new commander * with a few thousand troops by the way of Cumberland Gap, and tele- graphing me daily, almost hourly, to "remember Burnside," "do something for Burnside," and other appeals of like tenor. He saw no escape for East Tennessee until after our victory at Chattanooga. Even then he was afraid that Burnside might be out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpow- ered : and his anxiety was still intense until he heard that Longstreet had been driven from the field.
Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some twenty miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that Longstreet would leave the State. The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a short distance farther on and sub- sisted his army for the entire winter off East Ten- nessee. Foster now relieved Burnside. Sherman made disposition of his troops along the Tennes- see River in accordance with instructions. I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and, about the 20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee.
Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my entire military division, and also with the authorities at Washington. While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my
* General John G. Foster.
IOO PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my command and Washington.
Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the winter,* so I set myself to the task of hav- ing troops in positions from which they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies so as to be ready to claim a due share of the ene- my's attention upon the appearance of the first good weather in the spring. I expected to retain the command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaign against Atlanta. I also had great hopes of having a campaign made against Mobile from the Gulf. I expected after Atlanta fell to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the West by way of the road running through Au- gusta to Atlanta and thence south-west. I was pre- paring to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to Mobile if
* During this winter the citizens of Jo Davies County, 111., sub- scribed for and had a diamond-hilted sword made for General Grant, which was always known as the Chattanooga sword. The scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the names of the battles in which General Grant had participated.
Congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at Chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for Vicksburg and Chattanooga. All such things are now in the possession of the government at Washington.
VISITING KNOXVILLE. IOI
that city was in our possession : if not, to Savan- nah ; and in this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy. But the spring campaign against Mobile was not made.
The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland Gap until their animals had nearly all starved. I now determined to go myself to see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring, and if not to abandon it. Accordingly I left Nashville in the latter part of December by rail for Chattanooga. From Chattanooga I took one of the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there, and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinch with the Tennessee. From that point the railroad had been repaired up to Knoxville and out east to Straw- berry Plains. I went by rail therefore to Knoxville, where I remained for several days. General John G. Foster was then commanding the Department of the Ohio. It was an intensely cold winter, the thermom- eter being down as low as zero every morning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on my way from there on horseback to Lexington, Ken- tucky, the first point where I could reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville.
The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of broken wagons and dead
102 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
animals, much as I had found it on my first trip to Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. The road had been cut up to as great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that condition frozen ; so that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains to Lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one, and very disagree- able.
I found a great many people at home along that route, both in Tennessee and Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. They would collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me, generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. The people naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in the party. I was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. The crowds would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of quietly dismounting and getting into the house. It also gave me an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another about their general. Those remarks were apt to be more com- plimentary to the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were all in after a hard day's ride. I was back in Nash- ville by the 13th of January, 1864.
CIPHER DISPATCHES. IO3
When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person along who could turn dis- patches into cipher, and who could also read the cipher dispatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly. Under the rules of the War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton had taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone, should have the ciphers. The operators possessed of the ciphers, as well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders whom they were serving imme- diately under, and had to report to the War Depart- ment through General Stager all the dispatches which they received or forwarded.
I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at Nashville, because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to be for- warded from there. As I have said, it was necessary for me also to have an operator during this inspec- tion who had possession of this cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the War De- partment without my dispatches being read by all the operators along the line of wires over which they were transmitted. Accordingly I ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B. Comstock, of the Corps of Engineers, whom I had selected as a wise and discreet man who certainly
T04 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF V. S. GRANT.
could be trusted with the cipher if the operator at my headquarters could.
The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to Captain Comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the War Department were not to give it to anybody — the commanding general or any one else. I told him I would see whether he would or not. He said that if he did he would be punished. I told him if he did not he most cer- tainly would be punished. Finally, seeing that pun- ishment was certain if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his disobedience to his orders) from the War Depart- ment, he yielded. When I returned from Knoxville I found quite a commotion. The operator had been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be re- lieved. I informed the Secretary of War, or his assistant secretary in charge of the telegraph, Stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only obeyed my orders. It was absolutely necessary for me to have the cipher, and the man would most cer- tainly have been punished if he had not delivered it ; that they would have to punish me if they punished anybody, or words to that effect.
This was about the only thing approaching a dis- agreeable difference between the Secretary of War and myself that occurred until the war was over,
WITHHOLDING ORDERS. IO5
when we had another little spat. Owing to his nat- ural disposition to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out of the adjutant-gen- eral's office until he had approved it. This was done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined them and given his approval. He never disturbed himself, either, in examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him ; so that orders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction them. I remon- strated against this in writing, and the Secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of General-in-Chief of the Army. But he soon lapsed again and took control much as before.
After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had pro- posed to Burnside that he should go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee ; but Burnside assured him that with the troops which had been brought by Granger, and which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of Longstreet without availing himself of this offer. As before stated Sherman's command had left their camps north of the Tennessee, near Chattanooga, with two
106 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
days' rations in their haversacks, without coats or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps by the end of that time. The weather was now cold and they were suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had it been required, for the good of the cause which, had brought them into service. Sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old camp on the Tennessee River.
CHAPTER XLVI.
OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI LONGSTREET IN EAST TEN- NESSEE COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT - GENERAL —
COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.
SOON after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to distribute his forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville ; Sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back to Mis- sissippi, to the limits of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the pur- pose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on the east bank of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our boats. He expected also to have the co-operation of Banks to do the same thing on the west shore. Of course I ap- proved heartily.
About the ioth of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where Hurlbut commanded, and got to- gether his Memphis men, or ordered them collected and sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg and out to where McPherson was in command, and
108 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
had him organize his surplus troops so as to give him about 20,000 men in all.
Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was occupying Meridian with his headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable force of cavalry scattered west of him. He determined, therefore, to move directly upon Meridian.
I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General Sooy Smith to Sherman's department, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman got to Memphis. Hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and Sherman ordered him to reinforce Smith so as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against Forrest, who was then known to be south-east from Memphis. Smith was ordered to move about the 1 st of February.
While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of Hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could gather. When these scouts returned it was through them that he got the information of Gen- eral Polk's being at Meridian, and of the strength and disposition of his command.
Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, com- posed of thoroughly well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective. Smith's com- mand was nearly double that of Forrest, but not
OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI. 1 09
equal, man to man, for the lack of a successful ex- perience such as Forrest's men had had. The fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an extent that can hardly be counted by percentage. The difference in result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. This same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and for the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had carried on neither army could present a more effective officer than he was.
Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his expedition, meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the Big Black, and with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached Jackson, Mississippi. This latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on the 8th, and Morton on the 9th. Up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. Here, how- ever, there were indications of the concentration of Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close together. He had no serious en- gagement ; but he met some of the enemy who de- stroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur, Missis- sippi, where, by the way, Sherman himself came near being picked up.
He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month,
HO PER SOYA L MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
the enemy having retreated toward Demopolis, Ala- bama. He spent several days in Meridian in thor- oughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for the purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who he supposed had met Forrest before this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory be- cause of a superiority of numbers. Hearing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip to Vicksburg. There he learned that Smith, while waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River, instead of getting off on the ist as expected, had not left until the nth. Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in For- rest's favor.
Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a co-operative movement with him against Shreve- port, subject to my approval. I disapproved of Sherman's going himself, because I had other im- portant work for him to do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of Banks, though their time to remain absent must be limited. We must have them for the spring campaign. The trans- Mississippi movement proved abortive.
My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign and siege, had while there con- tracted disease, which grew worse, until he had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January I obtained permission to go to St. Louis, where he
112 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT.
was staying at the time, to see him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. While I was per- mitted to go, I was not permitted to turn over my command to any one else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to communicate reg- ularly with all parts of my division and with Wash- ington, just as though I had remained at Nash- ville.
When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone there again to make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern part of Tennessee co-operate with Sherman's movement in Mississippi. I directed Thomas, and Logan who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a threaten- ing movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had again relieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as possible there.
I learned through Confederate sources that John- ston had already sent two divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate against Sherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee. Seeing that Johnston had depleted in this way, I di- rected Thomas to send at least ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division which was already to the east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in command in East Tennessee, of this move- ment of troops into his department and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received. My object
LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE. I 13
was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part of the preparations for my spring campaign.
About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the Department of the Ohio after Burn- side until Schofield relieved him,* advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep Longstreet just where he was ; that he was perfectly quiet in East Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for their cause% I thought the advice was good, and, adopt- ing that view, countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet.
On the 1 2th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, if possible ; and I directed him to move without delay. Finding that he had not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him how important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with Sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. Then
* Washington, D. C. ,
December 29, 1863.
Maj. -General U. S. Grant :
General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command on
account of disability from old wounds. Should his request be
granted, who would you like as his successor ? It is possible that
Schofield will be sent to your command.
H. W. HALLECK,
{Official}} General-in-Chief.
Vol. 11. — 8
114 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
again on the 21st, he not yet having started, I asked him if he could not start the next day. He finally got off on the 2 2d or 23d. The enemy fell back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as strong and farther to the rear. Thomas reported that he could not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. He soon fell back.
Schofield also had to return for the same reason. He could not carry supplies with him, and Long- street was between him and the supplies still left in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding from theirs. On the 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman's suc- cess, which eased my mind very much. The next day, the 3d, I was ordered to Washington.
The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had passed through Congress and be- came a law on the 26th of February. My nomi- nation had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of March and confirmed the next day (the 2d). I was ordered to Washington on the 3d to receive my commission, and started the day following that. The commission was handed to me on the 9th. It was delivered to me at the Executive Mansion by President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my
COMMISSIONED LIE U TEN A N T- GENE RA L .
XI5
eldest son, those of my staff who were with me and a few other visitors.
The President in presenting my commission read from a paper — stating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines of reply. The President said :
" General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you lieutenant-general in the Army of the United States. With this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal con- currence."
To this I replied : " Mr. President, I accept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor con- ferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the respon- sibilities now devolving on me ; and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above
I 1 6 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."
On the icth I visited the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at Brandy Station ; then re- turned to Washington, and pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the com- mands there and giving general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring campaign.
It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even if I was made lieutenant-general ; but when I got to Washington and saw the situ- ation it was plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be. No one else could, probably, resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and pursue others. I determined, therefore, before I started back to have Sherman advanced to my late position, McPherson to Sherman's in command of the department, and Logan to the command of McPherson's corps. These changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. My commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of March, 1864. On the following day, as already stated, I visited General Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, at his head- quarters at Brandy Station, north of the Rapidan. I had known General Meade slightly in the Mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit.
COMMANDING ARMIES OF THE UNITED STA TES. I I 7
I was a stranger to most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all except the officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican war. There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army before my promotion. One was the consolidation of five corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands. Meade evidently thought that I might want to make still one more change not yet ordered. He said to me that I might want an officer who had served with me in the West, mentioning Sherman specially, to take his place. If so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. He urged that the work before us was of such vast impor- tance to the whole nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the way of select- ing the right men for all positions. For himself, he would serve to the best of his ability wherever placed. I assured him that I had no thought of substituting any one for him. As to Sherman, he could not be spared from the West.
This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade than did his great victory at Gettysburg the July before. It is men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the most efficient service.
Meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him. He was commanding an army
I 1 8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
and, for nearly a year previous to my taking com- mand of all the armies, was in supreme command of the Army of the Potomac — except from the authorities at Washington. All other general offi- cers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands so far as any one present with them was concerned. I tried to make General Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been if I had been in Washington or any other place away from his command. I therefore gave all orders for the movements of the Army of the Potomac to Meade to have them executed. To avoid the neces- sity of having to give orders direct, I established my headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for locating them elsewhere. This sometimes happened, and I had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. On the nth I returned to Wash- ington and, on the day after, orders were published by the War Department placing me in command of all the armies. I had left Washington the night be- fore to return to my old command in the West and to meet Sherman whom I had telegraphed to join me in Nashville.
Sherman assumed command of the military di- vision of the Mississippi on the 18th of March, and we left Nashville together for Cincinnati. I had Sherman accompany me that far on my way back to Washington so that we could talk over the
COMMANDING ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES. 119
matters about which I wanted to see him, without los- ing any more time from my new command than was necessary. The first point which I wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operation of his com- mand with mine when the spring campaign should commence. There were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war — the res- toration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important commands, namely McClellan, Burn- side and Fremont in the East, and Buell, McCook, Negley and Crittenden in the West.
Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by the general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign I thought advisable for the command under me — now Sherman's. General J. E. Johnston was defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia with an army, the largest part of which was stationed at Dalton, about 38 miles south of Chattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of the railroad from Cleve- land with the one from Chattanooga to Atlanta.
There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of the armies of the military division of the Mississippi. Johnston's army was the first objective, and that important railroad centre, Atlanta, the second. At the time I wrote General Halleck giving my views of the approaching campaign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it was expected
120 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
that General Banks would be through with the cam- paign which he had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of the Mississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon Mobile by land while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its ability.* The plan therefore was for Sherman to attack John- ston and destroy his army if possible, to capture At- lanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or at least to hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left in the possession of the enemy. This would cut the Con- federacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the Mississippi River had done before. Banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, and circumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all lands.
In regard to restoring officers who had been re- lieved from important commands to duty again, I left Sherman to look after those who had been removed in the West while I looked out for the rest. I
* See letter to Banks, in General Grant's report, Appendix.
FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 121
directed, however, that he should make no assign- ment until I could speak to the Secretary of War about the matter. I shortly after recommended to the Secretary the assignment of General Buell to duty. I received the assurance that duty would be offered to him ; and afterwards the Secretary told me that he had offered Buell an assignment and that the latter had declined it, saying that it would be degra- dation to accept the assignment offered. I under- stood afterwards that he refused to serve under either Sherman or Canby because he had ranked them both. Both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army. Sherman ranked him as a brigadier-general. All of them ranked me in the old army, and Sherman and Buell did as brigadiers. The worst excuse a soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the commander he is ordered to report to.
On the 23d of March I was back in Washington, and on the 26th took up my headquarters at Cul- peper Court-House, a few miles south of the head- quarters of the Army of the Potomac.
Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the President, I never met Mr. Lincoln until called to the capital to receive my commission as lieutenant- general. I knew him, however, very well and favor- ably from the accounts given by officers under me at the West who had known him all their lives. I had also read the remarkable series of debates be-
122 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
tween Lincoln and Douglas a few years before, when they were rival candidates for the United States Sen- ate. I was then a resident of Missouri, and by no means a " Lincoln man " in that contest ; but I recognized then his great ability.
In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them : but that procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the people at the North and Congress, which was always with himy forced him into issuing his series of " Military Orders " — one, two, three, etc. He did not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of them were. All he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed, pledging him- self to use all the power of the government in ren- dering such assistance. Assuring him that I would do the best I could with the means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the War Department, our first interview ended.
The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I knew him better.
While commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally held conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being otherwise used.
FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN. I 23
He and General Halleck both cautioned me against giving the President my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew. I should have said that in our interview the President told me he did not want to know what I proposed to do. But he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted me to hear and then do as I pleased about. He brought out a map of Virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the Federal and Confederate armies up to that time. He pointed out on the map two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that the army might be moved on boats and landed be- tween the mouths of these streams. We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies, and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. I listened respectfully, but did not sug- gest that the same streams would protect Lee's flanks while he was shutting us up.
I did not communicate my plans to the Presi- dent, nor did I to the Secretary of War or to Gen- eral Halleck.
March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at Culpeper, and the work of preparing for an early campaign commenced.
CHAPTER XLVII.
THE MILITARY SITUATION — PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF THE CAV- ALRY FLANK MOVEMENTS FORREST AT FORT PIL- LOW GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION COLONEL
MOSBY AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAM- PAIGN.
WHEN I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this : the Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth ; the line of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the North-west north of that river. A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river were held by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande. East of the Mississippi we held sub- stantially all north of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the State of Tennessee. West Virginia was in our hands ; and that part of old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we also held. On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia ; Plymouth, Wash-
THE MILITARY SITUATION.
125
ington and New Berne in North Carolina ; Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal and Fort Pulaski in South Carolina and Georgia ; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola in Florida. The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent, was still in the hands of the enemy.
Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division of the Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the Alleghanies and north of Natchez, with a large movable force about Chattanooga. His command was subdivided into four departments, but the commanders all re- ported to Sherman and were subject to his orders. This arrangement, however, insured the better pro- tection of all lines of communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden or unexpected raid within their respec- tive jurisdictions without awaiting the orders of the division commander.
In the East the opposing forces stood in substan- tially the same relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war began ; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals. It is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginia and North Carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been gained by
126 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
either side. Battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war, over ground from the James River and Chickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the National army, sometimes to the Confederate army ; but in every instance, I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern press if not by the Southern generals. The North- ern press, as a whole, did not discourage these claims ; a portion of it always magnified rebel success and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in their desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelming success of the Federal armies, would nevertheless generally express dissat- isfaction with whatever victories were gained be- cause they were not more complete.
That portion of the Army of the Potomac not engaged in guarding lines of communication was on the northern bank of the Rapidan. The Army of Northern Virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river, was strongly intrenched and com- manded by the acknowledged ablest general in the Confederate army. The country back to the James River is cut up with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except where bridged. The region is heavily timbered, and the roads nar- row, and very bad after the least rain. Such an enemy
THE MILITARY SITUATION.
127
was not, of course, unprepared with adequate forti- fications at convenient intervals all the way back to Richmond, so that when driven from one fortified position they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into.
To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. System and dis- cipline were both essential to its accomplishment.
The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four of them in the West had been concentrated into a single military division. The Army of the Potomac was a separate command and had no territorial limits. There were thus seventeen distinct commanders. Before this time these various armies had acted separately and independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively engaged. I determined to stop this. To this end I regarded the Army of the Potomac as the centre, and all west to Memphis along the line described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing ; the Army of the James, under General Butler, as the left wing, and all the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy. Some of these latter were occupying positions from which they could not render service proportionate to their numerical strength. All such were depleted to
128 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against blockade runners ; where they could not do this their positions were abandoned altogether. In this way ten thousand men were added to the Army of the James from South Carolina alone, with Gen- eral Gillmore in command. It was not contemplated that General Gillmore should leave his department ; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so. Officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their proper commands ; concentration was the order of the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest moment the roads would permit was the problem.
As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in support of it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under General Burnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland. This was an admirable position for such a reinforce- ment, The corps could be brought at the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North Carolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction. In fact Burnside and the War Department both thought the 9th corps was intended for such an expedition up to the last moment.
PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. \$g
My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such, as we have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac ; the second, under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to Sherman who was still at Chat- tanooga. Beside these main armies the Confeder- ates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond to Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the West with a large force ; making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the Northern States open to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it was moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of the James, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them. Better indeed, for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and with a greater force. Little expeditions could not so well
Vol. ii. — 9
I30 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly I arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to move from Chattanooga, John- ston's army and Atlanta being his objective points.*
* \Private and Confidential^ Headquarters Armies of the United States,
Washington, D. C, Aptil 4, 1864. Major-General W. T. Sherman,
Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.
General : — It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. For your information I now write you my programme, as at pres- ent determined upon.
I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch ; to turn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and the navy, and to return your troops to you and his own to New Or- leans ; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men ; to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number neces- sary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men. To this I will add five thousand men from Missouri. With this force he is to commence opera- tions against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him to commence too early.
Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate against Richmond from the south side of the James River. This will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to oper-
PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 13 I
Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from the mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the Virginia and Tennes- see Railroad to be his objective. Either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so much needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in command in the Valley of Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from an invasion
ate with, W. F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gillmore the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty- five thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army, wherever it may be found.
Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the other, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.
Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms.
You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.
I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations.
I32 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining near Harper's Ferry. Every mile he ad- vanced also gave us possession of stores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James River, having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective.
Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe. This was the first time I had ever met him. Before giving him any order as to the part he was to play in the approaching campaign I
As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is concentrating now. None will move from their places of rendezvous until I direcf, except Banks. I want to be ready to move by the 25th inst., if possible. But all I can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it.
From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do not calculate on very great results ; but it is the only way I can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move directly to his front. In this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words, if Sigel can't skin him- self he can hold a leg while some one else skins.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OE CAVALRY. I 33
invited his views. They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct, * in writing, before leaving.
General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general shortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not yet been confirmed. I found a decided prejudice against his confirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that his services had been such that he should be rewarded. My wishes were now reluctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one of the corps under General Butler. I was not long in finding out that the objections to Smith's promotion were well founded.
In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed my dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of accom- plishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. I said I wanted the very best man in the army for that command. Halleck was present and spoke up, saying: " How would Sheridan do?" I replied : " The very man I want." The President said I could have anybody I wanted. Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned to the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac. This relieved General
* See instructions to Butler, in Generals Grant's report, Appendix.
134 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection on that officer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficient as any other cavalry com- mander.
Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all the troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobile to be his objective.
At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move the Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left. Each plan presented advantages.* If by his right —
* In Field, Culpeper C. H., Va.,
April g, 1864. Maj. -General Geo. G. Meade,
Com'd'g Army of the Potomac.
For information and as instruction to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confi- dentially for your own perusal alone.
So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and towards one common centre. Banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to other movements. From the scattered condition of his command, how- ever, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans before the 1st of May, if so soon. Sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo. Johnston's army being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his
FLANK MOVEMENTS.
135
my left — the Potomac, Chesapeake Bay and tribu- taries would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to within easy hauling distance
ultimate aim. If successful he will secure the line from Chatta- nooga to Mobile with the aid of Banks.
Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. This he has been directed to do, and is now making prep- arations for it. Two columns of his command will make south at the same time with the general move ; one from Beverly, from ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord ; the other from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, under Brig. -General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reach the Ten- nessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join you. The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward to join Ord. The cavalry from Ord's command will try to force a passage southward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting Richmond with all the South and South-west.
Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000 men into the field directly to his front. The force will be com- manded by Ma j. -General W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore, Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous with yours.
Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the other
I36 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to the James River. But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a
with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on a raid. But if we take this route, all we do must be done whilst the rations we start with hold out. We separate from Butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the York or James rivers.
These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more fully than I can write them.
Burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce you. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the 20th inst., I will give him the defence of the road from Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the front.
There will be naval co-operation on the James River, and trans- ports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fall back into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such. What I would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing bag- gage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division head- quarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters.
Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to White House on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this contin- gency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or elsewhere.
FORREST AT FORT PILLOW. I 37
line rather interior to the one I would have to take in following. A movement by his left — our right — would obviate this ; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of sup- plies possible to take with us was considered. The country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us.
While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio. While he was able to enter the city he failed to capt- ure the forts or any part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forrest's raid I telegraphed Sher- man to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order.
-If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made for
ordnance stores. I would say not much short of five hundred
rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the
amount would be sufficient.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant- General.
I38 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the Mississippi River. The gar- rison consisted of a regiment of colored troops, infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry. These troops fought bravely, but were overpowered. I will leave Forrest in his dispatches to tell what he did with them.
"The river was dyed," he says, " with the blood of the slaughtered for two hundred yards. The ap- proximate loss was upward of five hundred killed, but few of the officers escaping. My loss was about twenty killed. It is hoped that these facts will de- monstrate to the Northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners." Subsequently For- rest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks humanity to read.
At the East, also, the rebels were busy. I had said to Halleck that Plymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold. It would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler's command. If success attended our arms both places, and others too, would fall into our hands naturally. These places had been occupied by Federal troops before I took command of the armies, and I knew that the Executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my views ; but before my views were carried out
GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION.
*39
the rebels captured the garrison at Plymouth. I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, but directed the holding of New Berne at all hazards. This was essential because New Berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter.
General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before my promotion to general command. I had opposed the movement strenuously, but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. By direction of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from Sherman's command. This reinforcement was wanted back badly before the forward movement commenced. But Banks had got so far that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, and turn over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the Ar- kansas. Orders were given accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to where it belonged and get back to New Orleans him- self in time to execute his part in the general plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not get back in time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor was Smith returned until long after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun. The ser- vices of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number required to hold all that was necessary
I40 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT.
in the Department of the Gulf, were thus paralyzed. It is but just to Banks, however, to say that his ex- pedition was ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsible except for the conduct of it. I make no criticism on this point. He opposed the expedition.
By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me in fixing a day for the great move. On that day Burnside left Annapolis to occupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rappa- hannock. Meade was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance. On the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the 4th of May, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and get as far up the James River as possible by daylight, and push on from there to accomplish the task given him. He was also notified that reinforcements were being collected in Washington City, which would be forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at Rich- mond. The same day Sherman was directed to get his forces up ready to advance on the 5th. Sigel was in Winchester and was notified to move in con- junction with the others.
The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the Rapidan to the James River that all the loss of life could have been obviated by mov- ing the army there on transports. Richmond was
COLONEL MOSBY
I4I
fortified and intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than equal to five out- side besieging or assaulting. To get possession of Lee's army was the first great object. With the capture of his army Richmond would necessarily follow. It was better to fight him outside of his stronghold than in it. If the Army of the Potomac had been moved bodily to the James River by water Lee could have moved a part of his forces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to re- inforce it, and with the balance moved on to Wash- ington. Then, too, I ordered a move, simultaneous with that of the Army of the Potomac, up the James River by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river.
While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of March to the 4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to confer with the Secretary of War and President. On the last occa- sion, a few days before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my part in the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby had for a long time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the Army of the Potomac. On my return to the field on this occasion, as the train approached Warren- ton Junction, a heavy cloud of dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry on
I42 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
a charge. Arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the dust. There was but one man at the station, and he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few min- utes before at full speed in pursuit of Federal cavalry. Had he seen our train coming, no doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. I was on a special train, if I remember correctly, without any guard.
Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby personally, and somewhat intimately. He is a different man entirely from what I had sup- posed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical exercise. He is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful. There were probably but few men in the South who could have commanded successfully a separate de- tachment in the rear of an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did with- out losing his entire command.
On this same visit to Washington I had my last interview with the President before reaching the James River. He had of course become acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been or- dered all along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. I explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops to guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to
AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. 1 43
prevent incursions into the Northern States. These troops could perform this service just as well by ad- vancing as by remaining still; and by advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. His answer was : " Oh, yes ! I see that. As we say out West, if a man can't skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does."
There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness campaign of which it may not be out of place to speak ; and to avoid a digression further on I will mention it here.
A few days before my departure from Culpeper the Honorable E. B. Washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some dis- tance south, through the battle in the Wilderness and, I think, to Spottsylvania. He was accom- panied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he presented as a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of writing a history of the war when it was over. He assured me — and I have no doubt Swinton gave him the assurance — that he was not present as a correspondent of the press. I ex- pressed an entire willingness to have him (Swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as a correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of the information he could give. We received Richmond papers with about as much regu-
144 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT.
larity as if there had been no war, and knew that our papers were received with equal regularity by the Confederates. It was desirable, therefore, that cor- respondents should not be privileged spies of the enemy within our lines.
Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters, and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. At all events he was not invited, and soon I found that he was cor- responding with some paper (I have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either expressed or implied. He knew of the assurance Washburne had given as to the character of his mission. I never saw the man from the day of our introduction to the present that I recollect. He accompanied us, how- ever, for a time at least.
The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the night of the 5th of May) Colonel W. R. Rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer at my headquar- ters. A short time before midnight I gave him ver- bal instructions for the night. Three days later I read in a Richmond paper a verbatim report of these instructions.
A few nights still later (after the first, and pos- sibly after the second, day's fighting in the Wilder- ness) General Meade came to my tent for consul- tation, bringing with him some of his staff officers. Both his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire
AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. 1 45
some yards in front of the tent, thinking our conver- sation should be private. There was a stump a little to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire. One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bowers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to the con- versation between Meade and myself. He called the attention of Colonel Rowley to it. The latter immediately took the man by the shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what he was doing there. The man proved to be Swinton, the " historian," and his replies to the ques- tion were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was warned against further eaves-dropping.
The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor. General Meade came to my headquarters saying that General Burnside had arrested Swinton, who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him to be shot that afternoon. I promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to return again on pain of punishment.
Vol. 11. — 10
CHAPTER XLVIII.
commencement of the grand campaign general
butler's position — sheridan's first raid.
THE armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single object. They were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible over such a vast field. Lee, with the capital of the Confederacy, was the main end to which all were working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was an important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was therefore almost an independent objective. It was of less importance only because the capture of Johnston and his army would not pro- duce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as would the possession of Richmond, Lee and his army. All other troops were employed exclusively in support of these two movements. This was the plan ; and I will now endeavor to give, as concisely as I can, the method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor detached but co-operative columns.
As stated before, Banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do on the Red River, and elimi-
COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN. 1 47
nated the use of forty thousand veterans whose co- operation in the grand campaign had been expected — ten thousand with Sherman and thirty thousand against Mobile.
Sigel's record is almost equally brief. He moved out, it is true, according to programme ; but just when I was hoping to hear of good work being done in the valley I received instead the following an- nouncement from Halleck: " Sigel is fn full retreat on Strasburg. He will do nothing but run ; never did anything else." The enemy had intercepted him about New Market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six guns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand.
The plan had been for an advance of Sigel's forces in two columns. Though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the other proved more fortunate. Under Crook and Averell his western column advanced from the Gauley in West Virginia at the appointed time, and with more happy results. They reached the Virginia and Ten- nessee Railroad at Dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up several miles of road and burning the bridge over New River. Having ac- complished this they recrossed the Alleghanies to Meadow Bluffs and there awaitecf further orders.
Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his com- mand, except the cavalry and some artillery which
I48 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
moved up the south bank of the James River. His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as if threatening the rear of Lee's army. At midnight they turned back, and Butler by daylight was far up the James River. He seized City Point and Bermuda Hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much to the surprise of the enemy.
This was the accomplishment of the first step con- templated in my instructions to Butler. He was to act from here, looking to Richmond as his objective point. I had given him to understand that I should aim to fight Lee between the Rapidan and Rich- mond if he would stand ; but should Lee fall back into Richmond I would follow up and make a junc- tion of the armies of the Potomac and the James on the James River. He was directed to secure a foot- ing as far up the south side of the river as he could at as early a date as possible.
Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk to cut the Weldon Railroad. He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond, but no great success attended these latter efforts. He made no great effort to establish himself on that road and neg- lected to attack Petersburg, which was almost de- fenceless. About the nth he advanced slowly until
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150 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
he reached the works at Drury's Bluff, about half way between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond. In the mean time Beauregard had been gathering reinforce- ments. On the 1 6th he attacked Butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very mate- rially the further usefulness of the Army of the James as a distinct factor in the campaign. I after- ward ordered a portion of it to join the Army of the Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with Butler to man his works, hold securely the footing he had al- ready gained and maintain a threatening front to- ward the rear of the Confederate capital.
The position which General Butler had chosen between the two rivers, the James and Appomat- tox, was one of great natural strength, one where a large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent of territory which it thoroughly protected. His right was pro- tected by the James River, his left by the Appo- mattox, and his rear by their junction — the two streams uniting near by. The bends of the two streams shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while it increased the area which the line inclosed.
Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent my chief engineer, General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the James to inspect
GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITLON. 151
Butlers position and ascertain whether I could again safely make an order for General Butler's movement in co-operation with mine, now that I was getting so near Richmond ; or, if I could not. wnether his position was strong enough to justify me in with- drawing some of his troops and having them brought round by water to White House to join me and re- inforce the Army of the Potomac. General Barnard reported the position very strong for defensive pur- poses, and that I could do the latter with great security ; but that General Butler could not move from where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. He said that the general occupied a place be- tween the James and Appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior ; but that he could do nothing offensively. I then asked him why Butler could not move out from his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad to the rear and on the south side of Richmond. He replied that it was impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that General Butler had. He then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle and that Butlers line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork ; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of
152 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
him across the neck ; and it was therefore as if Butler was in a bottle. He was perfectly safe against an attack ; but, as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a small force could hold the cork in its place. This struck me as being very expressive of his position, particularly when I saw the hasty sketch which General Barnard had drawn ; and in making my subsequent report I used that expression without adding quotation marks, never thinking that anything had been said that would at- tract attention — as this did, very much to the annoy- ance, no doubt, of General Butler and, I know, very much to my own. I found afterwards that this was mentioned in the notes of General Badeau's book, which, when they were shown to me, I asked to have stricken out ; yet it was retained there, though against my wishes.
I make this statement here because, although I have often made it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it will correct his- tory ; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I may have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly serving their country during the try- ing period of the war for the preservation of the Union. General Butler certainly gave his very ear- nest support to the war ; and he gave his own best efforts personally to the suppression of the re- bellion.
SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID.
153
The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated of in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being so inti- mately associated and connected as to be substan- tially one body in which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged.
Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman's great Atlanta campaign, which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movements preparatory to proceeding with that of the opera- tions of the centre, I will briefly mention Sheridan's first raid upon Lee's communications which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign. By thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more perfectly observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when I shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the Rapi- dan.
On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness and when we were moving en Spottsyl- vania I directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee's army and attack his cavalry : to cut the two roads — one running west through Gordonsville, Char- lottesville and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond,
154 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the James River and draw these from Butler's supplies. This move took him past the entire rear of Lee's army. These orders were also given in writing through Meade.
The object of this move was three-fold. First, if successfully executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of supplies and tele- graphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming up. Second, he would draw the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear and trains than by remaining with the army. Third, his absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from Fredericksburg, which had now become our base. He started at daylight the next morning, and accomplished more than was ex- pected. It was sixteen days before he got back to the Army of the Potomac.
The course Sheridan took was directly to Rich- mond. Before night Stuart, commanding the Con- federate cavalry, came on to the rear of his com- mand. But the advance kept on, crossed the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a station on the Vir- ginia Central Railroad, recaptured four hundred Union prisoners on their way to Richmond, de- stroyed the road and used and destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores.
SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID. I 55
Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing to- wards Richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the ioth and, by a detour and an ex- hausting march, interposed between Sheridan and Richmond at Yellow Tavern, only about six miles north of the city. Sheridan destroyed the railroad and more supplies at Ashland, and on the nth ar- rived in Stuart's front. A severe engagement en- sued in which the losses were heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured.
Sheridan passed through the outer defences of Richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones. But having no supports near he could not have remained. After caring for his wounded he struck for the James River below the city, to communicate with Butler and to rest his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them.
He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but in the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville. He then turned to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy by Meadow Bridge. He found this barred, and the defeated Confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying the opposite side. The panic created by his first entrance within the outer works of Richmond hav-
156 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
ing subsided troops were sent out to attack his rear.
He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could have extricated themselves. The defences of Richmond, manned, were to the right, the Chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining and the opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from Richmond. This force was attacked and beaten by Wilson's and Gregg's divisions, while Sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing and soon dispersed the Confeder- ates he found there. The enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in bridge building.
On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over the Chickahominy. On the 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on the James River at Haxall's Landing. He at once put himself into communication with General Butler, who directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished.
Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania, but did not know where either this or Lee's army was now. Great caution therefore had to be exercised in getting back. On the 17th, after resting his command for three days, he started on his return. He moved by the way of White House.
SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID. I 57
The bridge over the Pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, but a new one was speedily impro- vised and the cavalry crossed over it. On the 2 2d he was at Aylett's on the Matapony, where he learned the position of the two armies. On the 24th he joined us on the march from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of Chesterfield.
Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee's army : encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all ; recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed and cap- tured many of the enemy ; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war ; destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks.
CHAPTER XLIX.
Sherman's campaign in Georgia — seige of Atlanta
death of general mcpherson attempt to
capture andersonville — capture of atlanta.
AFTER separating, from Sherman in Cincinnati I went on to Washington, as already stated, while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties of his new command. His military division was now composed of four departments and embraced all the territory west of the Alleghany Mountains and east of the Mississippi River, together with the State of Arkansas in the trans-Mississippi. The most easterly of these was the Department of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding ; the next was the Department of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding ; the third the Department of the Tennessee, General McPherson commanding ; and General Steele still commanded the trans- Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas. The last- named department was so far away that Sherman could not communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign, and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to that of
SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA. I 59
the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved General Banks, was in command.
The movements of the armies, as I have stated in a former chapter, were to be simultaneous, I fix- ing the day to start when the season should be far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition for the troops to march.
General Sherman at once set himself to work pre- paring for the task which was assigned him to ac- complish in the spring campaign. McPherson lay at Huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points of Tennessee which were re- garded as most worth holding ; Thomas, with over sixty thousand men of the Army of the Cumber- land, was at Chattanooga ; and Schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at Knoxville. With these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all, Sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with a view of destroying Johnston's army and capturing Atlanta. He visited each of these commands to inform him- self as to their condition, and it was found to be, speaking generally, good.
One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting, before the time arrived for start- ing, an accumulation of supplies forward to Chat- tanooga sufficiently large to warrant a movement. He found, when he got to that place, that the trains
l6o PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.
over the single-track railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops without bringing forward any surplus of any kind. He found, however, that trains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. He at once changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses, and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, and used the road exclusively for transporting sup- plies. In this way he was able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for the move, the 4th of May.
As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearly one-fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The country is moun- tainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in moun- tain streams, some of them of considerable volume. Dalton is on ground where water drains towards Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east from there and flowing south-west — this being the general direction which all the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering into them. Johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during the entire winter. The best positions for defence had been selected all the way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very
Atlanta tk_ Campaign,
Vol. ii. — ii
l62 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT.
strongly intrenched ; so that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would have another to fall into in his rear. His position at Dalton was so very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold Sher- man there and prevent him from getting any fur- ther. With a less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, I have no doubt that he would have succeeded.
Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few days in advance from Knoxville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton. Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It had been Sherman's* intention to cross McPherson over the Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, and move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running from Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point Johnston was occupying ; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston, if the latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the army. In this he was disappointed. Two of McPherson's veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to have a furlough. This furlough had not yet expired, and they were not back.
Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two di-
SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA. 163
visions under A. J. Smith, the winter before, to co-operate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and this with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so as to be prepared for this very campaign. It is hardly necessary to say they were not returned. That department continued to ab- sorb troops to no purpose to the end of the war. This left McPherson so weak that the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. He was therefore brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of Thomas — the two coming together about Dalton. The three armies were abreast, all ready to start promptly on time.
Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault ; and even to carry it by regular approaches was impracticable. There was a nar- rowing up in the mountain, between the National and Confederate armies, through which a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran Besides, the stream had been dammed so that the valley was a lake. Through this gorge the troops would have to pass. McPherson was therefore sent around by the right, to come out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into the rear of the enemy. This was a surprise to John- ston, and about the