Personal Memoirs op U S. Grant , pawl & - w- PERSONAL MEMOIRS U. S. GRANT. VOL. II. -7^^u*/t PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. II. NEW YORK: CHARLES L. WEBSTER & COMPANY, 1886 Copyright, 1885, £y ULYSSES S. GRANT. (All rights reserved.) MAY* 1967 Press of J. J. Little & Co., Nos. 10 to 20 Astor Place, New York. 70215G6001 CI ft- CONTENTS VO L U M K II. CHAPTER XL. First Meeting with Secretary Stanton— General Rose- crans— Commanding Military Division of Missis- sippi— Andrew Johnson's Address — Arrival at Chattanooga 17-30 CHAPTER XLI. Assuming the Command at Chattanooga — Opening a Line of Supplies — Battle of Wauhatchie — On the Picket Line 31-43 CHAPTER XLII. Condition of the Army — Rebuilding the Railroad — General Burnside's Situation — Orders for Bat- tle— Plans for the Attack — Hooker's Position — Sherman's Movements...*.* 44-60 CHAPTER XLIII. Preparations for Battle — Thomas Carries the First Line of the Enemy — Sherman Carries Missionary Ridge — Battle of Lookout Mountain — General Hooker's Fight 61-74 CHAPTER XLIV. Battle of Chattanooga— A Gallant Charge— Complete Rout of the Enemy — Pursuit of the Confederates —General Bragg— Remarks on Chattanooga 75-88 IO CONTENTS OF VOLUME II CHAPTER XLV. PAGE The Relief of Knoxville— Headquarters moved to Nashville— Visiting Knoxville — Cipher Dispatches — Withholding Orders 89-106 CHAPTER XLVI. Operations in Mississippi — Longstreet in East Tennes- see— Commissioned Lieutenant-Genera l— Command- ing the Armies of the United States— First In- terview with President Lincoln 107-123 CHAPTER XLVII. The Military Situation — Plans for the Campaign — Sheridan assigned to Command of the Cavalry — Flank Movements — Forrest at Fort Pillow — Gen- eral Banks's Expedition — Colonel Mosey — An Inci- dent of the Wilderness Campaign 124-145 CHAPTER XLVIII. Commencement of the Grand Campaign — General But- ler's Position — Sheridan's First Raid 146-157 CHAPTER XLIX. Sherman's Campaign in Georgia— Siege of Atlanta- Death of General McPherson — Attempt to Cap- ture Andersonville — Capture of Atlanta 158-176 CHAPTER L. Grand Movement of the Army of the Potomac — Cross- ing the Rapidan— Entering the Wilderness— Bat- tle of the Wilderness 177-203 CHAPTER LI. After the Battle— Telegraph and Signal Service- Movement by the Left Flank 204-216 CHAPTER LII. Battle of Spottsylvania— Hancock's Position— Assault of Warren's and Wright's Corps — Upton Promoted on the Field— Good News from Butler and Sheri- dan 217-227 CONTENTS OF VOL UME II I I CHAPTER LIII. Hancock's Assault — Losses of the Confederates — Pro- motions Recommended— Discomfiture of the Enemy — Ewell's Attack— Reducing the Artillery 228-242 CHAPTER LIV. Movement by the Left Flank — Battle of North Anna — An Incident of the March — Moving on Richmond — South of the Pamunkey — Position of the Na- tional Army 243-263 CHAPTER LV. Advance on Cold Harbor — An Anecdote of the War- Battle of Cold Harbor — Correspondence with Lee — Retrospective 264-278 CHAPTER LVI. Left Flank Movement across the Chickahominy and James — General Lee — Visit to Butler — The Move- ment on Petersburg — The Investment of Peters- burg 279-299 CHAPTER LVII. Raid on the Virginia Central Railroad— Raid on the Weldon Railroad — Early's Movement upon Wash- ington— Mining the Works before Petersburg— Ex- plosion of the Mine before Petersburg — Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley— Capture of the Wel- don Railroad 300-325 CHAPTER LVIII. Sheridan's Advance— Visit to Sheridan— Sheridan's Victory in the Shenandoah — Sheridan's Ride to Winchester — Close of the Campaign for the Win- ter . . 326-343 CHAPTER LIX. The Campaign in Georgia — Sherman's March to the Sea — War Anecdotes — The March on Savannah — Investment of Savannah— Capture of Savannah 344-376 12 CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. CHAPTER LX. PAGE The Battle of Franklin — The Battle of Nashville 377-386 CHAPTER LXI. Expedition against Fort Fisher— Attack on the Fort — Failure of the Expedition — Second Expedition against the fort — capture of fort flsher 387-399 CHAPTER LXII. Sherman's March North— Sheridan Ordered to Lynch- burg—Canby Ordered to Move against Mobile- Movements OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS— CAPTURE OF Columbia, South Carolina — Sherman in the Caro- linas 400-419 CHAPTER LXIII. Arrival of the Peace Commissioners— Lincoln and the Peace Commissioners — An Anecdote of Lincoln — The Winter before Petersburg— Sheridan Destroys the Railroad— Gordon Carries the Picket Line— Parke Recaptures the Line— The Battle of White Oak Road 420-435 CHAPTER LXIV. Interview with Sheridan — Grand Movement of the Army of the Potomac — Sheridan's Advance on Five Forks— Battle of Five Forks— Parke and Wright Storm the Enemy's Line — Battles before Peters- burg 436-453 CHAPTER LXV. The Capture of Petersburg- Meeting President Lin- coln in Petersburg— The Capture of Richmond- Pursuing the Enemy — Visit to Sheridan and Meade 454-469 CHAPTER LXVI. Battle of Sailor's Creek— Engagement at Farmville— Correspondence with General Lee— Sheridan in- tercepts the Enemy 470-482 CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. 1 3 CHAPTER LXVII. PAGE Negotiations at Appomattox— Interview with Lee at McLean's House— The Terms of Surrender— Lee's Surrender — Interview with Lee after the Surren- der . . ■ 483-498 CHAPTER LXVIII. Morale of the two Armies— Relative Conditions of the North and South — President Lincoln visits Richmond — Arrival at Washington — President Lincoln's Assassination— President Johnson's Pol- icy 499-512 CHAPTER LXIX. Sherman and Johnston — Johnston's Surrender to Sherman — Capture of Mobile — Wilson's Expedition —Capture of Jefferson Davis— General Thomas's Qualities— Estimate of General Canby 513-526 CHAPTER LXX. The End of the War— The March to Washington- One of Lincoln's Anecdotes— Grand Review at Washington — Characteristics of Lincoln and Stanton— Estimate of the different Corps Com- manders 527-541 CONCLUSION 542-554 APPENDIX 555-632 INDEX 633-647 MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS. VOLUME II. PAGE Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, Engraved on Steel, by Wm. E. Marshall Frontispiece Map of Knoxville, Nashville and Chattanooga 23 Map of Chattanooga and Vicinity ■$?> Map of the Battlefield of Chattanooga 65 Map of the Meridian Campaign in Map of Bermuda Hundred 149 Map of Sherman's Campaign, Chattanooga to Atlanta 161 Map Illustrating Siege of Atlanta 173 Map of Wilderness Campaign 179 Map of the Battle of the Wilderness 1 89 Map of the Country between the Wilderness and Spott- sylvania Court House 209 Map of the Battle of Spottsylvania 219 Map of the Battle of North Anna 247 Map of the Operations between the Pamunkey and the James Rivers 257 Map of Central Virginia 261 Map of the Battle of Cold Harbor 267 Map of Richmond 309 Map of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign 330 Map of Sherman's March to the Sea 360 Map of the Nashville Campaign South 381 Map of Fort Fisher 389 Map of Sherman's March North 407 Map of Petersburg and Five Forks 441 Map of the Appomattox Campaign 457 Map of Jetersville and Sailor's Creek 471 Map of High Bridge and Farmville 475 Map of Appomattox Court House 487 Etching of McLean's House at Appomattox where General Lee's Surrender took Place 488 Fac-simile of the Original Terms of Lee's Surrender as Written by General Grant 496 Map of the Defences of the City of Mobile 520 Map of the Seat of War — 1861 to 1865 632 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. VOLUME II. CHAPTER XL. FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON — GENERAL ROSECRANS — COMMANDING MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI — ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS — AR- RIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA. THE reply (to my telegram of October 16, 1863, from Cairo, announcing my arrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to proceed immediately to the Gait House, Louis- ville, where I would meet an officer of the War De- partment with my instructions. I left Cairo within an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via Indianapolis. Just as the train I was on was starting out of the depot at Indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the Vol. 11. — 2 1 8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. Secretary of War was coming into the station and wanted to see me. I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent conversations over the wires the year before, when I was in Tennessee. Occasionally at night he would order the wires be- tween the War Department and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a conversation for an hour or two. On this occasion the Secretary was accompanied by Governor Brough of Ohio, whom I had never met, though he and my father had been old acquaintances. Mr. Stanton dismissed the spe- cial train that had brought him to Indianapolis, and accompanied me to Louisville. Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after I left Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of Halleck's dispatches that I had better go to Nashville and superintend the operation of troops sent to relieve Rosecrans. Soon after we started the Secretary handed me two orders, saying that I might take my choice of them. The two were identical in all but one particular. Both created the " Military Division of the Mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and all the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River north of Banks's command in the south-west. One order left the department commanders as they FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON, 19 were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and as- signed Thomas to his place. I accepted the latter. We reached Louisville after night and, if I remem- ber rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. The Secretary of War told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that occasion from which he never expected to re- cover. He never did. A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giv- ing me the military news at the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of some of the campaigns. By the evening of the day after our arrival all matters of discussion seemed ex- hausted, and I left the hotel to spend the evening away, both Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and my- self having relatives living in Louisville. In the course of the evening Mr. Stanton received a dis- patch from Mr. C. A. Dana, then in Chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so. As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly upon the government the propriety of a movement against Mobile. General Rosecrans had been at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, with a large and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with Bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on the defen- sive. But after the investment of Vicksburg Bragg's 20 PERSOXAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT. army was largely depleted to strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the siege. I frequently wrote General Halleck suggest- ing that Rosecrans should move against Bragg. By so doing he would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay Chattanooga open to capt- ure. General Halleck strongly approved the sug- gestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war, had re- plied in effect that it was a military maxim " not to fight two decisive battles at the same time." If true, the maxim was not applicable in this case. It would be bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. I, however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn from Rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was over, when these troops could be returned. Rosecrans was ordered to move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege. Fi- nally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days afterwards Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free to return. It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief the movement against Mobile. I GENERAL ROSECRAXS. 21 knew the peril the Army of the Cumberland was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as con- stantly being strengthened. Mobile was important to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than artillery. If threatened by land and from the water at the same time the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its defence. Those troops would neces- sarily come from Bragg. My judgment was over- ruled, and the troops under my command were dissi- pated over other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the most service. Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rose- crans was in trouble and required assistance. The emergency was now too immediate to allow us to give this assistance by making an attack in rear of Bragg upon Mobile. It was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent from every available point. Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the Tennessee River, and through and be- yond Chattanooga. If he had stopped and in- trenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and the mistake of not moving ear- lier partially compensated. But he pushed on, with 2 2 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT. his forces very much scattered, until Bragg's troops from Mississippi began to join him. Then Bragg took the initiative. Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army together at Chicka- mauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before the main battle was brought on. The battle was fought on the 19th and 20th of September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured. The corps under Major- General George H. Thomas stood its ground, while Rosecrans, with Crittenden and McCook, returned to Chattanooga. Thomas returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order. Bragg followed and took possession of Missionary Ridge, overlook- ing Chattanooga. He also occupied Lookout Moun- tain, west of the town, which Rosecrans had aban- doned, and with it his control of the river and the river road as far back as Bridgeport. The National troops were now strongly intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the Tennessee River behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and west, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain, and with Chattanooga Creek, for a large part of the way, in front of their line. On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all the forces that could be 24 PERSOXAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. spared from my department to be sent to Rosecrans. Long before this dispatch was received Sherman was on his way, and McPherson was moving east with most of the garrison of Vicksburg. A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. It would not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery still left with the Army of the Cumberland and the annihilation of that army itself, either by capture or demoralization. All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the government up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the south side of the Tennessee River ; but Bragg, holding Lookout and Raccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of the Tennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. The distance between these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail ; but owing to the position of Bragg, all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by a circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country, increas- ing the distance to over sixty miles. This country afforded but little food for his ani- mals, nearly ten thousand of which had already COMMANDING MILITARY DI VI SI OX OF MISSISSIPPI. 25 starved, and not enough were left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick. The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across the country. The region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there — " on the lift." Indeed, the beef was so poor that the sol- diers were in the habit of saying, with a faint face- tiousness, that they were living on " half rations of hard bread and beef dried on the hoof." Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without sufficient shoes or other cloth- ing suitable for the advancing season. What they had was well worn. The fuel within the Federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it was abundant. The only way of supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. It would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps. If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not prob- 2 6 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. able that any of the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if followed by the enemy. On the receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stan- ton sent for me. Finding that I was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where I was, and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. About eleven o'clock I re- turned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house, every person met was a messenger from the Secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see me. I hastened to the room of the Secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing- gown. Saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch. I immediately wrote an order assuming command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and telegraphed it to General Rose- crans. I then telegraphed to him the order from Washington assigning Thomas to the command of the Army of the Cumberland ; and to Thomas that he must hold Chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that I would be at the front as soon as possible. A prompt reply was received from Thomas, saying, " We will hold the town till we starve." I appreciated the force of this dispatch later when I witnessed the condition of affairs which prompted it. It looked, indeed, as if A NDRE IV JOHNSON S A DDRE SS. 2 J but two courses were open : one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured. On the morning of the 20th of October I started, with my staff, and proceeded as far as Nashville. At that time it was not prudent to travel beyond that point by night, so I remained in Nashville until the next morning. Here I met for the first time Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee. He de- livered a speech of welcome. His composure showed that it was by no means his maiden effort. It was long, and I was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be expected from me in response. I was relieved, however, the people as- sembled having apparently heard enough. At all events they commenced a general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of it, was a great relief to me in this emergency. From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville, that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that they could be held with the least number of men ; to Admiral Porter at Cairo, that Sherman's advance had passed Eastport, Mississippi, that rations were probably on their way from St. Louis by boat for supplying his army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to con- voy them; and to Thomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the wagon-road then in use back to Bridgeport. 28 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching Stevenson, Alabama, after dark. Rosecrans was there on his way north. He came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. My only wonder was that he had not carried them out. We then proceeded to Bridge- port, where we stopped for the night. From here we took horses and made our way by Jasper and over Waldron's Ridge to Chattanooga. There had been much rain, and the roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and from wash-outs on the mountain sides. I had been on crutches since the time of my fall in New Orleans, and had to be carried over places where it was not safe to cross on horseback. The roads were strewn with the debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thou- sands of starved mules and horses. At Jasper, some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport, there was a halt. General O. O. Howard had his head- quarters there. From this point I telegraphed Burn- side to make every effort to secure five hundred rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small- arms. We stopped for the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on. The next day we reached Chattanooga a little before dark. I went directly to General Thomas's headquarters, and ARRIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA. 29 remaining there a few days, until I could establish my own. During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. They pointed out on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon. If any of them had approved the move they did not say so to me. I found General W. F. Smith occu- pying the position of chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. I had known Smith as a cadet at West Point, but had no recollection of having met him after my graduation, in 1843, UP to this time. He explained the situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly that I could see it without an inspection. I found that he had established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood ; and, by rafting logs from the north side of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoons and road- way plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being there already. He was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing the boats for a third bridge. In addition to this he had far under way a steamer for plying between Chat- tanooga and Bridgeport whenever we might get possession of the river. This boat consisted of a 30 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT. scow, made of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheel attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or factory. I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying General Halleck of my arrival, and asking to have General Sherman assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, headquarters in the field. The request was at once complied with. CHAPTER XLI. ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA — OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE ON THE PICKET LINE. THE next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal inspection, taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the members of my personal staff. We crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the Tennessee at Brown's Ferry, some three miles below Lookout Mountain, unobserved by the enemy. Here we left our horses back from the river and approached the water on foot. There was a picket station of the enemy on the opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within easy range. They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our presence. They must have seen that we were all commissioned officers. But, I suppose, they looked upon the garrison of Chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of them except in self- defence. 32 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. That night I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport — a cracker line, as the soldiers appro- priately termed it. They had been so long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a line over which food might reach them. Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Ten- nessee, where that river runs nearly due west. It is at the northern end of a valley five or six miles in width, through which Chattanooga Creek runs. To the east of the valley is Missionary Ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more before reaching the Tennessee. On the west of the valley is Lookout Mountain, twenty-two hun- dred feet above-tide water. Just below the town the Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of Lookout Mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad passes this point, where the mountain stands nearly perpendicular. East of Missionary Ridge flows the South Chick- amauga River ; west of Lookout Mountain is Look- out Creek ; and west of that, Raccoon Mountains. Lookout Mountain, at its northern end, rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the sum- mit, where it ends in a palisade thirty or more feet in height. On the gently sloping ground, between Vol. ii. — 3 34 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farm- house, which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east. The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across Chattanooga valley to Lookout Mountain. Look- out Mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in Lookout valley west, and on Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it useless to us. In ad- dition to this there was an intrenched line in Chat- tanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to Lookout Mountain, to make the investment complete. Besides the fortifications on Mission Ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front. The enemy's pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies could converse. At one point they were separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from which both sides drew water. The Union lines were shorter than those of the enemy. Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below. Practically, the Army OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES. 35 of the Cumberland was besieged. The enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the river the pass- ing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical supplies. The Union army was short of both, not having ammunition enough for a day's fighting. General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered parts of the nth and 12th corps, commanded respectively by Generals How- ard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of the Potomac to reinforce Rose- crans. It would have been folly to send them to Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. They were consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to them. Before my arrival, Thomas ordered their CDncentration at Bridgeport. General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops. On the 24th of October, after my return to Chat- tanooga, the following details were made : General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march 36 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. up by Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry. General Palmer, with a division of the 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back road, until op- posite Whitesides, then cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear after he had passed. Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under General Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eigh- teen hundred of them, under General Hazen. were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout, down to Brown's Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that point. Smith was to march with the remainder of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river to Brown's Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge as soon as the crossing was secured. On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridge- port and commenced his eastward march. At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, Hazen moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eigh- teen hundred brave and well-equipped men. Smith started enough in advance to be near the river when Hazen should arrive. There are a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at Chatta- nooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of OPENING A LINE OE SUPPLIES. 37 Lookout. It was over this road Smith marched. At five o'clock Hazen landed at Brown's Ferry, sur- prised the picket guard, and captured most of it. By seven o'clock the whole of Smith's force was fer- ried over and in possession of a height commanding the ferry. This was speedily fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. By ten o'clock the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Look- out valley, was fortified and connected with the rest of the army. The two bridges over the Tennessee River — a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one at Brown's Ferry — with the road north of the river, covered from both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. Hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the af- ternoon of the 28th emerged into Lookout valley at Wauhatchie. Howard marched on to Brown's Ferry, while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped three miles south. The pickets of the enemy on the river below were now cut off, and soon came in and surrendered. The river was now opened to us from Lookout valley to Bridgeport. Between Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry the Tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it. To get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled ; that is, 38 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT. pulled up by ropes from the shore. But there is no difficulty in navigating the stream from Bridge- port to Kelly's Ferry. The latter point is only eight miles from Chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road, which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountains on the south side of the river to Brown's Ferry, thence on the north side to the river opposite Chattanooga. There were several steamers at Bridgeport, and abundance of forage, clothing and provisions. On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville for a good supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so long deprived of. Hooker had brought with him from the east a full supply of land transportation. His animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. In five days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeport and, with the aid of steam- ers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troops were receiving full rations. It is hard for any one not an eye-witness to realize the relief this brought. The men were soon reclothed and also well fed ; an abun- dance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerful- ness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. Neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. The weak and languid appear- ance of the troops, so -visible before, disappeared at OPENING A LINE OE SUPPLIES. 39 once. I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspond- ingly depressing. Mr. Davis had visited Bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to be about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report. " These dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage. Possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his de- struction was only a question of time." But the dis- positions were not "faithfully sustained," and I doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to "sus- tain" them now rejoice that they were not. There was no time during the rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the South was more to be benefited by its defeat than the North. The lat- ter had the people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and prosperous nation. The former was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class. With the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have extended their territory. The labor of the country was not skilled, nor allowed to become so. The whites could not toil without becoming de- 40 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. graded, and those who did were denominated " poor white trash." The system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the. people poor. The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor. Soon the slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. The war was expen- sive to the South as well as to the North, both in blood and treasure, but it was worth all it cost. The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of supplies. He appreci- ated its importance, and hastened to try to recover the line from us. His strength on Lookout Moun- tain was not equal to Hooker's command in the val- ley below. From Missionary Ridge he had to march twice the distance we had from Chattanooga, in order to reach Lookout Valley ; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made on Geary at Wauhatchie by Longstreet's corps. When the battle commenced, Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown's Ferry. He had three miles to march to reach Geary. On his way he was fired upon by rebel troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road was commanded. Howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE. 41 many prisoners. Leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to reinforce Geary. Be- fore he got up, Geary had been engaged for about three hours against a vastly superior force. The night was so dark that the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of the flashes of their muskets. In the darkness and up- roar, Hooker's teamsters became frightened and de- serted their teams. The mules also became fright- ened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded directly towards the enemy. The latter, no doubt, took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn. By four o'clock in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our " cracker line " was never afterward disturbed. In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man killed and four or five wounded. The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry, cap- tured. In the night engagement of the 28th~9th Hooker lost 416 killed and wounded. I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a hundred. After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our supplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see the situation of the pickets of the two armies. As I have stated, Chattanooga Creek comes down the centre of the valley to within 42 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRAXT. a mile or such a matter of the town of Chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north westerly, and en- ters the Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout Mountain. This creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from the same stream. As I would be under short-range fire and in an open country, I took nobody with me, except, I believe, a bugler, who stayed some distance to the rear. I rode from our right around to our left. When I came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard the call, " Turn out the guard for the commanding general." I replied, " Never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went back to their tents. Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek, were the guards of the Confederate pickets. The sentinel on their post called out in like manner, " Turn out the guard for the commanding general," and, I believe, added, " General Grant." Their line in a moment front- faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which I returned. The most friendly relations seemed to exist be- tween the pickets of the two armies. At one place there was a tree which had fallen across the stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing water for their camps. General Long- street's corps was stationed there at the time, and ON THE PICKET LIXE. 43 wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform. Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commenced conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. He was very polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to General Longstreet's corps. I asked him a few questions — but not with a view of gaining any particular information — all of which he answered, and I rode off. CHAPTER XLII. condition of the army rebuilding the rail- road— general burnside's situation orders for battle plans for the attack hook- er's position — Sherman's movements. HAVING got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position, I now began to look after the remainder of my new command. Burnside was in about as desperate a condition as the Army of the Cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged. He was a hundred miles from the nearest possible base, Big South Fork of the Cumberland River, and much farther from any railroad we had possession of. The roads back were over mountains, and all sup- plies along the line had long since been exhausted. His animals, too, had been starved, and their car- casses lined the road from Cumberland Gap, and far back towards Lexington, Ky. East Tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice. Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the nth of October. His instructions required REBUILDING THE RAILROAD. 45 him to repair the road in his rear in order to bring up supplies. The distance was about three hundred and thirty miles through a hostile country. His entire command could not have maintained the road if it had been completed. The bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done. A hostile community lived along the road ; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the West. Often Sherman's work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distance away. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee River at Eastport, Mississippi. Knowing the difficulty Sherman would have to supply himself from Memphis, I had previously ordered supplies sent from St. Louis on small steamers, to be con- voyed by the navy, to meet him at Eastport. These he got. I now ordered him to discontinue his work of repairing roads and to move on with his whole force to Stevenson, Alabama, without delay. This order was borne to Sherman by a messenger, who paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe and floated over Muscle Shoals; it was delivered at Iuka on the 27th. In this Sherman was notified that the rebels were moving a force towards Cleveland, East Tennes- see, and might be going to Nashville, in which event his troops were in the best position to beat them there. Sherman, with his characteristic promptness, aban- 46 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. doned the work he was engaged upon and pushed on at once. On the ist of November he crossed the Tennessee at Eastport, and that day was in Florence, Alabama, with the head of column, while his troops were still crossing at Eastport, with Blair bringing up the rear. Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the single track road from Nashville. All indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying Burnside's command in East Tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the same route. A single track could not do this. I gave, therefore, an order to Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge's command, of about eight thousand men, at Athens, and subse- quently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from Decatur north towards Nashville, and to rebuild that road. The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. All the bridges over these had been de- stroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. All the cars and locomotives not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. All bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur, and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and REBUILDING THE RAILROAD. 47 Charleston and the Nashville and Chattanooga roads unite. The rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply the army. From Bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river supplements the road. General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. He had no tools to work with except those of the pio- neers— axes, picks, and spades. With these he was able to intrench his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the enemy. As he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to Nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. He had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be found. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. When these were not near enough to the troops for protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. Black- smith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved up in like manner. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. Axemen were put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives when the road should 48 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. be completed. Car-builders were set to work repair- ing the locomotives and cars. Thus everv branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer except what the command itself furnished. But rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full capacity. There were no rails except those in use. To supply these deficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except ten. I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to points on the river and on the Memphis and Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the railroads except the Memphis and Charleston to Nashville. The military manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material. General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms ; the length of road repaired was one hun- dred and two miles. The. enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against Burnside or were going to GENERAL BURN SIDE'S SITUATION. 49 Nashville, went no farther than Cleveland. Their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at Washington, and, on account of our helpless con- dition at Chattanooga, caused me much uneasiness. Dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do something for Burnside's relief ; calling attention to the importance of holding East Tennessee ; saying the President was much concerned for the protec- tion of the loyal people in that section, etc. We had not at Chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a supply train. Rein- forcements could not help Burnside, because he had neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them ; hardly, indeed, bread and meat for the men he had. There was no relief possible for him except by ex- pelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and about Chattanooga. On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about fifteen thousand troops, besides Wheelers cavalry, five thousand more, to go against Burnside. The situation seemed desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up. The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for the safety of Burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief. On the 7th, before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I Vol. 11.— 4 50 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. ordered Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley. I directed him to take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them: to move the necessary artillery. But he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order. Nothing was left to be done but to answer Washington dispatches as best I could ; urge Sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and en- courage Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be relieved. All of Burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammuni- tion held out. He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held south and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his base and make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when the battle should begin. Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon ; but from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. Burnside's suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. On the 14th I tele- graphed him : " Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force will be ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest. If you can hold Longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing ORDERS FOR BATTLE. 5 I and falling back can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I will be able to force the enemy back from here and place a force between Longstreet and Bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to his supplies. Sherman would have been here before this but for high water in Elk River driving him some thirty miles up that river to cross." And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as follows : "Your dispatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With your showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment and save the most productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry Lookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. This favors us. To further con- firm this, Sherman's advance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton. The remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from Whiteside to Kelly's Ferry, thus be- ing concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley. Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only reach there on the 1 6th. This will bring it to the 19th as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until this time. I can hardly con- ceive of the enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing 52 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT, for Kentucky. If they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will ascertain if they have started, and inform you. It will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from here ? " Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th. That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. He was in a position threatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon, Sherman reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day. My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival,* except the dates, which could * Chattanooga, November 18, 1863. Major-General W. T. Sherman : Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to Major- General Thomas. You having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with the South ; but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the result of our first effort is known. I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to PLANS FOR THE ATTACH. S3 not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no special advantage to us now. Hooker was in- structed to send Howard's corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chatta- nooga; with the remainder of the command, Hooker Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or thereabouts. U. S. GRANT, Maj.-Gen'l. Chattanooga, November 18, 1863. Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Chattanooga : All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not be- ing provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of Chicka- mauga ; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division in 54 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OR U. S. GRANT. was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower pali- sades, and so get into Chattanooga valley. The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so as to readiness to move wherever ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simul- taneously with him as possible. The junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become neces- sary. All these troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or un- necessarily fired away. You will call on the engineer department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek. U. S. GRANT, Major- General. PLANS FOR THE ATTACK. 55 threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like service on our right. His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley in the most expedi- tious way possible ; cross the latter valley rapidly to Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks. To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at Brown's Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of Mission Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on- the ridge. There are two streams called Chickamauga emptying into the Tennessee River east of Chatta- nooga— North Chickamauga, taking its rise in Ten- nessee, flowing south, and emptying into the river some seven or eight miles east ; while the South Chickamauga, which takes its rise in Georgia, flows northward, and empties into the Tennessee some 56 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. three or four miles above the town. There were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the North Chickamauga River, their presence there being un- known to the enemy. At night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each boat. A few were to land east of the mouth of the South Chicka- mauga, capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two banks of the river. The rest were to land on the south side of the Tennes- see, where Missionary Ridge would strike it if pro- longed, and a sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side to ferry over the main body of Sherman's command while those left on the south side intrenched themselves. Thomas was to move out from his lines facing the ridge, leaving enough of Palmer's corps to guard against an attack down the valley. Lookout Valley being of no present value to us, and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure Missionary Ridge, Hooker's orders were changed. His revised orders brought him to Chattanooga by the established route north of the Tennessee. He was then to move out to the right to Rossville. Hooker's position in Lookout Valley was abso- lutely essential to us so long as Chattanooga was besieged. It was the key to our line for supplying HOOKER'S POSITION. 57 the army. But it was not essential after the enemy was dispersed from our front, or even after the bat- tle for this purpose was begun. Hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past Look- out Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, and up to Missionary Ridge. By crossing the north face of Lookout the troops would come into Chattanooga Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the valley, and would necessarily force its evacua- tion. Orders were accordingly given to march by this route. But days before the battle began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action were all considered. The passage over the mountain was a difficult one to make in the face of an enemy. It might consume so much time as to lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they were more wanted. After reaching Chattanooga Valley, the creek of the same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be crossed. I was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep Lookout Moun- tain until we got through with the troops on Mis- sionary Ridge. By marching Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream, and re- crossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named time ; when in this new position, he would have Chattanooga Creek behind him, and the attack on Missionary Ridge would unquestion- 58 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT. ably cause the evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on Lookout Mountain. Hooker's order was changed accordingly. As ex- plained elsewhere, the original order had to be re- verted to, because of a flood in the river rendering the bridge at Brown's Ferry unsafe for the passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all the troops together against Missionary Ridge. The next day after Sherman's arrival I took him, with Generals Thomas and Smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed them the ground over which Sherman had to march, and pointed out generally what he was expected to do. I, as well as the authorities in Washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for Burnside's safety. Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one who did not share in this anxiety. Nothing could be done for him, however, until Sherman's troops were up. As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, Sherman started for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, I believe, from Kelly's Ferry. Sherman had left Bridgeport the night of the 14th, reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the above-described inspection on the morning of the 1 6th, and started back the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the impor- tance of time. SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS. 59 His march was conducted with as much expedi- tion as the roads and season would admit of. By the 20th he was himself at Brown's Ferry with the head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division (Ewing's) was at Trenton, sent that way to create the impression that Lookout was to be taken from the south. Sherman received his orders at the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the following morning. News had been received that the battle had been commenced at Knoxville. Burnside had been cut off from telegraphic communications. The Presi- dent, the Secretary of War, and General Halleck, were in an agony of suspense. My suspense was also great, but more endurable, because I was where I could soon do something to relieve the situation. It was impossible to get Sherman's troops up for the next day. I then asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the morning of the 2 2d, and ordered Thomas to move on that date. But the elements were against us. It rained all the 20th and 21st. The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the pontoons in place. General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander under Burnside, was at this time occupying a posi- tion farther up the valley than Knoxville — about Maynardville — and was still in telegraphic communi- cation with the North. A dispatch was received 60 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP V. S. GRANT. from him saying that he was threatened from the east. The following was sent in reply : " If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that our attack on Bragg will commence in the morning. If suc- cessful, such a move will be made as I think will relieve East Tennessee, if he can hold out. Longstreet passing through our lines to Kentucky need not cause alarm. He would find the country so bare that he would lose his transportation and artillery before reaching Kentucky, and would meet such a force before he got through, that he could not return." Meantime, Sherman continued his crossing with- out intermission as fast as his troops could be got up. The crossing had to be effected in full view of the enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain. Once over, however, the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hills on the north side, and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountain or Missionary Ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the bank of the river. But when Sherman's advance reached a point oppo- site the town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, it will be remembered, had been concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march to join the troops on the south sideD His crossing was in full view both from Missionary Ridge and the top of Lookout, and the enemy of course supposed these troops to be Sherman's. This enabled Sherman to get to his assigned position without discovery. CHAPTER XLIII. PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE ENEMY — SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUN- TAIN GENERAL HOOKER^ FIGHT. ON the 20th, when so much was occurring to dis- courage— rains falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown's Ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge ; news coming of a battle raging at Knoxville ; of Willcox being threatened by a force from the east — a letter was received from Bragg which contained these words : "As there may still be some non-com- batants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early with- drawal." Of course, I understood that this was a device intended to deceive ; but I did not know what the intended deception was. On the 2 2d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg was leaving our front, and on that day Buckner's division was sent to reinforce Longstreet at Knoxville, and another division started to follow but was recalled. The object of Bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some 62 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. way to detain me until Knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be returned to Chattanooga. During the night of the 21st the rest of the pon- toon boats, completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in North Chick- amauga. The material for the roadway over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the Tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest. Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress in Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations for his relief. I determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the Army of the Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th. The position occupied by the Army of the Cum- berland had been made very strong for defence dur- ing the months it had been besieged. The line was about a mile from the town, and extended from Citico Creek, a small stream running near the base of Missionary Ridge and emptying into the Tennes- see about two miles below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, on the left, to Chattanooga Creek on the right. All commanding points on the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. The important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified and supplied with a proper arma- ment. Among the elevations so fortified was one to THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE ENEMY. 63 the east of the town, named Fort Wood. It owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and Missionary Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. Fort Wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the enemy's line. On the morning of the 23d Thomas, according to instructions, moved Granger's corps of two divisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood commanding, to the foot of Fort Wood, and formed them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan on the right, Wood to the left, extending to or near Citico Creek. Palmer, com- manding the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and south-west. He supported Sheri- dan with one division (Baird's), while his other divis- ion under Johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved to any point. Howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre. The picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. At two o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. By this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position all that was going on. The signal for advance was given by a booming of cannon from Fort Wood and other points on the line. The rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occu- pied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. These too were carried before 64 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance guards. But it was not without loss on both sides. This movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to this time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. During the following night they were made strong. We lost in this preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were capt- ured. With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first day The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only have been assured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I should have rested more easily. But we were doing the best we could for him and the cause. By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a position to move, though one division (Oster- haus's) had not yet crossed the river at Brown's Ferry. The continuous rise in the Tennessee had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to cross ; but I was determined to move that night even without this division. Orders were sent to Osterhaus accord- MAP OF THK BATTLEFIELD CHATTANOOGA. Scale of Miles.. UNITED STATES FORCES CONFEDERATE " Vol. ii.— 5 66 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. ingly to report to Hooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th. Because of the break in the bridge, Hooker's orders were again changed, but this time only back to those first ofiven to him. General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as Chief Engineer of the Military Division. To him were given the general direction of moving troops by the boats from North Chickamauga, laying the bridge after they reached their position, and gen- erally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief engineer. During the night General Morgan L. Smith's division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the brigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the river. During this night also General J. M. Brannan, chief of artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the Army of the Cumber- land, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end of the bridge was to rest. He had to use Sher- man's artillery horses for this purpose, Thomas hav- ing none. At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed out from the North Chicka- mauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE. 6 J loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. The boats with their precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the at- tention of any one who could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of South Chickamauga. Here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket guard known to be at that point. The guard were surprised, and twenty of their number captured. The remainder of the troops effected a landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good results. The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from the north side of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the pur- pose. A steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. The rest of M. L. Smith's division came first, then the division of John E. Smith. The troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their position. By daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well covered by the works they had built. The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was now begun. The ferrying over the infantry was continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, how- ever, as fast as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. By a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South Chick- 68 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT. amauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades below, and all the infantry and artil- lery were on the south bank of the Tennessee. Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. By one o'clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the course of Chickamauga River ; J. E. Smith next to the right and a little to the rear ; and Ewing still farther to the right and also a little to the rear of J. E. Smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come from that direction. A good skirmish line preceded each of these col- umns. Soon the foot of the hill was reached ; the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports. By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height without having sustained much loss. A brigade from each division was now brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand. The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that Lookout Moun- tain and the top of Missionary Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. But now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. Later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE. 69 too, failed, and Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained. Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at Chickamauga Station. All of Sherman's command was now south of the Tennessee. During the after- noon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded and carried from the field. Thomas having 'done on the 23d what was ex- pected of him on the 24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his position. Howard, however, effected a crossing of Citico Creek and a junction with Sherman, and was directed to report to him. With two or three regi- ments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks of the Tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid. He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway put upon it. Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed. While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker was engaged on the west. 70 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. He had three divisions: Osterhaus's, of the 15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary's, 12th corps, Army of the Potomac ; and Cruft's, 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland. Geary was on the right at Wauhatchie, Cruft at the centre, and Osterhaus near Brown's Ferry. These troops were all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. These brigades occupied the summit of the mountain. General Carter L. Ste- venson was in command of the whole. Why any troops, except artillery with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, I do not see. A hundred men could have held the summit — which is a palisade for more than thirty feet down — against the assault of any number of men from the position Hooker occupied. The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. Farther up, the ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. On the east side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging up it, connects the town of Chat- tanooga with the summit. Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. J I Geary's division, supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a crossing. The re- mainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. Osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross it. The bridge was seized by Gross's brigade after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. This attracted the enemy so that Geary's movement farther up was not observed. A heavy mist ob- scured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain. He crossed the creek almost un- observed, and captured the picket of over forty men on guard near by. He then commenced ascending the mountain directly in his front. By this time the enemy was seen coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing into their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. By eleven o'clock the bridge was complete. Osterhaus was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed and captured. While the operations at the bridge were pro- gressing, Geary was pushing up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his front, and in face of the guns on top of the moun- tain. The enemy, seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by Cruft and Osterhaus. Soon these were up abreast of 72 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT. Geary, and the whole command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. By noon Geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper pali- sade to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now made our line a continu- ous one. It was in full view, extending from the Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the base of Mission Ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to Chattanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper pali- sade. The day was hazy, so that Hooker's oper- ations were not visible to us except at moments when the clouds would rise. But the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. During the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Look- out all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT. 73 the time. At four o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable. By a little after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him. These troops had to cross Chattanooga Creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it, and by night the commander, General Carlin, reported to Hooker and was assigned to his left. I now tele- graphed to Washington: "The fight to-day pro- gressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of Mis- sionary Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at Chickamauga Creek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. Hooker reports two thousand prisoners taken, be- sides which a small number have fallen into our hands from Missionary Ridge." The next day the President replied : " Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here. Well done. Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside." And Halleck also telegraphed : " I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. I fear that Burn- side is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove fatal. I know you will do all in your power to relieve him." The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had been sent to the North Chicka- mauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited 74 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRAN 7 in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of citizens. On the night of the 24th his division, hav- ing crossed with Sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain to the north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued to a late hour in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point. CHAPTER XLIV. BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA A GALLANT CHARGE COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES GENERAL BRAGG REMARKS ON CHATTANOOGA. AT twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give orders for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to encourage Burn- side. Sherman was directed to attack at daylight. Hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he still remained ; if he had gone, then to move di- rectly to Rossville and operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge. Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Mission- ary Ridge. As I was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further orders from me. The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day. Bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers — pre- sumably staff officers — could be seen coming and going constantly. 76 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, over which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. The problem now was to get to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on the point ; and back farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the first. Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held the hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of Mis- sionary Ridge ; Loomis along the west base, sup- ported by two brigades of John E. Smith's division ; and Corse with his brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. The ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith's troops were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west side. The troops advanced rapidly and car- ried the extreme end of the rebel works. Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located. The enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the position we had gained, but BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA. yj without success. The contest lasted for two hours. Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in this assault. Sherman now threat- ened both Bragg's flank and his stores, and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to strengthen his right. From the posi- tion I occupied I could see column after column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman. Every Confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was concentrated upon him. J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged up the west side of the ridge to the support of Corse's com- mand, over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the enemy. He lay here for a time, but the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. A few hundred yards brought Smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily re- formed, when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his intrenchments. Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith from the position I occupied, I di- rected Thomas to send a division to reinforce him. Baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of Orchard Knob. It had to march a considerable distance directly under the eyes of the enemy to reach its position. Bragg at once commenced mass- 78 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT. ing in the same direction. This was what I wanted. But it had now got to be late in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compel- ling Bragg to mass in that direction also. The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain dur- ing the night, as I expected he would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hooker was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the de- struction above named. He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected from his forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it was to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge. But Sherman's condition was getting so criti- cal that the assault for his relief could not be de- layed any longer. Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed Thomas to order the charge at once.* I watched eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made. The centre of the line which was * In this order authority was given for the troops to reform after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying the ridge. A GALLANT CHARGE. 79 to make the charge was near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by an interven- ing forest. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to General Wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. He replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. I told him to make the charge at once He was off in a moment, and in an incred- ibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before them towards Missionary Ridge. The Confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. Our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and Union troops went over the first line of works almost at the same time. Many rebels were capt- ured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher up the hill. Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued. The retreating hordes being between friends and pur- suers caused the enemy to fire high to avoid kill- ing their own men. In fact, on that occasion the So PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position. Without awaiting further orders or stop- ping to reform, on our troops went to the second line of works ; over that and on for the crest — thus effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th * for this charge. I watched their progress with intense interest. The fire along the rebel line was terrific. Cannon and musket balls filled the air : but the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition ex- pended. The pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the Confederate barriers at different points in front * Chattanooga, November 24, 1863. Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Chattanooga : General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek. I have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in co-operation. Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road. U. S. GRANT, Major-General. COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY. 8 1 of both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. The re- treat of the enemy along most of his line was pre- cipitate and the panic so great that Bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their flight. Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a point above where the enemy crossed. He met some resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of Mis- sionary Ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. It was now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right and left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the movement before these dis- positions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. To Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished. While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General Thomas with staff, General Gordon Vol. il— 6 82 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. Granger, commander of the corps making the as- sault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which the entire field could be observed. The moment the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defences, I ordered Granger to join his command, and mounting my horse I rode to the front. General Thomas left about the same time. Sheridan on the extreme right was already in pur- suit of the enemy east of the ridge. Wood, who commanded the division to the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in the charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit. To the left, in Baird's front where Bragg's troops had massed against Sherman, the resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. I ordered Granger to follow the enemy with Wood's division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy had taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way. The enemy con- fronting Sherman, now seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also. Sherman, however, was not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received orders to pursue at day- light in the morning. As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he directed his reserves, Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland, to push PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES. 8$ over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chicka- mauga, and to move forward to Chickamauga Sta- tion. He ordered Howard to move up the stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow Davis at four o'clock in the morning. Morgan L. Smith was or- dered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still held. Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies. The rest of Sherman's com- mand was directed to follow Howard at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad towards Grays- ville. Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the destruction of the bridge at that point. He got his troops over, with the exception of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock. Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the remainder of his command. At Rossville he came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were captured. Hooker's position during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, ex- tending east of the ridge. Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville. 84 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could hold out ; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside. Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for the relief of Burnside the mo- ment the way should be clear. Thomas was directed to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. Grangers corps was to move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston, and up that to Knoxville, accompanied by the boat. In addition to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds of am- munition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in haversacks. In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the Potomac, from the Army of the Ten- nessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland par- ticipated. In fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the Tennessee River so mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept together, under their respective com- manders, during the battle. Hooker, on the right, had Geary's division of the 12th corps, Army of the Potomac ; Osterhaus's division of the 15th corps, PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES. 85 Army of the Tennessee ; and Cruft's division of the Army of the Cumberland. Sherman had three divis- ions of his own army, Howard's corps from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis's divi- sion of the Army of the Cumberland. There was no jealousy — hardly rivalry. Indeed, I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of this intermingling of commands. All saw a de- fiant foe surrounding them, and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was accomplished. The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily than was expected by reason of Bragg's making several grave mistakes : first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops ; sec- ond, in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle ; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his impregnable position. It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on Missionary Ridge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious differ- ence between Bragg and Longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the campaign against Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. 86 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. I had known both Bragg and Longstreet before the war, the latter very well. We had been three years at West Point together, and, after my graduation, for a time in the same regiment. Then we served together in the Mexican War. I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionally subsequently. I could well understand how there might be an irreconcilable difference between them. Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-in- formed man, professionally and otherwise. He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. A man of the highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army he was in fre- quent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his commanding officer infring- ing his prerogatives ; as a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect, even of the most trivial order. I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg. On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. He was first lieu- tenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other duty. As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the quartermaster — himself GENERAL BRAGG. 87 — for something he wanted. As quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his reasons for so doing. As company commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition called for nothing but what he was en- titled to, and that it was the duty of the quarter- master to fill it. As quartermaster he still persisted that he was right. In this condition of affairs Braoror referred the whole matter to the command- ing officer of the post. The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed : " My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with yourself ! " Longstreet was an entirely different man. He was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he had the courage to maintain. He was never on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given. It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knox- ville for the reason stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own military genius, and thought he saw a chance of ' killing two birds with one stone." On several occasions during the war he came to the relief of the Union army by means of his superior military genius. $& PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF V. S. GRANT. I speak advisedly when I say Mr. Davis prided himself on his military capacity. He says so him- self, virtually, in his answer to the notice of his nomination to the Confederate presidency. Some of his generals have said so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy. My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanooga were as fought. Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did ; Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweep across Chattanooga Valley and get across the south end of the ridge near Rossville. When Hooker had secured that position the Army of the Cumberland was to assault in the centre. Be- fore Sherman arrived, however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River. The waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing troops upon it. For this reason Hooker's orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were originally. Note. — From this point on this volume was written (with the exception of the campaign in the Wilderness, which had been previously written) by General Grant, after his great illness in April, and the present arrange- ment of the subject-matter was made by him between the loth and 18th of July, 1S85. CHAPTER XLV. THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE VISITING KNOXVILLE CIPHER DISPATCHES WITHHOLDING ORDERS. CHATTANOOGA now being secure to the Na- tional troops beyond any doubt, I immediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, about the situation of which the President, in particular, was very anxious. Prior to the battles, I had made prep- arations for sending troops to the relief of Burnside at the very earliest moment after securing Chatta- nooga. We had there two little steamers which had been built and fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run. General Thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with rations and ammunition and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops. General Granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand men, was to start the moment Missionary Ridge was carried, and under no cir- cumstances were the troops to return to their old §6 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. S. GRANT. camps. With the provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, it was supposed he could hold out until Longstreet was driven away, after which event East Tennessee would furnish abundance of food for Burnside's army and his own also. While following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the 27th, part of the time by the road to Ringgold, I directed Thomas, verbally, not to start Granger until he received further orders from me ; advising him that I was going to the front to more fully see the situation. I was not right sure but that Bragg s troops might be over their stam- pede by the time they reached Dalton. In that case Bragg might think it well to take the road back to Cleveland, move thence towards Knoxville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash upon Burnside. When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the 27th, I saw that the retreat was most earnest. The enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with the exception of Cleburne's division, which was act- ing as rear-guard to cover the retreat. When Hooker moved from Rossville toward Ringgold Palmer's division took the road to Grays- ville, and Sherman moved by the way of Chicka- THE RELIEF OF KMOXVILLE. §1 mauga Station toward the same point. As soon as I saw the situation at Ringgold I sent a staff offi- cer back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas of the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start Granger at once. Feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the relief of Burn- side I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at Ringgold through the day to prepare for the return of our troops. Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between East Chickamauga Creek and Taylor's Ridge, and about twenty miles south-east from Chat- tanooga. I arrived just as the artillery that Hooker had left behind at Chattanooga Creek got up. His men were attacking Cleburne's division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as to cover the retreat of the Confederate army through a narrow gorge which presents itself at that point. Just beyond the gorge the valley is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great many times in the course of the first mile. This attack was unfortunate, and cost us some men un- necessarily. Hooker captured, however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were left upon the field. I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the mills and all 9 2 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT, other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not to make any wanton destruction. At this point Sherman came up, having reached Graysville with his troops, where he found Palmer had preceded him. Palmer had picked up many pris- oners and much abandoned property on the route. I went back in the evening to Graysville with Sher- man, remained there over night and did not return to Chattanooga until the following night, the 29th. I then found that Thomas had not yet started Granger, thus having lost a full day which I deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of Knoxville. Thomas and Granger were aware that on the 23d of the month Burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve days and during that time he could hold out against Longstreet, but if not relieved within the time in- dicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt to retreat. To effect a retreat would have been an impossibility. He was already very low in ammu- nition, and with an army pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies. Finding that Granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, I sent word to General Sherman of the situation and di- rected him to march to the relief of Knoxville. I also gave him the problem that we had to solve — ■ THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. 93 that Burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, and that he must be relieved within that time. Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his re- turn from Graysville, having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from Dalton to Cleve- land and Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these troops had not yet returned to camp. I was very loath to send Sherman, because his men needed rest after their long march from Memphis and hard fighting at Chattanooga. But I had be- come satisfied that Burnside would not be rescued if his relief depended upon General Grangers move- ments. Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked ra- tions in their haversacks. Expecting to be back in their tents by that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them neither overcoats nor blankets. The weather was already cold, and at night they must have suffered more or less. The two days' rations had already lasted them five days ; and they were now to go through a country which had been run over so much by Confederate troops that there was but little probability of finding much food. They did, however, succeed in capturing some flour. They also found a good deal of bran in some of the mills, which the men made up into bread; 94 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. and in this and other ways they eked out an exist- ence until they could reach Knoxville. I was so very anxious that Burnside should get news of the steps being taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if it became necessary, that I determined to send a message to him. I therefore sent a member of my staff, Col- onel J. H. Wilson, to get into Knoxville if he could, report to Burnside the situation fully, and give him all the encouragement possible. Mr. Charles A. Dana was at Chattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before I assumed command. Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson, and did accompany him. I put the information of what was being done for the relief of Knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or other it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the hands of General Longstreet. They made the trip safely ; General Longstreet did learn of Sherman's coming in advance of his reaching there, and Burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it had been necessary. Burnside had stretched a boom across the Hol- ston River to catch scows and flats as they floated down. On these, by previous arrangements with the loyal people of East Tennessee, were placed flour and corn, with forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of the Union troops. THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. 95 They also drove cattle into Knoxville by the east side, which was not covered by the enemy ; so that when relief arrived Burnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported. Our total loss (not including Burnside's) in all these engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing. We captured 6,142 prisoners — about 50 per cent, more than the enemy reported for their total loss — 40 pieces of artil- lery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms. The enemy's loss in arms was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a great many that were found abandoned. I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men. Bragg had about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable. It was his own fault that he did not have more men present. He had sent Longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command. He did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communi- cation by way of Brown's and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing full rations and supplies of every kind ; and also when he knew reinforce- ments were coming to me. Knoxville was of no 96 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. earthly use to him while Chattanooga was in our hands. If he should capture Chattanooga, Knox- ville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a struggle. I have never been able to see the wisdom of this move. Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that he was on the north side of the Tennessee River, he sent Buckner's division to re- inforce Longstreet. He also started another di- vision a day later, but our attack having commenced before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered it back. It had got so far, however, that it could not return to Chattanooga in time to be of service there. It is possible this latter blunder may have been made by Bragg having become confused as to what was going on on our side. Sherman had, as already stated, crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River at Brown's Ferry, in full view of Bragg's troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before the attack. They then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of the troops on Missionary Ridge until they met their assault. Bragg knew it was Sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the Ten- nessee River to the relief of Knoxville and that Longstreet was therefore in danger. But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet, cannot be ac- THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. 9 J counted for in any way I know of. If he had capt- ured Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. It would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from Chattanooga safely. It was a manifold greater victory to drive away the besieging army ; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly annihilate it. The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we were the attacking party. The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361 : but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. There was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they could. Then, too, Chattanooga, following in the same half year with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was much the same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in the North the fall and winter before. If the same license had been allowed the people and press in the South that was allowed in the North, Chattanooga would prob- ably have been the last battle fought for the pres- ervation of the Union. General William F. Smith's services in these bat- Vol. 11. — 7 98 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. ties had been such that I thought him eminently entitled to promotion. I was aware that he had previously been named by the President for promo- tion to the grade of major-general, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination. I was not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a major-generalcy. My recommendation was heeded and the appoint- ment made. Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course, informed the authorities at Washington — the President and Secretary of War — of the fact, which caused great rejoicing there. The President especially was rejoiced that Knoxville had been re- lieved * without further bloodshed. The safety of Burnside's army and the loyal people of East Ten- nessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the President for several months, during which time * Washington, D. C, December 8, 1863, 10.2 a.m. Maj. -General U. S. Grant: Understanding that your lodgment at Knoxville and at Chatta- nooga is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command, my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless you all. A. LINCOLN, President U. S. HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE. 99 he was doing all he could to relieve the situation ; sending a new commander * with a few thousand troops by the way of Cumberland Gap, and tele- graphing me daily, almost hourly, to "remember Burnside," "do something for Burnside," and other appeals of like tenor. He saw no escape for East Tennessee until after our victory at Chattanooga. Even then he was afraid that Burnside might be out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpow- ered : and his anxiety was still intense until he heard that Longstreet had been driven from the field. Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some twenty miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that Longstreet would leave the State. The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a short distance farther on and sub- sisted his army for the entire winter off East Ten- nessee. Foster now relieved Burnside. Sherman made disposition of his troops along the Tennes- see River in accordance with instructions. I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and, about the 20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee. Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my entire military division, and also with the authorities at Washington. While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my * General John G. Foster. IOO PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my command and Washington. Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the winter,* so I set myself to the task of hav- ing troops in positions from which they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies so as to be ready to claim a due share of the ene- my's attention upon the appearance of the first good weather in the spring. I expected to retain the command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaign against Atlanta. I also had great hopes of having a campaign made against Mobile from the Gulf. I expected after Atlanta fell to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the West by way of the road running through Au- gusta to Atlanta and thence south-west. I was pre- paring to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to Mobile if * During this winter the citizens of Jo Davies County, 111., sub- scribed for and had a diamond-hilted sword made for General Grant, which was always known as the Chattanooga sword. The scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the names of the battles in which General Grant had participated. Congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at Chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for Vicksburg and Chattanooga. All such things are now in the possession of the government at Washington. VISITING KNOXVILLE. IOI that city was in our possession : if not, to Savan- nah ; and in this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy. But the spring campaign against Mobile was not made. The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland Gap until their animals had nearly all starved. I now determined to go myself to see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring, and if not to abandon it. Accordingly I left Nashville in the latter part of December by rail for Chattanooga. From Chattanooga I took one of the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there, and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinch with the Tennessee. From that point the railroad had been repaired up to Knoxville and out east to Straw- berry Plains. I went by rail therefore to Knoxville, where I remained for several days. General John G. Foster was then commanding the Department of the Ohio. It was an intensely cold winter, the thermom- eter being down as low as zero every morning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on my way from there on horseback to Lexington, Ken- tucky, the first point where I could reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville. The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of broken wagons and dead 102 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. animals, much as I had found it on my first trip to Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. The road had been cut up to as great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that condition frozen ; so that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains to Lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one, and very disagree- able. I found a great many people at home along that route, both in Tennessee and Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. They would collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me, generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. The people naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in the party. I was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. The crowds would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of quietly dismounting and getting into the house. It also gave me an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another about their general. Those remarks were apt to be more com- plimentary to the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were all in after a hard day's ride. I was back in Nash- ville by the 13th of January, 1864. CIPHER DISPATCHES. IO3 When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person along who could turn dis- patches into cipher, and who could also read the cipher dispatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly. Under the rules of the War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton had taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone, should have the ciphers. The operators possessed of the ciphers, as well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders whom they were serving imme- diately under, and had to report to the War Depart- ment through General Stager all the dispatches which they received or forwarded. I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at Nashville, because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to be for- warded from there. As I have said, it was necessary for me also to have an operator during this inspec- tion who had possession of this cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the War De- partment without my dispatches being read by all the operators along the line of wires over which they were transmitted. Accordingly I ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B. Comstock, of the Corps of Engineers, whom I had selected as a wise and discreet man who certainly T04 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF V. S. GRANT. could be trusted with the cipher if the operator at my headquarters could. The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to Captain Comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the War Department were not to give it to anybody — the commanding general or any one else. I told him I would see whether he would or not. He said that if he did he would be punished. I told him if he did not he most cer- tainly would be punished. Finally, seeing that pun- ishment was certain if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his disobedience to his orders) from the War Depart- ment, he yielded. When I returned from Knoxville I found quite a commotion. The operator had been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be re- lieved. I informed the Secretary of War, or his assistant secretary in charge of the telegraph, Stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only obeyed my orders. It was absolutely necessary for me to have the cipher, and the man would most cer- tainly have been punished if he had not delivered it ; that they would have to punish me if they punished anybody, or words to that effect. This was about the only thing approaching a dis- agreeable difference between the Secretary of War and myself that occurred until the war was over, WITHHOLDING ORDERS. IO5 when we had another little spat. Owing to his nat- ural disposition to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out of the adjutant-gen- eral's office until he had approved it. This was done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined them and given his approval. He never disturbed himself, either, in examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him ; so that orders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction them. I remon- strated against this in writing, and the Secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of General-in-Chief of the Army. But he soon lapsed again and took control much as before. After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had pro- posed to Burnside that he should go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee ; but Burnside assured him that with the troops which had been brought by Granger, and which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of Longstreet without availing himself of this offer. As before stated Sherman's command had left their camps north of the Tennessee, near Chattanooga, with two 106 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. days' rations in their haversacks, without coats or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps by the end of that time. The weather was now cold and they were suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had it been required, for the good of the cause which, had brought them into service. Sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old camp on the Tennessee River. CHAPTER XLVI. OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI LONGSTREET IN EAST TEN- NESSEE COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT - GENERAL — COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN. SOON after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to distribute his forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville ; Sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back to Mis- sissippi, to the limits of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the pur- pose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on the east bank of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our boats. He expected also to have the co-operation of Banks to do the same thing on the west shore. Of course I ap- proved heartily. About the ioth of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where Hurlbut commanded, and got to- gether his Memphis men, or ordered them collected and sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg and out to where McPherson was in command, and 108 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. had him organize his surplus troops so as to give him about 20,000 men in all. Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was occupying Meridian with his headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable force of cavalry scattered west of him. He determined, therefore, to move directly upon Meridian. I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General Sooy Smith to Sherman's department, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman got to Memphis. Hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and Sherman ordered him to reinforce Smith so as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against Forrest, who was then known to be south-east from Memphis. Smith was ordered to move about the 1 st of February. While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of Hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could gather. When these scouts returned it was through them that he got the information of Gen- eral Polk's being at Meridian, and of the strength and disposition of his command. Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, com- posed of thoroughly well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective. Smith's com- mand was nearly double that of Forrest, but not OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI. 1 09 equal, man to man, for the lack of a successful ex- perience such as Forrest's men had had. The fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an extent that can hardly be counted by percentage. The difference in result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. This same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and for the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had carried on neither army could present a more effective officer than he was. Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his expedition, meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the Big Black, and with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached Jackson, Mississippi. This latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on the 8th, and Morton on the 9th. Up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. Here, how- ever, there were indications of the concentration of Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close together. He had no serious en- gagement ; but he met some of the enemy who de- stroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur, Missis- sippi, where, by the way, Sherman himself came near being picked up. He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, HO PER SOYA L MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. the enemy having retreated toward Demopolis, Ala- bama. He spent several days in Meridian in thor- oughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for the purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who he supposed had met Forrest before this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory be- cause of a superiority of numbers. Hearing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip to Vicksburg. There he learned that Smith, while waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River, instead of getting off on the ist as expected, had not left until the nth. Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in For- rest's favor. Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a co-operative movement with him against Shreve- port, subject to my approval. I disapproved of Sherman's going himself, because I had other im- portant work for him to do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of Banks, though their time to remain absent must be limited. We must have them for the spring campaign. The trans- Mississippi movement proved abortive. My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign and siege, had while there con- tracted disease, which grew worse, until he had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January I obtained permission to go to St. Louis, where he 112 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT. was staying at the time, to see him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. While I was per- mitted to go, I was not permitted to turn over my command to any one else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to communicate reg- ularly with all parts of my division and with Wash- ington, just as though I had remained at Nash- ville. When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone there again to make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern part of Tennessee co-operate with Sherman's movement in Mississippi. I directed Thomas, and Logan who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a threaten- ing movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had again relieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as possible there. I learned through Confederate sources that John- ston had already sent two divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate against Sherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee. Seeing that Johnston had depleted in this way, I di- rected Thomas to send at least ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division which was already to the east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in command in East Tennessee, of this move- ment of troops into his department and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received. My object LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE. I 13 was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part of the preparations for my spring campaign. About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the Department of the Ohio after Burn- side until Schofield relieved him,* advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep Longstreet just where he was ; that he was perfectly quiet in East Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for their cause% I thought the advice was good, and, adopt- ing that view, countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet. On the 1 2th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, if possible ; and I directed him to move without delay. Finding that he had not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him how important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with Sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. Then * Washington, D. C. , December 29, 1863. Maj. -General U. S. Grant : General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command on account of disability from old wounds. Should his request be granted, who would you like as his successor ? It is possible that Schofield will be sent to your command. H. W. HALLECK, {Official}} General-in-Chief. Vol. 11. — 8 114 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. again on the 21st, he not yet having started, I asked him if he could not start the next day. He finally got off on the 2 2d or 23d. The enemy fell back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as strong and farther to the rear. Thomas reported that he could not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. He soon fell back. Schofield also had to return for the same reason. He could not carry supplies with him, and Long- street was between him and the supplies still left in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding from theirs. On the 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman's suc- cess, which eased my mind very much. The next day, the 3d, I was ordered to Washington. The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had passed through Congress and be- came a law on the 26th of February. My nomi- nation had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of March and confirmed the next day (the 2d). I was ordered to Washington on the 3d to receive my commission, and started the day following that. The commission was handed to me on the 9th. It was delivered to me at the Executive Mansion by President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my COMMISSIONED LIE U TEN A N T- GENE RA L . XI5 eldest son, those of my staff who were with me and a few other visitors. The President in presenting my commission read from a paper — stating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines of reply. The President said : " General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you lieutenant-general in the Army of the United States. With this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal con- currence." To this I replied : " Mr. President, I accept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor con- ferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the respon- sibilities now devolving on me ; and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above I 1 6 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men." On the icth I visited the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at Brandy Station ; then re- turned to Washington, and pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the com- mands there and giving general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring campaign. It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even if I was made lieutenant-general ; but when I got to Washington and saw the situ- ation it was plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be. No one else could, probably, resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and pursue others. I determined, therefore, before I started back to have Sherman advanced to my late position, McPherson to Sherman's in command of the department, and Logan to the command of McPherson's corps. These changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. My commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of March, 1864. On the following day, as already stated, I visited General Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, at his head- quarters at Brandy Station, north of the Rapidan. I had known General Meade slightly in the Mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit. COMMANDING ARMIES OF THE UNITED STA TES. I I 7 I was a stranger to most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all except the officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican war. There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army before my promotion. One was the consolidation of five corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands. Meade evidently thought that I might want to make still one more change not yet ordered. He said to me that I might want an officer who had served with me in the West, mentioning Sherman specially, to take his place. If so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. He urged that the work before us was of such vast impor- tance to the whole nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the way of select- ing the right men for all positions. For himself, he would serve to the best of his ability wherever placed. I assured him that I had no thought of substituting any one for him. As to Sherman, he could not be spared from the West. This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade than did his great victory at Gettysburg the July before. It is men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the most efficient service. Meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him. He was commanding an army I 1 8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. and, for nearly a year previous to my taking com- mand of all the armies, was in supreme command of the Army of the Potomac — except from the authorities at Washington. All other general offi- cers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands so far as any one present with them was concerned. I tried to make General Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been if I had been in Washington or any other place away from his command. I therefore gave all orders for the movements of the Army of the Potomac to Meade to have them executed. To avoid the neces- sity of having to give orders direct, I established my headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for locating them elsewhere. This sometimes happened, and I had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. On the nth I returned to Wash- ington and, on the day after, orders were published by the War Department placing me in command of all the armies. I had left Washington the night be- fore to return to my old command in the West and to meet Sherman whom I had telegraphed to join me in Nashville. Sherman assumed command of the military di- vision of the Mississippi on the 18th of March, and we left Nashville together for Cincinnati. I had Sherman accompany me that far on my way back to Washington so that we could talk over the COMMANDING ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES. 119 matters about which I wanted to see him, without los- ing any more time from my new command than was necessary. The first point which I wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operation of his com- mand with mine when the spring campaign should commence. There were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war — the res- toration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important commands, namely McClellan, Burn- side and Fremont in the East, and Buell, McCook, Negley and Crittenden in the West. Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by the general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign I thought advisable for the command under me — now Sherman's. General J. E. Johnston was defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia with an army, the largest part of which was stationed at Dalton, about 38 miles south of Chattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of the railroad from Cleve- land with the one from Chattanooga to Atlanta. There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of the armies of the military division of the Mississippi. Johnston's army was the first objective, and that important railroad centre, Atlanta, the second. At the time I wrote General Halleck giving my views of the approaching campaign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it was expected 120 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. that General Banks would be through with the cam- paign which he had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of the Mississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon Mobile by land while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its ability.* The plan therefore was for Sherman to attack John- ston and destroy his army if possible, to capture At- lanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or at least to hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left in the possession of the enemy. This would cut the Con- federacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the Mississippi River had done before. Banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, and circumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all lands. In regard to restoring officers who had been re- lieved from important commands to duty again, I left Sherman to look after those who had been removed in the West while I looked out for the rest. I * See letter to Banks, in General Grant's report, Appendix. FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 121 directed, however, that he should make no assign- ment until I could speak to the Secretary of War about the matter. I shortly after recommended to the Secretary the assignment of General Buell to duty. I received the assurance that duty would be offered to him ; and afterwards the Secretary told me that he had offered Buell an assignment and that the latter had declined it, saying that it would be degra- dation to accept the assignment offered. I under- stood afterwards that he refused to serve under either Sherman or Canby because he had ranked them both. Both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army. Sherman ranked him as a brigadier-general. All of them ranked me in the old army, and Sherman and Buell did as brigadiers. The worst excuse a soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the commander he is ordered to report to. On the 23d of March I was back in Washington, and on the 26th took up my headquarters at Cul- peper Court-House, a few miles south of the head- quarters of the Army of the Potomac. Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the President, I never met Mr. Lincoln until called to the capital to receive my commission as lieutenant- general. I knew him, however, very well and favor- ably from the accounts given by officers under me at the West who had known him all their lives. I had also read the remarkable series of debates be- 122 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. tween Lincoln and Douglas a few years before, when they were rival candidates for the United States Sen- ate. I was then a resident of Missouri, and by no means a " Lincoln man " in that contest ; but I recognized then his great ability. In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them : but that procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the people at the North and Congress, which was always with himy forced him into issuing his series of " Military Orders " — one, two, three, etc. He did not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of them were. All he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed, pledging him- self to use all the power of the government in ren- dering such assistance. Assuring him that I would do the best I could with the means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the War Department, our first interview ended. The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I knew him better. While commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally held conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being otherwise used. FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN. I 23 He and General Halleck both cautioned me against giving the President my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew. I should have said that in our interview the President told me he did not want to know what I proposed to do. But he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted me to hear and then do as I pleased about. He brought out a map of Virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the Federal and Confederate armies up to that time. He pointed out on the map two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that the army might be moved on boats and landed be- tween the mouths of these streams. We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies, and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. I listened respectfully, but did not sug- gest that the same streams would protect Lee's flanks while he was shutting us up. I did not communicate my plans to the Presi- dent, nor did I to the Secretary of War or to Gen- eral Halleck. March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at Culpeper, and the work of preparing for an early campaign commenced. CHAPTER XLVII. THE MILITARY SITUATION — PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF THE CAV- ALRY FLANK MOVEMENTS FORREST AT FORT PIL- LOW GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION COLONEL MOSBY AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAM- PAIGN. WHEN I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this : the Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth ; the line of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the North-west north of that river. A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river were held by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande. East of the Mississippi we held sub- stantially all north of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the State of Tennessee. West Virginia was in our hands ; and that part of old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we also held. On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia ; Plymouth, Wash- THE MILITARY SITUATION. 125 ington and New Berne in North Carolina ; Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal and Fort Pulaski in South Carolina and Georgia ; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola in Florida. The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent, was still in the hands of the enemy. Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division of the Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the Alleghanies and north of Natchez, with a large movable force about Chattanooga. His command was subdivided into four departments, but the commanders all re- ported to Sherman and were subject to his orders. This arrangement, however, insured the better pro- tection of all lines of communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden or unexpected raid within their respec- tive jurisdictions without awaiting the orders of the division commander. In the East the opposing forces stood in substan- tially the same relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war began ; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals. It is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginia and North Carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been gained by 126 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. either side. Battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war, over ground from the James River and Chickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the National army, sometimes to the Confederate army ; but in every instance, I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern press if not by the Southern generals. The North- ern press, as a whole, did not discourage these claims ; a portion of it always magnified rebel success and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in their desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelming success of the Federal armies, would nevertheless generally express dissat- isfaction with whatever victories were gained be- cause they were not more complete. That portion of the Army of the Potomac not engaged in guarding lines of communication was on the northern bank of the Rapidan. The Army of Northern Virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river, was strongly intrenched and com- manded by the acknowledged ablest general in the Confederate army. The country back to the James River is cut up with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except where bridged. The region is heavily timbered, and the roads nar- row, and very bad after the least rain. Such an enemy THE MILITARY SITUATION. 127 was not, of course, unprepared with adequate forti- fications at convenient intervals all the way back to Richmond, so that when driven from one fortified position they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into. To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. System and dis- cipline were both essential to its accomplishment. The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four of them in the West had been concentrated into a single military division. The Army of the Potomac was a separate command and had no territorial limits. There were thus seventeen distinct commanders. Before this time these various armies had acted separately and independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively engaged. I determined to stop this. To this end I regarded the Army of the Potomac as the centre, and all west to Memphis along the line described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing ; the Army of the James, under General Butler, as the left wing, and all the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy. Some of these latter were occupying positions from which they could not render service proportionate to their numerical strength. All such were depleted to 128 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against blockade runners ; where they could not do this their positions were abandoned altogether. In this way ten thousand men were added to the Army of the James from South Carolina alone, with Gen- eral Gillmore in command. It was not contemplated that General Gillmore should leave his department ; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so. Officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their proper commands ; concentration was the order of the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest moment the roads would permit was the problem. As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in support of it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under General Burnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland. This was an admirable position for such a reinforce- ment, The corps could be brought at the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North Carolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction. In fact Burnside and the War Department both thought the 9th corps was intended for such an expedition up to the last moment. PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. \$g My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such, as we have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac ; the second, under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to Sherman who was still at Chat- tanooga. Beside these main armies the Confeder- ates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond to Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the West with a large force ; making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the Northern States open to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it was moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of the James, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them. Better indeed, for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and with a greater force. Little expeditions could not so well Vol. ii. — 9 I30 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly I arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to move from Chattanooga, John- ston's army and Atlanta being his objective points.* * \Private and Confidential^ Headquarters Armies of the United States, Washington, D. C, Aptil 4, 1864. Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi. General : — It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. For your information I now write you my programme, as at pres- ent determined upon. I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch ; to turn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and the navy, and to return your troops to you and his own to New Or- leans ; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men ; to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number neces- sary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men. To this I will add five thousand men from Missouri. With this force he is to commence opera- tions against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him to commence too early. Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate against Richmond from the south side of the James River. This will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to oper- PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 13 I Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from the mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the Virginia and Tennes- see Railroad to be his objective. Either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so much needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in command in the Valley of Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from an invasion ate with, W. F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gillmore the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty- five thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army, wherever it may be found. Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the other, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms. You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations. I32 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining near Harper's Ferry. Every mile he ad- vanced also gave us possession of stores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James River, having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective. Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe. This was the first time I had ever met him. Before giving him any order as to the part he was to play in the approaching campaign I As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is concentrating now. None will move from their places of rendezvous until I direcf, except Banks. I want to be ready to move by the 25th inst., if possible. But all I can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it. From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do not calculate on very great results ; but it is the only way I can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move directly to his front. In this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words, if Sigel can't skin him- self he can hold a leg while some one else skins. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OE CAVALRY. I 33 invited his views. They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct, * in writing, before leaving. General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general shortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not yet been confirmed. I found a decided prejudice against his confirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that his services had been such that he should be rewarded. My wishes were now reluctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one of the corps under General Butler. I was not long in finding out that the objections to Smith's promotion were well founded. In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed my dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of accom- plishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. I said I wanted the very best man in the army for that command. Halleck was present and spoke up, saying: " How would Sheridan do?" I replied : " The very man I want." The President said I could have anybody I wanted. Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned to the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac. This relieved General * See instructions to Butler, in Generals Grant's report, Appendix. 134 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection on that officer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficient as any other cavalry com- mander. Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all the troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobile to be his objective. At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move the Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left. Each plan presented advantages.* If by his right — * In Field, Culpeper C. H., Va., April g, 1864. Maj. -General Geo. G. Meade, Com'd'g Army of the Potomac. For information and as instruction to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confi- dentially for your own perusal alone. So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and towards one common centre. Banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to other movements. From the scattered condition of his command, how- ever, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans before the 1st of May, if so soon. Sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo. Johnston's army being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his FLANK MOVEMENTS. 135 my left — the Potomac, Chesapeake Bay and tribu- taries would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to within easy hauling distance ultimate aim. If successful he will secure the line from Chatta- nooga to Mobile with the aid of Banks. Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. This he has been directed to do, and is now making prep- arations for it. Two columns of his command will make south at the same time with the general move ; one from Beverly, from ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord ; the other from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, under Brig. -General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reach the Ten- nessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join you. The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward to join Ord. The cavalry from Ord's command will try to force a passage southward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting Richmond with all the South and South-west. Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000 men into the field directly to his front. The force will be com- manded by Ma j. -General W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore, Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous with yours. Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the other I36 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to the James River. But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on a raid. But if we take this route, all we do must be done whilst the rations we start with hold out. We separate from Butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the York or James rivers. These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more fully than I can write them. Burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce you. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the 20th inst., I will give him the defence of the road from Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the front. There will be naval co-operation on the James River, and trans- ports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fall back into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such. What I would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing bag- gage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division head- quarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters. Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to White House on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this contin- gency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or elsewhere. FORREST AT FORT PILLOW. I 37 line rather interior to the one I would have to take in following. A movement by his left — our right — would obviate this ; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of sup- plies possible to take with us was considered. The country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio. While he was able to enter the city he failed to capt- ure the forts or any part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forrest's raid I telegraphed Sher- man to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. -If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made for ordnance stores. I would say not much short of five hundred rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the amount would be sufficient. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General. I38 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the Mississippi River. The gar- rison consisted of a regiment of colored troops, infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry. These troops fought bravely, but were overpowered. I will leave Forrest in his dispatches to tell what he did with them. "The river was dyed," he says, " with the blood of the slaughtered for two hundred yards. The ap- proximate loss was upward of five hundred killed, but few of the officers escaping. My loss was about twenty killed. It is hoped that these facts will de- monstrate to the Northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners." Subsequently For- rest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks humanity to read. At the East, also, the rebels were busy. I had said to Halleck that Plymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold. It would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler's command. If success attended our arms both places, and others too, would fall into our hands naturally. These places had been occupied by Federal troops before I took command of the armies, and I knew that the Executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my views ; but before my views were carried out GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION. *39 the rebels captured the garrison at Plymouth. I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, but directed the holding of New Berne at all hazards. This was essential because New Berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter. General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before my promotion to general command. I had opposed the movement strenuously, but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. By direction of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from Sherman's command. This reinforcement was wanted back badly before the forward movement commenced. But Banks had got so far that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, and turn over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the Ar- kansas. Orders were given accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to where it belonged and get back to New Orleans him- self in time to execute his part in the general plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not get back in time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor was Smith returned until long after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun. The ser- vices of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number required to hold all that was necessary I40 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT. in the Department of the Gulf, were thus paralyzed. It is but just to Banks, however, to say that his ex- pedition was ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsible except for the conduct of it. I make no criticism on this point. He opposed the expedition. By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me in fixing a day for the great move. On that day Burnside left Annapolis to occupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rappa- hannock. Meade was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance. On the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the 4th of May, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and get as far up the James River as possible by daylight, and push on from there to accomplish the task given him. He was also notified that reinforcements were being collected in Washington City, which would be forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at Rich- mond. The same day Sherman was directed to get his forces up ready to advance on the 5th. Sigel was in Winchester and was notified to move in con- junction with the others. The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the Rapidan to the James River that all the loss of life could have been obviated by mov- ing the army there on transports. Richmond was COLONEL MOSBY I4I fortified and intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than equal to five out- side besieging or assaulting. To get possession of Lee's army was the first great object. With the capture of his army Richmond would necessarily follow. It was better to fight him outside of his stronghold than in it. If the Army of the Potomac had been moved bodily to the James River by water Lee could have moved a part of his forces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to re- inforce it, and with the balance moved on to Wash- ington. Then, too, I ordered a move, simultaneous with that of the Army of the Potomac, up the James River by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river. While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of March to the 4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to confer with the Secretary of War and President. On the last occa- sion, a few days before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my part in the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby had for a long time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the Army of the Potomac. On my return to the field on this occasion, as the train approached Warren- ton Junction, a heavy cloud of dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry on I42 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. a charge. Arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the dust. There was but one man at the station, and he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few min- utes before at full speed in pursuit of Federal cavalry. Had he seen our train coming, no doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. I was on a special train, if I remember correctly, without any guard. Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby personally, and somewhat intimately. He is a different man entirely from what I had sup- posed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical exercise. He is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful. There were probably but few men in the South who could have commanded successfully a separate de- tachment in the rear of an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did with- out losing his entire command. On this same visit to Washington I had my last interview with the President before reaching the James River. He had of course become acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been or- dered all along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. I explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops to guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. 1 43 prevent incursions into the Northern States. These troops could perform this service just as well by ad- vancing as by remaining still; and by advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. His answer was : " Oh, yes ! I see that. As we say out West, if a man can't skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does." There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness campaign of which it may not be out of place to speak ; and to avoid a digression further on I will mention it here. A few days before my departure from Culpeper the Honorable E. B. Washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some dis- tance south, through the battle in the Wilderness and, I think, to Spottsylvania. He was accom- panied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he presented as a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of writing a history of the war when it was over. He assured me — and I have no doubt Swinton gave him the assurance — that he was not present as a correspondent of the press. I ex- pressed an entire willingness to have him (Swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as a correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of the information he could give. We received Richmond papers with about as much regu- 144 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT. larity as if there had been no war, and knew that our papers were received with equal regularity by the Confederates. It was desirable, therefore, that cor- respondents should not be privileged spies of the enemy within our lines. Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters, and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. At all events he was not invited, and soon I found that he was cor- responding with some paper (I have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either expressed or implied. He knew of the assurance Washburne had given as to the character of his mission. I never saw the man from the day of our introduction to the present that I recollect. He accompanied us, how- ever, for a time at least. The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the night of the 5th of May) Colonel W. R. Rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer at my headquar- ters. A short time before midnight I gave him ver- bal instructions for the night. Three days later I read in a Richmond paper a verbatim report of these instructions. A few nights still later (after the first, and pos- sibly after the second, day's fighting in the Wilder- ness) General Meade came to my tent for consul- tation, bringing with him some of his staff officers. Both his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. 1 45 some yards in front of the tent, thinking our conver- sation should be private. There was a stump a little to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire. One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bowers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to the con- versation between Meade and myself. He called the attention of Colonel Rowley to it. The latter immediately took the man by the shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what he was doing there. The man proved to be Swinton, the " historian," and his replies to the ques- tion were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was warned against further eaves-dropping. The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor. General Meade came to my headquarters saying that General Burnside had arrested Swinton, who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him to be shot that afternoon. I promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to return again on pain of punishment. Vol. 11. — 10 CHAPTER XLVIII. commencement of the grand campaign general butler's position — sheridan's first raid. THE armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single object. They were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible over such a vast field. Lee, with the capital of the Confederacy, was the main end to which all were working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was an important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was therefore almost an independent objective. It was of less importance only because the capture of Johnston and his army would not pro- duce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as would the possession of Richmond, Lee and his army. All other troops were employed exclusively in support of these two movements. This was the plan ; and I will now endeavor to give, as concisely as I can, the method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor detached but co-operative columns. As stated before, Banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do on the Red River, and elimi- COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN. 1 47 nated the use of forty thousand veterans whose co- operation in the grand campaign had been expected — ten thousand with Sherman and thirty thousand against Mobile. Sigel's record is almost equally brief. He moved out, it is true, according to programme ; but just when I was hoping to hear of good work being done in the valley I received instead the following an- nouncement from Halleck: " Sigel is fn full retreat on Strasburg. He will do nothing but run ; never did anything else." The enemy had intercepted him about New Market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six guns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand. The plan had been for an advance of Sigel's forces in two columns. Though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the other proved more fortunate. Under Crook and Averell his western column advanced from the Gauley in West Virginia at the appointed time, and with more happy results. They reached the Virginia and Ten- nessee Railroad at Dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up several miles of road and burning the bridge over New River. Having ac- complished this they recrossed the Alleghanies to Meadow Bluffs and there awaitecf further orders. Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his com- mand, except the cavalry and some artillery which I48 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. moved up the south bank of the James River. His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as if threatening the rear of Lee's army. At midnight they turned back, and Butler by daylight was far up the James River. He seized City Point and Bermuda Hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much to the surprise of the enemy. This was the accomplishment of the first step con- templated in my instructions to Butler. He was to act from here, looking to Richmond as his objective point. I had given him to understand that I should aim to fight Lee between the Rapidan and Rich- mond if he would stand ; but should Lee fall back into Richmond I would follow up and make a junc- tion of the armies of the Potomac and the James on the James River. He was directed to secure a foot- ing as far up the south side of the river as he could at as early a date as possible. Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk to cut the Weldon Railroad. He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond, but no great success attended these latter efforts. He made no great effort to establish himself on that road and neg- lected to attack Petersburg, which was almost de- fenceless. About the nth he advanced slowly until Q in W m w i2 PZ _ 3 « " Q ox g .S S B H m «♦« O c" ! ) u o . 2 "O . *~ w urv lire igii A efo w „ s u s <u £ Q From under the t. Brig. C Maj. of By Co sj. Gen'l Gen'l & C & pq « bi w > « pq « 150 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. he reached the works at Drury's Bluff, about half way between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond. In the mean time Beauregard had been gathering reinforce- ments. On the 1 6th he attacked Butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very mate- rially the further usefulness of the Army of the James as a distinct factor in the campaign. I after- ward ordered a portion of it to join the Army of the Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with Butler to man his works, hold securely the footing he had al- ready gained and maintain a threatening front to- ward the rear of the Confederate capital. The position which General Butler had chosen between the two rivers, the James and Appomat- tox, was one of great natural strength, one where a large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent of territory which it thoroughly protected. His right was pro- tected by the James River, his left by the Appo- mattox, and his rear by their junction — the two streams uniting near by. The bends of the two streams shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while it increased the area which the line inclosed. Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent my chief engineer, General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the James to inspect GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITLON. 151 Butlers position and ascertain whether I could again safely make an order for General Butler's movement in co-operation with mine, now that I was getting so near Richmond ; or, if I could not. wnether his position was strong enough to justify me in with- drawing some of his troops and having them brought round by water to White House to join me and re- inforce the Army of the Potomac. General Barnard reported the position very strong for defensive pur- poses, and that I could do the latter with great security ; but that General Butler could not move from where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. He said that the general occupied a place be- tween the James and Appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior ; but that he could do nothing offensively. I then asked him why Butler could not move out from his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad to the rear and on the south side of Richmond. He replied that it was impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that General Butler had. He then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle and that Butlers line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork ; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of 152 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. him across the neck ; and it was therefore as if Butler was in a bottle. He was perfectly safe against an attack ; but, as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a small force could hold the cork in its place. This struck me as being very expressive of his position, particularly when I saw the hasty sketch which General Barnard had drawn ; and in making my subsequent report I used that expression without adding quotation marks, never thinking that anything had been said that would at- tract attention — as this did, very much to the annoy- ance, no doubt, of General Butler and, I know, very much to my own. I found afterwards that this was mentioned in the notes of General Badeau's book, which, when they were shown to me, I asked to have stricken out ; yet it was retained there, though against my wishes. I make this statement here because, although I have often made it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it will correct his- tory ; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I may have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly serving their country during the try- ing period of the war for the preservation of the Union. General Butler certainly gave his very ear- nest support to the war ; and he gave his own best efforts personally to the suppression of the re- bellion. SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID. 153 The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated of in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being so inti- mately associated and connected as to be substan- tially one body in which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged. Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman's great Atlanta campaign, which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movements preparatory to proceeding with that of the opera- tions of the centre, I will briefly mention Sheridan's first raid upon Lee's communications which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign. By thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more perfectly observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when I shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the Rapi- dan. On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness and when we were moving en Spottsyl- vania I directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee's army and attack his cavalry : to cut the two roads — one running west through Gordonsville, Char- lottesville and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond, 154 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the James River and draw these from Butler's supplies. This move took him past the entire rear of Lee's army. These orders were also given in writing through Meade. The object of this move was three-fold. First, if successfully executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of supplies and tele- graphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming up. Second, he would draw the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear and trains than by remaining with the army. Third, his absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from Fredericksburg, which had now become our base. He started at daylight the next morning, and accomplished more than was ex- pected. It was sixteen days before he got back to the Army of the Potomac. The course Sheridan took was directly to Rich- mond. Before night Stuart, commanding the Con- federate cavalry, came on to the rear of his com- mand. But the advance kept on, crossed the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a station on the Vir- ginia Central Railroad, recaptured four hundred Union prisoners on their way to Richmond, de- stroyed the road and used and destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores. SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID. I 55 Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing to- wards Richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the ioth and, by a detour and an ex- hausting march, interposed between Sheridan and Richmond at Yellow Tavern, only about six miles north of the city. Sheridan destroyed the railroad and more supplies at Ashland, and on the nth ar- rived in Stuart's front. A severe engagement en- sued in which the losses were heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured. Sheridan passed through the outer defences of Richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones. But having no supports near he could not have remained. After caring for his wounded he struck for the James River below the city, to communicate with Butler and to rest his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them. He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but in the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville. He then turned to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy by Meadow Bridge. He found this barred, and the defeated Confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying the opposite side. The panic created by his first entrance within the outer works of Richmond hav- 156 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. ing subsided troops were sent out to attack his rear. He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could have extricated themselves. The defences of Richmond, manned, were to the right, the Chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining and the opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from Richmond. This force was attacked and beaten by Wilson's and Gregg's divisions, while Sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing and soon dispersed the Confeder- ates he found there. The enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in bridge building. On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over the Chickahominy. On the 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on the James River at Haxall's Landing. He at once put himself into communication with General Butler, who directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished. Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania, but did not know where either this or Lee's army was now. Great caution therefore had to be exercised in getting back. On the 17th, after resting his command for three days, he started on his return. He moved by the way of White House. SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID. I 57 The bridge over the Pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, but a new one was speedily impro- vised and the cavalry crossed over it. On the 2 2d he was at Aylett's on the Matapony, where he learned the position of the two armies. On the 24th he joined us on the march from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of Chesterfield. Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee's army : encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all ; recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed and cap- tured many of the enemy ; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war ; destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks. CHAPTER XLIX. Sherman's campaign in Georgia — seige of Atlanta death of general mcpherson attempt to capture andersonville — capture of atlanta. AFTER separating, from Sherman in Cincinnati I went on to Washington, as already stated, while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties of his new command. His military division was now composed of four departments and embraced all the territory west of the Alleghany Mountains and east of the Mississippi River, together with the State of Arkansas in the trans-Mississippi. The most easterly of these was the Department of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding ; the next was the Department of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding ; the third the Department of the Tennessee, General McPherson commanding ; and General Steele still commanded the trans- Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas. The last- named department was so far away that Sherman could not communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign, and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to that of SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA. I 59 the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved General Banks, was in command. The movements of the armies, as I have stated in a former chapter, were to be simultaneous, I fix- ing the day to start when the season should be far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition for the troops to march. General Sherman at once set himself to work pre- paring for the task which was assigned him to ac- complish in the spring campaign. McPherson lay at Huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points of Tennessee which were re- garded as most worth holding ; Thomas, with over sixty thousand men of the Army of the Cumber- land, was at Chattanooga ; and Schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at Knoxville. With these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all, Sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with a view of destroying Johnston's army and capturing Atlanta. He visited each of these commands to inform him- self as to their condition, and it was found to be, speaking generally, good. One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting, before the time arrived for start- ing, an accumulation of supplies forward to Chat- tanooga sufficiently large to warrant a movement. He found, when he got to that place, that the trains l6o PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. over the single-track railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops without bringing forward any surplus of any kind. He found, however, that trains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. He at once changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses, and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, and used the road exclusively for transporting sup- plies. In this way he was able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for the move, the 4th of May. As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearly one-fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The country is moun- tainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in moun- tain streams, some of them of considerable volume. Dalton is on ground where water drains towards Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east from there and flowing south-west — this being the general direction which all the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering into them. Johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during the entire winter. The best positions for defence had been selected all the way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very Atlanta tk_ Campaign, Vol. ii. — ii l62 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT. strongly intrenched ; so that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would have another to fall into in his rear. His position at Dalton was so very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold Sher- man there and prevent him from getting any fur- ther. With a less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, I have no doubt that he would have succeeded. Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few days in advance from Knoxville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton. Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It had been Sherman's* intention to cross McPherson over the Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, and move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running from Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point Johnston was occupying ; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston, if the latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the army. In this he was disappointed. Two of McPherson's veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to have a furlough. This furlough had not yet expired, and they were not back. Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two di- SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA. 163 visions under A. J. Smith, the winter before, to co-operate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and this with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so as to be prepared for this very campaign. It is hardly necessary to say they were not returned. That department continued to ab- sorb troops to no purpose to the end of the war. This left McPherson so weak that the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. He was therefore brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of Thomas — the two coming together about Dalton. The three armies were abreast, all ready to start promptly on time. Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault ; and even to carry it by regular approaches was impracticable. There was a nar- rowing up in the mountain, between the National and Confederate armies, through which a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran Besides, the stream had been dammed so that the valley was a lake. Through this gorge the troops would have to pass. McPherson was therefore sent around by the right, to come out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into the rear of the enemy. This was a surprise to John- ston, and about the 13th he decided to abandon his position at Dalton. 164 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Resaca ; but our cavalry having been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy's rear. Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing. The pursuit was continued to Kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little fighting, except that Newton's division overtook the rear of John- ston's army and engaged it. Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of bringing up his railroad trains. He was depending upon the rail- road for all of his supplies, and as of course the rail- road was wholly destroyed as Johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt. This work was pushed forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons would naturally expect in a moun- tainous country where there were so many bridges to be rebuilt. The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there. It is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting — some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important battles — neither were single positions gained in a day. On the con- trary, weeks were spent at some ; and about Atlanta more than a month was consumed. It was the 23d of May before the road was fin- ished up to the rear of Sherman's army and the pur- SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA. 165 suit renewed. This pursuit brought him up to the vicinity of Allatoona. This place was very strongly intrenched, and naturally a very defensible position. An assault upon it was not thought of, but prepara- tions were made to flank the enemy out of it. This was done by sending a large force around our right, by the way of Dallas, to reach the rear of the enemy. Before reaching there, however, they found the enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting for about a week at a place called New Hope Church. On the left our troops also were for- tified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get. They kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad. This was the case more par- ticularly with the cavalry. By the 4th of June John- ston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew off and Allatoona was left in our pos- session. Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for occupation by our troops before ad- vancing farther, and made a secondary base of sup- plies. The railroad was finished up to that point, the intrenchments completed, store-houses provided for food, and the army got in readiness for a further advance. The rains, however, were falling in such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads which they would have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of his new position. 1 66 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. While Sherman's army lay here, General F. P. Blair returned to it, bringing with him the two divi- sions of veterans who had been on furlough. Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kene- saw Mountain, where strong intrenchments awaited him. At this latter place our troops made an assault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up close to him, and failed, sustaining consider- able loss. But during the progress of the battle Schofield was gaining ground to the left ; and the cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear. These operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was found that Johnston had evacuated the place. He was pursued at once. Sher- man had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong guard in his intrenchments. He had intended, moving out with twenty days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again at the Chattahoochee River. Johnston frustrated this plan by himself starting back as above stated. This time he fell back to the Chattahoo- chee. About the 5th of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting easy possession of the Chattahoo- chee River both above and below him. The enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened by flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the river. THE SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 1 67 Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman's old tactics prevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta began. Johnston was now relieved of the command, and Hood superseded him. Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with much favor, either in the eyes of the administration at Richmond, or of the people of that section of the South in which he was command- ing. The very fact of a change of commanders being ordered under such circumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now they would become the aggressors — the very thing our troops wanted. For my own part, I think that Johnston's tactics were right. Anything that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did finally close, would probably have exhausted the North to such an extent that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a separation. Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circle about a mile and a half outside of the city. In addition to this, there were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siege could be commenced. Sure enough, as indicated by the change of com- manders, the enemy was about to assume the offen- sive. On the 20th he came out and attacked the Army of the Cumberland most furiously. Hooker's corps, and Newton's and Johnson's divisions were 1 68 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. the principal ones engaged in this contest, which lasted more than an hour; but the Confederates were then forced to fall back inside their main lines. The losses were quite heavy on both sides. On this day General Gresham, since our Postmaster- General, was very badly wounded. During the night Hood abandoned his outer lines, and our troops were advanced. The investment had not been relinquished for a moment during the day. During the night of the 21st Hood moved out again, passing by our left flank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear of him, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the 2 2d. At first the battle went very much in favor of the Confederates, our troops being some- what surprised. While our troops were advancing they were struck in flank, and their flank was envel- oped. But they had become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by an un- expected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in order and engaging the enemy, with the ad- vantage now of knowing where their antagonist was. The field of battle continued to expand until it em- braced about seven miles of ground. Finally, how- ever, and before night, the enemy was driven back into the city.* * General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command of the Army of the Tennessee during this battle, in his report gave our total loss in killed, DEATH OF GENERAL McPHERSON. 1 69 It was during1 this battle that McPherson, while passing from one column to another, was instantly killed. In his death the army lost one of its ablest, purest and best generals. Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad east of Atlanta and to cut it in the direction of Augusta. He was successful in this, and returned about the time of the battle. Rous- seau had also come up from Tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossed the Tennessee River about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama. Finally, when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of Sherman, and reported to him about this time. The battle of the 2 2d is usually known as the Battle of Atlanta, although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of September. Preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position. The work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were very long. Our troops were gradually worked around to the east until they struck the road between Decatur and Atlanta. wounded and missing at 3,521 ; and estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000 : and General G. M. Dodge, graphically describing to General Sher- man the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and was broken by his depleted command, remarks : " The disparity of forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my two brigades under Fuller and Mersy they took 351 prisoners, representing forty-nine different regiments, eight bri- gades and three divisions ; and brought back eight battle flags from the enemy." I70 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT. These lines were strongly fortified, as were those to the north and west of the city — all as close up to the enemy's lines as practicable — in order to hold them with the smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army to move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south of Atlanta. On the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. On the 28th the enemy struck our right flank, General Logan commanding, with great vigor. Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabled to resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon the enemy. These assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon, and resumed once or twice still later in the day. The enemy's losses in these unsuc- cessful assaults were fearful. During that evening the enemy in Logan's front withdrew into the town. This now left Sherman's army close up to the Confederate lines, extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north and west of it for a distance of fully ten miles ; the whole of this line being intrenched, and made stronger 'every day they remained there. In the latter part of July Sherman sent Stoneman to destroy the railroads to the south, about Macon. He was then to go east and, if possible, release our prisoners about Andersonville. There were painful stories current at the time about the great hardships ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE. I 7 I these prisoners had to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in which they were housed, and in the way in which they were fed. Great sym- pathy was felt for them ; and it was thought that even if they could be turned loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. But the attempt proved a failure. McCook, who commanded a small brigade, was first reported to have been captured ; but he got back, having inflicted a good deal of damage upon the enemy. He had also taken some prisoners ; but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he was obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with what men he had left. He had lost several hundred men out of his small command. On the 4th of August Colonel Adams, commanding a little brigade of about a thousand men, returned report- ing Stoneman and all but himself as lost. I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture of Stoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he received. The rumor was confirmed there, also, from other sources. A few days after Colonel Adams's return Colonel Capron also got in with a small detachment and confirmed the report of the capture of Stoneman with something less than a thousand men. It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was impossible, had made arrangements for 1^2 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. the escape of two divisions. He covered the move- ment of these divisions to the rear with a force of about seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and this detachment to the commanding Confederate. In this raid, however, much damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars, locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc. On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our right, where Schofield was in command, but these attempts failed utterly. General Palmer was charged with being the cause of this failure, to a great extent, by both General Sher- man and General Schofield ; but I am not prepared to say this, although a question seems to have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield had any right to command him. If he did raise this question while an action was going on, that act alone was exceed- ingly reprehensible. About the same time Wheeler got upon our rail- road north of Resaca and destroyed it nearly up to Dalton. This cut Sherman off from communica- tion with the North for several days. Sherman re- sponded to this attack on his lines of communica- tion by directing one upon theirs. Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of August to reach the Macon road about Jonesboro. He succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around 174 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was back again in his former position on our left by the 22d. These little affairs, however, contributed but very little to the grand result. They annoyed, it is true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon repaired. Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics ; that is, for a flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to some point in the enemy's rear. Sherman commenced this last move- ment on the 25th of August, and on the 1st of Sep- tember was well up towards the railroad twenty miles south of Atlanta. Here he found Hardee intrenched, ready to meet him. A battle ensued, but he was unable to drive Hardee away before night set in. Under cover of the night, however, Hardee left of his own accord. That night Hood blew up his military works, such as he thought would be valua- ble in our hands, and decamped. The next morning at daylight General H. W. Slocum, who was commanding north of the city, moved in and took possession of Atlanta, and noti- fied Sherman. Sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days to reach the city, and occupied a line extending from Decatur on the left to Atlanta in the centre, with his troops ex- tending out of the city for some distance to the right. CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. I 75 The campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the most memorable in history. There was but little if anything in the whole campaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing to criticise severely. It was creditable alike to the gen- eral who commanded and the army which had exe- cuted it. Sherman had on this campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whose alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command. The troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoy a little rest after their arduous campaign. The city of Atlanta was turned into a military base. The citizens were all compelled to leave. Sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army of sutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in the field, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and getting the money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, and for which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. He limited the num- ber of these traders to one for each of his three armies. The news of Sherman's success reached the North instantaneously, and set the country all aglow. This was the first great political campaign for the Repub- licans in their canvass of 1864. It was followed later by Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley ; I 76 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. and these two campaigns probably had more effect in settling the election of the following November than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading with banners and bands of music in the North. CHAPTER L. GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC CROSSING THE RAPIDAN ENTERING THE WILDER- NESS—BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. SOON after midnight, May 3d~4th, the Army of the Potomac moved out from its position north of the Rapidan, to start upon that memorable cam- paign, destined to result in the capture of the Con- federate capital and the army defending it. This was not to be accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed ; not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month, or a single season. The losses inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe ; but the armies now con- fronting each other had already been in deadly con- flict for a period of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness, captured and wounded ; and neither had made any real progress toward accomplishing the final end. It is true the Confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. But previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capt- ure Philadelphia, New York, and the National Vol. ii. — 12 178 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. Capital, and had made several attempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making their boast good — too near for complacent contem- plation by the loyal North. They had also come near losing their own capital on at least one oc- casion. So here was a stand-off. The campaign now begun was destined to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than any previously- suffered ; but the carnage was to be limited to a sin- gle year, and to accomplish all that had been antici- pated or desired at the beginning in that time. We had to have hard fighting to achieve this. The two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip. Ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken in wagons. Beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered as wanted. Three days' rations in addition, in haver- sacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier. The country over which the army had to operate, from the Rapidan to the crossing of the James River, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous streams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay. The cross- ings of these streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water, and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance i8o PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. of troops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition. The country roads were narrow and poor. Most of the country is covered with a dense forest, in places, like the Wilderness and along the Chickahominy, almost impenetrable even for infan- try except along the roads. All bridges were naturally destroyed before the National troops came to them. The Army of the Potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalry corps, commanded respec- tively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren, ' UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1 864. [compiled.] LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief. Major-General George G. Meade, Commanding Army of the Potomac. First Brigade, Col. Nel- son A. Miles. Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth. Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank. Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke. First Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Alex. S. Webb. Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. Joshua T. Ow- Maj.-Gen. W. S. Hancock, commanding Second Army Corps. First Division, Brig. -Gen. Francis < C. Barlow. Second Division, Brig. -Gen. John Gibbon. Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll. -,,. , -.. . . f First Brigade, Brig.- Third Division I Qen j *H< R Wa^ Maj.-Gen. David <( Second JBrigade< Brig.- Gen. Alexander Hays. First Brigade, Col. Rob- ert McAllister. Second Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster. Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball. B. Birney. Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen.Gershom Mott. CROSSING THE RAPIDAN. 181 John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan. The artillery was commanded by General Henry J. Hunt. This arm was in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass through. The surplus was much in the way, taking up as it did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the forage and other stores brought up by the trains. The 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the right, and marched directly for Germania Ford, preceded by one division of cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson. General Sedgwick followed Warren with the 6th corps. Germania Ford was nine or ten miles below the right of Lee's Maj.-Gen. G. K. Warren, commanding Fifth Army Corps. First Division, Brig. -Gen. Charles Griffin. Second Division, Brig. -Gen. John C. Robinson. Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford. Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James 1 S. Wadsworth. First Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres. Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer. Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. J. Bartlett. First Brigade, Col. Sam- uel H. Leonard. Second Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Henry Baxter. Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison. First Brigade, Col. Wm. McCandless. Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher. First Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Lysander Cut- ler. Second Brigade, Brig.- Gen. James C. Rice. Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone. Artillery Brigade, Col. C. S. Wainwright. 182 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. line. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road, farther east, directly upon Ely's Ford, six miles below Germania, preceded by Gregg's division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery. Torbert's di- vision of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for the time, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and getting into our rear. The cav- Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick, commanding Sixth Army Corps. Maj.-Gen. P. H. Sheridan, commanding Cavalry Corps. First Division, Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright. Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty. Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James B. Ricketts. First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert. Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg. Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson. First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown. Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton. Third Brigade, Brig.- Gen. D. A. Russell. Fourth Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Alexander Sha- ler. ' First Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Frank Wheaton. Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant. Third Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Thos. H. Neill. Fourth Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Henry L. Eus- tis. First Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Wm. H. Morris. Second Brigade, Brig.- Gen. T. Seymour. Artillery Brigade, Col. C H. Tompkins. First Brigade, Brig.- Gen. G. A. Custer. Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C Devin. Reserve Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Wesley Merritt. First Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Henry E. Da- vies, Jr. Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg. First Brigade, Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr. Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman. CROSSING THE RAPID AN. 183 airy seized the two crossings before daylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by six o'clock a.m. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of the infantry and artillery. This was un- doubtedly a surprise to Lee. The fact that the move- ment was unopposed proves this. Burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at War- renton, guarding the railroad from Bull Run forward to preserve control of it in case our crossing the Maj.-Gen. A E. Burnside, commanding Ninth Army Corps. Brig. -Gen. Henry J. Hunt, commanding Artillery. First Division, Brig. -Gen. T. G. Stevenson. Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter. Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando B. Willcox. Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero. Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton. General Headquarters. . . . f First Brigade, Col. J Sumner Carruth. J Second Brigade, Col. [ Daniel Leasure. f First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss. J Second Brigade. Col. [_ Simon G. Griffin, f First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft. I Second Brigade, Col. [ Benj. C. Christ. f First Brigade, » . Col. Joshua K. Sigfried. Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas. Provisional Brigade. Col. Elisha G. Marshall. ' First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching. Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins. First Brig. Horse Art., Capt J. M. Robert- son. Second Brigade Horse Art., Capt. D. R. Ransom. Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh. r Provost Guard, Brig.- Gen. M. R. Patrick. Volunteer Engineers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham. 1 84 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. Rapidan should be long delayed. He was instructed, however, to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed ; and a dispatch was sent to him a little after one p.m. giving the information that our crossing had been successful. CONFEDERATE ARMY. Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by General Robert E. Lee, August 31st, 1864. First Army Corps : Lieut.-Gen. R. H. Anderson, Commanding. Brig. -Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade, (a) M. D. Corse's " Eppa Hunton's " Wm. R. Terry's Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade. " E. M. Law's (c) " " John Bratton's " Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade. B. G. Humphreys' " Goode Bryan's " Kershaw's (Old) Second Army Corps : Major-General Jubal A. Early, Commanding. Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays' Brigade, (e) John Pegram's " (/) Gordon's " \g) Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke's Stonewall Brig. (Brig. -Gen. J. A. Walker). Maj.-Gen. Geo. E. Pickett's Division. Maj.-Gen. C. W. Field's Divi- sion, {b) Maj.-Gen. J. Division, (d) B. Kershaw's Maj.-Gen. John B. Gordon's Division. Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson's Division. Maj.-Gen. vision. Note. R. E. Rodes' Di- (h) Brig.-Gen. J. M. Jones' Brigade, (h) Geo. H. Stewart's " \h) L. A. Stafford's " (e) Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade, (i) Geo. Dole's " (k) S. D. Ramseur's Brigade. C. A. Battle's R. D. Johnston's " (/) (a) Col. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 20th, and probably at above date. (b) Inspection report of this division shows that it also contained Benning's and Gregg's Brigades. (c) Commanded by Colonel P. D. Bowles. {d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty ; names not indicated. (e) Constituting York's Brigade. (f) In Ramseurs Division. (g) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding and containing 12th Georgia Battalion. (A) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's Brigade, , Gordon's Division. (*") Grimes' Brigade. (k) Cook's I Org: e, f of J Organization of the Army " the Valley District. ENTERING THE WILDERNESS. 185 The country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing, particularly on the south side of the river. The battle-field from the crossing of the Rap- idan until the final movement from the Wilderness toward Spottsylvania was of the same character. There were some clearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field ; but generally the country was covered with a dense forest. The roads were narrow and bad. All the conditions were favorable for defensive operations. Third Army Corps : Lieut.-Gen. A. P. Hill, Commanding. EN. ' vision. (/) Brig. -Gen. J. C. C. Sanders' Brigade. Maj.-Gen. Wm. Mahone's Di- J „ . n 5Jal£n w • > « 1 \ J Brig. -Gen. N. H. Harris s (m) A. R. Wright's Joseph Finegan's " f Brig. -Gen. E. L. Thomas's Brigade (n) Maj.-Gen. C. M. Wilcox's J " James H. Lane's " Division. 1 " Sam'l McGowan's " I " Alfred M. Scale's " Maj.-Gen. H. Heth's Division. (P) Brig. -Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade. " John R. Cooke's " D. McRae's " J- J* Archer's " L " H. H. Walker's " Unattached : 5th Alabama Battalion. Cavalry Corps : Lieutenant-General Wade Hampton, Commanding, (p) Maj.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's Di- j Brig. -Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade, vision. \ " L. L. Lomax's " Maj.-Gen. M. C. Butler's Di- j Bng.-Gen. John Dunoy^Brigade. r " Thomas L. Rosser's " Maj.-Gen. W. H. F. Lee's Di- j Brig. -Gen. Rufus Barringer's Brigade, vision. ( J. R. Chambliss's " Note. {D Returns report but one general officer present for duty ■ name not indicated. (m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding-. («) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding-. (0) Four brigadier-generals reported present for duty ; names not indicated. (J>) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's, Fitz-Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's Division, and Dearing's Brigade. 1 86 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. There are two roads, good for that part of Vir- ginia, running from Orange Court House to the battle-field. The most southerly of these roads is known as the Orange Court House Plank Road, the northern one as the Orange Turnpike. There Artillery Reserve ; Brig.-Gen. W. N. Pendleton, Commanding. Cabell's Battalion. r Manly's Battery, ist Co. Richmond Howitzers. Carleton's Battery. Calloway's Battery. Haskell's Battalion. r Branch's Battery. Nelson's " Garden's " Rowan Brig. -Gen. E. P. -Alexander's Division.* Huger's Battalion. ' Smith's Battery. Moody Woolfolk ". Parker's ' ' Taylor's " Fickling's " Martin's " Gibb's Battalion. Davidson's Battery. Dickenson's " Otey's " Braxton's Battalion. •* r Lee Battery. ist Md. Artillery. Stafford t Alleghany " Cutshaw's Battalion. Charlotteville Artillery. Staunton Courtney Brig.-Gen. A. L. Long's Divi- sion. Carter's Battalion. -< Morris Artillery. Orange " King William Artillery. L Jeff Davis Nelson's Battalion. [ Amherst Artillery. Milledge [ Fluvauna " Brown's Battalion. Powhatan Artillery. 2d Richmond Howitzers. 3d Rockbridge Artillery. k Salem Flying Artillery. * But one general officer reported present for duty in the artillery, and Alexander'! name not on the original. ENTERING THE WILDERNESS. 187 are also roads from east of the battle-field running to Spottsylvania Court House, one from Chancel- lorsville, branching at Aldrich's ; the western branch going by Piney Branch Church, Alsop's, thence by the Brock Road to Spottsylvania ; the east branch goes by Gates's, thence to Spottsylvania. The Brock Road runs from Germania Ford through the battle-field and on to the Court House. As Spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads, some going to the town di- rect, and others crossing so as to connect the farms with roads going there. Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House. From there to Fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described running nearly paral- lel to the Wilderness. This gave him unusual facili- Col. R. L. Walker's Division. Cutt's Battalion. Richardson's Battalion. Mcintosh's Battalion. Pegram's Battalion. Poague's Battalion. i Ross's Battery. •< Patterson's Battery. ( Irwin Artillery. f Lewis Artillery. J Donaldsonville Artillery. 1 Norfolk Light [ Huger f Johnson's Battery. J Hardaway Artillery. j Danville " [ 2d Rockbridge Artillery. Peedee Artillery. Fredericksburg Artillery. Letcher " Purcell Battery. Crenshaw's Battery. Madison Artillery. Albemarle " Brooke [ Charlotte 1 88 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT. ties, for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right. These roads strike the road from Ger- mania Ford in the Wilderness. As soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushed forward, Wilson's divi- sion by Wilderness Tavern to Parker's store, on the Orange Plank Road ; Gregg to the left towards Chancellorsville. Warren followed Wilson and reached the Wilderness Tavern by noon, took position there and intrenched. Sedgwick followed Warren. He was across the river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of Warren, by sun- down. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with Warren and camped about six miles east of him. Before night all the troops, and by the even- ing of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons, were safely on the south side of the river. There never was a corps better organized than was the quartermasters corps with the Army of the Potomac in 1864. With a wagon-train that would have extended from the Rapidan to Richmond, stretched along in single file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving, we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelve days' rations, besides a supply of ammunition. To overcome all difficulties, the chief quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had marked on each wagon the corps badge with the divi- I9O PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. sion color and the number of the brigade. At a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagon belonged could be told. The wagons were also marked to note the contents : if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry ; if forage, whether grain or hay ; if rations, whether bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee or whatever it might be. Empty wagons were never allowed to follow the army or stay in camp. As soon as a wagon was empty it would return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same article that had been taken from it. Empty trains were obliged to leave the road free for loaded ones. Arriving near the army they would be parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. Issues, except of am- munition, were made at night in all cases. By this system the hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensed with. They consumed theirs at the depots. I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops had been put in motion, and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the Rapidan in advance of Sedgwick's corps ; and established headquarters for the after- noon and night in a deserted house near the river. Orders had been given, long before this move- ment began, to cut down the baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible. Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road from Culpeper BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 1 9 1< to Germania Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten their knapsacks ; an improvidence I had never witnessed before. Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very early hour on the morning o£ the 4th of May, that the Army of the Potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one: o'clock in the afternoon by what route we would confront his army. This I judge from the fact that, at 1. 1 5 p.m., an hour and a quarter after Warren had reached Old Wilderness Tavern, our officers, took off rebel signals which, when translated, were- seen to be an order to his troops to occupy their in- trenchments at Mine Run. Here at night dispatches were received announc- ing that Sherman, Butler and Crook had moved according to programme. On discovering the advance of the Army of the Potomac, Lee ordered Hill, Ewell and Longstreet^ each commanding corps, to move to the right to* attack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road, Long- street to follow on the same road. Longstreet was. at this time — middle of the afternoon — at Gordons- ville, twenty or more miles away. Ewell was ordered by the Orange Pike. He was near by and arrived some four miles east of Mine Run before bivouack- ing for the night. I92 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. My orders were given through General Meade for an early advance on the morning of the 5th. Warren was to move to Parker's store, and Wilson's cavalry — then at Parker's store — to move on to Craig's meeting-house. Sedgwick followed Warren, closing in on his right. The Army of the Potomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to the south, except when facing the enemy. Hancock was to move south-westward to join on the left of Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove Church. At six o'clock, before reaching Parker's store, Warren discovered the enemy. He sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him. Wright, with his division of Sedgwick's corps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to Warren's right, and Getty with his division, also of Sedgwick's corps, was ordered to move rapidly by Warren's rear and get on his left. This was the speediest way to reinforce Warren who was confronting the enemy on both the Orange plank and turnpike roads. Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on re- ceiving word that the Army of the Potomac had safely crossed the Rapidan. By making a night march, although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 1 93 the head of his column early on the morning of the 5th. Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilder- ness Tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road. I remained to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in position. Burnside at this time was not under Meade's command, and was his senior in rank. Getting information of the proximity of the enemy, I informed Meade, and without waiting to see Burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters to where Meade was. It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments if we were not intrenched ourselves. Warren had not yet reached the point where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. Neither party had any advantage of position. Warren was, therefore, ordered to attack as soon as he could prepare for it. At nine o'clock Hancock was ordered to come up to the support of Getty. He himself arrived at Getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear. Getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved. About this hour Warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though not decisive results. Getty was somewhat isolated from Warren and was in a precarious condition for a time. Vol. 11. — 13 194 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. Wilson, with his division of cavalry, was farther south, and was cut off fro'm the rest of the army. At two o'clock Hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered to join Getty and attack the enemy. But the heavy timber and narrow roads prevented him from getting into posi- tion for attack as promptly as he generally did when receiving such orders. At four o'clock he again received his orders to attack, and General Getty received orders from Meade a few minutes later to attack whether Hancock was ready or not. He met the enemy under Heth within a few hundred yards. Hancock immediately sent two divisions, com- manded by Birney and Mott, and later two brigades, Carroll's and Owen's, to the support of Getty. This was timely and saved Getty. During the battle Getty and Carroll were wounded, but re- mained on the field. One of Birney's most gallant brigade commanders — Alexander Hays — was killed. I had been at West Point with Hays for three years, and had served with him through the Mex- ican war, a portion of the time in the same regi- ment. He was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command wherever ordered. With him it was " Come, boys," not " Go." Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the 2d division were sent to reinforce Hancock and Getty ; but the density of the intervening forest was BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 1 95 such that, there being no road to march upon, they did not get up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where they were without getting into position. During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg's divi- sion of cavalry to Todd's Tavern in search of Wil- son. This was fortunate. He found Wilson en- gaged with a superior force under General Rosser, supported by infantry, and falling back before it. Together they were strong enough to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become ag- gressive. They soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin's Bridge. Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a close to it. Neither side made any special progress. After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my orders were given for the following morning. We knew Longstreet with 12,000 men was on his way to join Hill's right, near the Brock Road, and might arrive during the night. I was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative in the morning, and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4.30 o'clock. Meade asked to have the hour changed to six. Deferring to his wishes as far as I was willing, the order was modified and five was fixed as the hour to move. Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the I96 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. Potomac. Wadsworth with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line perpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the right of Hancock. He was directed to move at the same time, and to attack Hill's left. Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in between Warren and Wads- worth, and attack as soon as he could get in position to do so. Sedgwick and Warren were to make attacks in their front, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take advantage of any attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter. Burnside was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, to swing around to the left and envelop the right of Lee's army. Hancock was informed of all the movements ordered. Burnside had three divisions, but one of them — a colored division — was sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until July. Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his right until Longstreet got up. This is evident from the fact that notwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, both for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before Longstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault on our right. His purpose was evident, but he failed. Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. igj but learning in time that Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the Catharpin Road, thus threat- ening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, com- manded by General Barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by which Longstreet was ex- pected. This disposition was made in time to attack as ordered. Hancock moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road, and Wadsworth by the right of it. The fighting was desperate for about an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great con- fusion. I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if the country had been such that Hancock and his command could have seen the con- fusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been taken advantage of so effectually that Lee would not have made another stand outside of his Richmond defences. Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was or- dered to attack, but was not able to accomplish much. On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect with Hancock's left and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our left and rear. He met them at the intersection of the Furnace and Brock roads and at Todd's Tavern, and defeated them at both places. Later he was attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed. I98 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart, and thinking the enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position guarding the entrance to the Brock Road. Another incident hap- pened during the day to further induce Hancock to weaken his attacking column. Word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from the direction of Todd's Tavern, and Brooke's brigade was detached to meet this new enemy ; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundred convalescents coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock had advanced upon, to join their re- spective commands. At 6.50 o'clock a.m., Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock, was ordered to send a division to the support of Hancock, but to continue with the remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. The difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented Burnside from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the sixth. Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or more. He maintained this po- sition until, along in the afternoon, Longstreet came upon him. The retreating column of Hill meeting reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, be- came encouraged and returned with them. They were enabled, from the density of the forest, to ap- BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 199 proach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being discovered. Falling upon a brigade of Hancock's corps thrown to the advance, they swept it away almost instantly. The enemy followed up his advantage and soon came upon Mott's division, which fell back in great confusion. Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but after holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he had held in the morning, which was strongly in- trenched. In this engagement the intrepid Wads- worth while trying to rally his men was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. The enemy followed up, but made no immediate attack. The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet seriously wounded in this engagement. Longstreet had to leave the field, not to resume com- mand for many weeks. His loss was a severe one to Lee, and compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions, which had fallen to our lot during the day. After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee took command of his right in person. He was not able, however, to rally his men to attack Hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the pur- pose of reforming. Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants that might be left of Long- street's or Hill's commands. This brigade having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments 200 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. held by Hancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left to right. A brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move ; but it broke and disappeared without a contest. Firing was continued after this, but with less fury. Burnside had not yet been able to get up to render any assistance. But it was now only about nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on Hancock's right. At 4.15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left. His line moved up to within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. This status was main- tained for about half an hour. Then a part of Mott's division and Ward's brigade of Birney's di- vision gave way and retired in disorder. The enemy under R. H. Anderson took advantage of this and pushed through our line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on fire. But owing to the efforts of Hancock, their success was but tem- porary. Carroll, of Gibbon's division, moved at a double quick with his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss. Fighting had continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line, at other times only in places. The ground fought over had varied in width, but averaged three- quarters of a mile. The killed, and many of the severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was impossible to reach them. The BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 201 woods were set on fire by the bursting shells, and the conflagration raged. The wounded who had not strength to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. Finally the fire communicated with our breastworks, in places. Being constructed of wood, they burned with great fury. But the battle still raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer. Lee was now in distress. His men were in con- fusion, and his personal efforts failed to restore or- der. These facts, however, were learned subse- quently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success. His troops were withdrawn now, but I revoked the order, which I had given previously to this assault, for Hancock to attack, because his troops had ex- hausted their ammunition and did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some distance. Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during all this time ; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front. I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to be taken up except one at Germania Ford. The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to reinforce our left. This left our right in danger of 202 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. being turned, and us of being cut off from all pres- ent base of supplies. Sedgwick had refused his right and intrenched it for protection against at- tack. But late in the afternoon of the 6th Early came out from his lines in considerable force and got in upon Sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the pre- cautions taken, and created considerable confusion. Early captured several hundred prisoners, among them two general officers. The defence, however, was vigorous ; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much confusion as our troops, en- gaged, were. Early says in his Memoirs that if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought fresh troops to his great discomfort. Many officers, who had not been attacked by Early, continued coming to my headquarters even after Sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was pushing on and would soon be upon me. During the night all of Lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments. On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove the enemy's cavalry from Catharpin Furnace to Todd's Tavern. Pickets and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find the position of the enemy. Some went as far as a mile and a half before finding him. But Lee showed no disposition to come out of his works. There was BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 203 no battle during the day, and but little firing except in Warren's front ; he being directed about noon to make a reconnoissance in force. This drew some sharp firing, but there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back. This ended the Battle of the Wilderness. CHAPTER LI. AFTER THE BATTLE TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SER- VICE— MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK. MORE desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of May. Our victory consisted in having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. We gained an advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up, must have proven very decisive. In the evening the enemy gained an advantage ; but was speedily repulsed. As we stood at the close, the two armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as when the river divided them. But the fact of having safely crossed was a victory. Our losses in the Wilderness were very severe. Those of the Confederates must have been even more so ; but I have no means of speaking with accuracy upon this point. The Germania Ford bridge was transferred to Ely's Ford to facilitate the transportation of the wounded to Washington. It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE. 205 things connected with all movements of the Army of the Potomac : first, in every change of position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not, the moment arms were stacked the men in- trenched themselves. For this purpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could be found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt for- ward on the timber. Thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to stand in, and in- creased the elevation in front of them. It was won- derful how quickly they could in this way construct defences of considerable strength, When a halt was made with the view of assaulting the enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or their positions changed under the direction of engineer officers. The second was, the use made of the tele- graph and signal corps. Nothing could be more com- plete than the organization and discipline of this body of brave and intelligent men. Insulated wires — insu- lated so that they would transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water — were wound upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel. Two men and one mule were detailed to each reel. The pack-saddle on which this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placed crosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its wire, would revolve freely. There was a wagon, supplied with a tele- 206 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. graph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division, each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters. There were wagons also loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tent pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. The mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with the command they were assigned to. The operators were also assigned to particular headquar- ters, and never changed except by special orders. The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their wires. A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of the nearest flank of the bri- gade he belonged to, and would be led in a line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led off. When he had walked the length of the wire the whole of it would be on the ground. This would be done in rear of every brigade at the same time. The ends of all the wires would then be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. The men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at once raising the wires with their telegraph poles. This was done by making a loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE. 20J raising the pole to a perpendicular position. At in- tervals the wire would be attached to trees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was suffi- cient at a place. In the absence of such a support two poles would have to be used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its place. While this was being done the telegraph wagons would take their positions near where the headquar- ters they belonged to were to be established, and would connect with the wire. Thus, in a few minutes longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil, telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters of the army. No orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph. The signal service was used on the march. The men composing this corps were assigned to speci- fied commands. When movements were made, they would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of ground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or would climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote, by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often the movements of the enemy. They would also take off the signals of the enemy and transmit them. It would some- times take too long a time to make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive any benefit 208 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. from them. But sometimes they gave useful infor- mation. On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from Washington announcing that Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day, and that Butler had reached City Point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th. I had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that Lee might move rap- idly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could get there. My order for this movement was as follows : Headquarters Armies of the U. S., May 7, 1864, 6.30 a.m. Major-General Meade, Commanding A. P. Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd's Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvania road with the road from Alsop's to Old Court House. If this move is made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the Ny River. I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave Hancock where he is until Warren passes him. He could then follow and become the right of the new line. Burnside will move to Piney Branch Church. Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chancellorsville and on to his destination. Burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection of it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, then follow Sedgwick to his place of destination. All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops move, and then move off quietly. Country between the Wilderness AND SPOTTSYLVAHIA COURT HOUSE, i^cttionccl Forces * Con/bcterateJ^orces. Vol. il— 14 2IO PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy- attack on Hancock this afternoon. In case they do we must be prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our whole force. Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions. All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville. U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General. During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at Todd's Tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were to go by that route at night. Soon after dark Warren with- drew from the front of the enemy, and was soon fol- lowed by Sedgwick. Warren's march carried him immediately behind the works where Hancock's com- mand lay on the Brock Road. With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I preceded the troops. Meade with his staff accompanied me. The greatest enthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed by. No doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. It indicated to them that they had passed through the " beginning of the end " in the battle just fought. The cheer- ing was so lusty that the enemy must have taken it for a night attack. At all events it drew from him a furious fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us. Meade and I rode in advance. We had passed but a little way beyond our left when the road forked. MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK. 211 We looked to see, if we could, which road Sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. It seemed to be the right-hand one, and accordingly we took it. We had not gone far, however, when Colonel C. B. Comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of the engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into the lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a rapid gallop and all alone. In a few minutes he returned and reported that Lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into his lines in a short distance. We returned to the forks of the road, left a man to indi- cate the right road to the head of Warren's column when it should come up, and continued our journey to Todd's Tavern, where we arrived after midnight. My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two- fold : first, I did not want Lee to get back to Rich- mond in time to attempt to crush Butler before I could get there ; second, I wanted to get between his army and Richmond if possible ; and, if not, to draw him into the open field. But Lee, by accident, beat us to Spottsylvania. Qur wagon trains had been ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement commenced. Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Army of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his government. Accordingly he ordered Long- street's corps — now commanded by Anderson — to 212 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. move in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsylvania. But the woods being still on fire, Anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly on to his destination that night. By this accident Lee got possession of Spottsylvania. It is impossible to say now what would have been the result if Lee's orders had been obeyed as given ; but it is cer- tain that we would have been in Spottsylvania, and between him and his capital. My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to see which could reach Richmond first, and the Army of the Potomac would have had the shorter line. Thus, twice since crossing the Rapi- dan we came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the Rapidan to the James River or Richmond. The first failure was caused by our not following up the success gained over Hill's corps on the morning of the 6th, as be- fore described : the second, when fires caused by that battle drove Anderson to make a march during the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of. the 8th. But accident often decides the fate of battle. Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at Todd's Tavern until after night, with the field his at the close. He issued the necessary orders for seizing Spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the Po MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK. 213 River, which Lee's troops would have to cross to get to Spottsylvania. But Meade changed Sheridan's orders to Merritt — who was holding the bridge — on his arrival at Todd's Tavern, and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came up. Wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry ; but he could not hold it against the Confederate corps which had not been detained at the crossing of the Po, as it would have been but for the unfortunate change in Merritt's orders. Had he been permitted to execute the orders Sher- idan gave him, he would have been guarding with two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson had to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren to reinforce Wilson and hold the town. Anderson soon intrenched himself — if indeed the intrenchments were not already made — immediately across Warren's front. Warren was not aware of his presence, but probably supposed it was the cav- alry which Merritt had engaged earlier in the day. He assaulted at once, but was repulsed. He soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made a second attack, this time with his whole corps. This time he succeeded in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he intrenched. His right and left divisions — the former Crawford's, the latter Wadsworth's, now com- 214 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. manded by Cutler — drove the enemy back some dis- tance. At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch Church. I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to his sup- port. To this end Sedgwick, who was at Piney Branch Church, was ordered to Warren's support. Hancock, who was at Todd's Tavern, was notified of Warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to come up. Burnside, who was with the wagon trains at Aldrich's on our extreme left, re- ceived the same instructions. Sedgwick was slow in getting up for some reason — probably unavoidable, because he was never at fault when serious work was to be done — so that it was near night before the combined forces were ready to attack. Even then all of Sedgwick's command did not get into the en- gagement. Warren led the last assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed. Warren's difficulty was twofold : when he received an order to do anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the army should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. His ideas were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. In like manner, when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent instructions to division commanders, he MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK. 21 5 would go in with one division, holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an order without his presence. His difficulty was constitutional and beyond his control. He was an officer of superior ability, quick percep- tions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be done with a small command. Lee had ordered Hill's corps — now commanded by Early — to move by the very road we had marched upon. This shows that even early in the morning of the 8th Lee had not yet become ac- quainted with my move, but still thought that the Army of the Potomac had gone to Fredericksburg. Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond that he had possession of Spottsylvania and was thus on my flank. Anderson was in possession of Spottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee, how- ever. Early only found that he had been following us when he ran against Hancock at Todd's Tavern. His coming detained Hancock from the battle-field of Spottsylvania for that day ; but he, in like manner, kept Early back and forced him to move by another route. Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it would have put Hancock in the lead. It would also have given us an hour or more earlier start. It took all that time for Warren 2l6 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. to get the head of his column to the left of Hancock after he had got his troops out of their line con- fronting the enemy. This hour, and Hancock's ca- pacity to use his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to crush Anderson be- fore he could be reinforced. But the movement made was tactical. It kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the enemy. Our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the right passed. If an attack had been made by the enemy he would have found the 2d corps in posi- tion, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and 6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed. By a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by it would have been very much exposed. Then, too, I had not yet learned the special qualifications of the different corps commanders. At that time my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeed Meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from the field. As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an able man ; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance of the duty he had to perform. CHAPTER LII. BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA HANCOCK'S POSITION — ASSAULT OF WARREN'S AND WRIGHt's CORPS UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD — GOOD NEWS FROM BUTLER AND SHERIDAN. THE Mattapony River is formed by the junction of the Mat, the Ta, the Po and the Ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of the four. It takes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the Wilderness Tavern. The Po rises south-west of the same place, but farther away. Spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where they are but a few miles apart. The Brock Road reaches Spottsylvania without crossing either of these streams. Lee's army coming up by the Catharpin Road, had to cross the Po at Wooden Bridge. War- ren and Hancock came by the Brock Road. Sedg- wick crossed the Ny at Catharpin Furnace. Burn- side coming by Aldrich's to Gates's house, had to cross the Ny near the enemy. He found pickets at the bridge, but they were soon driven off by a brigade of Willcox's division, and the stream was crossed. This brigade was furiously attacked ; but 2l8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. the remainder of the division coming up, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it. About the time I received the news of this attack, word came from Hancock that Early had left his front. He had been forced over to the Catharpin Road, crossing the Po at Corbin's and again at Wooden Bridge. These are the bridges Sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupy on the 8th, while one division should occupy Spottsylvania. These movements of the enemy gave me the idea that Lee was about to make the attempt to get to, or towards, Fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. I made arrangements to attack his right and get be- tween him and Richmond if he should try to execute this design. If he had any such intention it was abandoned as soon as Burnside was established south of the Ny. The Po and the Ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abrupt banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms — at the time we were there — and difficult to cross except where bridged. The country about was generally heavily timbered, but with occasional clearings. It was a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an offensive one. By noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as follows : Lee occupied a semicircle facing 2 20 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. north, north-west and north-east, inciosing the town. Anderson was on his left extending to the Po, Ewell came next, then Early. Warren occupied our right, covering the Brock and other roads converging at Spottsylvania ; Sedgwick was to his left and Burn- side on our extreme left. Hancock was yet back at Todd's Tavern, but as soon as it was known that Early had left Hancock's front the latter was ordered up to Warren's right. He formed a line with three divisions on the hill overlooking the Po early in the afternoon, and was ordered to cross the Po and get on the enemy's flank. The fourth division of Han- cock's corps, Mott commanding, was left at Todd's when the corps first came up ; but in the after- noon it was brought up and placed to the left of Sedgwick's — now Wright's — 6th corps. In the morning General Sedgwick had been killed near the right of his intrenchments by rebel sharp- shooters. His loss was a severe one to the Army of the Potomac and to the Nation. General H. G. Wright succeeded him in the command of his corps. Hancock was now, nine p.m. of the 9th of May, across the left flank of Lee's army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder of Meade's army, by the Po River. But for the lateness of the hour and the darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again at Wooden HANCOCK'S POSITION. 22 1 Bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with both friend and foe. The Po at the points where Hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east. Just below his lower crossing — the troops crossed at three points — it turns due south, and after passing under Wooden Bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction. During the night this corps built three bridges over the Po ; but these were in rear. The position assumed by Hancock's corps forced Lee to reinforce his left during the night. Accord- ingly on the morning of the ioth, when Hancock renewed his effort to get over the Po to his front, he found himself confronted by some of Early's command, which had been brought from the ex- treme right of the enemy during the night. He succeeded in effecting a crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenched in his front, no more were crossed. Hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the ioth, with the view of forcing a crossing, if it was found that an advantage could be gained. The enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high ground overlooking the river, and commanding the Wooden Bridge with artillery. Anderson's left rested on the Po, where it turns south ; therefore, for Hancock to cross over — although it v/ould bring him to the same side of the stream with the rest of 222 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. the army — would still farther isolate him from it. The stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the enemy to unite with the main body. The idea of crossing was therefore abandoned. Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of Hancock's, and I deter- mined to take advantage of it. Accordingly in the morning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the centre by Warren's and Wright's corps, Hancock to command all the attacking force. Two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the Po. Gibbon was placed to the right of War- ren, and Birney in his rear as a reserve. Barlow's division was left south of the stream, and Mott of the same corps was still to the left of Wright's corps. Burnside was ordered to reconnoitre his front in force, and, if an opportunity presented, to attack with vigor. The enemy seeing Barlow's division isolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury. Barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter, and with considerable loss to him- self. But the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault. Birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river crossings built by our troops, and covered the crossines. The second assault was repulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and Barlow was withdrawn without further molestation. General T. G. Stevenson was killed in this move. ASSAULT OF WARREN'S AND WRIGHT'S CORPS. 223 Between the lines, where Warren's assault was to take place, there was a ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almost impenetrable by man. The slopes on both sides were also covered with a heavy growth of timber. Warren, before noon, reconnoitred his front twice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions. He was repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of the ground as to induce him to report recommending the assault. Wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably advanced position from the one he started from. He then organized a storming party, consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned Colonel Emory Upton, of the 121st New York Volunteers, to the command of it. About four o'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered, Warren's and Wright's corps, with Mott's division of Hancock's corps, to move simultaneously. The movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of strug- gles began. The battle-field was so densely covered with forest that but little could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made. Meade and I occupied the best position we could get, in rear of Warren. Warren was repulsed with heavy loss, General J. C. Rice being among the killed. He was not followed, however, by the enemy, and was thereby enabled to 224 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns of the enemy. To the left our success was de- cided, but the advantage was lost by the feeble action of M ott. Upton with his assaulting party pushed for- ward and crossed the enemy's intrenchments. Turn- ing to the right and left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners. Mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly. So much time was lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position to reinforce, that I ordered Upton to withdraw ; but the officers and men of his command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gained that I withdrew the order. To relieve them, I ordered a renewal of the assault. By this time Han- cock, who had gone with Birney's division to relieve Barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him. His corps was now joined with Warren's and Wright's in this last assault. It was gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of the enemy ; but they were not able to hold them. At night they were withdrawn. Upton brought his pris- oners with him, but the guns he had captured he was obliged to abandon. Upton had gained an important advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him lost it to us. Before leaving Washington I had been authorized to promote offi- cers on the field for special acts of gallantry. By this authority I conferred the rank of brigadier-gen- UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD. 225 eral upon Upton on the spot, and this act was con- firmed by the President. Upton had been badly wounded in this fight. Burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of Spottsylvania Court House, com- pletely turning Lee's right. He was not aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and I, being with the troops where the heavy fight- ing was, did not know of it at the time. He had gained his position with but little fighting, and almost without loss. Burnside's position now sepa- rated him widely from Wright's corps, the corps nearest to him. At night he was ordered to join on to this. This brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an important advantage. I attach no blame to Burnside for this, but I do to myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to me his posi- tion. The enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow up his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on Barlow. Then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire corps against two brigades. Barlow took up his bridges in the presence of this force. On the nth there was no battle and but little firing ; none except by Mott who made a reconnois- sance to ascertain if there was a weak point in the enemy's line. 226 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. I wrote the following letter to General Halleck : Near Spottsylvania C. H., May II, 1864 — 8.30 A.M. Major-General Halleck, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C. We have now ended the 6th day of very hard righting. The re- sult up to this time is much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy as well as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time eleven general officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater — we having taken over four thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except a few stragglers. I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer. The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great numbers. My object in having them sent to Belle Plain was to use them as an escort to our supply trains. If it is more convenient to send them out by train to march from the railroad to Belle Plain or Fredericksburg, send them so. I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take. Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee's army being detached for the defence of Richmond. U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. And also, I received information, through the War Department, from General Butler that his cavalry under Kautz had cut the railroad south of Peters- GOOD NEWS FROM BUTLER AND SHERIDAN. 227 burg, separating Beauregard from Richmond, and had whipped Hill, killing, wounding and capturing many. Also that he was intrenched, and could maintain himself. On this same day came news from Sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad and telegraph between Lee and Richmond, one and a half million rations, and most of the medical stores for his army. On the 8th I had directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac and pass around the left of Lee's army and attack his cavalry and communications, which was successfully exe- cuted in the manner I have already described. CHAPTER LIII. Hancock's assault — losses of the confederates promotions recommended discomfiture of the enemy ewell's attack reducing the artillery. IN the reconnoissance made by Mott on the nth, a salient was discovered at the right centre. I determined that an assault should be made at that point.* Accordingly in the afternoon Hancock was ordered to move his command by the rear of Warren and Wright, under cover of night, to Wright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next morning. The night was dark, it rained heav- ily, and the road was difficult, so that it was mid- night when he reached the point where he was to * Headquarters Armies U. S., May ii, 1864. — 3 p.m. Major-General Meade, Commanding Army of the Potomac. Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and 6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock a.m. to-morrow. I will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with Burn- side, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and HANCOCK'S ASSAULT. 229 halt. It took most of the night to get the men in position for their advance in the morning. The men got but little rest. Burnside was ordered to attack* on the left of the salient at the same hour. I sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance of pushing forward vigorously. Han- cock was notified of this. Warren and Wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the assault if circumstances made it advisable. I occupied a central position most convenient for re- ceiving information from all points. Hancock put vigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents itself. There is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely successful if it had com- menced one hour earlier and had been heartily entered into by Mott's division and the 9th corps. U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. * Headquarters, Armies U. S., May 11, 1864. — 4 p.m. Major- General A. E. Burnside, Commanding 9th Army Corps. Major-General Hancock has been ordered to move his corps under cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the enemy at 4 o'clock a.m. to-morrow. You will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o'clock a. m. to-morrow the 12th inst. Let your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy. 23O PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. Barlow on his left, in double column, and Birney to his right. Mott followed Birney, and Gibbon was held in reserve. The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half an hour. The ground over which Hancock had to pass to reach the enemy, was ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the enemy's intrenchments. In front of Birney there was also a marsh to cross. But, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushed on in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or five hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with a rush went up to and over the breastworks. Barlow and Birney entered almost simultaneously. Here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took place. The men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but used their guns as clubs. The hand conflict was soon over. Hancock's I send two of my staff officers ; Colonels Comstock and Bab- cock, in whom I have great confidence and who are acquainted with the direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you and General Hancock with instructions to render you every assistance in their power. Generals Warren and Wright will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take ad- vantage of any diversion caused by yours and Hancock's attack, and will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself. U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General. HANCOCK'S ASSAULT. 231 corps captured some four thousand prisoners — among them a division and a brigade commander — twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. Hancock, as soon as the hand- to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. About six o'clock I ordered Warren's corps to the support of Hancock's. Burnside, on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of the enemy. Potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but was not able to remain there. However, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the enemy ; but not without loss in return. This victory was important, and one that Lee could not afford to leave us in full possession of. He made the most strenuous efforts to regain the position he had lost. Troops were brought up from his left and attacked Hancock furiously. Hancock was forced to fall back : but he did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss, until behind the breastworks he had captured. These he turned, facing them the other way, and continued to hold. Wright was ordered up to rein- force Hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. He was wounded soon after coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps, although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. At eight 232 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT. o'clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with emphasis, At eleven o'clock I gave Meade written orders to relieve Warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. Hancock placed batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy, firing over the heads of his own troops. Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but negatively a great deal. He kept Lee from reinforcing his centre from that quarter. If the 5th corps, or rather if Warren, had been as prompt as Wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have been obtained. Lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line. Five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging our troops from their new position. His losses must have been fearful. Sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. In one place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by musket balls. All the trees between the lines were very much cut to pieces by artillery and musketry. It was three o'clock next morning before the fighting ceased. Some of our troops had then been twenty hours under fire. In this engagement we did not lose a single organization, not even a company. The enemy lost one division with its LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES. 233 commander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losses elsewhere.* Our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company was captured. At night Lee took a position in rear of his former one, and by the following morning he was strongly in- trenched in it. Warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, Cutler's division sent to Wright, and Griffin's to Hancock. Meade ordered his chief of staff, General Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the re- maining division, and authorized him to give it orders in his name. During the day I was passing along the line from wing to wing continuously. About the centre stood a house which proved to be occupied by an old lady and her daughter. She showed such un- mistakable signs of being strongly Union that I * Headquarters Armies U. S., May 12, 1864, 6.30 p.m. Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work, includ- ing two general officers, and over thirty pieces of artillery. The enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the last ditch. We have lost no organizations, not even that of a company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division (Johnson's), one brigade (Doles'), and one regiment entire from the enemy. U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 234 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. S. GRANT. stopped. She said she had not seen a Union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon it again. She said her husband and son, being Union men, had had to leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the Union army, if alive. She was without food or nearly so, so I ordered rations issued to her, and promised to find out if I could where the husband and son were. There was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishing between Mott's division and the enemy. I was afraid that Lee might be moving out, and I did not want him to go without my knowing it. The indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only taking his new posi- tion back from the salient that had been captured. Our dead were buried this day. Mott's division was reduced to a brigade, and assigned to Birney's divi- sion. During this day I wrote to Washington recom- mending Sherman and Meade * for promotion to the * Spottsylvania C. H., May 13, 1864. Hon E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. I beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days' battles, to wit : Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and Brigadier-General John Gibbon to be Major-Generals ; Colonel S. S. Carroll, 8th Ohio Volunteers ; Colonel E. Upton, 121st New York Volunteers; PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED. 235 grade of Major-General in the regular army ; Han- cock for Brigadier-General ; Wright, Gibbon and Humphreys to be Major-Generals of Volunteers ; and Upton and Carroll to be Brigadiers. Upton had already been named as such, but the appoint- ment had to be confirmed by the Senate on the nomi- nation of the President. The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were moved by the rear to the left of Burnside. The night was very dark and it rained heavily, the roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and Colonel William McCandless, 2d Pennsylvania Reserves, to be Brigadier-Generals. I would also recommend Major-General W. S. Hancock for Brigadier-General in the regular army. His services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this recogni- tion. In making these recommendations I do not wish the claims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, but recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. I would also ask to have General Wright assigned to the command of the Sixth Army Corps. I would further ask the confirmation of General Hum- phreys to the rank of Major-General. General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expecta- tions. He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I have come in contact with. If their services can be rewarded by promotion to the rank of Major-Generals in the regular army the honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally gratified. I would not like to see one of these promotions at this time without seeing both. U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 236 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. corduroy the road a part of the way, to get through. It was midnight before they got to the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could be organized to advance to their position in line. They gained their position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in Wright's front. Here Upton had to contend for an elevation which we wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. Upton first drove the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. Ayres coming to his support with his brigade (of Griffin's division, Warren's corps), the position was secured and fortified. There was no more battle during the 14th. This brought our line east of the Court House and running north and south and facing west. During the night of the I4th-i5th Lee moved to cover this new front. This left Hancock without an enemy confronting him. He was brought to the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he might be wanted. On the 15th news came from Butler and Averill. The former reported the capture of the outer works at Drury's Bluff, on the James River, and that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of Richmond on the Danville road : and the latter, the destruction of a depot of supplies at Dublin, West Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. The next day DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY. 2$ J news came from Sherman and Sheridan. Sherman had forced Johnston out of Dalton, Georgia, and was following him south. The report from Sheridan embraced his operations up to his passing the outer defences of Richmond. The prospect must now have been dismal in Richmond. The road and telegraph were cut between the capital and Lee. The roads and wires were cut in every direction from the rebel capital. Temporarily that city was cut off from all communica- tion with the outside except by courier. This con- dition of affairs, however, was of but short duration. I wrote Halleck : Near Spottsylvania C. H., May 16, 1864, 8 A.M. Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. : We have had five days almost constant rain without any pros- pect yet of it clearing up. The roads have now become so im- passable that ambulances with wounded men can no longer run between here and Fredericksburg. All offensive operations neces- sarily cease until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather. The army is in the best of spirits, and feel the greatest confidence of ultimate success. ****** You can assure the President and Secretary of War that the elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part. U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. The condition of the roads was such that nothing 238 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. was done on the 17th. But that night Hancock and Wright were to make a night march back to their old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in the morning. Lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the assault was unsuccessful. On this day (18th) the news was almost as dis- couraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital. As stated above, Hancock's and Wright's corps had made an unsuccessful assault. News came that Sigel had been defeated at New Market, badly, and was retreating down the valley. Not two hours before, I had sent the inquiry to Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton to stop supplies coming from there to Lee. I asked at once that Sigel might be relieved, and some one else put in his place. Hunter's name was suggested, and I heartily approved. Further news from Butler reported him driven from Dairy's Bluff, but still in possession of the Petersburg road. Banks had been defeated in Louisiana, re- lieved, and Canby put in his place. This change of commander was not on my suggestion. All this news was very discouraging. All of it must have been known by the enemy before it was by me. In fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have been known to him at the moment I thought he was in despair, and his anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed discomfiture, E WELL'S ATTACK. 239 But this was no time for repining. I immediately gave orders for a movement by the left flank, on towards Richmond, to commence on the night of the 19th. I also asked Halleck to secure the co- operation of the navy in changing our base of sup- plies from Fredericksburg to Port Royal, on the Rappahannock. Up to this time I had received no reinforcements, except six thousand raw troops under Brigadier- General Robert O. Tyler, just arrived. They had not yet joined their command, Hancock's corps, but were on our right. This corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready to move in any direction. Lee, probably suspecting some move on my part, and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved E well's corps about five o'clock in the afternoon, with Early's as a reserve, to attack us in that quarter. Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg, and had been halted on the road to the right of our line, near Kitch- ing's brigade of Warren's corps. Tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and they maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of veterans. Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to do it without waiting to make dispositions. Birney was thrown to Tyler's right and Crawford to his left, with Gibbon as a reserve ; and Ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss. 24O PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. Warren had been ordered to get on E well's flank and in his rear, to cut him off from his intrench- ments. But his efforts were so feeble that under the cover of night Ewell got back with only the loss of a few hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. The army being engaged until after dark, I rescinded the order for the march by our left flank that night. As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, I naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. The withdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered one road from Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies. This was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by Gen- eral Ferrero, belonging to Burnside's corps. Ferrero was therefore promptly notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come ; if he had to retreat to do so towards Fredericksburg. The enemy did detach as expected, and captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken. In consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few days, Lee could be reinforced largely, and I had no doubt he would be. Beaure- gard had come up from the south with troops to guard the Confederate capital when it was in dan- REDUCING THE ARTILLERY. 2 4 1 ger. Butler being driven back, most of the troops could be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed in North Carolina ; and Sigel's troops having gone back to Cedar Creek, whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley. The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles con- vinced me that we had more artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. It occu- pied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing up forage. Artillery is very use- ful when it can be brought into action, but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. Before leaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back to the defences of Washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and caissons. This relieved the roads over which we were to march of more than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than could be advantage- ously used. In fact, before reaching the James River I again reduced the artillery with the army largely. I believed that, if one corps of the army was ex- posed on the road to Richmond, and at a distance from the main army, Lee would endeavor to attack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up ; in which case the main army could follow Lee up and attack him before he had time to intrench. So I issued the following orders : Vol. 11. — 16 242 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. Near Spottsylvania C. H., Va., ) May 18, 1864. ) Major-General Meade, Commanding Army of the Potomac. Before daylight to-morrow morning I propose to draw Hancock and Burnside from the position they now hold, and put Burnside to the left of Wright. Wright and Burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy as they can get without a gen- eral engagement, or with a general engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, and intrench. Hancock should march and take up a position as if in support of the two left corps. To-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he will be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can be given to him, to get as far towards Richmond on the line of the Fredericksburg Railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever force he can find him. If the enemy make a general move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench. Suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and sur- plus artillery to conform to this movement. U. S. GRANT. On the 20th, Lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orders were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night. CHAPTER LIV. MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA — AN INCIDENT OF THE MARCH — MOVING ON RICHMOND — SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY POSITION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY. WE were now to operate in a different country from any we had before seen in Virginia. The roads were wide and good, and the country well cul- tivated. No men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black man having been sent away. The country, however, was new to us, and we had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or where they led to. Engineer and staff offi- cers were put to the dangerous duty of supplying the place of both maps and guides. By reconnoitring they were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps. Our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction which would not separate the army too widely. Hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to Guiney's Station, on the Fredericksburg Railroad, thence southerly to Bowling Green and Milford. He was at Milford by the night of the 21st. Here 244 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. he met a detachment of Pickett's division coming from Richmond to reinforce Lee. They were speed- ily driven away, and several hundred captured. Warren followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached Guiney's Station that night without moles- tation. Burnside and Wright were retained at Spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an in- tended assault, and to hold Lee, if possible, while Hancock and Warren should get start enough to in- terpose between him and Richmond. Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either by attacking Wright and Burnside alone, or by following by the Telegraph Road and striking Hancock's and Warren's corps, or even Hancock's alone, before reinforcements could come up. But he did not avail himself of either oppor- tunity. He seemed really to be misled as to my designs ; but moved by his interior line — the Tele- graph Road — to make sure of keeping between his capital and the Army of the Potomac. He never again had such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow. The evening of the 21st Burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed by Wright, 6th corps. Burnside was to take the Telegraph Road ; but finding Stanard's Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to the road taken by Hancock and Warren with- out an attempt to dislodge the enemy. The night BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA. 245 of the 2 1 st I had my headquarters near the 6th corps, at Guiney's Station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and Hancock. There was a slight attack on Burnside's and Wright's corps as they moved out of their lines ; but it was easily repulsed. The object probably was only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon the rear of the Confederates. By the morning of the 2 2d Burnside and Wright were at Guiney's Station. Hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. They were, therefore, permitted to rest dur- ing the 2 2d. But Warren was pushed to Harris's Store, directly west of Milford, and connected with it by a good road, and Burnside was sent to New Bethel Church. Wright's corps was still back at Guiney's Station. I issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next day : New Bethel, Va., May 22, 1864. Major-General Meade, Commanding Army of the Potomac. Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at five a.m. to-morrow. At that hour each command will send out cavalry and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is. If beyond the South Anna, the 5th and 6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to Beaver Dam Station, the 246 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roads reaching the Anna, as near to and east of Hawkins Creek as they can be found. The 2d corps will move to Chesterfield Ford. The 9th corps will be directed to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge. The map only shows two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of plantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give one for each corps. The troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. The trains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station. Headquarters will follow the 9th corps. U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General. Warren's corps was moved from Harris's Store to Jericho Ford, Wright's following. Warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by five o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharp- shooters. The men had to wade in water up to their waists. As soon as enough troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artil- lery and the rest of the troops crossed. The line formed was almost perpendicular to the course of the river — Crawford on the left, next to the river, Griffin in the centre, and Cutler on the right. Lee was found intrenched along the front of their line. The whole of Hill's corps was sent against Warren's right before it had got in position. A brigade of Cutler's division was driven back, the enemy follow- ing, but assistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches with heavy loss 248 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. in killed and wounded, with about five hundred pris- oners left in our hands. By night Wright's corps was up ready to reinforce Warren. On the 23d Hancock's corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spans the North Anna River just west of where the Fredericksburg Railroad crosses. It was near night when the troops arrived. They found the bridge guarded, with troops in- trenched, on the north side. Hancock sent two brigades, Egan's and Pierce's, to the right and left, and when properly disposed they charged simultane- ously. The bridge was carried quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved into the river, and some of them were drowned. Sev- eral hundred prisoners were captured. The hour was so late that Hancock did not cross until next morning. Burnside's corps was moved by a middle road running between those described above, and which strikes the North Anna at Ox Ford, midway be- tween Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford. The hour of its arrival was too late to cross that night. On the 24th Hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the river without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. The railroad in rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. Wright's corps crossed at Jericho early the same day, and took position to the right of Warren's corps, BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA. 249 extending south of the Virginia Central Railroad. This road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear (west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them over the burning ties. It was found, however, that Burnside's corps could not cross at Ox Ford. Lee had taken a position with his centre on the river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line making an acute angle where it overlooked the river. Before the exact position of the whole of Lee's line was accurately known, I directed Hancock and Warren each to send a brigade to Ox Ford by the south side of the river. They found the enemy too strong to justify a serious attack. A third ford was found between Ox Ford and Jericho. Burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, and to send one division to Hancock. Crittenden was crossed by this newly-discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect with Crawford's left. Potter joined Hancock by way of the wooden bridge. Crittenden had a severe engagement with some of Hill's corps on his crossing the river, and lost heav- ily. When joined to Warren's corps he was no further molested. Burnside still guarded Ox Ford from the north side. Lee now had his entire army south of the North Anna. Our lines covered his front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but a 25O PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF C7. S. GRANT. single division. To get from one wing to the other the river would have to be crossed twice. Lee could reinforce any part of his line from all points of it in a very short march ; or could concentrate the whole of it wherever he might choose to assault. We were, for the time, practically two armies besieging. Lee had been reinforced, and was being rein- forced, largely. About this time the very troops whose coming I had predicted, had arrived or were coming in. Pickett with a full division from Rich- mond was up ; Hoke from North Carolina had come with a brigade ; and Breckinridge was there : in all probably not less than fifteen thousand men. But he did not attempt to drive us from the field. On the 226. or 23d I received dispatches from Washington saying that Sherman had taken Kings- ton, crossed the Etowah River and was advancing into Georgia. I was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waiting for Burnside's corps to pass. Meade and his staff, besides my own staff, were with me. The lady of the house, a Mrs. Tyler, and an elderly lady, were present. Burnside seeing us, came up on the porch, his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked. He touched his hat politely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had never seen so many "live Yankees" before in their lives. The elderly lady spoke up promptly AN INCIDENT OF THE MARCH. 25 I saying, " Oh yes, I have ; many more." " Where ?" said Burnside. " In Richmond." Prisoners, of course, was understood. I read my dispatch aloud, when it was received. This threw the younger lady into tears. I found the information she had received (and I suppose it was the information generally in circulation through the South) was that Lee was driving us from the State in the most demoralized condition, and that in the South-west our troops were but little better than prisoners of war. Seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that a part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my news from Sherman was true. I assured her that there was no doubt about it. I left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troops should have all passed, and assured her that if her husband was in hiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also. But I presume he was in the Confederate army. On the 25th I gave orders, through Halleck, to Hunter, who had relieved Sigel, to move up the Valley of Virginia, cross over the Blue Ridge to Charlottesville and go as far as Lynchburg if pos- sible, living upon the country and cutting the rail- roads and canal as he went. After doing this he could find his way back to his base, or join me. On the same day news was received that Lee was 252 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. falling back on Richmond. This proved not to be true. But we could do nothing where we were un- less Lee would assume the offensive. I determined, therefore, to draw out of our present position and make one more effort to get between him and Rich- mond. I had no expectation now, however, of suc- ceeding in this ; but I did expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach the James River high up. Sheridan was now again with the Army of the Potomac. On the 26th I informed the government at Wash- ington of the position of the two armies ; of the re- inforcements the enemy had received ; of the move I proposed to make ; * and directed that our base of * Quarles' Mills, Va., May 26, 1864. Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. The relative position of the two armies is now as follows : Lee's right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg road and south of the North Anna, his centre on the river at Ox Ford, and his left at Little River with the crossings of Little River guarded as far up as we have gone. Hancock with his corps and one division of the 9th corps crossed at Chesterfield Ford and covers the right wing of Lee's army. One division of the 9th corps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridges above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army with equal facility. The 5th and 6th corps with one division of the 9th corps run from the south bank of the Anna from a short distance above Ox Ford to Little River, and parallel with and near to the enemy. MOVING ON RICHMOND. 253 supplies should be shifted to White House, on the Pamunkey. The wagon train and guards moved directly from Port Royal to White House. Sup- plies moved around by water, guarded by the navy. Orders had previously been sent, through Halleck, To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaugh- ter of our men that even success would not justify. To turn the enemy by his right, between the two Annas, is impossible on account of the swamp upon which his right rests. To turn him by the left leaves Little River, New Found River and South Anna River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of our army, to be crossed. I have determined there- fore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near Hanover Town. This crosses all three streams at once, and leaves us still where we can draw supplies. During the last night the teams and artillery not in position, be- longing to the right wing of our army, and one division of that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river and moved down to the rear of the left. As soon as it is dark this di- vision with most of the cavalry will commence a forced march for Hanover Town to seize and hold the crossings. The balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and follow as rap- idly as possible. The left wing will also withdraw from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing. Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already assured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements has 254 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. for Butler to send Smith's corps to White House. This order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should be landed on the north side of the Pamunkey, and marched until they joined the Army of the Potomac. It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the Potomac from its position south of the North Anna in the presence of the enemy. To ac- complish it. I issued the following order : Quarles' Mills, Va., May 25, 1864. Major General Meade, Commanding A. P. Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams and artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-mor- row. Send that belonging to General Wright's corps as far on the road to Hanover Town as it can go, without attracting attention contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the enemy. We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and Fred- ericksburg roads. I want to leave a gap on the roads north of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to import rail from elsewhere. Even if a crossing is not effected at Hanover Town it will prob- ably be necessary for us to move on down the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected. I think it advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from Port Royal to the White House. I wish you would direct this change at once, and also direct Smith to put the railroad bridge there in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to hold it. U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY. 255 to the fact. Send with it Wright's best division or division under his ablest commander. Have their places filled up in the line so if possible the enemy will not notice their withdrawal. Send the cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch and seize, if they can, Littlepage's Bridge and Taylor's Ford, and to remain on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and artillery all pass. As soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the division which you withdraw first from Wright's corps to make a forced march to Hanover Town, taking with them no teams to impede their march. At the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the 5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them for the same place. The two divisions of the 9th corps not now with Hancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they will be handy to support Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their road to follow the 5 th and 6th corps. Han- cock should hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. To-morrow it will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will have to take. As soon as the troops reach Hanover Town they should get possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. I think it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's left, to-morrow afternoon, also. U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. Wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved by our right south to Little River. Here he manoeuvred to give the impression that we were going to attack the left flank of Lee's army. 256 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. Under cover of night our right wing was with- drawn to the north side of the river, Lee being com- pletely deceived by Wilson's feint. On the after- noon of the 26th Sheridan moved, sending Gregg's and Torbert's cavalry to Taylor's and Littlepage's fords towards Hanover. As soon as it was dark both divisions moved quietly to Hanover Ferry, leaving small guards behind to keep up the impres- sion that crossings were to be attempted in the morning. Sheridan was followed by a division of infantry under General Russell. On the morning of the 27th the crossing was effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty, taken pris- oners. Thus a position was secured south of the Pamunkey. Russell stopped at the crossing while the cavairy pushed on to Hanover Town. Here Barringer's, formerly Gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was en- countered, but it was speedily driven away. Warren's and Wright's corps were moved by the rear of Burnside's and Hancock's corps. When out of the way these latter corps followed, leaving pickets confronting the enemy. Wilson's cavalry followed last, watching all the fords until everything had re- crossed ; then taking up the pontoons and destroy- ing other bridges, became the rear-guard. Two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. The one nearest to and north of the North Vol. ii. — 17 258 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. Anna and Pamunkey was taken by Wright, followed by Hancock. Warren, followed by Burnside, moved by a road farther north, and longer. The trains moved by a road still farther north, and had to travel a still greater distance. All the troops that had crossed the Pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest of the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the crossing that had been secured for them. Lee had evidently been deceived by our move- ment from North Anna ; for on the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to Richmond : " Enemy crossed to north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at Hanover Town." The troops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th. The country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over. The streams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush. The banks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult to approach except where there were roads and bridges. Hanover Town is about twenty miles from Rich- mond. There are two roads leading there ; the most direct and shortest one crossing the Chicka- hominy at Meadow Bridge, near the Virginia Cen- tral Railroad, the second going by New and Old Cold Harbor. A few miles out from Hanover SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY. 259 Town there is a third road by way of Mechanicsville to Richmond. New Cold Harbor was important to us because while there we both covered the roads back to White House (where our supplies came from), and the roads south-east over which we would have to pass to get to the James River below the Richmond defences. On the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by noon all had crossed except Burnside's corps. This was left on the north side temporarily to guard the large wagon train*. A line was at once formed extending south from the river, Wright's corps on the right, Hancock's in the centre, and Warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if he should come. At the same time Sheridan was directed to re- connoitre towards Mechanicsville to find Lee's position. At Hawes' Shop, just where the middle road leaves the direct road to Richmond, he en- countered the Confederate cavalry dismounted and partially intrenched. Gregg attacked with his di- vision, but was unable to move the enemy. In the evening Custer came up with a brigade. The attack was now renewed, the cavalry dismounting and charging as infantry. This time the assault was suc- cessful, both sides losing a considerable number of men. But our troops had to bury the dead, and found that more Confederate than Union soldiers 260 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. had been killed. The position was easily held, be- cause our infantry was near. On the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the position of Lee. Wright's corps pushed to Hanover Court House. Hancock's corps pushed toward Totopotomoy Creek ; Warren's corps to the left on the Shady Grove Church Road, while Burn- side was held in reserve. Our advance was pushed forward three miles on the left with but little fight- ing. There was now an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and Sheridan was sent to meet it. On the 30th Hancock moved to the Totopot- omoy, where he found the enemy strongly fortified. Wright was moved to the right of Hancock's corps, and Burnside was brought forward and crossed, taking position to the left of Hancock. Warren moved up near Huntley Corners on the Shady Grove Church Road. There was some skirmishing along the centre, and in the evening Early attacked Warren with some vigor, driving him back at first, and threatening to turn our left flank. As the best means of reinforcing the left, Hancock was ordered to attack in his front. He carried and held the rifle-pits. While this was going on War- ren got his men up, repulsed Early, and drove him more than a mile. On this day I wrote to Halleck ordering all the pontoons in Washington to be sent to City Point. 262 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. In the evening news was received of the arrival of Smith with his corps at White House. I notified Meade, in writing, as follows : Near Hawes' Shop, Va., 6.40 p.m., May 30, 1864. Major-General Meade, Commanding A. P. General Smith will debark his force at the White House to- night and start up the south bank of the Pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 a.m. in the morning. It is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of Smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get back before we are aware of it. Sher- idan ought to be notified to watch the enemy's movements well out towards Cold Harbor, and also on the Mechanicsville road. Wright should be got well massed on Hancock's right, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the Totopotomoy if neces- sary. I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a bri- gade, if not a whole brigade, at 5 a.m. in the morning, to communi- cate with Smith and to return with him. I will send orders for Smith by the messenger you send to Sheridan with his orders. U. S. GRANT. I also notified Smith of his danger, and the pre- cautions that would be taken to protect him. The night of the 30th Lee's position was substan- tially from Atlee's Station on the Virginia Central Railroad south and east to the vicinity of Cold Har- bor. Ours was : The left of Warren's corps was on the Shady Grove Road, extending to the Me- POSITION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY. 263 chanicsville Road and about three miles south of the Totopotomoy. Burnside to his right, then Hancock, and Wright on the extreme right, ex- tending towards Hanover Court House, six miles south-east of it. Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry was watching our left front towards Cold Harbor. Wilson with his division on our right was sent to get on the Virginia Central Railroad and destroy it as far back as possible. He got possession of Hanover Court House the next day after a skir- mish with Young's cavalry brigade. The enemy at- tacked Sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and the attack was speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distance towards Cold Harbor. CHAPTER LV. ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE — RETROSPECTIVE. ON the 31st Sheridan advanced to near Old Cold Harbor. He found it intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry. A hard fight ensued but the place was carried. The enemy well knew the importance of Cold Harbor to us, and seemed de- termined that we should not hold it. He returned with such a large force that Sheridan was about withdrawing without making any effort to hold it against such odds ; but about the time he com- menced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place at all hazards, until reinforcements could be sent to him. He speedily turned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in position for defence. Night came on before the enemy was ready for assault. Wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly to Cold Harbor passing by the rear of the army. It was expected to arrive by daylight or before ; but the night was dark and the distance ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR. 265 great, so that it was nine o'clock the ist of June before it reached its destination. Before the arrival of Wright the enemy had made two assaults on Sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. Wright's corps coming up, there was no further assault on Cold Harbor. Smith, who was coming up from White House, was also directed to march directly to Cold Harbor, and was expected early on the morning of the ist of June ; but by some blunder the order which reached Smith directed him to Newcastle instead of Cold Harbor. Through this blunder Smith did not reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and then with tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march. He landed twelve thousand five hundred men from Butler's command, but a divi- sion was left at White House temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranks in their long march. Before the removal of Wright's corps from our right, after dark on the 31st, the two lines, Federal and Confederate, were so close together at that point that either side could detect directly any move- ment made by the other. Finding at daylight that Wright had left his front, Lee evidently divined that he had gone to our left. At all events, soon after light on the ist of June Anderson, who commanded the corps on Lee's left, was seen moving along War- ren's front. Warren was ordered to attack him vigor- 266 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. ously in flank, while Wright was directed to move out and get on his front. Warren fired his artillery at the enemy ; but lost so much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and at three o'clock he reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and besides his lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with. He seemed to have for- gotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselves while their defenders are fighting in their front. Wright reconnoitred some distance to his front : but the enemy finding Old Cold Harbor already taken had halted and fortified some distance west. By six o'clock in the afternoon Wright and Smith were ready to make an assault. In front of both the ground was clear for several hundred yards, and then became wooded. Both charged across this open space and into the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle-pits of the enemy, and also captur- ing seven or eight hundred prisoners. While this was going on, the enemy charged War- ren three separate times with vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss. There was no officer more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than War- ren when the enemy forced him to it. There was also an attack upon Hancock's and Burnside's corps at the same time ; but it was feeble and probably only intended to relieve Anderson who was being pressed by Wright and Smith. 268 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. During the night the enemy made frequent at- tacks with the view of dispossessing us of the im- portant position we had gained, but without effect- ing their object. Hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordered to the left of Wright. I ex- pected to take the offensive on the morning of the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive and the roads so intricate and hard to keep, that the head of column only reached Old Cold Harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7.30 a.m. Preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not take place until the next morning. Warren's corps was moved to the left to connect with Smith: Hancock's corps was got into position to the left of Wright's, and Burnside was moved to Bethesda Church in reserve. While Warren and Burnside were making these changes the enemy came out several times and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. The attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. I was so annoyed at this that I directed Meade to instruct his corps commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they oc- curred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover. On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon A WAR ANECDOTE. 269 the Virginia Central Railroad, having damaged it considerably. But, like ourselves, the rebels had become experts in repairing such damage. Sher- man, in his memoirs, relates an anecdote of his cam- paign to Atlanta that well illustrates this point. The rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burn bridges and obstruct his communications had become so dis- gusted at hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had been burned, that they pro- posed to try blowing up some of the tunnels. One of them said, " No use, boys, Old Sherman carries duplicate tunnels with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up ; better save your powder." Sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the Chickahominy, to find crossings and the con- dition of the roads. He reported favorably. During the night Lee moved his left up to make his line correspond to ours. His lines extended now from the Totopotomoy to New Cold Harbor. Mine from Bethesda Church by Old Cold Harbor to the Chickahominy, with a division of cavalry guarding our right. An assault was ordered for the 3d, to be made mainly by the corps of Hancock, Wright and Smith ; but Warren and Burnside were to support it by threatening Lee's left, and to attack with great earnestness if he should either rein- force more threatened points by drawing from that 27O PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. quarter or if a favorable opportunity should present itself. The corps commanders were to select the points in their respective fronts where they would make their assaults. The move was to commence at half- past four in the morning. Hancock sent Barlow and Gibbon forward at the appointed hour, with Birney as a reserve. Barlow pushed forward with great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, through thickets and swamps. Notwith- standing all the resistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he carried a posi- tion occupied by the enemy outside their main line where the road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter for troops as if it had been made for that purpose. Three pieces of ar- tillery had been captured here, and several hun- dred prisoners. The guns were immediately turned against the men who had just been using them. No Near Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864, 7 a.m. Major-General Meade, Commanding A. P. The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive •; but when one does succeed, push it vigor- ously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken. I shall go to where you are in the course of an hour. U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR. 271 assistance coming to him, he (Barlow) intrenched under fire and continued to hold his place. Gibbon was not so fortunate in his front. He found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. But his men struggled on until some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy. Gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and here he intrenched and held fast. Wright's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits in their front, but accomplished nothing more. Smith's corps also gained the outer rifle-pits in its front. The ground over which this corps (18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were made. An open plain intervened between the contending forces at this point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. Smith, however, finding a ravine run- ning towards his front, sufficiently deep to protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a di- rect fire, put Martindale's division in it, and with Brooks supporting him on the left and Devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer — probably picket — rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also ad- vanced and gained ground — which brought the whole army on one line. This assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to compensate : but the enemy was not 2 72 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce him to take the offensive. In fact, nowhere after the battle of the Wilderness did Lee show any disposi- tion to leave his defences far behind him. Fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the morning. At eleven o'clock I started to visit all the corps commanders to see for myself the dif- ferent positions gained and to get their opinion of the practicability of doing anything more in their respective fronts. Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong to make any further assault promise success. Wright thought he could gain the lines of the enemy, but it would require the co- operation of Hancock's and Smith's corps. Smith thought a lodgment possible, but was not sanguine : Burnside thought something could be done in his front, but Warren differed. I concluded, therefore, to make no more assaults, and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all offensive action should cease. Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864. — 12.30 P. m. Major-General Meade, Commanding A. P. The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspen- sion of farther advance for the present. Hold our most ad- vanced positions and strengthen them. Whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if practicable. BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR. 2J7, Reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches. To aid the expedition under General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To do this effect- ually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the intrench- ments of Richmond than to have them go back there. Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through General Smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. The remainder of the day was spent in strength- ening the line we now held. By night we were as strong against Lee as he was against us. During the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some of their wounded, and with- out burying their dead. These we were able to care for. But there were many dead and wounded men between the lines of the contending forces, which were now close together, who could not be cared for without a cessation of hostilities. So I wrote the following : Cold Harbor, Va., June 5, 1864. General R. E. Lee, Commanding Confederate Army. It is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied respectively by the two armies. Humanity would dic- tate that some provision should be made to provide against such Vol. il— 18 2 74 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. hardships. I would propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired upon by the other party. Any other method, equally fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will be accepted by me. U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General. Lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to misunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party wished to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent. I an- swered this immediately by saying : Cold Harbor, V a., June 6, 1864. General R. E. Lee, Commanding Army of N. Va. " Your communication of yesterday's date is received. I will send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to do the same. I propose that the time for doing this be between the hours of 12 m. and 3 p.m. to-day. I will direct all parties going out to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops. U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General. Lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead and removal of the wounded in the way I proposed, but when either party desired such permission it should be asked for by flag of CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE. 27s truce ; and he had directed that any parties I may have sent out, as mentioned in my letter, to be turned back. I answered : Cold Harbor, Va , June 6, 1864. General R. E. Lee, Commanding Army, N. Va. The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention, between the two armies, compels me to ask a sus- pension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours. Permit me to say that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege will be ex- tended to such parties as you may wish to send out on the same duty without further application. U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General. Lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspondence brought it to the 7th of June — forty-eight hours after it commenced — before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field. In the meantime all but two of the wounded had died. And I wrote to Lee : Cold Harbor, YA.,Jtme 7, 1864. 10.50 A.M. Gen. R. E. Lee, Commanding Army of N. Va. I regret that your note of seven p.m. yesterday should have been received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was de- livered, after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead and wounded had expired ; 10.45 P-M- was tne nour at which it was received at corps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my headquarters. As a consequence, it 276 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. was not understood by the troops of this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. Two officers and six men of the 8th and 25th North Carolina Regts., who were out in search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of under- standing. I regret this, but will state that as soon as I learned the fact, I directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must be returned to their commands. These officers and men having been carelessly brought through our lines to the rear, I have not determined whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they will be sent by some other route. Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of wounded men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nuga- tory, I remain, &c, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 2 2d of May, 1863, at Vicks- burg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endur- ance, and soldierly qualities generally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight them "one Confederate to five Yanks." Indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining RE TROSPECTI VE. 277 any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily ; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared. There was more justification for the assault at Vicksburg. We were in a Southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. The Army of the Tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. They had driven a portion of that army from Port Gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked them out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf. They had attacked another portion of the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with great loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and small arms : they had captured the capital of the State of Mis- sissippi, with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures. Only a few days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first at Champions Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from returning) besides 278 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF (J. S. GRANT. large losses in arms and ammunition. The Army of the Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist under any circumstances. There was no telling how long a regular siege might last. As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in a Southern climate. There was no telling what the casualties might be among Northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropi- cal sun. If Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and officered, to operate else- where with. These are reasons justifying the assault. The only benefit we gained — and it was a slight one for so great a sacrifice — was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. Had the assault not been made, I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the siege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort. CHAPTER LVI. LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES GENERAL LEE VISIT TO BUTLER THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG THE INVEST- MENT OF PETERSBURG. LEE'S position was now so near Richmond, and the intervening swamps of the Chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the face of an enemy, that I determined to make my next left flank move carry the Army of the Potomac south of the James River. * Preparations for this were promptly commenced. The move was a haz- ardous one to make : the Chickahominy River, with its marshy and heavily timbered approaches, had to be crossed ; all the bridges over it east of Lee were destroyed ; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads to travel on to confront me in crossing ; more *Cold Harbor, June 5, 1864. Major-General Halleck, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C. A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north-east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use that road for supplying the army. To do so would give us a 280 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OE U. S. GRANT. than fifty miles intervened between me and Butler, by the roads I should have to travel, with both the James and the Chickahominy unbridged to cross ; and last, the Army of the Potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards from the enemy at the widest place. Lee, if he did not choose to follow me, might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over the Chickahominy and the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush him before the army with me could come to his long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army if possible north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the James River to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city. I have therefore resolved upon the following plan : I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about Beaver MO VEMENT A CROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES. 2 8 I relief. Then too he might spare troops enough to send against Hunter who was approaching Lynch- burg, living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition further than what he car- ried with him. But the move had to be made, and I relied upon Lee's not seeing my danger as I saw it. Besides we had armies on both sides of the James River and not far from the Confederate capital. I knew that its safety would be a matter of the first consideration Dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. When this is effected I will move the army to the south side of the James River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on north side and crossing there. To provide for this last and most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest class ought to be immediately provided. Once on the south side of the James River, I can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the canal. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be lost to him also. Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can. The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrench- ments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without this protection. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 282 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. with the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the so-called Confederate government, if it was not with the military commanders. But I took all the precaution I knew of to guard against all dangers. Sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communi- cate with Hunter and to break up the Virginia Cen- tral Railroad and the James River Canal, on the 7th of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come back with him.* Hunter was also informed by way of Washington and the Valley that Sheridan was on the way to meet him. The canal and Central Road, and the regions penetrated by them, were of vast impor- *Cold Harbor, VA.,June 6, 1864. Major-General D. Hunter, Commanding Dept. W. Va. General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with instruc- tions to proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commence there the destruction of the Va. Cen. R. R., destroying this way as much as possible. The complete destruction of this road and of the canal on James River is of great importance to us. Accord- ing to the instructions I sent to General Halleck for your guid- ance, you were to proceed to Lynchburg and commence there. It would be of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg for a single day. But that point is of so much importance to the enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all. I see, in looking over the letter to General Halleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route should be from Staunton via Charlottesville. If you have so understood it, you will be doing just what I want. The direction I would now give is, that if this letter reaches you in the valley between Staun- MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES. 283 tance to the enemy, furnishing and carrying a large per cent, of all the supplies for the Army of North- ern Virginia and the people of Richmond. Before Sheridan got off on the 7th news was received from Hunter reporting his advance to Staunton and suc- cessful engagement with the enemy near that place on the 5th, in which the Confederate commander, W. S. Jones, was killed. On the 4th of June the enemy having withdrawn his left corps, Burnside on our right was moved up between Warren and Smith. On the 5th Birney returned to Hancock, which ex- tended his left now to the Chickahominy, and Warren was withdrawn to Cold Harbor. Wright was directed ton and Lynchburg, you immediately turn east by the most prac- ticable road until you strike the Lynchburg branch of the Va. Central road. From thence move eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you join Gen- eral Sheridan. After the work laid out for General Sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the Army of the Po- tomac by the route laid out in General Sheridan's instructions. If any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed back in your Department, you are authorized to send it back. If on receipt of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem it practicable to reach that point, you will exercise your judgment about going there. If you should be on the railroad between Charlottesville and Lynchburg, it may be practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal. Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal. U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 284 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. to send two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream to Bottom's Bridge. The cavalry extended still farther east to Jones's Bridge. On the 7th Abercrombie — who was in command at White House, and who had been in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from the start — was ordered to take up the iron from the York River Railroad and put it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to City Point. On the 8th Meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank overlooking the Chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move. On the 9th Abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops arriving at White House, without debarking from their transports, to report to Butler. Halleck was at this time instructed to send all rein- forcements to City Point. On the 1 ith I wrote : Cold Harbor, V a., June 11, 1864. Major-Gen. B. F. Butler, Commanding Department of Va. and N. C. The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the James River will commence after dark to-morrow night. Col. Comstock, of my staff, was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position secure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of his force against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river we should reach to effect a cross- ing if it should not be practicable to reach this side of the river at Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Comstock has not yet returned, MO VEMENT A CROSS THE CHICKAHOMIN Y AND JAMES. 285 so that I cannot make instructions as definite as I would wish, but the time between this and Sunday night being so short in which to get word to you, I must do the best I can. Colonel Dent goes to make arrangements for gunboats and transportation to send up the Chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps. The corps will leave its position in the trenches as early in the evening, to-morrow, as possible, and make a forced march to Cole's Landing or Ferry, where it should reach by ten a.m. the following morning. This corps numbers now 15,300 men. They take with them neither wagons nor artillery ; these latter marching with the bal- ance of the army to the James River. The remainder of the army will cross the Chickahominy at Long Bridge and at Jones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below City Point. I directed several days ago that all reinforcements" for the army should be sent to you. I am not advised of the number that may have gone, but suppose you have received from six to ten thousand. General Smith will also reach you as soon as the enemy could, go- ing by the way of Richmond. The balance of the force will not be more than one day be- hind, unless detained by the whole of Lee's army, in which case you will be strong enough. I wush you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief- engineer and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. If there is a point below City Point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have it laid. Expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by Monday night, if you deem it practicable from the force you have to seize and hold Petersburg, you may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your present lines. I do not want Petersburg visited, how- ever, unless it is held, nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree of confidence of success. If you should go 286 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. there, I think troops should take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon supplies being sent after the place is secured. If Colonel Dent should not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the 18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied. U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General. P. S. — On reflection I will send the 18th corps by way of White House. The distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter to enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of navigation on the Chickahominy will be avoided. U. S. GRANT. Cold Harbor, V a., June n, 1864. Major-Genera* G. G. Meade, Commanding Army of the Potomac. Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose of ascertaining the best point below Bermuda Hundred to which to march the army has not yet returned. It is now getting so late, however, that all preparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting longer. The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 1 8th corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and artillery accompanying the balance of the army to Cole's Landing or Ferry, and there embark for City Point, losing no time for rest until they reach the latter point. The 5th corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on the Long Bridge Road to its junction with Quaker Road, or until stopped by the enemy. The other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one of them crossing at Long Bridge, and two at Jones's Bridge. After the crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach about Fort Powhattan. Of course, MO VEMENT A CROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES. 28 J this is supposing the enemy makes no opposition to our advance. The 5th corps, after securing the passage of the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which crosses the same bridge with themselves. The wagon trains should be kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made lower down than Jones's they should take it. U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General. P. S. — In view of the long march to reach Cole's Landing, and the uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the direction of the 18th corps may be changed to White House. They should be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded without waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go together. U. 5. GRANT. About this time word was received (through the Richmond papers of the nth) that Crook and Averell had united and were moving east. This, with the news of Hunter's successful engagement near Staunton, was no doubt known to Lee before it was to me. Then Sheridan leaving with two divisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both to Lee's communications and supplies. Much of his cavalry was sent after Sheridan, and Early with Ewell's entire corps was sent to the Valley. Sup- plies were growing scarce in Richmond, and the sources from which to draw them were in our hands. People from outside began to pour into Richmond to help eat up the little on hand. Consternation reigned there. 288 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. On the 1 2th Smith was ordered to move at night to White House, not to stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for City Point, leaving his trains and artillery to move by land. Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long Bridge effected a crossing by wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving their horses be- hind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. A pon- toon bridge was speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any ad- vance that might be made from the other side. War- ren followed the cavalry, and by the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. Hancock followed Warren. Burnside took the road to Jones's Bridge, followed by Wright. Ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther east, by Window Shades and Cole's Ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry. It was known that the enemy had some gunboats at Richmond. These might run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be sunk or captured by our navy. General Butler had, in advance, loaded some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel in an emer- gency. On the 13th I sent orders to have these sunk as high up the river as we could guard them, and prevent their removal by the enemy. MO VEMENT ACROSS THE CHICK A HO MIX Y A ND J A MES. 289 As soon as Warrens corps was over the Chicka- hominy it marched out and joined the cavalry in holding the roads from Richmond while the army passed. No attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however, but Warren and Wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in their front. By the evening of the 13th Hancock's corps was at Charles City Court House on the James River. Burnside's and Wright's corps were on the Chickahominy, and crossed during the night, Warren's corps and the cavalry still covering the army. The material for a pontoon bridge was already at hand and the work of laying it was com- menced immediately, under the 'superintendence of Brigadier-General Benham, commanding the engineer brigade. On the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced, Hancock in advance, using both the bridge and boats. When the Wilderness campaign commenced the Army of the Potomac, including Burnside's corps — which was a separate command until the 24th of May when it was incorporated with the main army — numbered about 116,000 men. During the pro- gress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were received. At the crossing of the James River June 1 4th- 1 5th the army numbered about 115,000. Besides the ordinary losses incident to a campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, Vol. 11. — 19 2QO PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT about one-half of the artillery was sent back to Washington, and many men were discharged by rea- son of the expiration of their term of service.* In estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned officer present is included, no matter how employed ; in bands, sick in field hospitals, hos- pital attendants, company cooks and all. Operating in an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base, large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads lead- ing to our flanks and rear. We were also operating in a country unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roads accurately. The manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially. In the Confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account, never, I believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of the artillery and armed with muskets *FROM A STATEMENT OF LOSSES COMPILED IN THE ADJUTANT- general's OFFICE. FIELD OF ACTION AND DATE. Wilderness, May 5th to 7th Spottsylvania, May 8th to 2Tst North Anna, May 23d to 27th Totopotomoy, May 27th to 31st. .. . Cold Harbor, May 31st to June 12th Total 2,261 2,271 186 99 1,769 6.586 8,735 9,360 . 792 358 6,752 26,047 2,902 1.970 165 52 i>537 6626 AGGREGATE. 13,948 I3,60I 1,143 509 10,058 39,259 GENERAL LEE. 2QI or carbines. Generally the latter are far enough away to be excluded from the count in any one field. Officers and details of enlisted men are not included. In the Northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected with the army and drawing Pay- Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had not less than 80,000 men at the start. His rein- forcements were about equal to ours during the campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back. He was on the defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, every obstacle to the movement of troops and every na- tural defence was familiar to him and his army. The citizens were all friendly to him and his cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our every move. Rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always a railroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. All circum- stances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers. General Lee, who had led the Army of Northern Virginia in all these contests, was a very highly esti- mated man in the Confederate army and States, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the people and press of the Northern States. His praise was sounded throughout the entire North after every action he was engaged in : the number of his forces 292 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S GRANT. was always lowered and that of the National forces exaggerated. He was a large, austere man, and I judge difficult of approach to his subordinates. To be extolled by the entire press of the South after every engagement, and by a portion of the press North with equal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his troops and to make him feared by his antagonists. It was not an un- common thing for my staff-officers to hear from Eastern officers, " Well, Grant has never met Bobby Lee yet." There were good and true officers who believe now that the Army of Northern Virginia was superior to the Army of the Potomac man to man. I do not believe so, except as the advantages spoken of above made them so. Before the end I believe the difference was the other way. The Army of Northern Virginia became despondent and saw the end. It did not please them. The National army saw the same thing, and were encouraged by it. The advance of the Army of the Potomac reached the James on the 14th of June. Preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon bridges and crossing the river. As already stated, I had previously ordered General Butler to have two ves- sels loaded with stone and carried up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where the channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and prevent Confederate gun- VISIT TO BUTLER. 293 boats from coming down the river. Butler had had these boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before my arrival. I ordered this done, and also directed that he should turn over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in ferrying the troops across. I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to Bermuda Hundred to see General Butler for the pur- pose of directing a movement against Petersburg, while our troops of the Army of the Potomac were crossing. I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Cold Harbor by the way of White House, thence on steamers to City Point for the purpose of giving General Butler more troops with which to accomplish this result. General Butler was ordered to send Smith with his troops reinforced, as far as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the Army of the James. He gave Smith about six thousand reinforcements, including some twenty-five hundred cavalry under Kautz, and about thirty-five hundred colored infantry under Hinks. The distance which Smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines was about six miles, and the Con- federate advance line of works was but two miles outside of Petersburg. Smith was to move under cover of night, up close to the enemy's works, and assault as soon as he could after daylight. I believed 294 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. then, and still believe, that Petersburg could have been easily captured at that time. It only had about 2,500 men in the defences besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency. Smith started as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force intrenched between City Point and their lines outside of Petersburg. This position he carried, with some loss to the enemy ; but there was so much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off from there. While there I informed General Butler that Hancock's corps would cross the river and move to Petersburg to support Smith in case the latter was successful, and that I could reinforce there more rapidly than Lee could reinforce from his posi- tion. I returned down the river to where the troops of the Army of the Potomac now were, communicated to General Meade, in writing, the directions I had given to General Butler and directed him (Meade) to cross Hancock's corps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning to Peters- burg ; halting them, however, at a designated point until they could hear from Smith. I also informed General Meade that I had ordered rations from Bermuda Hundred for Hancock's corps, and desired him to issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutely necessary. The rations THE MO VEMENT ON PE TERSE URG. 295 did not reach him, however, and Hancock, while he got all his corps over during the night, remained until half-past ten in the hope of receiving them. He then moved without them, and on the road re- ceived a note from General W. F. Smith, asking him to come on. This seems to be the first informa- tion that General Hancock had received of the fact that he was to go to Petersburg, or that anything particular was expected of him. Otherwise he would have been there by four o'clock in the afternoon. Smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the forenoon of the 15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening in reconnoitering what appeared to be empty works. The enemy's line consisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pits connecting them. To the east side of Petersburg, from the Appomattox back, there were thirteen of these redans extending a dis- tance of several miles, probably three. If they had been properly manned they could have held out against any force that could have attacked them, at least until reinforcements could have got up from the north of Richmond. Smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success. By nine o'clock at night he was in posses- sion of five of these redans and, of course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. All of them contained artillery, which fell into our hands. Hancock came 296 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT. up and proposed to take any part assigned to him ; and Smith asked him to relieve his men who were in the trenches. Next morning, the 16th, Hancock himself was in command, and captured another redan. Meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded Hancock, who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the com- mand of his corps on account of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received at Gettysburg. During the day Meade assaulted and carried one more redan to his rigdit and two to his left. In all this we lost very heavily. The works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them which fell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the effort to repel these assaults. Up to this time Beauregard, who had commanded south of Richmond, had received no reinforcements, except Hoke's division from Drury's Bluff,*