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THE INTIMATE PAPERS -OT?

COLONEL HOlfSE

# # # Into the World War

Arranged as a Narrative BY

CHARLES SEYMOUR

Provost and Sterling Professor of History, Yale University

BOSTON AND NEW YORK

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY

1928

COPYRIGHT, IQ38, BY HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

CAMBRIDGE . MASSACHUSETTS PRINTED IN THE U.8.A

PREFACE

THE two concluding volumes of The Intimate Papers of Colonel House begin with the entrance of the United States into the World War and end with Colonel House's attempt to secure some compromise on the basis of which the Senate might ratify the Versailles Treaty, including the Covenant of the League of Nations. Their central theme is American participation in the war and the Peace Conference, in so far as the papers of Colonel House shed light on the American effort and Wilsonian policies. Readers of the two preceding volumes will remember that Colonel House, although not an officeholder, occupied a special position in relation to Wilson's administration at the time the United States became a bel- ligerent. He had been chosen by the President as his per- sonal representative and sent on three separate missions to the European Governments in 1914 and the two following years. As Wilson's representative he had come in close contact with European leaders during the period of American neutrality.

It was natural that, during the war, President Wilson should look to House for advice on every matter that touched American relations with the Allies and especially on all problems of war aims. He selected him as chief of the or- ganization for preparing the American case at the Peace Conference, appointed him head of the American War Mis- sion to Europe for the coordination of military and industrial efforts, asked him to draft a constitution for a league of na- tions, and again sent him to Europe as American representa- tive on the Supreme War Council when it arranged the armi- stice with Germany. At the Peace Conference, House was Commissioner Plenipotentiary, and, because of his intimate personal relations with European statesmen, was constantly

vi PREFACE

used by the President to conduct the most delicate negotia- tions. During Wilson's absence from Paris and his illness, the President selected him to take his place on the Supreme Council.

In view of the position held by House and the care with which he and his secretary, Miss Denton, preserved all letters and memoranda, it is obvious that his papers, including the diary which he never failed to keep, provide historical ma- terial of the utmost value. The reader of these volumes, however, should be especially on his guard against two mis- conceptions. The papers here published represent a very small proportion of the large collection which Colonel House deposited in the Library of Yale University. If any attempt had been made to reproduce the substance of the numerous and complicated problems which were brought to House's attention — diplomatic, naval, military, economic — and upon which lengthy memoranda were written, the book would have been extended into a whole library of volumes. Exigencies of space have compelled omission of reference to all but the most significant problems. Even in the case of the most vital subjects the extracts from letters, cables, and diary deal largely in generalities. This is partly due to the fact that neither House nor any single individual could himself have gone deeply into the purely technical matters involved in the complex problems of the war; the function of Colonel House was essentially that of a diplomat, seeing that the right people got together to work out these problems. On the other hand, it has been necessary to omit numerous technical memoranda which, if published, would effectively disprove the assumption that his work was in any sense superficial.

It is equally important for the reader to remember that, despite the range of House's activities, these volumes are not intended to constitute a history of the American effort in the war. They are not, in fact, published as history, but as the

PREFACE vii

raw material for history. Their purpose is not to convey any definite historical conclusion nor to enforce any historical judgment, but rather to show what Colonel House did and how he came to do it. It is for the historian of the future to determine where he and others were right and where wrong. The papers are presented for what they are worth, unchanged, as they were written. They are presented with emphasis upon House's own point of view, for otherwise they would not be intelligible, but always with the realization that the historian may take another point of view. Furthermore the reader should bear in mind that these volumes concern Colonel House and are not intended to describe the activities of others except where they happened to touch his own. Colonel House is the central figure in the book, not because of any desire to overemphasize the importance of the political rdle he played, but simply because the book is based upon his papers. If all those closely connected with the administra- tion of President Wilson would tell the story of their own activities, following the example of Secretary Lansing and Secretary Houston, the scholars who ultimately write the definitive history of the time would find their task greatly facilitated.

C. S.

YALE UNIVERSITY August. 1928

NOTE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT

EVERY effort has been made to check the accuracy of Colonel House's papers by comparison with those of the statesmen with whom he was in correspondence. Each account of an important conversation recorded in the diary has been laid before those with whom he was in conference wherever they survive, and full opportunity has been given for comment in case of misunderstanding. It has also seemed wise to pub- lish at length the letters and cables of British and French statesmen, whenever they are necessary to an explanation of the nature of House's activities. In these volumes, as in the two preceding, care has been taken to secure complete authority for the publication of every letter and memo- randum.

I am deeply indebted to those who, by granting permission for the publication of documents and, in some cases, by add- ing their own comments, have increased the historical value of the volumes and made possible a complete picture of the work of Colonel House. I take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to Sir William Tyrrell, the Marquess of Read- ing, the Earl of Balf our, Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, Mr. Lloyd George, Sir Eric Drummond, Sir Horace Plunkett, the literary executors of Lord North- cliffe, Sir George Sutton, Mr. Montague Ellis, Sir Campbell Stuart, M. Georges Clemenceau, Ambassador Jusserand, Marshal P6tain, M. Andr6 Tardieu, M. Andr6 Ch6radame, M. Ignace Paderewski, Ambassador Aimaro Sato, Ambas- sador Boris Bakhmetieff , Mr. Carl W. Ackerman, President E. A. Alderman, Admiral W. S. Benson, General Tasker H. Bliss, Mr. Stephen Bonsai, Dr. Isaiah Bowman, Mr. Arthur Bullard, Mrs. Frank I. Cobb, Mr. Paul Cravath, Mr. A. H.

x NOTE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Frazier, Attorney-General Thomas W. Gregory, Professor Douglas Johnson, Secretary Robert Lansing, Mr. Walter Lippmann, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge 3rd, President A. Lawrence Lowell, Mr. Thomas Nelson Perkins, Senator Elihu Root, Mr. Lincoln Steffens, Mr. Karl von Weigand. In this respect I am most of all indebted to Sir William Wise- man, who as chief of the British intelligence service in Wash- ington acted as liaison officer between Colonel House and the British during the war; he has not only put his valuable col- lection of papers at my service, but has taken infinite pains to clarify doubtful points by himself writing memoranda based upon his wartime records. Without such assistance the story of the work of Colonel House would have been in- complete and confused.

I am particularly grateful to those who have read and crit- icized all or parts of the manuscript. Responsibility for the final form of the volumes rests upon my shoulders entirely; but the number of errors and infelicities would have been vastly increased except for the suggestions of the follow- ing: Mr. Gordon Auchincloss, Mr. Ackerman, Mr. Bonsai, Dr. Bowman, Mr. Frazier, Mr. Gregory, Mr. Breckinridge Long, Mr. J. J. Lyons, Professor Douglas Johnson, President S. E. Mezes, Mr. David Hunter Miller, Mr. Albert Bigelow Paine, Sir Horace Plunkett, Mr. A. D. Howden Smith, Sir Campbell Stuart, Mr. Henry Wickham Steed, Ambassador Brand Whitlock, Mr. Robert W. Woolley.

To Mr. Andrew Keogh and the authorities of the Yale University Library I am indebted for the care of the House Collection, and to Miss Frances B. Denton for invaluable as- sistance in the arrangement and elucidation of documents. The completion of these volumes would have been impossible except for the untiring labor of Miss Helen M. Reynolds, assistant to the curator of the House Collection, upon whose close familiarity with the documents and judgment in their use I have been constantly dependent both in the construe-

NOTE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT xi

tion and the revision of the manuscript. Finally, if there is any merit in the literary form of the book, credit must be as- signed to the suggestions and criticism of my wife, who has read and re-read every page of the manuscript and proof.

C.S.

YALE UNIVERSITY August, 1928

CONTENTS

I. INTO THE WORLD WAR 1

Wilson and the declaration of war on Germany — The military crisis of the spring of 1917, as reflected in Colonel House's papers — Discouraging symptoms in France — Conditions in Germany — Wilson and the American war organization — The activities and contacts of Colonel House — Food and shipbuilding problems — House's rela- tions with Allied envoys.

II. THE BALFOUR MISSION 29

The problem of American cooperation in the war — Ameri- can attitude toward the Allies — First suggestion of the Balfour Mission — Arrival of Balfour and conference with House; problem of war aims — Conferences in Washing- ton — Discussion of secret treaties by Balfour and House — House's account of Wilson-Balfour conference — Wil- son's knowledge of the Treaty of London — House's con- ference with Joffre — Further discussions of war aims with Balfour and Drummond.

III. TARDIEU AND NORTHCLIFFE 64

Means of communication between House and British diplomats — His correspondence with Balfour regarding naval agreement — Wilson's attitude on postponement of American capital ship programme — Disagreement be- tween House and Wilson over naval policy — House's re- lations with Sir Horace Plunkett — Sir Horace on the Irish Convention — The Tardieu Mission — Problems of coordination — The Northcliffe Mission — Relations of Northcliffe and House — Activities and accomplishments of Northcliffe in the United States — Northcliff e's cables dealing with war problems in America.

IV. FINANCE AND SUPPLIES 96

House's relation to financial problems — Financial situa- tion of the Allies in the summer of 1917 — Appeals for American credits — British anxiety over loans carried by J. P. Morgan and Company and other banks — North- cliffe's presentation of Allied needs — Confusion in de- mands of the Allies — Mr. McAdoo's plan for an inter- allied council of coordination — Northcliffe and House sug- gest that Lord Reading be sent to America as financial com- missioner — Request of British Foreign Office for House's advice — Reading accepts Mission — Purchasing Agree- ment of August — Results of Reading appointment.

xiv CONTENTS

V. WAR AIMS AND PROPAGANDA 125

Attempts to drive a wedge between German Government and people — Colonel House on situation in Germany — Urges encouragement to German liberals — Letters to Wilson regarding speech on war aims — Wilson's Flag Day Speech — House's interest in propaganda — North- cliffe's report — Plans for open debate on War Aims between New York World and Berliner Tageblatt — Correspondence with Frank Cobb — Objections of President Wilson.

VI. THE POPE'S PEACE PROPOSAL 149

Movement for peace of compromise in Austria and Ger- many — Czernin and the Reichstag resolution — Balfour reports receipt of the Pope's peace proposal and asks for Wilson's views — Colonel House on the proposal — Wilson's reply to Balfour — House's letters to Wilson, urging firm but liberal response — Views of Rus- sian Ambassador — Views of Ambassador Jusserand — Wilson-House correspondence regarding response to the Pope's proposal — Wilson plans definite formulation of American peace programme — Asks House to gather and organize data for the peace conference — 'The Inquiry.'

VIL AN AMERICAN WAR MISSION 174

Wilson's visit to House at Magnolia in September — Arrival of Reading — His efforts in behalf of coordina- tion— Reading memorandum on supplies — His sug- gestion of an American War Mission in Europe — Lloyd George and problems of military strategy; his desire for an American representative in Europe — Problems of tonnage — Balfour's cable to House regarding shipping losses — Colonel House chosen to head American Mis- sion — Wiseman memorandum on decision to send War Mission — Purposes of the Mission — Conferences in Washington — Departure of the Mission — Arrival in London.

VIII. CONFERENCES IN LONDON 210

Crisis in Allied fortunes: Caporetto and the Bolshevik Revolution — Lloyd George's plan for a Supreme War Council — The Rapallo Agreement — Advent of Clemen- ceau Ministry — Parliamentary crisis in Great Britain — Lloyd George and House — House urges Wilson to act in concert with Allies — Wilson's approval of Supreme War Council — House's report to Wilson on British

CONTENTS xv

crisis — Conferences with Balfour, Drummond, Cecil, Bonar Law, Robertson, Grey, Smuts, Cambon, French, Lansdowne, Geddes, Venizelos, Jellicoe — Discussion regarding peace terms with Lloyd George and Balfour — Efforts to achieve coordination in technical problems — Northcliffe's assistance — Conferences between Ameri- can Mission and British War Cabinet — Lloyd George's statement of Allied needs.

IX. THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL 247

Nature of the conferences at Paris — Arrival of the Amer- ican Mission — Drawbacks of Rapallo Agreement — House's reports to Wilson — Bliss-House memorandum on military unity — Conference with Clemenceau and Pfetain — Arrival of British — Lloyd George, after con- ference with House, refuses to alter Rapallo Agreement — The Interallied Conference — Meeting of Supreme War Council — Resolutions passed — Discussions of peace negotiations — Lloyd George anxious to probe Austrian possibilities — House's efforts to persuade Allies to meet German and Russian situations with joint statement of war aims — Wilson's approval of his resolution — Oppo- sition of Sonnino.

X. THE ADJUSTMENT OF EFFORT 291

Final session of Interallied Conference at Paris — House's opinion of its accomplishments — Cravath upon the need of coordinated effort — New interallied ma- chinery — Reports of American technical representatives — Secret reports of Colonel House, Admiral Benson, General Bliss — Return of American Mission to the United States — House's first conference with Wilson — Anxiety of Allies regarding American aid — Messages from Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Tardieu — Crisis in American war organization — Tardieu upon the final result.

XL THE FOURTEEN POINTS 316

Failure of Paris Conference to achieve joint programme of war aims — House urges Wilson to formulate war aims in a public address — Report of the Inquiry upon war aims — House visits Wilson to discuss proposed ad- dress— Its essential purpose — House's diary record of Wilson's drafting of the Fourteen Points, January 5, 1918 — Particular difficulties: Freedom of the Seas; Alsace-Lorraine; Russia; the Balkans — Lloyd George's speech of January 5 — Interchange of cables between

xvi CONTENTS

Balfour and House — Delivery of the Fourteen Points speech — Reactions in the United States, Great Britain, France — Failure of the immediate purpose of the speech — Ultimate importance.

XII. RUMORS OF PEACE 350

Withdrawal of Russia from the war — Brest-Litovsk negotiations — Industrial unrest in Austria and Germany — Replies of Czernin and Hertling to Wilson's Fourteen Points — Ackerman report on political situation in Cen- tral Powers — Gilbert Murray on ideal peace — Difficul- ties involved in uniting Allies in common programme — Supreme War Council statement — Wilson's irritation — He prepares an answer to Hertling and Czernin — Con- ferences with House — Wilson's speech of February 4 — Austrian peace overtures — Peace offer of the Emperor Karl — Balfour's cable to House regarding peace pro- posals — Smuts-Mensdorff conversations — Czernin's memorandum — Failure of peace propositions.

XIII. THE RUSSIAN ENIGMA 386

Effects of Russian Revolution — Proposed Japanese intervention in Siberia — Balfour's cable to House — Wilson and House opposed to intervention — House's explanation to Balfour — The Allies press for interallied intervention in Russia — Bolshevik policy — Reading's estimate of situation — House's plan of economic relief mission to Russia — Wilson unwillingly agrees to inter- allied intervention — State Department's declaration of purpose of expedition.

XIV. FORGE WITHOUT STINT OR LIMIT 423

Effects of Brest-Litovsk peace — Austro-German mili- tary treaty — Wilson's change of tactics: discusses with House an address emphasizing will to victory — The speech of April 6 — Allied plea for incorporation of American troops in Allied armies — Wilson's attitude — Balfour's cable to House on Allied needs — The March crisis — Renewed demand for American troops — House- Balfour interchange of cables — Request from Lloyd George that House attend Supreme War Council — Ar- rangement with Allies negotiated by Pershing — Opti- mism of Colonel House.

ILLUSTRATIONS

PRESIDENT WILSON AND COLONEL HOUSE, SEPTEMBER, 1917 Photogravure frontispiece

SIR WILLIAM WISEMAN 30

Photograph with inscription

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR (NOW EARL OF BALFOUR) 56

Photograph with inscription

ANDR£ TARDIEU 78

Photograph with inscription

PRESIDENT WILSON AND COLONEL HOUSE 100

LORD READING 122

Photograph with inscription

LORD ROBERT CECIL (NOW VISCOUNT CECIL) 166

Photograph with inscription

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 186

With autograph

PRESIDENT WILSON'S LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTERS COMMISSIONING COLONEL HOUSE TO REPRESENT HIM IN THE GENERAL CONFERENCE 206

DRAWING-ROOM, CHESTERFIELD HOUSE 226

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE MISSION, NOVEMBER AND DE- CEMBER, 1917 226

GENERAL TASKER H. BLISS 254

Photograph with inscription

ADMIRAL BENSON 298

Photograph with inscription

MARSHAL FOCH 308

Photograph with inscription

WILSON'S DRAFT OF POINT XI OF THE FOURTEEN POINTS, WITH VESNITCH'S NOTATION 334

xviii ILLUSTRATIONS

WICKHAM STEED 374 Photograph with inscription

ROBERT LANSING 396

FRANK L. POLK 396

ARTHUR HUGH FRAZIER 396

BRAND WHITLOCK 396

SIDNEY E. MEZES 396

GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING 430 Photograph with inscription

THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF

COLONEL HOUSE

APRIL, 1917— JUNE, 1918

• • •

CHAPTER I INTO THE WORLD WAR

When the President turned from peace to war, he did it with the same resolute purpose. . . .

Colonel House to Lord Bryce, June 10, 1917

I

4 THE day has come/ said President Wilson to Congress on April 2, 1917, 'when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other/ With these words he launched the United States on what he regarded as a crusade for a new international order; a 'steadfast concert for peace' that should guarantee the 'rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience/ With equal force he revealed his con- viction that only through the overthrow of the military masters of Germany could the object be attained. 'We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples/

It was a deep gulf that separated the Wilson of January, when he told House that 'there will be no war/ and the Wilson of April, when he asked Congress for a declaration. The bridge was not easy to cross and the new path would

2 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

not have been chosen except that he saw on the other side not so much a military triumph and the chastisement of an enemy as the vision of a new international structure in the creation of which the United States might take the lead. The German leaders themselves, by the inauguration of the ruthless submarine warfare, convinced him that no other course was possible. 'From that time henceforward/ wrote the German Ambassador, 'he regarded the Imperial Govern- ment as morally condemned/ l

President Alison was determined, once the bridge was crossed, to wage war with the utmost vigor. By tempera- ment and conviction he was likely to be as dogged in his re- solve to administer a complete defeat to Germany as he had been slow to resign the policy of neutrality. 'When the President turned from Peace to War/ wrote Colonel House to Lord Bryce, 'he did it with the same resolute purpose that has always guided him/ 2 This determination was fortified by an increasing realization that hopes of a speedy victory were not likely to be fulfilled. Many months of intense effort would be necessary before the United States could bring active military assistance to the Allies. In the meantime fortune seemed to turn towards Germany.

On the Western Front the carefully laid plans for continu- ing the Somme offensive were disturbed by a change in the Allied command, resulting in the defeat of General Nivelle on the Chemin des Dames in April. A crisis of war-weariness followed in France. For the remainder of the year French armies, undergoing a moral and material reorganization under General P6tain, were unable to attempt any major offensive. In the East, the Russian revolution of March led to the crumbling of all organization, whether economic or military. The dissolving of the ideal and forms of discipline had its inevitable effects. Behind the lines the spirit of chaos

1 Bernstorff, My Three Years in America, 385. 8 House to Bryce, June 10, 1917.

GERMANY'S SUBMARINE ATTACK 3

penetrated the economic life of Russia, at the same time that it attacked the army and navy. No longer could the Allies count on help from the colossus of the East which had proved of such avail in 1914 and 1916.

While events on the two main fighting fronts thus rescued Germany from the defeat that seemed to be impending after the Battle of the Somme, she launched the submarine attack upon which her leaders had gambled to achieve positive victory. * At the time it was a gamble perhaps — but not a wild one/ l Great Britain had become the mainstay of the Entente; her troops must take up the offensive during the period that P6tain had to spend in nursing his armies back to vigor; her munitions, her tonnage, her financial credit had become critical factors in a war that would be decided by the side with most reserves. France had borne the brunt of the great German attacks of 1914 and 1916; it was now the turn of the British. Thus there was much to encourage the Germans in their hope that if the submarine could isolate England and destroy her mercantile marine, they would end the war victoriously. And if the success of the intensive sub- marine campaign after three months was less than had been promised, it was sufficient to bring the British and the En- tente as a whole into very real peril.

'The whole war effort of the Allies was soon threatened with disaster' writes the Chairman of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive, 'and all the main European Allies were in imminent danger of starvation. . . . The opening success of the new campaign was staggering. In the first three months 470 ocean-going ships (including all classes of ships the total was 1000) had been sunk. In a single fort- night in April 122 ocean-going vessels were lost. The rate of the British loss hi ocean-going tonnage during this fort- night was equivalent to an average round voyage loss of 25

1 Sailer, Allied Shipping Control, 121.

4 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

per cent — one out of every four ships leaving the United Kingdom for an overseas voyage was being lost before its return. The continuance of this rate of loss would have brought disaster upon all the Allied campaigns, and might well have involved an unconditional surrender.' *

Just as vital to Allied success as British tonnage was the maintenance of British credit, which in the two preceding years had, to a large extent, been providing for the purchas- ing of necessary supplies for the Entente. British gold and credit had paid for the mass of food supplies, munitions, and various manufactured products which the United States ex- ported to the Allied countries; Great Britain not merely financed its own war trade but advanced large credits to France and Italy and the smaller Allies. But the spring of 1917 brought British finance to the verge of collapse. British balances in the United States were at the point of exhaustion. Without immediate financial assistance from the United States Government it seemed certain that trade between America and the Allies would cease, the war needs of the Allies could not be met, and Allied credit would collapse. Mr. Ball our, who in a long career had always been careful to avoid exaggeration, stated definitely that *a calamity* was impending,2

ii

Thus the United States entered the war at a moment when the fortunes ol the Entente, military, economic, and political, were depressed to an extent that was appreciated by very \^N \sv ^ \3\MteA. S&ate* and not many more in Europe. President Wilson's war speech of April 2 had been received throughout the country with a sort of sober gladness; his long-stretched patience had convinced all but a handful that

1 Salter, op. cz/., 77, 121.

1 Mr. Balfour's reference was to the difficult financial situation.

THE UNITED STATES ENTERS THE WAR 5

participation in the war was forced upon us; the Nation was instilled with the desire to contribute everything possible to German defeat. But there was a general impression that Germany was on its last legs, little suspicion that defeat and victory were still being weighed in the balance, hardly a guess that if the effort of America was to count it must be tremendous and immediate.

Even those Americans whose sources of information were numerous and authoritative only gradually came to appreci- ate how serious the situation was from the Allied point of view. This was not surprising when we consider that the extent of the war was so vast that no one person in Europe had a bird's-eye survey, and it was only as the news of the various sorts of reverses, military and political, drifted in that the character of the Allied problem became clear.

Colonel House's papers, containing a multitude of letters and reports from Europe, reflect the increasing realization of the need of American aid. In February they are colored by the jubilation of the Entente over the dismissal of Bern- storff and the prospect of American participation. A letter from Lord Bryce to House, of February 16, suggested indeed that in the event America entered the war 'a small number' of United States troops should be sent to the front; but Bryce obviously had in mind the moral rather than the military effect and he spoke of the * already dispirited Germans/ Early in March, however, House recorded a con- versation with a friend 'who had recently returned from England and presents a dismal story. ... It is important be- cause he is one oi General Lord French's closest friends and he probably reflects French's opinion.'

House himself, after the diplomatic rupture with Germany but before our formal entrance into the war, was evidently not in favor of a large American expeditionary force. He agreed with Wilson's insistence upon the most complete in- dustrial organization that might be necessary to consolidate

6 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

the full strength of the United States against Germany; but he feared that the attempt to create for ourselves a complete military machine and the desire to figure upon the scene of battle would divert energy from the less spectacular but more essential task of aiding the Allies in the manner they most desired. This was evidently in his mind when he wrote to the President a fortnight before the declaration of a state of war.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, March 19, 1917

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Captain Gherardi, our Naval Attach^ at Berlin, who re- turned via Paris, tells me that the French Admiralty and officers in the French Army told him that France badly needed steel billets, coal and other raw materials. They also told him that this war would be won by the nations whose morale lasted longest.

They estimated that the morale of the French troops was lifted 25 per cent when the United States broke with Ger- many.

The strain upon the English to furnish materials for Rus- sia, France and Italy has been so great that they are now un- able to recruit for the army any further.

Everybody I have talked to connected with the English and French Governments tells me that if we intend to help defeat Germany it will be necessary for us to begin immedi- ately to furnish the things the Allies are lacking.

It has seemed to me that we should constitute ourselves a huge reservoir t6 supply the Allies with the things they most need. No one looks with favor upon our raising a large army at the moment, believing it would be better if we would per- mit volunteers to enlist in the Allied armies.

It seems to me that we can no longer shut our eyes to the fact that we are already in the war and that if we will indicate

THE AMERICAN ARMY 7

our purpose to throw all our resources against Germany it is bound to break their morale and bring the war to an earlier close. Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Colonel House's opinion that it would be misdirected effort to build a large American army was doubtless that of many Americans at this period.1 That he was wrong became obvious after the events of the spring indicated the complete failure of the French offensive and the collapse of Russia's military strength. House himself changed his mind as re- ports of the increasing danger came in. Of these the most persuasive were sent to him, for the President's information, by his friend Mr. Arthur Hugh Frazier, Counsellor of the American Embassy in Paris. The reports were based upon what Mr. Frazier described as 'most confidential informa- tion . . . furnished by the French War Office/ In his opinion it was 'evident that the so-called information on this subject which is published in the public press is very inaccurate and altogether too optimistic/

The French memoranda painted the situation in gloomy tints, perhaps the more effectively to emphasize the need of immediate assistance. But there was no escaping the sta- tistics regarding the relative man-power of France and Ger- many, nor the conclusion of the French War Office that after some thousand days of war Germany still possessed, in the military and political sense, a powerful machine: strong in men and materials of war, strong in its solidarity.

'It results,' a supplementary memorandum from Mr. Frazier added, 'that after almost three years of war the

1 This opinion was shared by many persons abroad. Andr6 Tardieu writes (France and America, 218): 'Every one looked upon the United States as a vast reservoir from which European forces and supplies could be fed. No one believed it capable of creating a new army to be added to those already in line. Every one believed it would be dangerous to make the attempt/

8 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

Allies see themselves reduced by circumstances for a certain period longer, to a most disheartening inertia. The French people sorely tried by the privations and losses of a great war have before them several months of suffering without, as far as Europe is concerned, the stimulating hope of an en- couraging event to help them bear up, and necessarily their minds will turn toward interior difficulties. The moment to be passed is rather critical. In such a juncture ... it is deemed most important by the French that the United States should immediately send an important army to Europe. As for the Germans who universally believe that America's land participation in the war will be limited to sending money and supplies to the Allies, the arrival of an American army on the Western Front could but dismay this people already begin- ning surely to suffer from a fatigue due to a long war. . . .' *

The attitude which President Wilson assumed towards American cooperation was that in all large questions the United States must be guided by the experience which the Allies had gained in almost three years of fighting. If they wanted an expeditionary force for its moral or its material value, he believed the United States should send it. That the man-power as well as the munitions of America might ulti- mately become necessary to Allied victory was a conclusion naturally to be drawn from the increasing indications of the Russian collapse. In mid-May House received the report of an American agent in Germany, forwarded to him by Maurice Egan, American Minister at Copenhagen.

Report on Conditions in Germany

* Russia is regarded as being eliminated from a military standpoint for this year. There is an enormous [German] reserve army in the West, the largest reserve army which

1 On April 8, Norman Hapgood cabled House that Nivelle and Pain- levfe 'plead privately for Americans in small groups for French army. Say would mean salvation.'

REPORT ON CONDITIONS IN GERMANY 9

Germany has had at any time during the war. Officers and men from the Eastern Front, with whom I talked, told me that the Russians and Germans fraternize freely between the lines. The quiet in the East has enabled Germany to con- centrate all munitions for the West.

'The strong depression in Germany two months ago has been effaced by the U-boat successes as published in Ger- many. Not in a year has confidence been so rockbound as at present. . . .

'The food situation is better than I expected to find it. The next eight weeks will see it at its very worst, but Russian chaos, U-boat successes, failure of the French and British to get through in West, strengthens the people's fortitude, and there is much less complaint than I expected. . . .

'Military circles regard America's entrance as an admission on the part of England that she cannot defeat Germany, [has] thereby abdicated her leadership against Germany, and that the war now really is between Germany and America '

From London Charles Grasty, whose repute as a journalist secured for him numerous personal contacts and sources of in- formation, wrote to House that while the English were 'more confident than ever/ the London newspaper offices were con- vinced that the new Government in Russia was composed of a 'thoroughly corrupt set of grafters.' The French, he said, were on their 'last legs' when the United States entered the war, and the friction between political and military elements still clouded hope.

A month later House regarded the European situation with extreme disquiet. The British Foreign Office had just sent him an urgent cable, explaining the acute financial crisis and the need of immediate help. He recorded in his diary on the last day of June that the 'panicky cable which came to me yesterday is alarming.

10 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

"I see evidences of all the belligerents weakening, and the cracking process being actively at work. My letters from France indicate that the condition there is serious, and it is a question whether they will be able to hold out during the year. Great Britain I have counted upon but if she is going to pieces financially because certain funds are not given her, or certain debts paid, the situation is not reassuring.'

HI

A few years after the close of the war Colonel House wrote that 'no matter how discouraging the situation might appear at any particular moment, my belief in ultimate success never wavered, and chiefly because of my perfect confidence in Wilson's capacity for popular leadership/ That quality the President never displayed more effectively than at the very moment of our entrance into the war, when he im- pressed upon the nation that each citizen was essentially a soldier: thereby he evoked not merely enthusiasm, but a willingness to submit to organized discipline which was scarcely to be expected from so individualistic a people.

'In the sense in which we have been wont to think of armies,' said Wilson, * there are no armies in this struggle, there are entire nations armed. ... A nation needs all men; but it needs each man, not in the field that will most pleasure him, but in the endeavor that will best serve the common good. Thus, though a sharpshooter pleases to operate a trip- hammer for the forging of great guns and an expert machinist desires to march with the flag, the nation is being served only when the sharpshooter marches and the machinist remains at his levers. The whole nation must be a team, in which each man shall play the part for which he is best fitted/ l

It was not the least of the triumphs of the United States that the Nation was made to feel itself part of the fighting 1 Proclamation of the Selective Draft Act, May 18, 1917,

AMERICAN PREPARATIONS 11

forces and cooperated enthusiastically in the organization of the national resources. The process was inevitably of an emergency character, for the United States possessed no bureaucratic system comparable to those of Europe, which could immediately begin the necessary task of coordinating the national industries for the supply of the army. Every firm in every line of production was competing in the manu- facture of essential and unessential articles, in transporta- tion, in bidding for and holding the necessary labor. The army itself was decentralized, did not form or state its re- quirements as one body, but through five supplies bureaus which acted independently and in competition with each other. Bids for materials from the different bureaus con- flicted with each other, with those of the navy, and of the Allies. From this chaos order must be evolved before the United States could bring effective assistance to Europe, and in the nature of things it was many months before the neces- sary centralization was secured, whether in the strictly mili- tary sphere through the General Staff or in the industrial through the War Industries Board.

Characteristically the President avoided the creating of new machinery so far as possible. He believed always in evolution rather than in revolution. It was this tendency and not mere partisanship which led him to refuse the de- mand for a coalition cabinet which should include members of the Republican Party. As a student of politics he had never had any confidence in the efficiency of coalition govern- ment, and he assumed that the demand was based upon selfish motives.1

On the other hand, President Wilson was determined to keep partisan politics out of the war organization. He told House in February that so far as the foreign service was con- cerned he would not permit party affiliations to have any influence upon the selection of candidates, and he was

1 Wilson to House, February 12, 1917.

12 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

minded to apply the same principle to war appointments. Colonel House was entirely of the same mind and did all that he could to harmonize the differences between the Re- publicans and the Democrats. He discussed the organization of the House of Representatives with Mr. Willcox, Chairman of the Republican Committee.1 In March he wrote the President that the British Ambassador reported that Senator Lodge had * expressed a desire to cooperate with you in the future and Sir Cecil thinks if you will meet him halfway, this can be brought about. If you get Lodge it will probably mean the other Republican Senators upon the [Foreign Re- lations] Committee.' 2 A few weeks later: 'I am glad that you saw Roosevelt. I hope that you will send for Lodge also. It looks as if you would have to depend largely upon Republi- can support to cany through your war measures. Did you see the admirable speech that Root made last night at the Republican Club?'3

As it turned out, personal cooperation between the mem- bers of the Administration and the Republican leaders was never very cordial, although partisan issues were by common consent excluded from Congressional debates. But President Wilson, in his appointments to the new war boards, to mili- tary and civil positions of the first importance, made his choice without regard to political factors and probably in general without knowing what might be the party affiliations of the appointees. So much was certainly true in the cases of such men as Pershing, Sims, Hoover, Goethals, Schwab, Davison. It is true that neither Colonel Roosevelt nor General Wood was given a command in France; but the evi- dence is overwhelming that in each case the decision was not made by the President but by the military experts of the General Staff.

1 House to Wilson, March 30, 1917. « House to Wilson, March 14, 1917. » House to Wilson, April 10, 1917.

THE STUDY ON FIFTY-THIRD STREET 13

In this new war organization Colonel House held no formal position and exercised no official functions. The President had offered 'with the deepest pleasure and alacrity' to place him wherever he was willing to be placed.1 But House pre- 'f erred always to avoid office. Because of his personal rela- tions with Wilson and at the President's desire he was none the less drawn into an unbroken series of informal confer- ences, the gist of which when important was sent down to Washington, and when unimportant shunted aside and pre- Vented from confusing the already overburdened officials. Although he was rarely in the capital, he had daily conversa- tions with members of the Government and the President, for a private telephone ran directly from his study to the 'State Department. 'It is only necessary to lift off the re- ceiver, and I reach Folk's desk immediately. ... It gives me constant touch with Washington.' The telephone was ex- tended to Magnolia when House left New York for the sum- mer, so that his immediate connection with the capital re- hiained unbroken.

The papers of Colonel House record a kaleidoscope of per- sonal contacts. To his small study on Fifty-Third Street came all sorts and conditions. It was there that he discussed with Paderewski the plans for the formation of a Polish army, the raising of funds for Polish relief, the political char- ^cter of the Poland that was to be revived by the future Peace Conference, and its boundaries.2 Thither came the Ambassadors of all the Allied nations and the special com- missioners in charge of the problems of finance and supplies. There, or, if it were summer time, to his house in Magnolia ('all the roads lead ultimately to Magnolia,' said Northcliffe

1 Wilson to House, February 6, 1917.

1 Cf. the speech made at Warsaw, on February 20, 1919, by Pade- rewski, Prime Minister of the new Polish Republic: 'The great results obtained in America ought to be attributed to my sincere friend, the friend of all the Poles . . . Colonel Edward House,' Indtpendance Polq- naise, February 22, 1919,

14 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

in August), Colonel House talked with unofficial envoys: with Henri Bergson, the distinguished French philosopher, concerning methods of cooperation with France; l with T. P. O'Connor, who outlined the Irish situation — 'a good con- versationalist, has an Irish brogue, takes snuff like a gentle- man of the eighteenth century/ Labor leaders like Peter Brady, socialists like Max Eastman, journalists like Herbert Croly and Lincoln Colcord, British and American Major- Generals, bankers, members of the Administration and mem- bers of the Republican Party — with all of them House talked so as to have an insight into each situation from as many angles as seemed necessary to get a true picture, so that it might be passed on to the President. 'It is a weari- some job, but I keep at it/

To him came also those especially interested because of their position or knowledge, in the shipping, food, aircraft, coal, and Red Cross problems. Members of the Advisory Commission of the Council on National Defense explained their anxieties and submitted their proposals for the co- ordination of government purchasing and fixing of prices. His days were a continual turmoil; telephone calls, telegrams, letters, and personal interviews occupied every waking hour. To his callers House gave encouragement, sometimes advice; but he served them chiefly by putting them in touch with the proper official authority.

If the callers on Colonel House were measured by the hun- dreds, the letters written to him during this period, when he acted as the auditory nerve of the Administration, are to be reckoned by thousands. His files are crammed with applica- tions for government positions from college presidents and professors, the heads of great industrial corporations, camou- flage artists, journalists (some of them since not undistin-

1 Colonel House's papers record various conversations with M. Bergson in the United States and in Paris and there are letters from the French philosopher expressed in the most intimate terms.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S AUDITORY NERVE 15

guished), professional organizers. A politician of some note suggests that he will accept a cabinet position, or would like to become a member of the Peace Commission. There are myriads of memoranda to be handed over to the proper official: 'Will you be good enough to inform me if you can suggest any method of getting a prompt decision from the War Department on this important matter?' There are let- ters of gratitude, not quite so numerous indeed: ' I know that I am indebted to you for this honor and you know how I thank you for it/

Those planning the mobilization of scientific and indus- trial effort sent him their memoranda for criticism;1 in- dustrialists wrote him on the proper method to settle the coal or the railroad problem; financiers wrote regarding the tax plan of the Secretary of the Treasury; naval experts on the policy of Secretary Daniels; journalists on the unsatisfactory relations between the Administration and the Press, which

'have become intolerably tangled If something could be

done to straighten it out, it would have an immense influ- ence on the conduct of the war/ Pacifists sent him plans for the ideal peace settlement; experts or pseudo-experts wrote concerning the dehydrating of food, the destruction of Ger- man crops by salt scattered from airplanes, the introduction of a system of portable moving pictures to enliven the addresses of patriotic orators.

If Colonel House had passed on to Washington a hun- dredth part of the applications or the information which thus came to him, it is not likely that he would have long main- tained friendly relations with the Administration. What fil- tered through him was evidently regarded as valuable, for the letters of the President breathe not merely affection but gratitude : I am grateful to you all the time . . . and every- thing you do makes me more so You may have entirely

1 Cf. Report of Advisory Commission of Council on National Defense, by Dr. Hollis Godfrey.

16 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

satisfactory replies to my objections. . . , Will you not write

me again. Your grateful friend 1 devour and profit by

all your letters.1

President Wilson invoked the advice of House, as in the early days of his administration, in making the new appoint- ments and arranging for the new organizations that resulted from our entrance into the war. The President left it to him to develop the suggestion of Cleveland Dodge, that H. P. Davison be induced to accept the war organization of the American Red Cross. * Dodge wants Davison to be the executive head of the Red Cross/ wrote House in April, 4 believing that it will mean the difference between a five million proposition and a fifty million/ 2 Davison undertook the great task, which House later described as 'perhaps the finest piece of executive management accomplished during the entire war/ Through his visits and letters House was kept in close touch with the initial difficulties that Davison overcame.8

President Wilson also asked House to take up with Mr. Hoover, who had achieved the miracle of Belgian relief, the conditions under which he would assume control of the food problem. On April 6, Mr. Hugh Gibson, who as secretary of the American legation at Brussels had formed close relations with Mr. Hoover, wrote to House that 'he is evidently anxious to go to work* ; he enclosed a cable from Mr. Hoover: 'Relief will be fully organized within ten days and I shall be available for any appropriate service if wanted/ On April 18, Norman Hapgood wrote to House that Mr. Hoover was sailing for the United States. ' He is somewhat worried : does not wish to undertake the work unless enough independence goes with it to make it successful: that is, he would not want

1 Wilson to House, June 1, July 21, August 16, 1917. 1 In the end Davison raised approximately four hundred million. 1 Davison to House, July 25, August 8, August 17, August 24, Septem- ber 1, September 5, September 21, 1917.

HOOVER MADE FOOD COMMISSIONER 17

to be under any department. I am writing this more tact- fully to the President and Secretary Houston, but to you I may speak without indirection.'

Mr. Hoover landed in New York on May 3, and came up to House's apartment that afternoon. 'He has a well- thought-out and comprehensive plan/ wrote House in his

diary, 'if he can only put it into execution Hoover knows

the question of food control as no other man does, and he has energy and driving force/

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, May 4, 1917

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Hoover, as you know, is just back. I hope you will see him. ... He has some facts that you should know. He can tell you the whole story in about forty minutes, for I timed him.

I trust Houston will give him full powers as to food con- trol. He knows it better than any one in the world and would inspire confidence both in Europe and here. Unless Houston does give him full control I am afraid he will be unwilling to undertake the job, for he is the kind of man that has to have complete control in order to do the thing well

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Mr. Hoover was at once appointed Food Commissioner. In August, by the Lever Act, the President was empowered to create the Food Administration, at the head of which he placed Mr. Hoover with almost dictatorial powers. These he exercised with a combination of tact and enthusiasm which inspired the complete cooperation of the entire country. Without food cards or statutes, purely through the force of public opinion and of voluntary self-sacrifice, the Food Ad- ministration accomplished the economies and the extra pro-

18 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

duction necessary to meet the famine that threatened our European associates in the war.

Colonel House was also commissioned by the President to discuss with General Goethals, the constructor of the Panama Canal, who had just been appointed the head of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the conditions necessary to producing new ships in sufficient numbers to offset the ravages of the submarines.

'April 21, 1917: 1 went up to Mezes' for dinner to meet General George Goethals. ... It has been a long time since I have met any one I like so well. He is modest and able. I feel he is something like Kitchener, slow but sure. The undertaking which he has in mind needs celerity rather than thoroughness. . . .

'He told of the difficulties. He agreed it would be better to use steel because the ships would be lighter by 15 per cent, therefore they would bear that much more cargo, and they would be more valuable for a merchant marine after the war.

'He believes if the President will permit him to comman- deer certain steel products which foreigners have contracted for, and to commandeer shipyards which are now building for foreign accounts, he can make a creditable showing within a year. The people will be disappointed because the tonnage will be far less than anticipated. Goethals doubts whether he can do better than two million tons the first year, and he does not believe he can get out any tonnage before October 1st.

'May 2, 1917: Paderewski followed Grasty to discuss Polish matters. Farrell, Bedford, and Moore l came upon his heels. The purpose of their interview was to discuss how this

1 James A. Farrell, President of the United States Steel Corporation; Alfred C. Bedford, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Standard Oil Company, and Chairman of the Petroleum Committee of the Council of National Defense; and George Gordon Moore, New York capitalist.

GOETHALS ON SHIPBUILDING 19

country could most quickly supply the tonnage the Germans are destroying. I suggested General Goethals be communi- cated with and that Farrell, Goethals, and I get together here for luncheon or dinner Sunday and work it out. I would then place the matter before the President and ask him to give Goethals absolute authority and not have him hampered by the Shipping and other boards.'

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, May 6, 1917

DEAR GOVERNOR:

General Goethals took lunch with me to-day. He is very much disturbed over the delay in getting the shipbuilding programme started. He is already two weeks behind what he had counted on. This means a loss of 200,000 tons — if, indeed, the building of tons can be speeded up within six months to 400,000 tons a month as he hopes

Goethals, at my request, made the enclosed memorandum to show what in his opinion is immediately needful. If he can know by to-morrow or Tuesday if you favor these proposals he can make a start at once.

The tonnage required cannot be built wholly of timber because, in the first place, there is not enough seasoned tim- ber in the country to anywhere near meet the requirements, and the wooden ships cannot be built as quickly as the steel nor are they as effective when built.

Goethals has gone into the subject exhaustively and he declares there is no other way to meet the question. There are an infinite number of firms that have offered to build wooden ships, but he tells me that after inquiry he finds if contracts were let through these firms, they would never be able to carry them through. For instance, Florida offers to deliver a given number of wooden ships, but, upon investiga- tion, he says the different companies are counting largely upon the same material and the same labor and they would

20 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

not be able to cany on construction for more than one tenth of the number contracted for.

Please pardon me for bringing this matter to your atten- tion but it seems so vital, not only to our success in the war, but also to your own success, that I am doing so.

If Russia can be held in line, if the shipbuilding pro- gramme can be accomplished and the food situation be met, the war must go against Germany.

In order to carry through such a programme I know you will agree that it is necessary to place these matters almost wholly in the hands of one man, as it will never be possible to do it through boards or divided responsibility.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

General Goethals9 Memorandum

1. Executive order placing the ship yards at the disposal of the Shipping Board or preferably the U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation.

2. Authority of the President to build steel ships in addi- tion to wooden ones.

3. Appropriation of $500,000,000 for building 3,000,000 tons of shipping.

4. Appropriation of $250,000,000 to purchase ships now on the ways if found desirable.

Estimate of $500,000,000 based on 3,000,000 tons at $155 per ton.

To this President Wilson replied immediately after receiv- ing it, that he had devoted practically his entire day to the shipbuilding problem; had had Mr. Denman, chairman of the Shipping Board up 'on the Hill/ explaining the neces- sities of the situation to the men 'upon whom we shall have to depend/ and that he was arranging for a series of con- ferences. It would not be possible to follow General GoethaTs

CONFERENCES WITH FOREIGN ENVOYS 21

programme 'in all its length/ but the President could promise to use his influence in this all-important matter to the utmost: General Goethals may be sure that I am on the job and that the way will be cleared as fast as possible for what I realize to be immediately and imperatively neces- sary He added that the German ships were being put

in repair as fast as the shops could repair them and that the two interned German raiders would be named the Steuben and the DeKalb: That seemed to me to have a poetic pro- priety about it All of us unite in affectionate mes- sages.1

Unfortunately for the shipbuilding programme, the rela- tions between the Shipping Board and the Emergency Fleet Corporation did not prove harmonious, conflicts of author- ity and policy developed, and after months of wasted effort a complete reorganization became necessary. It was not until the following spring that American shipyards, under the driving leadership of Mr. C. M. Schwab, began to launch tonnage with the necessary speed.

IV

Conferences in which Colonel House found especial inter- est were those with foreign envoys. President Wilson asked him to undertake such relations in the belief that because of their purely unofficial character they might develop a frank- ness of expression that would be less likely if carried on by an official representative of the United States. The generous attitude and cooperation of the Secretary of State made such conferences possible and useful. For Mr. Lansing House felt admiration and affection. A decade later he wrote:

'The country has never quite appreciated Lansing. No other Secretary of State had so difficult a task. The years of neutrality before we entered the war presented many delicate

1 Wilson to House, May 7, 1917.

22 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

and intricate situations, and a false step might have proved disastrous. He made none.

'I shall always remember with gratitude his attitude toward me. My position was unusual and without precedent, and it would have been natural for him to object to my ven- tures in his sphere of activities. He never did. He was willing for me to help in any way the President thought best.

'The country owes Lansing much and some day I hope appreciation may be shown for his services during the peril- ous days of the Great War.' l

The following excerpts from House's papers throw light on the nature of the conferences he had with the Ambassadors:

'May 2, 1917: The Japanese Ambassador took lunch with me and we had more than two hours' discussion. There was no one present other than ourselves. It is delightful to me to come in touch with Eastern diplomacy. Sato is an able fellow and maintained his position well. I got a glimpse of the Japanese Government and of the constitution under which they work.

'The most important point of conversation occurred when he asked me whether or not this was a good time for his Government to take up with the Washington Government the unsettled questions between the two. He said when the war ended, all points which might cause friction between the United States and Japan should be smoothed out. This, he said, he understood to be the President's desire. I asked him to enumerate the points he had in mind. He spoke of the land law and our immigration laws as being the ones that hurt their national sensibilities most. He thought, how- ever, that if an arrangement could be made between the two countries by which no new adverse legislation would be enacted in the Western States against the Japanese, they might be satisfied.

1 Colonel House to C. S., March 24, 1928.

CONFERENCE WITH AMBASSADOR SATO 23

1 He understood the difficulty under which our Govern- ment was working, because of the rights of States to pass legislation which sometimes conflicted with the national pol- icy and with foreign treaties.

'I advised Sato not to take these matters up officially at this time because it might leave a suspicion that it was done for the purpose of forcing a decision just as the United States was entering the war against the Central Powers. I advised that he give me a memorandum of his Government's views so that they might be discussed unofficially. He saw the point and agreed to do so. He is to give me the memorandum when he returns to Washington. He hesitated, however, about putting it in writing, saying his Government had not authorized him to take the matter up officially. . . .

'The calmness, the poise and the placidity of this confer- ence delighted me. We were both as expressionless as graven images, and there was no raising of voices or undue emphasis upon any subject, no matter how important/

Ambassador Sato to Colonel House

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1917 MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

For your kind reception and open-hearted talk which I had the pleasure of enjoying in New York, I wish you to accept my warm and sincere thanks. According to your sug- gestion, I have since prepared a memorandum succinctly setting forth the point which formed a part of our conversa- tion and I am taking the liberty to send it to you for what- ever use you may see fit. . . .*

With high regard and cordial wishes, I beg you, Dear Colonel House, to believe me,

Very sincerely yours

AIMARO SATO 1 See appendix to this chapter.

24 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, May 11, 1917 DEAR GOVERNOR:

Last week the Japanese Ambassador took lunch with me. Before the end of our conversation he wanted to know if I did not think it a good time to take up the differences exist- ing between our two governments

I am enclosing you a copy of his letter and the memoran- dum and my reply. When you have leisure, will you not advise me concerning this. If Russia swings back to auto- cratic government, I think a close alignment between Ger- many, Japan, and Russia is certain

Walter Rogers has just returned from the Far East. . . . He strongly advises a better news service to Japan, China, and Russia. I will not go into details, but from what I learn, not only from Rogers but from others, this is one of the crying needs of the moment.

The general public in both Japan and China regard us as being almost as unwilling to fight as China herself, and none of our war preparations and but little of your addresses have reached the people.

This can all be changed at very little cost. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Although of later date, the following letter indicates House's interest in the Japanese problem which doubtless affected his opinion two years later on the Shantung question at the Peace Conference.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, September 18, 1917

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... I had a talk with Roland Morris l to-day. I hope you will see him for ten or fifteen minutes before he leaves for

1 Recently appointed Ambassador to Japan.

THE NEW RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR 25

Japan next Tuesday, in order to give him your viewpoint as to Far Eastern questions. I think he has the right view him- self and, if you agree with it, he will understand in what direction to proceed.

We cannot meet Japan in her desires as to land and immi- gration, and unless we make some concessions in regard to her sphere of influence in the East, trouble is sure sooner or later to come. Japan is barred from all the undeveloped places of the earth, and if her influence in the East is not recognized as in some degree superior to that of the Western powers, there will be a reckoning.

A policy can be formulated which will leave the open door, rehabilitate China, and satisfy Japan. Morris sees this clearly but needs your sanction, if, indeed, such a policy has your sanction.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

With the new Russian Ambassador from the provisional government, Colonel House also maintained close relations. At various times during the summer the Russian envoy visited him, evidently believing that through the Colonel he had a means of presenting directly to President Wilson Russia's increasing need of assistance from the outside, if she were to be saved from going to pieces.1 House endorsed his pleas for aid. *I do not think we can devote too much attention to the Russian situation/ he wrote the President, 'for if that fails us our troubles will be great and many.'

The relations of Colonel House with the French and

1 On July 23, House wrote to Wilson: 'The Russian Ambassador was here yesterday. He tells me that he has gone the round of Cabinet officers and officials and is at the end of the passage regarding certain matters. He wanted to know whether he had better approach you with these ques- tions. I advised him again to press the proper officials rather than to take his troubles to you. I promised, however, to tell you of them.' House then summarized M. BakhmetiefTs report on Russian needs.

26 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

British Ambassadors were of quite a different nature, for they rested upon sincere personal friendship. He had fought through with them the troublesome issues of the days of American neutrality, when United States interests frequently had clashed directly with those of the Allies. These differ- ences had apparently not shaken the confidence of the Am- bassadors in House, and they had certainly not affected his respect and admiration for them. * Jusserand knew America/ wrote House, 'as he knew Europe. His familiarity with the President's personality and views, due to his long residence in Washington, was of value in many dangerous situations. Jusserand had long been the closest tie between France and the United States and he had the respect and love of both countries/

Of Ambassador Spring-Rice, House later wrote: 'What a ruthless and destructive force is war! Here was perhaps the ablest and best-trained member of the British diplomatic service. There was no one who possessed to a greater degree the affection and confidence of his chiefs, and no one was more deserving. With all his accomplishments he possessed a personal charm that made him a multitude of friends. But when war broke loose he had a serious illness. Under ordi- nary circumstances he would soon have righted himself, but with the stress of disasters coming day by day, he could not regain his normal health. On he had to go, impelled by a high sense of patriotism and duty. He went as far and as hard as he could, but what he could not do he was willing should be done by others. He was one of the few I have known who did not hesitate to yield his prerogatives in order that his country's interests might not suffer. Even so the task finally proved too great. He gave his life for his country as surely as though he had been slain on the field of battle.'

In view of House's friendship for the Ambassadors of France and Great Britain, as well as because of his experience in Europe and his contacts with the political leaders of the

AMBASSADOR SATO'S MEMORANDUM 27

Allied Powers, President Wilson placed particular confidence in the Colonel's judgment on all matters of foreign relations: You are closer in touch, he wrote him in the early summer, with what is being said and thought on the other side of the water than we are here,1

It was thus not unnatural that Mr. Wilson should have called House into active participation in the first important conferences with representatives of the Allies, which took place shortly after our entrance into the war.

APPENDIX

Ambassador Sato's Memorandum

The Japanese-American question which calls for an immediate adjust- ment, is that of the treatment of the resident Japanese in this country. What Japan desires is nothing more than the enjoyment of the most favored nation treatment. That desideratum may be attained in my personal opinion, by the adoption of some of the following means:

1. By Treaty.

a. By concluding an independent treaty, mutually guaranteeing to the citizens and subjects, the most favored nation treatment, in matters of property and other rights relative to the exercise of industries, occupa- tions, and other pursuits. Negotiations in this line were for some time conducted between Secretary Bryan and Ambassador Chinda, which, however, for reasons I need not here state, have since been in abeyance.

b. By revising the existing commercial treaty between our two coun- tries, so as to conform, in its stipulations, to similar engagements between Japan and various European powers, which guarantee, in principle, the most favored nation treatment, in the enjoyment of property rights and in all that relates to the pursuit of industries, callings and educational studies.

2. By American legislation.

Although the subject is not fit for international discussion, it may be mentioned that a constitutional amendment restraining any State from making and enforcing any law discriminatory against aliens in respect to the property and other civil rights, will prove a far-reaching remedy. In fact a resolution with the same object in view has, I understand, been introduced in Congress lately.

In this connection, I may state the fact that the provisions of racial distinction in the present naturalization law, were, in a number of in- stances, made use of for the purpose of depriving Japanese subjects of the rights and privileges of a civil nature. Although the wisdom of the law is in itself a matter of national and not international concern, the unfortu-

1 Wilson to House, June 1, 1917,

28 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

nate circumstance that certain provisions of that law furnish a pretext for the impairment of alien civil rights, should, I may be allowed to remark, constitute a fit subject for legislative attention.

The comparative merits of each means should be studied by both Governments in the light of expediency and feasibility. Whether the adoption of any one means will be sufficient to cover the whole ground is a matter upon which precaution forbids me to pass a final judgment at present, but I am strongly convinced that each means will go a long dis- tance towards a complete solution of the question.

Before concluding, I desire to touch upon the subject of immigration. The question whether Japanese laborers shall be admitted or not, has been consummately solved by the continued faithful observance by Japan of the so-called Gentleman's Agreement. So far as the Japanese Government is concerned, it is no longer in the realm of living questions, and in my view, it would serve the best interests of both nations to leave the question as it is.

CHAPTER II THE BALFOUR MISSION

It pleased me to have Balfour rise with enthusiasm to the suggestion that Great Britain and the United States would stand together for a just

peace

Colonel House's Diary, April 22, 1917

PRESIDENT WILSON realized that the new war organization of the United States must be developed, not upon abstract principles, but in direct relation to the special needs of the Allies. The problem was not so much to get ready for war as to supply those things — men, ships, credit — in which the Allies were running short. The entrance of the United States into the war enhanced the potential resources of the anti-German group tremendously, but it would be of small practical value if it brought an isolated effort and not real cooperation. Germany had counted on the probability that America's effort, undertaken without adequate preparation, would not affect the outcome of the war, which was to be settled by the submarine. The gamble might succeed if close correlation were not at once established between the neces- sities of the Allies and the ability of the United States to satisfy them. As Sir William Wiseman wrote to House in September, 1917: Germany's greatest asset is the three thousand miles that separates Washington from London/

The futility of an isolated American effort was keenly appreciated by the President and his advisers, and it was largely as a result of American insistence, especially on the part of Secretary McAdoo and the heads of the war boards, that full cooperation was finally secured. The process was necessarily slow, for American opinion had to be educated to both the need and the opportunity. There was then, as there

30 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

will always be, a modicum of opinion which insisted that the United States had been lured into the war by designing inter- ests for the purpose of pulling Entente chestnuts from the fire. President Wilson himself was careful always to keep the United States distinct from any hard-and-fast war alliance, and introduced the phrase * associated power' to indicate the status of this country in its relation to the Allied powers of Europe.

The Allied Governments were well-informed of the various conditions in the United States which affected the problem of American cooperation. Through the British and French Ambassadors who had many friends in Republican circles, they followed the trend of unofficial opinion. They relied also upon the reports of the British chief of secret service, Sir William Wiseman, who because of his close contacts with Colonel House was regarded as an authoritative exponent of President Wilson's policy.1 A carefully drafted memoran- dum of Wiseman, which before going to the British Govern- ment was read by President Wilson and pronounced by him to be 'an accurate summary/ explains the difficulty as well as the importance of the problem of American cooperation from the Allied point of view.

Memorandum on American Cooperation

1917

'The sentiment of the country would be strongly against joining the Allies by any formal treaty. Subconsciously they [the Americans] feel themselves to be arbitrators rather than allies. On the other hand, the people are sincere in their determination to crush Prussian autocracy, and in their longing to arrive at some settlement which will make future wars impossible.

'It is important to realize that the American people do not consider themselves in any danger from the Central Powers.

1 See Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 11, 400.

SIR WILLIAM WISEMAN

WISEMAN'S MEMORANDUM 31

It is true that many of their statesmen foresee the danger of a German triumph, but the majority of the people are still very remote from the war. They believe they are fighting for the cause of Democracy and not to save themselves.

'There still remains a mistrust of Great Britain, inherited from the days of the War of Independence, and kept alive by the ridiculous history books still used in the national schools. On the other hand there is the historical sympathy for France, and trouble could far more easily be created between the British and the Americans than with any of our allies. German propaganda naturally follows this line, and has been almost entirely directed against England

'Any pronouncement [the Allied Governments] can make which will help the President to satisfy the American people that their efforts and sacrifices will reap the disinterested reward they hope for, will be gratifying to him, and in its ultimate result serve to commit America yet more whole- heartedly to the task in hand. The more remote a nation is from the dangers of the war the more necessary it becomes to have some symbol or definite goal to keep constantly before it. The Americans are accustomed to follow a " slogan " or simple formula. The President realized this when he gave them the watchword that America was fighting "To make the world safe for Democracy "; but the time has come when something more concrete and detailed is needed.

'Our diplomatic task is to get enormous quantities of sup- plies from the United States while we have no means of bringing pressure to bear upon them to this end. We have to obtain vast loans, tonnage, supplies and munitions, food, oil, and other raw materials. And the quantities which we demand, while not remarkable in relation to the output of other belligerents, are far beyond the figures understood by the American public to-day.

'The Administration are ready to assist us to the limit of the resources of their country; but it is necessary for them

32 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

to educate Congress and the Nation to appreciate the actu meaning of these gigantic figures. It is not enough for us assure them that without these supplies the war will be los For the public ear we must translate dollars and tonnaj into the efforts and achievements of the fleets and the armie We must impress upon them the fighting value of the money,

'The Administration are too far from the war, and ha^ not sufficient information, to judge the merits of these d mands. The Allies will have to use patience, skill, and i] genuity in assisting the American authorities to arrive at solution of this one grave difficulty, which is in a phras "The coordination of Allied requirements."*

The Allies were anxious to secure close diplomatic cc operation with the United States so soon as our entrance int the war appeared likely. A week after the dismissal c Bernstorff, Mr. Balfour's Secretary, Sir Eric Drummonc wrote as follows to Colonel House:

Sir Eric Drummond to Colonel House

LONDON, February 9, 1917 MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

Mr. Balfour is sending a telegram to our diplomatic repn sentatives to tell them that he considers that full and fran cooperation between British and United States diplomatist and agents is one of the most important factors of the wa] He is further telling them that he relies on them to d everything in their power to secure such cooperation.

This ought to avoid any possibility of relations being any where impaired by local suspicions.

Yours very sincerely

ERIC DRUMMOND

Existing diplomatic agencies, however, would hardly suf

THE BALFOUR MISSION 33

fice to develop and maintain the sort of relations which the entrance of the United States into the war made essential; they would demand the attention of highly expert technical advisers and organizers. No matter how able the Ambassa- dors, their routine duties would interfere with the new pro- blems of belligerent coordination. Furthermore it would be difficult for the same men who had borne the strain of the discussions relating to neutral trade, the blacklist, and the holding up of American mails, to meet the new conditions.

Immediately following the President's speech asking for a war declaration, the British Government considered the advisability of sending to the United States a special mission, the obvious purpose of which should be to put at the disposal of our Government the experience gained by Great Britain in nearly three years of war and which might also bring the British into closer touch with the situation in America. The importance of the mission was indicated by the choice of Mr. Balfour, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, as its chief.

Sir Eric Drummond to Colonel House

[Cablegram]

LONDON, April 5, 1917

May I offer you my warmest congratulations on magnifi- cent speech of the President.1 We are all deeply moved at its terms and tone. When Congress has responded to the great ideals which he has expressed, we trust consideration will be given to a commission, technically expert, being sent from here to place at the disposal of the United States Gov- ernment the experience gained in this country during the war.

It has been suggested that Mr. Arthur Balfour should be the head of such a commission for a short time to coordinate its activity and to discuss wider issues involved.

Would it be possible for you to give me your opinion pri-

1 The speech of April 2, asking Congress to declare the existence of a state of war between Germany and the United States.

34 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

vately on this? Your telegram would not, of course, be used to forward any proposal which would not meet with the warm approval of the President and your people; especially as the absence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs for even a few weeks has many inconveniences.

ERIC DRUMMOND

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, April 5, 1917

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I am enclosing a cable which has just come from Eric Drummond, Balfour's confidential secretary. Of course it is really Balfour speaking.

Will you not advise me what reply to send. I do not see how you can well refuse this request, coming as it does. It might be well to have a Frenchman of equal distinction come at the same time.

Balfour is the most liberal member of the present British Cabinet and it would be of great service to the relations of the two countries to have him here and to talk with him in person. Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

'April 6, 1917: Polk tells me over the telephone that the President read the cablegram at the Cabinet meeting to-day and they discussed the advisability of my sending a favorable response. . . .

'The French Government have offered to send Joffre and

Viviani over The only objection to their coming that

I can see is that it might create an unfavorable feeling throughout the country that we are fighting more for the Allies than we are for the great principles laid down by the President in his April second speech.'

Whatever his doubt of the effect upon certain strata of

THE FRENCH MISSION 35

opinion, House's belief in the practical value that would result from the suggested missions was such that he wrote the following letter to the President, which indicates what was in his mind but which on second thought he did not send; perhaps he feared lest he might appear to be urging a personal conviction,

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, April 6, 1917

DEAR GOVERNOR:

The more I think of Balf our's proposal to come to America, the better it seems to me. It would put you in personal touch with one of the most influential men in the Empire and would increase your prestige enormously at the peace conference. I would like Balfour to know you and to take back his im- pressions so they might come from a less partisan voice than mine. If a Frenchman of equal distinction should accom- pany him, that too, would help in the same direction. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

On April 6 President Wilson replied to House's first letter that of course the suggested mission would be welcome, although he himself visualized certain dangers in the effect upon opinion and feared that some Americans might mis- understand our relations with the Allies. A great many, he added, would look upon the mission as an attempt, in some degree, to take charge of us as an assistant to Great Britain. But he believed, none the less, that many useful purposes would be served and perhaps a great deal of time in getting together saved.1 Three days later he wrote House of the coming of a French mission, 'apparently only of compli- ment,' headed by Viviani and Joffre.2

1 WUson to House, April 6, 1917. * Wilson to House, April 9, 1917.

36 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE Colonel House to Sir Eric Drummond

[Cablegram]

NEW YORK, April 9, 1917

Many thanks for your kindly message. My friend has always held these convictions, but until Russia joined the democratic nations he did not think it wise to utter them.1

He is greatly pleased that Mr. Balfour will come to the United States and of course I am delighted. It should result in settling many problems that confront us, and this country will appreciate the honor. I hope he may come immediately.

I would suggest the mission be announced as diplomatic rather than military, and that the military and naval mem- bers be of minor rank in order that this feature may not be emphasized. E. M. HOUSE

Thus on the very day that by formal vote of Congress the United States entered the war, it was decided to welcome the Allied envoys. Within a week the Balfour Mission was on the Atlantic, and on April 21 they landed at Halifax, whence they came by train through New York to Washington. A few days later arrived the French Mission led by Viviani and Joffre, to be followed shortly by the Italians and Belgians.

Whatever the outcome of the conferences that followed, the despatch of these missions was of itself significant, a gesture symbolic of cooperative effort by which alone Ger- many could be defeated.

ii

On the morning of April 22, the Balfour Mission en route to Washington passed through New York. Besides the Foreign Secretary and Sir Eric Drummond the Mission in- cluded representatives of the army, navy, and treasury, General Bridges, Admiral de Chair, Lord Cunliffe. At nine in the morning Colonel House, at the suggestion of the British Embassy, went down to the Pennsylvania station in

1 Referring again to Wilson's speech of April 2.

OBJECTS OF THE BALFOUR MISSION 37

New York to meet Balfour, who entered and left the city entirely by tunnel. The interview covered general topics only, but House's report to Wilson is interesting in that it indicates his fear lest in the Washington conferences the vital but dangerous topic of war aims should be raised. House himself believed that at this time it ought to be avoided. It was the moment, he felt, to emphasize the need of coopera- tive effort rather than to bring up any underlying differences of purpose between America and the Allied powers; these could be settled, he thought, only after the defeat of Ger- many was assured.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, April 22, 1917

DEAR GOVERNOR:

At the suggestion of Sir William Wiseman who, I believe, spoke also for Sir Cecil, I met Balfour as he passed through this morning and had an interesting talk with him

I told Balfour that unless you advised to the contrary I thought it would be well to minimize the importance of his visit here to the extent of a denial that it was for the purpose of forming some sort of agreement with the Allies. I find there is a feeling that this country is about to commit itself to a secret alliance with them.

Such men as X and Y [extreme liberals] have been to see me and I could not convince them that the object of the visit of the British and French was not for this purpose.

I hope you will agree with me that the best policy now is to avoid a discussion of peace settlements. Balfour concurs in this. If the Allies begin to discuss terms among them- selves, they will soon hate one another worse than they do Germany and a situation will arise similar to that in the Balkan States after the Turkish War. It seems to me that the only thing to be considered at present is how to beat Germany in the quickest way.

38 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

I told Balfour I hoped England would consider that a peace which was best for all the nations of the world would be the one best for England. He accepted this with en- thusiasm.

If you have a tacit understanding with him not to discuss peace terms with the other Allies, later this country and England will be able to dictate broad and generous terms — terms that will mean permanent peace.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

As we shall soon see, it proved impossible not to discuss war aims, partly, at least, because Mr. Balfour himself had naturally assumed that Wilson would wish to know of the secret treaties by which the Allied powers had guaranteed to each other the fulfillment of their war aims, and had come fully prepared to discuss them with the United States Gov- ernment. At this first interview, however, House touched on the crucial topic only so far as to verify his conviction that the British Foreign Secretary would stand, at least in prin- ciple, for the sort of settlement Wilson had demanded in his speech of April 2. So much appears from a passage in his diary supplementing his letter to the President.

'April 22, 1917: 1 advised Balfour to be entirely frank in his statement to the President of the difficulties under which the Allies are struggling

*I urged him not to talk peace terms, and to advise the President not to discuss peace terms with any of the other Allies. If he did, differences would be certain to arise and the problem now was to beat Germany and not discuss peace. Balfour agreed to this in full, and said he would not talk to the President about peace terms unless the President him- self initiated it.

'Balfour asked what I thought of negotiations with

TALK WITH BALFOUR 39

Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria for separate peace. I thought well of Austria and Bulgaria * . . .

'It pleased me to have Balfour rise with enthusiasm to the suggestion that Great Britain and the United States would stand together for a just peace — a peace fair to all, to the small as well as the large nations of the world. Great Britain and America, I thought, were great enough to rise above all petty considerations. I thought that what was best for the smaller nations was best, in the long run, for Great Britain and the United States. This peace might easily be one of the greatest events in history and if we were to justify ourselves, we should not be small or selfish in its settlement.

'In speaking of the war, Balfour said it was perhaps the biggest event in history but beyond that he could not think; he could not grasp the details and probably would never be able to do so; that coming generations might find it possible to see the thing as it really existed but we could not '

The first days of the Mission's visit to Washington were taken up with official receptions. Mr. Balfour displayed the tact and magnetism necessary to evoke unstinted enthusi- asm for the Allies, which was enhanced by the arrival of the French Mission on April 24. If there had existed any fear that the United States was about to be caught in the toils of European diplomacy, it was lost in the burst of applause that was given the Allied Missions. The ceremonials at the capital were by no means wasted time, since they did much to impress upon the country the fact that the war was a cooperative enterprise.

Colonel House remained in New York during the first days of the Balfour Mission's visit; at the request of Wilson he came over to Washington for the week-end. On the 26th of April he had lunch with the President.

1 At this time the United States was at war with neither of these states.

40 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

'My conversation with Balfour,' said Wilson, 'was not satisfactory. How would it be to invite him to a family dinner, you being present, and go into a conference after- wards?'

The President was anxious, apparently, to settle the question of war aims as between the United States and the Allies. There was much to be said in favor of clarifying this problem at the moment the United States entered the war. On the other hand, as House had intimated in his letter of April 22 to Wilson, dangers lurked in the raising of it.

We had taken up arms against Germany, according to Wilson's speech of April 2, both because Germany had already made war upon us through the submarine and be- cause of our desire to achieve a lasting and just settlement. We were tacitly pledged to the defeat of Germany. If we did not come to agreement with the Allies as to the sort of peace to be imposed upon her, there was danger that we might be fighting for Allied war aims, perhaps as crystallized in the secret treaties. On the other hand if, after learning the terms of the secret treaties, we refused our approval, what then? We could hardly state that we would not continue to fight Germany, since we had our own quarrel with her. It would be futile to announce that because of our disapproval of the purposes of the Allies we would make war by ourselves. If we stated that we would fight with the Allies but reserved the right later to dispute the application of the secret treaties, the only effect would be to cause irritation and to injure the chances of effective cooperative action against the enemy.

Colonel House knew of the secret treaties. He had told the President of the Treaty of London before Italy entered the war, and Grey had told him of the demands of Rumania, so that he must have guessed the terms upon which she entered the war.1 He was shortly to learn more about them.

1 See Intimate Papers of Colonel House, i, 462.

THE QUESTION OF WAR AIMS 41

But he hoped that the President would not at this time make an issue of them, and he feared the results of an American demand that the Allies renounce them. The time might come when the United States would be in a position to en- force such a demand as a necessary preliminary to a stable peace. But America, coming late into the war and as yet having made no material contribution toward victory, had not attained that position.

Later President Wilson was severely criticized for having failed to settle the whole question of war aims at the moment when we entered the war. If the criticism is just, evidently Colonel House must share the responsibility. As will appear, neither the President nor House felt that it was possible to endanger unity with the Allies by raising a protest against the secret treaties.

'April 26, 1917: [Conference with President Wilson.] I argued against discussing peace terms with the Allies, just as I did in my first conversation with Mr. Balfour and in my letter to the President. The President thought it would be a pity to have Balfour go home without a discussion of the subject. My thought was that there was no harm in dis- cussing it between themselves if it was distinctly understood and could be said, that there was no official discussion of the subject, and if neither Government would discuss peace terms with any of the other Allies.1 It was agreed that this should be done.'

The President commissioned Colonel House to present to Mr. Balfour his invitation to dinner, thus preserving the desired atmosphere of informality; later it was decided that House should first discuss with the Foreign Secretary the general problem of war aims and ask him about the secret treaties, before the dinner with the President.

1 It is not clear how the British, who had treaties with the other Allies, could be expected not to discuss them if occasion arose.

42 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

In view of the later, controversy regarding American knowledge of the secret treaties, Colonel House's record of the following conversation with Balfour is of the utmost historical importance. It is unsatisfactory in a certain sense, for he dictated his notes on this conversation in a haste that could not be avoided and was obviously dealing in generalities. Unless this fact is kept in mind, the notes give an impression of superficiality. It should also be remembered that this discussion and those that followed were not directed to the merits of the secret treaties themselves, but rather to their bearing on American policy and the relations between America and the Allies.

'April 28, 1917: My most important conference to-day was with Mr. Balfour. ... No one else was present and we talked for an hour and a half without interruption. And this reminds me that Sir Eric asked yesterday whether it would be convenient for Balfour to continue to be a guest of the Government rather than to go to the British Embassy as planned.1 . . . We asked Drummond, and Balfour as well, to open their minds freely, as to one another, so that things might go without friction. They promised to do so and this is an evidence of it.

'Balfour wished to know where we should begin our dis- cussion, whether we should first take up peace terms to be imposed in the event of a decisive defeat of Germany, or whether to take it up on a basis of a stalemate of partial

1 Through the courtesy of Mr. Breckinridge Long, Third Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Balfour had been given the use of his house during the Mission's stay in Washington. ' In some ways/ Colonel House wrote, 'Breckinridge Long occupied a position of his own in the Wilson Ad- ministration. A man of wealth, of culture and of an old and distinguished family, he filled an enviable niche. He had charm, discretion and a sense of political values that made him an important factor in the State De- partment. He looked beyond his departmental duties, and worked assid- uously to strengthen the President's position. He sought to clarify and popularize the President's policies.'

ANOTHER CONFERENCE WITH BALFOUR 43

defeat. I thought we had better discuss the first proposition.

' He had a large map of Europe and of Asia Minor and we began this most important and interesting discussion, the understanding being that he and I would go through with it first, letting me convey our conclusions to the President before the three of us had our conference on Monday.1

'He took it for granted that Alsace and Lorraine would go to France, and that France, Belgium, and Serbia would be restored.

'He first discussed Poland and outlined what its bounda- ries should be. Of course, the stumbling block was the outlet

to the sea. There can be no other excepting Danzig

This would leave an Alsace and Lorraine to rankle and fester for future trouble.2 Balfour thought it might be made a free port, and in that way satisfy Poland. At the moment, I do not look upon this with favor, particularly since the Ger- mans and Poles would be antagonistic and ready upon the slightest provocation to find grievances against one another. However, I warmly advocated a restored and rejuvenated Poland, a Poland big enough and powerful enough to serve as a buffer state between Germany and Russia.

'Serbia came next, and it was agreed that Austria must return Bosnia and Herzegovinia, but that Serbia on her part should give to Bulgaria that part of Macedonia which the first Balkan agreement gave her.

'Rumania, we thought, should have a small part of Russia which her people inhabited and also a part of Hungary for the same reason.8

1 House later wrote that this map had the secret treaty lines traced on it and that Balfour left it with the Colonel. It is not to be found among the House Papers, and was doubtless handed over to The Inquiry and later sent to the State Department.

1 German protests against this corridor, which was established by the peace treaties, are clear evidence of the extent to which it constituted a factor of unrest.

1 References evidently to Bessarabia and Transylvania and the Banat. They may have looked small upon Balfour's map but the territories

44 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

'We thought Austria should be composed of three states, such as Bohemia, Hungary, and Austria proper.

'We came to no conclusion as to Trieste. I did not con- sider it best or desirable to shut Austria from the Adriatic. Balfour argued that Italy claimed she should have pro- tection for her east coast by having Dalmatia. She has no seaport from Venice to Brindisi, and she claims she must have the coast opposite in order to protect herself.'

The mention of the aspirations of Italy gave to House the opening for which he had been waiting and permitted him to put the pertinent question as to the secret obligations which the Allies had assumed towards each other for the fulfilment of their war aims.

'This led me to ask/ House continued, 'what treaties were out between the Allies as to the division of spoils after the war. He said they had treaties with one another, and that when Italy came in they made one with her in which they had promised pretty much what she demanded.

'Balfour spoke with regret at the spectacle of great nations sitting down and dividing the spoils of war or, as he termed it, "dividing up the bearskin before the bear was killed." I asked him if he did not think it proper for the Allies to give copies of these treaties to the President for his confidential information. He thought such a request entirely reasonable and said he would have copies made for that purpose. He was not certain they had brought them over, but if not, he would send for them.

' I asked if he did not consider it wise for us to keep clear of any promises so that at the peace conference we could exert an influence against greed and an improper distribution of

promised Rumania by the secret treaty of Bucharest, signed August 17, 1916, would almost double the area of Rumania. Bessarabia, belonging to Russia, was not included in the territories then promised Rumania.

ANOTHER CONFERENCE WITH BALFOUR 45

territory. I said to him what I once said to Grey, that if we are to justify our being in the war, we should free ourselves entirely from petty, selfish thoughts and look at the thing broadly and from a world viewpoint. Balfour agreed to this with enthusiasm.

* Constantinople was our next point. We agreed that it should be internationalized.1 Crossing the Bosphorus we came to Anatolia.2 It is here that the secret treaties between the Allies come in most prominently. They have agreed to give Russia a sphere of influence in Armenia and the north- ern part. The British take in Mesopotamia [and the region] which is contiguous to Egypt. France and Italy each have their spheres embracing the balance of Anatolia up to the Straits.3

'It is all bad and I told Balfour so. They are making it a breeding place for future war. I asked what the spheres of influence included. Balfour was hazy concerning this; whether it meant permanent occupation, or whether it meant that each nation had the exclusive right to develop the resources within their own sphere, he was not altogether clear.

* We did not touch upon the German Colonies, neither did we touch upon Japan, China, or the Eastern question gener- ally.4

* We went back to Poland. His objection to a Polish state, cutting off Russia from Germany, was whether it would not

1 This does not tally with the promises made by Great Britain and France to Russia in March, 1915, according to which Constantinople should belong to Russia but should be a free port for goods not entering Russia. House must have misunderstood Balfour, perhaps interpreting 'free port* as meaning 'free city.'

2 Meaning evidently Turkey in Asia.

8 Italy's demands were met in a general fashion in the Treaty of Lon- don; they were agreed to more definitely at this very time, April 19, 1917, at St. Jean de Maurienne.

4 Just before the United States entered the war France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia agreed to approve Japan's claims to German rights in Shantung and the German islands north of the equator.

46 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

hurt France more than Germany, for the reason it would prevent Russia from coming to France's aid in the event of an attack by Germany. I thought we had to take into consideration the Russia of fifty years from now rather than the Russia of to-day. While we might hope it would continue democratic and cease to be aggressive, yet if the contrary happened, Russia would be the menace to Europe and not Germany. I asked him not to look upon Germany as a permanent enemy. If we did this, it would confuse our reasoning and mistakes would likely be made. Balfour, however, was more impressed with the German menace than he was by the possible danger from Russia.9

in

House did not urge Balfour to give him complete details of the secret treaties, nor, being a private citizen, would he wish to ask for copies of the texts. It seems clear that he realized always the danger of pressing the discussion to a point which might emphasize the differences between the American and the Allied war aims. The following evening the Colonel dined with President Wilson and, if we may depend upon his diary notes, nothing was said of the matter nor of the approaching conference which Wilson was to have with Balfour. The President seemed anxious to escape from current politics.

"April 29, 1917: The President, Mrs. Wilson, Miss Bones and I had dinner alone. After dinner we went to the up- stairs sitting room and talked upon general subjects for awhile. The President read several chapters from Oliver's "Ordeal by Battle." He was interested in what I had to tell him of Oliver, and we discussed the different points Oliver made in the chapters read. . . .

*The President declared his intention of writing some things whicYi were on his mind, aiter he retired from office.

CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT 47

... He said he had no notion of writing about his adminis- tration, but expressed a desire to write one book which he has long had in mind and which he thought might have an influence for good.

'He said, " I write with difficulty and it takes everything out of me.'5 This estimate of himself in that field of his endeavors would surprise the general public, since he is considered such a fluent writer. I asked how long it took him to write his April 2nd Address to Congress. He said ten hours. I offered the opinion that his January 22nd speech to the Senate was a much abler document because it had more original thought. His April 2nd speech pleased, I thought, because it reflected the public mind, both here and in the Allied countries.

'He talked of the proposed book and its contents. I thought if he would bring out clearly the necessity for a more responsive form of government, and the necessity for having Cabinet members sit in the House of Representatives, it would be worth while. He agreed that if the Cabinet officers sat in the House, the outcome would be that the President would have to take his material for the Cabinet from Congress. This, in the end, would give the Cabinet more power, and would have the further effect of bringing into Congress the best talent in the country. It would eventuate in something like the British system.'

On the following evening, April 30, the intimate confer- ence between Wilson and Balfour took place in the White House, preceded by the family dinner which the President insisted upon and which proved conducive to the sort of in- formal discussion of war aims that was desired.

'Besides the President, Mr. Balfour and myself/ wrote House, 'there was no one present at dinner excepting Mrs. Wilson and Miss Bones. The President did most of the

48 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

talking The conversation was along general lines,

mostly educational, historical and architectural. The Presi- dent told several stories of Lincoln, and Balfour listened with interest. He said Lincoln was not ready for the Presi- dency when it came to him; that up to that time he was not sufficiently educated and had not had adequate public experience. He spoke of the difficulty Lincoln had in acquiring an education and of his manner of obtaining it. They both thought it little less than marvellous, with his antecedents and limited opportunities, that he should de- velop a distinct literary flavor

'In talking of education, the President expressed himself as not being in agreement with the general modern trend against the Classics. He thought the world had gained as much by the untruths of history as by the truths. He did not believe the human mind should be held down to facts and material matters. He considered that the trouble with Germany to-day. German thought expressed itself in terms of machinery and gases. The reading of the romance lan- guages and of the higher flights of fancy in literature led one into spiritual realms which, to say the least, was as advanta- geous to the world as its material progress. . . .

'We took our coffee in the oval sitting room and when it was finished we went to the President's study and began a conference, the importance of which cannot be overesti- mated. The President continued to do most of the talking. It was evident to me that he was keyed up for this con- ference, as he had been resting most of the afternoon, not taking his usual exercise. . . .

'The ground we covered was exactly the same as Balfour and I had covered in our conference Saturday. I tried to steer the conversation so as to embrace what Balfour had said to me and what the President and I had agreed upon in former conferences.

'When we touched upon the internationalization of

CONFERENCE OF WILSON AND BALFOUR 49

Constantinople I suggested that it might lead to trouble. It was with some difficulty that I made them understand that I thoroughly agreed with the general idea, but desired to point out that it would inevitably lead to an attempt to internationalize the Straits between Sweden and Norway and Continental Europe, and the Suez and Panama Canals. They did not agree with me that the two questions had much in common. . . .

'The discussion ran from shortly before eight o'clock until half past ten, when the President was due at a reception given by the Secretary of State to the members of Congress to meet the British and French Missions.

'I asked Balfour again about the Allies' treaties with each other and the desirability of his giving copies to the Presi- dent. He again agreed to do so.

'When the conference broke up I walked downstairs with Mr. Balfour and asked if he felt that his mind and that of the President had touched at all points. He was quite enthusi- astic and said he had never had a more interesting interview. He spoke of the President as having a wonderful combina- tion of human philosophy and political sagacity.

4 The President and Mr. Balfour went to the reception together and I went to my room to prepare for the train. Before I left, the President had returned and we had a few minutes further conversation. He was delighted at Balfour's comments, and seemed happy over the result of the evening's work.'

Colonel House's record of this conversation is interesting not merely because it indicates clearly that the existence of the secret treaties was discussed, but also because the Presi- dent evidently did not think it worth while to make an issue of the topic. The discussion, like that of House with Balfour two days before, was not based upon the treaties, but rather upon the most satisfactory settlement that could be arranged

50 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

to ensure peace. House had already told Balfour that he regarded Allied plans as expressed in the treaties as "bad/ and Wilson, who did much of the talking, must have in- dicated his own preferences.

Some months later, at the time of the drafting of the Fourteen Points, President Wilson expressed concern over the promises made in the secret treaties, particularly in the Treaty of London. Aware of his misgivings, Sir William Wiseman informed Mr. Balfour, who wrote at some length to the President regarding Allied obligations.

Mr. A. J. Balfour to President Wilson

LONDON, January 30, 1918 MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I gather from a message sent by Wiseman that you would like to know my thoughts on the Italian territorial claims under the treaty of London concluded in 1915.

That treaty (arranged of course long before I was at the Foreign Office) bears on the face of it evident proof of the anxiety of the Allies to get Italy into the war, and of the use to which that anxiety was put by the Italian negotiators. But a treaty is a treaty; and we — I mean England and France (of Russia I say nothing) — are bound to uphold it in letter and in spirit. The objections to it indeed are obvious enough: It assigns to Italy territories on the Adri- atic which are not Italian but Slav; and the arrangement is justified not on grounds of nationality but on grounds of strategy.

Now I do not suggest that we should rule out such argu- ments with a pedantic consistency. Strong frontiers make for peace; and though great crimes against the principle of nationality have been committed in the name of 'strategic necessity,' still if a particular boundary adds to the stability of international relations, and if the populations concerned be numerically insignificant, I would not reject it in defer-

WILSON AND THE SECRET TREATIES 51

ence to some a priori principle. Each case must be con- sidered on its merits.

Personally, however, I am in doubt whether Italy would really be strengthened by the acquisition of all her Adriatic claims; and in any case it does not seem probable that she will endeavour to prolong the war in order to obtain them. Of the three west-European belligerents she is certainly the most war-weary; and if she could secure peace and 'Italia

Irredenta9 she would, I believe, not be ill satisfied

Yours very sincerely

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

P.S. I shall always be delighted to answer with complete frankness any question you care to put to me. But this I think you know already.

It it thus quite certain that the President was informed of the character of the secret treaties and was entirely aware of the difference between his own peace programme and that of the Allies. At the time of the Balfour Mission he may have expected that in the end American influence at the Peace Conference would be sufficient to eliminate the treaties as practical factors in the settlement. Writing to Colonel House, a few weeks later, President Wilson in- timated strongly that American economic power would be such that the Allies must perforce yield to American pressure and accept the American peace programme: England and France, he wrote, have not the same views with regard to peace that we have by any means. When the war is over we can force them to our way of thinking.1

If President Wilson regarded the secret treaties as of small ultimate consequence, it is not surprising that at the moment when we entered the war he refused to make an issue of them.2

1 Wilson to House, July 21, 1917. f See appendix to this chapter.

52 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

IV

In the mean time Colonel House found opportunity, be- fore his return to New York, to come into contact with most of the members of the missions, French as well as British.

'April 29, 1917: At one o'clock, Frank Polk, Miss Bones, Miss Brennan and I drove to the Navy Yard to board the Mayflower, which Secretary Daniels had commissioned to take the French and British Missions to Mount Vernon. In addition to the personnel of the Missions the members of the Cabinet were present. I was busy from the time I boarded the ship until I returned, with discussions with different people.

'The most interesting person aboard was Marshal Joffre

'April 30, 1917: This has been a day filled with important work. . . . State Department officials, Cabinet members, etc., etc. Conversations with the French and British Mis- sions. . . .

'I lunched at the French Embassy. The other guests besides the Ambassador and Madame Jusserand ^vere, Marshal Joffre, Viviani, Admiral Chochresprat, Henry White, Myron T. Herrick, Marquis de Chambrun, Frank Polk. Before lunch there was a very pretty ceremony. The household servants and some neighborhood children brought flowers to Joffre and presented him with a small souvenir. He thanked them in a few sentences.

'My next engagement was with Sir Eric Drummond, which we filled by a drive. Since our last talk he had thought of Viscount Grey of Fallodon as a special envoy to the United States to remain indefinitely. This I considered an admirable suggestion. He wondered whether Grey would accept It would mean that they would have a repre- sentative of the British Government here with whom I

CONFERENCE WITH MARSHAL JOFFRE 53

believed the President would talk as frankly as to a member of our own Government. . . .

'We arranged to keep in constant communication and I urged him to let us know of any difficulties which might arise, or of any annoyance however petty which might come up and would not be known unless he dealt frankly with us.

* My next engagement was with 6mile Hovelaque.1 This also was filled by a drive with him through Rock Creek Park. . . .

'Hovelaque told of how serious conditions were in France and how necessary it was to send our troops at once. The Allies seem to be pretty much at the end of their tether, and it is to be hoped Germany is in an even more depleted condi- tion

'I went to Henry White's residence, where the French Mission is quartered, and was shown into the Marshal's room; where we had our conference. Joffre began by saying that he was anxious to explain the condition of France and how necessary it was for American soldiers to be sent over at once. He thought he could put them in condition to go to the front within five weeks after they arrived, provided they knew the rudiments of military tactics. He merely wanted them to be disciplined and to know the manual of arms.

'To me Joffre looks more of the German than the French type. He must have been quite blonde when young. His hair is now so streaked with gray that it is difficult to know its original color. His eyes are peculiar and, to me, the most striking feature he has. He seems to have a well ordered mind, and appears to be the type of General well suited to the French in the time of stress which they were under when he was in general command. I constantly compared him, in my own mind, to General Grant. I told him this, and he seemed not displeased at the comparison

'The French have used bad judgment in sending envoys

1 Of the French Mission.

54 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

here who cannot speak English, for it makes it impossible for us to have as complete an understanding with them as with the English. One hesitates to trust entirely an interpreter. I can see more and more clearly the danger of friction be- tween the Allies. Distrust lies close beneath the surface, and a little difference between them would bring it from under cover. This danger is not being well guarded. The Japa- nese, Russians, and Italians are being left out of English, French, and American calculations. As far as one can see, they do not appear at any of the functions in Washington except the larger ones, and there is a lack of Russian, Japa- nese, and Italian flags which might easily hurt sensibilities. The British and ourselves are not unlike the Germans in that our manner indicates that other nations do not much matter.'

On the evening of April 30 Colonel House returned to New York, but at Wilson's suggestion arrangements were made for him to continue conversations with members of the Allied Missions. What the President chiefly desired was an understanding regarding the tone of public statements that might be issued with the purpose of affecting opinion in Germany. It was also important to discuss the general sense of any replies that might be made to future peace proposals. He did not intend to bind himself to approve Allied policies, but he did wish to know what was in the minds of the British and French. He was certainly in com- plete agreement with Allied determination to achieve the ' defeat of Germany,' but he wanted to know exactly what was meant by the phrase. What did ' security against Ger- man aggression' connote? Must the war be carried to the point of breaking up the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires? He was anxious not to permit belligerent emotion to cloud common sense and he desired calmly to balance the relative advantages of minimum and maximum war aims in the light

CONFERENCE WITH BALFOUR 55

of the price that must be paid in human lives and material wealth.

On all these matters agreement between the President and House was so complete that he knew that his own point of view would be clearly explained by Colonel House to Mr. Balfour, and the conference would have the advantage of being entirely unofficial

'May 8, 1917: The usual telephone calls,' wrote House, 'have come from Washington and elsewhere. Wiseman had word from Washington that Balfour will lunch with us on Sunday. I have also arranged to dine with the British Ambassador Saturday and have Sir Eric Drummond for tea Sunday. This will give satisfactory conferences with all of them. . . .

'There is not much satisfaction talking with the French, for fhe reason they are not clothed with any authority, and are merely here to tell of France's needs and to express her appreciation of our entrance into the war. With Balfour it is different. He is Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of our most powerful ally and it may be that he will figure largely at the peace conference

' May 13, 1917 : The main business of the day was my con- ference with Balfour. He came for lunch and remained until four o'clock, giving us ample time to go over the inter- national situation. At lunch we discussed the impossibility of distinguished visitors getting the true American feeling or spirit because of the kind of people they necessarily met and the limited area of the country they visited. I told of the South and the West and of their sturdy and silent patriotism, and how they would quietly make ready for the struggle upon which we have embarked

'There was no one at the table excepting Balfour and my- self. After lunch we adjourned to my study. We decided we ought to have some understanding as to each other's minds

56 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

regarding the inauguration of peace measures. Germany at any time might make a tentative offer. . . .'

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, May 13, 1917

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Mr. Balf our took lunch with me to-day and we had a very interesting talk.

I suggested that it would be well to use his influence to- wards limiting the members of the peace conference to a minimum and I expressed the hope that you would consent to go from here as our only representative. He concurred in the wisdom of having a body small enough for it not to be unwieldy.

I asked him what would be his inclination in the event Germany made a tentative offer of peace on the basis of the status quo ante. He thought it would largely depend upon the condition of the U-boat warfare and also upon the condi- tion of Russia, France, and Italy.

It was my opinion that we ought not to let our desires run away with our judgment in the matter of making peace. For instance, if Turkey and Austria were willing to break away from Germany, or were willing to force Germany to make peace, I thought certain concessions should be made to them other than what we would have in mind in the event we had our complete will. He agreed to this.

He also agreed to the proposal that there should be no insistence that the makers of the war should be punished before a settlement had been even tentatively discussed.

He asked me to express to you his very great appreciation of your coming to Congress to hear him speak. He under- stands what an unprecedented compliment it was and is deeply moved. . . .

He is very happy over his visit and considers it a great success from every viewpoint.

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR (now Earl of Balfour)

A DRIVE ON GERMAN MORALE 57

Some time ago I had a letter from Page proposing that we start a propaganda in England to improve the feeling to- wards us. I spoke to Balfour about this and suggested that it would be better if this were done by the English them- selves. He agreed to take it up with his government and see that it was properly done.1

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

The British were evidently conscious that the question of sincere German peace offers was for the moment quite out- side the circle of practical possibilities. They responded more quickly to the suggestion that a concerted and con- tinual drive should be made on German morale. House believed that to break the belligerent spirit behind the lines was as important as to defeat the armies; this result could be attained, he felt, by constant repetition of the note which Wilson struck in his war speech of April 2 : that the war was waged by the Entente and America for the liberation of all peoples, Germans included, and that the Allies had no quarrel with the German people, no desire to dismember Germany; with the German military autocracy, however, the Allies would never deal. On May 20 House discussed this policy with Sir Eric Drummond, who promised to draft a memorandum embodying these principles so far as they met the views of the Foreign Office.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, May 20, 1917 DEAR GOVERNOR:

Sir Eric Drummond has been here for two days. We have gone over the situation of the Central Powers and he has given me the views of his Foreign Office on many points

1 This letter was answered on the telephone by the President, who ap- proved its general tenor.

58 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

I convinced Drummond that the most effective thing we could do at present was to aid the German liberals in their fight against the present German Government.

The idea is for you to say, at a proper time and occasion, that the Allies are ready at any moment to treat with the German people, but they are not ready to treat with a mili- tary autocracy — an autocracy which they feel is responsible for the troubles that now beset the world. It is not fair to the peoples of Russia, of Great Britain, of France, of Italy, and of the United States to be asked to treat with a military caste that is in no way representative of the German people themselves.

Both Drummond and I think that care should be used not to include the Kaiser. He has a very strong personal follow- ing in Germany, and if he is shorn of his power ... he could be rendered harmless. In not designating the Kaiser, the hands of the liberals will be strengthened because there is an element in Germany that would like to see a democratic Germany under a limited monarchy. The situation in Russia will accentuate the feeling that it is better not to make a too violent change from an autocracy to a repub- lic *

Ills* ...

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

The draft statement of policy agreed upon by Sir Eric and Colonel House, which, according to a note of Colonel House of May 23, was approved by Mr. Balfour, began by declaring that the United States and the Allies were determined to carry on the struggle until the aims set out by President Wilson were secured. America would spare neither treasure nor life, no matter how long the war continued. In 1918 there would be a million and a half American soldiers on the

1 This letter also was answered by the President on the telephone in a tone of general approval.

THE HOUSE-DRUMMOND MEMORANDUM 59

Western Front.1 But, although the Allies would never aban- don the 'cause of democracy and civilization,' and Germany could never hope for a favorable decision by force of arms, the Allies were ready to declare, as before, that they had no quarrel with the German people, no desire to dismember Germany.

The points outlined in the House-Drummond memoran- dum deserve careful appraisal, since they formed the basis for the public statements of President Wilson during the remainder of the war: Peace to the German people, endless war on German militarism. Unquestionably the attempt to differentiate between the Germans and their Government, unpopular as it was and fruitless as it seemed at the time, served finally to weaken German morale, the collapse of which, according to Ludendorff , explains the sudden charac- ter of the final surrender. The possibilities of this policy were perceived by Lord Northcliffe, who in the following spring organized at Crewe House the most effective scheme of propaganda known to modern history. Ceaselessly he poured into Germany the idea that unless the people re- pudiated the old regime, their own ruin would be linked with that of the Hohenzollerns. It acted as a subtle cor- rosive which ultimately ate away the German 'will to victory.'

The Balfour Mission slipped quietly out of New York, across the Canadian border, and back to England. The French and the Italians shortly followed. It yet remained to be seen whether practical working agencies could be evolved capable of directing the strength of America into the channels of assistance most necessary to the Allies. The

1 It is important to note that as early as May, 1917, as here indicated, President Wilson determined to send over so large an American expedi- tionary force.

60 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

Missions represented the first attempt to secure coordina- tion between the United States and the Allies, and it was not unnatural that they did not succeed immediately in estab- lishing effective cooperation; the task was one which would require long months of experiment.

The Missions, none the less, did go far to create the cordial atmosphere essential to whole-hearted cooperation. Most important of all, perhaps, they made possible a frank interchange of personal opinion which facilitated the settle- ment of many delicate questions such as are bound to disturb the official relations of even the most friendly governments. The Balfour Mission, in particular, established a close liaison between the British and the Americans that con- tinued throughout the war.

Sir Eric Drummond to Colonel House

LONDON, July 10, 1917

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE :

I am afraid that we have been overwhelming you with numerous telegrams on various subjects since we got back, but you were so kind to us on the Mission and definitely asked me to refer to you if any difficulties arose, that we have been emboldened to take what is perhaps an undue advantage of your kindness.

The visit to the United States really has done Mr. Balfour good physically, and he is much less tired than when he started from here. I need not tell you how happy he was in your country nor how much he appreciated the pleasure of seeing you again.

I would like further to say that he formed a very great

personal regard and admiration for the President You

know how well the two men got on together and I think I may say how mutual their respect for each other was

I trust that you are well and that your many cares are not placing too great a strain upon you. I do not like to

WILSON AND THE SECRET TREATIES 61

contemplate what the position might be if we were deprived, even for a short time, of your counsel and assistance. Yours very sincerely

ERIC DRUMMOND

APPENDIX

The problem of the extent to which officials of the United States knew of the existence and the content of the secret treaties has always been one of a controversial nature. President Wilson in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 19, 1919, stated that he had no knowledge of the secret treaties as a whole before he reached Paris: 'The whole series of understandings were disclosed to me for the first time then.1 He further stated that he was not informed of the Treaty of London. Senator Johnson recited the list of various treaties, including the Treaty of London, the agreement with Rumania, the vari- ous agreements with reference to Asia Minor, and asked: 'Did you have any knowledge prior to the conference?' To which the President replied: 'No, sir, I can confidently answer that "No" in regard to myself.'

It is difficult to reconcile this statement with available evidence. On March 4, 1918, Mr. Balfour, in reply to a question in the House of Com- mons as to whether copies of the secret treaties had been sent to the President, replied ' that President Wilson is kept fully informed by the Allies.' On May 16, 1918, Mr. Balfour stated in the House of Commons: ' I have no secrets from President Wilson. Every thought that I have in the way of diplomacy connected with the war is absolutely open to Presi- dent Wilson.' Furthermore, in a private letter to Colonel House, written July 17, 1922, permission to publish which is now authorized, he states in reference to a discussion of the secret treaties by Mr. R. S. Baker: 'He [Mr. Baker] was certainly wrong in his statement that Mr. Wilson was kept in ignorance by me of the secret treaties, an error which I feel the more acutely, because it is a calumny which, if I remember rightly, I have already publicly contradicted.' The clearest evidence of Mr. Bal- four's frankness with President Wilson is to be found in his letter of January 30, 1918, above quoted; this shows that, upon receiving informa- tion from Sir William Wiseman to the effect that President Wilson was disturbed by the content of the Treaty of London, Mr. Balfour immedi- ately wrote him regarding it.

The papers of Colonel House confirm this evidence. They indicate that Mr. Balfour and Colonel House discussed the secret treaties, and that in the conference with President Wilson which followed 'exactly the same ground was covered.' The question of the Far East was not raised and there is nothing to show that either Colonel House or the President knew anything of the understanding between the Allies and Japan regarding Shantung. Secretary Lansing stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he learned in 1917 of the projected division of the German Islands in the Pacific, but nothing about Shantung.

62 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

Although it seems clear that President Wilson knew of the Treaty of London in 1917,'it is possible that, after reaching Paris two years later and following the turmoil of the Conference, he may have confused the date of his hearing of this Treaty with the date of hearing of the under- standing with Japan regarding Shantung. All these agreements were loosely lumped together under the caption 'Secret Treaties.' At no time did the President take them very seriously, since the peace settlement was determined by the active forces at Paris and not by the secret treaties, which in every case were seriously modified. It is possible that Mr. Wilson had been early advised of the existence of the agreement with Japan, but forgot the fact, as it was crowded out of his mind by the influx of an astounding amount of detail, and thus failed to recollect the date when several years later he was suddenly questioned on the subject by the Foreign Relations Committee. Such confusion of mind, in the circumstances, may reasonably account for his statement that he knew nothing of the Treaty of London before he reached Paris.2 The following is the conclusion of Colonel House.8

4 1 disagree with the critics of President Wilson, both regarding his testimony before the Senate Committee as to when he first had know- ledge of the secret treaties, and in the matter of his apparent lack of appreciation of their importance.

'It is doubtful whether he knew of the treaty with Japan until he reached Paris. I cannot recall having such knowledge myself and my papers do not indicate that either of us knew. The President may have had that treaty in mind when questioned by the Senate Committee, or it may be that he forgot the date when the information first reached him. There was nothing to be gained by a misstatement, and it is clear to me that he spoke from conviction.

'There was no man living at that time who had more varied informa- tion and misinformation brought to him than President Wilson. How could he on the spur of the moment know when he first heard of this or that?

'There are those who believe the President laid too little stress upon the treaties and that he should have had some understanding with the Allies regarding them before he committed the United States to war. This was not practicable. We had our own quarrel with Germany, and if he had waited until he could have gotten a satisfactory understanding regarding the secret treaties the war would have been over before we entered the lists. England and France might have come to a quick decision, but, of necessity, they would have had first to reach an agree- ment with Japan, Italy, and Russia. Could any satisfactory agreement have been reached with them? I doubt it. Meanwhile, Germany would

1 In 1918 the Treaty of London, published by the Bolshevists and re- printed by the Manchester Guardian, was public property.

1 His testimony was given barely a month before his complete physical and nervous collapse.

• In a letter of April 9, 1928 to C. S.

WILSON AND THE SECRET TREATIES 63

have sunk our ships and we should have been standing idly by, waiting for a termination of negotiations regarding the secret treaties.

* As it was, the United States entered the war promptly and efficiently, but as an associate Power, uncommitted to any agreements made be- tween the Allies. Our hands were untied and we were free to do as we would at the peace table. If any criticism is to be made, should it not be of what we failed to do there, and not what we failed to do before we entered the war?'

CHAPTER III TARDIEU AND NORTHCLIFFE

These people are getting deeply into the war and are most resolute. Lord Northdiffe to Lord Rothermere, from New York, September 7, 1917

I

THE difficulties of waging war successfully by means of a coalition may be studied in any history. It is impossible to secure absolute unity of political or military action, and even imperfect coordination of a sort between the governments and armies of allied powers demands a variety of mutual sacrifices which few are willing to make except in the face of compelling peril. These difficulties were experienced by the European allies in their struggle against the Central Powers and never entirely overcome. It was all the more difficult to achieve coordinated action with the United States, which refused to accept the responsibilities of a treaty of alliance and insisted upon keeping its freedom of decision unrestricted.

The Balfour and Viviani Missions did not establish, did not indeed attempt to establish, machinery of coordination. They created, however, an atmosphere of mutual under- standing which proved of political importance; this was espe- cially true in the case of Anglo-American relations. President Wilson was acutely aware of the need of frank interchange of opinion and he was particularly pleased by the directness of Mr. Balfour's attitude during his conferences with the President and House. It was natural that he should ask Colonel House to develop his personal relations with the British, so that there might be informal means of exchanging facts and opinions with a frankness that would not always be possible between official departments of even the most

DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH LONDON 65

friendly nations. Sir William Wiseman thus describes the arrangements that were necessary.

* Colonel House foresaw the serious delays which would occur if communication was held through the ordinary diplo- matic channels, and realized the appalling difficulty of President Wilson's cooperating usefully with the Allies at a distance of more than three thousand miles, especially as it was impossible to have any one in Europe who could speak authoritatively for the American Government without refer- ence back to Washington. Balfour also dreaded the delays which must inevitably occur. In discussing this vital ques- tion, Colonel House arranged, with the President's approval, that Balfour should cable in a special British Government code direct to me in New York, and that I should make it my chief duty to attend to these cables and bring them im- mediately to Colonel House, who could telephone them over a private wire to the State Department or to President Wilson. In this way Balfour, speaking for the British Gov- ernment, could get an answer from President Wilson, if nec- essary, within a few hours. This would have been utterly im- possible had the communications gone through ordinary diplomatic channels/

An obvious example of the frankness with which opinions could be exchanged is to be found in a discussion which Colonel House began during the visit of the Balfour Mission and continued after its return to Great Britain. It concerned no less delicate a topic than the relative strength of the British and American navies. Historically it is chiefly of interest not because it affected the course of the war, but rather in the light of subsequent negotiations which became of the first importance after the Armistice and the close of the Wilson Administration.

The provisions of the Navy Bill passed by Congress in

66 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

1916 would, when carried into effect, make the United States Navy second only to that of Great Britain; indeed, in the opinion of various experts the reinforced American Navy would approximately equal that of the British in total strength.1 The immediate value of this increase in the American naval forces, however, was lessened by the empha- sis which the Navy Bill placed upon capital ships, whereas in the war against the German submarine the great need was lighter and swifter craft. The Allies asked, accordingly, that the United States postpone the building of capital ships in order to concentrate upon destroyers.

Since the United States desired above everything to bring effective assistance in the war against the submarine, they were anxious to meet this request. But they had also to con- sider what the ultimate effect would be upon their after-war naval strength if they neglected the building of capital ships. Would it be possible to enter into an arrangement with the British which would permit the United States to concentrate for the moment upon the building of destroyers and yet ensure the American Navy against the peril resulting from lack of capital ships, which, in the opinion of many experts, constituted the bulwark of naval strength? House raised the problem frankly with Balfour and Drummond. On May 13 he wrote in his diary:

'In talking with Drummond, I called attention to the Allied demand that we build submarine destroyers at the ex- pense of our major battleship programme. To do this would leave us at the end of the war where we are now, and in the event of trouble ... we would be more or less helpless at sea. I thought if Great Britain would agree to give us an option on some of her major ships in the event of trouble, ... we could go ahead with our destroyers without fear of subse- quent events.

1 This opinion was advanced at the Paris Peace Conference.

THE DESTROYER PROBLEM 67

'Drummond replied that Germany's navy might be left intact after the war and Great Britain might have need of all her fleet in a further war with Germany. In this event I suggested we give Great Britain an option to read that in case of war with Germany we would return the battleships which we had taken over, and would give her in addition an option on some of our major ships. He is to take it up with Mr. Balfour and let me know the result.'

Sir Eric Drummond to Colonel House

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1917

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

I have spoken to Mr. Balfour on the matter we discussed yesterday, and personally he welcomes your proposal most cordially. The subject is, however, of so great importance that he has thought it right to send a telegram to the Prime Minister to obtain his approval before proceeding further. I hope we shall have a reply within the next day or two, and if so I think Mr. Balfour may wish me to come at once to New York to discuss with you how best to take the next step. In any event I hope to be in New York again at the end of this week and will of course let you know as soon as I can make any definite plan. . . .

Yours very sincerely

ERIC DRUMMOND

No decision was made by the British until after the return of the Balfour Mission. Early in July House received from Mr. Balfour a cable which analyzed the problem in the light of the immediate submarine danger as well as of the future relations of the United States.

Mr. Balfour's cable stated that the possibility of a naval agreement to permit the United States safely to concentrate upon destroyers and light craft instead of capital ships had been carefully considered by the War Cabinet. It was of

68 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

vital importance, the British Admiralty believed, that the maximum number of destroyers be built. If the United States Government felt that its navy was likely to become dangerously unbalanced, the British Cabinet would be will- ing to consider some sort of defensive arrangement with the United States to meet the danger. Colonel House's proposal that the British agree to provide definite naval assistance to compensate for the unbuilt American capital ships was likely to raise, however, rather dangerous international issues. Mr. Balfour suggested therefore that the defensive agreement be made more general, and that the six major powers at war with Germany all enter into a naval agreement providing for mutual assistance against any maritime attack for a period of four years after the conclusion of the present war.1

Colonel House did not like the suggestion as well as his own plan providing that the British give the United States a definite option on certain British capital ships to be exer- cised in case of future trouble. Perhaps he feared lest the general defensive agreement should develop into something similar to a formal alliance that might arouse the opposition of American opinion. In Mr. Balfour's plan may be dis- covered the germ of the Naval Treaties of 1922, which were later concluded by the Harding Administration.

Colonel House to the President

MAGNOLIA, MASSACHUSETTS July 8, 1917

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I am enclosing a cable which I have just received from Balfour. I am sending it in duplicate so you will have a copy for the State Department. No one knows of these negotia- tions excepting Lansing and Polk

Breckinridge Long who is here to-day is taking this letter.

I cannot see that the solution Balfour suggests would be

1 Balfour to House, July 5, 1917.

THE DESTROYER PROBLEM 69

of much service excepting that it would prevent Japan from falling into the hands of Germany and forming a combina- tion against us.

In the event of trouble between Japan and ourselves, or other parties to the agreement, they would be forced to be neutral, or if there was war between any of the signatory powers, the others would necessarily be neutral.

That is not quite what we had in mind. I see no reason why our first proposal should not be accepted, and I see no reason why it should offend Japan or any other nation if known. What I suggested was that in view of our diverting government shipbuilding in our naval yards from the con- struction of capital battleships to that of vessels suitable for anti-submarine warfare, and the building of a merchant marine in order not to interrupt the supplying of the Allies with necessary materials for the continuation of the war, Great Britain should agree to give us an option on the pur- chase of such capital battleships as we might wish to replace those which we discontinued building because of our desire to aid them.

This would not be directed against Japan any more than it would be against France, Italy, Russia or even England herself.

Sir William Wiseman expects to return to England early next week and before going he will spend a day with me here. Will you not let me know your conclusions so I may discuss the matter with him and let him in turn take it up with his Government?

If the English are afraid of Germany, it seems to me it would be reasonable to include in the agreement a clause by which in the event of war between Germany and England, they might demand the return of these capital battle- • •

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

70 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

On July 13 President Wilson invited Wiseman to discuss outstanding problems before his visit to England; in the course of the conversation they came to the naval proposals of Balfour and House. Wilson was not enthusiastic in sup- port of either plan. He did not like the idea of anything approaching an alliance with the major European powers and Japan, even one limited in its scope to a purely defensive naval agreement. Nor did he agree with House that the question of capital ships was one of vital importance. The exigencies of the submarine war, he felt, would in any case lead to an emphasis upon the building of destroyers at the expense of capital ships; he seemed quite satisfied that this would not touch the effectiveness of the American navy after the war. Sir William's notes of this part of the conversation follow:

Wiseman Memorandum upon Conference with the President

July 13, 1917

'Wilson produced a memorandum from House regarding the proposed modification of the United States shipbuilding programme. Wilson said that he was not familiar with this proposition, and was therefore discussing it somewhat in the dark. In his own words — he was "thinking aloud to me." His observations were approximately as follows:

'That in his opinion the war had proved that capital ships were not of much value; that with this in view he did not consider the question of the United States delaying the building of capital ships as very important from a strategic point of view. He explained, however, that when Congress voted money for the naval programme, a specific estimate had to be made of the exact number of the different classes of ships upon which the money had to be spent. It would therefore be unlawful for him to change that programme and alter the number of ships to be built. The only way in which this could be done would be by laying the whole facts before Congress.

CONFERENCE OF WILSON AND WISEMAN 71

'When asked for a suggested solution [of the problem of defense against the submarine], he stated that he had always been opposed to allowing merchantmen to cross the Atlantic without convoy; that he was strongly in favor of forcing merchantmen to cross in fleets adequately protected by light naval craft. That he believed some such arrange- ment was now being put in force; that when the merchant- men reached some point near the British coast, lanes should be formed, strongly guarded by destroyers, through which the merchantmen could pass, and, again, when they were quite close to shore they should radiate to the various ports. He suggested that if some such scheme could be devised as an American scheme it would undoubtedly require a larger number of destroyers than the United States at present have, but that he could go to Congress with this scheme and ask for an appropriation specifically for this purpose. That as far as shipbuilding accommodation was concerned there would be no difficulty in delaying the building of capital ships and to make room for the laying down of destroyers, if necessary.

'With regard to Balfour's suggestion covering the naval shipbuilding difficulty by some species of defensive alli- ance:— Wilson stated that in his opinion the Allies had entered during the stress of war into various undertakings among each other which they would find it very difficult if not impossible to carry out when the war was over; and he was not in favor of adding to that difficulty. Moreover he pointed out that while the U.S. was now ready to take her place as a world-power, the strong feeling throughout the country was to play a "lone hand" and not to commit her- self to any alliance with any foreign power. With regard to Japan, Wilson said that in his opinion a successful attack on the Pacific coast was absurd owing to the long distance from the Japanese base and the difficulty they would have in ob- taining any suitable base on the Pacific coast. The possibil-

72 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

ity of their attacking the Philippines or some outlying posses- sion was, he thought, quite another matter, and presented a possibility which could not be overlooked/

Colonel House was not convinced that the day of the capital ship had passed. Until this was certified by naval experts he believed that it was the duty of the Administra- tion to provide full insurance for the defense of the United States. 'There may be something in the future,' he noted in his diary on July 14, 'but up to now Great Britain's success- ful blockade of Germany is maintained because she has a superiority in capital battleships/

Colonel House to the President

MAGNOLIA, MASSACHUSETTS July 17, 1917

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... I have a feeling that he [Wiseman] misunderstood you [concerning the value of capital battleships] for surely the present control of the seas is solely due to the superiority of the British Fleet in capital ships. No amount of smaller craft could take their place. While they are not effective in sub- marine warfare yet, submarine warfare is as distinct a phase of sea warfare as aircraft are in land warfare. I think it is true to-day as it was before the war that the nation having the most powerful capital battleships in both size and speed is the nation that will dominate the sea.

I hope you will insist upon some arrangement with Eng- land by which this country may obtain some of their capital ships at the end of the war, in the event we should wish them. The arrangement would be a safe one, for they need not be taken if not desired. I discussed this question thoroughly with Lord Fisher and other British naval men and there was no disagreement as far as I can remember.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

THE QUESTION OF CAPITAL SHIPS 73

To this letter the President returned no specific response, and the discussion lapsed during the summer. Late in Au- gust, in answer to an inquiry of Sir William Wiseman, who was then in England, House cabled that the 'capital ship ques- tion is lagging because of pressure of matters of immediate urgency/ But when Wilson came up to visit House on the North Shore in September the question was again raised, House emphasizing the need and value of capital ships, the President at once skeptical of their value and convinced of the impossibility of a satisfactory arrangement with the British.1 Colonel House thus describes the discussion with Wilson in his diary of September 9:

'After I had made an argument in favor of capital ships, he refused to discuss the question further, declaring that no matter whether I was right or he was right, it was impracti- cable to make an arrangement with Great Britain at this time looking to our securing some of her capital battleships after the war in consideration of our abandoning our ship- building programme of capital ships in order to build sub- marine destroyers. He thought the only thing that could be binding on Great Britain would be a treaty, and a treaty must necessarily go to the Senate for confirmation. He did not believe this country was prepared for a treaty of that sort with Great Britain. Anything less than a treaty he thought footless, because the present administration might change and the British Government might change, and what would a verbal agreement amount to under new administra- tions? I argued that an arrangement could be made which would meet the approval of our people. He in turn said if the British Government wanted to do this after the war, they would do it anyway, and if they did not want to do it, we had no means of making them short of a treaty. . . .'

1 British naval expert opinion supported Wilson rather than House, in so far as it declared that the American navy was already relatively strong in capital ships (except battle cruisers) and weak in the categories of fast light cruisers and destroyers.

74 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

Because of the imminence of the submarine peril and the representations of the Allies, the American naval authorities used the discretion left them by Congress to bend all their energies towards the building of light craft. Only two battle- ships, the Mississippi and New Mexico, were completed and commissioned while the United States was at war, and these had been started before we became a belligerent. The keels of two others, the Maryland and Tennessee, were laid before the armistice. 'Work on capital ships of the 1916 pro- gramme,' according to a Navy Department report, 'was virtually suspended during the period of the war in order to concentrate the facilities of the experienced shipbuild- ing plants upon the destroyer programme and other types needed to cope with the submarine problem.' l

When the war ended, of the ten battleships provided for by the 1916 programme, only two had been completed and nothing had been done on the six battle cruisers authorized by that programme. It is obviously a matter of conjecture or of expert opinion as to whether the American Navy was unduly weakened thereby during the months that elapsed before the conclusion of the Washington Treaties in 1922.

ii

The disagreement between the President and Colonel House over the question of capital ships did not affect ap-

1 Letter from Navy Department, July 29, 1926. 'Under Acts of Con- gress dated 4 March, 1917 and 6 October, 1917,' the letter adds, '235 destroyers, in addition to the 50 required by the 1916 programme were laid down; the contracts for six of these were subsequently cancelled, leaving 229 destroyers of the emergency programme which were actually completed. Of the 50 destroyers authorized in the 1916 programme, 38 were contracted for and built.

'During the period of the war, 6 April, 1917 to 11 November, 1918, 44 destroyers were completed. Of these the keels of five had been laid prior to April 6, 1917.

'No capital ships were built entirely within the period of the war. The building period of capital ships is materially longer than the 17 months period of actual hostilities.'

RELATIONS WITH SIR HORACE PLUNKETT 75

parently the former's confidence in House's judgment, for it was during this period that Wilson opened up to House all the sources of official information coming in to Washington and encouraged him to develop his personal relations with indi- viduals in Europe able to summarize unofficial opinion. House received long letters from our Ambassador in Rome, Thomas Nelson Page, Minister Egan in Copenhagen, and Counsellor Frazier in Paris. To him were sent copies of the cablegrams from our European embassies and legations to the State Department. He also received the personal im- pressions of Henri Bergson in France, of Sir Horace Plunkett in Ireland, and of such American journalists as Grasty and Ackerman.

Of the correspondence in House's files, nothing is more interesting than that with the great Irish statesman Plunk- ett. During his European visits in 1915 and 1916 Colonel House had developed the most intimate relations with Plunkett; the latter's knowledge of the United States, his close friendship with Mr. Balfour, his sympathetic under- standing of opinion on both sides of the Atlantic, enabled him to analyze the European situation in terms most useful for an American. In the days of American neutrality he had earnestly desired and assiduously labored to smooth Anglo- American relations. 'I hold,' he had written to House in December, 1916, 'that the best hope of a lasting peace lies in a right mutual understanding between the peoples of the American Republic and of the British Empire. For this reason I have, as you know, done my best to explain to our Government the difficulties of the President's position, which my long acquaintance with the Middle Western States has enabled me to understand. I wish to continue this slight service; and I should not have come across the Atlantic this year had I not wished to make it more efficient by further study of public opinion in those parts of your country which count most politically and of which least is known in England/

76 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

One of the most dangerous sources of Anglo-American dis- agreement has always existed in the problem of Ireland, and crises in the history of the Irish struggle for self-government have invariably been reflected in American politics. The 1916 rebellion and its suppression had been followed in the United States by expressions of anti-British sentiments, some of them upon the floor of the Senate itself. If general sympathy developed with the Sinn Fein movement, which grew rapidly after the executions of 1916, and if it stimulated strong anti-British feelings in the United States, the diffi- culties of Anglo-American cooperation in the war against Germany would be tremendously increased. In these circum- stances it was fortunate that Colonel House was in such close relations with the one Irishman of moderate views most capable of explaining the situation to President Wilson; especially fortunate was it that in the summer of 1917 Sir Horace Plunkett became chairman of the Irish Convention called to discover a reasonable settlement of the Irish ques- tion, and which sat all through the summer and autumn. With the approval of the British Government, Sir Horace was permitted to send Colonel House, for Wilson's information, the secret reports which he wrote of the Convention proceed- ings. These he amplified with personal letters and cables, of which the following is typical.

Sir Horace Plunkett to Colonel House

DUBLIN, September 28, 1917 MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

Sir William Wiseman conveyed to me a personal request from the President that I would keep him confidentially in- formed of the progress of the Irish Convention. At the same time I was commanded by the King to write a Secret Report for him, and I asked leave to make the same document serve the double purpose. I understand that the first two instal- ments of this Report were taken out by Sir William but, by

LETTER FROM SIR HORACE PLUNKETT 77

some accident, I was not informed, and only to-day have I learned from Arthur Balfour that I am free to send the further instalments to you for submission to the President. Three more have been printed and will, I hope, be sent to you by the Foreign Office at once. I am struggling to write the sixth, which will bring the story up to date ; but in the ex- treme pressure of Convention work it is hard to get the time.

Yesterday we ended a three days' sitting in Cork and brought the first stage of our proceedings to a conclusion. I was determined to make the Convention reveal its entire mind before I let it adjourn so that a thoroughly representa- tive Committee of workable size might try to agree upon a measure to be submitted to the whole body. ... In order to get a free expression of opinion, it was necessary to keep our deliberations absolutely secret. No stenographer is allowed to attend though one member of the Secretariat is an old newspaper reporter and gets down a good deal. But I need not add to what you will see in my Secret Report, unless to tell you that, on the whole, I am hopeful that we may get the Irish Question out of the way of your and the President's efforts to bring about a right mutual understanding between the two democracies.

I do wish you could send me, through a safe channel, your own view of the position and prospects of that great work. Medill McCormick spent a week-end with me a short time ago and gave me the only insight I had had into that part of the American situation which interested me most — the atti- tude of the Middle West towards the war. I always thought — and I think you knew — that this great silent community had been wholly misjudged — that they had more character and a higher idealism than was to be found in the better- known sections of the United States. All that McCormick told me certainly confirmed this judgment. Anything you can tell me about this and other matters will be most grate- fully received and, if it saved your time, which must be more

78 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

than ever occupied, I would send copies of the letter to Arthur Balfour and any other of the people whom you have taken into your confidence over here.

Please give my kindest remembrances to Mrs. House and believe me to be

Very sincerely yours

HORACE PLUNKETT

It thus came about that President Wilson was kept fully informed of the progress of the Irish crisis and the attempt to settle it. Upon the basis of this information he was able to resist the pressure brought upon him to sponsor protests against British policy in Ireland, which would certainly have ruined Anglo-American cooperation in the war. He was also able to intimate that while the Irish problem was none of America's official business, sympathy with Irish aspirations was so strong that Anglo-Ajnerican relations would never be entirely right until these aspirations were satisfied. At times the situation became critical in the extreme. As Plunkett wrote in the following April, 'It is all in the lap of the gods, who must be laughing or weeping according to their mood.' But at all times the President had the au- thoritative information which enabled him to avoid the pit- falls surrounding our relations with Great Britain.

m

When soon after the entrance of the United States into the war, the French and British Governments decided to send over special missions of coordination under Tardieu and Northcliffe respectively, it was natural that they should soon come into intimate contact with Colonel House. He was generally reported to be the man closest to the all-powerful President and his conferences with members of the Allied Governments during his European visits had revealed his influence. Officially he had nothing to do with the plans for

ANDR6 TARDIEU

THE TARDIEU MISSION 79

organizing Allied demands on the United States and the arrangements by which they were met and financed. His papers, however, give us a glimpse of certain aspects of the various problems, since the Allied Commissioners laid their difficulties before him and always kept him informed of the progress of negotiations that finally led to effective inter- allied cooperation. The Tardieu Mission arrived first, led by the distinguished journalist and historian, fresh from active service at the front, now entering upon a career of adminis- trative organization which culminated in his appointment upon the French Peace Commission and prepared him for entrance nine years later into Poincare's ministry of all the talents.

'On April 16, 1917, ten days after America had declared war/ writes Tardieu, 'it fell to my lot to direct on behalf of France our common effort. Actor and spectator for thirty- one months, I am still, ten years later, amazed at the pro- digious results obtained by the two countries. Ever- memorable days, when twice the war seemed lost; days pregnant with victory; days during which the initial effort of 1917, so weak and halting, grew beneath the spur of danger, grew by the progress of mutual understanding. . . . Astound- ing figures tell of the effort made, the help mutually fur- nished. In less than eighteen months the United States armed itself to the teeth An almost unbelievable achieve- ment if one remembers the past, the existing circumstances (both material and moral), the absence of military prepared- ness, the total ignorance of things European. During all this time, France and Great Britain held the front waiting for the arrival of American reinforcements, the one providing trans- port, the other arms for the United States Army The

splendour of this achievement led people to believe that it had been spontaneous. None had been more difficult/ l

1 Tardieu, France and America, 215.

80 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

Tardieu confesses that upon his arrival he found the pro- spect discouraging. It was for him to arrange a mechanism of coordination between the needs of France and the supply- power of the United States.

'The problem of cooperation/ he writes, 'how to pass from numbers to organization, from manufacture to armament, from inexperience to efficiency; and, in each of these, how to conciliate contrary necessities. The undertaking, every one admitted, might well have proved beyond human possibility. When I assumed responsibility for it, I knew that even those in whose name I was acting had no faith in its success. My Government, in bidding me God-speed, had said: "Do the best you can."' l

During the months that followed, Tardieu, assailed by the demands of his Government, strove with the problem of securing supplies for the French army at the moment that the United States was endeavoring to build up its own upon an unprecedented scale.2 As he wrote, 'Any shortcoming in

1 Tardieu, France and America, 217.

2 Tardieu (ibid., 224-25) gives the following examples of cabled orders sent from Paris to the French High Commission in Washington:

'May 27th, from Food Ministry: "The cereal supply is threatened. Rush shipments as quickly as possible."

'May 28th, from Ministry of Munitions: "Send 1000 lorries urgent."

'May 29th, from Transport Ministry: "Indispensable secure immedi- ately 30,000 tons shipping for food-supply devastated regions."

'June 3d, from Ministry of Munitions: "Increase shipments copper to 10,000 tons monthly."

'June 5th, from Ministry of Agriculture: "Send all haste 400 reapers binders."

'June 6th, from Ministry of Marine: "Send 12,000 tons gasoline for merchant marine and 24,000 tons for navy."

'June llth, from Ministry of Munitions: "Increase shipments nitrate to 46,000 tons monthly instead of 15,000. Vital for national defense. You must arrange for this in addition to programme."

'June 13th, from Ministry of Munitions: "Send 2000 tons of lead monthly."

'June 16th, from Ministry of Munitions: "Send 6500 small trucks/*

'June 16th, from Food Ministry: "Arrange for 80,000 tons wheat in excess of programme. Most serious situation ever. Any failure or delay may prove dangerous.999

CONVERSATION WITH M. TARDIEU 81

the adjustment of effort, any breakdown in the machinery

of supply, might have left our soldiers weaponless Day

after day the orders came over This list reads like a

nightmare. For how were all these demands to be met?' With the intensive submarine campaign, the British were forced to withdraw tonnage from the French service. 'On the docks in America, 600,000 tons of goods for France were

waiting their turn for shipment There was a shortage of

490,000 tons a month. That meant a shortage of everything that was essential in food supplies and war material, the things to eat and to fight with. And I was getting cables, "Ask the United States."' l

The Tardieu Mission reached Washington on May 17, and eight days later he called upon Colonel House, who thus records the beginning of what became a lasting friendship :

'May 25, 1917: Andr6 Tardieu, High Commissioner of France, called by appointment this afternoon. He brought letters of introduction from the French Ambassador and from our Paris Embassy. I told him he needed no introduc- tion, since he was well known as the author of the remarkable articles on the Agadir Incident which electrified the capitals of Europe. ... He wished to explain the needs of France, both from a military and an economic standpoint. I sug- gested that he write a letter covering the substance of our conversation. He is to write the letter to the President and send a copy of it to me. ... He seems to be an exceedingly able man and I do not doubt will serve his country well/

M. Andri Tardieu to Colonel House

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1917

MY DEAR COLONEL:

I was very sorry that I could not see you again in New York, last week, nor give you further information regarding our work here.

1 Tardieu, op. cit., 224.

82 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

The two essential questions are still the question of ton- nage — regarding which Mr. Denman said he could not set up any general plan earlier than within one or two weeks; and the question of the organization of war industries, regarding which it seems to me highly desirable that a final decision, which has been delayed as yet, should take place.

Through such delay a condition of uncertainty has been created as regards the American market, and the prices quoted for the orders which are now being placed by us are certainly excessive. On the other hand, I could not possibly stop our orders, there being no cessation of our needs.

I understand the reasons by which your Government's de- cision is being delayed. It seems absolutely necessary, how- ever, that such a decision should be made speedily. A satis- factory distribution of orders and the regularity of deliveries are unavoidably depending upon this decision.

The question is not less important from the point of view of prices. You told me that, in your opinion, the armies of the Allies ought to pay the same prices as the American army. M. McAdoo, when last in Washington, told me that he agreed upon this principle; that a general requisition law was not possible, though; but that by means of friendly negotiations he hoped that an equality of conditions could be achieved

As regards tonnage, I would like that the American Gov- ernment should promise now to let us have a definite propor- tion of the German tonnage seized in Brazil. I do not wish to start in Rio a negotiation which might counteract the negotiations of the U.S. Government. But it seems that by handling the matter yourselves alone in Rio, you could se- cure a certainty which would prove of great value in reference to our shipping within the next few months. I would like to know your own opinion regarding the matter.

As to military affairs two points, which I believe to be

LETTER FROM TARDIEU 83

essential, are still being held in suspense. In the present war there is no other way of learning the practice of war than making war. All school methods have been upset by the facts, and fighting is the only school of any value. I have been realizing that directly myself during my two years at the front.

Therefore, I deem it is of the utmost importance that a sufficient number of American officers (not including officers on General Pershing's Staff) should, as soon as possible, spend, in France, a period of three months with our fighting units (Infantry Divisions or Brigades, or Artillery Staffs) and provide, therefore, for the American troops, either in the United States or in France, instructors taught and trained by the reality of war.

To which Mr. Baker answers that you have only a small number of officers, which is true enough. But, by sending officers to be with our fighting units, you could within a few months secure a gain of one hundred per cent as regards the amount of time required for instruction.

Moreover, you could send over very soon young men from American universities who are now in the training camps; this would spare time as well. Two months at the front means more than six months in a training camp. You ought to bear always in mind that since 1914 we promoted to officers 85,000 privates, and that they have become excellent officers.

Such is the true method to be applied to a national and democratic army. We have been, ourselves, hesitating a long time before adopting it, on account of old routine traditions which were, on the whole, German doctrines. I wish that you might profit by our own mistakes

I am looking forward, my dear Colonel, to your coming some time to Washington, and I beg you to be good enough to let me know about it.

I was so highly pleased with our conversation last week,

84 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

that I would be glad if we could meet again, as you can do much towards bringing about our common victory. I am, my dear Colonel, with highest regard, Very truly yours

ANDR£ TARDIEU

IV

Shortly after Tardieu's arrival, House received word from Sir Cecil Spring-Rice that the British Government had also decided to send a War Mission to the United States for the coordination of British war activities. As chief of the Mis- sion they selected no less a person than Lord Northcliffe, who was qualified for this difficult task as much by his super- abundant energy as by his conviction that American re- sources were necessary to turn the scales of war in favor of the Allies. His functions were outlined in a memorandum which Wiseman gave to House on May 31.

Memorandum upon Proposed War Mission

'The War Cabinet think it desirable to have some system of generally supervising and coordinating the work of the representatives of the various British departments in the United States who are employed there on matters connected with shipping, food supply, munitions, and War Office and Admiralty business. If there is no such coordination, the representatives of these departments would waste much valuable time and power, and especially would interfere with each other by mutual competition.

' In view of these circumstances and of this danger which the War Cabinet consider as serious, they consider it essen- tial that for some months to come they should have in the United States an energetic and influential man of good busi- ness capacity and wide knowledge for purposes of general supervision and coordination. Mr. Balfour's mission has done excellent work, but it is strongly felt that much still

LORD NORTHCLIFFE'S MISSION 85

remains to be done, especially with a view to bringing home to the United States Government the realities of the present war situation, and the necessity of immediate active and strenuous cooperation in the war, with the least delay possible.

'The War Cabinet therefore proposed that they should have a representative in the United States charged with the duty of ensuring to the best of his ability that all possible measures are taken in order to render America's resources available in the most effective manner and with the least possible delay.

'He would have no diplomatic duties. Diplomatic rela- tions would remain in the same hands as heretofore, and the War Cabinet representative would apply to the British Em- bassy should he require diplomatic support for the purpose of carrying out the duties connected with his mission.

'In the opinion of the War Cabinet Lord Northcliffe is suited for such an appointment, and they propose mak- ing the appointment at once with the duties above enumer- ated '

Northcliffe arrived early in June and remained in the United States until November, perhaps the darkest period of the war and certainly the most confused and discouraging from the standpoint of America's war effort. The cables which he sent to the British War Cabinet, copies of many of which he gave to Colonel House, reflect the same diffi- culties which Tardieu had to face.

A nation like the United States, unaccustomed to central- ized control and unprepared for war contingencies, could not in the nature of things suddenly attempt to place itself upon a belligerent footing without producing confusion. It was the business of the Allied agencies in the United States to stimu- late America to increased production, which of itself led to more confusion; they must also secure for themselves all the

86 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

supplies possible, and they must persuade the United States Treasury to lend them the money to pay for them. They found themselves competing with each other, since Allied demands were as yet uncoordinated, and frequently with the United States Government itself, which requisitioned ships, raw materials, and manufactured products upon which the Allied agents counted. They faced the prospect of increased prices, since there was as yet no centralized control over American industries. They must avoid all friction, since they were dependent upon the good temper of the American Treasury. On the other hand, the American Treasury had no safe guide as to which loans were most essential nor as to how priority should be determined.

To this task Northcliff e brought interminable energy and complete disregard of the impossible, gilded with never- failing good temper. 'You may rely upon me never to use minatory language,' Northcliffe cabled to Mr. Balfour towards the close of his mission. "I have been dealing with these people for thirty years. Nothing can be gained here by threats, much by flattery and self-abnegation.' With all his experience in a life well stocked with problems, he confessed that he had never confronted a task crammed with so many difficulties. "The task is immense,' he cabled home, 'and ever growing. I have never worked so hard before.'

Northcliffe was fully convinced of the vital importance of bringing the whole strength of the United States to bear upon the settlement of the war; he constantly impressed upon the British War Cabinet the need of arranging the closest sort of cooperation with America.

Lord Northcliffe to Mr. Winston Churchill

[Cablegram]

NEW YORK, July 27, 1917

I have long believed war can only be won from here. The position is most difficult and delicate. Sir William Wiseman,

FRIENDSHIP WITH NORTHCLIFFE 87

Chief of our Military Intelligence here, should reach England in a few days. He is the only person, English or American, who has access to Wilson and House at all times. He had an hour and a half with Wilson last week and a day with House. The Administration is entirely run by these two men. Wilson's power is absolute and House is a wise assist- ant. Both are pro-English.

NORTHCLIFFE

House and Northcliffe came into touch soon after the latter's arrival, and there began a personal friendship which lasted until the latter's death. On his visits to England, House had met the great publisher casually, but evidently failed to take true measure of his size. He was soon to con- fess that he had been mistaken in his earlier estimate:

* Northcliffe has never received the credit due him in the winning of the war,' wrote House after the Peace Conference. 'He was tireless in his endeavors to stimulate the courage and energy of the Allies, and he succeeded in bringing them to a realization of the mighty task they had on their hands. He was among the first to grasp the significance of President Wilson's philippic against the German military autocracy, and the distinction he made between the Junkers and the German people. He caused these utterances of the American President to be sent into Germany by countless thousands, and did more than any single man, other than Wilson him- self, to break down the enemy's morale behind the lines.9

The references to Northcliffe in House's papers in the summer of 1917 all reflect increasing admiration and affec- tion. 'Northcliffe is doing good work,' he cabled to England on August 11, 'and is getting along well with every one.'

'When Northcliffe left,' House wrote in his diary two days later, 'I asked Pollen l his opinion of his ability. He said he

1 A. H. Pollen, naval expert and critic.

88 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

knew Northcliffe well and liked him That his talent con- sisted in the newspaperman's instinct to know where to go for advice. I do not agree with him in this estimate. I think Northcliffe's success is due to his force more than to anything else. He is a dominating man with boundless energy. I like him the more I see of him/

'He does what he promises,' House wrote two months later, towards the close of Northcliffe's mission, 'and he rings true.*

Lord Northcliffe, on his side, evidently placed full con- fidence in House and found it advisable to seek his counsel and aid. He cabled Wiseman on August 26 of a certain mat- ter that demanded speed: 'I am doing everything through House, who acts remarkably quickly. For example yester- day, on leaving Washington at four o'clock, I sent him a message through Miller,1 and on my arrival at New York at nine o'clock I found a reply message awaiting me.' Sir Campbell Stuart, Military Secretary to the British War Mis- sion, who, through tact and keen appreciation of all the elements in a difficult situation, contributed largely to its success, writes as follows:

'Lord Northcliffe worked in close touch with Colonel House. He told me that he regarded him as one of the wisest men he had ever met. Through him he kept in communica- tion with the Administration. In addition he received very great assistance from Sir William Wiseman, the head of the British Intelligence Service in the United States.' 2

Northcliffe brought to House copies of many of his most important reports so that he might make clear the difficulties of cooperation; he brought also matters which demanded the immediate notice of President Wilson and which might be

1 David Hunter Miller.

* Manuscript memorandum given to C. S. by Sir Campbell Stuart.

THE REQUISITIONING OF BRITISH SHIPS 89

delayed if they went through the regular official channels. This was true of the important analysis of the submarine situation in August, and of the acute crisis that resulted when the United States began to take over the output of the shipyards, even requisitioning tonnage already contracted for by the Allies.

Lord Northcliffe to Colonel House

NEW YORK, August 3, 1917

DEAR COLONEL HOUSE,

I have received a cablegram from Sir W. saying that my Government have at length prepared an analysis giving the facts about the submarine losses, presumably for presenta- tion to the President.

Would you kindly give me your advice as to whether I should submit it to you for your consideration and report to the President, or whether I should take it myself direct to him.1

I have just returned from being well broiled at Washing- ton. I was rather amused to find that the subject of the heat there is rather like that of earthquakes at San Francisco, and the local papers had the audacity to suggest that the District of Columbia as regards the heat question is no wickeder than any other part of the United States.

With kind regards to Mrs. House,

Yours sincerely

NORTHCLIFFE

NEW YORK, August 25, 1917 MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE,

Our people are evidently very agitated about this most delicate and difficult question of the British ships now build- ing here. The Censor is wisely stopping reference to it in the

1 The memorandum was taken direct to the President and a copy sent to House.

90 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

English newspapers, but that it will be raised in Parliament is very obvious. That it will create a very bad impression in Europe is equally obvious. Is there not some possible com- promise? . . .

My instructions are to point out that my Government will keenly feel the blow, which will be a very serious one to England, if these ships are taken over by your Government.

In the belief that the ships would not be transferred, public statements have been made by the Prime Minister in which these ships have been included in his estimates of British tonnage.

In view of the losses already sustained, the large propor- tion of our tonnage in direct war services and the complete subordination of our trade through war necessities, we can- not replace these vessels from British sources, and their loss must embarrass our military and naval activities.

It is important that the United States Government should realize that we made arrangements to buy vessels before the United States entered the war and that we stopped directly such purchases might have become embarrassing to United States.1

1 The requisitioning of these ships naturally created a serious and an unpleasant situation, and aroused warm protests especially from the Australians. It raised the question of prestige, an additional complica- tion in the problem of cooperation. Thus the offer of the United States to lease the requisitioned vessels to Australia, on condition that they carried the American flag and American crews, was unsatisfactory, since in the mind of Premier Hughes of Australia it would be a 'blow against the naval and maritime supremacy of the British Empire/ Of greater immediate significance was the fear lest such requisitioning should form a precedent.

'It is the opinion of influential people in Washington,9 cabled North- cliff e to Wiseman on August 26, 'that having made no provision for war, the American Government may take advantage of various contracts we have here, to supply their army and navy with what they want. I be- lieve that neither the President nor House like this sort of thing, and I am hoping to get some kind of compromise about the ships so as to avoid the establishment of a precedent of confiscation/

The vigorous protests of the Allies succeeded in saving a portion of the requisitioned tonnage.

COMPETITION FOR AMERICAN SUPPLIES 91

My Government places itself entirely in the hands of the President Yours sincerely

NORTHCLIFFE

Even more difficult were the problems resulting from com- petition with the other Allies for securing American supplies. They did not present their demands as a coordinated unit, and what they secured often seemed to them to depend upon chance. Northcliffe, as a veteran journalist with perfect faith in the value of news, believed that the British were at a disadvantage because they failed to emphasize the im- portance of Great Britain's military effort. Extracts from his cables indicate the close connection in his mind between complete war news and American supplies.

'August 15, 1917 : X and Y,' he wrote, ' are naturally work- ing for themselves. . . . They visit House about once a

month We have no British Military Representative who

has seen anything of the war. The American soldiers in France write home only about the French army. Nothing is heard of our fleet. House assured me that the President was absolutely aware of the great part we had played in the war.

* House said : "You ought to send to Washington a British soldier of high distinction and war experience. We don't want a military mission, but it would be advantageous to us if you send such an officer and if he were afterwards reen- forced by officers in various branches of the service with technical experience gained recently in the field." l

'All this has a direct bearing on the money situation and upon McAdoo's position before Congress.2

1 Sir Henry Wilson, who later became Chief of the British Imperial Staff, was selected by the British War Committee as chief of such a mis- sion. 'I flatly refused to go/ wrote Wilson in his diary. Callwell, Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, n, 11.

'See infra, p. 114.

92 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

'August 21, 1917: Things are not going well with us at Washington. Geoffrey Butler considers and I agree that we need the visit of some very prominent war characters. I have sent Smuts a cablegram which he will show you if you ask. The highest authorities here cannot understand why we do not make our case better known. Wiseman will ... tell you that certain leaders are with us and if it were not for them

the French would get everything I wish you would use

every effort with those concerned to release Smuts for a six weeks' visit here. He could easily say things that would be difficult for an Englishman to say.

'September 1, 1917: The kind of problem that faces one every morning is typified by the following which reaches me from War Department in Washington: "We should be glad if you would send us for our information whatever material you might receive concerning the progress of the war and matters of general interest for the confidential information of our Chief of Staff and Secretary of War." This is a matter that obviously should have been taken up ... directly the United States entered the war. The result of this kind of neglect on our part is that the United States Government has no notion of what we are doing in the war. Newspapers give the impression that the war is being fought by France and Canada. At a popular theatre here one of the scenes de- picted nightly is of Canadian troops returning from the battlefield to their meals which are being cooked for them by British soldiers. This ignorance indirectly affects all our

financial efforts at Washington It would be well if you

spoke to General Maurice. He issued a statement yesterday which appeared only in very few papers giving the propor- tion of the British and Canadian troops in the war. Such statements have no effect because they are drowned by the daily accounts of the deeds of the brave Manitobans and Montrealers, the wonderful feats of the French flying men and the huge captures of prisoners by the Italians.

NORTHCLIFFE AND HENRY FORD 93

'September 8, 1917: There is no German propaganda against the French. The whole Irish and German propa- ganda is to the effect that we are getting all the money and are doing little of the work. We do our utmost to counteract these impressions by means of my personal influence with friends on the American Press, but we have far to go before we shall have placed ourselves on an equality with the French here, and to do so we must at least be as well equipped, scientifically and otherwise, as they are/

Northcliffe not merely used his influence with friends on the American Press, but exerted himself in every way to come into close contact with the leaders of industry, so as to hasten and simplify the delivery of supplies for the British. When a misunderstanding arose over the offer of Henry Ford to send six thousand tractors to the British Food Pro- duction Department at cost, Northcliffe himself settled the matter and incidentally discovered in the great American industrialist a personality which piqued his interest and admiration.

'I have endeavored to get into touch with Ford/ he wrote on October 6, 'but he has twice put me off. It may be neces- sary for me to go to Detroit and eat humble pie, and if so will do so gladly. Ford is entirely indifferent to financial considerations.

'October 14, 1917: 1 have no desire for further long jour- neys, but it is considered important by those who are behind the scenes that I should go out to Detroit, and I propose arriving there Tuesday or Wednesday next. Edison, an in- timate friend of Ford and an old friend of mine, has arranged matters. . . .

'October 17, 1917: 1 spent yesterday with Ford. The con- struction of the tractors is being pressed forward with im- mense energy Ford is not in the tractor business for

94 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

money, but because he believes it will revolutionize the home life of England, to which country he is attached. The arrival of the tractors in England should be treated in the American way, and if possible, the Prime Minister should be cinematographed with them. ... I have seen many tractors, but in my personal judgment the Ford tractor is as great a revolution in cheap efficiency as the Ford motor car. Ford, who looks like the Bishop of London, is an anti-militarist

ascetic and must not be treated as a commercial man

'Ford wants a copy of Cobbett's "Rural Rides," and of Tennyson's "Letters," which were published some years ago by his son. Please send the books direct to him at Detroit, with my compliments, in case I should be on my way home by the time the books get there/

Northcliffe had the satisfaction of seeing the American effort acquire momentum during the period of his mission. * These people are getting deeply into the war/ he cabled to his brother on September 7, 'and are most resolute. Things are running more smoothly now.' He had also the satis- faction of seeing the British War Cabinet emphasize more definitely the necessity of close cooperation with the United States. In August Sir William Wiseman cabled to him:

'The Government every day realizes more fully the im- portance of the United States and are coming to the point of view which I know you hold, namely, that America must be treated as our most important ally. There is, however, need for this truth to be kept constantly before the Cabinet, owing to the great distance of America and the fact that members of the Government have little personal knowledge of Washington affairs. I believe that I have impressed the Government with the vital importance of keeping the Presi- dent fully and frankly informed about everything and also the necessity of prompt replies to your telegrams.'

NORTHCLIFFE AND TARDIEU 95

Lord Northcliffe not merely realized the potential re- sources of the United States, but from the beginning insisted that if a proper mechanism of cooperation were devised American supplies would be forthcoming in time; he insisted also that unless the Allies presented their demands for money and supplies in coordinated form, the confusion resultant upon the attempt to speed up American effort might result in disaster. This was precisely the conclusion reached by Tardieu, with whom, as Sir Campbell Stuart reports, 'throughout his stay Lord Northcliffe worked hand in hand/ The need of such coordination in Allied demands became especially obvious in the financial problems of the summer of 1917, upon which the papers of Colonel House throw some light.

CHAPTER IV FINANCE AND SUPPLIES

Before the American soldier, the American dollar turned the tide.

Andrt Tardieu, in France and America

I

As the student turns over the bulky manuscripts relating to the interests and activities of Colonel House during the war, he is surprised, perhaps, to note the number and size of those relating to financial problems. For years, House had given up active interest in business, which he confessed bored him, and had centered his attention on problems of government. He was certainly not regarded as an expert in financial af- fairs; it was so long since he had been to Wall Street, or even below Twenty-Third Street, that he could not remember when, if ever, he had visited the financial center of the United States. Nevertheless, in his files are bundles of papers bearing witness to long conferences with the financial repre- sentatives of the Allied Powers, and numerous detailed and quite technical memoranda that passed between him and Lord Northcliffe, or the British Ambassador, or Mr. Balfour. Most of the financial and supply problems of the war could doubtless have been settled with comparative ease by the business experts of each country if they could have been given a free hand without the intrusion of political factors. Such was not the case; international difficulties and jealous- ies created situations which disturbed the statesmen, who, with justification or not, felt it necessary to interfere. Colo- nel House, whose one desire in the summer of 1917 was to assist the President in the development of the diplomatic offensive against German morale, found himself brought into touch with various financial questions which, simple as they

THE AMERICAN DOLLAR 97

might seem to financiers, unquestionably brought the keen- est worry to the politicians.

It is far from the purpose of this chapter to sketch the financial history of America's relations with the Allies, of which the papers of Colonel House would doubtless fail to give a comprehensive view. It is important, however, to note his connection with them, since the financial difficulties of the summer led directly to the American War Mission of the autumn, which he was chosen to head.

The essential facts of the financial history of 1917 were simple : The Allies were compelled to ask for loans from the United States of a size which frightened the American Treas- ury, and which, even if the credits should be given, might be difficult to justify to the American taxpayer. The war was costing sums which were quite inconceivable to the ordinary citizen, and the Allies had begun to scrape the bottom of the chest. Unless the United States helped out freely, the mili- tary effort in the field could not be maintained. As Lord Northcliffe cabled late in the summer, the American Govern- ment was 'appalled by magnitude of financial task. They are complete masters of the situation as regards ourselves, Canada, France, Italy, and Russia. Loan to us strongly op- posed by powerful section of Congress. If loan stops, war stops.' l

The demands of the Allies were probably justified by the extent and cost of the military undertaking, but they were not understood by the American people. On the other hand, the Allies were too busy dealing with vital and critical ques- tions in the theater of war to give time to a complete and reiterated explanation of the situation. The British financial representatives in the United States were men of unusual ability. Sir Hardman Lever had formerly been financial Secretary to the Treasury and possessed wide knowledge of American business affairs; Sir Richard Crawford had had

1 H. Wickham Steed, Through Thirty Years, n, 143.

100 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

Mr. McAdoo was anxious to help the Allies with credits so far as possible. From April 1 to July 14 the United States advanced to Great Britain close to £140,000,000 and to the other allies £90,000,000, altogether well over a billion dollars. He was unable, however, to promise regular monthly credits at the rate desired by the Allies. Nor could he agree to the suggestion that indebtedness of the British Government in- curred before the United States entered the war should be liquidated through loans of the United States Government; he had engaged himself in a parliamentary agreement to the effect that credits voted by Congress should not be used for that purpose. This was carefully explained to the British War Mission in July: * House said,' Northcliffe cabled to Mr. Lloyd George, 'that the whole forthcoming winter will be spent in Congressional wranglings about finance, and for this reason McAdoo must be in a position to make perfectly clear that the money of the people of the United States was not being used for the benefit of ... Wall Street and the Money Power to which the Democracy so strongly objects/

The situation seemed less desperate, perhaps, to the finan- cial experts than it did to Allied political leaders, for it was likely that supplies would be exhausted before credits could be used. Thus in October, Lord Reading cabled to England: 'What will save the United States Treasury, as it has saved ours in the past, will be the material limitation on what it is possible to buy. Goods will not in fact be forthcoming on a sufficient scale to absorb the vast credits to which the De- partments and the Allies are becoming entitled.' None the less, the political leaders in Europe, as well as Northcliffe in the United States, were constantly caught in the nightmare that the loans would be refused: "If loan stops, war stops.' Hence the frequent appeals to House, asking his help in ex- plaining their need to the Administration.

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BALFOUR'S CABLEGRAM 101

ii

One of the most interesting appeals came at the end of June. Through some misunderstanding the British Ambas- sador gathered that in order to liquidate the Morgan loans on the date desired, July 1, it would be necessary for the British to sell collateral. The securities were perfectly sound, of the highest character; but with American Government loans overhanging the market, it would be difficult to sell American securities in large amounts at satisfactory prices. What chiefly disturbed the British leaders, however, was their fear that if the news of the selling of collateral were noised abroad, the effect would inevitably be disastrous to exchange and to the credit of the British Government. The British Secre- tary for Foreign Affairs evidently regarded the moment as critical.

Mr. A. J. Balfour to Colonel House

[Cablegram]

LONDON, June 29, 1917

For reasons fully explained to Page here and to Spring- Rice in Washington, we seem on the verge of a financial dis- aster which would be worse than defeat in the field. If we cannot keep up exchange neither we nor our Allies can pay our dollar debts. We should be driven off the gold basis, and purchases from the U.S.A. would immediately cease and the Allies' credit would be shattered. A consequence which would be of incalculable gravity may be upon us on Mon- day next if nothing effective is done in the mean time. You know I am not an alarmist, but this is really serious. I hope you will do what you can in proper quarters to avert calamity.1

BALFOUR

1 It should be clearly understood that this appeal, as well as that printed on p. 106, was made in behalf of the Allies as a whole and not of Great Britain alone.

104 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

Colonel House to President Wilson

MAGNOLIA, MASSACHUSETTS

July 11, 1917 DEAR GOVERNOR:

Since Balfour's cable I have been keeping in intimate touch with the financial differences between the British Government and the Treasury Department and I am glad to tell you that everything seems on the road to an amicable adjustment. . . .

I have brought McAdoo and Wiseman in touch and since Sir William is sympathetic with McAdoo's point of view I believe another such crisis can be avoided in the future. It will be necessary, however, for the British to send out an- other financial man. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

A few days after sending this letter, Colonel House re- ceived a visit from Lord Northcliffe at Magnolia. The chief of the British War Mission laid before him the statistics of British expenditure since the United States entered the war and the vital need of regular financial assistance from the United States. He recognized the help thus far given, which in a period of about fourteen weeks amounted to over a bil- lion dollars to the various Allies (229 million pounds). For the same period, however, Great Britain had advanced to the Allies 193 million pounds.1 The United States, moreover, had limited its assistance to the expenditure incurred by the Allies within the United States. Great Britain had been un- able to adopt this attitude, but had supported the burden of

1 British advances to other Allies (April 1-July 14, 1917) : £193,849,000.

United States advances to other Allies (April 1-July 14, 1917): £90,- 000,000.

United States advances to British (April 1-July 14, 1917): £139,245,- 000.

Thus the net advances of Great Britain amounted to about 54 million pounds; of the United States about 229 million pounds.

NORTHCLIFFE'S APPEAL 105

Allied expenditure in various parts of the world. Without this support, the Allies would have been unable to obtain supplies of food and munitions which were essential to the prosecution of the war. Great Britain was still financing the purchases of Russia in the United States. The total expendi- ture of the British since the United States entered the war was more than 800 million pounds, and they had received from the American Government slightly less than 140 million pounds in loans. Furthermore, during the years previous to the entrance of the United States the British had spent over four and a quarter billion pounds, making a total of more than five billion to the middle of July, 1917.

' It is after having supported an expenditure of this magni- tude for three years,' Northcliffe told Colonel House, 'that the United Kingdom ventures to appeal to the United States Government for sympathetic consideration in financial dis- cussion, where the excessive urgency of her need and the precariousness of her position may somewhat impart a tone of insistence to her requests for assistance which would be out of place in ordinary circumstances. . . .

'Our resources available for payments in America are ex- hausted. Unless the United States Government can meet in full our expenses in America, including exchange, the whole financial fabric of the alliance will collapse. This conclusion will be a matter not of months but of days.

'The question is one of which it is necessary to take a large view. If matters continue on the same basis as during the last few weeks a financial disaster of the first magnitude can- not be avoided. In the course of August the enemy will re- ceive the encouragement of which he stands in so great need, at the moment of the war when perhaps he needs it most/

At the same time Mr. Balfour again cabled to Colonel House, asking him to impress upon the President the vital

106 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

importance which the Allies attached to their request. What they needed was the assurance of an immediate advance suf- ficient to cover their August purchases and the arrangement thereafter of a programme of regular loans.

Colonel House to the President

MAGNOLIA, MASSACHUSETTS July 20, 1917

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I have just received the following cable from Balfour:

* Communication of the utmost importance and urgency with regard to financial position was made to the United States Ambassador to-day with request that he telegraph it in extenso to State Department. I should be most grateful