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HISTORY
OF THE
SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
A.E.F.
DURING THE
WORLD WAR:
1917-1919
FORMATION AND TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1917—1918
THE PRE-COMBAT PERIOD IN FRANCE
AT THE FRONT
THE FOST-.\RMISTICE PERIOD IN FRANCE
DEMOBILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1919
Compiled anii Edited dy
lIisTORr Committee "Dtii Division Association
J. Frank Barher, Chairman
Published by
Steinman & Stein.vian
Lancaster, Pa.
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Copyrighted
BY
79th division association
315 Liberty Bldg., Philadelphia.
IC1A69G007
JAN 12 '23
♦A« I
DEDICATION
To the proud and loving memory of those men of the Seventy-ninth Division with whom we marched and fought over gassed and shell-swept roads and fields, through days and nights of rain and cold and mud, who gave their lives for the cause of right, to the everlasting glory of them- selves, their Division and their country.
SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISIONAL INSIGNIA
The shoulder sleeve insignia of the 79th Division was approved by telegram November 16, 1918, from the Adjutant General, A.E.F., to the Commanding General, 79th Division. It is described as follows:
A blue triangular shield 2}^" in height by 2}^" in width, a Lorraine Cross within an orle. Cross and orle silver gray and the elements of each ys" in width.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Part I
Foreword by General Kuhx 1
CoMPOsiTiox OF Seventy-ninth Division 12
Introduction 13
Chapter T — Camp Meade Days 17
Chapter II — The Di\ision Goes to France 38
Chapter III — The Avocourt-Malancourt Sector 51
Chapter IV — The Meuse-Argonne, First Phase 75
Malancourt and Montfaucon
Chapter V — The Meuse-Argonne, First Phase 129
iSantillois and tlie Bois de Beiige
Chapter VI — The Thoyon Sector 179
Chapter VII — The Meuse-Argonne, Third Phase 203
La Borne de Cornouiller
Chapter VIII — The Meuse-Argonne, Third Phase 260
" Tlirough the Hills of the Meuse Eastward"
Chapter IX — After the Armistice Slg
Chapter X — The Artillery Brigade 340
Chapter XI — The Souilly' and Rimaucourt Areas 318
Chatper XII — Nantes, St. Xazaire and Home 364
Part II
Appendix I — The Roll of Honor — the Division's Dead 379
Appendix II — Statistics 424
Total of casualties — Kilometers gained — Prisoners taken — Material cap- tured— Units of German Army which opposed the Division — Totals of Deco- rations and Citations — Combat Service of Division, etc.
Appendix III — Chronology 429
The successive stages of the Division in Fiance as gained from table showing all locations of Division Headquarters.
Appentjix IV — D ecorations akd Citations 432
Awards of the Distinguished Service Cross — Distinguished Service Medal — Croix de Guerre — General Headquarters Citations — Division Citations — Unit Citations.
Appendix V — Field Orders 477
Principal Orders of Corps and Division Relating to Operations.
Appendix VI — Translation of Captured German Field Order 486
Appendix VII — Source or Reference Notes 491
Appendix VIII — " The Lorraine Cross" 503
The Division Newspaper Appendix IX — The Seventy-ninth Division Association 510
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
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American Expeditionary Forces, Office of the Comnander-in-Chief , France, April 13, 1919.
Major General Joseph E. Kuhn, Commanding 79th Division, American E. F. My dear General Kuhn:
It afforded me great satisfaction to inspect the 79th Division on April 12, and on that occasion to decorate the standards of yotlr regiments and, for gallantry in action, to confer medals upon certain officers and men. Your transportation and artillery were in splendid shape, and the general appearance of the division was well up to the standard of the American Expeditionary Forces. Throughout the in- spection and review the excellent morale of the men and their pride in the record of their organiza,tion was evident.
In the Meuse-Argonne Offensive the division had its full share of hard fighting. Entering the line for the first time on September 26 as the right of the center corps, it took part in the beginning of the great Meuse-Argonne Offensive. By September 27 it had captured the strong position of Montfaucon, and in Spite of heavy artillery reaction, the Bois de Beuge and Nantillois were occupied. On September 30 it was relieved, having advanced ten kilometers. It again entered the battle on October 29, relieving, as part of the 17th French Corps, the 29th Division in the Grande Montagne Sector to the east of the Meuse River. From that time until the armistice went into effect, it was almost constantly in action. On November 9 Crepion, Wavrille and Gibercy were taken, and in conjunction with elements on the right and left, Etraye and Moirey were invested. On November 10, Chaximont-devant-Damvilliers was occupied, and on November 11 Ville-devant-Chaumont was taken — a total of 9 kilometers.
This is a fine record for any division and I want the officers and men to know this and to realize how much they have contributed to the success of our arms. They may return home justly proud of themselves and of the part they have played in the American Expedi- tionary Forces.
Sincerely yours.
(-""jdUc^ Nlen^^
^ rt/fu^ /y v e/T^=i^fi^ k/
Major General Joseph E. Kunx
TO MY COMRADES OF THE 79th DIVISION
This history has been prepared primarily for you in order to preserve the ties of comradeship formed during strenuous days of training at home and stirring incidents of campaign abroad, and to make it possible, by word and picture, to convey to friends and relatives the trials and achievements of one of America 's combat divisions, hastily called into being to meet a nation- al emergency.
A scant four months between the peaceful pursuits of farm, factory and counting house to "over the top" in a foreign land against a veteran foe, practiced in more than four years desperate fighting, sounds incredible and yet this was the experience of more than half of the 79th Division when it underwent its first baptism of fire on tlie morning of September 26, 1918.
The capture of the dominating and strongly fortified Montfaucon and the penetration of the enemy's line to a depth of nine kilometers constitute a worthy achievement for a green division. In the subsequent desperate fighting at the salient on the scarred and rugged heights north of Verdun, the Division again demonstrated a courage and tenacity of whic-h it is justly proud.
Not only on the field of battle but on the march, in camp, billets and bivouac you have uniformly proved yourself loyal, patriotic and unselfish soldiers and citizens. It is with a deep and abiding sense of gratitude for your faithful services that your former commander looks back upon those eventful 22 months which covered the life of the Division.
Jufi-'Z^:-^ ^^^WC^
JOSEPH E. KUHN, Major General. U. S. A.
General Kuhn was born June 14, 1864, in Leavenworth, Kansas. He was appointed Cadet, United States Military Academy, West Point, N. Y., July 1, 1881, and graduated at the head of his class, June 14, 1885.
He was appointed 2nd Lieutenant Corps of Engineers, U. S. A. and served with Co. "C," Engineer Battalion at Willets Point, N. Y., and with the Engineer School, until 1888.
During 1888 and 1889 he was Assistant to the District Engineer at Detroit, Michigan, in charge of River and Harbor Works on the East Shore of Lake Michigan.
In 1889 he was promoted to 1st Lieutenant of Engineers, and served from then until August of 1894 as Instructor of Civil and MiHtary Engineering at the U. S. Military Academy.
From August 1894 to 1896, he was Assistant to the District Engineer at San Francisco, California, in charge of the Works of Fortification of that harbor.
In 1896 he received his Captaincy, and from then until 1900 he was Assistant to the Chief of Engineers, and in charge of the Sea Coast Defenses of the United States, and Military Personnel of the Engineer Corps.
During the Spanish-American War General Kuhn held the rank of Major, from May 1898 to September 1899.
From August 1900 to August 1903, he commanded the Engineer Company at West Point, and was Head of the Department of Practical Military Engineer- ing. He was also a member of the Academic Board of the Academy during this time.
From 1903 to 1904 he commanded, in the Philippine Islands, the 3rd Bat- talion of Engineers, and in April, 1904, he was promoted to Major, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.
The period from March 1904 to November 1905, General Kuhn spent as Military Observer with the Japanese Armies in the Field during the Russo- Japanese War, and from December, 1905, to June, 1906, he was occupied in the Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C, writing the report of his ob- servations. This work is published in War Department Document, ''Report of Military Observers attached to The Armies in Manchuria during the Russo- Japanese War'' — Part III., — and is used extensively as a text book and reference by the War College.
From June to September of 1906, General Kuhn attended the famous German Army Maneuvers and there had personal contact, and some very interesting conversations, with the Kaiser, on the subjects of Military Strategy and Tactics.
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From September 1906 to August 1909, General Kuhn was District Engineer in charge of the Norfolk River and Harbor District, and Works of Fortification, at Norfolk, Va.
In September 1909 he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of En- gineers, and from August 1909 to August 1912 was Senior Instructor in Military Engineering at the Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
August 1912 to August 1913 was spent as District Engineer in charge of the River and Harbor District and the Fortification Work at Philadelphia, Pa.
From September 1913 to December 1914, he was Commanding Officer of the Third Battalion of Engineers, the Engineer Depot and the Engineer School at Washington Barracks, Washington, D. C.
From December 1914 to March 1915, General Kuhn was a member of the Military Mission to Germany. In March 1915 he was promoted to the grade of Colonel, Corps of Engineers, and from March 1915 to December 1916, was Military Attache at the American Embassy in Berlin. During this period he was attached to the German General Headquarters, and visited frequently the German Lines on both the West and East Fronts.
In January 1917, General Kuhn was promoted to the grade of Brigadier General, and appointed President of the Army War College, and a member of the General Staff. He continued on these duties until August of the same year, during which time he was in charge of the initial steps for war preparations and war training.
In August 1917, he was promoted to the grade of Major General, and placed in command (at its inception) of the Seventy-Ninth Division. He commanded the Division during its organization and training at Camp Meade, Md., from August 1917 to July 1918, and from July 1918, he commanded the Division in France, including its entire combat service and until its return to the United States and its demobilization at Camp Dix in Jime 1919.
From July 1919 to September 1920, General Kuhn commanded Camp Kearney, California, and from September 1920 to January 1922, commanded Schofield Barracks, Territory of Hawaii, and organized the Hawaiian Division.
General Kuhn received the Croix de Guerre, with palm, and was invested with the rank of Commander of the Legion of Honor by the French Government in recognition of his services in the World War.
During the days of the Division at Camp Meade and its period of operations in the A. E. F., more than ninety thousand men served under and passed through General Kuhn's command. He earned and holds the respect, confidence and admiration of every man of the Seventy-Ninth Division, every one of whom sincerely appreciates his splendid services to the Division, to the individual, and to the Country. Every member of the Division will, throughout his life, hold General Kuhn in the highest honor and esteem.
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SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION STAFF
Lt. Col. George A. Wildrick, G-3
Lt. Col. James H. Steinman, Adjutant
12 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
UNITS COMPRISING THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION,
U. S. A.
Division Headquarters
Headquarters Troop
310th Machine Gun Battalion
157th Infantry Brigade
313th Infantry
314th Infantry
311th Machine Gun Battalion
158th Infantry Brigade
315th Infantry
316th Infantry
31'2th Machine Gun Battalion
154th Field Artillery Brigade 310th Field Artillery 311th Field Artillery 312th Field Artillery 304th Trench Mortar Battery
304th Engineers
304th Engineer Train
304th Field Signal Battalion
304th Division Trains and Military Police
304th Ammunition Train
304th Supply Train
304th Sanitary Train
304th Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop
INTRODUCTION
Whenever a great nation declares war, it follows as a natural consequence that history will be made. If that war is punitive in character, the masses of the people in a great nation pay little attention and are not greatly disturbed, nor are they distracted from their daily routine. But when that war is by far the greatest undertaking ever engaged in, the whole nation is awakened to its immensity and supports the concerted movement to the limit, throwing its full force — its every resource — into the fray.
Our country's part in the World War was by far the greatest project, com- mercial or military, ever entered into by these United States. All the nation's resources were turned from jieaceful and commercial pursuits and thrown into a supreme military effort.
The Anny, the military force, was increased within eighteen months from a body of less than one hundred thousand to more than five million men, and within fifteen months from the date this country declared war, we had placed a substantial fighting force in a field over thirty-five hundred miles from its base. This was augmented at the rate of several hundred thousand a month until more than two million men were in the American Expeditionary Forces in France.
It was of this great army, the American Ex]ieditionary Forces, that the Seventy-ninth Division became a part, and it is the purpose of this book to record in an accurate, unbiased, complete and authenticated manner the history of the Seventy-ninth Division, both at home and overseas.
Standing forth in the splendid record of the Division are three achievements, three grim epics of modern warfare. To the Seventy-ninth Division fell the signal honor of conquering the two highest points on the Meuse-Argonne battlefield and thrusting into the German line on Armistice Day the deepest salient on the whole American front.
Montfaucon, impregnable for four years, famed as an observatory from which the enemy commanded the entire American line, fell before the assaults of the Division. It was taken on September 27, the second day of the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, and, once it had been wrested free, the eye of the German Army was gone.
Of this front on which the Division was thus engaged General Pershing said ■}
"The Meuse-Argonne front had been practically stabilized in September, 1914, and, except for minor fluctuations during the German attacks on Verdun in 1916 and the French counter offensive in August, 1917, remained unchanged until the American advance in 1918. The net result of the four years struggle on this ground was a German defensive system of unusual depth and strength and a wide zone of utter devastation, itself a serious obstacle to offensive operations. The strategical importance of this portion of the line was second to none on the western front."
' Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, p. 43.
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14 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
Rreferring to a conference held at Marshall Foch's headquarters on Sep- tember 2, 1918, at which General Petain was present, General Pershing said: *
"It should be recorded that although the general offensive was fully outlined at the conference no one present expressed the opinion that the final victory could be won in 1918. In fact, it was believed by the French high command that the Meuse-Argonne attack could not be pushed much beyond Montfaucon before the arrival of winter would force a cessation of operations."
The 79tli Division captured Montfaucon within thirty hours after its jump off on September 26th, and in the succeeding days pushed its lines far beyond into enemy territory before, its strength spent and its ranks fearfully depleted, it was relieved from the offensive, September 30, 1918.
La Borne de Cornouiller, east of the Meuse, a height from which enemy observers had directed terrible enfilading fire on the American forces through two phases of the same offensive, was stormed early in November and fell before the onslaught of the Division. A menace to communications, it had played an im- portant part in holding up the American advance. Once it was captured, the lines east of the Meuse moved on with no molestation from the flank.
The attack was to be launched against the last line of German trenches of the Kriemhilde Stellung, the attempted assault against which, in the middle of October, had failed.
To the 79th Division was assigned the desperate task of breaking the enemy line at its pivotal and key position on La Borne de Cornouiller, known to the French as La Grande Montague and to the Americans as Hill 378, a great bare crest rising sheer from the Meuse Valley, and commanding practically the entire Meuse-Argonne front.
The full strength of the Division was thrown into the attack on November 3rd, and after four days of terrific fighting La Borne de Cornouiller was captured, and held. Of the troops who made the assault General Kuhn at that time said: "They have done the impossible." The Division pressed on to the north, four kilometers beyond its first objective. On November 8th the Division changed its direction of attack to due east, and assaulted and carried the last of the spurs and ridges of the long line of hills that separate the Meuse from the flat plains of the Woevre, and on the 9th and 10th went down into the valley of the Thinte, sweeping the enemy before it.
Then, during the closing days of the War, its face turned directly toward Germany after making a most difficult flank movement, the Division crowned its record with a memorable advance, culminating in a salient pushing straight toward the heart of the enemy. Beyond the crest of Hills 319 and 328 it extended, a threatening menace to the enemy flung far ahead of any other American position.
The attack was resumed on November 11th; under cover of a dense fog, and good progress was being made up the western slopes of the Cote de Morimont and the Cote de Romagne, the last strongholds of the Germans, when the order came to cease fire. This, as the records show, was by far the deepest penetration of the enemy lines by American troops at the time of the Armistice.''
' Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, p. 40.
^ See map of Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing. Also Situation Map of G-2, G.H.Q. of Nov. 11, 1918, accompanying this History.
INTRODUCTION 15
The Division was composed normally of some twenty-seven thousand men, yet through the period of its life — August 1917 to May 1919 — more than ninety- five thousand men were received and equipped by it, and trained and served in it.
The Division was in existence about twenty-three months and in service in France from July 1918 until May 1919. It had left the States M-ith approximately sixty-five per cent of its men in the ser^■ice only six weeks, so, including the time spent on the transports and in the training area in France, this portion of our na- tion's fighting force had had but sixteen to eighteen weeks of military training.
As a further example of the nation's condition of gross unpreparedness, the men received by the Division as replacements, during October 1918, were from the July draft and, consequently, entered the lines without any knowledge or experience with the rifle and very short military training. Naturally, this practice of rushing green material into combat was costly in man power and an extravagance for which the people in general are alone to blame.
It is interesting to note that, of the nine shock Divisions wliich were in line at the beginning of America's greatest battle, the Meuse-Argonne, three divisions, the Twenty-eighth, Seventy-ninth and Eightieth, were composed principally of men from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Thus, Pennsylvania is accredited with thirty-three per cent of the shock troops which opened the American Offensive.
History is the prose narrative of past events, as true as the fallibility of human testimony will allow, and it has been attempted in this volume to cover the life and achievements of the Seventy-ninth Division on this plan. War and battle conditions are so severe, so many different incidents occur at one and the same instant, and there are so many different angles from which the same incident can be seen, surveyed and estimated, that it is humanly impossible to picture, by words, any event in a manner that would correspond to the version of all eye witnesses and those concerned in the actual occurrences.
A most careful and exhaustive search and re-search have been made of all records pertaining to the Division, and months have been spent in analyzing, assembling and collating this data, and in arranging it in the text and tables.
In reading the tables of casualties, the killed and wounded, and in reading of the individual acts cited from time to time, it should be remembered that there were many more hardships and sacrifices, acts of bravery and devotion to duty, than it would ever be possible to relate. Those given are only examples, and the operations of the Division were filled — were rife — with acts and deeds that are the true test of the real, staunch, red-blooded manhood of our country. Many heroic acts were recorded, and many brave men were rewarded; but far more numerous were the heroic acts that went unobserved and unacknowledged, and will forever go unrecorded.
This History first had its inception whUe the Seventy-ninth Division was in the Souilly Area in France in the winter of 1918-19. It was then placed in the hands of Lieutenants Albert S. Crandon and AVarren M. Wells, who prepared a text of approximately thirty thousand words. Subsequently it was placed in the hands of Mr. James B. Wharton, who assembled more data and re-wrote the text. This version was of greater length than the first but, after careful reviewing by representatives of the different units of the Division, it was decided that the text was not yet in the form desired, and so a third and last effort was decided upon.
16 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
It was at this stage that the services of Mr. William Bell Clark were enlisted, and after months more of earnest work, collecting more data, making every effort at further research, Mr. Clark produced the text as it now stands and as it was finally accepted. The earnest way in which he undertook the task, sparing no pains to get the true understanding of his subject, the spirit of the elements he was to depict, the mass of detail — all necessary for the success of such a work — is evidence of Mr. Clark's ability and sincerity, and it is to him the Division owes a great debt for a history text, complete, authentic and yet full of human interest.
We owe also acknowledgements to Captain Joseph M. DuBarry, Captain Carl E. Glock, and Captain George L. Wright for their assistance and general contributions and help, and to Major Edward W. Madeira for his assistance in reviewing and criticising the text. Also to Lieutenant Colonel H. Harrison Smith for his contributions of many original and valuable views, taken mainly of the Grande Montague Sector, as well as for his help in preparing the history and appendix. Mr. Virgil Kauffman and Mr. Morris C. Sparks also have been very generous to us, allowing the use of several of their best photographs.
Many of the illustrations were procured from the collection of the 304th Engineers, as that was the largest and most complete set of views of our particular areas available. Also the several maps used are reproductions for which the 304th Engineers are responsible.
To Sergeant Thomas M. Rivel, of Division Headquarters, we are indebted for the cover design. Sergeant Rivel has used for his subject the Montfaucon Chateau, a scene familiar to every member of the Seventy-Ninth Division as well as to thousands of others who occupied this sector subsequently or who were engaged in the neighboring sectors. His wonderful presentation of the typical column of troops going forward on relief, is so vivid and realistic, so lifelike, that it im- mediately takes the soldier back to the gloomy, misty, rainy days, — days full of action every hour of the twenty-four, days full of ghastly noise, tumult, and in- tensive motion, days of hunger, fatigue and carnage, days of battle — the days of September, October and November, 1918. The subject could not be more appro- priate or the design better executed.
I am greatly indebted, personally, and the Division is indebted generally, to Sergeant John V. Dignan, of Division Headquarters, for the use of his very complete albums of Division orders and data, for his untiring work, his liberal assistance and his loyal co-operation in assembling of pages, the arrangement of illustrations, and his ingenuity, so liberally and generously given during the days of publication.
There were many others interested and helpful in varying degrees to whom, also, our appreciation is due. It was through the co-operation of these men and by untiring effort, undaunted by many, many obstacles, that this history was made possible and, after a period of ceaseless effort extending over four years, that it is finally accomplished. There were many difficulties and periods of trying times, when it seemed that progress was impossible; but that is ended, and now it remains for the reader to render his verdict on the result of the efforts expended.
J. Frank Barber,
Chairman, 79th Division History Comm. Note: Should the reader find errors or discrepancies, the editors will welcome constructive criticism, substantiated by proper evidence.
The reader will find numerous small figure references throughout the text. By referring to pages i91 to 503 in the appendix the source of the information can be determined.
CHAPTER I
CAMP MEADE DAYS
THE Seventy-ninth Division was one of sixteen created in the spring of 1917 to meet, by universal conscription, the emergency expansion of the United States Army during the World War. It was authorized by the Army Act of May 18, 1917, which prov-ided in part that the President "might raise by selective draft an additional force of 500,000 men and at a later time another force of 500,000."' Presaging the drastic legislation called forth through the declaration of a state of war against Germany, the War Department previously had prepared a paper organization for each of the proposed divisions. Conse- quently, the birth of the Seventy-ninth Division may be considered as coincident with the signing of the Army Act. From a typewritten table of division units as they were to be, to their actual existence upon the field, however, proved a long step. This process of incubation in the case of the Seventy-ninth Division was protracted over a period of four months. Measured in terms of days it seemed unusually long; in terms of accomplishment it proved remarkably brief.
The numerical designation of the Division was fixed by the War Department under an original plan dividing the fighting forces of the country into three groups — Regular Army, National Guard and National Army. The Seventy-ninth Division was placed in the latter category. The National Army divisions were numbered from seventy-six upward and the order followed was along geographical lines, beginning in the New England States. Tracing this plan, the result was: Seventy-sixth Division, New England; Seventy-seventh Division, Greater New York City; Seventy-eighth Division, New York State, New Jersey and Delaware; and Seventy-ninth Division, Eastern Pennsylvania, Maryland and the District of Columbia. Subsequently the distinctions between the various divisions of the army were eliminated by the War Department. Regular Army, National Guard and National Army gave way to the United States Army.- The numerical desig- nation of the divisions, however, remained unchanged.
To facilitate the mobilization of the selected men, the War Department de- cided to establish the training centres, or cantonments, within each geographical division and, in the case of the Seventy-ninth Division, the site chosen was near Annapolis Junction, Anne Arundel County, Maryland. The Government com- mandeered 4,000 acres which hitherto had been used exclusively for truck raising and fruit growing, prepared plans for a permanent encampment capable of housing 40,000 men, and named it Camp Meade in honor of Major General George Gordon Meade, the Pennsylvania commander of the Army of the Potomac who turned Lee back at Gettysburg in '63. The construction of what became eventually a modern city, located nearly midway between Baltimore and Washington and with Philadelphia 110 miles away, began on July 2, 1917.'
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18 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
In the meanwhile the machinery was evolved whereby conscription was to be enforced. The iVrmy Act of May 18, 1917, gave the President the power to enroll all men in the United States between the ages of 21 and 31, and, by procla- mation, June 5, 1917, was assigned as national registration day.^ Prior to this a provost marshal general had been appointed to administer the draft, and calcula- tions of the number of men available had been worked out on the basis of the cen- sus of 1910. These calculations were used in preliminary surveys whereby the various apportionments had been estimated in a rough manner, but with sufficient accuracy to enable the authorities to group the prospective draftees within the contemplated geographical boundaries. Actual figures were available for the necessary computations when 9,586,508 men of military age enrolled on national registration day.^ The next step, to establish the order of call to the colors for each individual, came on July 20, 1917. The country had been divided into draft districts, each district containing approximately 2,100 men. In each district the men were given serial numbers from one upward. At Washington, on July 20, a series of these numbers was placed in a bowl and the order of their being drawn forth established the order of the individual call.''
While the draft preliminaries were under way, the War Department was also taking up the question of officers to command and train the units of the new divisions. Recognizing that the commissioned personnel of the Regular Army was totally inadequate in number, the Officers' Reserve Corps was enlarged and numerous camps, for a three months' intensive training course, provided. One of these, established at Fort Niagara, New York, produced the majority of the men who were assigned ultimately to the Seventy-ninth Division. The Fort Niagara Training Camp opened on May 8, 1917, the officer candidates arriving during three successive mornings on trains known as the "Red, White and Blue Specials."' The candidates were drawn chiefly from Pennsylvania and Maryland and were formed into nine companies of infantry, three batteries of artillery, two troops of cavalry and one company of engineers. Barring those training in the company of engineers, they remained at Fort Niagara until August 15, 1917, when the successful men received their commissions and assignments. In the case of the engineers, the company was transferred on June 15, 1917, to the En- gineer Training Camp, American University, Washington, D. C, and Belvoir, Va.«
The number of men to be called in the first draft had been placed at 687,000, the excess over 500,000 being required to fill up the National Guard to war strength.' This 687,000, however, was known as the gross quota, and the draft officials an- nounced that credits would be given in all districts for volunteer enlistments. The working out of the net quota was not completed until well into August, 1917. The final figures of the first draft for the Seventy-ninth Division showed the net ciuota to be 39,951, divided as follows:'"
District of Columbia (11 draft boards) 929
Baltimore (21' draft boards) 2,866
Maryland (21 counties; 29 draft boards) 4,230
Philadelphia (51 draft boards) 14,665
Pennsylvania (36 counties; 108 draft boards) 17,261
CAMP MEADE DAYS 19
Under the credit system for volunteer enlistments two cities ■within the Seventy- ninth Division area were exempt from the first draft. They were Harrisburg and Lancaster, Pennsylvania, the former with a gross quota of 811 and enlistments of 887 and the latter with a gross quota of 476 and 531 enlistments."
Directions were issued by the Adjutant General of the Army on August 8, 1917, calling the National Army to the colors as follows:'^
30 per cent to be delivered commencing September 1. 30 per cent to be delivered commencing September 15. 30 per cent to be delivered commencing September 30. The remainder as soon thereafter as practicable.
Five days later, however, the Secretary of War changed the dates because ■'Saturday, Sunday and Labor Day are three of the first five days in September."'* The rearrangement set the first call for September 5, instead of September 1 ; the second call for September 19, and the third call for October 3. Another modifica- tion was found necessary because of the extensive use of the railroads in trans- porting the National Guard southward during the early part of September. On August 25, therefore, it was announced that only five per cent would be called beginning September 5, to be moved at the rate of one per cent a day, and that forty per cent would be called upon each of the other days, September 19 and October 3.>2
But Camp Meade, despite its rapid growth, was not ready for the drafted men from Pennsylvania, Maryland and the District of Columbia on Sei)tember 5. According to the Provost Marshal General, "the water supply system would not be completed."'* From the report of Lieutenant Colonel P. E. Pierce, of the General Staff, and a member of the War Industries Board, it was apparent that more than the water supply was at fault. Lieutenant Colonel Pierce's report, dated September 1, 1917, gave the status of completion as follows:"
Annapolis Junction, Md. (Camp Meade)
Buildings: Company barracks, 44 per cent; company lava- tories, 44 per cent; officers' quarters, 44 per cent; officers' lava- tories, 44 per cent; storehouses, 56 per cent. Materials: Frame lumber, 72 per cent; boards, 68 per cent; flooring, 68 per cent; hardware, 68 per cent; finish lumber, 72 per cent; sash and doors, 68 per cent.
Water Supply: Source of supply, 80 per cent; pumping sta- tions, 28 per cent; supply main, 60 per cent; storage, 28 per cent; purification works, 28 per cent; distribution system, 64 per cent. Materials: Piping (cast iron or wood over 6 inches), 64 per cent; piping (cast iron or wood 6 inches or under), 64 per cent; piping (galvanized iron), 100 per cent; machinery, 84 per cent.
Sewerage: Collecting system, 60 per cent; disposal, 40 per cent. Material: Piping, 80 per cent.
Plumbing: Conapany lavatories, 44 per cent; officers' lava- tories, 44 per cent; kitchens, 44 per cent; hospitals, 16 per cent. Materials: Heaters and boilers, 24 per cent; lavatory outfits, 72 per cent; shower outfits, 100 per cent. Piping : Valves and fittings, 72 per cent; sinks and grease traps, 36 per cent.
Roads: 32 per cent bridges and culverts, 32 per cent. Mater ials: Broken stone and gravel, 96 per cent.
20 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
Electrical work: Transmission line, 44 per cent; cantonment distribution, 44 per cent; interior wiring, 44 per cent. Materials: Lamps, 44 per cent; wiring, 44 per cent.
Number of men employed, September 1, 1917, 9,140.
As a result of this report, the War Department, under date of September 1, 1917, made an announcement that "draft of the first increment of the National Army has been postponed to September 19. This includes only the first five per cent and only men who are to report to Camp Meade, Admiral, Md.""
Preparations for the reception of the first of the selected men had been going on apace in the partly completed camp. On August 3, 1917, the War Depart- ment, in General Order No. 101, specified the various units to be incorporated in the Seventy-ninth Division and, on August 11, in Special Order No. 186, desig- nated the ofiicers of the Regular Army and of the Officers' Reserve Corps to be assigned to the Division. In the meanwhile, on August 5, 1917, Joseph E. Kuhn, a brigadier of the Regular Army, had been promoted to the rank of major gen- eral in the National Army and assigned to Camp Meade to organize and com- mand the new Division. He arrived at the cantonment with his staff on August 25, while still a brigadier, not accepting his new commission until four days later. On the day of his arrival, however, he organized the Division officially with the issuance of General Order No. 1, Seventy-ninth Division, the first of a long series to foUow.
The graduates of the First OflScers' Training Camp at Fort Niagara, 1100 in number, having enjoyed a two weeks' leave of absence after their strenuous three months of training, reported for duty on August 29. Simultaneously there arrived the Regular Army officers selected to command brigades and regiments, and about 600 enlisted men from the Regular Army to form the non-commissioned cadre, or framework of companies, battalions and regiments. General Order No. 2, issued on August 26, 1917, was awaiting the newcomers. It assigned the of- ficers to their respective units and, by September 1, the skeletonized Division was formed according to the War Department Tables of Organization. The com- manding officers assigned to the various units as of August 26, 1917, some of whom served with the Division throughout the entire war, were as follows:
Commanding General *Major General Joseph E. Kuhn
Chief of Staff *Lieutenant Colonel Tenney Ross
Adjutant Major Charles B. Moore
Division Engineer Colonel James P. Jervey
Quartermaster Major Robert F. Tate
Inspector Major Samuel G. Talbott
Ordnance Officer Major Townsend Whelan
Judge Advocate Lieutenant Colonel James J. Mayes
Signal Officer *Major George S. Gillis
Surgeon *Lieutenant Cloonel Philip W. Huntington
Headquarters Troop *Captain Eugene S. Pleasonton
310th Machine Gun
Battalion *Major Andrew W. Smith
157th Infantry Brigade *Brigadier General William J. Nicholson 313th Infantry Regiment *Colonel Claude B. Sweezey
CAMP MEADE DAYS
21
314th Infantry Regiment 311th Machine Gun Battalion
158th Infantry Brigade 315th Infantry Regiment 316th Infantry Regiment 312th Machine Gun BattaHon
154th Artillery Brigade 310th Field Artillery
Regiment 311th Field Artillery
Regiment 312th Field Artillery
Regiment 304th Trench Mortar
Battery
304th Engineer Regiment
304th Division Trains and Military Police
304th Ammunition Train
304th Field Signal Battalion
304th Supply Train
304th Sanitary Train
* Indicates those tvho served K. I. A. Killed in action.
Colonel Thomas W. Darrah
Brigadier General Everard E. Hatch Colonel Otho B. Rosenbaum Colonel Oscar J. Charles
Major Edmond L. Zane * Brigadier General Andrew Hero, Jr.
Colonel Dan T. Moore *Lieutenant Colonel Charles F. Mortimer
Colonel James F. Brady
Captain William G. Huckel
Colonel James P. Jervey
*Colonel William C. Rogers Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Prosser
Major Sidney T. Moore K. I. A. Major Israel Putnam, *Lieutenant Colonel James F. Trout.
with the Division throughout the war.
At the time the various unit commanders, officers and non-commissioned officers arrived. Camp Meade was just beginning to take form. Its appearance is thus described by the historian of Company "I", 315th Infantry:
In the few weeks preceding the permanent organization of the Division, Camp Meade presented the disheveled appearance of a lumber camp or of a railroad pioneer camp in the first stages of constructive work.
The ground chosen for the cantonment lay in ridges and vales, running northwest and southeast, heavily wooded with scrub pine and scattering trees of the deciduous varieties. Dotting the open land, like toy ornaments, sat the little old cottages built of silvered, weather-beaten clapboards; souvenirs of many win- ters, and of a construction, hand-hewn and massive, to secure man from the raging elements. Such of these dilapidated little houses as the Government allowed to remain standing were often, in later months, seized upon eagerly in maneuvers as ideal nests for machine guns, and as such came to fill the eye of the dough-boy with suspicion and distrust. Clustered around these rustic cot- tages, and marking spots where others of equal magnificence had stood, rose many delicately formed small cedars, whose dusky richness formed landmarks which guided many a warrior, pleasure bent, to satiate his craving for pears, apples and cherries in the abandoned orchards that adjoined them.
2£ HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
At this time, great gangs of darkies were clearing sites and blasting stumps, hiding under any small brush nearby until after the explosion, frightened ashen-grey one moment and singing heart-high the next. Trucks from Truck Company S^S, which had only recently arrived from Texas, roared up and down the sandy roads, carrying piles of lumber and pipes, as well as cots and blankets for the first few barracks that were up. On many oc- casions, these trucks sank hubdeep in the soft Maryland sand, and it was no uncommon sight to see a mixed crowd of soldiers and laborers digging one of the mired trucks out of its over-soft resting place. Day and night the pile-drivers were at work and were followed in turn by gangs of carpfenters, erecting the frame- work of barracks, laying floors and putting on roofs, so that the Camp seemed to spring up from a waste almost by magic.
Through the balance of the day the selected men came pouring into the camp. All in civilian attire, their habiliments were as varied as their types. Some wore brown suits and some checked suits, some showed the latest cuts of a custom tailor's art and some were attired in the baggiest of trousers, coatless and with shirt sleeves rolled up. Their headgear was as variegated — straw hats, felt hats, derby hats, caps, and no hats. They carried suitcases, bags and bundles, these civilians — business men, school teachers, clerks, farmers, barkeepers, peddlers, laborers, Americans, Hebrews, Irish, Slavs — of all occupations and of many of the nationalities of the earth. Some were a little frightened, some dumb-struck by the sudden change in the more or less even tenor of their lives, others con- temptuous, the majority eager, but all, consciously or unconsciously, stirred deep down in their souls by what they were doing. They were proud to be playing their part in the world's most stupendous undertaking and, as a whole, they were pretty sure of themselves.
Daily, for the ensuing week, scenes similar to the foregoing were witnessed as contingent after contingent came swinging in, first from Pennsylvania and then from Maryland and the District of Columbia.
September 20 saw 2,304 men delivered at the camp — all Pennsylvanians. Adams County sent 120 of these; Bucks County, 80; Chester County, 142; Cumber- land County, 86; Dauphin County, 225; Delaware County, 277; Chester City, 179; Franklin County, 140; Juniata County, 45; Lancaster County, 208; Lebanon County, 138; Monroe County, 52; Northampton County, 75; Perry County, 59; Philadelphia, 113; Pike County, 29; York County, 317; and York City, 19.
Pennsylvania's eastern counties, still contributing, on September 21, added 2,615 to the growing total. They came as follows: Berks County, 315; Reading, 269; Carbon County, 127; Columbia County, 133; Scranton, 208; Luzerne County, 500; Wilkesbarre, 43; Montgomery County, 415; Norristown, 46; Montour County, 34; Schuylkill County, 363; Sullivan County, 37; Susquehanna County, 77 and Wyoming County, 38.
September 22 and 23 were Philadelphia days. Three Philadelphia boards had sent contingents on September 19 and one on September 20. Twenty boards entrained 2,490 men on September 22 and twenty-four boards sent 2,582 men the following day. In the five days Pennsylvania had sent 12,768 men to camp."
CAMP :\IEADE DAYS
23
Camp Meade- jHEtT no 5.
Map of Camp Meade, Md., Made by the Topoghaphic Section, 30-Ith Engineers, Fall, 1917
This area was occupied by the 79th Division during its mobilization and training before going over- seas— August, 1917-June, 1918
24 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
The District of Columbia sent its first forty-five per cent on September 26,'' 420 of its net cjuota of 929 men arriving at a})Out the same time that the first Balti- more contingent heralded the beginning of the Maryland influx. The Maryland movement continued from September 26 to September 30. The first day 700 men arrived from Baltimore and surrounding counties." By September 30, the forty-five per cent cjuota, 3,000 men, were in camp and a total of 16,000 raw re- cruits, from two states and the National Capital, awaited welding into soldiers.
Camp Meade, by October 1, 1917, was well on its way to becoming the second largest city in Maryland, a rank which it later attained. It was an unfinished city, however, and remained so until about November 30 of the same year. Not until that later date was it of sufficient size to house the entire division and the depot brigade, 40,000 men in all. Like all other cantonments and large war in- dustries, it sprang up like a mushroom. Its construction required 450,000,000 feet of lumber, used in the erection of 1200 wooden barracks, stables and other buildings. Most of the barracks were of two stories and housed between 200 and 250 men. Fifty-two miles of sewer pipe and fifty miles of water pipe were laid, the latter distributing 3,000,000 gallons of water daily.'
The cantonment was laid out along highly scientific lines with the parade grounds running through the centre, and the various brigade and Division units located to the east and west on either side. Barring the remount station, all the Division buildings lay to the north of the Washington, Baltimore and Annapolis Railroad, which passed through the cantonment grounds from east to west, with the Admiral and Disney sidings located on either side of the inverted "U", or southern mouth, of the parade grounds. Along these sidings for a distance of more than a mile stretched the Division warehouses. Turning northward through the centre of the parade grounds, on the right hand side were barracks of the following units in order: 304th Ammunition Train, 304th Supply Train, 304th Engineers, 316th Infantry, 315th Infantry, 312th Field Artillery, 23rd Engineers (not a Division unit), 311th Field Artillery, 310th Field Artillery and 304th Trench Mortar Battery.
On the left side of the parade grounds, beginning at the south, were the bar- racks of the 351st Field Artillery (colored) and 368th Infantry (colored) (neither a Division unit), 310th, 311th and 312th Machine Gun Battalions, 314th Infantry, 313th Infantry, Headquarters Troop, 304th Field Signal Battalion, 304th Sani- tary Train, 304th Division Trains and Military Police, 27th and 28th Engineers (not division units) , 324th Field Signal Battalion (not a Division unit) , and 154th Depot Brigade with its training battalions.
Division headquarters was almost in the centre of the encampment in front of the 313th Infantry barracks and facing the artillery brigade, while the three brigade headquarters were located in barracks housing particular brigade units. Beyond the parade ground, nearly a mile to the north, lay the permanent base hospital.
A task of tremendous magnitude confronted the officers and non-commis- sioned officers assembled in this large cantonment. They had been brought together suddenly to constitute the framework of a combat division and to direct its training — the training of thousands of men who had never before marched in
CAMP MEADE DAYS
25
formation, shouldered a rifle, obeyed orders, or had the slightest knowledge of military life and discipline. Only a handful of the Regular Army officers assigned possessed the experience necessary for the organizing and training of this mass of raw material. The large body of young oflScers from the Officers' Training Camp was somewhat divided as to pre\'ious military experience. A great many had been members of the National Guard and could draw upon the training secured in the enlisted or commissioned ranks there, but the majority confessed to no more military knowledge than that gained in three months at Fort Niagara. Most of the soldiers from the Regular Army, slated for non-commissioned posts, had seen but short service, owing to the absorption of the older and more valuable enlisted men in the expansion of the Regular Army. In fact, in many instances, the train- ing cadres sent to the National Army camps were used as means to clear Regular Army outfits of undesirable soldiers and, hence, proved of little assistance. But, if there was a dearth of experience, there was no lack of zeal, willingness and abil- ity, which, as later events showed, met and successfully overcame all obstacles.
New Material Going to be Outfitted
The handling of so large a body of untrained men as was shunted into Camp Meade during the last eleven days of September, 1917, was a serious problem alone. Outside of the framework of company and non-commissioned ofiicers, there was no organization to enable each unit to commence immediately its daily routine. These new arrivals were not yet soldiers, classified according to the tasks for which each one was fitted, but thousands of civilians taken from every walk of life and suddenly plunged into a new and strange environment. It was necessary to determine the qualifications of all of these men — -who could cook, who were mechanics, who had handled horses, who were chauffeurs, and most important, which ones possessed the quality of leadership to hold non-commis- sioned rank. It was this which gave the officers many trying days and much serious thought before every unit was functioning smoothly.
The personnel of the regiments was vastly different. Those which were made up of men drawn from Philadelphia or Baltimore contained far different types from those composed of men from the farm regions of the two states, and the
26 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
farmers, in turn, differed largely from miners from the Eastern Pennsylvania coal regions. An excellent indication of the various kinds and classes represented in the Division was secured in a statistical census taken by the 310th Field Ar- tillery.
In this one regiment there were fifteen nationalities, American, Russian, Italian, Polish, Austrian, Jewish, Swiss, English, Lithuanian, Greek, Bohemian, French, Irish, Roumanian, and even German. There were four different religious beliefs, Protestant, Catholic, Hebrew and Greek Catholic, while twenty-five men of the regiment asserted they had no religious adherence. As to educational at- tainments, but fifty men in the regiment had ever attended college, while 114 had no education of any sort. Others had been to elementary, gramnaar and high schools. These statistics are typical of other units in the Division. They indicate the heterogeneity of the regiments and the mammoth task it was to weld these thousands into a fighting unit.
Under the original plan, to place only selected men from Eastern Pennsyl- vania, Maryland and the District of Columbia in the Seventy-ninth Division, the geographical allocation was carried into the personnel of the various units as well. The best illustration of this method is given in the original distribution of the men from the fifty-one Philadelphia draft districts, which was as follows :
315th Infantry: Contingents from Local Boards Nos. 1, 9, li, 13, 17, 19, '21,
24, 26, 28, 29, 31, 34, 35, 36, 44, 47 and 51.
304th Engineers: Contingents from Local Boards Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 16 and 23.
312th Field Artillery: Contingents from Local Boards Nos. 8, 10, 18, 20, 22,
25, 30, 39, 41, 48 and 49.
316th Infantry: Contingents from Local Boards Nos. 32 and 43.
304th Field Signal Battalion: Contingent from Local Board No. 11.
314th Infantry: Contingents from Local Boards Nos. 3, 33, 37, 38, 42 and 46.
304th Ammunition Train: Contingent from Local Board No. 45.
310th Field Artillery: Contingents from Local Boards Nos. 7 and 40.-''
During the calling of the first 100 per cent every effort was made to assign tne men to the same regiment to which their predecessors from the local boards had gone, the idea being to make as distinct geographical units as possible. In carrying this out, the men from the District of Columbia were placed in the 312th Machine Gun Battalion; from Baltimore and Western Maryland in the 313th Infantry, and from Southern Maryland and the Eastern Shore in the 310th Field Artillery. Of the Pennsylvanians from the thirty-six counties, exclusive of Phila- delphia, those from the mining regions were sent to the 311th Field Artillery and the 314th Infantry, and from the central and southern counties of the state to the 316th Infantry, 304th Engineers, 310th and 311th Machine Gun Battalions and Division auxiliary troops. In the early months of the camp, before drafts from other sections of the United States had, in a measure, destroyed the geographical distinctions, two of the infantry regiments, the 313th and 315th, had been named "Baltimore's Own," and "Philadelphia's Own," respectively, because of their personnel.
CAMP MEADE DAYS
27
Before the rudiments of military training could be taught to the first con- tingent of 16,000 men, the War Department ordered another five per cent to the colors and, on October 5 and 6, a two day movement brought 1,739 men from Pennsylvania, 350 from Maryland and 50 from the District of Columbia. In addition, from Pennsylvania, between October 1 and 14, came numerous delayed contingents which should have reported in September, totaling 1,126 men." The five percent and the delinquents, added to the 16,000 of the first contingent, brought the total of selected men at Camp Meade as of October 11, 1917, to 20,- 300.=^ The War Department kept pace with the draft movement in supplying clothing for the new soldiers, and, on the same day that the total of 20,300 men was given for the cantonment, it was announced that the equipment which had gone to the camp consisted of 30,000 bedsacks, 80,532 blankets, 16,096 cotton breeches, 21,295 woolen breeches, 16,691 cotton coats, 24,188 woolen coats, 50,815
Recruits Lined Up for Their First Instbuction
summer drawers, 116,911 winter drawers, 42,062 hats, 24,111 leggings, 22,034 overcoats, 53,996 flannel shirts, 66,878 cotton stockings, 41,453 light woolen stockings, 48,615 cotton undershirts, 77,595 woolen undershirts and 36,642 pairs of shoes. -^
Receiving the clothing and assigning it to the men were different matters, particularly in the case of shirts, breeches, shoes and socks where the question of size intruded. Company and regimental supply officers realized the herculean task soon enough, but the sympathy was never extended to them but went to the "rookies" who couldn't be fitted. For several weeks after the first draft con- tingents arrived, companies could be seen daily at drill garbed in a weird mixture of civilian and military attire. The parade of the non-descripts was a feature of almost every organization of the Division until well into October. Even after O. D.'s (olive drab) were supposed to be plentiful, civilian articles of apparel clung tenaciously to each company. The problem was solved only when the supply officer succeeded in begging, swapping or stealing certain needed sizes of blouses, breeches, leggings, shoes, etc.
28 HISTORY OF THE SEVEXTY-NIXTH DIVI>IOX
Throughout the first week in October work went on in earnest, and all cleared spaces in and about the camp were filled from early morning until night with squads of men jierforming setting-up exercises and receiving instructions in the fundamentals of military training. The general lack of knowletlge was more than offset by the enthusiasm with which the men sought to learn. This spirit brought rt^-sults and within a few weeks markeii progress had been made. Squads, platoons, companies, regiments, in fact, had a military appearance when as- sembled and the men had a soldierly bearing when alone. As an illustration of the enthusiasm with which the transformation from civilian to soldier was carried on. four days after the first men had reached Camp Meade a uniformed band had been organized in the Sloth Infantr>- and on September '25 it played the National Anthem at retreat.- And all the while, as the drilling was carried on. the changes throughout the camp liecame marked. The old sweet potato and stjawl>erry patches around the barracks rapidly became tramped bare by the passage of countless feet, while the erection of the barracks went on apace. Where once had l>een a paying truck farm was now a drill field or an athletic ground. As the camp neared completion the contractors' army of laborers and artisans gradu- ally diminisheil. Fewer lurching lumber wagons, drawn by teams of Maryland mules, jolteii along the uneven ro;ids with their darkey drivers dozing on the seats. The roads, in turn, tlirough the tireless efforts of grading gangs, became more and more what roads should be, while rapid progress was made on the main liighway. a concrete U-shaped n^ad skirting the building line of the canton- ment.
The entire Division, as it was then constituted, was assembled upon the piirade grounds for the first time on OctoWr 11. 1917. the occasion being the for- mal opening of the Second Liberty Loan Drive. Genend Kuhn. from a stand erecteii on a knoll, delivered a brief address and the massed bands of the Divi- sion rendered a cretiitable performance.^ In addition to the rivalrj- between the thirty or more training camps and cantonments throughout the countrj- during the Second Loan, there was keen competition l^etween the various luiits of the Division to see wliich would subscribe the largest quota. In the end, ^l.TOO.OOO was subscril>ed by men of the Di\-ision. which took first place among National Army cantonments and second place among all the camps of the countrj".
AMiile the Liberty Loan camp;iign was under way. the War Department made the first of a long series of drafts upon Camp Meade, robbing the Di\ision of many of its trained men at a time when they were most needed to train pending incoming drafts. Between Octolier 16 and -20 the four infantrj" regiments were stripjieii of l.CXXt men each and two of the artillerj- regiments of 500 men apiece, making a total of 5,000 transferred to the Eighty-second Division at Camp Gor- don. Atlanta. Ga.-* To offset this another draft movement, calling for thirty percent more of the first quota, was ordered by the War Department. Notifica- tion of the pendiiig movement was given October ^7 to the State Draft authori- ties^ the instructions calling for the men to be sent to camp l>etween November ^ and 6.-* Pennsylvania responded with 7.S06 men in the period; Maryland with •2,000 and the District of Columbia with •250. The result brought the Di\-ision strength up to alx>ut -23.000.
CAMP MEADE DAYS
29
In the early days of the cantonment, the anxiety and concern of rehitivcs and friends of the men, wiio were solicitous for their material and moral welfare, caused a mixture of pity and amusement. The belief seemed to have prevailed that the moment a citizen put on a suit of khaki he became at once a starving hero, subjected to all manner of cruel and ruthless treatment from a relentless army discipline. Much that was both pathetic and ludicrous might be written upon this subject, but the main point is that the public had to be more or less educated to accept new and unusual situations at the same time that the citizen soldiers were being trained. The men themselves fell with avidity into army life. Can- teens appeared to take the place of the corner drug store and cigar stand; company messes were made more homelike by purchase of edible luxuries to garnish the army rations; some organizations bought cutlery and table wear and relegated the less inviting mess gear for use at Saturday inspections only; while sleeping in underwear and discarding a necktie slipped in like second nature. Man's adapta- bility to circumstances was evidenced on all sides.
Bihd's-eye View of the Cantonment from Division Headqbaktebs
At the same time the various welfare organizations stepped forward with much to offer in the way of recreation, amusement and education, moral and mental. The illiterates of the Division found, in the classes formed by the Young Men's Christian Association the opportunity to learn; the foreign-born, profiting likewise, took pride in the mastery of the English language, while the men with an eye to the future, who wished to speak French, found teachers only too ready to aid them. These various agencies, in addition to the Young Men's Christian Association, included the Knights of Columbus, the Jewish Welfare Board, the American Red Cross, the Young Women's Christian Association, the American Library Association, the Episcopal War Commissions of Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, and the Fosdick Commission on Training Camp Activities. Of all of them, probably the Y. M. C. A., with its central auditorium and eight huts conveniently located throughout the camp, was the most appreciated. Nightly entertainments, varying from song services to boxing matches, were held in each
30 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
of the "Y" buildings, while on Sunday religious services were conducted there by army chaplains or by denominational clergymen from outside the camp.
Several months after the camp opened, the Young Women's Christian As- sociation provided an artistic, well-built Hostess House which radiated cheer and hospitality to the members of the Division and the numerous visitors who flocked into the cantonment each week-end. The Knights of Columbus, Jewish Welfare Board, the Library Association and the Episcopal War Commissions also erected buildings for carrying on their several activities and contributed materially to the mantenance of contentment and morale. The Fosdick Commission provided an able and popular song leader in Kenneth Clark, who remained with the Division continuously and whose rallying cry, "Alre-a-d-y let's go-o-o-oh" became famous. He was a tower of strength upon many occasions. Colonel Tenney Ross, the Division Chief of Staff, credits Mr. Clark with doing "more than any other one man of or with the Division" in keeping the morale at a high standard and making the men satisfied with conditions. Later in the life of the camp, the Fosdick Commission also provided a large Liberty Theatre with a capacity of .3,000, where plays were provided nightly at a nominal fee.
Recreation and amusement, however, did not interfere with the grim business of preparing for modern warfare By the begnning of November the canton- ment was ready for something more than rudimentary training. On November 3, two distinguished foreigners, General McLauchlin, of the British, and General Vignal of the French War Missions to the United States, visited the camp to make arrangements for the attachment of British and French officers to the Divi- sion for training purposes. With them came Lieutenant Paul Rochat, a French expert on automatic rifles. The 158th Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier Gen- eral Hatch, and with Colonels Rosenbaum and Charles at the head of the 315th and 316th Infantry, respectively, paraded 4,000 strong before the visitors.='= The result of the inspection was apparent when, during the next week, there arrived a little group of ten British and French specialists in modern warfare, together ' with a number of non-commissioned officers from the two Missions. Included in the officers were Major Duncan Campbell and Major Liebenrood, from the Brit- ish Mission, and Captain Marie Adolphe de Casteja and Lieutenant Rochat, who had accompanied General Vignal on the visit of November 3, from the French Mission.-'
On Monday, November l^, the foreign officers began their courses in special instruction.-' Rifle ranges, bayonet courses and various types of trenches were constructed and the troops entered upon a period of advanced training. Every- thing became specialized. Bombing schools were organized, bayonet schools, schools of automatic arnas, intelligence schools, machine gun schools, small arms schools, schools of engineering, classes in gas defense, in signalling, in artillery fire, in first aid, in fact, schools and classes covering all of the major and many of the minor requirements for each of the units.
Thanksgiving Day came and brought leaves of absence for many of the men, and for those left in camp menus of turkey and cranberries, celrey, ice cream and pie, cake and candy — a true Thanksgiving dinner. From this time on, every week-end long trainloads of khaki-clad, healthy and well-disciplined soldiers left
CAMP MEADE DAYS 31
Camp Meade for Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington and the hundreds of little towns of Pennsylvania and Maryland which had sent their sons to form the Sev. enty-ninth Division. One of the largest leave of absence crowds journeyed to Philadelphia on December 1, to watch their Division football team play Camp Dix. The result was a set-back for the Seventy-ninth's championship aspirations as Camp Dix won, 13 to 6.-'
In mid-December the War Department renewed its drains upon the Divi- sion personnel. On December 12 a large draft of men was taken from the infantry brigades and transferred to the Fourth Division, at Camp Greene, N. C, and on December 13, sixty-nine second lieutenants of the Quartermasters' Corps, who had been temporarily assigned to the Division, were transferred, forty-nine to Camp Joseph E. Johnston and the remainder to Camp Greene.^' An event of interest preceded the Christmas holidays when, on Saturday. December ^'J, Sec- retary of War Newton D. Baker reviewed the Division and was quite compli- mentary upon its appearance.^' As Christmas approached preparations were made for the celebration of the day. Greens were picked and taken into all the mess halls, the curriculum was suspended for four days, and company funds were spent lavishly. Reports of Uncle Sam's gift of turkey for the big dinner filtered through the camp in advance. The day passed with many of the men on leave, while those who were obliged to remain in camp feasted bountifully and enjoyed themselves as much as it was humanly possible to do upon such an occasion away from home and in an army post.
With the beginning of the New Year, the War Department ordered all local boards to forward to Camp Meade sufficient men to fill up deficiencies in per- centage due to physical rejections at camp. At that time Camp jNIeade was sup- posed to have received eighty-six per cent of the first quota from all sources, but figures showed that approximately 3,000 more men were needed to make the eighty-six per cent accurate. ^^ The instructions were that the deficiencies were to be made up prior to February 15. As a result, on January 3, 1918, Philadelphia moved 881 men to camp. Pennsylvania's total between January 1 and February 1-t was 1,891,'" and Maryland's and the District of Columbia's about 1,100. These men, unlike those who had gone before, were not assigned immediately to units of the Division. Instead, they were placed in the 15-lth Depot Brigade, from where, after partial training, they were transferred to the special and technical services and to other divisions. Few of them found their way into the Seventy- ninth Division units. They went to aviation, engineering, ordnance, quarter- master and other special branches of the service. Between February 2 and 5 large drafts were sent from both the 15-lth Depot Brigade and also the long-suffer- ing infantry and artillery brigades to the Eighty-second Division, while another lot went to the Eightieth Division at Camp Lee, some to the Fifth Division and still others, in small dribbles, to other training camps. By the end of March, 1918, the depot brigade was almost depleted and the Division itself numbered scarcely more than 15,000 men.
Meanwhile there had been some few changes in the officer personnel. In January, 1918, the Third Officers' Training Camp was organized in the Division and, for those chosen to attend, three long months of intensive drilling, tiresome
32
HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
hours of study and nerve-racking examinations followed. On May 17, 1918, the camp ended with 103 soldiers receiving certificates of eligibility for commissions.^^ Prior to this, on December 15, 1917, a small number of commissioned men, gradu- ates of the Second Officers' Training Camp at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., were assigned to the Division.^*
In December, 1917, and January, 1918, had come cold weather and much snow. The winter of 1917-1918, in fact, was one of the bitterest in years. Its frigidity forced a partial abandonment of outdoor work; lectures in barracks took the place of training on the snow-covered drill fields. Even though barrack-room stoves were kept red hot, it was hard to keep warm.
Outside, the thermometer flirted always with zero. Sentries could testify to that as they felt the cold gripping at their finger tips and nipping their ears. So could the hapless companies hauled out on the ice-coated fields to stagger through the intricacies of a bayonet drill, each man expecting to see his opponent skid and receive the point of the weapon somewhere in his frozen anatomy. But
ik-'.-Ctf
304 ENGINEERS
Company Drill Atter Weeks of Training
miracles still happen, or at least they did that winter, for never a casualty was reported from these hazardous instructions. Right in the heart of the cold weather, on January 29th, the Second Battalion of the 304th Engineers was ordered off to Accotink, Virginia, to begin construction on one end of a spur railroad line run- ning from Accotink Station to Camp Humphreys. The work consisted of clear- ing timber, grading, making cuts and fills and building four trestles. Not until April was it finished and the battalion ordered back to Camp Meade. The winter training was dreary, at times discouraging and always amid discomforts, but the men persevered with unflagging zeal and, as April approach ^d, those who had been unmolested by the War Department drafts found themselves fast rounding into something considerably better than recruits.
During February, 1918, the final contingents of the first quota had been called out, the men arriving at camp between February 18 and 28, with some de- layed shipments in the first two weeks in March. Pennsylvania contributed 2,945 men to complete its quota;" Maryland, 1,000, and the District of Columbia
CAMP ]\IEADE DAYS
Emergency Road Construction by the 304th Engineers at Camp Meade
1. Placing stringers for the foundation
2. View of excavation and foundation
3. Placing corduroy for the sm-face
34
HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
about 100. These proved a mere drop in the bucket to the insatiable demand for men from other camps and finally, in late March, a second quota was demanded from the divisional territory. The War Department went further afield, however, and dropped the old boundary lines, ordering men to Camp INIeade not only from Pennsylvania, Maryland and the District of Columbia, but from West Virginia and Ohio. The movement began on April 1 and continued, with slight interrup- tions, for a whole month. The final shipment, on May 1, consisted of 465 men from Ohio.^° The total movement was 8,316, of which '-2,700 were from Pennsyl- vania, 1,000 from Maryland, a few from the District of Columbia, and the bal- ance from West Virginia and Ohio.
AVhile this converging movement was on foot, the various units of the Divi- sion acquired their first taste of army life under real field service conditions. Late
Sunset View of Pup Tent Camp
in March, each organization was required to hike out to the fringe of the reserva- tion and pitch a shelter tent camp for at least one night. The chill of wnter was still in the air and the ground had not yet dried out from its winter deluge of snow and rain. The troops, however, regarded their one night stand as a wel- come relief from the monotony of work in the regimental areas, and carried through their maneuver in a manner that drew commendation from the Division Staff.
Shortly after this the Division was given an opportunity to show the results of its long months of hard work by a review in Baltimore on April 6 before the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, President Wilson, in commemoration of the first anniversary of America's entry into the World War. The Di\-ision marched from Camp INIeade to Baltimore and back, '2^1 miles each way, and in this, the first real test of endurance, the men acquitted themselves well. It was a great day for the Division as rank after rank of those, who a few months before had been untrained civilians, passed through the streets, erect in carriage, keen eyed and
CAMP MEADE DAYS 35
bronzed by the outdoor training. With "eyes right," platoon after platoon passed the official reviewing stand whereon the President and his party showed their appreciation of the moulding of a greater American Army as typified by the Seventy-ninth Division. The occasion was an especially eventful one for the 313th Infantry, which marched on home soil for the first time since created at Camp Meade.
Shortly after the review at Baltimore, the 31'-2th Field Artillery was given an opportunity to shake the dust of Camp Meade for a two-days hike. On April 25 the entire regiment, in llea^•y marching order, went out the Baltimore pike and wound through the picturesciue hilly country to a camp site on a bluff over- looking the Severn River. It was a twenty-one mile hike and wound up with every artilleryman in the outfit swimming in the Severn. The regiment broke camp the following day and returned by the shortest route to the cantonment. The hike was repeated on May 3 and 4, being made particularly interesting on the second occasion by a sham battle the first day and a rain storm during the night which blew down ninety per cent of the pup tents. The camp on the Sev- ern was made possible through the friendship between the owner of the land and Major James Patterson, commanding the second battalion. Excluding the re- view at Baltimore, the 31'-2th Artillery and the 304th Engineers were the only outfits to get away from Camp ]Meade for over night stretches during the period of the divisional training there.
The result of the intensive and specialized training became apparent as spring crept on. Upon one occasion the machine gun units of the Division gave a demon- stration of indirect firing and barrage work before a group of officials from the War Department and high-ranking officers of the Army. This demonstration, directed by Major Liebenrood, of the Briti.sh Machine Gun Corps, was fired with the new Browning guns. It was a distinct success and was instrumental in es- tablishing confidence in the new Browning, which later resulted in its adoption as standard equipment.
During the week after the return from the Division review in Baltimore, the S16th Infantry regiment repaired to the target range, on the southern end of the cantonment. ^^ For six days the men sought to make marksmen of themselves. During this time they slept in shelter tents, securing just a glimpse of some of the experiences in store for them. The 316th was followed to the range by the 315th. which was succeeded in turn by the two regiments of the 157th Infantry Brigade. On May 3, the 314th Infantry was awarded the highest honors for rapid fire work at the 100, SOO and 300 yard rifle range. The regiment made the best showing of any unit in the National Army, thirty-one of the men cjualifying for the mid- ranges. ''
With the rifle practice completed, the attention of the entire Division was turned to the "open war game." Hitherto the trend of training had been toward trench warfare, but a new era of fighting seemed to be developing on the Western Front and its effect was apparent in the changed curriculum at Camp Meade. A bayonet assault course was constructed by one of the regiments as part of the larger scheme of offensive M'ork, and, by mid-May, the Division as a whole was solving real problems; "capturing" strategic points, "outmaneuvering" strong
36
HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
columns, "routing" heavy attacks, and "surprising" unsuspecting encampments. The new training had a novelty to it which the tedious instruction through the winter had lacked. The men took part with avidity in the new "game," and Division "oflfensives" were remarkably battle-like save for the absence of gun- powder.
During the spring months a great deal of stress was laid upon the subject of gas training and gas discipline. Certain officers and non-commissioned officers were selected from each regiment to take a special course of training at the Divi- sion Gas School, in order that they might serve as instructors in their respective units. Returning from the Division course of training, they lost no time in ex- plaining the dread effects of German gas, to which explanations their comrades listened with broad, sickly grins, and learned to don the gas mask in less than five
Rifle Practice on the Range at Camp Meade, Md., Spring, 1918
seconds. As a grand finale to the general course of gas instruction, each com- pany was required to visit the gas chamber, located in a ravine near the south- western edge of the reservation, and there spend a certain amount of time in a room filled with lachrymatory gas.
But still the Division was being robbed of its men by the War Department. On April 24 a total of 1900 were sent to the Twenty-eighth Division at Camp Han- cock, and the drain continued until June, when the Division had been reduced in strength to 12,000 men. This was despite the fact that in May alone 11,065 men were added in a third call upon the two original states. The third quota began to arrive on May 25, when 2,038 men were despatched from thirty-six Pennsyl- vania counties. The subsequent arrivals were, May 26, 1,244 from Philadelphia, May 27, 1,500 from Philadelphia and 1,085 from Eastern Pennsylvania and 500 from six Maryland counties; May 28, 500 from Baltimore, 220 from Maryland,
CAMP MEADE DAYS 37
446 from Philadelphia and 1,180 from Pennsylvania, and jNIay 29, 675 from Balti- more and 618 from Pennsylvania.'* The majority of these men got no further into Camp Meade than the Depot Brigade, taking the place of 2,126 men for- warded elsewhere on May 30 and 31, of which 1502 went to Camp Lee and 574 to Fort Niagara. These 2,126 comprised many of the men who had arrived at the camp in the late April draft.''
The reasons lying behind the wholesale raids upon Camp Meade for men are much in dispute. Whether it was failure of the volunteer system, failure of the cantonment builders to meet contract time, failure of the War Department to call sufficient men to the colors in the beginning, or lack of vision of the political leaders of the period are mooted questions. Whatever the causes were, the re- sidt was disheartening and discouragmg to the Seventy-nmth Division, as it was also called upon to furnish details of officers who were sent to the various towns /
in eastern Pennsylvania to stmiulate recruiting for the Twenty-eighth Division, i'"*"^ Approximately 95,000 men were called to Camp Meade to be trained and of these only 27,000 were retained by the Division.^" In addition to that, of the 27,000, about 15,000 were men selected for military training in June of 1918 and conse- quently went overseas with the Division as green troops. Maryland and the Dis- trict of Columbia alone of the original Camp Meade area contributed quotas to the final draft. No more men went from Pennsylvania after the month of May. Maryland sent 2,150 men beginning June 22; the District of Columbia sent 300 and the balance were received from New York City, Brooklyn, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, Ohio and West Virginia.*' In the time allotted before sailing, it was impossible to give these men, representing fifty-eight per cent of the Division, more than the mere rudiments of a military educaton. They secured overseas clothing, accoutrements and rifles along with the rest of the Division, learned the elements of movements by columns, had a brief lesson or two in the use of the gas mask and that was all.
By June the War Department was beginning to establish records in the way it was shipping men to the American Expeditionary Forces. Rumors of sailing orders, which had been prevalent around the cantonment for several months, grew more believable. Issuance of the overseas equipment was evidence that a movement was anticipated soon. The departure between June 26 and 29 of ad- vance detachments from the various units was significant enough.*- The per- sonnel of the Division, even to the newest recruits, was more than satisfied to get away soon. To a man, the Division was eager to go.
CHAPTER II
OVERSEAS AND THE TRAINING AREA
TN THE first six months of 1918, while the Seventy-ninth Division at Camp -'■ Meade was being plucked of its men more rapidly than the local boards
could supply them, the war had brought grave conditions to the Western Front. The old stalemate of trench warfare was at an end. Ludendorff, that German Quartermaster General who specialized in shock formations, was hammer- ing at the Allied hue. Amiens in March ! Flanders in April! To the Marne in May! Montdidier in June! Four offensives in four months and the last twoof them toward Paris!' The Germans had battered their way to within seventy kilometers of the French Capital and the struggle "had cut wide swaths in the British and French ranks."^ Elements of three American divisions had been thrown into the fighting — the First at Cantigny, the Third at Chateau Thierry, and the Second at Belleau Woods and Vaux. More American divisions were training behind the battlefront and still more were on the way overseas. France, England and America had pooled their maritime interests in the hour of dire ne- cessity. The joint tonnage had transported 2-25,000 men across the Atlantic in May and 230,000 in June.^ July's record was to eclipse that, and, to the Seventy- ninth Division fell the honor of being in the forefront of the July movement.
On June 30, 1918, General Kuhn and his staff and the Advance School De- tachment of the Divison, composed of various regimental officers and enlisted men who had left Camp Meade between June 25 and 28, sailed from New York for France. Their departure marked the first move of the Division toward the battlegrounds of Europe. The Division Commander and his staff sailed on the Calamares; the regimental infantry officers and all the enlisted men on the Duca Degli d'Abruzzi, and the regimental artillery officers on the Mongolia. These ships were in a convoy of ten others and arrived in Brest on July 13.
The departure of General Kuhn left the command of the Division at Camp Meade to Brigadier General Nicholson, of the 157th Infantry Brigade. It was the second time in the history of the cantonment that he had been at the helm, there having been a period of about nine weeks in the winter of 1917-18 when the Com- manding General and his Chief of Staff made a tour of inspection on the Western Front. Upon General Nicholson devolved the task of entraining the Division for the port of embarkation. His success was noted after the war when, in an address before the General Staff College at Washington, the Chief of the Trans- portation Service, Brig. Gen. Frank T. Hines U. S. A., stated that "the Seventy- ninth made the quickest entrainment of any division in the United States."^
(38)
OVERSEAS AND THE TRAINING AREA 39
Changes in commanding officers in a number of the units also had taken place, some permanent and others merely temporary. Colonel Darrah, of the 314th Infantry, and Colonel Rosenbaum, of the 315th Infantry, had been promoted to brigadier generals and transferred to other divisions, the latter being detached upon the eve of departure from Camp Meade. ^ Lieutenant Colonel ^Yilliam H. Oury succeeded to the command of the 314th, and was promoted to his full Colonelcy on May 12th, 1918, and assigned to command the 314th Infantry; but in the 315th where the lieutenant-colonelcy was vacant and the two senior majors were in the Advance School Detachment, the command devoh'ed ujjon INIajor Francis V. Lloyd, of the third battalion.^ In the Artillery Brigade, Colonel Howard L. Landers had, some time before, succeeded Colonel Dan T. [Nloore in command of the 310tli Artillery,'' while other new leaders were Captain Edward \V. Madeira, Headcfuarters Troop, vice Captain Pleasonton, promoted to Major and assigned as Adjutant of the 157th Infantry Brigade," and ^Major Stuart S. Janney, Sl'ith Machine Gun Battalion, vice Major Zane, transferred. As Bri- gadier General Hatch also had been detached from the Division, the 158th Infantry Brigade command fell to Colonel Charles, of the 316tli Infantry, as the senior ranking officer. Also, a new unit had been organized in May, the 304th Engineer Train, commanded first by Lieutenant Clinton W. Morgan and later by Lieutenant Edward A. Hill. With all of these changes, some of several months previous and others of a more recent date, the manner in which General Nicholson and his various unit commanders won the praise of the Chief of the Transportation Service is a tribute to their individual ability.
The units of the Division began to entrain at Disney Station on July 6. Ef- forts had been made toward the utmost secrecy in carrying out the troop move- ment; but for a week or more the atmosphere of the cantonment had been electric with rumors of the Division's departure, and on Saturday, July 6, and Sunday, July 7, there were quite a number of mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers and sweethearts on hand to bid the men a heart-aching farewell as companies, bat- talions and regiments marched across the parade ground for the last time and halted along the tracks, awaiting their turn to board the long trains of day coaches. By nightfall of July 7 all had gone except the Artillery Brigade and Ammunition Train. The troop trains ran north, each containing a noisy and excited crowd. There could be no concerted effort to give a rousing send-off to the men of the Division. Theoretically, no one in civilian life was to know they were going. Yet, somehow, at the little towns, the station platforms were fairly ■well crowded with cheering people, and at North Philadelphia, where all the trains made a brief stop, the word had spread that the Division was bound overseas, and the relatives and friends of Philadelphia men were on hand by the hundreds.** Beyond Phila- delphia lay a quick run across New Jersey, and then ferries from the Jersey City railroad yards took the men to the great embarkation piers at Hoboken.
The U. S. S. Leviathan, once the famous Hamburg-American liner Vater- land, was waiting at Hoboken for part of the Seventy-ninth Division. On July 7 and 8 the embarkation was carried out until slightly more than 10,000 troops were on board. These, with the crew, made more than 13,000. The Division units on board were Division Headquarters, Headquarters Troop, 310th Machine
40
HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
Gun Battalion, 304th Field Signal Battalion, and the 157th Infantry Brigade complete (313th and 314th Infantry and 311th Machine Gun Battalion). It is interesting to note that the two machine gun battalions were the first to sail over- seas equipped with the new Browning guns.
The sailing of the great liner is best described in the words of one of the of- ficers of the Division who was a passenger:
I have a distinct recollection of the evening of July 8, 1918, when, with a screech of her siren, the Leviathan left her pier at Hoboken. We had just completed our first Abandon Ship drill, and the troops were all on deck as the engines of the ship moved her away from the pier. As she swung down stream, gaining speed at every moment, the troops all cheered and the bands played. On the buildings of New York were great crowds of
m-:.
U. S. S. Leviath.^n
people likewise cheering, and every whistle, both in the city and on the ships in the river saluted the ship. Above all, on each flagstaff were the Stars and Stripes, flying at half-mast in honor of Mayor Mitchell, who had just been killed in an airplane acci- dent, but flying, nevertheless, triumphant. We stayed on deck as the ship moved down stream in the afternoon sunlight and passed the Statue of Liberty, which we were not to see again for many long months. Finally, as twilight came and the land gradu- ally disappeared in the west, the word was passed to clear the decks and we went below.
German submarines had appeared off the American coast in June, so war- ships of Squadron No. 1, Cruiser Force, U. S. N., were escorting all troopships to
OVERSEAS AND THE TRAINING AREA 41
a rendezvous twelve hours out of New York, where the overseas convoy usually was formed.' The Leviathan, because of her superior speed, left the cruisers at the end of the twelve hour period and steamed onward alone, disdaining protection in the twenty-two knot speed of her engines. Life on board was not monoton- ous. It could not be with 13,000 human beings packed on the great ship. The feeding of some 10,000 troops on board was a stupendous task in itself, but was accomplished successfully twice a day. The meals were served in the main salon of the big ex-German liner and were excellent, which is more than can be said regarding some of the other transports. Constant practise in the "Abandon Ship" drill was the chief evidence of danger from enemy U-boats. The men became so expert that, before many days out, they could clear their compart- ments and get to their lifeboat stations in slightly more than seven minutes after "Abandon Ship" was sounded on the bugle. Incidents typical of the voyage are found in a memorandum of July 13, 1918, for "Officers' Call." It is an almost forgotten bit of war-time literature, but quotations from it are interesting. For illustration, the following:'"
Services will be held for the 313th Infantry on B deck aft Starboard at 10.30 A. M. tomorrow. Services will be held on B deck aft Port at the same time for the 314th Infantry.
Or this:
It is reported that Head(|uarters Company, Supply Conipany and part of Company G, 314th Infantry quartered in E. R. S. 1, moved out to dinner ahead of their time. Apparently no officers were present with these men.
Or even this:
It is reported that at the "Abandon Ship" drill 11:00 A. M., July 13, Company L, 313th Infantry, came from the upper decks with no officer leading. This Company was halted with its head at No. 4 Stairway, thereby causing more congestion.
Anyone desiring reading matter on the voyage found it in the twenty-seven or more pages of memorandum on "Provisional Instructions on Embarkation, Entraining and Detraining of Troops in France and England; also General In- structions for Debarkation on Base Sections."^' The memorandum, as formidable as its title implies, consisted of an original on July 3 and extensive supplements on July 10 and 11. It contained information of all variety, ranging from orders to erase distinguishing marks from base drums to form sheets for lighter services, with advice on spies, French money, rest camp rations and many other matter, thrown in.
Four destroyers picked up the Leviathan, when twenty-four hours out of Brest, on July 14. Everyone had been feeling a little uneasy, knowing they were in the danger zone, and it was with the greatest sense of relief and security that the men viewed the greyhounds which were to escort them to port. The big troop- ship arrived at Brest on the morning of July 15, six and one-half days after leaving New York'^ and but two days after the arrival of General Kuhn and the Advance
42 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
School Detachment, who had sailed on June 30. On July 16 the debarkation was completed, the troops moving to Pontanezen Barracks and vicinity for a rest of three days.'^
On July 9, the day after the Leviathan sailed from Hoboken, a second convoy put out from New York Harbor with the 158th Infantry Brigade complete (315th and 316th Infantry and 312th Machine Gun Battalion), 304th Engineers, 30-ltli Engineer Train, 304th Division Trains and Military Police, 304th Supply Train and 304th Sanitary Train. These units of the Division were di\ided among five transports, the Agamemnon, America, La France, Mount Vernon and Ori- zaba. The Agamemnon carried all of the 316th Infantry except Co. ^I and the Supply Company;" the America bore the 315th Infantry;" La France had on board the 312th Machine gun Battalion, 304th Engineers and Engineer Train, and the balance of the 316th Infantry/^ and the other Trains were on the Mount Vernon and Orizaba.
Poignant recollections of this sailing from home are brought back in this description, written by the historian of the 316th Infantry, who was aboard one of the troopships of this convoj':''
"The subway was filled with its evening rush crowd; the commuters were jamming the ferries to Jersey; the lights of Man- hattan were barely awakening into radiance; the thoughts df some millions of busy humans were turning once more to home in tene- ment or flat or mansion, as the Agamemnon, with a hoarse blast of its siren, left its dock and floated down the river, past the crowded ferries, past the figure of Liberty and out into the broad Atlantic. Behind lay the imposing sky-line of New York, a mass of majestic ghosts in the twilight — ahead, lay France, and thte Western Battlefront."
Unlike the voyage of the Leviathan, the trip of the second convoy proved eventful. At 11.50 o'clock on the night of July 14, the America rammed the British freight steamer Indesiructo. The America, at that time the third largest transport carrying the American flag, was running without lights at a speed of about fifteen knots. The big ship's bow plunged into the freighter amidships, plowing through it like a knife and practically cutting it in two. The Indestructo was hurled to starboard where it sank in seven minutes. ^^ The America, veering off and coming to a stop, well nigh collided with the La France.^' Lifeboats from the America rescued eleven of the forty-two members of the crew of the freighter. The rest were lost.'^
Two days later, on the morning of July 16, eight sub-chasers arrived to escort the five transports into Brest. Their presence proved fortunate when, on the following morning, an enemy submarine was sighted. It dove as the sub-chasers started toward it, and then emerged a little astern of the convoy. The after port gun of La France was fired and the U-boat submerged. The sub-chasers bombed the spot for an hour, but nothing happened.'*
The transports reached Brest, without further incident, on the afternoon of July 18, and debarkation began at once. The men were marched to open fields adjoining Pontanezen Barracks and pitched shelter tents, resting for three days
OVERSEAS AND THE TRAINING AREA 43
where "the face of the land m'HS pleasant enough but the face of the sky was marred with continual weeping."'^
To return to the Artillery Brigade at Camp Meade. The three regiments, the Trench Mortar Battery and the Ammunition Train had watched the infantry, machine gunners and other units depart on July 6 and 7, knowing their own turn would come soon. The order arrived in time to send them forth on July 13. The trains took them not to Jersey City, but to the Port Richmond piers at Phila- delphia where, awaiting them, was the most nondescript collection of troop ships the men could imagine. It consisted of the Haverford and Northland, former liners which had been converted into au.xiliary cruisers, transports, supply ships or anything else the British Navy had required of them in four years of war, and the Saxonia, Mesaha, Nevasa and Morvada, all of which had been horse or cattle ships for several years. A great crowd, which grew as the word spread that the artillery of the Seventy-ninth Division was embarking, congregated on the water- front to say good-bye. During the morning of July 14, Bastille Day, the vessels were freighted with their human cargo. The departure is described by the his- torian of the 310th Field Artillery, who was on board the Northland:-''
In broad daylight the ship pulled out and passed down the river, cheered by the crowds on ferry boats and pier heads. Next morning the hotels of Cape May loomed out of the mist off the port beam; by dark we passed Fire Island Light. Wednesday night, the 17th, we lay off Halifax and nosed into the harbor next morning. The larger part of the fleet already lay at anchor but we lay over two days while the stragglers came in. Saturday, July ^20, at 8 A. M., the convoy filed out, twenty-two transi)orts and freighters, one light cruiser, H. M. S. Berwick, another of the "leaf" type, and two sub-chasers. From ships, shore and docks, bands played and crowds cheered. At sundown the chasers turned back; with the danger zone extending to our own coast, the great fleet seemed curiously naked and exposed."
On July 30, the artillery transports arrived off the coast of England and paused to await the escort of destroyers due to guide them through the danger zone. This picturesciue and thrilling incident in the passage to France is well described by an officer of the 311th Artillery on board the Saxonia-}^
At last they topped the crest and tore over the horizon — two, four, sbc, eight destroyers — and bore down uj)on us, their funnels pouring out great clouds of dense black smoke, the spray dashing wildly from their bows, careening over to port, then to starboard, in seeming imminent peril of vanishing for good and all beneath the surface but suddenly bobbing up again and crash- ing through the waves. Then they were upon us.
As we approached land, though not yet in sight, our own look- outs gave the dreaded warning, "Submarine in sight^" Like a flash the destroyers wheeled and struck across our bows to the starboard side. The transport came out of its lethargic mood and, like an ancient gray-hided monster, suddenly lurched for- ward with a crash and roar and dropped a shell two hundred feet in front of our bows, but, if the truth must be told, the gallant old hulk had fired at a fish which had lucklessly leapt out of its ele-
44
HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
ment, tossing up white foam in its path. Meanwhile the destroy- ers were combing the sea, blasting the depths for miles around with their powerful and deadly bombs. For some time the heavy detonations continued and then, slowly, steadily, a film of oil rose and spread, carrying the tale of success to our arms. Out it stretched in a great wide pool, sinister, merciless, betraying the death of the skulking Boche. Back swept the destroyers, and falling into line, the convoy pushed on, and then, in sight of land, our party split, each boat destined for a different port.
The transports docked at Liverpool and Birkenhead, England, and Avon-
Ttpical French Locomotive
mouth, Wales, on July 31, the men being sent to the rest camp at Knotty Ash and subsequently to the American camp at Romsey. On the night of August 3 and 4, the 311th Field Artillery crossed the channel from Southampton to Cher- bourg, France; the 312th crossed and debarked at Le Havre on August 5, and the 310th at Cherbourg on August 8. While the completion of this final step, the entire Division was at last in France. However, it was not assembled there, nor was it to be until after the Armistice. Henceforth, save where otherwise indicated, the term, "Division," will exclude the Artillery Brigade.
Some time before the i\.rtillery Brigade reached France, the balance of the Division had departed from Brest for a training area. To the men, the three days in the rest camp had been a nightmare. But few had been billeted in the Pon- tanezen Barracks, the majority sleeping in shelter tents in the mud. Commenting upon the conditions, the historian of the 304th Sanitary Train states that "at first men became righteously indignant over conditions but later came to regard the 'rest camp' idea as an atrocious form of Yank humor, and so just grinned and
OVERSEAS AND THE TRAINING AREA
45
stood up under the strain.--" On July 19, Division Headquarters, Headquarters Troop, SlOtli Machine Gun BattaHon and the 157th Infantry Brigade were marched back to Brest and informed that they were headed for the Twelfth Training Area- to which had been ordered all of the Division except the Artillery Brigade and the Artillery Section of the Ammunition Train. The men embarked in some- thing new — French box cars, now forever famed in American Expeditionary Force annals as "Hommes 40, Chevaux 8," a title drawn from the legend painted upon each car. These queer vehicles called to mind a paragraph in the debarkation memorandum which had read:"
An "8-40" French Box-car — the Soldier's Traveling Pal.\ce
Box cars are usually provided for the accommodation of the troops. They hold from 3'-2 to 40 men. Sometinies seats are provided. Straw will be pro^■ided whenever practicable to make the men as comfortable as possible when traveling in cold weather. Space at each end of the car should be left clear for rifles, rations and accoutrements; the rifles being secured by an improvised rack made with screw rings and a strap or sling.
The paragraph had not exaggerated. If anything, it had painted a prettier picture than the real articles turned out to be. For three days these box cars were the habitation of the "Hommes 40"; fortunately there was no attempt to crowd in the "Chevaux 8." The way led through the very heart of France, dis- closing scenes of rural beauty which thrilled and yet saddened the men. The absence of young men in the towns and villages and the use of women to take their places in fields provided a deep reminder of what war meant. Men unaccustomed to a dearth of youth for farm work, found it strange indeed to see women spading or plowing in the fields. German prisoners also were seen work-
46 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
ing along the railroads. And the men of the Division from the farming com- munities eyed with astonishment the land cultivated and divided into neat little strips of different kinds of crops. Always the French people were cheerful, inter- ested in the Americans, and gave them gay receptions. The route led by way of Laval-Rennes and Le Mans. At the latter place while one of the troop trains stopped in the train shed, a number of Turkos were brought in wounded, all cov- ered with mud and badly cut up. In a large baggage hall many stretchers were lined up, each containing a very badly wounded man. The men standing about were astonished to think that a battle was on so near; that is, near enough to al- low men so badly wounded to be transported from it and still live. The wonders and discomforts of the ride were brought to a close only with the arrival, on July 22, in the Twelfth Training Area around Chatillon-sur-Seine.
Before the balance of the Division put in an appearance at Chatillon-sur- Seine, General Headquarters decided suddenly that the Seventy-ninth Division should go to the Tenth Training Area, around Champlitte and Prauthoy, in the Department of Haute-Marne and midway between Dijon and Langres. The decision was reached in time to divert tlie 158th Infantry Brigade, which had entrained at Brest on July 21 and 22, but the 157th Infantry Brigade and Division units were getting comfortably ensconced in the Twelfth Training Area and had to be rooted out of their billets around July 25 and consigned to truck trains for another ride. Fortunately, the distance was short. By July 29, the final units had reached the area designated. Division Headquarters were established at Prauthoy; 157th Infantry Brigade Headquarters at Champlitte and 158th Infantry Brigade Headquarters at Vaux-sous-Aubigny near Esnomes. The various out- fits were scattered among some thirty-eight towns, a few being Boussenois, Choil- ley, Chassigny, Percy-le-Grand, Maatz, Dommarien, Courcelles, Chalancey, and Leuchey, which made up the area. The soldiers were billeted in stables, barns and anything else with a roof on it. In many instances "the billets of the men were identical with the billets of horses, cows and chickens; foul, dark, damp places, reeking with a million unsavory odors."" The 304th Sanitary Train had its work cut out during that occupation of the training area and spent many weeks making that particular spot in France measure up to American Sanitary stand- ards.
By the first of August the intensive training schedule was laid out and the men realized suddenly that the lessons of Camp Meade days had been little more than the primer of warfare. Several of the French officers, assigned to the Div- ision in America, had accompanied it overseas and they were augmented by many more, all specialists in their several lines — Captains Antoine Prevost Du Comte, Antone Raoul Erondelle and Robert Feuardent, First Lieutenants Paul Medinger, Louis Olivier, Emile Comoy, Stephan Knocker, and Second Lieutenants Edouard Cauchois, Henri Castel, Raymond Bezancon, Andre Garelle and Jean Bezos.^ Eight hours a day were devoted to training, and made a varied and crowded cur- riculum.
The war was not waiting for anyone in those days of August, 1918. The German had shot his bolt at Rheims and Chateau Thierry on July 15 and was being hurled back by American and French troops across the Marne and the
OVERSEAS AND THE TRAINING AREA 47
Ourcq to the Vesle, while, further north, the British had opened up the magnifi- cent August offensive in which two more American divisions were about to par- ticipate.
It was the task of the Seventy-ninth Division to learn much and learn quickly, for it was needed at the front. Rifle ranges were constructed and the men who had joined in the June draft had their first opportunity to receive instruction in musketry, to fire at various ranges and to become generally acquainted Mitli their rifles. Specialists were selected and received individual instruction as automatic riflemen, carriers, rifle grenadiers, runners, bombers and so forth. A Division Intelligence School, established at St. Broingt-Le-Bois, had a large attendance and trained the men who subsequently functioned in the intelligence detachments with division, brigade and regimental headquarters. The machine gun battalions sent experts to the machine gun companies of the infantry to train them in handling the light Brownings, first of their kind to be used abroad.'-* Maneuvers formed a large part of the instructions. Division terrain exercises were held weekly in the ^-icinity of Freftes near Champlitte, to train the elements of the Division in the important work of liaison and combat.
In the middle of August, the officers and men who had formed the Advance School Detachment rejoined the Division, and others were sent to the Second Corps School at Chatillon." Some changes had also been made in the unit com- manders. On July 27, Lieutenant Colonel Alden C. Knowles, of the 316th In- fantry, had been transferred to the 315th Infantry and was later commissioned a colonel and assigned permanently to the regiment.-* In the SlOth Machine Gun Battalion, INIajor A. W. Smith was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and became Divisional ^Machine Gun Officer, being succeeded by Captain J. L. Evans, pro- moted to major." On August 14, Brigadier General Robert H. Noble arrived and was assigned to the command of the 158th Infantry Brigade.--
As the period of training approached an end, surplus clothing and equipment were salvaged. Steel helmets and gas masks were issued. The gas officers and non-commissioned officers, recently returned from a short term at gas school, told gruesome stories of the German use of different kinds of deadly vapors.
Influenza first made its presence felt in the Division in the latter part of August. In one organization, the 304th Engineers, the epidemic became so severe that it was quarantined. In the late August period, the Division had a total of about 600 cases with four per cent mortality.-^
The country about Champlitte and Prauthoy had never been scorched by the fires of the World War. It was picturesque from one end of the training area to the other, with the peasants always ready to extend a hearty greeting. ]Men of the Ammunition Train tell of a large sign displayed on the town hall, or hotel de ville. of one of the places they entered, bearing the inscription, "Welcome to our American Friends," and of the formal address of welcome delivered by the town's patriarch, while the children and girls threw flowers to the men standing in the ranks. There was, however, little to do in the area by way of recreation. At the end of a hard day's work the sole amusements would be a stroll through quaint village streets, a halting conversation with a native, or a glass of light wine sipped in a sidewalk cafe. Regulations forbidding the sale of strong liquors
48 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
were enforced by the military authorities, and were well observed on the part of the French population. The conduct of the American soldiers, General Kuhn is quoted as saying, was in every respect all that could be desired.
News of what was going on at the front was received by the various units daily. On August 18, the office of G-2, Seventy-ninth Division, began the issu- ance of Summaries of Intelligence, which embraced the activities of the Allies and the enemy, and the mimeographed copies were posted on each company bul- letin board for one day and then destroyed.^' Copies of the London Daily Mail, the Continental edition of the New York Herald, the Stars and Stripes, and news- papers and magazines from home, were read with eagerness.
In late August three officers of the Division participated in a successful de- ception of the enemy as to the actual point where the initial attack of the First American Army was to be launched. The trio, none of whom dreamed they were merely acting as decoys were. Major George A. Wildrick, G-3 of the Division staff; Major Alfred R. Allen, of the 314th Infantry, later killed in action and Major Norman E. Borden, of the 315th Infantry. They were sent under secret orders to Belfort, in the Sixth (American) Corps front line sector, near the Swiss border. At Belfort they were instructed to make a reconnaissance of the sector opposite Altkirch, which, they were told, would be the area selected for the Seventy-ninth Division to attack in a pending offensive, vast preparations for which were al- ready underway. As the officers learned long afterwards, the entire affair was a "demonstration" which misled the Boche and resulted in some German divisions being sent to that part of the front, with the consequent weakening of other sec- tors. This will explain many a rumor which circulated in the Division Training Area at the time. The ruse was so well kept a secret that it deceived everyone except those few who knew its purpose.
September came and the first day of the month found several of the units that were billeted on the outer edge of the area, headed toward Champlitte, with full field equipment, on a march of concentration which was scheduled to con- clude with a divisional maneuver by the entire Division on September 3d. How- ever, before the end of the first day's hike, news had apparently reached Division Headquarters that changed the whole complexion of affairs, for the units which were already on the road received orders to return to their billets the following day. To the rank and file of the Division this news indicated strongly that some- thing important was in the wind, and that idea was strengthened materially by a secret order with a long supplement which were issued by Division Headquarters on September 1 and 4, respectively, and which was found to contain important general instructions regarding movements in front line positions, concealments, reconnaissances, combat employment, infantry deployment, artillery barrages, cleaning-up operations, organization of conquered ground, liaison, etc.'^ Divi- sion Headquarters had nothing to say specifically, but rumor said much. The men listened to rumor and waited, but not for long.
OVERSEAS AND THE TRAINING AREA
49
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50
HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
Lt. Woods and the Post Office Detachment.
RcE DE Langres, Prauthot, Haute Marne — 79th Division Headquarters, July 2!)-Sept. 8, 1918.
CHAPTER III
THE AVOCOURT-MALANCOURT SECTOR.
THE training period of the Seventy-ninth Division in the Tenth Area came to an abrupt termination on September 7, 1918, when, in the early hours of the afternoon, a telegram from General Headquarters at Chaumont came ticking into the Division telegraph office at Prauthoy. It was concise and it was welcome, this message, which read:'
G-3 No. S'Sl. The Seventy-ninth Division will proceed by train, morning 8th September to Robert Espagne Area, west of Bar-le-Duc, reporting upon arrival to Second French Army for tactical control and administration. Entraining points: Vaux-sous-Aubigny, Maatz, La Ferte-sur-Amance, Oyrieres. Detraining points: Longeville, Mussey, Revigny. Billeting parties will proceed tonight to new area reporting for arrangements to Zone Major at Robert Espagne. One officer will report at Second French Army Headquarters at Laheycourt after- noon September 8th. After detraining all precautions will be taken as to sacrecy of movement. Acknowledge receipt.
DRUM
Within two hours Field Order No. 1, the first in the history of the Division, and indicative in its very title of marches, bivouacs and battles, was on its way to each unit in the wide-spread area, telephone calls in advance summarizing its contents to the various commanders.- A wave of suppressed excitement com- municated itself to the men, first around Division Headquarters, then further afield, to the Headquarters Troop, the Supply Train and the Military Police, all billeted not far off. Everyone was positive the Division was headed for the front line, but no one knew in what direction. That first Field Order was a model of discretion. It conveyed to the Division at large only a part of the informa- tion contained in the telegram from Chaumont. It told the men where they were to entrain, but it did not mention where they were to get off. The fact that the Robert Espagne Area was the destination and that the Seventy-ninth Division would pass from American to French control were matters confided in the beginning to only a few — the G-1 section of the Division staff.
Briefly, Field Order No. 1 concerned itself with getting the men out of the Tenth Training Area as rapidly as it could be done. It assigned each unit to one of the four entraining points specified by G. H. Q.; designated the officers to be responsible "for detailed arrangements regarding the march to entraining points;" stated that the motorized trains would proceed under their own power;
(51)
52 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
provided for the early departure of the advance billeting parties; directed the entrainment to be made September 8 and 9, and announced that Division Head- quarters would close at Prauthoy at 8 P. M., or 20 H. according to the French time which our army had adopted, September 8 and reopen at the same hour and date at the ultimate destination. As to the destination, the order specified that "detraining stations will be indicated to Commanding Officers of Trains on arrival at 'first destination.' This information will not be communicated by C. O. of Trains to others."^ The precaution warning of the G. H. Q. telegram was being observed even in advance of detraining.
At Vaux-sous-Aubigny, located just south of Prauthoy, and where the major portion of the Division was to entrain. Brigadier General Noble was in charge. Units ordered to that point were Division Headquarters, Headquarters Train and Military Police, Headquarters Troop, the three Machine Gun Battalions, one company of the Ambulance Section of the Sanitary Train, 158th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, and the 315th Infantry. La Ferte-sur-Araartce, the second en- training point, was outside the Training Area to the east and was under the charge of Colonel Oury, of the 314th Infantry. To it were ordered the 314th and 316th Infantry and the balance of the 304th Sanitary Train. Maatz, with Colonel Jervey, of the 304th Engineers, in charge, was in the very centre of the area and was the entraining point for the 304th Engineers and Engineer Train, the 304th Ammunition Train (less the Artillery Section), the 304th Supply Train, Sales Commissary No. 21, attached to the Division, and the Y. M. C. A. representatives. The final point, Oyrieres, under Brigadier General Nicholson, of the 157th In- fantry Brigade, lay south of Champlitte, and was designated for both the 157th Infantry Brigade Headquarters and the 313th Infantry .^
Practically all the Division units, save the 316th Infantry, were within a few hours march of entraining points. The 316th, however, with Regimental Head- quarters at Choilley, near Prauthoy, was forced to proceed eastward on foot across two-thirds of the Training Area. Consequently, to comply with the schedule, it was necessary for it to move first, and, two hours after the order had been re- ceived, the third battalion was swinging out in heavy marching column, followed, before dawn, by the remainder of the regiment.^
Meanwhile, in the small towns from Chalancey in the far west to Argil- lieres in the east, the Training Area was seething with activity, as Town Majors called for statements of claims and damages to settle their accounts; company clerks dismantled field orderly rooms; officers' trunks and boxes were pushed into far corners of billets to be stored; final instructions were given, packs rolled with care and properly adjusted, and farewells exchanged with the villagers. And while the preparations went on, through the night of September 7 and the morning of September 8 the rain fell in abundance, breaking a drought which had been upon the area for more than a month and breaking it at a time when the Division fervently desired dry weather.
The entrainment began on the morning of September 8, long lines of French box cars having been pushed in to the designated points during the night. The first train from each point, departing sometime before noon, carried the advance
THE AVOCOURT-MALANCOURT SECTOR
53
billeting parties of the regiments and such separate units as could be crowded on board.^ Division Headquarters, 158th Brigade Headquarters and the 315th Infantry cleared Vaux-sous-Aubigny that day; the 31-tth Infantry cleared La Ferte- sur-Aniance; 157th Brigade Headquarters and the 313th Infantry cleared Oyrieres, and the 304th Engineers (less two companies*) and part of the trains cleared Maatz. On September 9 the balance of the Division, with one exception, departed on the long troop trains. This exception was a battalion of the 316th Infantry which did not get away until the early morning of September 10,^ the men having marched for hours in a driving rain to reach the entraining point.'
The commanding officers of the trains had been told by aides from G-1 just where the Division was bound, the information having been vouchsafed at the last minute, but the men remained in total ignorance throughout the trip. The
Preparing to Go to the Front.
four entraining points were on branch lines of the main Paris-Belfort Railroad. The way led generally north over the branches to the junction at Chalindrey and then due north through Chaumont (G. H. Q.) and St. Dizier to Longeville, Mus- sey, or Revigny, as the case might be. Each of the detraining points lay on the section of the railroad between St. Dizier and Ste. Menehould, the most northern, Revigny, being just forty kilometers due west of the apex of the St. Mihiel salient. Longeville and Mussey lay within the Robert Espagne Area, but Revigny was beyond it. As a result, the units which detrained at the former towns had but brief marches, ranging from two to eight kilometers, to their billets, while those sent through to Revigny spent long hours on foot in a heavy rain storm before reaching the villages assigned to them. Division Headquarters had, meanwhile, opened at the town of Robert Espagne, ten kilometers southwest of Bar-le-Duc.
54 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
To complete the official passage to French control, G. H. Q., on September 9, transferred the Seventy-ninth Division from the Sixth to the Third American Corps and attached the Third Corps to the Second French Army.'
The northern part of the Robert Espagne Area had been in the hands of the Germans in 1914, when they had swung to the southward just prior to the first battle of the Marne. Many of the villages in 1918 showed the effects of the Boche occupation in 1914 and afforded to the men of the Division their first glimpse of war devastation. It was merely a glimpse, however, as the worst damage in the Robert Espagne Area was but slight in comparison to the ruins which they were to see in the future. The French civilian population had thronged back as soon as the Boche left, and the Seventy-ninth Division found with surprise that the area was far richer and more densely populated than the one it had just left.
Great troop concentration was going on somewhere further east as the Divi- sion moved in. Just where and why intrigued the men. Those detraining at R^vigny had passed columns of Italian infantry on the road, just coming out of the line,^ and all the troop trains had been delayed while specials, routed through and laden with Americans of other divisions, passed them bound eastward. On every side were preparations which indicated a big offensive somewhere near. It was the gathering of the First American Army for the attack on the St. Mihiel salient, although the ranks of the Seventy-ninth Division knew nothing more of the plans than what they saw with their own eyes. Division Headquarters knew what was pending, but Division Headquarters, with instructions before it to start the Division for the front line not later than the night of September 12, knew also that the St. Mihiel offensive was not to require the services of the Seventy-ninth.
The instructions regarding the next move of the Division had been received on September 9 from the Second French Army. They were contained in what was known as Special Order No. 3518/3 which specified that "the Seventy-ninth Division, U. S. A. (actually without artillery), stationed in the zone of Robert Espagne(Hq), Fains, Longeville, Sommelonne, is placed, beginning 12 Sept at the disposition of the 17th Corps (French) to relieve 157th Div. (French)."'
The special order divided itself between instructions for the relief by the Seventy-ninth Division and subsequent movements of the 157th French Division. That part pertaining further to thi Seventy-ninth Division directed that cadres of the Division carry on necessary reconnaissances to reduce to a minimum the duration of the relief; that the move from the Robert Espagne Area be "by autos, for the unmounted elements" and "by roads for the mounted elements and trains"; that a General Staff officer from the Division report to the Third Army Bureau, Greneral Staff, Laheycourt, at 11 A.M., September 11, to regulate the relief move- ment, and that the Division supplies should be requisitioned through the Fourth French Army and would be received at Rampont Rail Head.'
Secret Order No. 3, of the Seventy-ninth Division, was issued on September 10 to cover preliminary arrangements for the pending move. It stated that "the Seventy-ninth Division will relieve troops in a front line sector within the next two or three days" and added that officers to be concerned with the relief would be despatched on reconnaissance to the sector in question the following day.
THE AVOCOURT-MALANCOURT SECTOR 55
Further, it directed that the Division should not undertake any •nork not con- nected with the maintenance of the troops "other than that required in connec- tion with salvage, equipment of troops and what is absolutely necessary to make billets habitable."- The exact contents of the individual field kit was set forth as was what constituted company baggage, and it was made mandatory that all equipment in excess of the list should be salvaged at once.- The men were ac- quainted with only the latter part of the secret order, the part regarding the front line sector and the reconnaissance being withheld from them. However, the in- structions regarding unnecessary work and field kits indicated to them that the stay in the area would be brief.
Two days later, at noon on September I'S, came the second Field Order from Division Headquarters.^ It was all embracing, naming the section of the front line to be taken over as Sector 304, and giving explicit instructions not only for the departure from the Robert Espagne Area but for the actual relief of the units of the 157th French Division. A table showing the order in which the units would depart from the area accompanied it, and this indicated that the first to move would be the 313th and 315th Infantry regiments and a company of both the 311th and 312th Machine Gun Battalions, scheduled to embus that night. The necessity for absolute secrecy was set forth in a paragraph which read:'
On and after embussing all unnecessary noises will be avoided, smok- ing is prohibited during the night and after debussing the rattling of equip- ment will be prevented. No memlier of the command will, peiulitig arrival at debussing point, furnish any information as to his identity, the organization to which he belongs, his mission or destination, to any person other than an officer of the 79th Division or Military Police personnel.
Busy with final inspections of su]iplies and equipment and issuance of emer- gency rations, the Division, nevertheless, paused in its preparations on September 12 to listen to the guns rumbling far over to the eastward. The noise had begun long before daybreak with what was apparently a barrage of some hours, and had lessened through the morning and afternoon. The men speculated about it as they worked but did not learn until afterwards that it was the First American Army pinching out the St. Mihiel salient.
That night the first units started away to the northward, all movements from then on being made under the cover of darkness. Into the small towns, as dusk fell, came long trains of French motor trucks, each truck capable of holding twenty- two men. The drivers were Anamites, French Colonial troops from Indo-China, who, bundled in great coats of goatskin and wearing French helmets, tam-o'- shanters, caps or turbans, presented odd spectacles to an American eye. The Anamites showed no expression on their faces, but soon proved that they could make their camions go like the wind. The trains, in long columns, moved cross- country to the Verdun- Bar-le-Duc road, (the "Sacred Way" of France which had been the means of feeding Verdun in 1916,) and turned northeastward along it. The men had no means of knowing this. It was pitch dark; village lights were extinguished as a precaution against air-raids, and non-coms in each camion en- forced rigidly the prohibition against smoking. The trucks bounced and pitched
56
HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
over the uneven road beds while the occupants sought comfort by standing up, or squatting or lying down, but found it not. All through the night the journey continued, the columns leaving the main highway finally near dawn, and bearing more to the north. When the first streaks of light appeared in the sky, the trucks stopped and the men, stiffened and sore, piled off. The Anamites, the unloading completed, cranked up and moved off, the now empty camions turning back to the south before their presence might betray to German aerial observers that troops were in the vicinity.
Officers hurried the men off the roads and into the woods for cover. As they went, they eyed in awe the sight before them — villages in ruins, fields pitted
BLERCOTjBivMEtrsE, 79th Division Headqtjakteks, Sept. 13 to 15, 1918.
with shell holes and showing only the rank vegetation which betokened neglect, and mud, mud everywhere, regular quagmires through which they sloshed. It was the region lying between Rampont, Blereourt and Dombasle, not more than a dozen kilometers southwest of Verdun, and just south of the Avoeourt-Malan- court Sector — a part of the original French Sector 304. The devastation had been wrought by the German guns of 1916 striving to cut off the supply source during the heroic defense of Verdun.
Division and Brigade Headquarters had moved with the first echelon of the Division on the night of September 12 and at 3 A. M., September 13, Division Headquarters was established at Blereourt,^ 157th Infantry Brigade Headquarters being located at Recicourt, and 158th Brigade Headquarters at Dombasle at
THE AVOCOURT-MALANCOLTRT SECTOR 57
9 o'clock the same morning.^ On tlie night of September 13 another echelon of the Division, including the 314th Infantry and the bulk of the 316th Infantry, made the camion trip from Robert Espagne, and on the night of the 14th and the morning of the 15th, the remainder came up the "Sacred Way" to Blercourt and vicinity. Between September 14 and 16 the various motorized trains also pulled into the new area until the entire Division had arrived. Before the relief of the 157th French Division, as set forth in Field Order No. 2, was taken up, a special order from G. H. Q. on Septemlier 13 directed that a battalion of the 304th Engi- neers and the Engineer Train should proceed to Dombasle for service in Engineer Park and to supply forward engineering dumps.'"
On the night of September 13, the relief began. The 313th and 315th In- fantry regiments, designated to take over the front, were in position and ready for guides by 9 P. M., September 13, the regimental headquarters of the 313th being at Camp de Pommieres and of the 315th being at Dombasle. The ofBcers had a working knowledge of the positions they were to assume, as the field order had pointed out that Sector 304 was divided into two brigade sectors, the one on the right (Favry) being held by the 333rd French Infantry, and the one on the left (Avocourt), by the 371st Infantry (colored), a unit of the Ninety-third Amer- ican Division, which, throughout the war, fought 'with the French.
On the right, where the 315th Infantry moved in at dark, the sector was sub-divided into equal parts for a two battalion front. The second battalion was on the right (Zouaves) and the first battalion on the left (Legrand), each with a company in the front line trenches, two more in the zone of resistance and one in reserve at the respective battalion headquarters. A company of the 312th Machine Gun Battalion was in support of the second battalion, and the regimental machine gun company was in support of the first battalion. The third battalion acted as brigade reserve and had three companies secreted in Normandie Woods and one company at regimental headquarters, then 'established on Hill 309, im- mediately behind the headquarters of the advance battalions."
The left half of the sector, where the 313th relieved the colored men of the 371st Infantrj', was also sub-divided for a two battalion front. The third bat- talion was on the right (La Noue) and the second battalion on the left (Croix Presheur), the positions of the companies corresponding to those assumed in the advance battalions of the 315th Infantry. A company of the 311th Machine Gun Battalion and the regimental machine gun company were in support from right to left. The first battalion of the regiment was in brigade reserve behind regi- mental headquarters at Verrieres.* The 314th and 316th Infantry were in re- serve, the former in Camp Deffoy, and the latter in Camp Normandie, north of Dombasle.
While the companies in the advance line and those in the zones of resistance reached their assigned positions before dawn on September 14, the relief was not completed over the entire sector until 5:30 o'clock on the morning of September 15.'^ The original front, as then taken over by the Seventy-ninth Division, covered roughly a distance of about four and one-half kilometers from a point a few hundred metres west of the hamlet (long since destroyed) of Avocourt to a point about 500 metres southeast of the town of Haucourt (likewise in ruins).
58
HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
Shell Pitted Area Directly ix Front of Line Where 79th Relieved the French.
THE AVOCOURT-MALANCOURT SECTOR 59
The defensive system consisted of a series of outpost trenches which were con- nected by means of communicating trenches, or boyou, with island strong points, and these formed the main line of resistance. The usual barbed wire entangle- ments were in place, and several batteries of 75 's, from the 203rd and 211th French Artillery regiments, were assigned to furnish the necessary protective artillery fire.
A study of any war map of the Western Front will show that this area lies on the high water mark of the ebb and flow of the battle of Verdun. For almost the whole of the preceding four years of the war the line, for some ten kilo- meters to the west, had surged backward or forward scarcely a yard. It had lain practically anchored fast by the impregnable depths of the Argonne Forest on the extreme left. For about the same distance to the east, that is, to the Meuse River, probably no ground in the entire theatre of the war had witnessed so much con- flict of the bitterest sort. This was the battlefield of Verdun where the great Armies of France and Germany had fought the greatest battles in history — the battlefield of Verdun with Le Mort Homme and Hill SOi, in all their ghastly mem- ories, rising within or near the sector now being held by the Seventy-ninth Divi- sion.
Facing the Avocourt-Malancourt sector, the Germans held one of the most formidable of their positions on the entire Western Front. Just 500 meters be- yond the Division outpost line on the right lay the ruins of Haucourt, and a half kilometer beyond that Malancourt, another town in name only. The outpost line on the left faced the eastern edges of the Bois de Malancourt, while in between was the pock-marked, shell-torn strip of "No-Man's land." To the north, the country rolled in a series of rough, steep hills and ravines, which were literally covered with barbed wire entanglements as well as small clumps of trees and under- brush. On the horizon, the dominating heights of Montfaucon rose threaten- ingly, the white ruins of the village on its crest giving it a curious snow-capped appearance. It was from these heights that the German Crown Prince had ob- served the futile assaults upon Verdun two years before. So strong was this posi- tion that the Germans called Montfaucon the "Little Gibraltar" and boasted that it could never be taken. Even French oflScers were positive that no frontal attack ever would be attempted upon the place. Strong as the enemy positions were by nature, the Boche had rendered them still more formidable by four years of ceaseless labor, constructing trenches, gun positions, entanglements and pill boxes, all on ground chosen particularly for defensive purposes.
This scheme of defense had been organized and constructed in accordance with the best tactical principles of the German High Command. Montfaucon was on the main line of German resistance about six kilometers in the rear of the Boche front line. The German outpost zone on the immediate front of the Sev- enty-ninth Division was about three kilometers in width. This was due to the fact that the most advanced German line, known as the Hagen Stellung, con- sisted, between Haucourt and Avocourt, of an abandoned element of the French line, and the chief line of resistance in the outpost zone — the Hagen Stellung Nord — was the original German line. The battle zone, north of the Hagen Stellung Nord line, was of a depth of about three kilometers." Behind that, on beyond
60
HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
Montfaucon, the ground was heavily defended clear to the Kriemhild Stellung (Hindenbiirg Line) fifteen kilometers away from the American outposts in the Avocourt-Malancourt sector.
No doubt on account of the formidable nature of the German position, for two years this sector had been known as a quiet one. To quiet sectors it was the custom to send those troops who, worn and decimated by long periods of action elsewhere, had need of a protracted period of inaction for rest and recuperation. Like all such sectors, by mutual understanding, all activity was kept at a mini- mum and on both sides the plan of defense, so far as the front line was concerned, had been devised with this idea in view. As a result, the men of the 313th and 315th Infantry on outpost found that the system consisted of a series of half-
Aeroplane View While Boche Were in Montfaucon, Taken Sept. 2, 1918.
platoon posts — 20 men — scattered at about quarter mile intervals along the front line trench, four posts assigned to each company. The rest of the company, that is, two additional platoons, were located at convenient points within a thousand yards to the rear, with the line of resistance approximately another thousand yards further back, and the balance of the formation as previ- ously described.
The relieving units of the Division, at the time they "took over," had been instructed that under no consideration was this plan of defense to be altered in any way without the consent of the Commanding General. It was desired that every precaution be taken to conceal from the Germans that a change of units on their front had taken place. There was no doubt that the plan of defense under
THE AVOCOURT-MALANCOURT SECTOR 61
the conditions was an admirable one and entirely adequate for meeting any situ- ation that might arise without some forewarning through intelligence channels. In that case it could have been altered quickly to meet the special situation.
For those of the men assigned to the little half-platoon outposts, however, the matter appeared in a totally different light. There were only twenty or so of them to each post and they were anywhere from a half to three quarters of a mile from any support. They were there to give warning of any attack and to resist it to the utmost. Their sole mission was "to die as loudly as possible."
To the men of the Division in the outpost lines, and, in a lesser degree to the troops stationed on the line of resistance and in reserve, the task of taking over a sector of the front line presented a stiuation beset with innumerable thrills. Every- thing was new, strange, and weird. In the outpost lines, the battered, crumbling trenches, oftentimes only waist deep, which zig-zagged through the sea of shell holes, gave visible evidence of the titanic struggles of the past. This evidence was intensified by the unmistakable signs of the death and destruction which existed on every side. Scattered articles of French and German equijjment, rusting helmets, broken rifles and bayonets, half-rotted bits of clothing, here and there a bleached bone protruding from the earth, in a word, the flotsam and jet- sam of a battle field — all told their own gruesome tale of devastating conflict.
Farther back, on the line of resistance, the men of the Division also saw the signs of war, but in a different way. Here, long stretches of revetted trenches, their bottoms here and there lined with dilapidated duck-boards and their sides covered with a net-work of telephone wires (most of which had long since passed the stage of usefulness) showed the effects of four years of continuous warfare, but at the same time evidenced a high state of organization.
An example of what might be termed the almost permanent organization of the line of resistance in Sector 304, was found in the "mitrailleuse de position," literally, machine guns of position, which the French maintained in the sector, even after it was taken over by the Division. These machine guns were posted at strategic points along the line of resistance, and more than one 79th Division doughboy experienced a shock of surprise when he suddenly turned the corner of a trench and bumped into one of these machine guns, manned by a French poilu in his uniform of faded horizon blue. Many of these French machine gunners had occupied the same position in Sector 304 for over two years, and the Division subsequently learned that the "mitrailleuse de position" played a cardinal part in any French defensive scheme. Later, from bitter experience, it was found that the enemy had adopted this same plan of organization for defense on the immediate front of the Division.
While the troops in the outpost and resistance positions found trench-warfare pretty much as they had pictured it before-hand, the men in the reserve positions, which were located in patches of woods far behind the front, encountered condi- tions far different from their anticipations. Steeped as they were in all the theo- retical lore of trench warfare during the days in the training area, the members of the Division who were stationed in reserve were distinctly surprised to find themselves living an almost normal camp life. In some places in the woods the men lived in huts and shacks, half underground, built of tar paper or boards or
62 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
of corrugated iron, while others, not so fortunate, had no better dwelling place than deep gallery shelters or dugouts, each holding several hundred men. These, however, were so chilly and damp that the men preferred to risk the shells and sleep under the shelter tents in the open.
Instead of the long series of trenches stretching toward the front lines that imagination had led them to expect, they found only pathways, paralleled by the ever-present "lead" wires for guidance at night, which led across country to the seemingly far distant positions on the line of resistance, and which were traversed in broad daylight by carrying details, reconnaissance parties and runners.
In all parts of sector 304, however, whether outpost, support or reserve, the men of the different units took an intense interest in the daily aeroplane en- counters which occurred far above their heads between the Boche and Allied aviators engaged in reconnaissance work. To practically every man in the Divi- sion the sharp, muffled "Pouf" of the shells from the anti-aircraft guns became a familiar sound, followed in turn by the familiar sight of tiny puff-balls of black and white smoke from the bursting shells.
With the coming of night, the most picturesque side of trench warfare pre- sented itself to the men in the thousands of star shells, rockets and flares which blazed against the night sky from dusk to dawn in a display that cast into shadow any Fourth of July celebration ever witnessed. A certain number of the star shells, rockets, etc., soared forth from the American trenches, but by far the lar- ger number had their origin in the German lines, for the Boche seemed to be a bit nervous, and lost no opportunity to illuminate "No Man's Land" to the fullest extent possible.
In the routine of trench life, the officers of the front line troops found that much of their time was taken up with the study of the "dossier," a neat little packet of papers which each unit commander had inherited from his French prede- cessor. These "dossiers" had been kept with the neatness and precision of a business ledger, and contained complete maps of the position held, detailed ac- counts of its organization, the general system of defense and attack, and itemized lists of all trench stores. Taken all in all, the "dossiers" contained much valu- able information and gave the officers of the Division a clear insight into the me- thodical manner in which the French carried on the general game of trench war- fare.
Despite the hardships on all sides, health conditions in the Division im- proved. The influenza, which had threatened in the Training Area, disappeared almost completely, very few men being evacuated. The medical officers kept a lookout for "trench feet, " but no such cases developed. Sanitary conditions were admittedly bad and chlorinated water had to be used. As a result, officers kept careful watch to see that the men filled their canteens at the beginning of the day and drank no other water. '^
The first fatality on the front occurred in the right sector, held by the 315th Infantry, on the night of September 15, A German plane, seeking to de- stroy the regimental headquarters on Hill 309, dropped a bomb which exploded and mortally wounded Corporal Thomas L. Landenberger, of Company "I."'* "His courage, while suffering severely from the wound was an inspiration to the
THE AVOCOURT-]VL\LANCOURT SECTOR
Shell-pitted Terrain East of Avocourt Over Which the Raids of Sept. 19, 20 and 22 Were
Repulsed by the 313th Infantry.
64 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
company; he increased the morale of the company by the manner in which he bore himself," states the Division citation which was awarded posthumously.'^
On the following night another Boclie airplane came over and dropped a bomb or two in the neighborhood of Dombasle. Subsequently, during the entire occu- pation of the sector, there was considerable air activity. The planes came over regularly at mess times — noon and 5 P. M. — and it was only with difficulty that the men could be kept in concealment and the mess kits prevented from flashing in the sunlight.
Enemy shelling was not severe. The Summaries of Intelligence, issued from September 14 on, made daily mention of it. Thus, on September 14 and 15, "intermittent shelling right subsector in vicinity of P. C, 315th Infantry" was reported.'^ Beginning the following day an exact report was kept of the number of shells fired, the time of firing, the calibre, the objective, the direction fired from and the purpose, whether to register or destroy. Seventy-eight shells fell within the sector in the first twenty-four hour period this record was kept, and forty- seven in the next.'^
On the night of September 17, the enemy suddenly rained heavy shells upon a platoon of Company "L," 313th Infantry, in the right sub-sector of that regi- ment. Sergeant Raymond Jordan, in command of the men, moved along the line encouraging them personally to hold and "maintaining the platoon intact and in position prepared to meet any attack that might be made."'^ As a whole, however, gas shells were more feared than the occasional high explosives. The troops were not used to being gassed as yet, and several bad cases occurred, de- spite the precautions of klaxon warnings. Five men of the outpost company of the 304th Field Signal Battalion received enough of it, while running some tele- phone lines through a wood, to necessitate evacuation.'* Likewise, six men from Company "A," 304th Engineers, were gassed while going to the assistance of a wounded French soldier in a dugout near Dombasle."
Orders had been received by the Division that a constant watch should be kept on the enemy, but that no raids should be made and patrols conducted cautiously, as every precaution was being taken to prevent the Boche from learn- ing the identity of the troops opposing him in this sector. The Germans, how- ever, suddenly displayed considerable activity. It indicated, beyond a doubt, that they had suspected a relief in progress in the opponent's line. How they did so might be accounted for in any one of a number of ways, or in all of them. The men of the Seventy-ninth Division, unskilled in what was to them a totally novel maneuver, no doubt gave themselves away when they took over the sector from the colored and French troops previously occupying it. It was seldom that an outfit, effecting a relief for the first time, did not do so. Again, the relieved troops, French and colored, had been completely accoutred as French Colonials, including the French style of helmet, khaki colored instead of blue. The differ- ence in the shape between these helmets and the American ones might have been detected easily from the German observation posts. But probably the most positive indication to the Germans was the difference in the tactics pursued by the men in the outpost positions. In thorough accord with the involuntary habit of all new troops in the line, the men became obviously aggressive. Varying
THE AVOCOURT-MALANCOURT SECTOR 65
disturbances, such as a shot from the German Hnes, or a new shadow caused by the moon appearing from behind a cloud, begot a fusillade of shots from the American rifles. It was as unnecessary as it was novel to the ever observant enemy. And no one can possibly estimate how many furtive peeps over the top of the trench at this much talked of "No Man's land" were noted by the enemy.
For the first six days, almost every night produced its reports of enemy pa- trols heard prowling along the front, or of movements of a suspicious nature ob- served somewhere within the German lines. The Summaries of Intelligence of the period have much to say on the subject.
These summaries, as well as all orders, etc., used French Military Time. In fact, all operations of the American Army in France were based upon this method which simply runs the hours in numerical order from midnight to midnight, 1 o'clock in the afternoon becoming 13 h, and so on. Midnight is 24 h, but one minute after midnight, and the 24 is succeeded by 0, the designation then becoming, 0 h 1 (0 hour, one minute). The above explains the following quo- tations from the Summaries of Intelligence :'-
September 1.5: Small convey movement seen near Hill 342.
September 16: At 3h 25 five Germans observed in front of K Company sector. [313th Infantry]. At 16h 46, two enemy seen at the right of Bois de Tuilerie, joined by two others and all disappeared in woods. At 24h to 3h wagons heard opposite to K Company [313th Infantry]. During same period train on tramway heard. During previous night incessant barking of dog on enemy front. On left sub-sector our patrols have twice been shot at by machine guns.
The first actual clash with one of the German patrols occurred on the night of September 19-20. First Lieutenant Anthony L. jNIcKim and a detachment of E Company, 313tli Infantry, occupied the extreme left outpost position of the regimental and divisional sector. Lieutenant McKim was in a shell-proof dugout with two of his noncommissioned officers. Without any warning, a German potato-masher (grenade) rolled into the midst of the group, thrown from the rear of the trench. It failed to explode. Immediately, however, one of those melees started known as a night raid. Of comparatively little military importance con- sidered from the standpoint of the ultimate outcome of the war, these raids were, for the men involved in them, events of gigantic importance. The greatest battle ever fought at its very height never offered more terrifying thrills than is offered when twenty or so men, in the pitch dark, scramble around a group of trenches trying to kill and not be killed by twenty or so other men whom they cannot distinguish as friend or foe. This particular raid lasted about a half hour and terminated by the enemy being driven off. There were only minor casualties among the "E" Company men involved. That should have been enough for one night, but two hours later this same platoon was again raided, the resulting fight lasting another half hour. The reason for the second raid was divulged the next morning when a reconnoitering party came upon the dead body of a German of- ficer lying on the edge of "No Man's Land," just outside the sector. Later, information confirmed the speculation that, killed in the first attack, the raiding party had been sent back to recover the body of the officer. He was Frederick
66
HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
Aeroplane View of Enemy Fbont-line Trenches, Sector 304.
THE AVOCOURTMALANCOURT SECTOR 67
von Frienburg, a second lieutenant in the First Regiment, First Division, Prussian Guards.'^
A second raid in far greater strength was made on Sunday morning, Sep- tember 22, and also fell on the left of the Division sector. Between 5h 36 and 6h 30 the front line and the line of resistance were heavily shelled, after M'hich two attacks were delivered simultaneously, one on an outpost of "E" Company, 313th Infantry, on the left sub-sector, and the other on an outpost of "A" Com- pany, on the right of the regimental sector, the first battalion having relieved the Third Battalion on the night of September 18-19, in compliance with Field Order No. 4, 79th Division, dated September 17.^ In the dim light of early morning, the two outposts, each half-platoons, put up sterling resistance. The attack on the "A" Company platoon apparently was delivered by a strong force. After a fierce melee in trench and dugouts, the Americans drove the invaders off with severe losses. The platoon, however, had three men killed — Private 1st cl Samuel A. Lanard and Privates Thomas H. Gray and Edwin C. Pearson — while an officer and six men were wounded and one private was missing who had been taken prisoner.
The half -platoon of "E" Company was under the command of First Lieu- tenant Carl E. Geis, who was slightly wounded, and Sergeant James McGarvey. The latter, with the utmost coolness, directed the fire of each man under him, while Sergeant Joseph W. Oppitz, and Privates John G. Rhodes and Joseph N. Wright, composing an automatic rifle team, swept the oncoming raiders with their rapid-fire weapons. Two other men. Privates George Remfrey and Wilbur E. Forrest, who formed a sentry squad and were cut off by the barrage, remained at their post and aided by their marksmanship in repulsing the enemy. "^^ One of the "E" Company men, Private Rodney E. Dixon, was killed, three others beside Lieutenant Geis were wounded, and a fourth was missing, and was subsequently found to have been captured. The total casualties to the regiment were four men killed, two taken prisoner and two officers and nine men wounded. In front of the outposts the next day were found the bodies of three Germans, while a fourth was taken prisoner. The bodies of the enemy dead were brought within the lines and identified as a lieutenant, 12th Company, 157th Regiment, 117th Division; Corporal, same company and regiment, and a private, 233rd Pioneer Company, attached to the 117th Division.
The prisoner, who was examined by Liuetenant Colonel George N. Russell, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 5th Army Corps, said that orders had been received by the 157th Regiment at 3 a. m., September 22, for three companies of the third battalion and two companies of the first battalion to make a raid for the purpose of obtaining prisoners. He told Lieutenant Colonel Russell that the 9th, 11th and 12th Companies had started out from the third battalion, but that he knew nothing of the movement of the first battalion. That one of the two companies from the first battalion had been the 233rd Pioneers was established by the iden- tification of the dead private. The prisoner also established the identity of the German unit on the right of his Division as the First Guard Division, which ac- counted for the presence of the young guard officer killed on the night of September 19-20. The failure of the first raid to secure prisoners and thus establish the
68 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
identity of the newcomers in the Avocourt-Malancourt Sector had been the reason for the larger daylight undertaking with artillery fire preceding it.'^
While trench raids, shell fire and gas were occupying the attention of the units in the line and in reserve, matters of greater moment were arising for the Division staff. Division Headquarters had been set up at Jouy-en-Argonne, two and one-half kilometers north of Blercourt, at 8 a. m., September 16, the hour on which the command of the entire sector passed into the hands of General Kuhn. Almost immediately advance preparations for the pending offensive began.
The definite decision for the American First Army to attack on the Meuse- Argonne front had been decided as early as September 2, 1918, in conference be- tween General Pershing, Marshal Foch and General Petain.'" The former con- sidered the strategical importance of this portion of the line as "second to none on the Western Front."^" He chose -it for the First American Army because, in his opinion, "no other Allied troops had the morale or the offensive spirit to overcome, and successfully, the difficulties to be met in the Meuse-Argonne sec- tor and our plans and installations had been prepared for an expansion of opera- tions in that direction."^'
The purpose of the offensive he well summarized as follows:^"
The Army was to break through the enemy's successive fortified zones to include the Kriemhild-Stellung, or Hindenburg Line, on the front Brieulles-Romagne-sous-Montfaucon-Grandpre, and, thereafter, by developing pressure toward Mezieres, was to insure the fall of the Hindenburg Line along the Aisne River in front of the Fourth French army, which was to attack to the west of the Argonne Forest. A penetration of some 12 to 15 kilometers was required to reach the Hindenburg Line on our front, and the enemy's defense were virtually continuous throughout the depth.
The concentration for such an offensive as planned, of necessity began long before the day set for its opening. To the Division units in reserve it soon became apparent that something on a gigantic scale was underway. With the coming of dusk and darkness each night, battery after battery of light horse-drawn ar- tillery and heavy motorized guns would come lumbering down the roads and take up positions in the heavy woodland Truck after truck, piled high with ammuni- tion of all calibres and kinds, as well as other supplies, nightly unloaded their bur- dens at newly established dumps and dashed back to return with more and still more. French tanks later joined the rumbling throng. It seemed as if all of the army traffic in France had been diverted suddenly to the Seventy-ninth Div- ision area. It was almost impossible to believe that room could be found to place all the guns and supplies along so short a front. As it was, the reserve elements of the Division were compelled to shift their positions frequently to make room for the constantly increasing mass of artillery which kept pouring in.
The men watched all these preparations with widening eyes. Somehow they did not connect it with their own future movements. Most of them knew that the usual process of seasoning required of green troops was several weeks holding the line on a quiet sector and then a transfer somewhere else for active operations. They looked upon the tenanting of the Avocourt-Malancourt Sector as part of
THE AVOCOURT-MALANCOURT SECTOR 69
the seasoning process, and would not have been surprised if at the end of a few weeks they should have been withdrawn and sent in somewhere else. No one in the enhsted ranks dreamed that the Division, without previous "blooding," was to be one of the center divisions in the opening phase of the final drive of the World War. If the men heard rumors that they were destined to take Montfaucon they laughed at them. It would not be likely that a green division would be hurled at the strongest point in the whole German line.
Back at Division Headquarters, where the truth was known, the time was all too short for the many arrangements to be made. JNIany conferences were held, plans were made and unfolded, schemes of liaison outlined, maps studied and certain important data marked down, while at the same time the final preparations and placing of the Division units in position — on paper — were carried out. Busy orderlies and couriers hurried between regiments and Division Headquarters and from Division to Corps and Army. The Seventy-ninth Division had passed
JotJT-EN-ARGONNE, SeVENTT-NINTH DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, SePT. 15 TO 25, 1918.
again from French to American control on September 21, and was now a part of the Fifth American Corps, whose Field Order No. 31, of that date, had directed preparations for the pending attack and covered all Corps details. All messages were now received and sent in code. A Division code had come into being on September 16 whereby every member of the Division staff, from the Major Gen- eral commanding down, became "Itasca" with a numeral aiBxed. General Kuhn was "Itasca-1" and the Division Sergeant Major was "Itasca-'ZS." Similarly, the 157th Infantry Brigade was "India," its commander being "India-1" and the 158th Brigade was "Italy," with its brigadier, "Italy-1." The other units were as follows:22 qi^^^ Infantry, "Incite"; 314th Infantry, "Instruct"; S15th Infan- try," Invade"; 316th Infantry, "Invent"; 304th Engineers, "Indicate"; 304th Field Signal Battahon, "Index"; 304th Headquarters Train and Military Police, "Iron"; 304th Ammunition Train, "Insure"; 304th Supply Train, "Issue"; 304th Sanitary Train, "Iodine"; 310th Machine Gun Battalion, "Inlet": 311th Machine Gun Battalion, "Island"; 312th Machine Gun Battalion, "Isthmus." Units
70 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
having battalion subdivisions added "er" to the key word for first battahon; "ed" for the second battalion, and "ing" for the third battalion.
One of the first steps in preparation consisted in shortening the Division front. This was effected under Division Field Order No. 5, dated September 21, when the left brigade sector was turned over to the Thirty-seventh Division, U. S. A. The relief began on the night of September 22-23, the first battalion of the 313th Infantry, in the right sub-sector being replaced by a battalion from the 73rd Infantry Brigade, and the second battalion, 313th Infantry, in the left sub- sector, by a battalion from the 74th Infantry Brigade. On the following night the relief was completed when the machine guns of the 157th Infantry Brigade were succeeded by the machine guns of the Thirty-seventh Division.^ The regi- mental P. C. (Poste de Commande) of the 313th Infantry, at Verrieres-en-Hesse F™^, was evacuated on the afternoon of September 22 and established with the first and second battalions in the Bois de Lambchamp, while the third bat- talion was in Camp Bretagne.
As a result of this maneuver not only had the Seventy-ninth Division line been reduced from four and one-half to a little more than two kilometers, but the entire length had now become a single brigade front, with two battalions of the 315th Infantry holding the line of resistance. On the night of September 24-25, however, the first battalion and the Machine Gun Co. of the 316th Infantry re- lieved the first battalion and the Machine Gun Co. of the 315th Infantry in the left sector,23 the second and third battalions of the 315th having effected a mutual relief on the night September 18-19. Both units of the 158th Infantry Brigade then held a position on the line of resistance. Neither, however, held the outpost positions. The same field order which had relieved the 313th Infantry in the left sector (Field Order No. 5) had sent a battalion of the 129th Infantry of the Thirty-third Division, U. S. A., into the outpost line along the entire Avocourt- Malancourt Sector.^ This was in order to deceive the enemy as to the identity of units on his front should he take any prisoners by a raid or strong patrol.
Meanwhile the Intelligence Department anxiously maintained a sharp ob- servation on the enemy front line and on all back areas, through the regimental observers in the line and by its own observers and airplane reports, to see if the plans and preparations had been detected by the enemy, and if there had been a counter concentration of men and guns to meet an expected offensive or to launch a surprise attack. One of these observers, Private 1st cl Russell M. Harrison, Company "C," 304th Field Signal Battalion, maintained a buzzer phone at Ga- briel outpost for five continuous days and nights, remaining at the post alone and without relief under heavy and constant fire."^^ The Boche was showing un- mistakable signs of uneasiness. His numerous captive, or "sausage," balloons and his air patrols remained up through the day, and at night the area to the north was illumined by flares and star-shells which lighted up "No-Man's Land" and the front from dusk to daybreak.^^ Efforts to keep him guessing were never abated. On the night of September 17, for example, a French 75 was brought up from Montezeville on a truck and from a point near the front hurled sixteen shells into the German trenches on the northern edge of the Bois de Montfaucon. The gun was taken back to Montezeville before midnight, the purpose being to give
THE AVOCOURT-MALANCOURT SECTOR
71
Typical View op Enemy Trenches Over Which 79th Division Troops Passed.
72 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
the Germans the idea that there were permanent gun emplacements at the point from which it fired. '-
As preparations neared completion and the zero hours approached, men, animals and trucks labored night and day pulling and hauling the vast stores of supplies and thousands of rounds of ammunition from the railheads at Rampont and Dombasle to the main division dumps and from there to forward area dumps. Batteries already in position now and again sent a shell screaming overhead across "No-Man's Land" and into the enemy's line. The anti-aircraft guns, ("Archies"), fired many rounds into the air in an effort to drive back the enemy reconnaissance planes, while an occasional air battle between Allied and Boche aviators furnished a thrill to the troops on the ground below. To the increased Allied artillery ac- tivity, the Boche replied with shots that did little harm.
On September 25, the Division P. C, with the advance echelon of Division Headquarters, was established near Hill 309, west of Montezeville.' Late that afternoon General Pershing visited the new Division Headquarters, and after a conference with General Kuhn he continued his inspection of the preparations for the tremendous drive so soon to begin. At 13h 30, on that same day, Septem- ber 25, Field Order No. 6 was issued. Only thirty-eight copies were mimeographed, for, unlike the field orders which had gone before, the contents of this one was meant for the immediate enlightenment of but a few. It was the first battle order of the Division and it ended all questions as to the part the Seventy-ninth was to play in the offensive whose preparations were being carried on all around. Green division it might be, but just the same it was "going-in" and the direction was straight ahead from the position then held. The goal was Montfaucon, aye, and beyond that as well. A single paragraph told the story :^'
The 79th Division, maintaining close combat liaison with the 4th Division (III Corps) on its right, and with the 37th Division (V Corps) on its left, will advance rapidly to the Corps objective, the line 05.5-77.5, 08.2-80.2, 1L5-81.0. It will seize in succession Malancourt, Montfaucon and Nantillois.
A glance at the co-ordinated "Argonne Special," the map issued for the oc- casion, showed the Corps objective for the first day running just north of Nan- tillois, and Nantillois was three full kilometers north of Montfaucon. When that first day was to be, remained unanswered in the field order. It specified "D day" for the attack and "H hour" for the time it was to begin, "D" and "H" being the unknown quantities, much like the unknown quantity of "X" in the algebraic equation. But if the day and hour remained a mystery, there was enough in the field order to give all concerned plenty to do and think about. The main text was three mimeographed pages in length; the plans of liaison, divided into eight parts, covered eight pages more, and the administrative annex was about the same length. To take the main text and dissect it, was what the recipients of the order did first; tlie disclosures were all embracing.
While the Seventy-ninth Division was to make the direct assault on Mont- faucon, the Fourth Division, on the right, was to aid in turning the stronghold and also in subsequently turning the sector of the hostile second position at Nan- tillois. At the same time, the Thirty-seventh Division, on the left, was to con-
THE AVOCOURT-]VL\LANCOURT SECTOR
73
tribute its part by assisting in turning the Bois de Montfaucon, a woods which lay to the south and west of the town of the same name. The axis of advance for the Seventy-ninth, according to the sector boundaries prescribed, was north, about twenty-five degrees west, to a point beyond Montfaucon, and tlien bore shghtly more to the west to beyond Nantillois.
The enemy, the order stated, "holds his line from the Meuse to the Aisne with about five divisions. In the immediate front of the 79th Division he has about one regiment of infantry."" This deduction may have been responsible for the deep objective for the first day — it was nine full kilometers from the Avo- court-Malancourt Sector to Nantillois. This unusual distance was recognized, as the order, while stating that the advance should be pushed "with the greatest vigor," also directed that "brigade commanders will provide by echelonment in depth, the necessary driving power. "-^
Aeroplane View of Montfaucon Looking East.
A preparation fire, to include "wire cutting, harassing, destructive, counter- battery and interdiction fires, "^^ was to precede the infantry advance and was to begin at an hour to be designated later. At H hour, however, the artillery was to concentrate on the enemy first line positions for twenty-five minutes and then change to a rolling barrage which should leap forward 100 meters every four minutes. There were to be certain pauses in the barrage, ten minutes to fire on the hostile intermediate position just beyond Malancourt and twenty minutes on the hostile second position in front of Montfaucon. In addition, a covering fire was directed to precede the barrage by 200 meters.-"
The Division was to advance with the 157th Infantry Brigade attacking and the 158th Infantry Brigade in Divisional Reserve, but following the 157tli Bri- gade at about 1000 meters. The brigade front was to consist of four battalions
74 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
abreast, two from each regiment, with machine gun units in support. The troops were to advance to within 300 meters of the barrage and follow it "as closely as possible."^^
So much for the main features of the order. The remainder of it contained specific instructions for all other units participating; how the machine gun bat- talions were to distribute their companies in support; how the 304th Engineers, (with the exception of one company) were to follow the advance and "reconnoiter, repair and maintain the road on the axis of supply"; how that one company of Engineers was to go with the 14th and 15th Tank Battalions (French) which were to remain unemployed during the first stage but be on hand at H-12h to assist the advancing infantry; how Company D, First Gas Regiment, was to assign its mortars equally to the regiments of the 157th Infantry Brigade; how the 214th French Aero Squadron and the Sixth U. S. Balloon Company were to keep Divi- sion Headquarters informed as to enemy concentration, new battery positions and the course of the advance; how liaison was to be maintained with the divisions to the left and right; how the flanks were to be protected by combat patrols; how the Division trains were to forward ammunition and supplies from the railheads, and how the various batteries of the supporting artillery should be employed.
The artillery at the disposal of the Seventy-ninth Division consisted of the 57th Artillery Brigade, of the Thirty-second Division, U. S. A.; 119th Field Ar- tillery (complete) ; 120th Field Artillery (three batteries) and 121st Field Artillery (four batteries) ; five batteries of the 147th Field Artillery, of the Forty First Division, U. S. A.; two batteries of the 65th Coast Artillery Regiment, U. S. A.; the 302nd Field Artillery (French), and the 330th Field Artillery (French). The total was twenty-three batteries of 75's, two batteries of 9.2's (the Coast Artillery), ten batteries of 155's, and a trench mortar battery (107th, U. S. A.) of twelve guns. The whole was under the command of Brigadier General G. LeRoy Irwin, of the 57th Artillery Brigade.^^
The plans were laid! The maps drawn! All was ready for the final order establishing the day and hour; the order which would send men and guns to their assigned stations for the opening of the great Meuse-Argonne offensive. It came that same afternoon, an "Addendum to Field Order No. 6." The first paragraphs were a few last instructions — to the tanks, to keep off the axial road; to the light batteries, to follow the infantry at noon and try to cross "No-Man's Land" by following in the paths of the tanks; to the platoons of Company "D," First Gas Regiment, to maintain liaison by runners with their commander at Division Headquarters — and then came that for which the Division waited}^
Tomorrow, September 26th, will be "D" day; "H" hour will be 5.30 o'clock, A. M.
CHAPTER IV THE MEUSE-ARGONNE— FIRST PHASE
Maiancourt and Montfaucon
THE decisive final attack of the Allies on the Western Front, the American contribution to which was known as the jNIeuse-Argonne offensive, opened on September 26, 1918, and resulted in the greatest battle in tlie history of warfare. "Armageddon" was the term applied to the colossal struggle by Major General Sir Frederick Maurice, former Director of Military Operations in the Britisli AVar Office.^ It involved almost simultaneous assaults by four army groups — American, Belgian, British and French — and engaged the enemy line from Flanders to the Meuse.^ The German salients on the Marne, at St. Mihiel, and facing the Somnie had previously been pinched out by the "preliminary punches" delivered in July, August and early September by the Allies.' As a result, the defensive line then occupied by Ludendorff's German armies ran roughly "from north to south from the North Sea coast near Nieuport, just east of Ypres, by Armentieres, west of Douai, Cambrai and St. Quentin to the River Oise near La Fere" and then made a big bulge westwards round the St. Gobain Forest along the Oise and the Vesle to Rheims, where it again straightened out and ran eastward through the Champagne heathlands across the Argonne Forest to the Meuse, northwest of Verdun."' The objective of the combined offensives is set forth with clarity in General Pershing's Final Report as Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, which states:*
All supplies and evacuations of the German armies in northern France were dependent upon two great railway systems — one in the north, passing through Liege, while the other in the south, with lines coming from Luxemburg, Thion- ville, and Metz, had as its vital section the line Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres. No other important lines were available to the enemy, as the mountainous masses of the Ardennes made the construction of east and west lines through the region impracticable. The Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres line was essential to the Germans for the rapid strategical movement of troops. Should this southern system be cut by the Allies before the enemy could withdraw his forces through the narrow neck between Mezieres and the Dutch frontier, the ruin of his armies in France and Belgium would be complete.
Thus, while the First American Army, to the east, and Gouraud's French Army, to the west of the Argonne Forest, were to drive straight north toward Sedan and Mezieres, combined British, French and Belgian attacks in Flanders and along the line north of the St. Gobain Forest were to prevent the Germans from detaching reinforcements to the imperiled railroad defenses and also force a general withdrawal from the Hindenburg line and the Belgian coast.*
16
HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
For the first pliase of the ]\Ieuse-Argonne offensive, the American First Army deployed nine divisions into line on the night of September 25. On the right, from the west bank of the Meuse to the ruined hamlet of Haucourt, was the Third Corps, Major General Bullard commanding. It consisted of the Thirty-third Division on the right, the Eightieth Division in the centre, and the Fourth Division on the left. Adjoining the Third Corps on the west lay the Fifth Corps, Major General Cameron commanding. Its units were the Seventy-ninth Division on the right, the Thirty-seventh Division in the centre, and the Ninety-first Division on the left. The extreme western point of the Fifth Corps' sector, la Hardon- nerie Fme (Farm), formed junction with the First Corps, Major General Liggett
Hill 304, Showing Shell-Torn Area over which the Men of the Seventt-ntnth Division Passed before Reaching Boche First Line, Shown in Foreground.
commanding. The First Corps, the left wing of the American Army, extended to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, with the Thirty-fifth Division on the right, the Twenty-eighth Division in the centre and the Seventy-seventh Divi- sion on the left.* Each of the three corps held a division in reserve, while, in addition, there was an army reserve of three more divisions.* Regarding the Fifth Corps, of which the Seventy-ninth Division was the right wing, it was to attack on a front of about 11,600 yards, and had an infantry rifle strength of about 37,000 rifles, which represented approximately 321 rifles to every hundred yards. ^ To support the infantry attack on the entire First Army front were assembled "about 2,700 guns, 189 small tanks (142 manned by Americans), and 821 airplanes (604 manned by Americans)."^
]\MLANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON
77
Nightfall of September 25, on the Avocourt-Malancourt sector, found the preparations in and behind the Seventy-ninth Division growing more and more intensified. The last moves had, perforce, to await the arrival of dusk. It would not do, in the final hours, to give the enemy aerial observers an inkling of what was to come. With darkness, the roads, so deserted by day, suddenly became filled with panting horses, rumbling guns and caissons, motor trucks and long columns of infantry. From Dombasle and Rampont came streaming convoy after convoy bearing ammunition to the reserve dump in the Bois de Deft'oy and the forward dumps near Camp de Civils and in the Bois d'Esnes; rations to the
AVOCOURT, THE RniNED ToWN AT WHICH OUR LefT SeCTOR LiMIT STOPPED.
This Town was Right on the Allied Front Line.
same dumps and engineer supplies to the Bois d'Esnes. A narrow-gauge train, mule drawn, passed constantly between Camp de Civils and Avocourt with en- gineering material, ammunition and rations, in that order of priority, imtil enemy shells put the Avocourt end out of operation. About 100 burros augmented the flow of material northward from Camp de Civils, the donkeys marshaled by men from the Wagon Company of the 304th Ammunition Train.* The motorized heavy batteries emerged from concealment in the woodlands and forged toward the front, headed for pre-arranged battery positions. The lighter guns carromed past, their advance punctuated by low warnings from groups of signalmen along the way, who, stringing the last telephone wires, saw in the heavy wheels ever present menaces to connections. But through the first few hours the artillery
78 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
had the right of way. The program was to open with the heavies, and the Division artillery was scheduled for the first encore.
Out in front, ahead even of the outposts, final reconnaissance patrols were determining the sixteen points where the German barbed wire entanglements were to be cut, while a group of officers from the 157th Infantry Brigade, moving stealthily in the uncanny quiet, were measuring and fixing the tape line from which the infantry attack was to be launched.' There was no stir as yet between the outpost line and the main line of resistance. The former was still held by the battalion of the 129th Infantry, and the battalions of the 315th and 316th In- fantry, 1,000 yards in the rear, had instructions to maintain their positions until the 157th Brigade had passed through and their companion units of the 158th Brigade came up.
° Back in the Bois de Lambechamp, where the 313th Infantry had been lying in reserve, dusk had brought hasty summons of all battalion and company com- manders to regimental headquarters at Verrieres Fme., where marked maps and orders were distributed and instructions issued to get the men underway at once for the front. It was a long march from reserve to outpost line, and it would take the better part of the night at a stiff pace if the regiment was to be in position for "H" hour. The 313th Infantry began to swing out from the Bois de Lambe- champ at 19h., September 25th. *°
The 314th Infantry, in the Foret de Hesse, had even a longer distance to go than the 313th. It, too, got under way at 19h under verbal orders from the regi- mental commander. Field Order No. 6, of the Division, not being received at regimental headquarters until 19h 10, after the troops were already in motion. '^ The two battalions of the 315th Infantry and the two of the 316th, which were in Ijrigade reserve in the Foret de Hesse and Camp de Normandie, respec- tively, also began the forward movement at nightfall, timing themselves so as to follow the units of the 157th Brigade into position. As the 311th and 312th Machine Gun Battalions also had some marching to do to reach their assigned posts, it will be seen that practically two full infantry brigades were afoot and pressing forward a few minutes after darkness descended.
Just a half hour before "D" day — 23h 30 of September 25 to be exact — the preliminary bombardment by the heaA'y corps and army artillery began. '^ The silence of the night gave way to the deep throated intonations of the great 155's and 9.2's which, from the Meuse to the Argonne, were concentrating their terrific explosives upon the Hagen-Stellung and the Hagen-Stellung Nord lines. The infantry had, in many cases, come up abreast of the positions of the heavies when the infernal clamor began. It was the first time the men of the Division had been so close to such large calibre weapons in action, and the roars which splintered the darkness, the weird red glare accompanying them, and the pungent battle smoke filtering under the trees, made "many a stout heart tremble." The columns swept past the camouflaged heavies without a pause, ofiicers urgent, men willing, and the crashing racket of the bombardment drowning out every other sound until the roads seemed peopled by an army of spectres. Another hour, and the advance battalions of the 157th Brigade were beginning to enter the support trenches, platoons feeling their way along in the darkness past the quiet lines of the front
MALANCOITRT AND MONTFAUCON
79
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80 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
battalions of the 315th and 316th Infantry. By 2h, September 26, the rehef of the battalion of the 129th Infantry on outpost was begun, and the first files of these men from the Thirty-third Division were coming back when the real fury of the Franco-American artillery attack developed.
It was 2h 30 on that memorable 26th of September, when to the roar of the heavies was added the thunder of all the Di^^sion guns. It was the "greatest concentration of artillery the world had ever known."'' The 2,700 guns, men- tioned in General Pershing's report, echeloned on the entire American front, were blasting the enemy positions. The artillery fire was covering every point, for five or more kilometers in depth, with a hurricane of shrieking, splintering missiles. The night became lurid, then murky as the smoke settled lower. Red flares stabbed the blackness, faded out, and were repeated. The intonations, first distinct, became merged into an ear-splitting drumming. Ahead, through the tangled woodland or in the rolling country, the ground became silhouetted momentarily by the projectiles bursting over or upon enemy positions. The night moaned and whined and shrieked to the terrible fusillade, which seemed to grow more and more intensified as the minutes passed. To this leaden tempest the enemy made but a feeble retaliatory fire. Perhaps most of the German guns had been withdrawn or were then being hastened to safetj^ beyond the hills north of Romagne. Those which were still in position sent their shells plunging into the American sector, but with slight effect. As the second battalion of the 315th Infantry was making its way through the communicating trenches toward the jump-off position, a vagrant shell burst in the midst of a platoon, killing one mem- ber of it and wounding six others. In the 313th several high explosives burst and caused some casualties — no fatalities — while the 314th escaped unscathed.
Both regiments of the 157th Brigade were in front of their own guns at 2h 30, when the real bombardment began, but neither was quite in position. In fact, it was not until 4h that the final elements of the 313th reached their assigned positions, and a half hour after that when the 314th reported itself as "all set."'- Not until then did the officers of the 314 th receive the marked maps and orders which should have been in their hands before leaving the Foret de Hesse. '"^ By that time also, the reserve battalions of the 315th and 316th had come up, the battalions of those regiments already in line contracting their fronts to make positions for them. Shortly before 5h the entire Division was ready for the at- tack. The exact position of each unit, to amplify the official report of operations, was then as foUows:
The 157th Infantry Brigade, Brigadier General William J. Nicholson com- manding, was in the front line of the Di\-ision zone of advance (Favry sector). The 313th Infantry, Colonel Claude B. Sweezey commanding, was on the left (Legrand sub-sector); and the 314th Infantry, Colonel William H. Oury com- manding, on the right (Zouaves sub-sector). Each regiment had two battalions in the attacking line and one in the Brigade Reserve. The front line battalions were echeloned in depth by companies, with one company echeloned in depth on the front line, one company echeloned in depth in support, and one company as battalion reserve — each battalion furnishing one company to the regimental reserve. One company from the Brigade Reserve was distributed through each
MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 81
regiment and assigned to the task of mopping up. The 311th Machine Gun Bat- taHon, Major Charles M. DuPuy commanding, furnished one company to each front hne regiment.'*
The 313th Infantry assigned two platoons of its own Machine Gun Company to the right battalion (Third Battalion, Major Jesse R. Langley commanding) and one platoon to the left Ijattalion (Second Battalion, Major Benjamin Frank- lin Pepper commanding) to protect the flanks. In addition, one platoon of the company from the 311th Machine Gun Battalion (Company A) was assigned by the 313th Infantry as a combat platoon of infantry protecting the left flank and to form combat liaison with the Thirty-seventh Division on the left. The balance of the company of the 311th Machine Gun Battalion, assigned to the 313th, was held in regimental reserve, together with the one-pounder platoon of the Head- quarters Company, 313th Infantry. The regiment also had one-half of Company D, First Gas Regiment, assigned to it.'* The "lead off" companies in the two front battalions were "H" and "K." The "raoppers up" were "C" Company, with "G" Company as regimental reserve while the Brigade Reserve consisted of the First Battalion, Major Israel Putnam commanding, less "C" Company.'"
The 314th Infantry, on the right, assigned the company from the 311th Machine Gun Battalion (Company "C") to its left battalion (Third Battalion, Major Harry M. Gwynn commanding) and the regimental Machine Gun Com- pany to the right battalion (Second Battalion, Major Robert B. Caldwell com- manding), and one section of the one pounder platoon of the Headciuarters Com- pany to each battalion. This regiment was also assigned one-half of Company D, First Gas Regiment.'* The "lead off" companies of the 314th were "E" and "L," with "H" and "I" Companies in regimental reserve. The First Battalion, Major Alfred R. Allen commanding, was in Brigade Reserve." The Brigade Reserve, in addition to one battalion from each infantry regiment, included the remaining two companies of the 311th Machine Gun Battalion. From this force one company of infantry and one machine gun platoon were detached to each flank for contact combat liaison with the 4th and 37th Divisions.'*
The 158th Infantry Brigade, Brigadier General Robert H. Noble command- ing, constituted the Division Reserve. It was composed of the 315th Infantry, Colonel Alden C. Knowles commanding; the 316th Infantry, Colonel Oscar J. Charles commanding, and the 312th Machine Gun Battalion, Major Stuart S. Janney commanding. In addition, the 310th Machine Gun Battalion, Major John L. Evans commanding, was right behind as a Division Reserve also. The formation of the 158th Brigade was practically the same as that of the 157th Brigade.'*
The 315th Infantry, on the right, had the Third Battalion, Major Francis V. Lloyd commanding, and the First Battalion, Major Fred W. McL. Patterson commanding, in the front line from right to left.'* On the left, the 316tli Infan- try had the Third Battalion, Major J. Baird Atwood commanding, and the First Battalion and Machine Gun Company, Major Harry D. Parkin commanding, from right to left.'^ Companies "A" and "C," of the 312th Machine Gun Bat- talion, were assigned to the 315th and 316th Infantry, respectively, while the remaining two companies of the battalion were assigned to the Brigade Reserve."
82 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
This reserve also included the Second Battalion of the 315th, Major Norman E. Borden commanding,'^ and the Second Battalion of the 316th, Captain Alan W. Lukens commanding.'^
The supreme Division command was exercised from the advance P. C, near Hill 309, west of Montezeville, or more specifically indicated as "the eastern exit of road in north edge of Bois de Lambechamp."'^ The Division Commander, Major General Joseph E. Kuhn, had at that time the following principal members of his staff:
Chief of Staff, Colonel Tenney Ross; G-1, Major Charles B. Moore; G-2, Captain Spencer Roberts; G-3, Major George A. Wildrick; Division Engineer, Colonel James P. Jervey; Signal Officer, Lieutenant Colonel George S. Gillis; Adjutant, 0. A. Fritchett, succeeded October first by Major James H. Stein-
RoAD OVER Xo-Man's Land, Reconstructed by 304 Engrs., Showing Method of Filling Shell
Holes.
man; Judge Advocate, Major Barry Wright; Quastermaster, Major Joseph W. Denton; Surgeon, Lieutenant Colonel Philip W. Huntington, and Ordnance OflBcer, Major Thomas W. Miller.
With Colonel Jervey at Division Headquarters, the field command of the 304th Engineers devolved upon Lieutenant Colonel J. Frank Barber, who, by 3h, Sep- tember 26, had Company D in the second line trenches ready to start construc- tion, at the earlest possible moment, of a road for tanks across "No Man's Land," and the balance of the regiment in Camp des Gendarmes."
Of the other units of the Division, as "H" hour approached, forty men of the Headquarters Troop, Captain Edward W. Madeira commanding, were in the advance P. C. of the Division;" Companies "A," "B," and "C,"of the Am- munition Train, were at Jouy-en-Argonne and Camp de Civils;^" and the Supply Train, Major William T. R. Price commanding, was at Dombasle.^'
MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON
83
The Sanitary Train, Major Robert B. Shackelford commanding, had the Division Triage at Clair Chenes, one field hospital packed on trucks and ready to move fom-ard, medical detachments with each infantry regiment, the ambu- lance dressing stations near the front, and the horse drawn ambulances at Dom- basle.^^
Twenty seconds prior to "H" hour, the trench mortars of Company "D," First Gas Regiment, filled "No Man's Land" with a protective screen of smoke and flame." At 5h 30 — the long awaited "H" hour — the fury of the artillery preparation was concentrated, for twenty-five minutes as prearranged, on the enemy front line." Under this crescendo of fire, the men of the advance com- panies of the 313th and 314th Infantry, with fixed bayonets, "jumped off" for the attack, each company maintaining a distance of ten to fifteen meters between each man.'" At the same moment, all up and down the Meuse-Argonne front, the shock companies of eight other divisions surged forward.
AVOCOTJBT THRU WHICH ThE TRANSPORT OF THE DIVISION MUST PaSS ON ITS WaT TO MaIAN-
COURT. The Road from this Point to Malancoxjrt has been Entirely Destroyed by
Three Years of Shell Fire
The devastating effect of the artillery deluge upon the opposing trenches was apparent to the men in the advance companies. The air was fairly alive with whining, whistling, screaming missiles. The concussions and flashes rom every noint of the compass temporarily deafened and blinded. I'hrough this the shock companies made their way, the support units getting into motion as the prescribed istances were reached. In the first twenty-five minutes the advance was sup-d posed to cut the barbed wires, get through and be prepared "to hop" the first enemy line. Or, in the words of Field Order No. 6, "approach to within 300 meters of the barrage and follow it as closely as possible.""
Promptly at "H" hour 25, as specified, the barrage began to move northward in bounds of 100 meters every four minutes, while a covering fire from five bat-
84
HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 85
teries of 75's, the loo's and the Coast Artillery howitzers preceded it by 200 me- ters, picking out successive targets as it went.^^ A German counter-barrage, attempted in retaliation, failed of its purpose, but inflicted some casualties in the support companies.'' The support companies were stepping out, the regimental reserves advancing, the 158th Infantry Brigade, 1,000 meters to the rear, also leaving the second line trenches. The entire infantry and machine gun strength of the Seventy-ninth Division was in motion as the barrage began to move. At the same time the rest of the First American Army, from the Argonne Forest to the banks of the Meuse, was surging forward under the protection of its artillery fire. The first phase of the great offensive was under way.
The squad and platoon columns slowly and steadily snaked their way through the gaps in the wire and gradually drew near to the enemy trenches — the Hagen Stellung outpost line. At first, in the half-light of early morning, nothing could be seen of the Boche. The roar of the guns in the rear continued, sounding like the beating of myriad drums. From time to time a new sound was added, the nasty whining of machine gun bullets. Then, as those in advance topped the enemy trenches, the day grew momentarily lighter and it could be seen that the enemy was gone. There were a few dead here and there, but the majority had retired, following, no doubt, the German precept, "When it is known that the enemy is going to attack, the division may order the methodical evacuation of the outpost zone."-^ The first rush, overwhelming the German first line, had occurred with surprisingly little resistance, had been almost simultaneous on either flank and had been conducted in similar manner on both flanks. From this point forward, however, the leading regiments found that each had its separ- ate work cut out over ground which differed in every respect.
Here. began to develop a situation that came very near to threatening the success of the entire action. It had been anticipated by the higher command that the terrain immediately in front of the 313th Infantry would offer unusual difficulties and orders had provided an extra minute every 100 meters in the barrage schedule at that point. Covered by dense underbru.sh and the shattered remains of the Bois de Malancourt and by an unusual quantity of old and new wiring, cratered and shell-holed to an unbelievable degree by artillery of large calibre for nearly four years and made even more so by the terrific intensity of the recent American barrage, this country retarded progress by human beings on foot to a snail's pace. Even the extra time provided was not sufficient. As a result, the barrage gradually drew away from the breathless, sweating, stumbling, struggling infantrymen, leaving them to meet the most stern resistance along the entire twenty kilometer front with their great offensive weapon gone.
It is not hard to appreciate the helpless, heart-sick feeling of the front line officers and those others whose understanding of battle tactics was sufficient to convey the significance of it to them, when they realized that the almost essential protection of that great tidal wave of steel missiles was lost to them for good. For a while the full extent of the loss did not manifest itself. Aside from a scat- tered machine gun here and there, an isolated pill box, or a lone sniper cracking away from some point of vantage overhead, there was little to check the advance except the terrible conditions of the ground. But it was not for long. At about
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i I i I - 1 I I
I I", r
84
HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
«
]VL\LANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON
85
teries of 75's, the 155's and the Coast Artillery howitzers preceded it by 200 me- ters, picking out successive targets as it went.^ A German counter-barrage, attempted in retaliation, failed of its purpose, but inflicted some casualties in the support companies." The support companies were stepping out, the regimental reserves advancing, the 158th Infantry Brigade, 1,000 meters to the rear, also leaving the second line trenches. The entire infantry and machine gun strength of the Seventy-ninth Division was in motion as the barrage began to move. At the same time the rest of the First American Army, from the Argonne Forest to the banks of the Meuse, was surging forward under the protection of its artillery fire. The first phase of the great often si ve was under way.
The squad and platoon cohunns slowly and steadily snaked their way through the gaps in the wire and gradually drew near to the enemy trenches — the Hagen Stellung outpost line. At first, in the half-light of early morning, nothing could be seen of the Boche. The roar of the guns in the rear continued, sounding like the beating of myriad drums. From time to time a new sound was added, the nasty whining of machine gun bullets. Then, as those in advance topped the enemy trenches, the day grew momentarily lighter and it could be seen that the enemy was gone. There were a few dead here and there, but the majority had retired, following, no doubt, the German precept, "When it is known that the enemy is going to attack, the division may order the methodical evacuation of the outpost zone."" The first rush, overwhelming the German first line, had occurred with surprisinglj' little resistance, had been almost simultaneous on either flank and had been conducted in similar manner on both flanks. From this point forward, however, the leading regiments found that each had its separ- ate work cut out over ground which ditt'cred in every respect.
Here. began to develop a situation that came very near to threatening the success of the entire action. It had been anticipated by the higher conmiand that the terrain immediately in front of the 313th Infantry would offer unusual difficulties and orders had provided an extra minute every 100 meters in the barrage schedule at that point. Covered by dense underbrush and the shattered remains of the Bois de Malancourt and by an unusual quantity of old and new wiring, cratered and shell-holed to an unbelievable degree by artillery of large calibre for nearly four years and made even more so by the terrific intensity of the recent American barrage, this country retarded progress by human beings on foot to a snail's pace. Even the extra time provided was not sufficient. As a result, the barrage gradually drew away from the breathless, sweating, stumbling, struggling infantrymen, leaving them to meet the most stern resistance along the entire twenty kilometer front with their great offensive wea])on gone.
It is not hard to appreciate the helpless, heart-sick feeling of the front line officers and those others whose understanding of battle tactics was sufficient to convey the significance of it to them, when they realized that the almost essential protection of that great tidal wave of steel missiles was lest to them for good. For a while the full extent of the loss did not manifest itself. Aside from a scat- tered machine gun here and there, an isolated pill box, or a lone sniper cracking away from some point of vantage overhead, there was little to check the advance except the terrible conditions of the ground. But it was not for long. At about
86
HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
9h, at a point some three kilometers beyond the first German defense, the front Hne of the 313th ran into a situation that justified fully the darkest anticipations to which the loss of the barrage had given rise.
At this point the Bois de Malancourt opened suddenly into a clearing, known on the military maps as the Golfe de Malancourt This clearing, nearly a mile wide and something less than that in depth, resembled nothing so much as a tri- angular rent in the woods from right, to left. On the right lay open country beyond the eastern boundary of the Bois de Malancourt. To the left, the woods curved around continuously to the far side, directly opposite, where they were known as the Bois de Cuisy. From the edge of the Bois de Malancourt, on the south side of the clearing, the ground sloped up gradually to the edge of the Bois de Cuisy, where the rise became rapid and more pronounced, with the result that
Entrance to the Golfe de Mal.\xcourt. Here the 313th Infantry Regiment met its first
Determined Resistance.
it afforded the Germans a defensive position of the greatest advantage. They had made the most of it. In the clearing, protected by great bands of barbed wire, were located the German second line trenches — the Hagen Stellung Nord — well constructed and practically intact. Due to the rising ground, the Germans had been able to place effectively many more machine guns than would ordinarily have been possible in the same area. Beyond and above, in the Bois de Cuisy, were innumerable machine gun nests perfectly concealed and ideally situated to support those in the trenches below them with overhead fire.
It was this position, defended to its fullest possibilities by the enemy, that held up the 313th Infantry for nearly five hours and effectively checked the cap- ture of Montfaucon, as planned, on the first day of the attack. It resisted numer- ous frontal attacks of the most determined sort, not only by the two front line
MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 87
companies but by additional companies of the front line battalions as they came up. It was simply an impossibility for men in any numbers to survive the machine gun fire that the slightest or most carefully concealed sortie from the woods brought forth. And the few who did get across some part of the open ground lost their lives in, or were checked by, the barbed-wire entanglements. It was here in the Golfe de Malancourt that Major Benjamin Franklin Pepper, of the Second Bat- talion, was shot through the head by a sniper and mortally ■wounded, while his adjutant. First Lieutenant Francis Stuart Patterson was instantly killed.-^ Here also Major Jesse R. Langley, of the Third Battalion, was shot through both legs and seriously wounded,^^ and the regimental casualties on all sides piled higher and higher.
The slaughter at this particular point, as the infantry left the protection of the woods and emerged in the open of the Golfe, commanded as it was by in- numerable machine guns, in permanent selected positions, and augmented by the great number of portable machine guns, hastily thrown into position by the enemy, was indescribable. The German map, showing the disposition of their machine guns for this defensive organization, indicates that in this particular sector there were 113 and it was fair to assume that in addition to these fixed guns there were at least half as many more movable or portable machine guns, in action against our advancing infantry.
The plan of flanking the position, as a solution, suggested itself ahnost from the first, and a very definite effort to organize such an attack was made. The difficul- ties in the way were numerous. The first of these was the great area of the German position and its wonderful commanding height giving, as it did, an almost per- fect field of fire for several kilometers in every direction, and the almost total absence of any terrain protection for the attacking troops. It would have taken a very carefully worked out plan, involving coordinated effort on the part of a number of widely separated units, to have functioned effectively. The second of these was the entire absence of lateral communication due to the hopelessly stag- gered position of what should have been parallel units, due in turn to the break- down of the time schedule because of the unforeseen and unequal difficulties of- fered by the terrain. The third was the precarious position of the 313th Infantry, although doing nothing more than holding the position on the edge of the Bois de Malancourt. The Germans continually raked the woods with machine-gun fire and, while its effect was necessarily much reduced by the woods this fire was taking a continuous toU.
But far more effective was the fire of scores of snipers in concealed positions in the tops of trees and elsewhere above, and actually behind. These snipers, emboldened by the proximity of a strong German position, had stuck to their posts and succeeded in doing what was expected of them to a highly successful degree. Scarcely a runner despatched with a message between separated units of the regiment escaped their fire. Their only restraint was exercised when to fire would have given away their positions. ^^ One of these snipers wounded First Lieutenant Robert N. SchaufBer, of the Regimental Intelligence Section, while he and Colonel Sweezey were bending over a map, the latter having pushed his P. C. almost to the northern edge of the Bois de Malancourt.-' Even while this happened.
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HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
in an attempt to flank through the Bois de Montfaucon, on the left, First Lieu- tenant David M. Rupp, of Company "G," led his platoon through the woodland and surprised a German machine gun position, the outfit bagging twenty-two German prisoners.^^ At the same time, no opportunity was lost to push the at- tack wherever it offered even the most remote possibility of accomplishing its object.
While the 313th Infantry was held up by the enemy defenses in the GoKe de Malancourt and the Bois de Cuisy, the 314th Infantry, on the right, was experienc- ing great difficulties in its advance. No woodland faced the 314th. It had jumped off into a valley, running toward the northwest parallel with the edge of the Bois de Malancourt through which the 313th was fighting. As in the case of the
Edge of Bois de Mal.\a'court, Showing P.C. 313 Inf.
kindred regiment to the west, the difficult terrain prevented the men from keeping within the protection of the barrage. In addition, the thick smoke and fog, which filled the ravines, caused the intermingling of units and resulted in the front line passing by machine gun nests, unobserved in the murky atmosphere. This advance was made against heavy machine gun fire from the village of Malan- court. The regimental P. C. was advanced with the attack, and at one point Colonel Oury and his headquarters detachment captured five enemy machine gunners, from whom it was learned that a regiment of Machine Gun troops was in the Malancourt basin.
The first rush had engulfed Haucourt, the ruined hamlet on the enemy front line, and by lOh the shock companies had pushed on toward Malancourt, reaching the southern end of the shattered town as the fog lifted. Immediately, from
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MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON
89
every point of the compass, hostile machine guns, which lay ahead, on the flanks and even within the ground already occupied, opened a destructive fire.^' This was verification in deadly earnest of the previous information received from the prisoners. The front line was swept by machine guns in the ruins of Malancourt and from two strongholds, one on a trench on the hilltop running parallel to the Malancourt valley and inside the sector of the division on the right,^° and the other from a strong point one and one-half kilonaeters northwest of Malancoiu-t.^^ Sec- ond Lieutenant Harvey R. Jagger, Company "C," 304th Field Signal Battalion, was mortally wounded at this point while directing a detail laying a telephone wire from Colonel Oury's P. C. to the rear.
Fortunately, while the advance of the 314th was held up, the organiza-
Seventy Ninth Division Troops moving up Front on Esnes — Malancourt Road.
tion of the regiment in depth provided an effective means for silencing the machine gunners whom the shock company and some of the support companies had passed unseen in the fog. The result was practically two continuous engagements, one conducted by the van seeking to penetrate through Malancourt and deeper up the valley, and the other by the supj^ort companies battling with the machine gunners in their midst. The stalking of concealed enemy rapid fire guns was carried out by the regimental and brigade reserves slowly, but with ultimate suc- cess. Numerous acts of heroism were recorded.
Corporal Hugh F. Cox, Company "C," for instance, crawled upon his stomach to within a few yards of a nest and hurled a hand grenade, killing the gunner and silencing the gun.^' Sergeant Michael C. Ventura, Company "D", leading two
90
HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
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combat groups, died under the hurricane of fire but exhibited such courage that his men pressed forward and avenged him upon the machine gunners in their path.^- Private 1st cl Garosi Guido, of Ventura's combat group, though wounded in the shoulder, emulated his dead leader by his "bravery and self-sacrifice to duty."^^ Another instance of unusual bravery was the conduct of Private Ralph Pilla, Company "I". He, instructed to take prisoners to the rear, disdained the machine gun fire as he herded them before him. They passed a wounded soldier. Pilla stopped and made an improvised stretcher from the soldier's coat and sev- eral pieces of wood. Then he compelled the prisoners to carry the wounded man, first to a dressing station and afterwards to an ambulance a mile further along.
The First Group of Prisoners Captdred by Seventy-Ninth Division, Carrying Wounded
Men Back.
Finally, having delivered his prisoners, he retraced his steps and rejoined his company after dark.'^
The fight through the ruins of Malancourt was a series of bitter combats with nest after nest of machine gunners, located so that the field of fire of those to the rear protected the more exposed positions. Colonel Oury, of the 314th, endeavored throughout to make use of his own machine guns.'" The Machine Gun Company of the regiment, armed with heavy Brownings, managed to keep well up in the support line, but the company from the 311th Machine Gun Bat- talion (Company "C") had encountered rough going from the very jump off. Within an hour after it had left the German first line trenches behind it, the men, despairing of making fast enough time, discarded their carts and man-handled
92 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION
their heavy Brownings.'" Sergeant John E. Spasio, of this company, pushing forward with a squad, captured a German non-commissioned officer and, at the point of a pistol, forced him to disclose the position of a number of trench mor- tars. Through this stroke the mortars were later captured, but Spasio, a little later, enlarged his achievement by capturing ten more prisoners.'' Private Sher- idan C. Broadwater, of the company, was killed by a machine gun bullet during the advance. The heavy Brownings finally reached a forward position at lOh 30, arriving at a time when Major Gwynn, of the Third Battalion, 314th Infantry, was seeking some way of silencing three persistent nests on his flank. "C" Com- pany mounted its guns and set to work. It silenced the enemy guns in almost less time that it takes to tell about it. At that time Major Gwynn, seeing the terrain in front of them and realizing that the men could not stagger forward any farther with the heavy weapons, reluctantly ordered them to return to the jump- ing off place and await further orders. '"'
All through the advance on the left of the regimental sector, the Third Bat- talion was having its troubles. Company "K," in particular was, "up to its neck" in combat with machine guns. Corporal James A. Larson and Private Nolan L. Jordan, of this company, "outflanked a machine gun in advance of the line, killed three of the crew and captured two others together with the gun."'* Serg- eant Charles J. Dewees, Jr., "led in the capture of two machine guns, killing the entire crew of both guns."'- Corporal Earl B. Mohn, although seriously wounded, led his squad to the capture of yet another weapon.'- The enemy shelling during this period was not particularly severe, nevertheless, it had inflicted a number of casualties in this same Third Battalion. '^ First Lieutenant Kenneth H. Mor- ton, Company "K," was knocked unconscious by a high explosive. Upon re- covering consciousness he refused to go to the rear, continuing to lead his pla- toon until wounded by a piece of shrapnel. '^ Sergeant Mart J. Cawley, Sergeant Samuel W. Shearer and Private Samuel Santucci, all of "K" Company also, although knocked over by a bursting shell, got doggedly to their feet and re- mained on duty.'- Sergeant Harry E. Mitchell, of the same company, when wounded, disdained even first-aid in his determination to keep up with his men.'^ In Company "L", Corporal John Bassusky, with a shrapnel wound in the hand, went to a dressing station, but, refusing to be evacuated, returned to his platoon,'^ while Sergeant Peter C. Strucel, "walking up and down the line cheering and en- couraging his men," was killed instantly.'*
On the right, where the Second Battalion was echeloned in depth, two non- coms of the leading company — "E" — conducted themselves heroically. They were Sergeant Carl P. Frank, who, with two other men, captured a machine gun nest and seventeen prisoners, and Corporal Eric Rosenfield, who led his squad in cleaning up three nests and taking twenty-two prisoners.'- Nor were the other companies of the Second Battalion without their deeds of gallantry. In the fore- front of those recorded stands the achievement of an automatic rifle patrol of "F" Company, headed by Sergeant John A. McCawley. It had been sent out to flank several machine gun nests. McCawley got within fifty yards of one of the nests and opened fire, directing his men to fire on two others. The patrol wiped out entirely the three enemy groups. Other enemy machine gunners spotted
IVL\LANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 9S
the determined band and decimated it. Sergeant McCawley being instantly killed. Almost all of the men in the patrol were killed or wounded "but the sacrifice saved many, for it enabled the company to advance, while the patrol attracted the enemy fire."^^
Captain Henry M. Smith, Company "G," won the Distinguished Service Cross in the advance through Malancourt, when "although painfully wounded leading a platoon of his company against strong machine-gun nests, he continued the advance until all the machine guns in his immediate front were silenced and the crews killed or taken prisoners. He continued on duty until ordered to the rear by his regimental commander."^^ Even more thrilling was the exjierience of Second Lieutenant (then Sergeant) Joseph Cabla, of Company "F", of whom a Division Citation states:'^
Sergeant Cabla successfully maneuvered his patrol so he could flank the enemy machine gun nests. He advanced within five feet of one gunner and opened fire. At this point he directed his