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A N

EXAMINATION

Of the Notion of

Moral Good and Evil,

Advanced in a late Book, entitled.

The Reltgton of Nature delineated.

By JOHN CLARKE,

Mafter of the publick Grammar-School in Hull.

n

ic LONDON: K^ tnt Printed for A. Bettesworth, at the Red Ljon in FAUr-noJier-Row. MDCCXXV. Price I ;.

A N

EXAMINATION

O F T H E

Notion of Moral Good and Evil, ^c.

O advance wrpng Notions of Religion, is apt to have thefe two very ill EfFeds.

1 . To miflead fuch as are impofed upon thereby in the Conduct of Life j and

2. To expofe Religion to the Infults of thofe that being engaged in Deifm or Atheifm, or inclinable that way, have, notwithftanding their Folly, Senfe e-

B z nough

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nough to perceive the Weaknefs of fuch Notions. Tis upon this Account I have thought it worth while to take under Exami- nation the firft Scdion of a late Book, en- titled The Religion of Nature delineated^ writ by one Mr. Wollafton^ a Pcrfon of con- fiderable Parts, who might have made a fine Book of it, had he fet out upon a right Bottom : But unluckily falling upon a whim- fical Notion of Morality, and perhaps too much tickled with the Novelty of it, and a Defire to fiipport, and leave it as a Legacy to the World, has fo leavened his Treatife with it, as muft render it difagreeabie to the moft judicious Readers, and at the fame time expofe Morality, inftead of recommen- ding it. There is befides fuch a Mixture of Pedantry in almoft every Page, as is very unaccountable in a Man of his Scnfe. The Latin and Greek Qiiotations are generally very little to the Piu'pofe, unkfs it can be fuppofed to the Purpofe, to cxprefsThoughts, and thofe oftentimes pretty common, and to be met with in numerous Authors, in Latin and Greeks at the Bottom of the Page, which have been already as well or better expreffed in the Text it felf in Englijh. This is flopping and diilurbmg his Reader to no Purpofe, and preventing him from taking in the Senfe of what he reads, in the moft cafy expeditious Manner, and to the beft

Advan-

( 5 ) Advantage. But what he could mean by his frequent Quotations from the Rabbini- cal Writers, efpecially upon fuch a Subjed, unlcfs it was to make a Parade of his y-rcat Reading in a fort of Autliors remarkable for nothing but Stupidity and Lying, mufl be the Wonder of every Man of Senfe that reads him. He knew very well what Kind of Character the Rabbins have amongfl the Learned, and how well they deferve it, and muft be fenfible, tho' their Charaftcr was the reverfe of w^hat it is, how little to the Purpofe of his Pleaders it was, to trouble them with Quotations, they would none of them, or not one in ten thoufand under- ftand. But this en pajfant only.

The Author in the firft Seclion of his Book propofes to (hew upon what Ground the Law of Nature (lands, from what Prin- ciple it is to be deduced, or how it may be made out, that there is fuch a Law or Re- ligion of Nature ^ and this in anfwer to the firft Qtiery of his Friend, Is there really aiiy fiLch Thing as natural Religion properly and truly fo called ? I fhall tranfcribe the Sub- ftance of what he has faid, to explain and vindicate his Notion, to fave the Reader the Trouble of turning continually to his Book.

Page 8. We are told, a true Tropofition may be denied, or Things 7nay be denied to be "-^juhat they are, by \Deeds as '-^ell as by

exprefs

(4) exprefs Words, or another Tropofition.^'^^ That there are many ftich A6ts, as confli- tute the CharaEier of a Maris Conduct in Life, ''jjhich have in Nature, and isjould be taken by any indifferent Judge, to have a Signification, and to imply fomeTr op o fit ion as plainly to be under flood, as if it was de- clared in JVords ; and therefore, if what fuch ABs declare to be^ is 7iot, they muft contradiH Truth as much, as any falfe Tro- pofition or Affertion can. This is illuftratcd by an E x amp 1 c . If a Body of Soldiers fee- ing another Body approach, fl:ould fire upon thern, would not this Action declare, that they were Enemies, and if they were not Enemies, would not this military Language declare what was falfe "^ Again p. 13. / lay this down as a fundamental Maxim, that whoever aEls as if Things were fo, or not fo, doth by his AUs declare that they are fo, or not fo, as plainly as he could with IVords, and with more Reality ; and if the Things are otherwife, his Acts con- tradict thofe Tropofitions, which affert tloem to be as they are. No Act {whether Word or 'Deed) of any Being, to whom moral Good or Evil are imputable, that interferes with any true Tropofition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be right. This Propofition the Author endeavours to fup- port by fcveral Reafons, which fhali here- after

( 5 ) after be taken notice of. P. 1 6. JVhat has been f aid of AEiions inconjiftent ijuith Truths may alfo he [aid of many OmiJJionSyOr Neg- lects to a6i, that is, by thefe alfo true Tro- fofitions may be denied to be true, and then thofe Omiffions by ^iz'hich this is doneymufl be wrong. Again p. 20. Every Aci there- fore of fiich a Being as is before defer ibedy and all thofe Omijfions, which interfere with Truth ( i. e. deny any Tropofition to be true, or fufpofe any thing not to be what it is, in any regard) are morally e^vil inform degree or other-, the forbearing fuch AEis^ and the acting in Oppofitton to fuch Omif Jions, are morally good, and when any thing may be either done or not done^ equally with- out the Violation of Truth, that Thing is indifferent. I would have it to be minded well, thatwhen I fpeakofAcisinconfftent with Truth, I mean any Truth, any true ^ropofition whatfoever, whether contain- ing Matter of Speculation or plain Fact. I would have every thing taken for what in Fa6t and Truth it is.

From all this our Author's Notion of moral Good and Evil I think is very evi- dent. Thofe Ads according to him are morally good or obligatory, the Omiffica whereof would amount to, or imply the Denial of fome Truth, any Truth what- foevcr. Thofe Omiflions., Neglecls, or For- f bcarances.

(6)

bearaaces to acl are morally good and obli- ^atorv, where theAclions omitted or for- born, would, if perform'd, be a Denial of the Truth. And all Aclions or Omiflions whereby a xMan denies Truth of any Kind whatfoever, are immoral and unlawful. I fuppole this Sort of Language of denying Truth by Adion, or acting a Lie, as the Author fome where expreflcs himfelf, will be a little furprizing to the Reader. And I am afraid the Novelty furprized the Author into an Approbation of it, and a paffionate Defire to make sood what he thought would gain him the Character and Credit of being anOriginal. He takes notice, that what he has advanced concerning the Nature of moral Good and Evil, and is the prevailing Thought that runs through his Book, he never met with any where. And I hope to make it appear, before I have done with him, it would have been more for his Credit, if it had not been to be met with in his Book.

I defire the Reader to take notice, that Affirming and Denying ai'e Aclions, w^hich in ftrict Propriety of Language are only ap- plicable to Agents; fo that A<5lions, whe- ther Words or Deeds, can not be properly faid to affirm or deny any thing; the A- gent only can be properly faid to affirm or deny Truth by his Actions, whether Words or Deeds. This tho' it may feem a nice Di-

ftindion

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ftinftion, yet is not more nice than neccf- fary y for in order to a Perfon's affirming or denying the Truth, an Intention to affirm or deny is required, without which he cannot be faid to affirm or deny it. A Man is then, and then only, faid to affirm or deny a Thing, \yhen he conveys a Propofition in his owr^; Mind to the Minds of others; as expreffing his own Senfe, Apprehenfion or Perfua- fi.on of the Agreement or Difagreemenr of Things. It matters not, what Notions or Propofitions his Words or Actions may na- turally, or by Compaft, excite in the Minds of thofe that hear the one, or fee the other V if he himfelf had no fuch Propofitions ill his own Mind, had no Intention of commu- nicating any fuch Propofitions to others^ he cannot in any Propriety of Language be faid to affirm or deny them. Thus for Inftance, aPerfon that fhould pronounce, in the hear- ing of others. Words in the Greek Tongue, which he underftands not, equivalent to this Propofition- in Englt^y There is no God, could not be faid to deny the being of God i and for this Reafon, becaufe he had no fuch Propofition in his own Mind, nor any In- tention of conveying it to the Minds of o- thers. The fame may be faid of Deeds, as well as Words. Let us fuppofe fome Adion fhould as neceflarily convey the aforemen- tioned Propofition into the Minds of fuch as B {hould

( 10 )

ihould fee or hear of it, as Words themfelves could 5 yetfuppdfc the Agent altogether m- fenfible of it, and to have no fuch Intention at all, he could not be faid to deny the Be- ing of a God. Let us fuppofe, again, Orders given in a Nation under the Apprehenfion of an Invafion from an Enemy, that Beacons fhould be fir'd, or Lights fet up in fuch and fuch Places, to give Notice of his Approach ; that Perfons were appointed accordingly for the Purpofe, and agreed to execute the faid Orders : If they fire the Beacons, or fet up the Lights, that Aclion would be equivalent to this Propofition, The Enemy is come -, and they might be faid thereby to affirm a Truth, if the Enemy was come, and a Lie if he was not, becaufe this was really meant and in- tended. But fuppofing other Perfons ig- norant of the Orders and L^fe of Beacons, fhould fire the Beacons, or fet up Lights, they could not be faid thereby to affirm that the Enemy was come, notwithflanding their Aftion would neccffarily convey that Pro- pofition to the Minds of fuch as, being ac- quainted with the Orders given, Ihould fee. the Lights j and that for this Reafon only, becaufe they had not the lead Intention to affirm any fuch Thing. All this, I think, is plain bey ondDifpute, and need not be longer infifted upon.

If

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If therefore nobody can be faid to affirm or deny any thing, without an Intention fo to dO;, I doubt the greateft of Villains, will, according to Mr. JFollafion's Doclrine, ftand difcharged from the Guilt of the greateft of Crimes; iince they are fo far from intending the Denial of any Truth, any true Propofi- tion whatfoever, by the Rapine and Mur- ther they are guilty of, that they never fo much as once imagine, their Actions have any fuch Tendency, Meaning or Signitica- tionatall. Does a Villain that demands a -Man's Money upon the Road, with a Piftol at his Breaft, intend thereby the Denial of any Truth, or the Truth Mr. Wollafton pre- tends is denied by fuch an Adion, ^-oiz. that the Money belongs to the Traveller? Far from it ! He never fo much as dreams of the Denial of any fuch Thing, nor has his Action any fuch Signification, but quite the contrary. For Men do not ufeto claim their own in that violent manner, but Rogues frequently take that Method to deprive ho- neft People of their own; and therefore the Thought that would naturally arife in the Mind of a Speftator upon it, that is, the na- tural Meaning or Signirication of the Adion would be, that the Money certainly belong'd to the Traveller; and not the Highway- man.

B 2 If

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If It fhould be faid in Defence of onr Au- thor, that tho' the Aclion of the Highway- man does not indeed imply a Denial of the Money to be the Travclier'^, yet it may in- terfere with other Truths ; that I put too precife and ftrid a Scnfe upon his Words, whereas he means no more, but that A^lions or Omiffions denominated immoral, have a natural Meaning or Signitication, inconfi- ftent with fome Truth; and that therefore the Immorality of anyAclion, or Omillion, does not lie in the Intention, but in the natural Tendency or Signification of the Adion or Omiflion to deny fome Truth, in aFitnefs to raife, or excite in the Minds of fuch as fee or hear of it, Propofitions contrary to the Truth. I anfwer, this is ftrange Morality in- deed, and fuch as renders a Perfon that de- nies a Truth in Words without being fenfi- ble it is a Truth, and fo confequently with- out any Intention to deny the Truth, equal- ly guilty with him who denies it, though he knows it to be a Truth; for in both Cafes the Words are fuppofed to be the fame, and confequently their Inconfiftency with the Truth precifely the fame ; fo that if the Im- morality of the Action lies there exclufive of the Intention, it is plain the Guilt mufl: be the very fame.

Take it therefore which way you will, w^hether an Intention to deny the Truth be

made

( 13 ) made necefiary or not nGgeffary to the Im- morality of any Adion, Mr. IVolIaJion's Do- clrine cannot ftand. Vpon the former Sup- pofition, thegreateft of Rogues will be excii- fableinthevilcft of Actions for want of this Intention to deny the Truth, as it is very cer- tain fhey have it not. They trouble n6t their Heads about Truth, or the Denial of it , all they are concerned for, is to get Money to fpend in Lewdnefs and Debauchery ^ and their Manner of ^ettins; it, is fo far from im- plying fuch a Denial of Truth, as Mr. JVolla- flon fuppofes the Immorality of their Aclion to confift in, that the natural Signification of it lies quite the contrary way, as I have a- bove taken notice. And upon the Suppofi- tion that an Intention to deny the Truth, is not necefTary to the Immorality of an Aclion, but that it is fuiRcientto render an Action im- moral, that it has a Meaning or Signification inconfiflent with foiiK Truth, tho' the Agent has not the lead Intention of denying any Trudi : I fay upon this fuppofition it will be a crime, and as great a crime to deny the Truth thro' Ignorance or Miftake, as to do it wittingly and knowingly, with a per- verfc and malicious Intention, which to be fure is admirable Morality.

Tho'what has been faid be fufficient to

blaft our Author's new Notion of Morality,

yet I fnall not leave him thus, I have not

? done

( 14 ) done with him by far. Affirming or deny- ing is neither more nor lefs than convey- ing our Senfe (real ©r pretended) of things, their Agreement or Dilagteement to others by Words. This is the primary, original, and moft proper Notion of affirming and deny- ing. But becaufe it is poflible, to foniG Degree, to convey our Minds or Senfe of Things to others, by Adioiis as well as Words, where they have by Confent a Sig- nitication or Meaning apply'd to them, for that Purpofe the Senle of the Words affirm and deny has perhaps been fometimes ex- tended to Adions of that kind, and if any one has a mind to ufe them fo, I lliail not difpute the Propriety of that Ufe of them with him. But to extend them farther to fuch Anions as the Confent of Men has not attached any Meaning to at all, if it be not peculiar to Mr. Wollafion^ is at beft a vio- lent Figure, a bold Catachrefis, fuch as fliould by all means be avoided in philofo- phical Difcourfes, v/hcre the plaincft Lan- guage, and the lead liable to be difputed, is certainly the beft. This Stretch, in point of Language, has obliged him to put forc'd and violent Meanings upon the feveral In- ftances of immoral Aftions he has Occafion to take notice of, fuch as, I dare fay, never entered into the Thoughts of any body be- fore himfelf. T>oes a Man break a Bar-

gain ?

( 15 ) gain ? this is, according to Mr. JVollaJioTti denying the Truth by Action, denying there "nas any Bargain : Tho' if another might tal^e the fame Freedom, or pretend to the like Skill for the finding out the Senfe and Meaning of Actions, he would be apt to think it perhaps a Denial not of the Bar- gain, as tho' there had been none, but of the Obligation only to keep it. Ano- ther Critic in Actions would perhaps find it out to be a Denial of neither, but an Affirmation rather of this Propofition, that the Breach qf the Bargain was a likely means to rook his Chapman of fome Mo- ney, or at leaft fave his own, and thereby lay theDifturbance which a covetous griping Humour at that time gave him. And if fuch a Critic fhould ftand bufF, in vindi- cation of the Fellow's Action, as very inno- cent, and fo far from implying the Denial, that it imported the Affirmation of a ma- nifeft and undeniable Truth, I fee not how our Author would be able to come hand- fomly off with him ■> he would find himfelf in fome danger, I doubt, of being fool'd at his own Weapon j it would at leatf, I think, be an even Wager on the Critic's fide.

Again, is a rich Man regardlefs or negli- gent of the poor? according to Mr. /W- lajlon, he denies by that Negied the Con- dition of the poor to be what it is, his

own

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own Condition to be what it is. Docs a Man lie with his Neighbour's Wife ? he by that Action impudently denies her to be his Neighbour's, and affirms her to be his own j tho' the Circumftancc of Secrecy, with which that kind of Gallantry is ufually car- ried on, vifibly implies the quite contrary, 'viz. that (he is not his own- : Which being a Truth, fome people raa^y perhaps be thank- ful to our Author for the notable Argument his do£lrine furnifhes them with, to prove the Innocence of Adultery. Befides, this Adion is the Affirmation 0f another Truth, /. e. that the Man is in love, and knows no other way fo ready to make himfelf cafy as that. And feveral other Meanings perhaps might be found conformable to Truth, all of them as likely and natural at leaft as thofe our Author has thought fit to alfign. lor thefe Actions are, 1 think, fomething like the Clinking of a Bell ; you may, by the Help of that Preedom Mr. PVol- lajlon t2i)fits with them/ make them fay al- moft what you have a mind^ affirnv or deny Truth juft as you pleafc. Nay, I do not know but a good ingenious Fellow, that would but apply his Parts for fome reafon- able Time to ftudy tht Meaning of A6i:ions, might venture for a Wager, with any one of the Admirers of our Author's new No- tion of Morality, ■ to- drop Meanings with

him.

(17) him, a Truth affirmed for a Truth denied, to Ranting, Roaring, Tearing, Swearing, Drinking, Gaming, Pim.pmg, Whoring, or whatever Species of immoral Action he could think of befides.

Will our Author needs have it that all Vice, every immoral Action denies fome Truth? let that be granted, we will for once allow him the Privilege of exprefling him- felf in his own way : But then he muft be forced to allow that every fuch Action or Omillion docs as well affirm Truth as de- ny it : For Inftance this Truth, that the Perfon concerned propofes or promifes to himfelf fome Intereft or Advantage, fome Pleafure or Satisfaction from his vicious and immoral Behaviour. This Meaning of his Behaviour is a certain Truth, and much more obvious in any Inftance of Immora- lity that can be put, than any of thofe Mr. Wollaflon has invented. It will avail no- thing to fay, that notwithitanding any vici- ous Action or Omiffion implies indeed this Truth, yet it denies fome other Truth, which is fufficient to bring it under the Denomina- tion of vicious or immoral 5 for I fay on the other hand let the Aftion deny what Truth you will, yet fince it affirms other Truth, that is as fufficient to bring it under the De- nomination of virtuous.

D Por

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For if the Denial of Truth, any Truth whatever be, as Mr. IVollafton pretends, immoral, and for thisReafon only, becaufe it is a Denial of the Truth, without any Reference or Regard to Confequences, that may follow from Aclions or Omiflions, whereby Truth is denied, muft not then the affirming of Truth, any Truth, whether of any Confequence or Importance, or no, be matter of Duty, or a Virtue, or at leaft very commendable or praife- worthy \ For if Truth, all Truth without Exception, be fo very facred, as that Mankind ought to have a fupreme, ultimate and terminating Regard to it in all their Conduft, in all they fay or do, if Vice be Vice, therefore and only upon Account of its Oppofition to, or Inconfiflency with the Truth; it will puzzle, I doubt, any one even of our Au- thor's Head-piece, to allege a folid fubftan- tial Reafon, why the affirming of Truth, any Truth whatever by Word or by Deed, even in Cafes, where Forbearance or Omif- fton would not imply a Denial of Truth, fhould not be looked upon as a Virtue, or meritorious $ becaufe by this means as Regard is ihewn to Truth, to which the higiieft Re- gard is due, and upon Account of which alone any Regard is due to ought elfe, ac- cording to Mr. JVollaJion. Does not Virtue receive all its Merit from the Regard it im- plies

( 19)

plies to Truth? muft not therefore every Adion, whether Word or Deed, whereby a Regard is paid to Truth, or Truth is af- firmed, be at leaft commendable, if not mat- ter of ftrid Duty ? And if fo, it will then be a glorious Exercife for a Man to fpend his Time in thrumming over fuch worthy and weighty Propofitions as thefe, A Man's no Horfe, a Horfe no Cow, a Cow no Bull, nor a Bull an Afs. Every body at firft Sight perceives how ridiculoufly trifling this would be, and may thereby judge of our Author's Dodrine, from which fuch filly idle Confequences vifibly and manifeftly flow.

If it fhould be further alledged in Behalf of our Author, that all immoral Adions de- ny more Truths than they affirm, and are upon that Account immoral. I anfwer, this is uncertain, and perhaps falfe 5 for I doubt not but a Man of Invention equal to that of our Author might aflign to any Species of vicious A6lion or Omiffion, as many probable Meanings, affirmative of Truth, as he could for the Denial of it. But be that as it will, to put Morality upon fuch a Foot is vifibly ridiculous, and unwor- thy of a fcrious Confutation.

That Action or Omiffion, or Perfons by Aftion or Omiffion, cannot be properly faid to affirm or deny Truth, unlefs where Adli-

D 2 on

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on has by Confcnt a Signification applied to it 5 which Signification is cjcfigned to be com- municated to others, has been above fuffici- ently fhewn. The only rcafonable and true Scnfe therefore that can be put upon Mr. JVollafton's2.Li\Q,i2\ Affertion, That Men may by their Adions or Omiflions deny Truth, is this, That Adions, even fiach as are not by Compacl or Agreement made expreflive of, and equivalent to Propofitions, may yet convey Propofitions into the Minds of fuch as may fee, or othcrwife come to the Knowledge of them, inconfiftent with, or contrary to fome Truth, even where a Per- fon has no Intention by his Aftion or Omif- fion of conveying any fuch Senfe or Pro- pofition to the Minds of others. This is all, I fay, that can be allowed him, and perhaps all at bottom that he meant, tho' his im- proper and barbarous way of wording him- felf, might eafily miflead his Reader into an Imagination, that he meant fomething fur- ther. V^^c are now therefore to examine his Dodrine according to this Senfe of his Words.

That Aftions or Omiffions oftentimes be- tray Mens Senfe of Things, real Intentions or Defigns, is too obvious to be denied 5 and therefore fuch Actions or Omiflions may in fome Senfe be faid to have a Signi- fication j but yet fo far from being certain

or

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or determinate, generally fpcaking, that the' fame Action or Omiflion not only may, but frequently does convey into the Minds of different People different Notions orPro- pofitions, and oftentimes fuch as are quite contrary to one another. A Man, not ac- quainted with the World, meets with a Sharper, that treats him with abundance of Civility and Refpeft, in Hopes by that means of finding an Opportunity o£ picking his Pocket, or rooking him of his xMoney at Game : The poor innocent Mortal naturally from thence conceives a good Opinion of him, and the Propofition conveyed to his Mind by the Sharper's enfnaring Carriage is this, that he's a mighty civil honeft Gentle- man. A Spedator, well acquainted with the World, that obferves the Rogue's Air and Manner, conceives immediately a quite different Notion of him, and the Meaning or Signification of the Sharper's Aftion to him is, that he is a cunning defigning Raf- cal. I defire to know which of thefe Mean- ings is the right one, or whether both thefe Significations may be allowed as juft and proper Significations of the Rogue's Adion > If only one is to be allowed it will be a hard matter, I fear, to allign a very fatis-^*' faftory Reafon, why one rather than the other fhould pafs for the juft and proper Meaning of the Rogue's Actions when both

2 feem

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feem to have an equal Title to It, as being both equally conveyed, and the one as na- turally as the other. The Difficulty of mak- ing a Determination will s^row with the Number of Significations the fame Aftion may have or convey to different People. This Difficulty attending our Author's Scheme, he feems not to have been in the leaft aware of, tho' it lies fo very obvious, and was fo neceffary to be taken notice of, in order to the clearing up of his Dodrine, and deli- vering it from an Incumbrance that feems to confound and overwhelm it all at once ; for the fame Action or Omiffion may have very different Significations, or convey very different Notions and Propofitions to the Minds of different People, lome of which may be conformable to Truth, and others not. Without fome Criterion therefore whereby to determine which of the various Significa- tions of the fame Aftion or Omiffion are to be taken into the Account, in order to judge of the Morality or Immorality thereof; all he has faid upon the Subjedl {i.niifies not one Straw, and amounts to nothing. Un- lefs his Meaning was that all Adions or Omiffionsthat convey but to any one fingle Body a Senfe inconfiftent with the Truth, any Truth whatever, for fo he words him- felf, are to be lookM upon as immoral. If this was his Meaning, it was a very ftrange

one.

(^3 ) one, and as wild a Thought as ever enter'd

into the Soul of Man : Such, in fhort, as may make the moft innocent, and the moft virtuous Actions in the W^orld, and fuch as are allowed fo to be by all Mankind, im- moral ; becaufe fuch may chance to con- vey (as they often have done) Notions or Apprehenfions utterly inconfiiknt with Truth.

It would be eafy to multiply Inftances of Anions, very various in their Significations, fome of which would be agreeable to Truth, others not 5 but I fhall only add one more brought by himfelf, p, 9. When Popillius 'Lxw2iS folicited to have Cicero profcribed^ and that he might find him out and be his Executioner \ vjoidd not his Carriage have fufficiently fignified to any one, vi'ho vuas ig- norant of the Cafe, that TuUy either ''jjas fome very bad Man, and had deferved ca- pital Tnnijh7nent, or had fome vaay grie- voiifly injured this Man, or at leafl had not faved his Life, or had not as much Reafon to expett his Service and good Offices, upon Occafion, as he ever had to expect TullyV ? Now all thefe various Significations Lcenass Adion had by our Author's own Confeflion 5 but then it is worth the Reader's while to remark, that this Carriage of Lxnzs, he fays, vaould only have fignified one or other of thefe various

Meanings

( 24) Meanings to one that was ignorant of th^ Cafe. What then would that Carriage of his have fignitied to one that was not ignorant of the Calc, but knew Tully to be a Perfon of eminent Parts, Learning, Eloquence and Virtue, that had merited highly from his Country, and particularly from LanaSy whoie Life he had faved? why 'tis as clear as the Sun can be at Noon-day, that to fuch a Perfon it would have had ne'er a one of thofe various Significations, but only this, that L^nas was what the World call an ungrate- ful profligate Villain. What then becomes of our Author's Denial of the Truth, im- plied in the Behaviour of L^naSy wherein precifely, according to him, the Immorality of it lay, and without which it would have been very innocent ? Perhaps we fhall be told in the Language and Stile of our Au- thor, that Lienas by his Carriage denied Cicero to be a Man ; a very pretty Defenfe ! He mufl have been ignorant of the Cafe with a witncfs, that from the Carriage of L^nas could have conceived an Imaginati- on, that Cicero was a Cow.

From hence then, I fay, our Author's new Scheme of Morality appears clogg'd and embarafled with infuperable Difficulty. Since the fame Adlions will have various Significations, with refped to thofe that are and thofe that are not ignorant of the Cafe,

that

(25 ) that is, the Condition and Circumftances of the Ador, and the Relation he (lands in tq the World about him, and of thole various Sigaiiications, fome will be agreeable to Truth and fome not. In the midfi of all this perplexing Variety, what Significations we are to have regard to, in forming a Judgment of the Morality or Immorality of human Actions, will, I doubt, be im- poflible to determine upon any folid fub- ftantial Reafons : And yet without this ail our Author's Doctrine comes to nothing. Por to -fay, what is all that is left to be faid to evade that Difficulty and Perplexity, that it is fufficient to render an Aclion or Omilli- on immoral, if it does but communicate or <arry with it an Intimation, that interferes with any Truth, to the Mind of any Body wliatcver, whether ignorant or not igno- rant of the Cafe, I fay, to pretend to evade

-the Difficulty thus , would be down- right Madnefs and Diilraclion. And there- fore, tho' what our Author fays up and down his Book, feems to amount to that, and any one at firft Reading \vould be in-

-clinabie to think he meant fo 5 yet, as that

:is a Meaning not to be recondl'd Vvirh

common Senfe, I cannot think he w^ould

I -.be guilty of fuch an Abfurdity : And there-

• fore it will lie upon the £fpoufeis of his

Notion of Morality, if any^Jtlich there bf,

E to

( ^6 )

to make up the Deficiency of his Scheme^ by giving us Tome Criterion, whereby wc may be enabled to diftinguifh, in the Va- riety of Significations the fame Aftion or Omillion may poffibly have, thofe we arc to form a Judgment upon, as to the moral Good or Evil thereof.

But to go to the Bottom of this Bufmefs of the Signification of Actions at once.

The free and voluntary Adions of Men may have various Significations, according to the various Senfe and Difccrnment, the different Knowledge of Mankind, particu- larly of the Condition and Circumftances of the Perfon acting, and thofe his Aftion has any Relation to, in different Obfervers. This is evident beyond all Difpute, that dif- ferent Perfons may have different Senfes, Notions, Apprehenfions or Propofitions con- veyed to them by the fame Aftion. And accordingly we find that Perfons well ac- quainted with the World, fuch as have ftu- died Mankind, will penetrate flrangely into other Men, and difcover by their way and manner of Adtion their Notions, Humours, Inclinations, paffions, real Defigns and In- tentions, where others of lefs Difcernment will be altogether at a lofs, or have very different Conceptions. I fhali endeavour to illuftrate what I fay by another Inflance fctch'd from our Author/. lo. If K jhould

enter

(27)

ent£r into Compact ^juithB, byjuhich he pro- rnifes and engages never to do fome certain Things and after this he does thatThingy in this Cafe it mujl be granted that hisA^ inter- feres "-juith his Tromife^ and is contrary to it. No'-j:; it cannot interfere ^-juith his Tromife but it mufl alfo interfere with the Truth of that Tropofitiony which fays there was fuch a Tromtfe made-, or that there is fuch a Compa^ fubfifiing. If this Tropofition be trucy A made fuch a certain Agreement with B, it would be denied by this, A never made any Agreement with B 5 why ? be- caufe the Truth of this latter is inconfifient with the Agreement ajferted in the former, l^he Formality of the 'T>enial, or that which makes it to be a "Denial, is this Inconfiflence : If then the Behaviour of K be inconfifient with the Agreement mentioned in the for- mer Tropofittony that Tropofition is as much denied by his Behaviour ^ as it can be by the latter or any other Vropofitton. i \ obferve in the firft Place that what our Author fays, that Ms A£i cannot interfere with his Tromifey but it mufl interfere with the Truth of that TropofitioKy which fays there was fuch a Tromife made, is falfe. For let us fuppofe A comes to B, fometime after the Promife made, and makes a Declaration in thefe Words; I will do what I promiied you I would not : Ti^ plain this Declaration interferes with, or is E z contrary

contraify to the Promife, M'\d yet is fo far from denying that it acknowledges it. Wiiy then may not the Aaion, which is but the Declaration in tad, or put in txftv . cution, interfere, or be incrnfilicnt with the Promife, without neceffanly implying a Denial of it. Let us fuppofe agam C a Stranger to both ^and By but accidentally, prefent at the making of the Promife. The Adion of^, contrary to his Promife, could never fuggeft to him that there had been no Promife, when he knew the cotitrary. Tis very evident the Action of A's couM have na fuch Intimation or Meaning with refpect ta C 5 but it might raife feveral other Thoughts or Imaginations in his Mind ; as for Iti^ fiance, this, perhaps B has rcieas'd ^ from the Obligation: Or this, perhaps -^ hal made B Satisfadion fome other ways : Or this, perhaps B has done fome great Injury to ^, and by that means cancel'd the Obli- gation : Or this, perhaps there was fome Condition implyed to be performed by'.B, which being not pcrforhfd, yf was at li-r berty : Or this, A had forgot his Promife; or perhaps jB i^ dead, and lA by that means difcharged fron^ the Obligation : Or jperhap? fomebody told ^ fo, land by that means occafioned his ading contrary to his Pro- hlife : Or perhaps he was commanded ^to do the Thing by fome that had Authotft}<ib

( 29 )

to command him: Or finally y^is, what the AVorld call a Knave. ivThefe are all poflible Meanings of y4's Adion to C, becaufe it might very eafily fuggeft or convey, one or more of thefc feveral Propofitions, to his Mind. But our Author's pretended Meaning, it is utterly impoflible As Adion fhould fuggeft to C, who knew there had been fuch a Promifc mad^ : That Knowledge of his would ef- feCtlially exclude the leaft Thought or Ima- gination, that there had been no Promife given. Now if we fuppofe C, very well acquainted with ^, and By then fome <jf thefe Meanings may vaniih, and of the reft different Significations become attached to the Action of A, according to the different Charaders of .^, and B. If ^ have t very good Name for Honefty, whilft B pat fes in the World for a Tricdkfter, the Sig- nifications of y^'s Adion will be in his Fa- voil^*^ ^nd ViC^ verfa. is^^^'s 7

N6W fuppofe any one of the firft nine Significations to be true, the reft with the Tenth would be all falle, and yet the Ac- tion of A very Innocent 5 Whereas if the: Morality of it was to be judged of, and de- termine! by the plain obvious Meaning of our Author's Rule of Morality, that no Ad that interferes with any true Propdfition can be aright, /. €. innocent or lawful, it ought

to

( 50 )

to be condemn d as immoral, becaufe it has fo many various Meanings, all mconfiftent with the Truth. As for Inftance fuppofe B to have frankly releafcd ^ from the Obli- gation of his Promife, unknown to C, ^'$ Action contrary to the Promife given, would be indifputably very harmlefs, innocent, and lawful: And yet all the other Meanings or Significations of his Action, would inter- fere with the Truth of that Propofition, that J5 had frankly releafed A from the Obligation of his Promife, and fo by our Author's Rule, A's Adion would be immo- ral, and unlawfliL

I fuppofe the Reader by this Time fees pretty plainly, how little the World is o- bliged to Mr. Wollajlon for his new Noti* on, or Rule of Morality. I fhall but take Notice of one Inftance more of his Weak- ncfs upon this Head, of the Denial of Truth by immoral. or vicious Anions. He tells us, p. 28. that a T^ebtoTy whorefufes to pay his Creditor, dire6ily denies the Money which is the Creditor's to be the Creditors, I An- fwer, tho' it Ihould be nevet fo true, upoa the Suppofal of Property ampngft men, that the Debtor s Rcfufal did d^ay the Creditor's Property : Yet our Author is not at Liberty to fuppofe, there is fuch a Thing as Pro- perty in the World, or that any Man can be truly faid to have a Property in any

Thing :

( n )

Thing: Becaiife fuch a Suppofition, is tak- ing the Thing for granted, which it is the Defign of this firft Section of his Book to prove. The Reader muft remember, that what our Autlior propofes in this firft Sec- tion, is to make out in general, that there is a Religion, or Law of Nature; now Pro- perty is founded in the Law of Nature, and is, without that , nothing but an empty- Name : So that to fuppofe Property, is to fuppofe there is a Law of Nature, the very Thing in Queilion, and which it is the Bu- fmefs and Defign of this Section to prove. That Property is grounded upon the Law of Nature, is evident, becaufe it is nothing but a Power to enjoy or difpofe of a Thing, agreeably to the good Pleafure of God, al- lowed, and granted, by the Law of Nature, Thus an honeft man is faid to have a Pro- perty in his Life, or a Right to his Life, that is, a Power or Licence from the Law of God, to enjoy it j fo that whoever goes about to take it from him, or difturb him, in the peaceable Enjoyment of it, becomes thereby liable totheDifpleafurc ofGod, and his Vengeance. Thus too a Man is faid to have a Property in Lands or Goods, that is. Allowance or Licence, from the Law of God, to ufe, and difpofe of them, that is, give, fell, or barter them ; and therefore whoever goes about, by Fraud, or by Force,

2 to

( 32 )

to moleft, difturb, let, or hinder him, in the Ufc of his Property, contrary to the Intention of the Law, becomes thereby ex-j pofed to the Refentment of the Almighty, as ading contrary to his Pleafure, declared by the Voice of Nature. This is, I think, what every Body means by Property, tliat have any meaning at all in the Ufe of tha^ Word, which I am afraid our Author had not> by his weak Way of talking about it. And from hence it appears very manifeilly, a plain Begging of the Queftion to fuppofc any fuch Thing as Property, in an Attempt to prove, that there is a Law of Nature, becaufe it is fuppofmg the very Thing to be proved.

In other Inftanccs of immoral Adion or Omiffion, wherein Property is not concern- ed, our Author does, I think, keep pretty clear of the Suppofition of moral Trutii, and rather choofes to put ftrange kind of uncouth far-fetched Meanings, upon immo- ral Aftions or Omiffions, than to take No- tice of one Meaning, they might be fuppof- cd to have a thoufand Times more obvious than thofe of his own coining ; that is, of their implying the Denial of moral Truth, or riie iuppofed Obligation from the Law of God, with Refpeftto thofe Actions, or O- miffions. And herein he aded very a-ight, for thefe two very obvious Reafons. One ys,

that

(33) that the Pounding the Immoralit}^ or Vici- culncfs of any adion or Omiflion, in the Denial of moral Truth, or the Obligation from the Law of Nature, refpeding that Adion, or Omiilion, would have been vi- fibiy nippofing the Thing he was to prove, that there is moral Truth, a Law or Reli- gion of Nature ; for thefe are all the fame. The other is, that a meaning affignd to immoral Actions implying a Denial of mo- ral Truth, would be in EfFeft fetting afide "the other pretended Meaning, implying a •denial of Things to be what they are.

The Application of this to an Inftance, will perhaps better let the Reader into my Meaning. A Man of Ability y he tells us, p. 17. that fljoidd never gi've any thing to the ^oor, "uottld certainly deny the Conditi- on of the poor:, to be '-Ji' hat it is, and his o'uxn to be '■ji'hat it is. Now this appears at firft Sight, to any indifferent Reader, a very violent, forcd Senfe, put upon the rich Man's Neglcd, and fuch a Meaning, as, I dare fay, never any one dreamt of, before our Author. The Condition of both, is oftentimes fo very glaring, and evident to the World, that neither can the rich Man intend any fuch thing by his Neglect of the Poor, as to deny their Circumftances, and his own, to be what they are 5 that would be too ftupid and ridiculous, for any one

F in

( 34) in his Wits to intend j and for that Reafon his OmilTion cannot naturally carry any fuch Intimation, or Signification, ^long with it, but this rather, as vaftly more obvious, and natural , that he did not look upon him- feif as obliged by any Law of God, to re- lieve them 5 and fo his Negled of them would be a Denial, not of their Circum- ftances, and Condition, to be what they are, but only of his Obligation to regard or relieve them. Now this Meaning of the rich Mans Omiffion or Neglecl, viz. the- Denial of all Obligation to relieve the Poor, infinitely more obvious, and natural, than that of his own, he takes no Notice of, and fo far he was undoubtedly right : Be- caufe that was vifibly n( thing to his Pur- pofe, but inconfiftent wiiii it ; for to pre- tend to prove the rich Man's Neglect of the Poor immoral, becaufe it implies a De- nial of this Truth, that the Rich are obliged to relieve the Poor, is fo palpably proving the Thing by itfelf , that no Man of our Author's Senfc, or indeed but common Senfe, could well be guilty of it. But having no clear diftind Notion of Property, he has, in Cafes, where that is concern d, unluckily blundcr'd upon that manner of Proof, com- monly called petitio principii. The Denial of Property in the Owner did not fo vifibly imply the Suppofition of a Law of Nature, as the Denial of Obli2;ation did. And

(35 )

And then if our Author had taken No- tice of, and infifted upon this Meaning of the rich Man s Inhumanity to the Poor, the Denial of all Obligation to relieve them, that would have effcdually fet afide the other, the Denial of his own, and the Poor's Circumftanccs to be what they are, as be- ing plainly inconfiftent therewith ; for if the natural Meaning of the rich Man's want of Charity, be a Denial of his Obligation to relieve the Poor, it is grounded upon the Suppofition that their Circumftances and his own are what they are, and by confc- quence cannot (land with the contrary Sup- pofition. There could, it's manifeft, be no Foundation for any one to conceive, from the rich Man's Tccglc6L of his poor Neigh- bours, any Imag'mation that he denied, or did not look upon himfelf to be obliged to relieve them, but upon the Suppofition, that his Circumftances and his poor Neighbours are what they are, that is, that he was Rich, and they Poor. So that it is as plain as any thing can be, that thofc two Meanings are utterly incompatible and inconfiftent with one another.

But fuppofing Actions or Omiflions right- ly denominated immoral, did really imply a Denial of the Truth, fuch as our Author contends for, a Denial of Things to be what they are 5 yet how will it follow from fuch

P 2 a

( 36 ) aDenial, that thofcAdions therefore aretrnly and properly immoral, that is, contrary to the Will and good Pleafure of God, declared by the Voice of Reafon, or the Light of Nature? For this our Author gives fcveral Reafons, which I come now, in the next Place, to examine. We are told, p. 15. No Act {-whether Word or T>eed) of any Being to '-ji'bom moral Good or Evil are im- putable^ that interferes iz'ith any true Tro- poftiGUy or denies any thing to be as it is^ can be right. That is, if our Author means any thing to the Purpofe, agreeable to the Will and Zvlind of God; and therefore what he fays, muil amount to this, that every fuch Action mcft be immoral, or contrary to Ibme Lav or Rule, which God has pre- fcribed to the Actions, and Conduct of Men. Por right and wrong muft be here tanta- mount to moral and immoral, commanded and forbidden, agreeable and difagreeable to the divine Law j for if he means any thing elfe by right and wrong, it is vifibly nothing to the Purpofe.

His firft Proof runs thus. If that Tra- pofition izihich is falfe be rjirong, that Act iz'hich implies fuch a Tropoftion , or is founded in it cannot be rights becaufe it is the very Tropojttion in Practice, Here I fear the Word wrong Hands for nothing, or what is the fame as nothing, to our Au-i

thor's

( 37 ) thor's Purpofe. The Terms of Right and Wrong are not applicable to Propofitions at all, in any moral Senfe, or Signification of them, nor to any thing elfe, but the Actions, or Omiflions of realbnable Beings. What? You'll fay perhaps, is not a falfe Propofition vifibly wrong? Yes to be fure, if by wrong you mean falfe, a falfe Propofition is certainly falfe. Right and Wrong are Denominations given to things, upon account of their Agreement or Difagreement with fome Rule, to which they are referred , and by which they are judged of. Now the only Rule to which Propofitions, confidered as true or falfe, are referred, and by which they are judgd of, is the Nature and Exiftence of things, or matter of Facl. Such Propofitions as are conformable thereto, may be, and are pro- perly called right, thofe that are not, wrong ; , that is, true or falfe, and in no other Senfe can Propofitions be denominated right or w^rong. Thefc Terms in their Application to Propofitions, fignify neither more nor lefs, than true or falfe. For Inftance, this Propofition, that the Diagonal of a Square is commenfurable to the Side thereof, can- not be faid to be w rong, in any other Senfe, than as it is not agreeable to the Nature of .thofe Lines, or the Nature of a Square 5 fo that to fay that Propofition is wrong, is but the very fame, as to lay it is falfe.

And

( 38 ) And I dcfire any one, that can difputc a Thing fo very evident , to inform me how the Term ^-jirong, in the moral Senle of it, can be applied to that or any other falfe Propofuion whatfoever. Propofitions con- fidercd in themfelves, arc never called, nor can properly be called moral or immoral. The affirming or denying Propofitions may come under thofc Denominations, but the Propofitions themfelves cannot. If any Teacher of the Mathematicks fhould go a- bout to miflead, and impofe upon his Scho- lar, by affirming, and pretending to demon- ftratc the forefaid Propofition, that, I grant, would be wrong in the moral Senfc of the Word, that is, it would be vitious or im- moral, becaufe forbid by the Law of God 5 but it is Nonfenfe to fay the Propofition it- felf IS io. This is fo very plain, as not to admit of a Difpute. If therefore the Word ''ji'rong here fignifies falfe^ which is all the Senle it can have, when applied to Propo- fitions, then what our Author fays, will be this, // that Propofition 'jjhich is falfe be falfe, that A^ ^-jahich implies ftich a Tro- pojitton, or is founded in it cannot be trne^ or declarati've of the Truth, contrary to that falfe Propofition i, which is to be lure very true, but at the fame Time very trifling, and nothing at all to the Purpofe ; for the Thing to be proved was, not that Actions

which

( 39 ) which imply a Denial of the Truth, cannot be declarative of the Truth they deny, which is felf-evident , and needs no Proof, but that fuch Actions are immoral, or forbidden by God.

Our Author's fecond Proof, is but the fame over again in different Words, to wit, that nothing can interfere 'jjith any Tro- pojition, that is trite^ but it muft like'juife interfere ^ui-ith Nature — and confequently be unnatural or ^iDrong in Nature 5 for I defire any one to tell me^ '-jshat interfering '■Ji'ith Nature^ unnatural or 'ujrong in Nature ^ can poffibly here ilgnify, but falfe, or declara- tive of what isfaife. So that our Author's Way of proving Actions, orOmiffions, that deny Truth, to be immoral, or contrary to the Will of God, is but affirmmg over and over again in darker Language, that Acti- ons or Omiilions that deny Truth deny Truth : A wonderful Demonftration, to be iure, of their being immoral!

His third Proof, is the fame again exact- ly, with a Variation of the Phrafe only» He tells us, p. 14. that to o\Z'n things to be as they arey is to o:ji;?i ^n'hat God caufesy or at leaft permits^ to be thus caufed^ or per- mit tedy and this is to take things as he gives theniy to go into his Conjhtution of the Worlds and to fuhmit to his JVill, revealed in the Books of Nature j to do this therefore 7?iuli

{ 40 ) he agreeable to his Willy and if fb the con- trar") muft be difagreeable. Now the Phrafcs, to take things as God gives them, to go in- to his Conjiitution of the Worlds arc but different Ways of wording tlie fame Scnfe, of owning things to be as they are, by Ac- tions or Omiffions. If any one thinks o- tlierwife, I defire him to make out how and wherein they differ , as likewife to fhew how owning Socrates to have been a Per- fon of admirable Virtue, and Julius defar a great Rogue, is taking things as God gives themy and going into his Conjiitution of the World, fnbmttting to his Will, re- 'uealedin the Books of Nature : If any more is meant by that Language, tlian to own things to have been as they were or to be as they are. Perhaps I fhall be told, that by owning thmgs to be as they are, our Author means only owning them fo to be, in In- ftances of Aftion or Omiflion, where a con- trary Behaviour would imply a Denial of things to be as they are. To which I fay, if he meant fo , he fhould have faid fo > whereas his Propofition is general without reftriclion: However we ihall apply his Lan- guage to an Inilance, not liable to be dif- puted as improper. It is doubted whether a Man of Ability is obliged to relieve the Poor by any Law^ of Nature. Yes, fays our Author, he is : Not to do it, would be to

deny

(41 )

deny his own Condition and that of the Poor to be what the)" are, and to relieve them will be taking things as God has given theniy and going into his Confiittttion of the Worlds fitbmitttng to his Will re- veaied in the Book of Nature ; fo that tak- ing things as God has given them, is here, it feems, altering things that God has cauf- ed or permitted to be 5 and co??2ing into his Conftittition of the World, is altering that Conflitution, which he himfelf has appoint- ed or permitted to be : A very flrange Way of taking things as he has given them, and coming into his Conftitution of the World. This Language, one would think, is rather more juftly applicable to the quite contrary Conduft, a Negled of the Poor i becaufe by that things are left in the Condition he has caufed or permitted them to be, and his Conftitution of things fuifered to re- main unaltered. It is by this Time, I fup- pofe, pretty evident to the Reader that this Language of Mr. Wollafton's amounts to no- thing, but a dark myftical Way of Expref- fmg, what in other Words he calls, own- ing things to be what they are, and is very far from being any Proof of what he pro- px>fcd.

His next Proof is much of a piece with

the former. Things cannot he denied , he

lays, to be vi'hat they are without contra-

G dieting

( 42 )

diBing Axioms and Truths eternal --^^ that have alouays fubjifted in the divine

Mind* and cannot be denied, but the

Truth of the divine Knovuledge muft be de- nied too. All this is but faying again in other Words, that the Denial of Truth is the Denial of Truth, and proves nothing. The Denial of any Truth is the Denial of that to be true which God knows to be true, becaufe he knows all Truth; but cannot be called a Denial of the Truth or Certainty of the divine Knowledge, unlefs it was to be denied under that Con- fideration precifely, of its being Truth known to the divine Being. But be that as it will 5 let it be granted, that the Deni- al of any Truth is the Denial of the Truth of the divine Knowledge, it is a grofs Abfur- dity, a Contradi£lion in Terms : But that it is an Immorality, fhould not here have been fuppofed but proved. Thofe that deny that God has given any Law to Men, do there- by deny that he has laid them under any Reftraint, with refped: to their Conduft towards him, or demands any Reverence or Regard from them : And therefore our Au- thor, who undertook to prove that there is a Religion or Law of Nature, fhould not have taken the Thing for granted, as he here docs. To deny Truth, fays he, is to deny the Truth of the divine Knowledge :

^ Well,

C43 )

Well, what then > fays the Epicureariy how does that prove it to be immoral or con- trary to the divine Will ? God's Happinefs is not efFc6led by the Behaviour of Men; and therefore he regards it not, but has left them to a£i: as they pleafe. So that to prove Adlions or Omillions contrary to the Will of God, it is not fufficient to alledge that they imply a Denial of the Truth of the divine Knowledge, becaufe fuch a De- nial is no Immorality, but upon the Sup- pofition of a Law that requires Honour and Worfhip to be paid to God 5 which is the very thing to be proved, and therefore not to be fuppofed. Our Author fays indeed that it's contrary to the Government and Sovereignty of God 5 but faying is not prov- ing. To fuppofe God to be a Governor, as our Author here docs, without proving it, is to fuppofe he has given Laws to the World (for a Governor, a fovereign Go- vernor, without Law, is a Contradiction in Terms) the very thing he iliould have proved.

It is a little furprifing to fee how our Author prefents his Reader, with the very felf fame Stuff, under different Difguifcs, over and over again. It brings to mind a Story, I have read, of a Roman General, that was entertain d with a vaft Variety, as he imagined, of feveral forts of Yenifon,

G z very

( 44 ) very good, and at a time too when Vcni- fon was not much in Scaibn. Upon ex- preifing his Wonder at ity he was ftill the more furprifed to find it was only Swine's Ilefh;, difguifcd by various ways of Cookery 5 juHt thus docs our Author deal with his Readers : Whilfl: they imagine themfelves cntertain'd with a curious Variety of Veni- fon, his Peaft is all made up entirely of rcafty Bacon. Inflead of feveral foUd fubftantial Reafons for his Dod:rine, which a carelefs Peruial might difpofe his Readers to ima- gine themfelves regard with, there is in- deed nothing but the fame Thought, that the Denial of Truth is the Denial of Truth, drefied up in a Variety of Phrafe, with a Suppofition all along of the ImmoraUty of it, under that Difguife. But to return 5 wc are told in the fifth Place, that to treat Things AS not being 'Ujhat they arey is to put bitter for p-jueet (that is, to deny Truth) T>arkmfs for Light (deny Truth again) crooked for fir ait (denying Truth again) Occidit miferos Crambe repetita. This is the old Song over again; the Denial of Truth is the Denial of Truth. Ohe ! jam fatis eft. Ah! but here's worfe behind ftill: It's to fubvert all Science, renounce all Senfe of Truth, flatly to deny the Ex- jftence of any Thing, Wonderful! who cou'd have thought it, if our Author had

not

( 45 )

not told us fo? or who befides himfdf coud have found out, for Inftancc, that to commit Fornication, is to deny that there is fo much as one Woman in the World; and to get drunk, is to deny that there is one Drop of Liquor, ftrong or fmall, for a Man to quench his Thirft with, upon the Face of the whole Earth: Nay to deny that there is any Earth, any World, any Man, or ought elfe ? How has poor Science done to fubfift in the World, under fuch terrible and furious AlTaults, from the Vices and Follies of Men ? Nay, what is far more wonderful, how comes it fo many vicious Men attain to fo great a Degree of Per- fedion in the feveral Sciences ? whilfl: they poor Fellows are, it feems, without know- ing any thing of the Matter, or meaning any the leaft Harm of that kind, daily fub- verting all Science, renouncing all Senfe of Truth, and falfly denying the Exiftence of any one Thing. I dare not be anfwerable for it, that the Reader fhall not fufped our Author, from his way of talking, to have renounced all Senfe of Truth. But I dare fay he will think this Proof of his too extra- vagant to deferve a ferious Confutation.

The laft Reafon for his Dodrine is, that to deny things to be ^ji'hat they arCy is a Tranfgrejjwn of th€ great La'-ju of our Na^ tare J the Law of Reafon. He wa^toprovq

taere

( 46 )

there is ^ Law of Nature, a Law of Rea^ fon, and that Adions or Omiflions, denying Truth, are contrary to that Law ; and this is here done at laft for a finifhing Stroke, by a folemn Affirmation , without fo much as the lead Offer made for any thing of Proof.

Thus 1 have gone through all Mr. JVol- lafion has advanced, for the Support of his lingular Notion of Morality 5 and having, I hope, fufficiently deftroyed his fundamen- tal Maxim, I judge it needlefs to purfue him in the Application of it to the feveral Branches of Morality. I fhall only add a few Refledions, by which perhaps, the Reader may be enabled to difcern the Weaknefs of his Doftrinc, ftill the more clearly, and in a better Light.

He every where fpeaks of owning Things to be as they are, as in it felf a matter of the higheft Importance, as the ne plus ultra, beyond which no Man needs or ought to go in his Enquiries or Confultations, what is fit or proper to be done or not. This is the Principle in which the Mind is finally to reft and acquiefce, as if that alone was a Thing defirable in and for itfelf, and every thing elfe with a View to that only ; which is a Contradidion to the common Senfe and Experience of Mankind: Eor a little Refleftion may quickly fatisfie any one, that

nothi^ig

(47 )

nothing but Pleafure or Happincfs is or can be defirable upon its own Account, with- out Reference to any thing cKc : And that other Things are defirable and purfued by us, only fo far as they are conceived or ap- prehended to be the Means of attaining Pleafure or Happinefs. Nothing again is or can be the Object of Hatred or Averfion in it felf, or upon its own Account, but Pain or Mifery. Other Things \\c have a Ha- tred or Averfion for, not for themfelves, but for the Pain or Mifery that is fup- pofed to attend or follow from them. Happinefs, in fhort, is the ultimate End of all our Aims and Defigns, all our Wiflies and Defires. This, either prefent or future, we conftantly and fteadily purfue. Nor can it be otherwife : And for the Truth of this I appeal to the inward Feeling and Ex- perience of all Mankind, not excepting our Author himfelf, who has fomething very like it, p. 35. where he tells us Tain^ con- Jidered in it felf ^ is a real EijH \ Tleafure a

real Good Tleaftire is in it felf defirabky

^ain to he avoided: Which is more than can be faid of owning and denying things to be what they are, I am fure : The former is not defirable in and for itfelf alone, without Regard to any thing further 5 that is the Privilege of Happinefs alone ^ confe- quently owning things to be as they are is z no

( 48 )

no further defirable than as It Is a Means, more or lefs conducive to the End of all our Wifhes and Defires, Happincfs.

To infill therefore with fo much Strefs upon the treating of Things, as what they are; to make fuch a mighty Pother, fo huge a Din and Buftle up and down his Book, as he does, about owning Things by Adion or Omiffion, to be what they are, a Man to be a Man, Men's Circumftances to be what they are, Happinefs to be Hap- pinefs, Mifery to be Mifery, c^r . as if this was fomething defirable in and for it felf without Regard to Confequences , nay even preferable to Happinefs it felf; for fome Cafes put by him are fo folved, and his w^ay of talking now and then fuch as feem to imply as much ; I fay to infift upon this Owning of Things to be what they are, in fuch a way, is talking like one that was a Stranger to human Nature. Happinefs with him feems but to be Mat- ter of a fecondary Confideration to abet the Practice of Truth ; as if Happinefs had been appointed by the Author of Nature only to encourage the Pradice of Truth, or own- ing Things to be what they are, and the Regard due to Truth not inftituted or com- manded, as it is purely and folely with a View to the Well-being and Happinefs of Mankind. In all the Inftances of Im- morality

( 49 ) morality of the moft difmal Confeqiiencc to the World, in reprefenting the Nature of the Crime, the great Strefs is laid upon their implying a Denial of the Truth, the Denial of tilings to be what they are, whilft the dreadful Confcquences are overlook'd, or but {lightly touch'd upon 5 as if God was more concern d to have Things own d for what they are, than to fee his Creatures contribute mutually to one another's Happi- nefs, which is reprefenting him as an odd kind of a capricious Being (with Reverence be it fpoken) whofe Satisfadion confifts in fomething, for which it is impoffible the rational Part of the Creation Ihould have any real Reverence or Veneration for him. And how his Dodrine can be reconciled with that of the divine Goodnefs, I leave to the Confideration and Judgment of the Reader. For, according to his Reprefenta- tion of Things, God feems not to take any Satisfaction in the Happinefs of Mankind, further than their Happinefs by being con- necled with the Practice of Truth, becomes a Means of inducing them to own by Adi- on or Omiflion Things to be what in Pad and Truth they are. This feems with him to be the great and ultimate End of the great Creator, and that wherein all the Views, Aims, and Defigns of Men are to terminate. Happinefs indeed he does allow

H us

( 50 )

us to purfue, and fays we are obliged fo to do : But then his Notion of xMorality, and his AppHcation of it up and down his Book, fccms to imply, that we are not to purfue it as our main End, but only for the fake of praclifmg Truth, or owning Things to be what they are ; and becaufe if we did not we fhould deny Happinefs to be Hap- pinefs, a thing of infinitely more Weight and Confidcration it fcems than Mifery; tho' if the Fear of the latter will not oblige Men to a Purfuit of Happinefs, the infipid Confideration of denying Happinefs to be Happinefs will hardly effect it I ihould think. I: was this aukward way of thinking, fo difagreeablc to Nature, that obliged him m Spight of ail his good Scnfe, and contrary to the Streams of all the bell Writers upon Morality, to that odd Determination of the two Cafes put byhim^. 29, where he main- tains that a xMan in extreme Danger of perifh- ing by Hunger, and not reduced to that Extre- mity by any Fault but Misfortune only, may not fteal from the Rich to fave his Life. As likewife, where a Man has it in his Power to fave the Life of an innocent Man from a Ruffian in purfuit of him, by a harmlefs Un- truth, an Untruth that can hurt no body, he ought not to do it, but fufFer the poor Innocent to pcrifh, and perifli himfelf like- wife, rather than utter an Untruth, the'

of no ill Confequcnce in the World to any Body. They muft take it as their Pate, Truth will be Truth, and muft retain the Charader of its Porce, let the Cafe be what it will : A very weighty and a very worthy Reafon to be fure, but more likely I fhould think to move the Scorn or In- dignation of the Reader than gain his Af- fent.

Mankind neither arc, nor can be con- cerned for any thing but Happinefs and the Means of attaining it. He that is compleat- ly happy, in a State of the higheft Enjoy- ment, he either is, or conceives him capa- ble of, has all he could wiih for, and is by Confequence entirely free from all Defire of, or Concern for any thing elfc. Own- ing things therefore to be what they are, or a Conduct conformable to Truth, can fignify nothing to Mankind any furth'.r than it is a Means to promote their Happinefs > and by Confequcnce to urge the Practice of Truth, upon fuch a Being as Man, as de- firable in and for itfelf, which nothing but Happinefs can be, from which yet Mr. IP^ol- lajion himfelf allows it to be different, is doing nothing. If the Practice of Truth, or a Conduct conformable to Truth, be re- commended, not indeed as a Thing defira- ble in and for itfelf, without reference to ought elfe, but only as a Mleans for the at-

H 2 taining

( 52 )

taining of Happinefs, fomcthing is faid that may deferve the Attention of Mankind, but Ibmething that evidently overturns our Author's whole Scheme. For if this Con- formity to Truth is pleaded for only upon the Score of its being the Way to procure Pleafure or Happinefs, that is vifibly to give the Preference to Happinefs before Truth and the Praclice thereof, fince the latter is only valuable, it feems, fo far as it proves a Means of attaining the former: And by Confequence a Regard to Truth will ceafe to be a Duty in all Cafes, where it has not a Tendency to promote the Good and Hap- pinefs of Mankind^ and human Aftions or Omiflions muft be morally Good or Evil, according as they have in their Nature a Tendency to advance the Happinefs or Mi- fery of Mankind : And fo our Author's ge- neral Idea or Notion of Morality is quite out of Doors.

This is fo natural, that our Author could not help hitting upon it, and coming into it tho' it be fo vifibly inconfiftent with his ownDoclrine. He tells us, p. 21. That nei- ther all evil nor all good A£iions are equal. Thofe Truths '-juhich they refpeEi^ may com- frife matters of very different Impor- tance— If A Jleals a Book from B, which was pleafing and ufeful to him^ it is true A is guilty of a Crime j in not treating the I Book

( 55 )

Book as being what it is, the Book of B, wh0 is the proprietor of it, and one -uuhofe Hapfinefs partly depends upon it. But ft til if A fcould deprive ^ of a good Eft ate, he would be guilty of a much greater Crime — Tho the Convenience and innocent Tlea- fare that B found in the Ufe of the Booky was a T)egree of Happmefs, yet the Hap- pinefs accruing to him from the Eftate, by which he was fnpplied not only with Ne* cejfaries, but with many other Comforts and harmlefs Enjoyments , vaftly exceeded it. And therefore the Truth violated in the former Cafe, was, B had a Property in that : which gave him fuch a "Degree of HappinefSy that violated in the latter, B had a Property in that, which gave him a Happinefs vaftly fuperior to the other. The Violation therefore in the latter Cafe is, UPON THIS Account, a vaftly greater Violation than in the former. We arc told again too p. 31. That tho to act againft Truth in any Cafe is wrong, yet the "De- grees of Guilt varying with the Impor^ tance of things, in fome Cafes the Impor- tance one Way or other may be fo little as to render the Crime evanefcent or almoft nothing. All Truths then by Mr. Wollaf- ^ tons own ConfeiTion arc not of equal Im- portance, and their Importance is different, j.uft in the (ame Proportion as they con- duce

( 54 ) duce to the Happincfs of Mankind; or, td Ipeak more properly, according as a Con- formity thereto in Praftice, or the Con- dud of Life, contributes more or lefs to that great End. Now if this be fo, as it certainly is, and the Force of Truth obliges our Author to confefs, why all this Buflle and Stir about the Praclice of Truth , or owning by our Condud things to be as they are, as if that in itfelf, without all further Reference, was of the utmoft Im- portance, and the fupreme and ultimate End, to which all our Behaviour ought to be direded? When after all there is a further End to be regarded, and this Conformity to Truth is only valuable, and to be regard- ed, juft fo much or fo far as it is a Means to promote that End , the Happinefs of Mankind. Truth, or a Conformity to Truth, rather receives its Value, its Importance from Happinefs, or the Relation it has thereto as a Means to attain it. Why then did our Author ft op Ihort, and lay the S tr efs upon the Means inftead of the End ? Does not his ovrn Account of the dift^erent Im- portance of different Truths vifibly imply, that the great End, the fole End aimed at in all the Laws of Nature, is Happinefs ; jlnce he acknowledges in exprefs Terms, that the owning of Truth by our Condud has more or lefs of moral Goodnefs in it,

as

( 55 )

as it contributes more or icfs to that End 5 and the Difagrcement of our Condud with Truth has more or lefs of moral Evil in it, as it has more or lefs a Tendency to the Contrary , Unhappinefs or Mifery > The moral Good and Evil therefore of the Con- dud of Men is to be judged of and deter- mined by that Tendency, and nothing elfe ; And the general Notion of Morality to be dated accordingly, and applied to the feve- ral Branches of the Law of Nature.

Here then we may fix with the utmoft Ailurance , for we are as certain, that what has, in its Nature, a Tendency to promote the Well-being and Happinefs of Mankind, is morally Good, and what has a contrary Tendency, morally Evil, as we are, that God is a good and gracious Being, truly con- cerned for the Happinefs of his Creatures s and a greater Certainty than this, we can- not have, becaufe moral Good and Evil de- pend entirely upon the Suppofition of the divine Goodnels, take away that, and mo- ral Good and Evil vanifh at the fame Time. What we call the Laws of Nature would indeed, upon the contrary Suppofition, be pretty good Rules of Convenience, general- ly fpeaking, but not properly Laws, or fit to be obfervcd at all Times and in all Cafes.

u

( 56 )

If therefore it be evident beyond all Queftion, that the moral Good or Evil of human Aftions confifts in a Tendency to promote the Welfare and Happinefs of Mankind, or the contrary, Mr. JVollajlon\ general Idea of moral Good and Evil can- not be juft, as not exprcfling that Tenden- cy, wherein precifely the moral Good or Evil of human Aftions confifts 5 and befides, is fo far from coinciding with it, that it's hardly applicable to any Species of human Action, except thofc of affirming or deny- ing Truth by Woi'ds 5 and even there, in fome extraordinary Cafes, it will miflcad us if followed, as it did him in the Cafe above mentioned : And with regard to other Ac- tions, if his general Notion of MoraUty is .to be applied to them, in the plain obvious Meaning of the Words, the moft inno- cent, virtuous and commendable Aftions ia the World, muft be frequently liable to be condemned as Immoralities, bccaufe as cer- tainly interfering with Truth, as any con- fefs'd Immorality can do: In the only Senfe that Expreffion can poffibly have in our Author's Ufe of it. And if his general Notion of Morality is not to be underflood in the plain obvious Meaning of the Words, it has none at all that we can come at, and the Application of it can only lead us to endlels Perplexity, by reafon of the va- rious

( 57 )

rious Significations the fame Action or O- million may have , fome conformable to Truth, and others not. And a great many s;ood or bad Actions will be found upon Enquiry hardly to have any Meaning at all, befides that univcrlal one, that the Agent propofes to himfeif fome Degree of Plea- lure, Satisfaction, or Advantage, more or lefs, fuch as our Author has found out for vari- ous kinds of immoral x\clion, are the mod unnatural and forced that could be thought of. To pretend that Cruelty and Injullice is denying a Man to be a Man, is nothing but mere Rant, to be wondered at in a Man of our Author's Senfe^ and borrowed from an hyperbolical Way of aggravating the Ab- furdity of fuch Behaviour, without ever ftridtly meaning what is faid. And is fuch a loofe Way of talking upon violent Ads of Injuftice or Humanity, proper to be in- troduced into a philofophical Difcourfe upon the Law of Nature, to be made the Standard of Morality, a Criterion, whereby to judge of the moral Rectitude or Pravity of human Actions ? Another of his Meanings too, ap- plied to Actions of Inhumanity or Injuftice, is the Denial of Happinefs to be what it "is, Mifery to be what it is ^ a M-eaning that I dare fay Mr. JVollaflon himfeif did' not believe, any mortal Man from the Days of Adam to his owh; ever imagined to be im-

I plied

( 58 )

plied or fignificd by fuch Adion^. How llrangcly unaccountable then is it in a Man of his Parts to lay a Strefs upon fuch kind of Trumpery?

But fuppofing every immoral Adlion or Omillion, and none but fuch, did interfere with, or imply a Denial of Truth, and in our Author's own Senfe of that Expreffion ( if he had any clear and determinate Mean- ing annexed to it, which is very much to be queftioned) then indeed the interfering with or denying Truth would be a certain Cri- terion, whereby to diftinguifli immoral Ac- tion or Omiffion from what is not fo , but (till the Nature of Immprality, the Idea or formal Ratio of it, to borrow our Au- thor's own Expreffion, would not confift in that Denial, but fomething elfe; for if it did, the Degrees too of moral Evil would depend upon that only: Adions or Omif- fions would be more or lefs immoral, more or lefs criminal, according as they denied more or lefs Truth j and fuch as denied c- qual Truths, or the fame Truth, would be equally immoral or criminal. But here we have our Author himfelf falling in with us, for the confounding and confuting his own Dodrine j for he durfl: not pretend to mea- fure the Degrees of Immorality by the Number of Truths violated alone, which he ought to have done, did Immorality

confift

( 59 ) confift barely and precifely in the Violation of Truth as he affirms, p. 138. where he tells us, that the Idea and formal Ratio of moral Evil confifts in acting; a Lie. He has thought fit to take in the Importance of Truths violated as well as Number, p. 22. where he fays, the T>egrees of Evil or Guilt are as the Importance and Number of Truths violated. Which is a vifiblc Con- tradiction to his own Doctrine, that the Idea or formal Ratio of moral Evil confifts in ading a Lie. For if that be a juft Re- prefentation of the Nature of moral Evil, then the more Truth is contradicted or violat- ed, by any Action the wickeder it is : No, fays our Author , the Importance of the Truths violated is to be taken into Account, for the Degrees of moral Evil or Guilt are as the Importance and Number of Truths violated. Then, I fay, this fliould have been expreffed in the Definition of moral Evil, wherein he pretends to give us the Idea or formal Ratio thereof 5 and it fhould have been made to confift in acting Lies of Im- portance, or contradifting Truths of Impor- tance : If It fhould be faid for our Author, that was needlefs, becaufe all Truth is of Importance. I Anfwer, by his own Con^ feffion, that Importance in fome Cafes is fo little as to be cvanefcent,or almoft nothing : Why may we not fuppofe then there may

I z bQ

( 60 )

be Cafes, where the Importance of Truth is abfolutely nothing, as in that of an innocent Man purfued by a Ruffian? How can that Truth be of any good Importance, which, if declared, will be the Ruin of an innocent Man y if denied, will fave his Life, and hurt no body elfe? Are we not to under- ftand by the Importance of Truth, the na- tural Tendency, which the Conformity of our Condud thereto has to promote the Happinefs of Mankind ? And if fo, 1 defire to know how the Difcovery of the poor Man to one that intends to murther him, which is declaring the Truth, tends either to his Benefit or any body's elfe j and if it does not, in what Senfe can it be called a Truth of Importance, and therefore facrect and inviolable? ;

All Denial of Truth, any Truth what-r ever, is, according to Mr. /^fol/aff on, immor ral. This Notion has been battled with fuch plaufible Reafons at leaft, by fome of the fined and moft judicious Writers upon the Law of Nature, that fomething more than a bare Affirmation to the contrary was neceflary to fet them afide. Accord- ing to him all Peints in War, all falfe Re-f ports fpread to impofe upon the Enemy, tho' they have no Tendency to hurt any body but him, whom we here fuppofe to be an unjuft Aggrcflbr, arc utterly unlawful y and

why?

( 61 )

why? becaufe they are inconfiftent with Truth : A weighty Confideration indeed to be put in the Balance againft the Defenfc and Security of Millions of innocent Peo- ple, whofe Defenfe and Security oftentimes depend upon the Pradice of thofe Arts! Innocent Nations, it feems, nnifl be ex- pofed to the utmoft Ravage and Defolation rather than the lead Truth be violated, tho' the Violation thereof tends only to the Pre- judice of thofc who have forfeited their Lives by being Aggreffors in an unlawful War, and not only may, but ought to be ^eftroy'd in Defenfe of the Innocent.

A Man that falls into the Hands of Robbers or Pirates may not make ufe of the ieaft falie Pretence to get out of their Clutches, tho' by fuch Pretences he be fo &r from doing any Injiury to the Innocent he does none to the Rogues themfelves.

A Man rauft not difguife or conceal his Anions, Thoughts, or Intentions, by Word or by Deed, that may carry any the Ieaft Intimation that th?y are not what they are i even where others have no Intereft depend- ing, or any Right to pry into or difcovej them, and where fuch a Difcovery might be highly prejudicial to a Man in the Ma- nagement of his own honeft Bufine fs, or- the carrying on of ufeful and laudable Pro*

And

( 6z )

And finally, if no Aft can be right that interferes with any true Propofition, or de- nies any thing to be as it is, then none of the moft innocent harmlefs Adlions of Life may be performed, where fuch Action may have a Tendency to convey a Miftake to the Minds of others, tho' attended with no ill Confequence in the World. A Man for Inftance ought not to prefent a Fowl- ing-piece at a Bird, unlefs he defigns to fhoot, for fear that A£tion fhould convey to the By-ftanders this dreadful Miftake, that he defigns to fhoot when he does not. The two firft of theic Corollaries, from our Author's Notion of Immorality, every Body will allow to be aereeable to his Sentiments j and the two latter follow as evidently from it, in the only Senfe the Phrafe of denying Truth by Aclion or Omiffion feems capable of, explained above, which yet makes his DoiSrine at firft Sight appear fo very grofs, that I fear he ufed that Expreffion without any clear determinate Meaning at all. - I have now done with Mr. JVollafton, whom I own to have been a very ingenious Man, and capable enough of writing very finely upon the Subject, had he not been mifled by the unhappy Miftake I have been all this while confuting. I did propofe indeed when I firft took up the Defign of examin- ing iiim, to have premifed a Diflertation

upon

( 63 ) Upon the Poundation of Morality, In order to erect a new Building of my own at the fame time I demolifhed his ; but finding that Work was likely to run out to a greater Length than I at firft imagined, I have chofen to publifh this Examination of Mr. Wollaflon by itfelf : If it makes its way in the World to my liking, the other intended Part may perhaps follow after, as faft as the cumberfom Employment I have upon my Hands will allow.

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