GIFT OF EVGENE MEYER^R.
SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF
CARL SCHURZ
IN SIX VOLUMES
SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF
CARL SCHURZ
SELECTED AND EDITED BY
FREDERIC BANCROFT
ON BEHALF OF THE CARL SCHURZ MEMORIAL COMMITTEE
VOLUME IV. JULY 20, i88o-SEPTEMBER 15, 1888
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
NEW YORK LONDON
fmicfcerbocfter press 1913
COPYRIGHT, 1913
BY SCHURZ MEMORIAL COMMITTEE
ttbe ftnfcfcerbocfeet Tress, flew »orfc
CONTENTS OF VOLUME IV 1880.
PAGE
To James A. Garfield, July 2Oth .... i
Disappointment at Garfield's letter of acceptance — Regarded as reactionary — A better course to have taken — Schurz will appeal to the independents and conservatives.
Speech: Hayes in Review and Garfield in Prospect,
July 20th 5
From James A. Garfield, July 22d .... 44
Defends letter of acceptance — Refers to his attitude in Congress on money question and civil service — Expresses "great satisfaction" with Schurz's Indianapolis speech.
To James A. Garfield, September 22d ... 47
Popular impression growing that Garfield will return to old patronage system and will not prevent sectional strife — His recent visit to New York believed to be a surrender to the "machine" — Schurz advises Garfield not to go to Warren.
From James A. Garfield, October I5th ... 49
Republican victory in State elections due to fear of reactionary tendencies of Democratic party — Hopes that Schurz can allay the antagonism between German Repub lican leaders in New York — Thanks Schurz for effective campaign work.
To James A. Garfield, November 3d ... 50
Congratulates Garfield on his election but adds: "Your real troubles will now begin. "
To John D. Long, December 9th .... 5° A full statement of the case of the Ponca Indians.
268678
iv Contents of Volume IV
1881.
PAGE
To James A. Garfield, January 2d . . .78
Garfield's task more difficult than that of Hayes — Future of Republican party dependent on success of his Adminis tration — Cabinet should be chosen for their ability, energy an4, integrity, rather than to please the party — Schurz dis cusses the merits of several whose names have been suggested.
To James A. Garfield, January i6th .... 84
"Geographical question" in choosing Cabinet of less importance than efficiency — General tendency toward inde pendence in politics — "Boss-rule" a menace to Republican party — Democrats in earnest about civil service reform — Garfield's Administration must be clean, and able in man aging public business.
To James A. Garfield, January 28th . . 88
Indispensable qualifications for a Commissioner of Indian Affairs — Francis A. Walker recommended.
To Henry L. Dawes, February 7th . . . . 91
Case of Big Snake reviewed — Dawes's misrepresenta tions — Official evidence quoted to prove that Poncas were content to remain in Indian Territory — Let the Poncas at last have rest.
From James Freeman Clarke, February lyth . . 114
Congratulates Schurz on his able defense of his Indian policy.
From Edward Eggleston, February 2 2d . . .114
The "large-minded wisdom" shown by Schurz while Secretary of the Interior.
To James A. Garfield, February 22d . . . 115
Importance of a good Cabinet and a business Adminis tration — Anxious to see Garfield succeed.
From Ex-President Hayes, March I oth . . .115
Acknowledges gratifying letter from Schurz — Hopes they will always be friends — Cordial invitation to "Spiegel Grove. "
From Ex- President Hayes, June 1st . . . . 115
Desirous of reading Schurz's editorial articles — Busy and happy in private life — Interesting himself in local affairs.
Contents of Volume IV
PAGE
Essay: Present Aspects of the Indian Problem, July . 116
From Thomas F. Bayard, July yth . . . ' . 146
Enjoys Schurz's editorials — Reasons for Conkling's solicitude for Arthur — Senate was prevented from electing a President pro tern, before adjournment because a Demo crat would have been chosen.
From Alonzo Bell, August 5th . . . . .147
Rejoices that "the Ponca war" has been ended by the marriage of Tibbies and Bright Eyes — Will Dawes and Long add this to their indictments? — Schurz's Indian policy adhered to by Kirkwood.
To George M. Lockwood, October 27th . . .148
Anonymous charges against Schurz as to contingent fund of Interior Department.
From Thomas Went worth Higginson, November 26th 149
Schurz invited to speak before Massachusetts Woman- Suffrage Association — Fee and expenses offered.
To Thomas Wentworth Higginson, November 28th . 150
Has never taken part in Woman- Suffrage movement — Impossible to accept invitation.
1882.
To George F. Edmunds, January i6th . . .150
Senate resolution calling upon the Interior Department for copies of Secretary Schurz's ruling on the Northern Pacific R. R. land grant — Schurz assailed in the newspapers — Asks Edmunds to move for a thorough investigation of the case.
From Thomas F. Bayard, January iQth . . . 151
Will aid in procuring fair investigation of the land-grant case.
To George F. Edmunds, January 24th . . .152
The Northern Pacific R. R. land case, as a legal question, was submitted to the Attorney-General and decided on its merits — Newspapers ascribe false motives — Thorough investigation desired.
From George F. Edmunds, January 27th . 153
Unless more specific charges are made, thinks it unlikely the Senate will order an investigation — Advises fighting it out in the press.
vi Contents of Volume IV
PAGE
To Joseph Medill, September 2ist . . . . 154
Amused at Elaine's posing as a civil service reformer — Schurz did not write the Evening Post criticism of Blaine — Natural that Blaine should dislike one who believes the author of the Mulligan letters would never be President.
1883.
To John T. Morse, Jr., January Qth . . .156
Is at work on the biography of Clay; but would prefer Gallatin as a less laborious subject.
To the Editor of the Savannah News, January 3oth . 157
Homicides in the South — Their causes — How they are encouraged — How they might be checked.
To George W. Julian, March I5th . . . . 168
Detailed reply to criticism of Schurz's administration of the Department of the Interior in relation to railroads and land-grants.
From Ex-President Hayes, March 2Oth . . . 181
Commends reply to Julian — Expresses theory as to why Julian is "sour and malignant."
From Thomas Wentworth Higginson, April 5th . 181
Requests, for public use, a brief statement from Schurz as to relative efficiency of women clerks as compared with men.
To Thomas Wentworth Higginson, April 6th . . 182
Thinks men more efficient — Many women clerks do excellent work — Impatience of discipline and frequent absences of others bring down the average.
To B. B. Cahoon,t April nth 183
Comments on Julian's attacks — The attacks caused Schurz to review, with several officials, his own records and decisions as Secretary — Found they would bear the most searching investigation — Democrats lack courage on tariff question — Probable rearrangement of political parties in near future.
To George W. Julian, May 9th . . . .184
Reviews and confutes charges brought against his admin istration of Interior Department — Julian's personal record brought out.
Contents of Volume IV vii
1884.
PAGE
From John A. Logan, February 28th . . .194
Asks Schurz to help him obtain the Republican nomina tion for the Presidency.
To John A. Logan, February 29th . . . 194
Tries to dissuade Logan from his ambition — Logan's record on civil service reform and specie payment questions would prove fatal.
To W. G. Sherman, March ist .... 196
Is not an "apologist of violent methods" — For Repub licans to urge want of improvement in the South as a political issue, would be to defeat themselves — Remedy for existing evils.
To Gustav Schwab, March 2ist . . . . 197
Declines a gift of $100,000 contributed by generous friends.
To Simon Wolf, March 22d . . . . .198
Gives his views on Sunday opening of libraries, museums, etc. and the operation of railroads — Prohibition laws — Protecting public school system from sectarian control — Equal taxation, etc.
From P. B. Plumb, May 6th . . 200
Desires an exchange of political views — New York essential to Republican success.
To P. B. Plumb, May I2th 200
New York a doubtful State — Strong opposition to Blaine — "Arthur stands much better" — DeHrous of seeing the Republican party succeed.
From P. B. Plumb, May 25th 202
How Republicans might win without vote of New York — Various candidates for nomination considered.
To P. B. Plumb, May 27th 203
New York necessary to Republican victory — Only a candidate with unblemished record can succeed — Expects to attend Chicago Convention.
viii Contents of Volume IV
PAGE
To G. W. M. Pittman, June I5th . . . . 204 Why Elaine and the Republican party deserve defeat.
To Thomas F. Bayard, June 28th .... 205
Would be glad to see Bayard President — To defeat Elaine, friends of Bayard and of Cleveland should work together — Tammany's hostility to Cleveland would strengthen him.
From Thomas F. Bayard, June 2Qth. . . . 208
Explains personal attitude and agrees with Schurz's suggestions — Puzzled by New York politics and not asso ciated with local politicians — Not seeking a nomination, but, if nominated, would be grateful for Schurz's counsel and aid.
To J. W. Hoag, June 29th 210
Asks Hoag to sign protest against Elaine's nomination — • Mulligan letters show that Elaine traded upon his official position for his own pecuniary advantage — Moral standard of the country would be lowered by electing Elaine.
From John B. Henderson, July 1st . . . . 212
Elaine regrets Schurz's indisposition to support him — How election to the Presidency would change Elaine — Henderson asks Schurz to suspend all political activities until after they meet.
To Thomas F. Bayard, July 2d . . . .213
Butler and Kelly using Bayard's name to prevent Cleve land's nomination — Tammany against Cleveland — Import ance of Bayard and Cleveland cooperating — Loss of Demo cratic opportunities would mean Elaine's election.
To John B. Henderson, July 5th . . . .214
Glad to meet Henderson, but cannot support Blaine — Schurz sorry to be in opposition — Some recently learned facts cause a worse opinion of Blaine.
To Henry Cabot Lodge, July I2th . . . . 215
Urges Lodge carefully to review the reasons that have led him to declare for Blaine — The demoralizing influence Elaine's election would have on the country — Advises Lodge not to accept nomination for Congress from the Republican party while it is so corrupt — Sincere, warm, personal feeling for Lodge.
Contents of Volume IV ix
PAGE
From Henry Cabot Lodge, July I4th . . . 218
Is grateful, but takes a different view of the political situation — Obligations to Republican friends and neighbors —Having freely declared his independent views, he will accept a seat in Congress if offered — However mistaken, he acts from a sense of duty — Must pay a debt of honor to the party.
To Henry Cabot Lodge, July i6th . . . .221
Duty to one's country paramount to allegiance to one's party — Elaine's record makes support of him impossible — After decision, argument is superfluous.
From Henry Ward Beecher, July 29th . . . 222
Is "paralyzed" by statements of "eminent clergymen" against Cleveland — Urges Schurz to postpone prospective speech for Cleveland — Suggests choosing a candidate with a clean record — Accepting Cleveland as candidate would elect Elaine and kill the Independent movement.
To Henry Ward Beecher, July 3Oth .... 222
Schurz's investigations convince him that, aside from the old offense, the stories are maliciously exaggerated for political purposes — Known facts do not warrant the risk of changing plans now.
Speech : Why James G. Blaine Should Not Be President,
August 5th 224
To Henry C. Bowen, August 6th . . . .272
Is disappointed at failure of Independent to publish Dr. Ward's article championing Cleveland — In politics, public virtue is more important than private.
To Albert H. Walker, August 7th . . . .274
Promises to read and give due weight to Walker's defense of Blaine — Has spared no trouble to get at the truth.
From George William Curtis, August I5th. . . 274
Commends Schurz's anti-Elaine speech — Elaine's suit for libel will have an important influence on the canvass — Cleveland hurt by the scandal.
To Paul Bechtner, August 2Oth .... 275
Reply to open letter from Milwaukee purporting to answer Schurz's anti-Elaine speech — The signers will be invited to hear Schurz speak in Milwaukee.
x Contents of Volume IV
PAGE
To George F. Hoar, August 226. .... 276
Detailed reply to Hoar's attempt to discredit some of the statements in the Brooklyn anti-Blaine speech.
To Albert H. Walker, September 2d 284
Summary review of some of Elaine's letters, his explana tions and pleas.
To R. R. Bowker, September 2ist . . . . 285
Activities in the campaign — Itinerary to October 4th — Asks why more Independent speakers are not in the field — Great demand for German edition of anti-Blaine speech.
To James Bryce, November 9th .... 286
Representatives, both State and National, the immediate agents of the people — Senators generally of a higher aver age but not belonging to a privileged class, excite no jeal ousy — Two-house system entirely satisfactory.
To Grover Cleveland, November I5th . . . 288
Congratulations — Civil service question will demand immediate decision — Cleveland's Administration might be made a turning-point in country's political development — Schurz does not seek anything for himself or for his friends.
To George Fred. Williams, November i6th . . 290
Urges Williams to point out to Democratic Representa tives from Massachusetts that failure to support civil service reforms will "quickly sweep their party out of power again."
From Thomas F. Bayard, November I7th . . 291
Praise for Schurz 's part in campaign — Hopes Schurz may officially assist in making victory fruitful.
To Thomas F. Bayard, November 2ist . . . 291
Appreciates Bayard's praise — Hopes to see him Secre tary of State — Character of Cabinet of great importance — Schurz will help only "as a private citizen."
To George Fred. Williams, November 23d . . 293
Approves formal declaration to Cleveland that anyone asking for office ceases to represent the principles and aims of the Independent movement — Elaine's speech after defeat.
Contents of Volume IV xi
PAGE
To George Fred. Williams, November 26th . . 294
Could not accept Cabinet position because of the expense — Advises Williams not to go into public life until he is financially independent.
To Thomas F. Bayard, December 2d 296
If Bayard fears expense of Secretaryship of State, Schurz suggests Secretaryship of the Treasury as less expensive and more influential — Bayard "absolutely needed" in Cabinet.
From Grover Cleveland, December 6th . . . 297
Had been expecting to meet Schurz — Regrets the ob stacles to Schurz 's coming to Albany — "Glad to hear your views at length."
To Grover Cleveland, December loth . . . 297
Schurz offers detailed views to President-elect — Civil service reform the decisive question — What is required of a reformer — Kind of Secretaries a reform President needs, especially in Treasury, Post-Office and Interior Depart ments — Importance of being well known — Slight import ance of geographical considerations — Why Schurz did not go to Albany.
1885.
To Grover Cleveland, January 3d . . . 305
Cleveland's civil service letter an "excellent docu ment" — Schurz arguing with advocates of reform that attitude of critical opposition will delay concentration of energies and necessary reorganization of political forces — Reports prospective absence during Cleveland's visit to New York.
To John T. Morse, Jr., January 7th . . . . 308 Reasons for slow progress with Henry Clay.
To George W. Folsom, January loth . 3°8
Accepts partial reimbursement for campaign expenses — Makes political contribution. Lecture: Benjamin Franklin, January 21 st . 3°9
From Horace White, January 24th . . 348
Detailed account of an interview with Cleveland about the choice of a Cabinet: Whitney, Bayard, Manning and others — Cleveland had made no pledges — Desires re- appointment of Pearson— Cleveland strongly opposed to silver coinage — White's impression of Cleveland.
xii Contents of Volume IV
PAGE
To Silas W. Burt, February i6th . . .351
Importance of selecting best men in Democratic party for Cabinet positions — Several persons discussed — Impossi bility of keeping all Presidential aspirants out of Cabinet — Paramount object, to create public confidence.
To Grover Cleveland, February 24th . . . 354
Quality that an inaugural should contain — A suggestion about the selection of the Cabinet.
To L. Q. C. Lamar, March 2d 355
Objections to making Whitney and Manning members of Cabinet — Independents disappointed by the prospects — Schurz's past experience in cooperating with Democrats — Has no personal aims, but wishes to see reforms accom plished — Why Lamar is appealed to and what he could do.
To President Cleveland, March 2ist . . . 360
Urges reappointment of Pearson — Cleveland's pledges to make efficiency instead of partisanship the test in the civil service will be judged by his treatment of Pearson — No satisfactory middle course between spoils and reform.
From President Cleveland, March 23d . . . 363
Has had many urgent matters to attend to — Perplexed by official documents on file in the Pearson case — Hopes to do the right thing and to gratifiy the reformers — His burden and solemn good intentions.
To President Cleveland, March 26th .... 364
"What I want to see recognized is not a person but the public interest" — The Administration should either reap- point Pearson or make public its reasons — The Independ ents made a "free offering" of their support of Cleveland.
To President Cleveland, March 3ist . . 367
Congratulations on Pearson's reappointment — Regrets appointment of Higgins in Treasury Department.
Essay: The New South, April .... 368
To John T. Morse, Jr., April 3Oth .... 400 Hopes to finish biography of Henry Clay by October.
To President Cleveland, June 25th . . . .401
Congratulations because of wise appointments — Fears appointment of a partisan, instead of an efficient collector of customs — Administration gaining friends — Bold and consistent reform the only safety.
Contents of Volume IV xiii
PAGE
To President Cleveland, June 28th .... 404
Forwards letters — Warns against partisan acts of newly appointed officials — Fears Hedden is but a cat's-paw of H. O. Thompson — Newspaper comment.
To Lucius B. Swift, August 25th .... 406
Thinks criticism of Eastern Mugwumps by Western newspaper too severe — Deplores recent appointments in Indianapolis — Swift should submit to the President charges against Jones.
To President Cleveland, September iyth . . . 407
Newspaper attacks on recent appointees reflect public opinion — A President's advisers and chief officials should be in thorough accord with him.
To President Cleveland, September 23d . . . 408
Personally grateful for investigation ordered of the Bacon-Sterling affair — The anti-reform movement in Democratic party should be met with calm and defiant determination — Danger of having unsympathetic sub ordinates.
To Alfred T. White, October I2th . . 409
Approves resolutions of Brooklyn Independent Repub lican Committee — Duty of Independents to vote for the best man, irrespective of party — Davenport represents the best, Hill the worst, political tendencies — Attitude of the Independents — Good administration the main question.
1886.
To President Cleveland, January i6th . .414
Urges the President to make public the reasons for sus pension or removal from office — Quotes letter dismissing a Republican appointee to make room for a Democrat — The President dishonored and discredited by such partisan rulings — Need of heroic measures — Believes a law requiring the President to give his reasons for removals would be both Constitutional and helpful to a reform Administration.
To Thomas F. Bayard, February 1st ... 420
Condolence — Devotion to duty and the pursuit of some high aim will help him bear his bereavement.
xiv Contents of Volume IV
PAGE
To President Cleveland, February 5th . . .421
Apprehends that the President misunderstood a recent letter — Urges him to issue Executive order that "hereafter in every case of removal the reasons therefor shall be put upon public record" — Much criticism on the part of Independents.
To George F. Edmunds, February 27th . . . 425
Favors publicity in all things connected with appoint ments and removals — Moral authority of the Senate hampered by secrecy.
To George F. Edmunds, March I2th . . 426
Is following with interest the debate on removals and suspensions — How the lost prestige of Senate might be regained — Scheme of Republican Senators to force Cleve land to acknowledge partisan removals and appointments, so as to justify spoils system.
From George F. Edmunds, March lyth . . . 428
Not at liberty to discuss what passes in secret session — Cases in which publicity would be advantageous — Instances where privacy during discussion is essential.
To George Fred. Williams, March i8th . . . 429
Points out lack of discrimination in speeches at Reform Club dinner — Independents must never be partisans — Commends Williams for denouncing Democratic "office- mongering" in Massachusetts — Favorable opinion of Edmunds — Need of a strong, searching but high-toned opposition.
To George F. Edmunds, March i8th . .431
Secrecy in the Senate and secrecy in the Cabinet very different — Secret sessions to consider nominations often serve only party interests.
From George F. Edmunds, March 23d . . . 433
Failure of the President to keep his avowed intention to make "removals for cause only" attributable to irresist ible party pressure.
To George F. Edmunds, March 25th . . . , 433
By referring each case of suspension or removal to the proper committee for open inquiry, the Senate could deter mine the public judgment — The people have no confidence in the Senate's secret proceedings in such matters.
Contents of Volume IV xv
PAGE
From George F. Edmunds, March 26th . . . 434
Departmental rule to refuse access to their official files would embarrass Senate in ordering investigation by committees as proposed by Schurz.
To Wayne McVeagh, March 3Oth .... 435
Without undervaluing the good Cleveland has done, Schurz thinks the President has permitted partisan re movals and appointments — Prefers to make no public speech at present.
To W. H. Clarke, April 3Oth . . . 436
Lincoln's fears of the evil effects of officeseeking.
To Thomas F. Bayard, May 6th .... 437
Schurz's most pointed criticisms of Cleveland have been made to Cleveland — Cleveland has exasperated the spoils men without satisfying the reformers — Strength of Demo cratic party waning — Cleveland can save the day by acting with firmness and decision — Schurz watching with intense and friendly anxiety.
From Thomas F. Bayard, May 8th, iyth . . . 439
Detailed defense of Cleveland and exposition of the difficulties — Understands Schurz's attitude and invites him to come and take a closer view.
To Thomas F. Bayard, May 2oth .... 442
Has not visited Washington lest the cry be raised of Mugwump influence, etc. — The mistakes of an Adminis tration are widely commented upon, while its good work is scarcely known — Schurz makes specific and practical recommendations as a means of success through reform — President Grant's warning example — Does not regret sup porting Cleveland.
To William Potts, June nth 447
Importance of the National Civil Service Reform League's always telling the truth — Schurz anxious to have Cleveland demonstrate that a public man's word can be kept.
To Silas W. Burt, June 2ist 448
Growth of Cleveland's popularity — Importance of popular confidence that he will be true to his pledges — Why benefited by the attacks in the Senate.
xvi Contents of Volume IV
PAGE
To L. Q. C. Lamar, September 28th . . .451
Schurz's interest in character of Administration wholly non-personal — Must soon make a report on progress of reforms — Commends selection for New York collector of customs.
To L. Q. C. Lamar, October Qth .... 453
Believes in Cleveland's sincerity but does not excuse his mistakes — The causes and the remedies — Seeks a friendly understanding between the reformers and the Administra tion — Suggests interchange of clerks in the Indian Bureau and those at the Indian agencies — Spoils scandals.
To L. Q. C. Lamar, October I4th .... 457
Heads of Government offices throughout the country should report to proper Department at Washington reasons for each removal.
To Winslow Warren, October i6th . . . .457
Significance of the millionaire in politics — Menace to the country where wealth is a candidate's only recommenda tion.
To Abram S. Hewitt, October 26th .... 461
Asks whether Hewitt has given pledges as to appoint ments or patronage.
From Abram S. Hewitt, October 27th . . . 462
Has given no promises as to appointments, etc., and authorizes publication of his letter.
To John T. Morse, Jr., November I9th . . . 462 Anxious to avoid mistakes in Henry Clay.
To President Cleveland, December I5th . . . 463
At the request of Independents and Democrats, Schurz points out to the President the more serious mistakes of his Administration, his waning popularity and the possibility of defeat should he accept renomination and the Republi cans select almost any one but Blaine — Party success and adhering to reform pledges hang together — Schurz's atti tude toward the Administration and the charge of " imprac ticability" — Spokesman for many in this unwelcome task.
Contents of Volume IV xvii
1887.
PAGE
From Charles R. Codman, January 3ist . . . 470
Gives details of conversation with Cleveland about his pledges and his practice as to appointments — Believes him to be a "faithful public servant, honest and manly, simple and brave" — Thinking too much of details, he fails to grasp the entire situation — Claims to have kept his pledges, to have made progress and to be considering the next advance — Codman would "deal gently with Mr. Cleveland," in civil service reform report.
To Charles R. Codman February 3d ... 474
Cleveland's mistaken point of view — His explanations fail to explain — Relations and obligations between Schurz and Cleveland — The Independents must tell the truth and the "report" must deal with actual conditions — Desires conference with Codman before the "report" is made public.
From Thomas F. Bayard, April nth . . . 477
Sends advance copy of Diplomatic Correspondence for 1886 — Elaine's diplomacy — Schurz's part in preventing Elaine from being President.
To Thomas F. Bayard, April 28th .... 477
Recovering from effects of fall — Elaine's "beautiful sug- gestiveness " in diplomacy and the good effects of his defeat as Presidential candidate — Labor candidate in 1888 for Presidency, probable — Inquires as to John Sherman's chances for nomination.
From Ex-President Hayes, July 2d . . . . 479
Commends Schurz's Henry Clay and suggests he write a "full autobiography."
From Ex- President Hayes, July 9th . . . 480
Rejoices that the autobiography is begun— Schurz's political independence is an "enigma," a "mystery" to the average party man.
From Moses Coit Tyler, August 3Oth . . .481
Praise of Henry Clay — Tyler has always been in political accord with Schurz.
To Melville E. Stone, October 3d . . . .482 Declines to telegraph his views of the Administration.
xviii Contents of Volume IV
PAGE
To Mayor Hewitt, November 5th .... 482
Protests against Mayor Hewitt's favoring Fellows, a confessed gambler and beneficiary of Tweed, for nomina tion as district attorney — Advocates the appointment of Nicoll, an energetic prosecutor — Gives reasons.
From George William Curtis, November 7th . . 490 Letter to Hewitt, a "great public service."
1888. To Oscar S. Straus, February 7th . . . .491
Contemplates writing a political history of 1852-61 — Cleveland's tariff message has strengthened his position — Cleveland's chances of reelection good, if party stands by him — Speculation as to the Presidential election.
To Thomas F. Bayard, March 7th . . . 493
The only charm of public office — Commends Bayard's management of the fisheries dispute — Death of Emperor William I. and possible results.
Address: Emperor William, March 21 st . . .495
To Thomas F. Bayard, March 29th .... 505
Intending to write a political history of the United States beginning in 1852, he seeks Bayard's aid in obtaining access to archives of foreign Governments.
To Thomas Bayard, April 3d 506
Thanks for passport and letters of introduction — Speech on the dead Kaiser — If Blaine is nominated, will return and oppose his election.
To Count Donhof, May i8th 507
The victim of a newspaper story involving Prince Bis marck, Schurz asks how the matter is regarded in court circles — Complains that the newspapers report him as asking favors from the Crown Prince as to the Techow affair.
To L. S. Metcalf, August I3th . . . . 509
Received with much friendliness by Prince Bismarck and other German statesmen — Lucrative offers from newspapers — Will write nothing for publication while abroad.
Contents of Volume IV xix
PAGE
From Thaddeus C. Pound, July ist . . . . 509
Appeals to Schurz to come home and help elect Harrison and Morton.
Public Letter: To Thaddeus C. Pound, September
i 5th . .... 510
How Cleveland missed his opportunity — The main con sideration: how the public interest can be best served — Elaine the real candidate — The tariff question — "The Trust is the younger brother of the Tariff" — What Cleve land has accomplished — Cannot support Harrison.
THE WRITINGS OF CARL SCHURZ
The Writings of Carl Schurz
TO JAMES A. GARFIELD1
INDIANAPOLIS, July 20, 1880.
My dear Garfield : Those are not the least sincere and faithful among your friends who tell you the truth even when it is not pleasant. I consider it a duty to say to you that your letter of acceptance has been a great disappoint ment to very many good men who hailed your nomination with joy and hope. Especially the vagueness of your language on the financial question, and still more the positive abandonment of ground taken, and to a great extent maintained, by the present Administration with regard to the civil service, have greatly discouraged many who expected to support you with enthusiasm and would have done so with effect. I enclose a letter from Horace White which is only one of a large number I have received and which indicate that the same feelings are alive with a much more numerous class of voters than that which he represents. You will find a tone of regret running through many Republican newspapers that do not always give an indiscriminate approval to whatever the party and its candidates may do or say. I do not even mean here the Nation and kindred periodicals. I know how I feel about it myself and how much stronger that feeling would be, did I not know you personally.
1 Republican candidate for President.
VOL. IV.— I I
2 The Writings of [1880
If your letter was intended to serve your chances in the election, the calculation was, I think, at fault. The voters who are going to decide this election by throwing their weight on one side or the other, are likely to be influenced by one of two currents of sentiment : one is that since the Republican party has been in power for twenty years, the time has come for a change, and this current has great strength; the other is that the administration of public affairs during the last four years having been on the whole satisfactory, it is most prudent to let well enough alone. This current may become stronger provided the next Republican Administration bids fair to be at least as good as the present. As the one or the other of these currents of feeling grows during the campaign, so the election will go. Discussion of all other topics will have little effect upon the result.
Your letter of acceptance has had the effect of strength ening the current first mentioned and to weaken the second. It is universally interpreted as opening a prospect of the reestablishment of the party machine in the civil service, and of a return to the old system of Congressional patron age; in one word, as a reactionary movement in the direc tion of the worst of old abuses. It is useless to speak after this of regulating the civil service on sound principles by Congressional action, for everybody knows as well as you or I do that as long as Congressmen do not find their patronage cut off by the Executive, it will be idle to expect any Congressional legislation curtailing their enjoyment of it. And I know from four years of executive experience, that honest government is impossible with the civil service as a party machine, and the public offices used as patron age and perquisite. The intelligent public knows it just as well. But the public does not know as well as I, that if elected, your whole moral and intellectual nature will recoil from a relapse into the old abuses. The public
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judge you from your utterances. You may fear defeat from two causes: the disaffection of the regular party machinists, or the disaffection of the intelligibly inde pendent and the conservative elements which stand be tween the two parties but are necessary to the victory of either. If you should suffer defeat in consequence of strong declarations for sound principles which might at tract the latter but disaffect the former, it would be a defeat with honor. If you should suffer defeat by surren dering sound principles and which might propitiate the former but drive away the latter, it would be a defeat with disgrace tainting your whole future career.
Where is the greater danger? The regular machine elements do not like you because they know that at heart you do not belong to them, whatever you may say. If they support you it is because they cannot do otherwise; they care for party success and are nothing without their party. If they did wish your defeat, any concessions of principle you may make to them will simply deprive you as a man of their respect without winning their support. I think they will support you because they cannot do otherwise without destroying themselves. If Conkling himself sulks, his following will go on without him and he will lose it.
The independent and conservative elements care little for mere party. If they support you, it is only because they see reason to hope for good government at your hands. They would have supported Hayes heartily and vigorously, and expected to favor you in the same measure as you would give assurance of improving upon what he had begun. In the same measure as they see reason to fear a reaction, they will drop off, thinking that it might be just as well to try a change of party. It may be said that they are not very numerous. But they are certainly numerous enough to hold the balance of power in the
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contested States necessary for Republican success. With out them you can scarcely hope to win.
Besides, you want not only to be elected, but, if elected, to do good service to the country and credit to yourself by your Administration. I think I am not entirely igno rant of politics. Let me make a prediction. No skill in nice balancing will save you from the necessity of choosing between two roads, one running in the reactionary ten dencies and machine politics, and the other in the direc tion of intelligent, progressive and reformatory politics. Following the latter, you will be supported by the best intelligence and moral sense not only of the party but of the country and be their leader. Following the former, you will have the political machinists around you and will be their slave. Just in the same measure as President Hayes maintained in practice the principles with which he started out, he won the applause of the country and made his party strong. His failures, which have brought the censure of the respectable opinion of the country upon him, all were in the direction indicated in your letter of acceptance as the course you mean to follow. I must confess that I regretted to find in your first utter ance as a candidate an implied disapproval of the prin ciples of your predecessor, the good record of whose Administration is at the present moment the best capital of the party whose candidate you are. I should not wonder if President Hayes had felt that himself.
I write you this for the reason that I think it necessary you should understand every phase of the campaign, and to point out some dangers which might be rendered still more serious by further steps in the same direction. I am going to speak here to-night and you will find my speech in the papers. I had originally sketched out a different and higher kind of argument, when your letter appeared and forced me to adopt the low key you observe
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in its tone. You will discern at once that it is intended to stop all hasty demonstrations of discontent in independent quarters. I have written to my correspondents to the same [end], and with what effect, I do not know yet.
I communicate to you Horace White's letter, of course only in strict confidence. Please return it to me after having read it. I am on my way to the Pacific coast, and letters will find me from Aug. 28th to Sept. 1st in San Francisco, and until Sept. 5th at Sacramento City, Cal.
HAYES IN REVIEW AND GARFIELD IN PROSPECT1
FELLOW-CITIZENS: — In response to the invitation with which a large number of citizens of Indianapolis have honored me, I shall speak to you only on a few of the questions which will be discussed in the present contest; on those, I mean, which come directly home to you. I shall address myself to the conservative business men of the country, whose interest in politics is only that of the public good.
I shall appeal not to your passions, but to your reason, and, without any resort to the artifices of oratory, give you a plain practical talk. The language of party war fare is apt to fly to violent exaggerations for the purpose of producing strong impressions; the language of reason and common- sense will abstain from them. Let me say at the outset, therefore, that I do not agree with those who speak of the present moment as the greatest crisis in the history of American affairs. The questions we have to dispose of are not those of immediate life or death ; but the bearing they have upon the future welfare of the nation, and upon those interests which most nearly affect us, is important enough to make us consider well what we
1 Speech at Indianapolis, Ind., July 20, 1880.
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are doing, to call for our best judgment and a strenuous effort to put that judgment into execution.
In the first place, let us make it clear to our own minds what we want. The answer is, in a general term, that we want a good government; that if we have it we must endeavor to keep it, and that if we have it not we must endeavor to get it. What is good government? We may answer again in general terms, that it is a government which well understands the public business, and, under standing it, transacts it within the limits of its consti tutional power, intelligently, honestly and justly. The second question we have to answer to ourselves is, how far the government we have comes up to these requisites, how far the principles upon which it acts, the methods it employs, the aims it pursues and the degree of efficiency it develops, answer the public need, and how far in this respect we ought to preserve what we have or look for other things we have not.
As a member of the present Administration now on the point of yielding its power into the hands of a new set of public servants, I may be permitted to appeal to the candid judgment of the American people as to the manner in which the public business has been conducted during these last years. While it might be natural that, bearing a part of the responsibility myself, I should be inclined to take a favorable view of its performances, still I feel that my ways of thinking are independent enough not to betray me into mere partisan eulogy, and that we may confidently rely upon the judgment frequently expressed, not only by our friends, but also by very many candid men among our opponents. As a matter of course I do not expect Democratic politicians and orators to give us that fairness of judgment in the heat of an election contest which they could not deny us during the repose of a previous period, and which they will not deny us when this contest is over ;
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for it is a common experience that partisan spirit will, under the excitement of the campaign, call a man a villain to-day whose worth was recognized yesterday, and whose merit will again be admitted to-morrow. I think I am not exaggerating when I say that the fair-minded men of this country will admit, and do admit in their hearts to-day, that on the whole the public business has been conducted by this Administration, as far as it was in its control, honestly, intelligently and successfully. I should be the last man to claim perfection for it, for as one of those who had an opportunity to watch affairs in detail, I am well aware of errors committed and of failures suffered in this and that respect. No administration of govern ment ever has been or ever will be free from them; and with respect to them I claim no larger measure of charity than would be claimed by any member of a government acting upon correct motives of duty, and willing to have the acts and the general success of the Administration impartially judged as a whole. It has maintained the public faith and raised the credit of the United States to a point never reached before. It has with consistent energy followed a policy relieving the country of the evils of an irrational and dangerous money system, and greatly promoted the prosperity of the people by the restoration of specie payments. It has funded enormous masses of the National indebtedness at a lower interest, and thus saved many millions a year to the taxpayer. It has faithfully executed the laws with a conscientious observ ance of sound Constitutional principles. By its fidelity to these Constitutional principles it has removed many obstacles which stood in the way of a friendly understand ing between the different sections of the country and different classes of people. It has, under trying circum stances, when the public peace was disturbed by riot and violence on the part of a numerous class of citizens,
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greatly aided the restoration of order and security by a calm and moderate employment of the limited power at its command, without in any case resorting to a doubtful stretch of authority. It has reformed many abuses in the public service, infused a higher sense of duty into its different branches, raised its moral tone, increased its efficiency, punished dishonesty and kept the service unsullied by the scandals arising from lax notions of official integrity. In saying this I am not unmindful of the fact that the reform of the public service has not overcome, in so high a degree as was intended and as was desirable, the obstacles opposing it in the shape of inveter ate political habit and antagonistic interest ; that therefore the highest standard has not been reached; that some mistakes have been made in the selection of persons for public position — points of which I shall say more in the course of these remarks; but it is certainly true that the service is now showing a greater degree of efficiency, a higher moral spirit and a stronger sense of duty than has prevailed perhaps at any time since the period when the administrative machinery was demoralized by the intro duction of the spoils system. It has in many of its branches introduced rules and methods which have borne excellent fruit, and are capable of the most beneficent development if further carried on by coming administrations in sym pathy with them.
I think I can say without exaggeration that these achievements will stand unquestioned in history by all fair-minded men. Withal the country is on the whole in good condition. The people are prosperous again; business is reviving ; our industries are active ; labor finds ready and remunerative employment; the Government enjoys the confidence of the business community in a rare degree, as our financial management has won the con fidence of the whole world. Everybody sees reason to look
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hopefully into the future, provided the conduct of our public affairs remains as good as it has been.
Now the time for a change in the personnel of the Ad ministration has arrived, and if the present conduct of affairs is on the whole good, patriotic and sensible citizens will see to it that the change now to come be such as to give the greatest possible guarantee for the preservation of all that is good, and, wherever possible, for an improve ment on it. They certainly will endeavor to prevent such a change as would threaten a serious deterioration. We should, therefore, favor that candidate for the Presidency who in this respect can be best depended upon.
We have to deal with two parties and their candidates. The Republican party, with James A. Garfield at its head, and the Democratic party, with General Hancock. I do not deem it necessary to discuss the possibility of the victory of the Greenback party and their nominees, for the simple reason that their chances of success are not perceptible to the ordinary eye, and that their organiza tion may be looked upon as a mere tender to the Democracy.
Now I desire you to put before your minds with impar tial candor the question, whether the Democratic candidate and the party behind him can be best depended upon to preserve that which is good in the present condition of things, and develop it in the direction of improvement? I wish to state the question mildly, for I am not partisan enough — indeed my orthodoxy in that respect has now and then been questioned — to deal in wholesale and indis criminate denunciation of our opponents. I do not mean to incite your prejudices and inflame your passions, but to discuss facts and to draw from them legitimate con clusions. I do not want the party to which I belong to depend for success upon the failings of its opponents, and I am, therefore, not inclined to exaggerate the latter.
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While adhering to one party I desire the other to be as good as possible, so as to compel my own to do its best. In this respect, therefore, I sincerely declare that I wish well to the Democratic party. I once participated in an attempt, which attempt miscarried, to move it up to the progressive requirements of the times. The contending political parties in a republic should be such in point of mental and moral constitution and capability that the government may be intrusted to either without serious apprehension for the safety of the public interest. I hope it will be so some day, and I wish it were so now. Let us see whether it is so now.
To speak in all candor, it appears to me that the Demo cratic party labors under historic as well as constitutional difficulties. Since the downfall and disappearance of the slave-power as a compact political interest, from which the Democratic party, more than twenty years ago, derived its morals, its logic, its political skill and states manship, that party has been floundering about, out of logical connection with the questions of the day; never knowing the time of day; always looking for something to turn up, and when something did turn up, spoiling it; lamely lagging in the rear of the events and requirements of the day ; always behind ; denouncing as impossible things that were already accomplished facts; with a strange incapacity to understand the present and to measure the future, making itself the recipient and rallying point for all dangerous and obstructive tendencies and elements, and thus committing blunder after blunder, which at the moment of their birth it uniformly gloried in as great strokes of policy, from the secession movement in 1861 down to the nomination of General Hancock in 1880.
There are many good and clear-headed men in the Demo cratic party, men whom I personally esteem and whose friendship I value, who deplore this condition of things
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as much as I do, but are unable to control the obstrep erous elements and tendencies of the organization, and to fit it for the tasks and responsibilities of government.
It is not my habit to rake up the embers of past discords and to substitute for the living questions of the present issues which lie behind us ; but if we want to ascertain the prevailing tendencies and the present capability for good government of the Democratic party in accordance with the spirit and requirements of the present day, it is not unfair to review some striking experiences as illustrations.
Looking back to the year 1864, the fourth year of the civil war, when the Southern Confederacy was near the total exhaustion of its resources, we find the Democratic party in National Convention solemnly declaring that the war was a failure and must be abandoned. A few months afterwards the triumph of our arms was decided, the Confederacy collapsed, the restoration of our Union was assured and the Democracy was forced to acknow ledge that the war had been a success. The Democracy had proclaimed its despair of the Republic just at the time when the triumph of the Republic was ripe. It became evident to every one that, had the Democratic policy been then adopted, the war would have indeed become a failure and the Union have gone to wreck and ruin.
When slavery breathed its last and its abolition had become an evident logical necessity, requiring nothing more than the form of law, the Democratic party declared that the abolition of slavery would be the ruin of the country and must by all means be averted. Who is there to deny now that the abolition of slavery was an absolute necessity, and has turned out a blessing? The Democrats are compelled to admit it themselves.
When as measures of settlement the thirteenth, four teenth and fifteenth amendments were passed, the Demo cratic party declared them void and entitled to no respect,
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and almost immediately afterward found itself compelled to admit that for the peace of the country and as a basis for future development these Constitutional amendments had to be maintained.
Coming down to more recent history, when the Repub licans in Congress had passed the resumption act in 1875, and the fruit of the restoration of specie payments was almost ripe to be plucked, the Democratic party in its National Convention of 1876 thought it a smart thing to declare that the very act passed for bringing specie pay ments was an impediment in its way and must be repealed. And who is there to deny now that had the act been re pealed under the pressure of all the inflation elements in the country, the confusion of our financial policy necessarily ensuing would have prolonged the evils of an irredeemable paper currency under which we were then suffering? I need not accumulate further examples to show how incap able the Democratic party proved itself to understand and appreciate not only the immediate requirements of the times but facts that had been virtually accomplished, and how its greatest efforts were directed to the end of - obstructing things that had become inevitable, and which it afterwards found itself compelled to admit as good.
And now in this year of 1880, when the war issues are fairly behind us; when by its conciliatory spirit and its strict observance of Constitutional principles the Govern ment has removed all the elements of discord between the two sections which it was in its own power to remove; when, aided by a wise and successful financial policy, general prosperity is again blessing the land, and when the people look above all things for enlightened practical statesmanship that well understands the questions it has to deal with to foster and develop that prosperity; now the Democratic party knows nothing better to do than to set aside all its statesmen of known and settled opinions,
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political experience and training, and to nominate for the Presidency a major-general of the regular army, a pro fessional soldier, who has never been anything else but that, and who from the very nature and necessities of his profession has always stood aloof from the management of political questions.
I shall certainly not attempt to depreciate the character of General Hancock and the great services which he has rendered to the country. He is a gentleman of irreproach able private character, which I shall be sorry to see any effort made to discredit. As a soldier he has shown signal bravery and skill in the handling of troops under difficult circumstances, and his name is identified with some of the most splendid achievements of the war. For all this every good citizen will honor him. But the question is not whether we shall honor a deserving general.
The question is whether that deserving general would be the kind of a President the country needs, a President who can be depended upon successfully to solve the prob lems of statesmanship which are now before us ; to preserve the good things already done and to improve upon them. To lead battalions of brave men against a fortified position, or to win a campaign by a dashing manoeuvre, is one thing ; to regulate the finances of the country in such a way that the blessings of a sound currency may be permanently secured to us; to develop our commercial opportunities; to organize the civil service in such a manner that it may conduct the public business upon sound business prin ciples, is another; and in the latter case the brave spirit and ability which storms hostile batteries and lays low invading hosts does not appear in the first line of import ance. When such difficult civic duties are to be performed we shall, as reasonable men, inquire whether the brilliant captain, who appears so glorious at the head of his columns, is also familiar with the complex interests which in official
14 The Writings of [1880
station he would have to serve; whether his knowledge, training, experience and mental habits fit him clearly to distinguish on the political field good from evil, not only in the abstract, but in the confusing multiplicity and variety of forms in which things appear in reality ; whether he will be sufficiently equipped to penetrate, restrain and baffle the wiles of political intrigue and the conflicts of faction among the friends, which always surround the chief magistrate of a great commonwealth; whether he will show himself fitted to move on that field of civil action and duty, where forces are handled and directed not by a mere rule of command and obedience, but by finding the just measure of firmness and moderation in the pursuit of great objects and in the resistance to evil influences. I cannot impress it too strongly on your minds that there can be no greater difference than that between the hand ling of troops in a campaign and the handling of the political forces of a great people and the handling of the political affairs of a great government.
Moreover it must not be forgotten that this Govern ment is no longer the simple machinery it was in the early days of the Republic. The bucolic age of America is over. The interests the Government has to deal with are no longer those of a small number of agricultural com munities, with here and there a commercial town. They are the interests of nearly fifty millions of people spread over an immense surface, with occupations, pursuits and industries of endless variety and great magnitude ; large cities with elements of population scarcely known here in the early days, and all these producing aspirations and interests so pushing, powerful and complicated in their nature, and so constantly appealing to the Government rightfully or wrongfully, that the requirements of states manship demanded in this age are far different from those which sufficed a century ago.
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It is believed by many that it is an easy task to perform the duties of the President of the United States — that the only thing he has to do is to form a program of policy which he desires to carry out, and to call good and experi enced men into his Cabinet to attend to the detail of the business, without meddling himself with its intricate complications. The experience I have gathered from personal observation, not only as a member of the legis lative body but also of the Cabinet, has convinced me that this is a great mistake.
If all the President had to do were to select seven men who agree with him as to the principal objects to be ac complished, and then consult and agree with them about the means to be used, undisturbed by the pressure of out side forces, it would, indeed, be a comparatively easy and a comfortable thing. But the fact is that the President of the United States, by the very nature of his position, is obliged to spend far more time in listening to the advice and the wishes and the urgency of men outside of his Cabinet, than to his consultations with Cabinet ministers themselves. The opposition he may encounter from the opposing party in Congress and in the press is, in most cases, the least of the difficulties he has to contend with. The greatest puzzles that are apt to perplex and sometimes to overwhelm his mind come from his own party, who have a claim upon his attention and insist to have that claim respected. Not only upon the great measures of his Administration, but upon every detail, the advice of the members of his party, especially those in Congress, is urged upon him with all imaginable sorts of argument and from all imaginable sorts of motive. There is scarcely an appointment he has to make, there is certainly not a reform he wants to execute, that he will not have to carry through a siege and storm of opposing wishes and interests. Every object he pursues will run counter to the wishes
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not only of his opponents, but of some of his friends; every reform, the execution of which may appear to him desirable, will tread upon the toes of somebody whose interests lie in the abuse to be reformed, or who has a friend to protect who is connected with it; and all these pleas, representations, remonstrances, urgencies and pressures go to the President, not through the members of his Cabinet, but behind their backs ; and it is a matter of long and varied experience that unless the President himself has a sufficient knowledge of affairs, a clear eye to see through arguments and motives, and that temper and skill which are necessary to resist without offending, and to conciliate without giving up his objects, he will inevitably be run over and lamentably fail. No man who has not witnessed it has an adequate conception of the furious pressure the President is subjected to, especially during the first period of his administration; and that first period is apt to determine the character of the whole. No Cabinet minister can carry out a reform in the branch of the public service over which he presides unless he has the President at his back, for if the President yields to remonstrances and urgencies brought to bear upon him against such a reform, the Cabinet minister will find himself baffled at every step.
I speak from experience when I say that most of the good things that have been done under this Administra tion, whatever merit the respective Cabinet ministers may deserve for them, are no less due to the clear-headed and faithful support, frequently called the "amiable ob stinacy," with which President Hayes stood behind them by warding off the opposition. It is for such reasons of inestimable benefit to an administration that the Presi dent himself should have had the experience of active work in legislative bodies, and especially in the Congress of the United States. It will require in a President a high degree
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of that intuitive genius with which but very few men in a century are endowed to make his administration success ful without that experience.
Now put, for the sake of argument, in that most trying position, General Hancock or any man trained exclusively in the walks of army life, of which he is so conspicuous an ornament — I mean a man not endowed with that intuitive genius which I have spoken of, and which even his most ardent friends, as I understand, do not claim for General Hancock. What has there been in the school of his past life to fit him for it? As a boy he was accepted by the Government as a cadet at West Point, and that was his college and university. I have high respect for that military school. Every branch of military science is taught there, I have no doubt, with knowledge, skill and success. The principles of military honor and the great law of command and obedience are inculcated as the guid ing stars of the future life of the student. The affairs of ordinary human existence outside of the military profes sion, and the problems it has to deal with, are necessarily treated as matters of only secondary moment. Our military school at West Point has given us many glorious soldiers who have adorned the history of the country; but it has never been pretended that it was meant to be, or was, a school of statesmanship. That school absolved, the young man entered into the regular army service. Of all classes of our society it may be said that our regular army is the most exclusive, the most widely separated from the ordinary business life of the people in point of sympathy, duty and habit. If we have an apart class among us, a class whose contact with the cares and en deavors and business and objects of the life of the masses is only occasional and unsympathetic; a class that in its ideas and aims is separated from the multitude, it is the officers of the regular army. This is not meant to dis-
VOL. IV. — 2
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credit in any sense the character of our service or of the officers in it; it is the almost unavoidable peculiarity of their training and situation, for which they are in no way responsible. Their duties may be arduous; but, except in places of highest command in active warfare, they are extremely simple, specific and narrow ; and it is a common experience that the mental horizon of men is apt to be come limited by the sphere of their duties. I have heard it said a hundred times by men who had spent the best part of their lives in the regular army, and then were thrown upon their own resources to make a living in ordinary pursuits, that their army life had unfitted them for the every-day tasks of society. They found them selves, in a multitude of cases, utterly bewildered by the competition they had to run with those who had been trained in civil pursuits. How is it possible to assume that men who have spent the best part of their lives, who have grown old in that exclusive atmosphere, should show particular fitness for the most complex and confus ing of all duties, the highest civil office in the land?
It may be said, therefore, without exaggeration, that in a hundred cases to one, by taking an old regular army officer, who has never been anything else, and putting him into the highest and most difficult political position, you may spoil an excellent general in making a poor President.
There he is, with an honest intention to do right and to serve his country. Problems of financial policy suddenly rise up before him — questions of revenue, of commercial policy, not in the way of general maxims and vague principles, but in the mysterious shape of practical prob lems to be applied to a given state of circumstances; questions of party politics, where the interests of the public and of the party are curiously mixed together in bewildering confusion. The man at the head of affairs
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means to do right ; let us assume his Cabinet officers mean the same. But now a host of Senators, Representatives, prominent political leaders from all parts of the country swarm in upon him. Having never had any practical contact with the workings of financial or commercial systems, having stood aloof from the intricacies of political management, the man at the head of the Government is the objective point of all their efforts. There are a hundred politicians of name and importance, real or pretended, who lay claim to his attention, and having heard them all — as he has to hear them — and finding that their views and objects run counter to one another, he suddenly discovers himself in an unexpected state of uncertainty as to what is right and what is not, what will serve the interest of the country and what will benefit or injure the interests of his party. He has to meet a multitude of arguments put at him by a multitude of men from a hundred different motives, all seeming to him important, because all are to him new; not a few among the most prominent of those who urge their opinions most strongly upon his mind, trained and skilled by long prac tical schooling in all the arts of covering up the weak points of their cases and concealing their motives by specious arguments, and of making private interests appear those of the public. They have all contributed to his election and success; they are all entitled to his regard; he has heard of them all as prominent men entitled to respect; he has considered them all as men entitled to credit ; and now he discovers that their opinions clash and that their aims are different and contradictory. Scores of them beseeching him with their urgency to make him believe that the Cabinet minister he trusts, by the things he attempts to carry out is injuring the party upon whose permanence the life, or at least the welfare, of the Repub lic depends. He has yet to learn that the Senator in
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his State or the Congressman in his district has interests of his own, peculiar to himself; that those interests are sometimes not exactly those of the country or even of the party at large; that the man who is recommended to him for high ofBcial position, as a model citizen of the Republic, has attained that position, in the opinion of his backer, less by services rendered to the commonwealth than by services rendered to a person; that the same man will be represented to him by others, not as the model citizen, but as a villain who cannot be trusted a moment. He will be told that those who judge of political objects and the means by which to attain them from a higher standpoint than mere personal or partisan interest, are amiable theor ists, who are well enough in their way, but are useless in the practical conduct of politics; that the practical poli tician, who cares less for public questions but is skilled in the management of men, is after all the man who can alone be counted upon to preserve the power of his party, and thereby the salvation of the Republic. And when he has gone through this for weeks and months, and his head begins to swim in the confusing contests of interests and ambitions entirely new to him, and he feels himself in many things he has done or left undone under a pres sure giving him no rest of mind, a helpless tool of foreign wills instead of being the director of things, he will then conclude that the repulse of the fiercest onset at the battle of Gettysburg and the taking of the angle of intrenchments in the Wilderness, glorious feats of arms, were after all very simple things compared with this. And as he goes on and gradually the light of experience dawns upon him, and he discovers glimmers of truth and finds himself unable to correct mistakes irretrievably made, and to redress injuries irremediably inflicted, and to recover failures which have then become part of the history of the country, he finally will see reason to wish that his
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friends had permitted him to enjoy his military renown in peace instead of casting over it a cloud of civil failure.
The picture I have drawn is one which every man of experience in political affairs will recognize as applicable to every novice in politics placed in the Presidential chair, even under ordinary and favorable circumstances. But what is likely to happen to such a man elevated to the Presidency with such a motley host upon his back as the Democratic party is to-day?
That party as now constituted is indeed a wonderful mixture of elements. I shall certainly not question the convictions and the motives of the enlightened and patri otic men that are in it who mean to do the best they can for the country with the means they have; but it is not unjust to them to say that many of them are undoubtedly not without their misgivings as to the latter, and are held where they are by the strength of life-long associations, by the traditions of circles and constituencies within which they move and from which they have derived their posi tion and power ; and also by the opinions grown from long struggles against what they considered and what in some cases may have been abuses on the other side; men of good intentions, laboring under the disadvantage of seeing their aspirations and endeavors hemmed in and baffled by followers and by circumstances which they cannot control. There is the Southern element of which I shall certainly not be inclined to deny that a marked improve ment has taken place in the temper and aspirations of many of its leading men, who have cast the old ambitions of the war period behind them and are now with a patriotic spirit endeavoring to serve the country, and to whom therefore our esteem is due. It is also true that they begin to be supported by a class of orderly and well- meaning citizens; but it is no less true that they find themselves hampered and clogged by noisy factions in
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their constituencies, who, whether they are a majority or not, endeavor, and I regret to say in many instances successfully, to impress their temper upon the character of Southern politics; still smarting under the defeats of the war and the losses which those defeats had brought upon them ; some of them with a sullen feeling that those defeats were an insult as well as a wrong to them, for which, in some way, they must have satisfaction; with a vague desire to retrieve of the old condition of things something they do not know exactly what; and withal insisting that something is due to them as Southern men in politics, as well as in society, and in their worldly for tunes as compared with the rest of mankind; rather reckless of the rights of others; with financial ideas desti tute of a due regard for the good faith of the country, inclined to fly to any money system which they vaguely think can be manipulated so as to make them rich again by legerdemain ; deeming it due to them that large appro priations should be made for their particular benefit, for all imaginable purposes, good, bad and indifferent, merely to pour money into that section of the country; with scarcely any traditions in government, except such as existed in their States before the war, and the reactionary desires and attempts of the party immediately after it; with appetites sharpened by long exclusion from power and the sweets of office, and greedy to make the most of that if they can obtain it.
There is the Northern Democracy, also with men of statesman-like instincts in it and excellent intentions, but behind them a large number of restless and ambitious politicians who, for twenty years, have been boxing the compass to find some principle or some policy, to avail themselves of some passion, or some prejudice by which they might win an election and regain the possession of power. Such an element, however, will be found, more
Carl Schurz 23
or less, represented in all parties. But the Democracy has had the misfortune of exercising a remarkable power of attraction for the adventurous, and even the dangerous, elements of our population; and its attempts to regain power by all sorts of devices, and the advocacy of all sorts of principles and policies has gathered under its banner so many divergent tendencies and incongruous elements, held together by the only desire to regain the spoils of government, that when the party comes into power nobody can tell which element will be uppermost in strength and determine the current of its policy.
Thus we find there the hardest of hard-money men hand in hand with the wildest of inflationists, the freest of free-traders and the stiffest of protectionists ; we find them in their platforms declaring for the restoration of specie payments to satisfy one part and the repeal of the resump tion law in the same sentence to satisfy the other part of the organization. We find men who would scorn the idea of faithlessness to our national obligations in the closest alliance and cooperation with those who repudi ated their debts in their own States, and who would not hesitate a moment to repudiate the debts of the Republic. We find men sincerely desirous of cultivating among the Southern people the heartiest sentiments of loyalty to the Republic and respect for the rights of all, irrespective of color, and by their side men who still think that their own rights are worth nothing unless they are permitted to oppress the rights of others. And it must not be forgotten that upon these different elements the official declarations of platforms have not the least effect. While the party in its national conventions declares for specie payments, that does not hinder a moment Democratic Congressmen from opposing resumption in Congress, or the Democrats of Ohio from nominating their inflation leader, General Ewing, or the Democrats in Indiana from
24 The Writings of
nominating the fiat-money man, Landers, for the governor ship of those States; nor does it prevent the Democrats in many of the Western and Southern States from pur suing their greenback agitation as lustily as before.
While they declare for an observance of our national obligations, that does not hinder the Democrats in many of the Southern States from going on in their work of local repudiation, and declaring that local repudiation is so good a thing that it ought to be made general. But all these factions, these incongruous elements, are held together by one great impulse — that is, the appetite for public plunder, which the exclusion from power for twenty years has stimulated to a degree of keenness scarcely ever seen before. Now consider that, if General Hancock ever can be elected, it must be by a very hearty cooperation of all these elements — the Greenback- Democrats in Ohio, Maine and Indiana and the West and South, with the hard-money men in New York, New Jersey and other States; the protectionists in one quarter and the free traders in another; the war-Democrats in the North and the reactionary elements elsewhere; and to all these elements together, General Hancock, if successful at all, will owe his success ; and all those elements, if the success ful party is to be maintained in its strength and continued in power, must be satisfied in order to hold them together.
That will be the situation and such the problem which the soldier, to whom political science and management so far have been a sealed book, will have to solve. What will he do to satisfy the hard-money men without driving the Greenbackers away? What will he do to keep the Green - backers in the party without betraying the principles of the hard-money men? How will he satisfy the Southern element, that claims to have been robbed by an anti- slavery war, and is entitled to restitution in some shape, and at the same time keep the management of the govern-
i88o] Carl Schurz 25
ment within the bounds of economy and propitiate the Northern taxpayer? How will he content the Southern men in the distribution of offices, who will claim that they have furnished the majority of votes and are therefore entitled to the lion's share? And how will he keep the Northern Democracy in good spirits and in working order by a distribution of the patronage which will appease the hunger of twenty years? These are some of the problems which the unsophisticated soldier- President, whose whole sphere of mental activity has so far been confined to the handling of troops on the field of battle, and to the narrow horizon of duty which army life in times of peace com prises, will have to solve. And these problems he will have to solve not in the quiet of the closet, surrounded by a few able counsellors in peaceful consultation, but quickly, under the bewildering pressure of not a hundred but thousands of eager politicians, who fill the ear with a babel of sound and with a pandemonium of conflicting ambitions. This is a task that would tax a man of phenomenal genius to the utmost of his capacity ; but what will become of one who is unaided even by the least experience of political life, and has nothing but his inner consciousness to measure the value of the arguments and pretenses which are dinned into his ears and the character of the interests that besiege him with their urgency for immediate action?
Let us see now what, in view of all this, we have a right to expect from a Democratic victory. Is it the main tenance of our public faith? While there are prominent opponents of repudiation in the Democratic party, it is a notorious fact that all the elements hostile to the Consti tutional discharge of our National obligations have also gathered under the same banner. Nearly all, if not all, the States that have repudiated or speak of repudiating their own debts are Democratic States, with heavy Demo cratic majorities, furnishing Democratic electoral votes
26 The Writings of
and Congressmen. Who will tell me that it is certain they will be more conscientious with regard to the national debt than they showed themselves with regard to their own? Have we a right to expect a sound financial policy? While there are many good, sound-money men in the Democratic party, it is equally well known that the Democratic party has irresistibly attracted to its fold a very large majority of the Greenbackers, inflationists and fiat-money men. It has, indeed, in its national platforms of late declared for sound money; but in 1876, while it pronounced for resumption it demanded at the same time the repeal of the resumption law. I ask, what would have become of resumption had the resumption law been repealed? But while thus speaking of sound money in their national platforms, is it not equally true in a large number of the States the most prominent infla tionists are put forward for the highest honors followed by the masses of their party? So General Ewing, in Ohio, so General Butler, in Massachusetts, so Mr. Landers, in Indiana; while in Maine, Democrats and Greenbackers fuse in cordial embrace, and while in many of the Western and most of the Southern States the Democrats almost en masse represent unsound financial ideas. Is it not true, that to the very last, resumption was opposed in Congress by Democratic Congressmen? Why, when General Hancock was nominated, the attraction for the Greenbackers seemed to be so strong that the venerable Peter Cooper and General Sam. Carey, of Ohio, were among the first to pay to him their devotion and wish him success.
Now, can anybody foretell what will happen in these respects in case of a Democratic victory? In fact, we do not know whether the advocates of the public faith or the repudiationists, whether the hard-money men or the inflationists, are the strongest element in the Democratic
Carl Schurz 27
party throughout the country, and which of those ele ments will control its policy. I appeal to you, business men, am I going too far in saying that all this is dark, and that in voting the Democratic ticket you will take a gambling chance, and that chance being rather against you? Are you prepared, taxpayers of the country, to take that gambling chance under such circumstances?
But one thing is certain, that the Democratic party, in its fashion, will reform the civil service. That it will certainly do ; it will do it according to an old Democratic principle, "to the victors belong the spoils." That prin ciple is of Democratic origin, and the Democratic party has adhered to it with a fidelity worthy of the best cause. Other parties were infected by it, but the Democratic party may claim the glory of its paternity and of its most unswerving advocacy. It may abandon any other prin ciple, but not that. If there ever was a Democrat, either at the head of the organization or in the ranks, who has proved recreant to that great doctrine, and made pro clamation of his opposition to it, I do not know his name. It is so closely interwoven with the traditions of that party that I doubt very much whether it could be abandoned without destroying the party's existence. That great word, "the cohesive power of public plunder," had its first and most pointed application to the Democracy. And, indeed, when we look at its heterogeneous elements to-day, it is not easy to imagine any other cohesive power which could hold them together. If General Hancock, or any other leader, should signify his intention to abandon it, every Democrat in the land would receive the news with an ironical smile, and simply say that that leader knew a trick or two. If such an intention were declared, and the declaration believed, it is not unlikely that their hosts would disband at once. When the Democracy, therefore, speaks of a reform of the civil service, the meaning of
28 The Writings of [1880
that term, in the light of history and of the tendencies at present prevailing, can be nothing else than that the reform shall consist in putting out all the Republicans and putting all Democrats in their places. What a reform that would be! How the North and South would shake hands over the bloody chasm filled with such good things ! What a host of men would be marching upon the capital from all quarters of the compass, each one feeling that he is born to serve the public, and that the Government cannot get on without him ! It is said that at the present moment, when the Democracy feels sanguine of success, as it always does, the most popular work of literature with Democrats, even with those who never read a book before, is the "Blue Book," being the register of offices under the Government, with salaries attached, each active Democrat selecting his, and many the same.
Now let us see what that sort of Democratic reform in the civil service really means and what its effect would be. Look at the present condition of the service. I have already admitted that the reform of it has not gone so far as was intended and was desirable, but I may say also that more has been accomplished than is generally known and believed. I repeat, it is an almost universally acknowledged fact that at present the public business is, on the whole, well and honestly conducted in the Govern ment offices. The revenues are collected with remarkable fidelity, and never in the history of the country has the loss in their collection been as small as now. In some of its branches it has almost entirely disappeared. The postal service is acknowledged to be more than ever ably, honestly and efficiently done. Even in those branches of the public service which more than others have almost from the beginning of the Government borne the reputa tion of being inefficient and corrupt, such as the land and especially the Indian service, cases of peculation and
Carl Schurz 29
roguery have become comparatively rare, and the general inefficiency of officers is very much improved ; and I speak of this with assurance, for the reason that I am conversant with the details. How has this been brought about?
In the first place, officers of all grades were made to understand that dishonesty of whatever kind or degree would under no circumstances be tolerated. Officers guilty of corrupt practices, whenever their guilt was shown with sufficient clearness, have been exposed and ejected from their places without hesitation. Every man in the service understanding this, it may be said that if persons with thieving propensities were left or put in place, they did in most cases not dare to steal. Secondly, the number of removals made by this Administration has been com paratively small. Not only clerks in the Departments, but officers, appointed for a term of years, were generally left in their places as long as they showed the necessary degree of ability and efficiency in the discharge of their duties. In this way the service retained a very valuable stock of official experience which could not but tell in its general efficiency, while at the same time public servants were imbued with a feeling that the best way to secure themselves in place was to perform their duties according to the best standard. Thirdly, in appointing new men care was taken to select such as would presumably be capable to perform the tasks assigned to them. In some Departments, and in a number of the larger govern ment institutions in the country, systems of examinations were introduced, which deterred at once the entirely incapable from urging themselves or being urged for official position, while they furnished also a good measure of the capacity of the applicants. This system of exami nation may not in all cases furnish an absolutely reliable test, but it has proved to be an infinitely better test than mere recommendation from political favor. It has not
30 The Writings of
been extended as far as it should be, but a good beginning has been made, capable of large extension and develop ment. Fourthly, the practice of making promotions from lower to higher places for good official services rendered, not only in the Departments, but also in some branches of the service outside of them, has been carried out to a much greater extent than is generally known; thus furnishing another stimulus to the zeal of the public servants. I repeat that mistakes in appointments have undoubtedly occurred, some of a more or less conspicuous kind, and that the principles of a thorough reform have not been as universally applied as they should have been. Great cries have been raised about instances in which those principles appear to have been disregarded; but under the old regular spoils system such instances were the rule, compliance with which would not have been criticized at all; and the very cries that are now raised with regard to them in our case prove that at present they are the exception. The very kind of criticism applied to the Administration shows that things have grown better. In spite of the imperfections of the methods followed, the result has been that the public business is recognized to be conducted now in a more business-like manner than before, and that the efficiency of the service has been lifted up to a much higher standard.
Now substitute for this the Democratic reform, making a clean sweep according to the old spoils system, and what will you have? Hundreds of thousands of politicians, great and small, but all hungry, rushing for seventy or eighty thousand places, backed and pressed by every Dem ocratic Congressman and every Democratic committee in the land. This impetuous rush must be satisfied as rapidly as possible, for they want to make the best of their time, and in this case, as well as others, time is money. It is useless to disguise it; the masses of office-
i88o] Carl Schurz 31
seekers, starved for twenty years, will not be turned back as long as there is a mouthful on the table. Seventy or eighty thousand officers selected at random from that multitude of ravenous applicants will be put into places held now mostly by men of tried capacity and experience. They must be taken at random, for it is impossible to fill so large a number of places, in so short a time as the furious demand will permit, in any other way. Need I tell any sensible man what the effect upon the conduct of the public business will be? It will be the disorganization of the whole administrative machinery of the Govern ment at one fell blow; it will be the sudden substitution of raw hands for skilled and tried public servants; the substitution of the eager desire to make out of public affairs as much as can be made in the shortest possible time, for official training, experience and sense of responsi bility. It will be a removal for some time at least of those carefully devised guards which are now placed over the public money and its use; it will in one word be the sudden distribution of so many thousand places of trust, responsibility and power, now well filled, in the true sense of the word as spoils among the hosts of the victorious party.
It is useless to say that the Democratic party contains a sufficient number of men of ability and integrity to fill all those places. No doubt it does. But it is absolutely impossible for those who have the appointing power, even if they were ever so well disposed, to make careful selec tions for so many thousand places in a short time, espe cially considering the fact that usually the least worthy aspirants are among the most clamorous and the most skillful in securing the strongest political indorsements. Need I tell the taxpayers what such an experiment will cost? Suppose, after a success of the Democratic party in a Presidential election, all the offices, high and low, in
32 The Writings of [1880
all the banks and savings institutions of the country, were to be filled suddenly with Democratic politicians upon the recommendation of Democratic Congressmen and cam paign committees, what would the stockholders and the depositors think of the safety of their money? And yet the interests involved in the banks are certainly by no means greater than the interests involved in the con duct of the great Government of the United States. I do not think this is putting the case too strongly, and I invite the business men of the country and the taxpayers generally to consider it well before they cast their votes.
I am willing to assume that in all these respects General Hancock entertains the best possible intentions, and even that he may form for himself a plan of action intended to obviate these difficulties and disasters. He may possibly tell you so, and mean what he says. Yet is it not obvious that, having no experience whatever in political life, he will be completely at the mercy of wind and waves, and that there will be a power of wind in the Democratic victors clamoring for the spoils strong enough to upset the ingenuity of the firmest and most skilled politician in his party? No, let nobody indulge in any delusion about it; a Democratk victory means that the victors will take the spoils at once; and this means the complete destruction for a time of the whole administrative ma chinery of the Government, with all its checks and guards, and the people will have to foot the bills for the carnival. This will be a reform of the civil service to make the ears of the taxpayers tingle.
No prudent citizen can fail to be repelled by such prospects unless equally great or greater dangers threaten from the other side. Let us look at that other side now. I am certainly not one of those who would assert that the Republican party has been without fault. I have been one of its most unsparing critics, and have been unsparingly
i88o] Carl Schurz 33
criticized myself by thoroughgoing partisans in return. I shall always claim for myself freedom of opinion and speech in that respect. The Republican party has un doubtedly made a great many mistakes. I will not go back to the period of reconstruction and an absolved Southern policy, because that lies far behind us, and is not an issue in this campaign. Its Constitutional results have become settlements, accepted by both sides — in profession at least, and the policy of force after the admission of the late rebel States has under this Adminis tration yielded to a scrupulous rule of Constitutional principles. Neither would I deny that, with regard to the question of the public debt at one time and to the currency question for a more extended period, there was in the Republican party an antagonism of opinions, a contest of conflicting ends. We have had Republican advocates of the payment of the public debt in green backs; we have had Republican inflationists, and the discussions inside of the Republican party were for some time heated and bitter. Thus for a season the party seemed to stumble along with an uncertain gait, but it has always had an unerring instinct which in the end made it turn right side up; and then it kept right side up. When in 1869 the Republican majority in Congress declared for the payment of the public debt, principal and interest, in coin, there was the end once and forever of the repudiation movement, open and disguised, in the Republican party. When in 1875 the Republican major ity in Congress passed the resumption act, there was the end, once and forever, of the unredeemable paper-money business in the Republican party. Those who remained repudiationists or fiat-money men did not remain Repub licans, at least not leaders of the party. They tried their luck for some time inside of it; then they left it, and became independent Greenbackers, and finally most of
VOL. IV. — 3
34 The Writings of [1880
them landed in the Democratic party, as the Democratic Greenbackers, who for a time became independents, mostly went back there. General Weaver and his fol lowers are still in the intermediate state, but will no doubt finally materialize as sound Democrats.
But while the Democratic party has been attracting such elements, the Republican party has been either converting them to sound principles or ejecting them until they almost wholly disappeared among its component parts. Thus it has become emphatically the protector of the national faith and the party of sound money. I have no doubt that the disagreements still existing upon financial subjects of minor importance in the Republican party will be solved in the same way after mature dis cussion. This tendency in the Republican party has been owing to some very characteristic causes. It has not only a predominance of good sense and a thoughtful desire to be right and an endeavor to do that which was best for the general interests of the people, but it was also the traditional feeling grown out of the loyal attitude of the Republican party during the civil war in support of the Union and the preservation of the Republic — the feel ing of solemn duty that all the obligations contracted for so sacred a purpose must be and remain sacred and inviolable. Therefore, it was that the idea of repudiation never could obtain a permanent foothold among Republi cans, whatever the vacillations of individual minds during a limited period may have been. And the abhorrence of repudiation in our discussions of the financial problem inspired the most powerful arguments that brought the Republican masses to a sound appreciation of the money question.
In this way the Republican party, steadily progressing in an enlightened perception of the principles of sound finance, has become the reliable sound-money party of the
Carl Schurz 35
country, to which, as parties now are, the solution of new financial problems can alone be safely trusted. And how magnificently do the effects of the results already achieved appear in the revival of our business prosperity !
It may be said that our financial policy has not wholly originated that prosperity. True, but it has most power fully aided it by giving us that confidence which is impos sible without stable money values and a sound currency system. And what prudent man would now risk these great results by turning over our financial policy to the hands of a party which, as I have shown, is the refuge of all destructive elements threatening new uncertainty and confusion?
Indeed, not only in the traditions and good sense of the Republican party do you find the best security there is at present for the sanctity of our national faith as well as a successful management of the financial policy; you find equal security in the known opinions and principles of its candidate, James A. Garfield. His convictions on these subjects have not found their first and best pro clamation in the platform of his party or in his letter of acceptance. His record of nearly twenty years of Con gressional service is not a blank on the great questions of the times, like that of his opponent. There is not a phase of the question of our national obligations ; there is not a point of financial policy, from the first day that the subject was considered in Congress since he became a member of that body to the present hour, that he has not discussed with an ability and strength, a lucidity of argument, amplitude of knowledge and firmness of conviction, placing him in the first rank of the defenders of sound principles.
If you want to study the reasons why the public faith should be inviolably maintained, why an irredeemable paper currency is, and always has been, a curse to all the
36 The Writings of [1880
economic interests of this and all other countries, why confidence can be restored and maintained, why business can obtain a healthy development, why foreign commerce can be most profitably conducted only with a money system of stable and intrinsic value, you will find in the speeches of James A. Garfield upon this subject the most instructive and convincing information. You will find there opinions not suddenly made up to order to suit an opportunity and the necessities of a candidate in an elec tion, but the convictions of a lifetime, carefully matured by conscientious research and large inquiry, and main tained with powerful reason, before they had become generally popular. You find there a teacher, statesman and a leader in a great movement, with principles so firmly grounded in his mind, as well as his conscience, that he would uphold them even were they not supported by a powerful party at his back. There is double assurance, therefore, in the traditions and acts of the party and in the character of the leader at its head.
As to the civil service, I have stated to you what in my opinion its condition is to-day, and that opinion accords, I think, with that of every fair-minded observer. As to what it will become in case of a Republican victory, I shall not predict the millennium, neither from the know ledge I have of the obstacles in the way of a permanent reform on sound principles, nor from the party platform, nor from the last utterance of the candidate. One thing, however, may be taken for certain: the administrative machinery of the government will not be suddenly taken to pieces and disorganized, to be recomposed of raw material. In so far as it has shown itself honest and efficient, it will be preserved in its integrity and efficiency, and upon the good foundation laid there is reason for assurance that it will be developed to greater perfection. The business interests of the country, the taxpayers
i»8o] Carl Schurz 37
generally, whose first desire it must be to see the public business of the Government administered in an honest and intelligent way, will, therefore, have no reason to fear sudden and fitful revulsions in the organization of the administrative machinery, as the distribution of the spoils among the victors after Democratic success would inevi tably be. This is the least advantage we may expect with certainty; but that advantage is so great that no man of sense will fail to appreciate it. Of the greater, more thoroughgoing and permanent reforms which I have long considered not only necessary but also practicable, and which have been attempted and in part carried out, it may be said that so far their advocates have made them selves heard only on the Republican side, and that at present there appears to be no other organization of power in which they can be worked for with any hope of success. That this work will not be given up, is certain, while, on the Democratic side, we have no reason to look for any thing else than a complete relapse into those barbarous methods which in former times have proved so demoraliz ing as well as expensive.
And now I appeal to the conservative citizens of the Republic, to you who desire the public faith sacredly maintained, where will you go? Can you, in view of present circumstances, conscientiously go to the Demo cratic party? You will indeed find there not a few men who think as you do ; but with them, you will find closely allied in party interest all those elements to whom our national obligations are the football of momentary advantage. You will find on that side every State that has repudiated or speaks of repudiating its public debt; you will find there all those who decried the public creditor as the public enemy, and whom no loyal tradition and impulse attaches to the national honor. You will find there a party, inside of which the public faith has still to
38 The Writings of [1880
fight a battle with its enemies, without any certainty of its issue. Is that your place? Or will you go to the Republican side, where the loyal maintenance of our public faith has become a fundamental principle, univer sally adhered to with unswerving fidelity, in spite of the gusts of adverse public sentiment in former days? And you who desire to preserve the fruits of the success gained in the abolition of the curse of an irredeemable paper money and the reestablishment of specie payments, where will you go? Will you go to the Democratic party, where again you will find some who think as you do, and yet with them as a powerful and perhaps the most numerous component part of the organization, wielding commanding influence in a great many of the States subject to its control, the great mass of the inflationists and fiat-money men who were gathered under the Demo cratic banner by a seemingly irresistible power of attrac tion, and furnished many of the acknowledged leaders of that organization, and who even now, when the pros perity of the country has been so magnificently aided by a sound financial policy, would be ready to subvert it all and throw the country back into the wild confusion of the fiat-money madness? Will you, business men, farmers, manufacturers, merchants of the country, find the safety of your interests there? Will you help a party to power, inside of which, between its component elements, the battle of a sound-money system and an irredeemable paper currency is still pending, and will you trust the earnings of the poor as well as the fortunes of the wealthy to the uncertainties of its issue? Or will you go to the Republican side, where great victories for the cause of good money have been achieved; where sound sense and patriotism have won every fight so far decided, and where we may with certainty look for the same sound sense and patriotism to solve the problems not yet disposed of?
Carl Schurz 39
And you who desire the administrative business of the Government performed in a business-like way by honest and capable public servants, where will you go? Will you go to the Democratic party, which has no other reform idea than an eager desire to take the whole administrative machinery of the Government suddenly to pieces, and to fill it as rapidly as possible with politicians demanding offices as spoils? Or will you go to the Republican side, where you have the assurance of a civil service which, in spite of shortcomings and mistakes, has already on the whole proved itself capable to transact your business honestly and efficiently, and where you find all those elements that are faithfully and energetically working for a more thorough and permanent reform?
I might go on with the catalogue to show you where the path of safety lies; but it is enough. Your own State of Indiana furnishes you at this moment a most instructive illustration. Look at the contending forces here. On the one hand, a man put forward by the Democrats as their candidate for the governorship, one of the leaders of the wildest inflation movement, one of the most vociferous advocates of the repeal of the resumption act, the success ful execution of which has conferred upon the American people such inestimable blessings.
Where would our prosperity be had he and his followers prevailed? And now you find him the representative man of the Democratic party, still advocating his wild doctrines, and hoping for their triumph, which would be the ruin of your prosperity. You are certainly mindful of the fact that the wise and patriotic men among you, and I am glad to say that they were a majority of your voters, made an effort to do away with the scandals of fraudulent voting, arising from the absence of a good registration law and the seductive opportunities furnished by your October elections. You know how a majority
40 The Writings of
of your citizens with the applause of all fair-minded men in the country, voted and carried that reform at an elec tion held for the ratification of your constitutional amend ments; you know how by Democratic judges that decision of the majority was set aside upon reasons which made the whole legal profession stare the country over. Is that the party which, as citizens of Indiana, mindful of the welfare and the good name of this State, you will support?
Now look to the other side. Your Republican candi date for the governorship, one of your purest, best in formed and most useful and patriotic men who on every question of public interest stands on the side of the honor of the country and the welfare of its citizens ; whom even the voice of slander cannot reach, and to whose hands his very opponents would without hesitation commit their interests. That is the illustration Indiana gives of the character of our national contest.
What is there then on the Democratic side which could seduce you from the path of safety ? Is it the nomination for the Presidency of a soldier who during the war did brave deeds and deserved well of the country? Is it a sense of gratitude for those brave deeds that should make you elevate the soldier to the place in which a statesman is wanted? Gratitude to those who on the field of battle bared their breasts to the enemies of the country is a sentiment of which I shall not slightingly speak; it is a noble sentiment ; but is the Presidency of the United States a mere bauble that should be given as a reward for things done on a field of action wholly different?
Is the Presidency like a presentation sword, or a gift horse, or a donation of money, or a country house, given to a victorious soldier to please him? If so, then simple justice would compel us to look for the most meritorious of our soldiers and reward them in the order of their merit ; and, brave and skillful as General Hancock has been,
Carl Schurz 41
there are others who have claims of a still higher order. Then, General Grant having already been President, we should reward General Sherman and Lieutenant- General Sheridan first before we come to the major-general nominated by the Democratic party. Certainly let us be grateful; but let us not degrade the highest and most responsible trust of the Republic to the level of a mere gift of gratitude. Let military heroes be lifted up to the highest rank in the service which belongs to the soldier. Let them be rewarded with the esteem of their countrymen; and, if need be, let wealth and luxury be showered upon them to brighten that life which they were ready to sacrifice for their country.
But let it never be forgotten that the Presidency is a trust that is due to no man ; that nobody has ever earned it as a thing belonging to him, and that it should not be bestowed but for services to be rendered in the way of patriotic and enlightened statesmanship.
But, above all things, the Presidency should never be pointed out as the attainable goal of ambition to the pro fessional soldier. I certainly do not mean to depreciate the high character of the regular army. But I cannot refrain from saying that in a republic like ours great care should be taken not to demoralize it by instilling political ambition into the minds of its officers. The army is there to obey the orders of the civil power under the law as it stands, without looking to the right or to the left. And it will be an evil day for this Republic when we inspire the generals of our Army with the ambition to secure the highest power by paving their way to it with political pronunciamentos. I will not impute to General Hancock any such design. He may have meant ever so well when he issued General Order No. 40, which is now held up by a political party as his principal title to the Presidency. But you once establish such a precedent, and who knows
42 The Writings of
how long it will be before you hear of other general orders issued for purposes somewhat similar to those for which they are now issued in Mexico? I am for the subordina tion of the military to the civil power. And therefore I am for making Congressman Garfield President, and for letting General Hancock remain what he is, a general, always ready to draw the soldier's sword at the lawful command of the civil power.
What have we, on the other hand, in the Republican candidate: his youth was that of a poor boy. He lived by his daily labor. He rose up from that estate gradually by his own effort, taking with him the experience of poverty and hard work and a living sympathy with the poor and hard-working man. He cultivated his mind by diligent study and he stored it with useful knowledge. From a learner he became a teacher. When the Republic called her sons to her defence he joined the army and achieved distinction in active service as one of the brave on the battlefield. He was called into the great council of the Nation, and has sat there for nearly twenty years. No great question was discussed without his contributing the store of his knowledge to the fund of information necessary for wise decision. His speeches have ranked not only among the most eloquent, but among the most instructive and useful. Scarcely a single great measure of legislation was passed during that long period without the imprint of his mind. No man in Congress has devoted more thorough inquiry to a larger number of important subjects and formed upon them opinions more matured and valuable. He was not as great a soldier as his com petitor for the Presidency, but he has made himself, and is universally recognized as, what a President ought to be, a statesman. He understands all phases of life, from the lowest to the highest, for he has lived through them. He understands the great problems of politics, for he has
Carl Schurz 43
studied them and actively participated in their discussion and solution. Few men in this country would enter the Presidential office with its great duties and responsibilities better or even as well equipped with knowledge and experience. He need only be true to his record in order to become a wise, safe and successful President. If the people elect him it will be only because his services ren dered in the past are just of that nature which will give assurance of his ability to render greater service in the future. The country wants a statesman of ability, knowledge, experience and principle at the head of affairs. His conduct as a legislator gives ample guarantee of great promise in all these things.
In a few months you will have to make your choice. I know that when a party has been so long in power as the Republican party, many citizens may be moved by a desire for a change. In not a few cases it may be a desire for the sake of a change. While the impulse is natural, it should not be followed without calm discrimination. Prudent men will never fail to consider whether the only change possible bids fair to be a change for the better. It is true that parties are apt to degenerate by the long possession of power. The Republican party cannot expect to escape the common lot of humanity ; but no candid observer will deny that within a late period the Republican party has shown signs rather of improvement than deterioration; and that it possesses the best share of the intelligence, virtue and patriotism of the country. In matters of most essential moment to the public welfare it can be safely better counted upon for efficient and faithful service, while its opponent opens only a prospect of uncertainty and confusion.
The Democracy may in the course of time gain the confidence of the people; but that should be only when the repudiationists and the advocates of unsound money
44 The Writings of
have ceased to be in its ranks so powerful and influential an element as seriously to threaten the great economic interests of the country ; when by energetic and successful action in protecting the rights of the voter whether white or black, whether Republican or Democratic in all parts of the country, and by the suppression of fraud at the ballot-box through a healthy and irresistible power of public opinion within itself, it will have won the right to appear in its platforms as the protector of the freedom and purity of elections, and when it will find it no longer necessary to discard the ablest of its statesmen and to put a general of the Army, who has never been anything but a soldier, in nomination for the Presidency, to make for itself a certificate of loyalty to the settlements of the great conflict of the past.
And for all these reasons, in my opinion, the interests of the Republic demand the election of James A. Garfield to the Presidency of the United States.
FROM JAMES A. GARFIELD
MENTOR, O., July 22, 1880.
My dear Schurz: Yours of the 2Oth inst. from Indianapolis came duly to hand — and was read with interest. I thank you for your frank and faithful criticism ; and with equal frankness let me say that I do not think my letter of acceptance is a surrender of any essential point gained by the present Ad ministration. On the subject of finance, I did not dream that any one could doubt my attitude, for on every phase of the sub ject I have stood on the skirmish line against all forms of soft money and bastard silver fallacy. The only fear my friends have had was that I should be too radical. So good and sound a man as Senator Hoar wrote me urging that I avoid sug gestions which would create apprehensions of violent change. The key to sound money is, I think, contained in my phrase,
Carl Schurz 45
"to maintain the equality of all our dollars. " Can any sound- money man suggest a more radical creed? Remember I was not writing an inaugural message, nor an exhaustive essay on finance ; but a brief campaign summary of Republican doctrine. On the subject of civil service, there is more room for difference of judgment, because there are real differences of opinion among Republicans. I think I may say, without immodesty, that no member of Congress has said or done more in behalf of real reform in that service than I have. But I have been saying, for several years past, that the pressure of public opinion should be brought to bear upon Congress, rather than upon the President, to make any reform in that direction effective. If the President will sketch the outline of a bill fixing a tenure of office for all minor offices, and prescrib ing the grounds on which removals are to be made, and in a message urge its passage, he will concentrate the weight of public opinion upon Congress, and some action will at last be compelled. So long as he makes the fight with Congress a concrete one, involving the personality of each appointee, Congress, or rather the Senate will beat him half the time or more. If he makes it a fight of general principles with no personality involved in the contest, he can win. In short, in my letter of acceptance, I have sought to shift the battle ground from the person of the appointee to the principles on which the office shall be held. Of course, I may be in error; but I think I am right. If any one thinks I have surrendered to Congressional dictation, other than by legislation, such a one will find himself greatly mistaken if the trial comes. I shall be sorry if the President is grieved at the clause of my letter to which you refer. But I have never doubted that one portion of his order no. I was a mistake, and was an invasion of the proper rights of those who hold Federal offices to take part in the nomination of candidates to office. In a district like mine where nomination is equivalent to election, the right to participate in the proceedings of a caucus is more important than the right to vote. The popular understanding of the order has made the holding of a local Federal office a badge of political disability. This should not be. If the order had been
46 The Writings of
confined to the great centers, like New York, where office holders from all quarters were concentrated, and were used to control local caucuses in which they had had no right to par ticipate, it would have met general approval. It was that phase of the case I sought to touch in my letter. I thought my position was not only right in itself, but would remove the only real objection to the order, and at the same time advance the cause of civil service reform.
Here, as on the financial questions, I have not attempted to go into details; but have left myself free to propose such a plan as will embody the necessary elements of a permanent and effective reform. I recognize the strength which the Adminis tration has given to the party by its singularly fine record. They have had my cordial support — in the midst of some contradiction — and I have no purpose to let the party down from the high standard of recent work. I do not think Horace White is justified in treating my letter as a surrender to the machine. He ought to remember that all the pressure and pride of my public life are behind me to project into future action what I have so long advocated; and that I have dis tinctly referred to my public record for my opinions. If you will read an article which I wrote for the Atlantic Monthly for July, 1877, you will see how fully I discuss the subject of civil service. Some of these gentlemen treat my letter as though I had never spoken before. You can do much to prevent their taking this view of it, and, as you know me better than they, I shall hope for your assistance.
I have read your Indianapolis speech with great satisfaction. You do it great wrong when you speak of it as a poor one. It has the clear and incisive spirit which characterizes all your utterances, and its repetition at the leading centers of political life will do great good. I have made no terms of concession with the New York wing; but have trusted to time and the pressure of the campaign. My freedom is in no way crippled, beyond the committals fairly made in the letter of acceptance ; and I do not think that is inconsistent with my past record. Certainly I did not intend it should be. I return White's letter, as you request. I hope you will write me freely and
Carl Schurz 47
often — and, especially, let me know what the outlook is on the Pacific coast.
TO JAMES A. GARFIELD
WASHINGTON, Sept. 22, 1880.
My dear Garfield: Yesterday I received your telegram asking me to go to Cleveland to speak. I shall certainly do so with pleasure and to-day telegraphed to Mr. Chas. O. Evarts, the secretary of the Campaign Committee, to that effect.
Now a word on the campaign as it has developed itself during the last two months. Since my return from the West I have received some strong impressions in that respect from numerous letters and conversations. They were most pointedly summed up in a few words spoken by a New York business man whom I met here yesterday. He is a man of standing and influence in his circle, has always voted the Republican ticket when voting at all and may be taken as a fair representative of a large class. "At first, " he said, "it looked as if the election of General Garfield would give us another sober, quiet, clean, business like Administration, uncontrolled by extreme partisan influences, like the present Administration. But for several weeks the old talk and cries of sectional warfare and bloody shirt, etc., have been uppermost again, as is said, with the full approval of Mr. Garfield. Now if that, as well as the old patronage business, is to be the spirit and character of Mr. Garfield's Administration, there are a great many of us who think we might as well try a change, for four years of sectional quarrel may and prob ably will have a disturbing effect upon the business affairs of the country, and unsettle everything. " I find similar apprehensions expressed in many letters I receive, par ticularly also from Germans. Of course it is unjust to
48 The Writings of [1880
hold you responsible for everything that is said on the stump. But somehow or other the impression seems to have got around that the tone of the campaign was de termined upon at your conference in New York as the result of an agreement or capitulation concluded between yourself and the elements represented there. I am free to say that I always considered your trip to New York a mistake, for it was certain that under existing circum stances you could not make it without giving color to rumors of concession, surrender, promises etc., impairing the strength of your legislative record. And I may add, that if, as the newspapers state, you go to the meeting at Warren, the result will be just as injurious with a large class of voters, besides exposing you to the chance of listening to expressions of condescension like those at the Academy of Music in New York, very little short of contempt and insult. I enclose a couple of editorials from the Evening Post and the N. Y. Herald which it is worth your while to read. They may be somewhat overdrawn in their coloring, but they do give expression to a current of thought running through the heads of a large number of people whose votes we need. That the effect of that sort of a campaign is virtually as stated by these papers is abundantly proven by the Maine election. There we had the "sectional" music by the whole orchestra and in endless variations. I will not say that it caused the Republican defeat, but it proved entirely ineffectual in preventing it, while a quiet, conservative, persuasive tone of discussion, in the line of your anti-sectional and reform utterances in Congress, might have won converts and so prevented the disaster.
These things are not pleasant to contemplate, but as your friend I consider it my duty to point out to you dangers you have to confront, and which you ought to see and appreciate in time. I should like to have a talk with
i88o] Carl Schurz 49
you, but that is probably not an easy thing to arrange, and, perhaps for some reasons not even desirable. But I want you to know that upon all these things you can depend upon me to tell you exactly what I think.
By the way, when I was in Indiana, the Committee showed a great desire to have me speak at some places before the October election. I have not heard from them since my return. I might visit two or three important places in Indiana in connection with my appointment at Cleveland. Webb Hayes writes me that they want a speech from me very much at Fremont. I thought, as you are probably better informed about the necessities of the campaign in that region, you might indicate to the re spective committees what to do. I ought to be back here by the 6th or yth of October on account of public business.
FROM JAMES A. GARFIELD
MENTOR, Oct. 15, 1880.
My dear Schurz : At last we have got down to the bottom of our news-bag — on the election of last Tuesday, and find the extent of the victory. It is clear to me that the chief force which produced the result was the fear of patriotic business men that they could not safely entrust the country and its great material interests in the hands of a party so full of dangerous and reactionary tendencies as the present Democracy.
The drift of the debate during the last three weeks has been very markedly in the business direction. Our friends in Cleve land were deeply impressed by your speech as were also the people of Toledo. Your work was felt and appreciated every where. I hope you will be able to strike some more blows, at the nerve centers, between now and November. I hear that there is some antagonism between the German Republican leaders in New York City, which it is thought you might do
VOL. IV. — 4
50 The Writings of
much to allay. Of this you know better than I. I shall be glad to know how the field looks to you now. With thanks for your very effective work, and with kind regards.
TO JAMES A. GARFIELD
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, WASHINGTON, Nov. 3, 1880.
My dear Garfield : I congratulate you and the country most sincerely on your success. Quod felix faustumque sit. Your real troubles will now begin. But, as I have frequently taken occasion to say during the campaign, President James A. Garfield will have only to act accord ing to the teachings of Member of Congress Garfield to give this country one of the most wholesome Administra tions it ever had. Accept my cordial wishes.
TO JOHN D. LONG'
WASHINGTON, D. C., December 9, 1880.
I have read a full report of the speeches delivered on the resolutions passed at a meeting over which you presided, held in Boston, on the 3d of December, for the purpose of expressing sympathy with the Poncas.
That meeting was held in the interest of justice. It demanded justice for that Indian tribe. But it seems that not one of the speakers remembered that measure of justice which is due to the officers of the Government whose names were connected with that deplorable affair. Permit me to demand justice for them also. To this end it is necessary to pass once more in rapid review the salient points of the case. The old Ponca reserve in southeastern Dakota, a tract of 96,000 acres, was con firmed to that tribe by various treaties. In 1868 a treaty
1 Governor of Mass. An open letter on the removal of the Poncas.
Carl Schurz 51
was concluded with the Sioux by which a reservation was granted to them, including the tract which formerly had by treaty been confirmed to the Poncas. The Sioux treaty of 1868 was ratified in the usual way and became the law of the land. The Poncas, however, continued to occupy the ceded tract. They and the Sioux had been hereditary enemies, and the former had suffered much from the hostile incursions of the latter. After the Ponca reserve had been granted to the Sioux these incursions became more frequent and harassing, so much so that the Poncas found themselves forced to think of removal to some safe loca tion. Several times they expressed a wish to be taken to the Omaha reservation where they might live in security. But, although they had initiated an agreement with the Omahas to that effect, the arrangement was for some reason not accomplished. In 1874 and 1875 the Commis sioner of Indian Affairs recommended the removal of the Poncas to the Omaha reserve and their permanent location thereon. These recommendations, however, were not acted upon by Congress. On the 23d of Septem ber, 1875, a petition was signed by the chiefs and headmen of the Poncas requesting that they be allowed to remove to the Indian Territory and to send a delegation there to select a new home. This petition was forwarded to the Indian Office. It was subsequently asserted, by members of the Ponca tribe, that when signing the petition they had not understood it to contain a request to be removed to the Indian Territory; but they had in their minds a removal to the Omaha reservation and the sending of some of their chiefs and headmen to the Indian Territory to see whether they could find a suitable location there. How ever that may be, they expressed the desire to remove from their lands in Dakota.
Thereupon the Indian Appropriation Act of August 25, 1876, appropriated "twenty-five thousand dollars
52 The Writings of [1880
for the removal of the Poncas to the Indian Territory, and providing them a home therein, with the consent of said band." The Act of March 3, 1877, appropriated fifteen thousand dollars "in addition to that heretofore appropriated for the removal and permanent location of the Poncas in the Indian Territory." At the same time Congress, by Act of March 3, 1877, provided for the removal of the Sioux to the Missouri river. As the Ponca reserve had, by the treaty of 1868, been formally ceded to the Sioux, the execution of the provision of law with regard to the Sioux, without the execution of the provision of law with regard to the Poncas, would have brought the old enemies together upon the same ground, and would have threatened serious consequences to the Poncas as the weaker party. It is true that in 1875 a kind of treaty of peace had been made between the Poncas and one band of the Sioux which it is said had been observed by that band; but subsequently some of the Poncas had been killed by Sioux belonging to another band. These circumstances, it appears, induced the Indian Office to send an inspector, Mr. Kemble, to the Ponca reserve early in January, 1877, for the purpose of obtaining their con sent to the proposed removal. They at first disclaimed any desire to remove, but finally agreed to send a delega tion to the Indian Territory for the purpose of selecting a suitable location for their tribe, and that then their chiefs be permitted to visit Washington to negotiate for the surrender of their lands in Dakota. They were told by Inspector Kemble that the expense of sending a party to the Indian Territory and a delegation to Washington could not be incurred until they had consented to relin quish their Dakota lands. Inspector Kemble reported to the Indian Office that he had obtained that consent at a council held with the Poncas on the 27th of January, 1877, and that such consent was given with the under-
Carl Schurz 53
standing that the final details of the transaction should be completed at Washington after the selection of lands in the Indian Territory had been made. He forwarded, also, the minutes of that council, from which it appeared that the consent he claimed to have been given consisted in speeches made by the chiefs, but not in a formal re- linquishment on paper with their signatures. However, Inspector Kemble reported it as a conclusive consent. A delegation of Ponca chiefs went with him to the Indian Territory where they had hoped to find a home among the Osages, whom they believed to be similar to them in language and habits. But when the delegation arrived at the Osage agency the head chiefs as well as the agent were absent; the Ponca delegates were inhospitably received and poorly provided for, and the weather being inclement, were detained in uncomfortable quarters for several days. Most of the delegates became disheartened at the outset and refused to consider other desirable locations which were shown them, and on reaching Arkan sas City eight of them left in the night without the know ledge of the inspector, and started on foot for the Ponca agency, which they reached, after a tedious and difficult journey, in forty days. The other two, with the inspector, their agent and the Rev. S. D. Hinman, continued their inspection and pronounced in favor of the northeast quarter of the Quapaw reserve as a location for their tribe. Thus the removal was initiated, and the preliminary measures carried out, before the present Administration came into power. Reports made to the Indian Office were to the effect that on their return to their people the Ponca chiefs found the tribe divided in sentiment, the opposition to removal being constantly strengthened by the influence of outside parties; that the jealousies and animosities which had always prevailed among the different bands of the tribe were so intensified by those differences of opinion
54 The Writings of
with regard to the removal, that violence was threatened to any one who should attempt to leave the reservation; that to protect the removal-party from the intimidating tactics of their opponents forty-five soldiers were sent from Fort Randall. But the influence adverse to the removal so far prevailed that only 175 members of the tribe crossed the Niobrara on the I7th of April, on their way to the Indian Territory. After the departure of this party the remaining five hundred and fifty Poncas, notwithstanding strong opposition, were prevailed upon by the inspector to go, and four companies of cavalry were sent for to attend the removal ; but before the arrival of the troops, all the Poncas, as was reported to the Indian Office by their agent, had decided to go peaceably, and the soldiers were recalled while on their march to the agency. On the 1 6th of May, 1877, all the Poncas were on their way. Contrary to the express wish of the agent, but in accord ance with previous orders, which the commanding officer thought he could not disobey, the twenty-five soldiers who had remained at the agency, after the departure of the first party, accompanied the second as far as Colum bus, Nebraska. The journey was continued under great difficulties and hardships, occasioned by unprecedented storms and floods. On their arrival in the Indian Terri tory a majority of the Poncas were dissatisfied with the location chosen for them by their two chiefs who had remained with Inspector Kemble. That dissatisfaction deterred the Indian Office from making provision for their permanent settlement there. The Ponca chiefs asked to be permitted to visit Washington, and in the fall of 1877 they arrived in this city.
From this recital of facts, taken from the official rec ords in this Department, it appears that all the legisla tion which brought about the removal of the Poncas, and the initiatory steps taken to this end, occurred before the
i88o] Carl Schurz 55
present Administration came into power; that the Indian Office had first recommended their removal to the Omaha reservation, upon which no action was taken, while Congress did provide for their removal to the Indian Territory. The removal itself, in pursuance of the law quoted, was effected a very short time after I took charge of my present position, when, I will frankly admit, I was still compelled to give my whole attention to the formid able task of acquainting myself with the vast and com plicated machinery of the Interior Department. If at some future day you, Governor, should be made Secretary of the Interior, you will find what that means; and although you may accomplish it in a shorter time than I did, yet you will have to pass through some strange experiences during the first six months. During that period I had to confess myself as little conversant with Indian affairs as many of those seem to be who are now writing and speaking upon that subject. Under such circumstances I had to leave the practical management of the several bureaus, as to the business left over from the former Administration, for a short time, without much interference on my part, to the bureau chiefs whom I had found in office. I believed them, and justly so, to possess what I had not the advantage of, experience in the current business. On the Ponca affair I thought it best to accept the laws recently passed as the expressed will of Congress and to take the judgment of the then Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Hon. J. Q. Smith, which I have no doubt was conscientiously formed, as he was a man of just and benevolent impulses. His opinions, as I subsequently found, were largely based upon the reports made to the Office by Inspector Kemble. As to the measures taken by Mr. Kemble to obtain what he rep resented as the consent of the Poncas to the relinquishment of their lands and their removal to the Indian Territory, it
56 The Writings of [1880
may be said that he followed a course which unfortunately had been frequently taken before him on many occasions. Having been a man of military training, he may have been rather inclined to summary methods ; moreover it is probable that as the Ponca reserve had been ceded to the Sioux by the treaty of 1868, and as Congress had provided also that the Sioux should be removed to the Missouri river, and the Sioux were the same year to occupy that part of the country, the removal of the Poncas may have appeared to Mr. Kemble a necessity, in order to prevent a collision between them and the Sioux which would have been highly detrimental to both. Besides he stood not alone. In this opinion that the removal of the Poncas was necessary, he had the concurrence of Bishop Hare of the Episcopal Church, as expressed in dispatches to the Indian Office. Had I then understood this matter and Indian affairs generally as well as I do now, I should have overcome the natural hesitancy of a man new in office to take personal responsibilities.
The details of the case did not come clearly to my knowledge until the Ponca chiefs arrived in Washington and told their story. I concluded that they had suffered great hardship in losing the reservation originally con ferred upon them by treaty, after a so-called conse'nt which appeared not to have been a free expression of their will. They had also endured many disasters on their way to the Indian Territory, and after their arrival there were greatly afflicted by disease and lost a large number of their people by death. Then the question of redress presented itself. They requested permission to return to Dakota. This request was denied, not without very careful consideration. The Sioux had in the meantime been removed to the Missouri river and occupied that part of their reservation which included the Ponca lands. To return the Poncas to those lands under such circum-
Carl Schurz 57
stances seemed a dangerous experiment, not only on their account but, also, because the temper of the Sioux at that period appeared still very critical, and it was believed that the slightest irritation might lead to another out break of that tribe, the most powerful of all the Indian nations. Indeed, military officers predicted that another and a larger Sioux war was threatening and that any untoward occurrence might bring it about.
In the consultations had upon that subject the late Mr. William Welsh, of Philadelphia, one of the sincerest, warmest and also most experienced friends the Indians ever had, took an active part; and with his concurrence the conclusion was arrived at that under these difficult circumstances the return of the Poncas to Dakota would be too dangerous a venture, and that it would be best to propose to them a selection of lands in the Indian Terri tory, which they might choose themselves. This they consented to do. Had we then proposed to Congress the return of the Poncas and obtained authority and money for that purpose, and a new Indian war had ensued, which was not only possible, but, from the information we re ceived from that quarter, appeared probable, the folly of such a step would have been more seriously and more generally condemned than all the wrongs done to the Poncas are now.
The Poncas did select a new location in the Indian Territory, at the Salt Fork of the Arkansas river, and in July, 1878, they went to it. It is the tract of land they now occupy. That land is among the very best in the Indian Territory, with respect to agricultural and pas toral pursuits; and since then they have been provided with houses and schools, cattle, farming implements, horses etc. While they suffered severely from disease on the Quapaw reservation, and lost many of their people by death, their health has constantly improved, and
58 The Writings of [1880
according to the latest reports received, the births among them have exceeded the number of deaths during last year.
In the meantime the state of things in the Sioux country has been greatly changed for the better by careful manage ment. The 13,000 Sioux who shortly after the removal of the Poncas from Dakota had occupied the country on and near their old reserve, selected new locations for themselves farther west of the Missouri river. They are in good condition now, but I am not by any means certain whether the reappearance of the Poncas in their vicinity might not induce some reckless young men among them to resume their old quarrels, which were amusement to them, but a very serious thing to the Poncas. But another difficulty arose of a grave nature : the invasion of the Indian Territory by white intruders striving to obtain possession of certain lands in the Indian Territory held for Indian settlement in that region, of which the present Ponca reservation forms a part. With regard to this difficulty I expressed, in my last report, the opinion that the success of this invasion, introducing into the heart of the Indian Territory a reckless, lawless, grasping element of adventurers, sure to grow and spread rapidly after once having gained a foothold, would bring upon the Indian population of that Territory in its present condi tion the most serious dangers. The lands coveted by the invaders are held against the intrusion on the ground that they are reserved for Indian settlement. It is important, therefore, that the Indian settlements actually on such lands should remain there at least while the Indian Terri tory is in danger. To take away the existing Indian settlements from those lands under such circumstances would very much weaken the position of the Government in defending them, and encourage the invasion. The lands occupied by the Poncas belong to that region. If
i88o] Carl Schurz 59
the Poncas were now taken from those lands and returned to Dakota, this very fact would undoubtedly make other northern Indians, who have been taken to the Indian Territory, restless to follow their example, such as the northern Cheyennes, the Nez Perces and possibly even the Pawnees. Unscrupulous white men, agents of the invaders, would be quickly on hand to foment this ten dency. An evacuation by the Indians, and possibly an extensive one, of the very region which is held by the Government against the intruders on the very ground that it is reserved for Indian settlement, would be the consequence, and that just at the moment when the Government has the struggle for the integrity of the In dian Territory on its hands, and it requires the greatest watchfulness and energy to defeat the invasion. At this moment, while I am writing this letter, intelligence arrives that a new attempt is made by bands of intruders to gain possession of those lands. The unscrupulous leaders of that lawless movement, although repeatedly baffled, ap pear determined not to give up. Any measure looking to an evacuation by the Indians would, therefore, now be especially unsafe. An attempt to right the wrongs of the Poncas in that way now, might involve consequences disastrous to an Indian population a hundred times as numerous as they are. Those who look only at the wrongs of the Poncas may not appreciate this consideration. But it is the duty of Government officers responsible for the management of Indian affairs at large to foresee such consequences, and to guard against the danger of choosing that method of undoing a wrong to some, which will be apt to bring greater disaster upon a hundred times larger number.
Does it not appear, in view of this complication of difficulties, that the Poncas, after the great fundamental mistake of ceding their lands to the Sioux in 1868, were
60 The Writings of [1880
more the victims of unfortunate circumstances than of evil designs on the part of anybody connected with the Interior Department? And if your meeting was called in the interest of justice, would it not have been just to the officers of the Government connected with this affair to take these circumstances into account?
But more remains to be said. It was reported in several speeches in your meeting that now at last that great wrong to the Poncas has been ' ' unearthed. " I beg your pardon, it is by no means now that it has been unearthed. It was fully disclosed and published three years ago. And who did it? Not you, Governor, nor Mr. Tibbies, nor Senator Dawes, nor Mayor Prince. But I did it myself. In my annual report of 1877, mY firs^ report after the removal of and after my meeting with the Poncas in Washington, three years ago, I made the following statement :
Congress at its last session made provision for the removal of the Poncas from their former reservation on the Missouri river to the Indian Territory, resolved upon for the reason that it seemed desirable to get them out of the way of the much more numerous and powerful Sioux, with whom their relations were unfriendly. That removal was accordingly commenced in the early summer. The opposition it met with among the Poncas themselves and the hardships encountered on the march are set forth at length in the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The Poncas, about 700 in number, were taken to the Quapaw reservation, in the northeastern corner of the Indian Territory, with a view to permanent settlement. But the reluctance with which they had left their old homes, the strange aspect of a new country, an unusually large number of cases of disease and death among them and the fact that they were greatly annoyed by white adventurers hovering around the reservation, who stole many of their cattle and ponies, and smuggled whisky into their encampments, en gendered among them a spirit of discontent which threatened
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to become unmanageable. They urgently asked for permis sion to send a delegation of chiefs to Washington to bring their complaints in person before the President, and it was reported by their agent that unless this request be granted there was great danger that they would run away to their old reserve on the Missouri river. To avoid such trouble, the permission asked for was given, and the delegation arrived here on November yth. They expressed the desire to be taken back to their old reservation on the Missouri, a request which could not be acceded to. But permission was granted them to select for themselves, among the lands at the disposal of the Government in the Indian Territory, a tract at least equal in size to their old reservation, and they also received the assur ance that they would be fully compensated in kind for the log-houses, furniture and agricultural implements, which, in obedience to the behests of the Government, they had left behind on the Missouri.
The case of the Poncas seems entitled to especial considera tion at the hands of Congress. They have always been friendly to the whites. It is said, and as far as I have been able to learn, truthfully, that no Ponca ever killed a white man. The orders of the Government always met with obedient compliance at their hands. Their removal from their old homes on the Missouri river was to them a great hardship. They had been born and raised there. They had houses there in which they lived according to their ideas of comfort. Many of them had engaged in agriculture, and possessed cattle and agricultural implements. They were very reluctant to leave all this, but when Congress had resolved upon their removal they finally overcame that reluctance and obeyed. Consider ing their constant good conduct, their obedient spirit and the sacrifices they have made, they are certainly entitled to more than ordinary care at the hands of the Government, and I urgently recommend that liberal provision be made to aid them in their new settlement.
In the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of the same year you will find that statement amplified
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with much information in detail. In the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, presented by me in 1878, the following passage occurs:
It should be remembered that their old reservation in Dakota was confirmed to the Poncas by solemn treaty and at the time of making the treaty they received promises of certain annuities in consideration of the cession to the United States of a large tract of land. That treaty, which is still in force, also recognized certain depredation claims which are still unad justed. By a blunder in making the Sioux treaty of 1868, the 96,000 acres belonging to the Poncas were ceded to the Sioux. The negotiators had no right whatever to make the cession, and the bad feeling between the Sioux and the Poncas, which had existed for a long time, compelled the removal of the latter to the Indian Territory.
In this removal, I am sorry to be compelled to say, the Poncas were wronged, and restitution should be made as far as it is in the power of the Government to do so. For the vio lation of their treaty no adequate return has yet been made. They gave up lands, houses and agricultural implements. The houses and implements will be returned them; their lands should be immediately paid for, and the title to their present location should be made secure. But the removal inflicted a far greater injury upon the Poncas for which no reparation can be made, the loss by death of many of their number, caused by change of climate.
Nothing having been done in the previous session of Congress, my report notwithstanding, a bill was drafted in this Department and submitted to Congress during the session of 1 878-^9. In that bill provision was made for an appropriation of $140,000, to indemnify the Poncas for the lands and other property given up by them, and to acquire title for them to their new reservation.
In my annual report of 1879 the same subject was again
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referred to in the following language: "That the Poncas were grievously wronged by their removal from their location on the Missouri river to the Indian Territory, their old reservation having, by a mistake in making the Sioux treaty, been transferred to the Sioux, has been at length and repeatedly set forth in my reports as well as those of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. All that could be subsequently done by this Department, in the absence of new legislation, to repair that wrong and to indemnify them for their losses, has been done with more than ordinary solicitude. "
At the same time I presented the report of the Commis sioner of Indian Affairs of that year which, as a reminder, contained the text of the bill submitted by the Department to Congress at the previous session and adds: "By the provisions of the above bill it will be seen that everything has been done for the Poncas, so far as this Department can act. Their lands were ceded to the Sioux by act of Congress, and proper reparation can only be made by the same authority. "
You will admit that the language employed in those reports with regard to the wrong done to the Poncas could not have been stronger; there was nothing concealed or glossed over. Three years ago, therefore, the matter was fully "unearthed" and reparation demanded, and it was done by this Department. But Congress took no notice of it. If the reparation to the Poncas proposed in the bill submitted to Congress was not satisfactory, then there was a full opportunity for Congress to amend that bill and to act upon its own judgment. If the Poncas had any real friends in Congress, those friends had, ever since 1877, sufficient knowledge furnished them by me upon which to speak and to act. But session after session passed ; this Department again and again called attention to the matter and Congress said nothing, and did nothing
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except to appropriate money for the support of the Poncas.
Had Congress directed this Department to do this or that, there would have been no hesitation in executing the law. But now I read in your speech that all that was required to right the wrongs of the Poncas was "a heart and a stroke of the pen" on the part of the principal officer of the Government managing Indian affairs. Three years ago, by my declarations in the annual report, I showed that I had a heart for the Poncas long before the speakers at your meeting. But when you said that it required merely a stroke of the pen on my part to return the Poncas to Dakota, you had certainly forgotten that the powers of the Executive branch of the Government are limited ; that such a removal and the resettlement of the Poncas in Dakota would have required much more money than their support where they were; and that this Department had no authority of law to spend a dollar of money that was not appropriated. You go even so far as to say that this Department had no legal authority to keep them in the Indian Territory, and to spend any money for them there; you forget that this Department reported the matter to Congress in 1877, without any concealment as to the wrong done, and that Congress by law made appropriations for the support of the Poncas in the Indian Territory year after year with that full knowledge. It is said that had I recommended to Con gress an appropriation for their return to Dakota, it would have been granted. But an appropriation was recommended by this Department for the purpose of indemnifying them in another way, and Congress, with a full knowledge of the facts spread by me before them, might have amended that bill, had it been so minded; yet the matter received no notice at all.
The reasons why I recommended that the Poncas be
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indemnified upon the lands they then occupied, and why I thought it wise that it should at least be tried whether they could not be made comfortable and contented there, are stated above.
It was hoped that when they were settled upon their new reserve in the Indian Territory they would go vigor ously to work to improve their condition, and that such work, with the prospect of increasing prosperity and well- being, would render them gradually satisfied. Their lands are the best in the Indian Territory ; the climate is as good as in southern Kansas, which is now becoming densely peopled; their sanitary condition was greatly changed for the better. The inspiration of successful work might have made them hopeful and healthy. This would in all probability have been the case had the restlessness of their minds, which at first was natural enough, not been constantly excited by reports coming to them from the outside that their stay on the lands they occupied would only be temporary ; that they would certainly be returned to Dakota, and that, therefore, any effort to improve their condition on their present location would be thrown away. That such influences were assiduously brought to bear upon them there is no doubt. The evidence is abundant, and the result has been by no means beneficial to them, although not a few of them have actually gone to work.
In my annual report I mentioned a petition which was recently received from the Poncas, and which seems to indicate that they themselves begin to appreciate their real interests. It is in the following words :
We, the undersigned chiefs and head men of the Ponca tribe of Indians, realize the importance of settling all our business with the Government. Our young men are unsettled and hard to control, while they think we have a right to our land in
VOL. IV. — 5
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Dakota, and our tribe will not be finally settled until we have a title to our present reservation, and we have relinquished all right to our Dakota land. And we earnestly request that the chiefs of the Ponca tribe of Indians be permitted to visit Washington the coming winter for the purpose of signing away our right to all land in Dakota, and to obtain a title to our present reservation, and we also wish to settle our Sioux troubles at the same time.
We make the above request, as we desire to have the young men of our tribe become settled, and commence to work on their respective claims. We also desire to make this visit in order to convince the Government that it is our intention of remaining where we are, and requesting the aid of the Govern ment in obtaining teams, wagons, harness, tools &c., with which to work our land. Signed :
WHITE EAGLE, BLACK CROW,
FRANK LA FLESCHE, BIG SOLDIER, CHILD CHIEF, , THE CHIEF,
STANDING BUFFALO, LITTLE PICKER,
RUSH-IN-THE-BOTTLE, BlG BULL, SHORT-MAN, RED LOAF,
FOUR BEARS, YELLOW BIRD,
WHITE BUFFALO BULL, WHITE FEATHER, BUFFALO RIB, PETER PRIME AUX,
BIG GOOSE, WALKING SKY.
We the undersigned certify, on honor, that we were present and witnessed the signing of the above by each of the in dividuals named, and that the above was written at the solicitation of the Ponca chiefs.
JOSEPH ESAW, Interpreter. A. R. SATTERTHWAITE. PONCA AGENCY, INDIAN TER., October 25, 1880.
I notice in your speech a remark that this petition has been obtained "by fraud or false promises or some cajol-
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ery. " I can only assure you that there is no information in this Department to that effect, and I suppose you have none. I may assure you, further, that the petition has not been instigated by anybody here. On the contrary, there are reasons to believe that it was the outgrowth of a very natural sentiment growing up among those people. When the chiefs, White Eagle and Standing Buffalo, were here last winter to testify before the Senate Committee, it appears that great care was taken to prevent White Eagle from coming to see me, and he did not come ; but Standing Buffalo solicited an interview with me, and remembering the absurd rumor spread on the occasion of the visit of the Ute chiefs here, that they were held under duress and were not permitted to speak in the presence of anybody but a Government official, I assembled several gentlemen in my office while my conversation with Standing Buffalo was held. Standing Buffalo spoke to me as follows : ' ' I would rather do what you want me to do because I know you have always treated me well. If I controlled matters myself I would not go away; I would stay where we are. I am the old chief, and if I go back there I want to see how many people will stay even if White Eagle goes. I have a farm-house with pine lumber, and I have got lands; I don't think it very good for white men to try to get the Poncas back to their old reservation."
When asked what the condition of the health of his people was, he answered: "When any people, even the white man, go to a new country, when they first go there they do not get along, some die ; but they get used to the country. When first we got there, all sick; now we are getting better; some people have had consumption before they went down to the Indian Territory ; a good many died on account of the change. "
When asked whether they had been receiving letters from Omaha or other places, asking them not to do any
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work because they would be taken away from there, he answered: "Yes, we get letters all the time; I do not know whether the letters come from Omaha; they also told me the Ponca going to get his land back ; that is the reason the Ponca didn't want to work. I think that letters came from here; somebody put them, Bright Eyes put them, and in that way the letters came around to the Ponca Agency. "
I have also received a letter, signed by Standing Buffalo, dated on May 3, 1880, in which the following passage occurs :
As I told you when I was in Washington last winter, I would rather stay here than anywhere else. My people have quieted down, but somebody has told them that when Congress adjourns they will be told whether they can go back to their old reservation or not. I do not do as I want to at all times, but I do as you advise me to do; but one-half of the tribe would remain here with me if I advise it, should the others leave. I can prove by any one that the half-breeds are the worst about trying to get back to Dakota ; some white men have been fooling with us for nearly two years, and pre venting us from doing anything. It is not our fault that the Poncas are unsettled. Stop these white people from interfer ing with us and our people will quiet down and go to work. When I was in Washington I thought that but few of the Poncas would be willing to stay, and I asked for only ten wagons; I would now like to have twenty wagons for my people.
The talk Standing Buffalo held with me is so much in accord with the letter I received that I am compelled to conclude the latter expresses his real sentiments ; and if so, then the petition appears to be the result of a change of feeling, which from Standing Buffalo's immediate fol lowers has spread over the whole tribe; this, certainly, can have been the case. It seems to me therefore that to
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call it the result of fraud or other illegitimate practices, is at least a hasty conclusion not warranted by other evi dence. Moreover, if the petition does not express the real sentiments of the Poncas, and has been extorted from them by illegitimate means, the men so extorting it have made a great mistake in advising that they be permitted to go to Washington where they would be at perfect liberty to express their true sentiments not only before me but before others. I would certainly not restrain them. But if that petition does express their real sentiments and they are willing to stay where they are, and to improve their condition, and to accept indemnity for the lands they lost in Dakota, would not that be, in view of all the difficulties surrounding the case, a satisfactory solution of the problem? If the point of right and principle in ques tion be fully and clearly established by act of Congress ; if the ceding away of the Ponca lands to the Sioux be thus fully recognized as a wrong; if ample indemnity be paid for it, and if the Poncas then are content to stay where they are, thus avoiding a new removal, the breaking up of their present houses and farms and mills and educational facilities, and the transfer to Dakota, where all these things would have to be begun again from the beginning, avoiding also a possibly unpleasant contact with the Sioux, and a partial evacuation of the Indian Territory, which appears especially dangerous under present cir cumstances — would that not be satisfactory to you? Would you in that case wish they had not come to such a conclusion? And, indeed, considering that the quality of the land on which they now are is much better than that of their land in Dakota, and the circumstance that after much suffering they appear at last to have now become acclimated like other settlers in that region, does it not seem that in time they may become prosperous and contented? Would you regret this? It was said that the
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advocates of fiat money deplored the reviving prosperity of the country because it destroyed their arguments. Can it be that any sincere friend of the Indians would regret the success of a solution apt to avoid serious risks and difficulties because it stopped their agitation? I should be sorry to think so.
I say to you frankly that I desire this solution. I know very well that no reparation can be perfectly complete, for the loss they have suffered by death, which I deplore as much as you do, cannot be repaired by this settlement, nor can it be by their return to Dakota. But we have to take care of the living, and this can be done by the solu tion here set forth, which appears to me the best for the Poncas as well as the safest with regard to the mainten ance of peace and the protection of the rights and interests of tribes in the Indian Territory much more numerous than they. Nor would such a solution leave out of view the principles contended for. It is in the nature of com pensation for property taken by the Government in the way of expropriation for public use, or by an error like the Sioux treaty of 1868, where restitution in kind would endanger the rights of other innocent parties. I will say further that conscientiously believing this to be the best solution, I shall express that opinion to the Ponca chiefs and encourage its acceptance, not by way of com mand, but by way of argument. I shall consider it my duty to do so, and I shall be glad if the Poncas accept it. It is quite possible, if new emissaries are sent among them again for the purpose of dissuading them from any consent to this proposition or of inducing them to run away in a disorderly manner from the lands they now occupy, that the Poncas may be prevailed upon to reject the reparation thus offered to them, notwithstanding the petition they have sent to me. But I trust that you and all the sincere friends of the Indians engaged in this movement will
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discountenance such mischievous practices; and that if this solution appears acceptable to the Poncas no influence be employed to prevent it. On the contrary, I should think that every true friend of the Indians would aid in its accomplishment .
Permit me now a few words about the resolutions passed at your meeting. The first of them denounces the wrong done to the Poncas and demands reparation. The second is in two parts: first, "that it is unbecoming in a free Government to allow its agents to slander, prosecute and imprison those whose only offense lies in befriending the victims of that Government's oppression. " This un doubtedly refers to the arrest of Mr. Tibbies last sum mer, on the Ponca reservation, by the Indian agent there. The report made to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs by Agent Whiting, upon this occurrence, was as follows:
I have to state that on the 28th ultimo, as I was on my way to Arkansas City, I was informed that Mr. Tibbies had started that morning on horse-back for Ponca agency, and in connec tion with an accomplice, who was to remain in the State of Kansas he intended to coax the Poncas to run off, a few fami lies at a time, and meet at a point a few miles from Nez Perce* reservation, where he (Tibbies) would have supplies furnished to feed them, until quite a number were collected, when he would take them all back to Dakota. The Indians informed me that Mr. Tibbies told them to collect all the property they could and meet him at the above-named point; that he promised them wagons, harness, farming implements, horses, cattle etc., and that they would receive rations until they could raise a crop. Mr. Tibbies told them to run off in the night and to tell no one where they were going. The evening Mr. Tibbies was arrested four families had made arrangements to run off and join him at the appointed place.
On the 2Qth ultimo I returned to the agency and found Mr. Tibbies under arrest, but being very pleasantly entertained at
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the house of Mr. Frisbie, agency carpenter, where he had taken his supper.
Mr. Tibbies was arrested on the evening of the 29th ultimo, while trying to make his way across Nez Perc£ reservation to a cattle camp, where he was making his headquarters, by a Nez Perce* policeman, and taken to Oakland agency, where he was recognized, and was informed that he must consider himself a prisoner until word could be sent to Ponca agency. Mr. Tibbies was escorted to Ponca agency by agency employes where he arrived about dark and was given his supper. Upon my arrival I took Mr. Tibbies to my house and gave him a room for the night, stationing a white employe in the hall, to see that he made no effort to escape. In the morning Mr. Tibbies was given his breakfast, after which he was told to mount the pony he brought to the agency, and in company with the chief of police and four Indian policemen he was escorted to the State line and warned of the consequences should he return.
Mr. Tibbies was treated kindly and respectfully while under arrest, there was no violence attempted or threatened, and he was assured that no harm should befall him. He was enter tained the same as any other person visiting the agency, except a watch was kept over him to prevent his escaping.
I am aware that Mr. Tibbies says he went there to have a legal consultation with the Indians, and that his life was in imminent danger. He frequently speaks of such perils. He seems to like the robes of martyrdom. From what I know of the two men I see very good reason to take the word of Agent Whiting in preference to that of Mr. Tibbies. Upon this point I expect you to agree with me some day. As to the things done by Mr. Tibbies on the Ponca reservation, according to the report of Agent Whiting, I desire to call your attention to the following sections of the Revised Statutes :
SEC. 2111. Every person who sends any talk, speech, message or letter to any Indian nation, tribe, chief or indi-
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vidual, with an intent to produce a contravention or infrac tion of any treaty or law of the United States, or to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the United States, is liable to a penalty of two thousand dollars.
SEC. 2 1 12. Every person who carries or delivers any talk, message, speech or letter intended to produce a contravention or infraction of any treaty or law of the United States, or to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the United States, knowing the contents thereof, to or from any Indian nation, tribe, chief or individual, from or to any person or persons whatever, residing within the United States, or from or to any subject, citizen or agent of any foreign power or state, is liable to a penalty of one thousand dollars.
SEC. 2113. Every person who carries on a correspondence, by letter or otherwise, with any foreign nation or power, with an intent to induce such foreign nation or power to excite any Indian nation, tribe, chief or individual, to war against the United States, or to the violation of any existing treaty; or who alienates, or attempts to alienate, the confidence of any Indian or Indians from the Government of the United States, is liable to a penalty of one thousand dollars.
SEC. 2147. The Superintendent of Indian Affairs, and the Indian agents and sub-agents, shall have authority to remove from the Indian country all persons found therein contrary to law; and the President is authorized to direct the military force to be employed in such removal.
SEC. 2148. If any person who has been removed from the Indian country shall thereafter at any time return, or be found within the Indian country, he shall be liable to a penalty of one thousand dollars.
SEC. 2149. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs is author ized and required, with the approval of the Secretary of the In terior, to remove from any tribal reservation any person being therein without authority of law, or whose presence within the limits of the reservation may, in the judgment of the Commis sioner, be detrimental to the peace and welfare of the Indians ; and may employ for the purpose such force as may be neces sary to enable the agent to effect the removal of such person.
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When a man enters an Indian reservation and mis chievously tries by false promises which he cannot per form, as in this case, or in any other way, to induce the Indians to run away, breaking up their settlements, an Indian agent will consider it his duty to enforce the above provisions of law.
The second part of the resolution is as follows: "That it shows consciousness of wrong and fear of justice when the highest officials belie their principles by denying a hearing in our own courts to those who claim the protec tion of the laws." I suppose this refers to the circum stance that on some occasion I stated that, according to the opinion of lawyers I had consulted, an Indian tribe cannot sue the United States in the Federal courts, as decided by the Supreme Court in the case of the Cherokee Nation vs. the State of Georgia, which decision was delivered by Chief Justice Marshall. If there was any denial of justice in this then it was Chief Justice Marshall who did it, unless the lawyers misunderstand him; but certainly not I, for I declared at the same time that "if an Indian tribe could maintain an action in the courts of the United States to assert its right I should object to it just as little as I would object to the exercise of the same privilege on the part of white men. " It may be that the censure expressed in that resolution refers to the circum stance that when the brief of the United States District Attorney in Nebraska for an appeal from Judge Dundy's habeas corpus decision was submitted to me, I could not approve the principles upon which the argument of that brief was based and advised the Attorney-General that, as far as I, as Secretary of the Interior, was concerned, there was no desire that an appeal should be taken, but rather that Judge Dundy's decision should stand without question on the part of the Government. Moreover, I have repeatedly recommended the passage of a statute by
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Congress extending the jurisdiction of the courts over Indian reservations, and that the Indians have the pro tection of the laws like white men.
Under such circumstances I think you will admit yourself that the language of the resolution was highly intemperate and unjustifiable, to say the least of it.
The third resolution calls upon the President for a prompt use of his large powers to rectify the injuries done. This seems to leave out of view that the President has to execute the laws passed by Congress as they are and can not order the use of any money without an appropriation. And as in this case there is neither legal authority nor appropriation he can do nothing without the further action of Congress.
To sum up the case, on two things you and I are agreed. First, a great wrong has been done to the Poncas. I denounced that wrong years before you did. Second, reparation is due them. This Department asked for reparation long before you did. The only question of difference between us is what that reparation shall be. You look at it from the standpoint of one who has the Poncas alone in view. I look at it as one who has the responsibility for the management of the affairs of all the Indian tribes, of whom the Poncas form but a small part. You demand a reparation which with that respon sibility upon me, I consider attended with serious risks and difficulties. I demand a reparation which, in point of principle, is just as good, but which at the same time is to avoid all those risks and difficulties.
In differing from you I am actuated by no pride of opinion. I have shown more than once, when I became aware of having made a mistake, that I did not hesitate to acknowledge and correct it. Such an acknowledgment would be particularly easy in this instance, as I was the first to denounce the wrong that was done ; and when now
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my opinion as to what reparation should be made does not agree with that of others, they have no reason to attribute it to mere stubbornness, and certainly not to a want of heart for the suffering Indians. In what I say to you I express my honest conviction under a keen sense of the responsibility I have to bear. It may be called an error of judgment, perhaps, which I think it is not, but nobody has a right to call it anything else. The thought of gross injustice to the Indians is as revolting to me as it is to you, and probably much more so, for my impressions are not owing to a sudden excitement produced by a single case. I have seen large numbers of Indians here in Washington, where they came to express their complaints and their wishes. I have gone to visit them on their reservations and in the wilderness in order to study their needs, and there I have learned to appreciate their good traits, as well as their faults and their helplessness; and I am not ashamed to say that I have conceived for them the hearty sympathy of a personal friend. But that very friendship does not permit me to overlook the dangers and the interests of the many when a wrong done to a few is to be righted, and can be substantially righted without putting the rights of others in peril. When a man in my position has patiently, earnestly and laboriously studied the Indian problem, when day after day he has watched over the rights and interests of those helpless people as much as any one in his position before, spared no effort to better their condition and accomplished some things at least that promise to endure, he may consider himself entitled to something better than scurrilous abuse or injurious insinuations from decent men.
I deeply regret that an agitation like this appears to have brought about antagonism between those who ought to work harmoniously together for a common end. I do not desire to boast of anything. But when an effort is
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made to produce the impression as if this Department had during four years devoted itself principally to the business of oppressing the Poncas, I may be pardoned for mention ing some other ends it has endeavored to serve. If those who participate in this agitation will take the trouble to raise their eyes for a moment from that one case which alone they see in the whole Indian question, they would perceive that under this Administration many things have been done which deserve their hearty sympathy and cooperation; they would observe constant efforts to se cure by statute to the Indians the equal protection of the laws and an impregnable title to their lands and homes; they would notice practical measures, not merely to declare the Indian "a person" in theory, but to make him a person capable of taking care of himself, and of exercising and maintaining his rights; they would see the establishment of educational institutions which, although new, have already produced most promising results; they would see thousands of Indians but a short time ago vagrant and idle, now earning wages running into hun dreds of thousands of dollars as freighters ; they would see the organization of an Indian police which has not only been most efficacious in the maintenance of law and order, but also in producing a moral discipline, formerly unknown to them; they would see multitudes of Indians but a few years since on the warpath, now building houses and cultivating their farms in their simple way, and raising cattle and asking Congress for the white man's title to their lands ; they would notice the conspicuous absence of those scandals in the Indian service which at another period called forth so much complaint; they would see a general treatment of the Indians humane and progressive ; they would see the introduction of principles in our Indian policy which at a future day promise to work the solution of that difficult problem. I do not pretend that this is
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complete or perfect, but it is something; and every true friend of a just and sound Indian policy will rather en deavor to promote its development by sympathetic co operation than discredit and hamper it by unreasoning criticism and random attacks.
Certainly I do not deprecate criticism. When it is just, it is useful and welcome ; when it is unjust, it may injure the cause it is meant to serve. Needless disagree ments, preventing the cooperation for a good end of those who ought to work together, I should especially deplore in a community whose enlightened public spirit and active philanthropy have served so many noble causes and whose good opinion I therefore particularly value.
TO JAMES A. GARFIELD
WASHINGTON, Jan. 2, 1881.
Dear General : You invited me to write you my views on the situation, and I will do so without reserve.
You labor under certain disadvantages as compared with the present Administration, which you should not lose sight of. We came in under a cloud: a disputed Presidential title, hard times, the Republican party in discredit and discord. The Administration goes out with the record of purity and generally successful management ; the times are prosperous, the party strengthened morally and numerically. Your Administration will come in under a full blaze of sunshine: good times, a hopeful feeling throughout the country, the character of the party restored and its prospects brightened. We started on a bad state of things ; every improvement went to our credit. You start on a good state of things ; every failure to keep things in the present good condition, every untoward accident, will go to your discredit. Your task is the more difficult one and will require the more careful handling.
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We had much to gain, you have much to lose. That is what I mean in saying that you labor under a certain disadvantage.
Upon the success of your Administration will depend the future of the Republican party as well as your own. The two are in a certain sense identical. If you succeed, you should be and will be renominated. If you fail, the Republican party will succumb to the opposition in 1884. Any lowering of the present standard will be looked upon as a failure.
Your success in the best sense of the word will depend upon your management of the public business, not upon the management of party politics, or, at least, upon the latter only in a very small degree. It is now generally recognized that the Republican party in the last campaign was greatly strengthened by the character and success of the present Administration. Indeed, without these things victory would have been impossible. The success of the present Administration was owing exclusively to the conduct of the public business, for political management there was none. If wise political management can go hand in hand with a good conduct of the public business so much the better. But the latter should never be sub ordinated to the former. The idea that the former can make up for failures in the latter, will prove a disastrous delusion.
You want, therefore, in the first place, a good business Cabinet upon whose intelligence, integrity and energy you can depend. It is desirable that the party be kept har monious if that is possible, and that to this end the different elements composing the Republican party be properly respected. But it is of infinitely greater im portance that every member of your Cabinet give you, by his character and ability, the greatest possible assurance that in his hands the public interests committed to his
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care be perfectly safe. You will get along much better without harmony in the party than without a perfectly honest and intelligent management of the public affairs. When the former can be obtained only at the expense of the latter, it should be sacrificed without hesitation. It is a great mistake that an Administration cannot sustain itself and succeed in the best sense of the term without an harmonious party at its back. Our experience is that the friendship of certain elements in the party purchased at the price which it would have cost, would have been far more dangerous to our general success than their hostility proved to be. You will undoubtedly go through the same experience, and it will not injure you, if you realize and appreciate it early enough. An Administra tion faithfully serving the public interest will always be much stronger than any faction in the party, however strong and demonstrative, even if it appear like a majority of it.
Permit me to repeat some of the remarks I made in our conversation here. You should be perfectly sure not only of the ability and general character but also of the political motives of every one of your Cabinet Ministers.
Your Cabinet should be your Constitutional council, not an assemblage of agents of party leaders.
No member of your Cabinet should have reason to think that he owed his position to any other influence than your own free choice.
Especially at the head of the Treasury, the Interior, the Post-Office and the Department of Justice you should have men whom you can count upon to [serve] the public interest and [be] loyal to yourself under all circumstances, without being watched. They should also have the neces sary moral courage to say No on all proper occasions what ever pressure be brought upon them. They must be able to say -No for you, and even to oppose your own good-nature
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when necessity requires it. These are the Departments which manage the public service in all the branches that involve the moral and political character and the efficiency of the Administration at home. An unreliable man at the head of any one of them can do much mischief with out your becoming aware of it in time to prevent the consequences.
As to the Treasury, I fear you have lost your best opportunity. It has always been my opinion that Mr. Sherman ought to remain at the head of it, and that it will be almost impossible to find a man that can fill his place. The advantage of the confidence which his reten tion would have secured to your Administration, and of the ability he would have brought to the discharge of his duties would have far outweighed all the disadvantages possibly growing from the displeasure of some political leaders, which his presence in the Cabinet might have called forth. Of course, I do not know whether his re tention is still among the possibilities, but if it is, I would in your place not hesitate a moment between him and some second-rate man who would probably shine only by the contrast.
For the Postmaster-Generalship, which requires only an inferior kind of talent, a man of thoroughly sound character and business ability will be sufficient, but you should be able to depend upon him as a personal friend.
I have heard Wayne McVeagh mentioned in connection with the Department of Justice. In fact, you mentioned him yourself in your conversation here. I think he would be a good selection in every essential respect. He would also be a most excellent feature of your Cabinet in a social respect.
The Interior Department is the most dangerous branch of the public service. It is more exposed to corrupt influences and more subject to untoward accidents than
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any other. To keep it in good repute and to manage its business successfully requires on the part of its head a thorough knowledge of its machinery, untiring work and sleepless vigilance. I shall never forget the trials I had to go through during the first period of my Administration, and the mistakes that were made before I had things well in hand. It is a constant fight with the sharks that surround the Indian bureau, the General Land Office, the Pension Office and the Patent Office, and a ceaseless struggle with perplexing questions and situations, es pecially in the Indian service. Unless the head of the Interior Department well understands and performs his full duty, your Administration will be in constant danger of disgrace. Of all men that I know there is not one as well fitted for that place as General Walker, the present head of the Census Office. He has been Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and understands that business thoroughly. You cannot find a man better equipped for it. He possesses large acquirements, great working capacity and extensive knowledge of general affairs, great energy and firmness, and at the same time an excellent temper. His character is of the highest. If he were placed at the head of the Interior Department, I should consider you out of danger at the most delicate point. I have heard it said that he does not represent any political force. If he did not, in the party sense, I should scarcely consider it an objection; for a successful conduct in that branch of the business would soon be felt in itself as a political force.
But he would represent in your Cabinet the liberal Republican element in its best features, and his appoint ment would, I have no doubt, be hailed by a very large number of Republicans, and just those whose approval a man like you would most keenly appreciate, as a thing of good omen. I earnestly commend this to your attention.
The estimation in which your Administration will be
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held, will depend in a great measure upon the character of your Cabinet, and that character will be determined not only by the presence of some elements in it, but also by the conspicuous absence of others. I trust it is scarcely necessary to speak to you of such characters as Chaffee, Dorsey, Filley, Hitchcock etc. Any one of them con nected in any way with your Administration would sink it at once in public esteem.
I understand that efforts are being made to press upon you Mr. Bowman of Kentucky, as a Southern man. He has been for some time in the employment of this Depart ment as a Commissioner, and my experience leads me to the conclusion that he would by no means be a proper man to take into your official family. Also Mr. Routt of Colorado has been spoken of. He does not possess the necessary ability and I know that the support given him is only ostensible. Some of those who bring his name before you will privately tell you so, as they have told me.
But I do not know whether you desire to have my judgment of persons. If you do, command me, and I shall speak to you with entire frankness. On the whole, whatever you may think at present of the necessity of satisfying everybody and of avoiding unpleasant compli cations, I have no doubt before you are far advanced in your Administration, you will become convinced that the best policy is to make up your mind clearly as to what you want to accomplish for the public good, and then to select the best men you can find for that purpose and to go straight ahead without fear or favor. "A pound of pluck is worth a ton of luck. " It is pluck in the pursuit of good ends the people admire and they will stand by.
I have to apologize for the length of this letter, and perhaps also for the positiveness of its tone. But I have written you with entire frankness as one who means to be a true friend to you. I see the difficulties and dangers
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surrounding you and feel anxious about them. When I shall have returned to journalistic work to exercise an influence [on] public opinion, nothing will delight me more than to be able to carry on the business of criticism in the way of support and approval of your endeavors and achievements.
TO JAMES A. GARFIELD
WASHINGTON, Jan. 16, 1881.
Permit me now a few remarks of a general character in addition to my last letter. I hear that you are troubled by the "geographical question" in connection with the formation of your Cabinet. While it may seem desirable that the members of the Cabinet should be fairly distri buted in the geographical sense, this consideration appears, before the formation of the Cabinet, of far greater im portance than it will after the fait accompli. When the Cabinet is announced there always is a little grumble from this or that section or State, but it will soon die out. The only thing of real importance is that every member of the Cabinet be fit for his place, no matter from what part of the country he may come. If you succeed in making a Cabinet the individual fitness of whose members is conceded, the geographical grumble will amount to nothing and never give you any trouble. But if you sacrifice fitness to the geographical consideration and a member of your Cabinet turns out a failure, the people will scarcely accept the excuse that you selected a man of questionable fitness, or rejected a better man, merely for the purpose of gratifying a particular section of the
1 About Schurz's wish to appoint a Commissioner of Indian Affairs of such qualities that he would be retained by Garfi eld's Administration. See letter of Jan. 28, 1881.
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country. The judgment of public opinion will be that the public interest should have been considered as first in importance.
If, for instance, you should be inclined to consider the appointment of General Walker as Secretary of the Interior on account of his eminent fitness and as the most available representative of the "independent" element of the Republican party, the objection that he hails from New England would, as I think, be generally deemed of small consequence. It would be forgotten in a fortnight ; and you would have the benefit of his ability, experience and political connections thenceforward unquestioned.
Moreover, recent events make it more important than ever that you should have a good man belonging to the independent wing of the Republican party in your official family. It cannot have escaped you that if one-half of the "Republican scratcher's" vote in New York had gone to the Democrats, the election would have been lost. To be sure, the same may be said of "stalwart" elements. But there is this distinction to be made : while these stal warts have no place of abode except in the party and the offices are to them a matter of great consideration, the class of the independents I speak of deem it of far greater importance that the Government be well conducted than what set of men conducts it, and are therefore not un willing straightforwardly to oppose the party when they think it wrong. Besides, no man with open eyes will fail to observe that the general tendency is decidedly in the direction of independent politics, and that the independent element is therefore likely to grow steadily in strength. The feeling in favor of "a change, " after the Republican party had been in power for twenty years, was very strong, and it would have been almost irresistibly so, had the Administration during the last four years been more open to attack. That feeling in favor of "a change" will be
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still stronger when the Republican party has been twenty- four years in power, and it may become overwhelming if the conduct of the Government during the next four years presents vulnerable points or the Republican party renders itself in any way obnoxious to independent opinion. The Republican party will more than ever need the support of the independent element in order to main tain itself in power four years hence, and it can keep that support only by deserving it. That support will certainly be forfeited by any connivance with present and any relapse into old abuses.
One of the greatest dangers to the ascendancy of the Republican party consists in the evils of boss-rule. Look at New York to-day. Whatever some editors may say, there is no doubt that Mr. Platt's nomination for the Senate was dictated by Mr. Conkling, and if there were an election in that State to-morrow it is more than prob able that an overwhelming majority of the independent vote would go against the Republicans. At least I am so advised by persons who may be presumed to be well informed. In Pennsylvania there is an actual revolt. In regard to this matter your Administration will find itself in the same situation in which the present has been during the last four years. It will have to attract and keep attached to the party the elements which local poli tics are calculated to repel. It will have to do this by conducting the affairs of the Government in an irreproach able and generally acceptable manner, and also by keeping itself in living contact with the independent element. You will find it necessary to have somebody in your Cabinet who in this respect can do what I did during these four years: maintain active correspondence with those elements, explain to them things liable to be misunder stood, communicate their views and wishes to the head of the Government and so on. He should be a man
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understanding the independent element and enjoying their confidence. Walker possesses these important quali fications. He is a man of tact, also, as well as of sound principle. His administration of the Department would, I have no doubt, raise him in the general opinion of the country and be of great benefit to you. Compared with such considerations the geographical question would seem to amount to very little.
Let me call your attention to another point. The civil service reform movement started in the Democratic party is meant to be, and is, a serious thing. Pendleton believes in it and will honestly push it. Others will aid him from political motives. Some people laughed at it at first, but it will not be a thing to be laughed at as it goes on. It is probable that the men having the matter in hand will produce a sensible plan. They will have the sympathy and support of a constantly growing number of Republicans. The Republican party cannot afford to let this movement pass to the credit of the Democrats. If the Republicans in Congress are wise they will take it out of the hands of their opponents and carry it on them selves. If they do not do so in Congress, the Administra tion will have to do it alone, and to this end you will want at least one man in your official family who believes in it and understands it. Any return to old vicious methods will turn out to be fraught with very grave consequences as to the strength of the party.
I find an opinion expressed in some papers that the machine-victory in the Senatorial election in New York will be apt to secure to Conkling the control of the patron age in that State. It should have just the contrary effect. The control of the offices would strengthen Conkling in the management of the party organization, but it would inevitably drive away from the party a number of voters more than large enough to bring on its defeat as soon as
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the Democracy is reunited. Only your Administration can save New York and States similarly situated, by being and offering that which boss-rule is not. I trust you do not think of putting at the head of the Treasury a Wall street banker. It would be fatal. If you deem it necessary to give a place in your Cabinet to the Conkling- Grant wing of the party, no fairminded man in the country will find fault with you for selecting the person and the place yourself. If Conkling then quarrels with you, he will soon discover that he cannot afford to quarrel with two Republican Administrations in succession. It will be likely to prove a fatal blow to his influence even among the followers who so far have stood by him. You are entirely master of the situation. Only let your Administration be clean in character and able in its management of the public business, and the rest will in a great measure take care of itself. There are certain antagonisms which, I think, you cannot avoid. You will easily pass through them if the cleanness of your Admin istration in point of character and its ability secures the confidence of the country. Failure in that respect will be the only really dangerous thing.
P. S. The enclosed may amuse you as a specimen of the tricks of a shrewd wirepuller who wants to appear as a great man and to become your Postmaster-General.
TO JAMES A. GARFIELD
Jan. 28, 1 88 1.
Dear General: Your letter of the 2Oth inst. seems to indicate that you do not desire to give your assent in any manner that might be considered binding, to the appoint ment of Inspector Pollock as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, with the understanding that he should remain in place under your Administration. In suggesting his
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appointment I did, of course, not mean anything but that after the 4th of March he should have a full and fair chance to prove his efficiency. I recommended him knowing him, from my own official experience, to be in every essential respect well fitted for the place. I do not think that the appointment of Senator Bruce would be a fortunate one. The Commissioner ship of Indian Affairs requires a man of thorough business training and habits, indefatigable industry, quick judgment and great power of resistance. I fully recognize Senator Bruce's excellent qualities, but they are not such as would fit him for the perplexing and arduous duties of that office. He appears to be rather of an indolent disposition, and I am inclined to think he would soon feel very uncomfortable in the Indian Office, which is one of the most difficult and trying positions under the Government. However, if you desire to leave matters in statu quo until the 4th of March and then make new arrangements, I will drop it here, only repeating that you will need in the Interior Department and the Indian Office men of capacity, working energy, experience and great firmness of character, to guard your Administration against damaging accidents.
You ask me whether I do not think that Wayne Mc- Veagh would be a proper man to form the connecting link between your Administration and the independent element. I esteem Wayne McVeagh very highly, and my relations with him are those of warm personal friendship. I should be very happy to see him in your Cabinet, and I sincerely hope he will be there. His general correspon dence with the independent Republicans, however, would not be as intimate and confidential as it would be between them and General Walker.
But permit me to suggest that it would probably be an exceedingly good thing for your Administration to have both McVeagh and Walker in it. I cannot impress upon
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you too strongly the necessity of having in the Interior Department a man who can be depended upon to put that most vulnerable and dangerous point of the Administra tion in a condition of safety. With regard to this point, if I had the responsibility of constructing a Cabinet, the geographical would not have a feather's weight with me. Let me repeat that the geographical consideration appears of great importance only before the formation of the Cabinet, and perhaps one day after it, and is then never heard of again. General Grant had in his Cabinet at one time five men from the States east of the Alleghany mountains, a fact which was scarcely remembered at that time, and the only censure passed upon the Cabinet was that the men composing it were in some instances not the right kind of persons. Believe me, if your Secretary of the Interior is good, nobody will ask where he comes from a week after his appointment. If he turns out badly, it will not be taken as an excuse that he was selected for geographical reasons. I speak of this with so much warmth and urgency because I know the Interior Depart ment and all the difficulties and dangers connected with it ; because I have the policies successfully inaugurated in several of its branches very much at heart and would greatly deplore to see them spoiled, and because I am convinced, from personal observation and experience, that Walker is far better equipped for its business than any man so far mentioned in connection with it, in fact far better than any man I know.
As the Cabinet is the subject of frequent discussions here, I have now and then mentioned Walker's name, and in every instance the unanimous judgment was that his appointment would be almost too good a thing to hope for. I can only add that such an appointment would be hailed by every well-wisher of the Republic in general and your Administration in particular with the greatest satisfaction,
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while the appointment of any man of indifferent or doubt ful qualifications to so enormously difficult and responsible a position would be likely to become the cause of great regret to you.
Pardon this reiteration. My own interest in the matter is only that of an ordinary American citizen. Yours is that of the responsible head of the Government.
TO HENRY L. DAWES '
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, WASHINGTON, Feb. 7, 1881.
I have